Dynamics of Interorganizational Collaboration

DYNAMICS OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COLLABORATION:

SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DURING KOREA‘S TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIOLOGY

AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES

OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS

FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Jung-eun Lee

March 2010

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/

This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/vx731hw1935

ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Gi-Wook Shin, Primary Adviser

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Douglas McAdam, Co-Adviser

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Susan Olzak

Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost Graduate Education

This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives.

iii

Abstract This dissertation investigates the conditions under which alliances form between social movement organizations (SMOs). Although the positive role of cross-movement alliances has been highlighted during democratic transitions around the globe, the factors that increase alliances have not been clarified. I address this issue by examining the changing political and organizational environments in the Korean case. After an introductory chapter, Chapters 2 through 4 compare single, intra- movement, and inter-movement protests, with a particular focus on why collaborative protests (i.e., intra- and inter-movement protests) exhibit different patterns from single protests. My main argument is that both the external political environment represented by reform, repression, and elites‘ division and the internal organizational environment such as organizational structure and culture affect the likelihood of collaboration between SMOs. In Chapter 2, I show that single protests prevailed in both a relatively free political atmosphere (January - May 1980) and an extremely repressive context (May 1980 - 1983). The political freedom in early 1980 led to a larger protest wave than in the repressive period, but both periods seldom saw collaborative protests. In the former period, a lack of organizational capacity hampered collaborative protests. In the latter period, while underground activism based on an isolated network structure protected movements from repression, it hindered interorganizational collaboration and accelerated the radicalization of movements. Nonetheless, I argue in Chapter 3 that the onset of liberalization within an authoritarian regime revitalized the creation of above-ground SMOs, which increased collaborative protests between multiple SMOs. The reduction of authoritarian rule (1984 - 1987) provided more political opportunities for SMOs to protest. SMOs also sought alliances with opposition elites. These links tended to be temporary, but they increased the movements‘ public legitimacy and supplied material resources. Based on an increase of coalitions and organizational diversity, SMOs formed centralized networks that coordinated large-scale protests. SMOs enjoyed temporary ideological integration when radicals adopted mass-oriented strategies and agreed to seek a broad consensus around the goal of a direct presidential election.

Chapter 4 discusses the complexities of post-transitional changes (1987 - 1991). Institutionalization of movements by elites‘ increasing cooptation caused conflicts within coalitions, and the state blended reforms with repression as it retained authoritarian legacies. Despite these structural constraints, collaboration continued between SMOs. SMOs became realigned around the goal of reunification, which sustained the level of pre-transition protests but now based their appeal on nationalism. Formal coalitions and high organizational diversity contributed to this trend. However, the weakening of inter- movement coalitions coupled with increasing autonomy of other coalitions decentralized movement leadership. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War precipitated ideological differentiation among Korean activists and spurred the rise of new moderate movements. Chapter 5 deepens my analysis by further investigating the difference between single/intra-movement and inter-movement protests in terms of goal structure, and evaluating the role of organizational environments in protest types. Statistical results show that, reform and repression are more likely to affect inter-movement protests than single or intra-movement protests, while the division of elites fails to have an effect. Coalitions and organizational diversity positively affect all types of protests. The establishment of a strong alliance structure broadly empowers movements by providing a locus of organizational interactions and supports. My findings illustrate the particular sensitivity of inter-movement protests to broad reform-repression dynamics as well as the importance of forging coalitions and diversifying SMOs in the progress of the democracy movement. This dissertation contributes to theorizing the intersection of social movements and democratization by uncovering the time-variant trajectories of alliance formation in pre- and post-democratic transition periods. Adding to the importance of political environment, I stress the role of organizational environment in terms of organizational structure and culture. My focus on interorganizational collaboration in a transitional society improves the understanding of the longitudinal dynamics of protests in periods of contentious politics.

Acknowledgements First of all, I thank Gi-Wook Shin, my academic advisor and mentor, who guided me through the sociological training at Stanford. His profound insights and inspirations helped me grow in the field. He helped me overcome various obstacles in my academic progress and generously supported me. I also thank Doug McAdam, who never lost a smile on his face and encouraged my work at every opportunity. His detailed suggestions and thorough critique shaped my work to a considerable degree. In addition, I want to pay gratitude to Susan Olzak for her intelligent comments and questions, which sharpened my ideas and improved the quality of my work. Her sense of humor and warm encouragements gave me strength and energy. In the larger academic community, I thank Andy Walder, who taught me how to bring people and their minds into my analysis. His advice helped me combine my background as a student of history with sociological disciplines. Yumi Moon has been also helpful for the progress of my dissertation, encouraging me to think deeply about the potential implications and contributions of my work in Korean scholarship. I also thank Henning Hillmann, Paolo Parigi, and Sarah A. Soule, who have provided comments and suggestions at the Political Sociology, Social Movements and Collective Action Workshop. I want to express my gratefulness to the late Kie-chung Pang, my academic advisor in the master‘s program at Yonsei University, who showed me a model of a dedicated scholar. His vast knowledge of Korean history inspired me to contemplate the questions of Korea‘s past, present, and future. I give thanks to my family, relatives, friends and colleagues. I especially thank my mother, whose intelligence, Christian spirit, and wholeheartedness I greatly admire. Additionally, I will cherish the memories of the writing sessions with Hiroko Terasawa, who has been, and will be, a precious lifetime friend of mine. I had my daughter, Charlotte Yoonji, during my graduate years. I want to thank her for teaching me the joy of becoming a parent. Finally, I dedicate this work to my beloved husband, Jinkuk Choi. Since I first met him, he has been always supportive, patient, and full of love. Even when I lost confidence in myself, he never did. I thank him for being my better half, more than literally.

Table of Contents CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ...... 1

1-1: The Puzzle: Social Movements during Democratization ...... 1

1-2: Different Phases of Protests: From Authoritarianism to Democratization ...... 2

1-3: Theoretical Frameworks: Dynamics of Interorganizational Collaboration ...... 4

1-3-(1): Theories of Coalition: Costs and Benefits of Alliance Formation ...... 6

1-3-(2): Introducing a Comparative Approach: Differentiating Types of Protests..... 8

1-3-(3): Exploring the Mechanisms of Interorganizational Collaboration during Protests ...... 11

1-3-(4): Macro-Level Processes: Reform, Repression, and Elites‘ Division...... 16

1-3-(5): Meso-Level Processes: Organizational Structure and Culture ...... 21

1-3-(6): Arguments: the Impacts of the Macro- and Meso-Level Factors on Korea‘s Social Movements ...... 33

1-4: Data and Methods ...... 35

1-4-(1): Quantitative Datasets and Methods ...... 35

1-4-(2): Qualitative Data and Method...... 36

1-5: Contributions ...... 37

1-5-(1): Theoretical Contributions ...... 37

1-5-(2): Empirical Contributions ...... 38

1-5-(3): Korean Scholarship ...... 38

1-6: Organization of Dissertation ...... 40

CHAPTER 2. THE SEOUL SPRING AND MOVEMENTS IN ABEYANCE (1980 - 1983) ...... 41

2-1: Introduction ...... 41

2-2: Theoretical Framework ...... 42

2-2-(1): Macro-Level Political Environment ...... 42

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2-2-(2): Meso-Level Organizational Processes: Organizational Constraints ...... 44

2-3: Data and Methods ...... 47

2-4: Historical Context ...... 48

2-5: The Seoul Spring: A Surge of Protests (Period 1) ...... 50

2-5-(1): Political Opening, Opposition Elites, and Protests ...... 50

2-5-(2): Organizational Constraints ...... 53

2-6: Social Movements in Abeyance (Period 2) ...... 58

2-6-(1): Repression and Demobilization ...... 58

2-6-(2): Organizational Constraints: Abeyance Structure and Network Closure ..... 64

2-7. Conclusion ...... 77

CHAPTER 3. LIBERALIZATION AND THE GROWTH OF SOLIDARITY (1984 - June 1987) ...... 80

3-1: Introduction ...... 80

3-2: Theoretical Frameworks ...... 82

3-2-(1): Macro-level Political Environment ...... 82

3-2-(2): Meso-level Organizational Processes ...... 82

3-3: Overview ...... 84

3-4: Macro-Level Political Environment ...... 88

3-4-(1): Political Reforms and Repression ...... 88

3-4-(2): Elites‘ Division ...... 92

3-5: Meso-Level Organizational Processes ...... 97

3-5-(1): Organizational Infrastructure...... 97

3-5-(2): Organizational Diversity ...... 115

3-5-(3): Organizational Networks ...... 117

3-5-(4): Ideological Interpretation ...... 124

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3-6: Conclusion ...... 142

CHAPTER 4. AT A CROSSROAD: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION (JULY 1987 - 1992) ...... 145

4-1: Introduction ...... 145

4-2: Theoretical Frameworks ...... 148

4-2-(1): Macro-level Political Environment ...... 148

4-2-(2): Meso-level Organizational Processes ...... 150

4-3: Overview ...... 155

4-4: The Macro-Level Political Environment ...... 161

4-4-(1): Political Reforms and Repression ...... 161

4-4-(2): Alliance with Elites: A Double-Edged Sword ...... 180

4-5: The Meso-Level Organizational Mechanisms ...... 191

4-5-(1): Organizational Infrastructure...... 191

4-5-(2): Organizational Diversity ...... 200

4-5-(3): Organizational Networks ...... 206

4-5-(4): Ideological Interpretation ...... 216

4-6: Conclusion ...... 231

CHAPTER 5. INSULARITY OR SOLIDARITY?: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 236

5-1: Introduction ...... 236

5-2: Theory and Hypotheses ...... 237

5-2-(1): Protests and Goal Structure ...... 237

5-2-(2): Political Opportunity Structure...... 238

5-2-(3): Social Movement Sector ...... 240

5-3: Data, Variables, and Methodology ...... 241

5-3-(1): Data...... 241

5-3-(2): Dependent Variables ...... 242

5-3-(3): Independent Variables ...... 244

5-3-(4): Control Variables...... 245

5-3-(5): Methodology...... 246

5-4: Results ...... 247

5-5: Discussion and Conclusion...... 249

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION: THEORIZING POLITICAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND IDEOLOGIES IN TRANSITION ...... 254

6-1: Summary...... 254

6-2: Korea‘s Social Movements in the 1990s and Beyond ...... 260

6-3: Theoretical Implications and Contributions ...... 263

6-3-(1): Political Opportunity Structure of Democratic Transition ...... 263

6-3-(2): Organizational Dynamics: Organizational Structure and Culture ...... 265

Appendix A ...... 269

Appendix B ...... 285

Bibliography ...... 286

List of Tables

Table 2-1. Monthly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (Jan - May 1980) 54

Table 2-2. Types of Social Groups during Protests (Jan - May 1980) ...... 56

Table 2-3. Yearly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (June 1980 - 1983) 58

Table 2-4. Types of Social Groups during Protests (June 1980 - 1983) ...... 67

Table 3-1. Yearly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (1984 - June 1987) 86

Table 3-2. Types of Social Groups during Protests (1984 - June 1987) ...... 115

Table 4-1. Yearly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (July 1987 - 1991) ...... 160

Table 4-2. Types of Social Groups during Protests (July 1987 - 1991) ...... 200

Table 4-3. Network Density (1984 - 1992) ...... 210

Table 4-4. Normalized Betweenness Centrality for the Inter-movement Coalitions (1987, 1989, 1991) ...... 212

Table 5-1. Negative Binomial Regression on the Types of Protests (N=144) ...... 247

List of Figures

Figure 1-1. Macro- and Meso-Level Processes of Interorganizational Collaboration during Protests ...... 14

Figure 2-1. Monthly Frequency of Different Types of Protests (1980 - 1983) ...... 50

Figure 2-2. Monthly Percentage of Protests by Different Types (Jan - May 1980) ...... 55

Figure 3-1. Monthly Frequency of Different Types of Protests (1984 - June 1987) ...... 85

Figure 3-2. Monthly Percentage of Protests by Different Types (1984 - June 1987) ...... 86

Figure 3-3. Annual Frequency of Protests and Participants (1980 - 1987) ...... 87

Figure 3-4. Network Evolution (1984 - 1987) ...... 119

Figure 3-5. Spectrum of Ideological Orientation and Public Appeal (1984 - 1987) ...... 125

Figure 3-6. The Trajectory of the Student Movement: Ideological Camps and Organizations ...... 129

Figure 4-1. Comparison of Protest Patterns between Korea and Four Eastern European Countries ...... 156

Figure 4-2. Annual Frequency of Protests and Street Protest Ratio (1988 - 2007) ...... 157

Figure 4-3. Annual Frequency of Protests and Participants (1988 - 1992) ...... 158

Figure 4-4. Monthly Frequency of Different Types of Protests (July 1987 - 1991) ...... 159

Figure 4-5. Monthly Percentage of Protests by Different Types (July 1987 - 1991) ..... 159

Figure 4-6. Annual Number of the Prosecution Cases Based on the NSL and the ACAD ...... 174

Figure 4-7. Annual Number of Union Members, Unions, and Labor Disputes...... 176

Figure 4-8. Annual Foundings of Coalitions (1971 - 2002) ...... 203

Figure 4-9. Network Evolution (1988 - 1992) ...... 208

Figure 4-10. Network Comparison: 1987 vs. 1992...... 211

Figure 5-1. Annual Frequency of Protests (1980 - 1991) ...... 242

Figure 5-2. Annual Proportion of Protests (1980 - 1991) ...... 243

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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 1-1: The Puzzle: Social Movements during Democratization Democratization in the Third World has drawn considerable scholarly attention to the impact of democratic transitions on various actors. Whereas Western liberal democracies have been consolidated for a long period of time, a number of developing countries in the Third World underwent the processes of democratization in the late 20th century and are now consolidating their versions of political democracy.1 In studying these societies, scholars have emphasized that both elites and civil society contributed to democratization. On the one hand, a good amount of theoretical attention has been paid to elites who have successfully negotiated pacts regarding democratic transitions of power between different ruling blocs (O'Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and Burton 1989; Przeworski 1991; Marks 1992; Zhang 1994; Casper and Taylor 1996). On the other hand, civil society theorists emphasize civil society as a vehicle of democratization which challenges repressive states and exploitative market forces (Keane 1988; Gold 1990; White 1996; Silliman and Noble 1998).2 The role of social movements within the process of democratic transition has risen as an important research topic during the latter group‘s discussions on what constitutes civil society. Social movements are thought to be a crucial force that revitalizes civil society, which tends to be dormant during authoritarian rule (Cohen and Arato 1992; Gill 2000). As ―an effective threat of revolution is the spark that ignites the democratization process‖ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2005:36), the role of social movements has been recognized as a critical variable which leads to a democratic transition. The forces of opposition in authoritarian countries play an accelerating role in the process of democratization (Slater 2009).

1 The percentage of democratic countries in terms of installation of electoral procedures (e.g., free elections and multiparty system) increased from 27.5 % in 1974 to 46% in 1990 and to 61% in 1996 (Diamond 1997:xvi). 2 The concept of civil society has been widely discussed and its definition varies greatly. In the broadest sense, civil society is equivalent to the idea of democracy or citizenship (Seligman 1992). However, in a narrower definition, the notion of civil society is civic associational life (Persell, Green, and Gurevich 2001) and depends on self-organization of social relations that stand outside the state (Calhoun 2001). Thus, civil society is sustained by small groups which actively interact with one another and engage in civic activities (Fine and Harrington 2004). 1

Nevertheless, while the importance of social movements is recognized in the current democratization literature, more disagreement has arisen regarding the effects of the transition process on social movements. For instance, in Chile and Spain, democratization resulted in the institutionalization of social movements and the demobilization of political protests (Hipsher 1996). On the contrary, Poland and South Korea (hereafter Korea) continued to be marked by considerable political protests during democratization (Bond et al. 1997). Although social movements played a leading role in democratizing all these countries, in the aftermath of the democratic transition, they did not fare in the same way. Their different trajectories suggest an important puzzle: why do some movements remain active after democratization while others do not?

1-2: Different Phases of Protests: From Authoritarianism to Democratization In order to solve the stated puzzle, it is important to take a comparative historical view and look at how various modes of democratic transition are related with different levels of protests. To begin with, authoritarian regimes are generally associated with a lack of protests. Authoritarian regimes offer a unique political context to study protests (see Boudreau 1996; Osa 2003a; Wickham 2002; Schock 2004; Almeida 2008), as such regimes tend to outlaw free civic organizations, repress protests, and restrict the citizens‘ basic rights, whereas democratic states grant more political freedom and institutional channels to the citizens. In the early phase of authoritarianism, the state attempts to gain full control over the society and consolidate its power, which makes it autocratic or totalitarian in its rule. The use of force is maximized and the society is under the iron fist of the state authority. A number of countries in Latin America, Asia, and Africa went through this phrase of authoritarianism. It is important to note, however, that authoritarian regimes vary in the level of constraints they pose on the citizenry. Depending on the domestic and international conditions, the authoritarian state may decide to liberalize to some degree. Liberalization of an authoritarian regime offers significant political opportunities to social movements. With liberalization or relaxation of surveillance, social movement organizations (SMOs) and protests increase (Almeida 2008; Weiss 2005; Osa 2001; Pickvance 1999).

However, the consequence of liberalization may not always be positive. Liberalization could result in a transition to democracy, but it could be reversed to harsh repression. Such divergent paths provide an interesting comparative setting for a natural experiment where different patterns of protests might prevail depending on the changing political environments. On the one hand, after a period of liberalization, the state may return to the repressive phase, which is typically addressed as de-liberalization or de-democratization. The patterns of protests during this period have been inconsistent in the past empirical studies; in the case of El Salvador, radical, disorderly, and violent protests were likely to occur (Almeida 2008), while in the case of Minsk, Belarus, moderate tactics prevailed in the de-liberalization period (Titarenko et al. 2001). On the other hand, the state may launch a democratic transition. The transition process could be based on either elite-driven negotiations or mass-driven struggles. Usually, the former authoritarian leader steps down, and free democratic elections take place. The impact of a democratic transition on social movements will vary depending on the mode of transition. First, if mass revolutionary movements drive a democratic transition, more rapid and extensive reforms that show a clear break from the past authoritarian legacies will be introduced. This trend is shown in the case of the Carnation Revolution (Revolução dos Cravos) in Portugal, where the Armed Forces Movement continued for a long time after overthrowing an authoritarian leader (Bermeo 1986; Hammond 1988). The new government had a leftist agenda and supported grassroots political protests. In this context of a revolutionary transition, movements remained active and persistent. Second, democratization may be based on elite-centered negotiations: In Spain and Chile where authoritarian leaders retained considerable power during democratization, the popular movements rapidly demobilized after the state democratized (Hipsher 1996; Alvarez-Junco 1994). Hipsher (1996) states that movements demobilized because the democratic institutionalization narrowed the opportunities for disruptive protests, and the social movements deliberately avoided confrontations which could provoke the authoritarian elites to reverse the democratization process, as they still

maintained political influence after democratic transitions. Such a ―conservative‖ transition typically results in demobilization of social movements. In contrast, an establishment of a government led by the former opposition elites tends to be reform-oriented as seen in the case of Poland. The persistence of protests in Poland after the fall of a Leninist regime can be explained by the dominance of opposition elites after the political shift. Similar to the case of the Portuguese revolution, social movements remained an important political force instead of demobilization in the course of democratization. The comparison between ―conservative‖ and ―progressive‖ models suggests that the latter tends to cause more protests than the former after the transition. However, Korea does not exactly follow either model. Unlike Poland, the opposition elites failed to dominate the polity after the democratic transition. However, unlike Spain or Chile, Korea‘s social movements remained relatively active during the course of democratization. Why did Korea exhibit active protests despite its ―conservative‖ transition led by authoritarian elites? In order to answer this question, I highlight the importance of SMOs‘ ability to form alliances among themselves in Korea‘s transition from authoritarianism to democratization.

1-3: Theoretical Frameworks: Dynamics of Interorganizational Collaboration My primary research interest is in analyzing the mechanisms of interorganizational collaboration between different SMOs. Examining why and how interorganizational collaborations occur between SMOs is important at empirical, theoretical, and methodological levels. Empirically, scholars argue that collaborative protests and organizations have played a crucial role in advancing democratization around the world: umbrella organizations were created among different SMOs and contributed to the democratization process in Eastern Europe (Szabó 1994; Osa 2003b) as well as Latin America (Pérez 1997; Johnston and Almeida 2006; Almeida 2008). Likewise, Korea‘s path from authoritarianism to democratization involved multiple SMOs that established alliances through which mass protests were effectively coordinated (Chung 1996; Kim 2000). Various SMOs in different fields engaged in collaborative projects in order to bring democratization forward in the 1980s. Given that

ecumenical coalitions and collaborative protests have been observed in many cases of democratization, it is important to ask about the conditions under which they emerge and how they respond to the changing political environment. Theoretically, the mechanisms of interorganizational collaboration have seldom been analyzed or questioned in the study of social movements despite the importance of forging alliances between SMOs seen by the past empirical cases. My dissertation addresses this research gap by systematically analyzing the processes of interorganizational collaboration, a point which I will elaborate further in this chapter. Methodologically, the study of interorganizational alliance is a relatively new and underdeveloped field in social movement scholarship. For example, ―protest event analysis,‖ which ―systematically map(s), analyze(s), and interpret(s) the occurrence and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis,‖ has been established as one of the most dominant methods in the field of social movements (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). However, in a typical protest event analysis, each protest event equally counts as one event, regardless of the different patterns of alliance within an event. In other words, social movement scholars have tended to analyze protests without paying attention to how SMOs are aligned within each protest event. This predominant tendency of ―lumping‖ different types of protests obviously shows a lack of research interest in alliance formation between movements. My dissertation deals with this methodological problem by distinguishing different types of alliance and non- alliance events. This dissertation thus provides a novel perspective to the extant literature based on protest event analysis. Furthermore, the existing theory of inter-movement alliance does not offer a satisfactory explanation for the Korean case. In the case of Philippines, the Catholic Church took a strong cultural/religious hegemony and led prodemocracy protests that involved various social groups (Thompson 1995). In a recent study of democratic protests in Southeast Asia, hegemonic religious leadership is theorized to be one of the most important cultural factors that facilitate successful democracy movements by providing a locus of solidarity (Slater 2009). However, Korea did not enjoy any cultural hegemony dominated by a single religious group like in Philippines. According to Slater‘s observation, prodemocracy struggles without clear cultural hegemony and unity in

opposition camps tend to fail (e.g., Vietnam). Nevertheless, Korea enjoyed successful democratic mobilization and democratization without such hegemony. Korea is indeed a puzzling case from this standpoint. Therefore, investigating why alliances across cultural boundaries were possible during an authoritarian period in Korea is an important theoretical contribution to current literature. In this dissertation, I will engage in existing debates about interorganizational collaboration and reformulate the theoretical frameworks in order to explain the variations in a transitional context. By taking on the task of analyzing the mechanisms of alliance formation in Korea‘s social movements, I contribute to broadening the current sociological perspectives about interorganizational collaboration through a systematic investigation over alliance-building processes.

1-3-(1): Theories of Coalition: Costs and Benefits of Alliance Formation Various social movements around the globe have witnessed the efficacy of creating a strong collaborative basis in order to successfully coordinate collaborative protests between SMOs. Interorganizational collaborations among different SMOs in different fields are rapidly increasing in the form of transnational activism in the globalizing era (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Bandy and Smith 2005; Dufour and Giraud 2007). Such broad alliance clearly has benefits: since social movement actors do not have access to resources and constituencies enjoyed by institutional actors, they can create ―an alternative system of resources‖ through ties among themselves (Rosenthal et al. 1985:1052). When a number of groups cooperate and present a united front, political influence is enhanced (Hathaway and Meyer 1997). Diverse coalitions can pressure several political fronts (McAdam 1999 [1982]). Moreover, the visibility of collaborative protests or coalition organizations enhances their efficacy (Meyer 2007:75). A broad alliance may mobilize a wide range of people and tactics (Meyer and Corrigall- Brown 2005). SMOs can overcome their powerlessness through building a broad alliance that could influence domestic politics, or even global politics (Smith 2005). Simply put, there is power in collaboration. In contrast to the benefits, the coalition literature also emphasizes several costs in forming alliance among different SMOs. One of the central problems in the alliance

formation arises with regard to the issue of organizational identity or goals. Coalitions among various SMOs risk diluting each organization‘s identity, as coalitions‘ goals often diverge from the organization-specific goals (Zuckerman and Rottmann 2003; Jasper 2006:127; Obach 2004:23; Meyer 2007:75; Mische 2007). Alliances can visibly link SMOs with unreliable or tainted allies (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005), which could harm the SMOs‘ reputation. Thus, alliance could create tensions and competition for resources between the participating SMOs (Kleidman and Rochon 1997; Hathaway and Meyer 1997). Managing alliances requires tremendous work especially when the movement has to mediate between moderate and radical flanks, who often disagree with ideology, goals, and tactics, within the alliance (Heaney and Rojas 2008). In a similar vein, from the perspective of organizational ecology, the SMOs with heterogeneous identities are less likely to survive in the long term than those with a homogeneous identity, which shows the difficulty in maintaining interorganizational alliances (Carroll and Huo 1988). Rensburg (1996:238-39) also argues that the SMOs with specifically defined interests and agendas are more likely to survive the political shift than those that address diverse interests and pursue an expansive change agenda. Another cost involved in creating alliances is that the increased visibility of a movement can put it at a greater risk of being repressed by an authoritarian or autocratic regime. This issue largely has been overlooked by the coalition literature, due to its focus on stable Western liberal democracies. Indeed, forming alliances poses a serious dilemma to the SMOs in an authoritarian context: coalitions may be likely to attract media attention and support from the public due to this visibility, but will simultaneously invite repression from the authoritarian state. In the case of Korea, the creation of coalitions often resulted in organizational repression. For instance, the Council of Movement for People and Democracy (minjuhwa ch’ujin hyŏbŭihoe: minch’uhyŏp), which was one of the major coalitions in the 1980s, tried to open an office in Seoul in 1984. However, it was very difficult for them to just move in to their office due to the repression. The door was locked when the activists tried to get inside, and the furniture was frequently moved outside the office overnight (S.D. Jeong 2007). As seen in this example, creating and maintaining alliances is likely to be high-risk in authoritarian contexts.

The theories of coalition have summarized the costs and benefits involved in alliance formation. However, they remain silent about the utility of alliance by suggesting that creating coalitions can be both good and bad because of the complex interorganizational interactions. Scholars have tried to resolve this dilemma by looking for the ways in which mutual differences can be managed between SMOs at the interpersonal level from the perspective of activists (Beamish and Luebbers 2009). For instance, a study notes that those who are involved in the coalition building process should recognize ―individuals‘ experiential differences and identities,‖ ―conduct honest appraisal of how privilege…is played out in the specific relationship or alliance,‖ and ―find a common ground‖ (Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001:9-10). However, this solution is not unique to the issue of interorganizational collaboration because the same scheme can be applied to movement participation at the micro/individual level. Such an approach does not add any substantive knowledge to the existing body of research on protests. I argue that it is more useful to investigate the conditions under which the benefit of alliance formation may outweigh its cost, or vice versa (see Poloni-Staudinger 2009). Focusing on the conditions for alliance-building, I contextualize this question at the levels of broader political and organizational environments that lead to interorganizational collaboration. In other words, what are the macro- and meso-level variables that inhibit or facilitate interorganizational collaboration? Previous studies have not examined this crucial question of external and internal conditions under which the calculations of cost and benefit may change depending on political contexts. In this dissertation, I address this theoretical question of the likelihood of interorganizational collaboration in changing political (macro-level) and organizational (meso-level) environments. Since the case of Korea‘s democratic transition offers a setting for a quasi- natural experiment to compare different political environments, investigating the case will help answer the stated research question.

1-3-(2): Introducing a Comparative Approach: Differentiating Types of Protests Given the costs and benefits in forming alliance between SMOs, SMOs vary with respect to involvement in collaboration with other organizations. However, the coalition literature rarely examines alliances as opposed to isolated movements. The absence of a

comparative approach is problematic since movements consist of different types of protests. My research is set out to analyze the conditions for three types of protests: single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests. By single protest, I mean a protest by an individual SMO which focuses a distinctive set of goals based on a distinct membership base. For example, feminist SMOs, labor unions, and university student associations are all individual SMOs. Coalitions composed of two or more SMOs are the opposite of individual SMOs. I differentiate between single protests and collaborative protests which involve two or more SMOs. Furthermore, collaborative protests are composed of two distinct categories: I define intra-movement protest as a protest involving two or more SMOs that belong to the same social movement industry (e.g., students in college A wage a protest in collaboration with college B). I define inter-movement protest as a protest involving two or more SMOs that belong to different industries (e.g., students, Christians, and workers have a joint rally). I distinguish between intra-movement protest and inter- movement protest because they require different types of ―coalition work‖ (Staggenborg 1986) since the former is more likely to share common goals than the latter. In particular, note that protests do not have to be organized by more than one SMO in order to be treated as collaborative protests. Both intra- and inter-movement protests may be organized by one SMO if the SMO wages the protest for the purpose of supporting a different SMO or protest. For instance, if a student SMO organizes a protest in order to support a previous strike by a labor union, this counts as an inter-movement protest. In the same way, if a student SMO launches a demonstration for the purpose of supporting a previous protest by a different student SMO, this incident counts as an intra- movement protest. This broad view can capture how different SMOs make various levels of collaborative efforts even when they do not necessarily participate in one protest together, as long as they ―deliberately seek to support each other‖ (Rucht 2004:202). My focus on collaborative protests is important because alliance has often been reduced to a type of organization rather than a collaborative action in the coalition literature (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Heaney and Rojas 2008; Obach 2004; Rose 2000). The scholars tend to study coalition organizations as a ―dependent‖ variable without investigating the tasks they perform. However, SMOs are ―mobilizing structures‖

(McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996)—the vehicles of mobilization—that could produce protests. While building SMOs may imply potential power of a movement, ―the real test for the movement comes at the actual protest site where all involved see how many are willing to take the risks associated with challenging authority‖ (Hirsch 1990:245). Without protest activities that justify SMOs‘ commitment to activism, SMOs are never fully functioning. Mindful of this assumption, I argue that coalitions should be studied as an ―independent‖ variable because they are one of the most important mobilizing structures (see Van Dyke 2003). Thus, I deliberately distinguish between ―coalition‖ as a formal organization and ―collaborative protest‖ (i.e., intra- and inter-movement protest) as a collective action. A coalition cannot prove itself as a successful vehicle of mobilization unless it leads to collaborative protests. Of course coalitions are generally created for a specific purpose of mobilizing a large scale protest involving multiple individual SMOs, but the actualization of a collaborative protest is the process by which the power of movement is demonstrated in public. As Klandermans (1993:388) points out, ―the stronger and more extended a movements‘ alliance system, the higher the proportion of the mobilization potential that will participate.‖ Collaborative protests demonstrate the power of movement in terms of both the scale of mobilization and the diversity within the social movement sector.3 Collaborative protests are the very ones that create a protest wave, which isolated movements cannot achieve (Osa 2003b:105). The ability to organize large-scale collaborative protests is more likely than isolated protests to signal to authorities that the support of the movement is rising and concessions should be given. Particularly in the context of democratization, movements can retain their vitality when a broad alliance within and beyond social movements‘ boundaries develops before democratization. In the case of Korea, inter-movement protests were crucial in bringing about democratic transition in the 1980s. Korean scholars have pointed out that the June

3 McCarthy and Zald (1977) developed the concept of social movement sector (SMS) along with social movement industry (SMI) and social movement organization (SMO) based on the resource mobilization theory, and I use their definitions in this research. They provide the definitions of the terms as follows: SMO is ―a complex, or formal, organization which identifies its goal with the preferences of a social movement or a countermovement and attempts to implement those goals.‖ SMI is constituted by ―all SMOs that have as their goal the attainment of the broadest preferences of a social movement.‖ Lastly, SMS ―consists of all SMIs in a society.‖ 10

uprising in 1987 was a result of a broad alliance across the social movement sector which succeeded in mobilizing millions of protestors (Kim 2000). The massive scale of protests pressured the authoritarian government to promise democratic reforms and legalize direct presidential election. Given the critical role of alliance in the course of democratization in Korea, it is important to investigate the conditions under which collaboration increases between SMOs.

1-3-(3): Exploring the Mechanisms of Interorganizational Collaboration during Protests This dissertation investigates the conditions under which interorganizational collaboration occurs between SMOs in comparison with isolated movements. The current social movement theories shed light on which factors may influence the likelihood of intra- and inter-movement protests. I intend to build my theoretical framework upon the political process theory which emphasizes the role of political opportunity structure (POS) (McAdam 1999 [1982]; Tarrow 1998b), resource mobilization (RM) theory (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983), and collective identity theory (Gamson 1996; Polletta and Jasper 2001), by reformulating them in the context of Korea‘s transition to democracy. My research scope includes the conditions that affect interorganizational collaboration represented by intra- and inter-movement protests at the macro- and meso- levels, rather than the micro-individual level. The macro-level variables are the factors that are external to social movements, including the state and the composition of elites. This external political environment where social movements operate, conceptualized often as the ―polity‖ (Tilly 1978), is important in understanding the ebb and flow of interorganizational collaboration. According to the political process model, the relationship between social movements and the POS is central to understanding the dynamics of social movements. The premise of the model is that movements are embedded in the POS, which renders the movements subject to the influences from the POS. Tarrow (1998b:81) asserts that social movements are more closely related to the available political opportunities for collective action than to social or economic structures. The nature of the POS is important to social movements, as the POS affects the cycles of protest (Meyer 1993), organizational forms, or strategies (Meyer and Minkoff 2004).

Moreover, the POS mediates between social movements and their success (Kitschelt 1986; Amenta and Zylan 1992; Kriesi et al. 1995). SMOs react to the external stimuli from the political environment by carrying out levels of protest activities and various organizational tasks (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996). The macro-political conditions for movements such as reform, repression, and the composition of elites are often highlighted in this model (McAdam et al. 1996). In order to examine the effects of the POS, I analyze how political reform, repression, and the composition of elites influence interorganizational collaboration during protests. In addition to the role of the POS, I focus on the role of SMOs in organizing protests. Drawing from the RM theory, I define meso-level processes as the interactions between SMOs in the organizational environment (i.e., social movement sector). Social movements are embedded in multi-organizational fields that are composed of a variety of SMOs with different goals, strategies, and constituencies. Multi-organizational fields ―operate significantly in the emergence and maintenance of protest organizations‖ (Curtis and Zurcher 1973:54). In addition to the impacts of external environment on movements, organizational processes shape the patterns of protests. Although the importance of SMOs has been widely acknowledged in the tradition of the RM theory (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983), the organizational processes at the level of social movement sector that affect alliance formation have been relatively less theorized (Larson and Soule 2009:294). The problem in the coalition literature is that it tends to focus on explaining the organizational processes that lead to individual SMOs‘ decision to make coalitions between themselves (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Heaney and Rojas 2008; Obach 2004; Rose 2000) and does not go beyond the level of individual organizations. Also, the literature focuses almost exclusively on how a coalition is organized, thereby ignoring whether the coalition succeeds in mobilizing collaborative protests. Perhaps more problematic is that little is known about the cultural mechanisms by which collaborative protests are organized between different SMOs. Traditionally, the paradigms of both the political process and the RM perspectives have shown difficulties in accommodating cultural variables in the study of social movements because of their ―structuralist‖ bias (Zald 2000; Goodwin and Jasper 2003a; Polletta 1999). The ―internal

characteristics or dynamics of the movements themselves‖ (Aminzade and McAdam 2001:14) often have been overlooked in these theories, and ―the ways in which strategic choices are made‖ (Goodwin and Jasper 2003b:viii) seldom have been understood. Scholars point out that the model often treats culture as ―secondary‖ in its importance for studying movements (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008:74). In order to bridge this research gap, social movement scholars have shown growing interest in studying collective identity as a way to correct bias in the field (Polletta and Jasper 2001). Therefore, they emphasize that participating in social movements generates collective identity shared among the members and empowers SMOs (Gamson 1996; Armstrong 2002), which shows that strong cultural processes are at play. SMOs also play an important role in facilitating the formation of collective identity, since they not only mobilize resources but also engender ―collective identities on a larger scale than [the participants] would otherwise obtain‖ (Gould 1995:18). However, the literature has not explored the cultural dilemma associated with collective identity in terms of forming alliances between SMOs. Development of a strong collective identity creates a sharp distinction between ―us‖ and ―them,‖ which raises the chances of inter-organizational hostility (Saunders 2008). Forming alliances among different SMOs inherently raises the possibility of such conflicts. A strong focus on exclusive group identity may discourage coalition building (Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001). The problem becomes exacerbated when the participant SMOs fall into severe ideological conflicts, which may hinder collective action or even end up in organizational dissolution. Nonetheless, despite how serious this problem can be, the role of ideology in establishing alliances across SMOs has not been investigated. Therefore, in my view, the current literature falls short of both 1) clarifying the mechanisms of alliance-building processes by which collaborative actions occur via organizational structure, and 2) illuminating the cultural mechanisms with regard to the role of collective identity based on ideology that lead to interorganizational collaboration. I address these theoretical issues by studying the dynamic relationships among SMOs in a broad social movement sector. Specifically, I focus on the four dimensions of the organizational processes, in terms of both organizational structure and culture, which lead

to collaborative protests: organizational infrastructure, diversity, networks, and ideological interpretation.

Figure 1-1. Macro- and Meso-Level Processes of Interorganizational Collaboration during Protests

State Reform Repression & Elites

Elites‘ Division

Organizational Organizational Organizational Structure Infrastructure Diversity

Organizational Networks

Organizational Ideological Culture Interpretation

Interorganizational Collaboration

Figure 1-1 maps the processes by which the macro- and meso-level variables jointly affect interorganizational collaboration (i.e., intra- and inter-movement protests). The model includes feedback loops, representing the protest mobilization as an ongoing process. The macro-level political environment represented by reform, repression, and elites‘ division shapes general conditions for protests. I conceptualize reform, repression, 14

and elites‘ division as an interrelated political process which broadly conditions the prospect for protests. Here, one caveat is that the impacts of these variables will vary with the changes in the political contexts (i.e., the transition from authoritarianism to democratization), which requires more scholarly scrutiny and historical perspectives. I will provide more nuanced explanations about how the contexts may shift over time and how they affect political environment later in this chapter. Furthermore, while broad political environment shapes the general condition for protests, it does not directly lead to protests unless it is mediated by organization-level processes in terms of both organizational structure and culture. I agree with Soule (2009, 48-49) that internal and external factors have joint and mediated effects on the emergence of protests and protest outcomes. I contend that the degrees of organizational infrastructure, diversity, networks, and ideological interpretation variably affect the likelihood of collaborative protests. Organizational infrastructure, diversity, and networks constitute the dimension of organizational structure. First, strong organizational infrastructure including individual SMOs and coalitions can effectively coordinate collective action. Second, at the same time, increasing diversity of SMOs contributes to enlarging the pool of potential alliance partners that come from a wide variety of social movement industries. Organizational infrastructure and diversity reinforce each other. Third, dense organizational networks form between the SMOs when coalitions successfully bridge diverse organizations. Especially, the creation of functional coalitions reshapes the structure of SMOs‘ networks by providing new centers for alliance-building, which has implications for the power dynamics between SMOs. Moreover, different forms of network structure may reciprocally affect member SMOs‘ relationships within coalitions and influence the level of organizational diversity during protests. Finally, such organizational structure is mediated by organizational culture, and I focus on the role of ideology. Different ideological groups interpret the political conditions for protests based on distinct collective identities shaped by ideological principles, which affects their propensity to join alliances. The level of consensus based on ideological interpretation (i.e., ideological affinity) of each SMO regarding the

external environment as well as its organizational goals and tactics will determine the extent to which the SMO joins collaborative protests. Further, I emphasize the interplay between organizational structure and cultural process in Figure 1-1, as culture also affects organizational structure in turn. Cultural process is not only an interpretative tool by which SMOs make decisions about protest participation, but also shapes SMOs‘ goals and tactics, which directs how they form relationships between one another. Therefore, I assume that organizational structure and culture interact with each other in shaping the likelihood of collaborative protests. In this dissertation, I will lay out the theoretical perspectives related to the two sets of factors—political environment and organizational processes—and explain their relevance to understanding collaborative protests. By analyzing the macro- and meso- level dimensions for protests, I attempt to emphasize the interactive nature of the complex processes that lead to interorganizational collaboration. I discuss each variable in greater depth below.

1-3-(4): Macro-Level Processes: Reform, Repression, and Elites’ Division Political Reform and Repression Operationalization of the various aspects of the POS has been a challenge to social movement scholars (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). The inclusiveness of the concept has allowed itself to become an amorphous ―catchall‖ category rather than an analytically precise and useful concept. In order to make the best use of the concept, it is necessary to revisit the classical premise of the political process model which emphasizes that political opportunities and constraints are intertwined in terms of their relative effects on protests (Tilly 1978). Such a theoretical notion still challenges social movement scholars in their analysis of how formal rule and policy changes affect political access and movements (Meyer and Minkoff 2004:1467), since social movement activists consciously measure and respond to changes in the broader political climate, exploiting favorable shifts. Moreover, it is imperative to acknowledge that the impacts of macro-political conditions vary considerably across historical and political contexts. Therefore, I focus on the dimension of the broad political environment by examining the reform-repression dynamics as the crucial basis of the POS.

Previous theories about the impact of reform and repression on protests have been inconclusive. First, in terms of reforms, a shift from a highly repressive to a more relaxed political atmosphere signals to social movement activists that they should seize the moment. A reform-oriented stance taken by the state could encourage protests (Olzak, Beasley, and Olivier 2003:40). In contrast, increasing institutional access could dampen social movements, as the state performs the functions which used to be performed by social movements. In such cases, the state fragments, co-opts, and weakens social movements through the process of institutionalization (Meyer 1993; Koopmans 1993; Piven and Cloward 1977). When alternative political venues open up, coalitions could break up (Vasi and Strang 2009:1754). Second, repression has traditionally been linked to the closing of political opportunities, which contributes to social movements‘ loss of vitality (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978). If the severity of repression scares people away and takes resources away from social movements, protests will not occur (Oberschall 1973; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Tilly 1978). However, an increase in state repression does not necessarily undermine protests (Morris 1984). For instance, some empirical studies have found that repression can become a critical motive to mobilize (Olivier 1990; Khawaja 1993; Francisco 1995; Olzak and Olivier 1998; Jenkins, Jacobs, and Agnone 2003; Chang 2008). Additionally, different forms of repression have differential effects on protest (Koopmans 1997). The paradox of reform-repression dynamics demonstrates that the extent to which the changing political opportunities influence protests varies according to the political contexts in which the movements are placed. The same logic applies to SMOs‘ collaboration. The current social movement literature, however, remains rather suggestive on the conditions under which alliance is facilitated and tends to emphasize activists‘ subjective interpretations. Some argue that the sense of crises or threats will increase inter-movement alliance (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005). On the contrary, one study suggests that coalitions tend to form when the anticipation of success increases (Zald and Ash 1966). Taking a broader view, I intend to investigate the conditions of alliance formation at the level of political regime transformation, assuming that activists‘ perceptions will change depending on the actual

shifts in their external political environment. I attempt to specify the broader external conditions which affect the chances of interorganizational collaboration. By analyzing a longitudinal data, I examine how different stages of regime transformations affect social movements. The combinations of political reforms and repression associated with each stage of regime transformations will bear differential effects on the frequencies of overall protests, as ―the particular constellation of opportunity and threat shapes the form of mass contention‖ (Almeida 2008:14). First, I argue that extreme repression and a lack of reforms dampens protests in general. This period of ―total‖ repression will prevent both intra- and inter-movement protests from occurring, while sporadically allowing a small number of single protests. The risk and cost associated with dissent prevent people from engaging in collective action (Muller and Weede 1990). After a massacre perpetrated by the state in 1980, the Korean government tightened its grip over the society, which severely contracted civic associational activities. With a lack of organizational bases, I expect that SMOs rarely engaged in collaborative protests. Second, a relaxation of repression under authoritarian settings, which I call ―liberalization,‖ will boost the frequency of overall protests and begin to increase both intra- and inter-movement protests by allowing associational activities. Liberalization tends to be limited in its scope, but is known to increase protests (Almeida 2008; Pickvance 1999). Semi-authoritarian regimes may be as brutal as autocratic ones when they react to dissent (Carey 2009), but allowing above-ground SMOs in Korea in the mid-1980s revived protests and interorganizational interactions. Even though the level of repression did not go down substantially since the society was still controlled by the authoritarian system, I expect that political openings facilitated collaborative protests compared to the earlier period. Finally, after a democratic transition, institutional and electoral politics become invigorated and civic organizational activities are revitalized, as seen in other empirical cases of democratization (Kaufman and Alfonso 1997; Szabó 1994). However, democratization may not necessarily increase political opportunities for protests, contrary to what is argued by the classical political process model. The model predicts that political openings will lead to more protest activities (Eisinger 1973), but democratization

is a very distinct type of political opening which fundamentally changes political structure in a given country. For instance, scholars find that demobilization typically happens after a democratic transition with increasing access to institutional channels (Foweraker 1995; Almeida and Johnston 2006). According to the existing theory of democratization, I expect to find a tendency towards demobilization in the Korean context. Compared to the period of liberalization in an authoritarian regime, the phase of democratization will see a decline of overall protests. However, despite demobilization, I also expect that organization-level variables play a mediating role in sustaining collaborative protests to a considerable degree. Since the new democratizing regime in Korea was a blend of authoritarian practices and democratic reforms, I maintain that collaborative protests still occurred frequently in order to criticize authoritarian practices and implement democratization. Based on the previous organizational bases and the addition of new SMOs, I argue that collaborative protests remained as one of the most important protest strategies even after the democratic transition, even though general level of protests remains lower than in the pre- transition period.

Elites‘ Division According to the political process theory, division among elites is one of the important political opportunities that potentially increases protests (Tarrow 1998b; McAdam 1999 [1982]; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977). When elites are divided into different political platforms, the presence of elites who support social movements can be beneficial to protests. Alliance with elites may be a valuable asset to the social movement sector, as they have material resources as well as authority or legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Elites can mean many different groups, such as intellectuals or political elites, but the elites in the social movement literature usually refer to the political elites within institutional politics (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1999 [1982]; Jenkins et al. 2003). However, not all politicians consider an alliance with movements as a viable option. For instance, the government party politicians are likely to view social movements as challengers to routine politics rather than partners (Kriesi et al. 1995). Thus, I focus on the opposition

elites: the politicians who belong to the opposition parties. Opposition elites might encourage protests as seen in the case of the African-American protests in the United States (Minkoff 1997). In past studies, opposition elites or parties that are excluded from electoral politics under authoritarianism have been viewed beneficial to movements. The existence of strong ―communal elites‖ who retain cultural hegemony under authoritarianism and are in opposition to the authoritarian regime is known to trigger democratic mobilization (Slater 2009). Opposition political parties are known to take up the demands of social movements under repressive regimes (Almeida 2003). They might play a quasi-activist role in the extra-institutional arena when their entrance to the polity is severely restrained by the authoritarian political structure. When the opposition elites support social movements, they could bring in resources and power that social movement activists cannot afford. To what extent, however, are opposition elites reliable as allies? Although many studies have viewed opposition elites in a positive light, opposition elites may not be as trustworthy as they seem. The bottom line is that political elites should not be conceptualized the same as activists when they sympathize with and even participate in social movements (Caniglia 2001). The primary goal of the opposition elites is to control and dominate institutional politics, whereas movement activists generally aim at social change which is likely to disrupt the status quo. Therefore, when opposition elites gain standing in the polity, their electoral advances could make the environment less open to protest (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). The close ties that movements have with opposition elites could make the movements follow the elites‘ decision about abstaining from protests (e.g., Spain, Chile) (Hipsher 1998). Thus, the congressional strength of the opposition parties might negatively affect movements‘ vitality (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Diani 1998; Larson and Soule 2009).4 I expect that establishing ties between elites and movements can be beneficial to movements under authoritarianism, but becomes a liability during democratization.

4 When strong protests occur, reform-minded elites could take advantage of the political opening to push forward political reforms, which social movement actors are not capable of carrying out by themselves (Tarrow 1998b). Such a progressive stance could help realize social movements‘ goals in the policy making arena. Thus, opposition elites‘ entrance to electoral politics will have a positive impact on reforms. However, their appropriation of movement goals will weaken the power of social movements in the extra- institutional arena. 20

During an authoritarian era, opposition elites are not allowed to participate fully in electoral politics. Thus, they tend to support movements as long as the movements‘ goals resonate with their own, which is to overthrow the incumbent regime, and if movement tactics stay within acceptable—generally nonviolent—boundaries. However, after the democratic transition, opposition elites tend to withdraw their support for movements as they become more entrenched within electoral politics. They focus more on using legal/institutional means to resolve social problems and political conflicts, rather than resorting to extra-parliamentary protests. Given this shift of strategies, the linkages formed between elites and movements before the transition will not increase protests. Moreover, political parties could reinforce ―the isolation and fragmentation of grassroots movements‖ (Mainwaring 1987:147) during democratization. I expect that the ties between them will be used to fragment SMOs as opposition elites coopt movements by recruiting party members from movement leaders in order to utilize their prodemocracy credentials as political leverage against their rival conservative parties. The extent to which cooptation occurs during democratization depends on the degree of elite-movement ties. Thus, the SMOs which have the strongest ties with opposition elites will be mostly likely to be coopted. Considering the ambiguity of opposition elites‘ role in movements in the course of regime transformations, I define opposition elites as ambivalent allies to SMOs. Thus, elites‘ division caused by opposition elites‘ entrance to institutional politics will not have a consistent, sustainable impact on protests. Opposition elites will oscillate between institutional politics and movements based on their shifting political calculus, which is shaped by the power dynamics among elites in changing political contexts. Their changing political strategies will significantly affect SMOs and their ability to mobilize protests.

1-3-(5): Meso-Level Processes: Organizational Structure and Culture Granted that political environment may affect the likelihood of interorganizational collaboration, organizational mechanisms are equally important (Ansell 2001:36). Building on the RM theory and the cultural perspective, I argue that the following indicators of meso-level organizational processes in the social movement sector increase

the likelihood of collaborative protests: organizational infrastructure, organizational diversity, organizational networks, and ideological interpretation. Organizational infrastructure, diversity, and networks represent the dimension of organizational structure in the social movement sector. Organizational infrastructure and diversity affect movements‘ capacity to mobilize protests. The changes in organizational infrastructure and diversity also shape network formation between SMOs. Finally, I analyze organizational culture by examining how SMOs‘ ideological interpretations affect their decisions, since cultural/cognitive processes are crucial in turning SMOs or movement networks into actual sites of mobilization (McAdam 1999 [1982], xiii). These four meso-level mechanisms are conceptually distinct but mutually reinforcing processes that shape the patterns of collaborative protests at the level of the organizational field (i.e., social movement sector). I propose that the causal linkages between these variables affect the likelihood of collaborative protests in a transitional context from authoritarianism to democratization.

Organizational Infrastructure Students of the RM theory often emphasize the role of SMOs in organizing protests based on various resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Fisher et al. 2005). SMOs increase the likelihood of rapid and sustained protests, as they enable ―bloc recruitment‖ rather than individual recruitment (Oberschall 1973). Additionally, SMOs generate collective identity which helps preserve the movement community when it is difficult to organize protests (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989). Organizational level factors are important in understanding alliance formation because collaborative protests are possible only when multiple SMOs make a decision to collaborate. However, the conditions under which a collaborative protest occur are underexplored in the current coalition literature due to an exclusive research focus on the internal dynamics of coalitions (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; Rose 2000; Obach 2004; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Beamish and Luebbers 2009). The RM theorists correctly point out that SMOs are one of the important resources for social movements besides financial and social/human capital (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1980; McAdam 1999 [1982]). The proliferation of SMOs has

been theorized to be related to the vitality of social movements, as organizational foundings increase the volume of protests (Ramos 2006). Also, according to the organizational ecology theory applied to social movements, organizational density promotes diffusion of protests because it legitimates the movements‘ goals and tactics (Minkoff 1997). Thus, creation of a dense organizational environment in terms of the number of SMOs is essential for protests. Moreover, the presence of the coalitions that weave together diverse strands of SMOs enhances the capacity for mass mobilization and precipitates collaborative protests (Pérez 1997:90). In my definition, coalitions mean formal organizations which recruit individual SMOs. Coalitions that play a brokerage role between different SMOs are one of the important vehicles of protests (Almeida 2008). They are ―structuring mechanisms that bring a broad spectrum of otherwise distinct organizations into contact, spreading interpretative frames, organizational structures, political analysis, and tactics‖ (Meyer and Whittier 1994:290). Since coalitions bridge between SMOs, they facilitate movements‘ diffusion by spreading information quickly. In the case of the U.S. ―Bill of Rights‖ movement, diverse coalitions were ―crucial for the widespread diffusion of municipal efforts to defend civil liberties‖ (Vasi and Strang 2009:1748). More importantly, coalitions perform the function of mesomobilization (Heaney and Rojas 2008). The concept of mesomobilization was coined by Gerhards and Rucht (1992:558), denoting ―the groups and organizations that coordinate and integrate micromobilization groups.‖ In my definition, mesomobilizer groups are equivalent to the coalitions that are comprised of multiple individual SMOs from diverse movement industries. Coalitions recruit organizations while individual SMOs recruit individuals. Coalitions coordinate activism across various groups, spread protests, and mobilize various SMOs. Therefore, coalitions function as effective organizational vehicles that increase protests (Larson and Soule 2009). Based on these theoretical insights, I expect that organizational infrastructure equipped with individual SMOs and coalitions will positively affect the likelihood of collaborative protests.

Organizational Diversity

Diversity plays an important role in social movements. Olzak and Ryo (2007) illuminate the impact of diversity on protests. They suggest that diversity of goals and tactics of SMOs greatly matters in understanding the rate of protest activities as well as policy outcomes. Their findings show that diversity has a strong impact on both protest vitality and movement outcome; goal diversity increases protests and tactical diversity increases the likelihood of achieving a desired policy outcome. If goal and tactical diversity matters to movements, one should ask what the role of the SMOs‘ diversity is on protests as well. The RM theory stresses the importance of organizational diversity in terms of its contribution to movements‘ vitality. According to Oberschall (1973:230), the diversity of SMOs contributes to a steady flow of movement activities. As a ―celebration of differences‖ (Bernstein 1997:544) could increase the supporters and the movement‘s chance for success, diversity of SMOs will favorably affect the vitality of movements. The assertion that the range of mobilization is ―limited by the kinds of group identities that can be converted into solidarities‖ (Rochon 1998:128) implies that a high diversity of groups that establish an alliance will increase the level of mobilization. In his empirical research, Ganz (2000) underscores that the diversity of activist groups and their constituents positively affects a movement‘s success. Also in Chang's (2008) study, the diversity of social groups has a strong impact on collaborative protests even after controlling for the repression and economic variables in the 1970s in Korea. I add to this perspective that SMOs‘ diversity is a key to understanding the context of non-democracies. As authoritarian states impose sanctions on political activities and civic associations, the scope of SMOs is constrained. For example, the church used to function as the only active organizational basis in Korea for social movements in the 1970s since a creation of formal SMOs was prohibited by the state. Hence, in an authoritarian context, rising diversity of SMOs indicates the increasing power of a movement, which may cope with state repression more effectively. Social movement scholars have stated that increasing density of SMOs has a signaling effect or demonstration effect (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), as an increase in density of organizations shows a rising support for a movement‘s cause (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Tarrow 1988). Likewise, increasing diversity of SMOs will have a

similar impact on protests by triggering bandwagoning behavior in the context of authoritarianism. In an authoritarian state, SMOs tend not to last long due to the severe state repression. Nevertheless, a few pioneers dare to create SMOs with an expectation that the founding of an organization will help galvanize protests, as it signals to other activists that there are comrades who are interested in organizing protests. As Rasler (1996:134) notes, ―a small number of people trigger the participation of larger numbers of people over time.‖ Along the same line, potential movement participants can be recruited by overt dissident behavior since this shows ―the willingness and commitment of others,‖ which ―makes their activities desirable and raises the social rewards for participating‖ (Carey 2009:24). Based on this line of theories on protest, I argue that the SMOs‘ diversity during protests substantially affects collaborative protests. Increasing diversity of the SMOs that participate in protests means that potential candidates for alliance can be identified in highly diverse organizational fields. The establishment of a ―multi-actor field‖ (Chang 2008:17) is a necessary condition for alliance. Especially in an authoritarian context, the diversity of the SMOs that actually show up at protests ought to matter greatly when it comes to the possibility of alliance because, unlike the stable Western democracies, the density of the existing SMOs is hardly identifiable due to the proliferation of secret underground SMOs. In this specific situation, SMOs are likely to locate their potential partners once they achieve some meaningful levels of protest since participation in a protest demonstrates how serious the SMO is about engaging in a collective action. Thus, diversity of SMOs during protests will increase the likelihood of collaborative protests in the subsequent protests.

Organizational Networks Both the political process and the RM theorists advocate the importance of social networks in social movements. Within a movement, linkages among different SMOs, among individual activists, and between SMOs and activists are likely to be established (Diani 1992:107). Pre-existing social networks are also necessary to generate and sustain protests (McAdam 1999 [1982]; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Morris 1984; Zuo and Benford 1995). A number of empirical studies have stressed the importance of networks

in recruitment, mobilization, and organizational survival (Snow, Zurcher, and Sheldon Ekland-Olson 1980; Fernandez and McAdam 1988; Marwell, Oliver, and Prahl 1988; Gould 1991; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Nepstad and Christian Smith 2000; Rosenthal et al. 1985). Moreover, informal networks among movement participants expand the goals of a movement (Shemtov 2003), and meso-level networks contribute to movements‘ diffusion (Hedström, Sandell, and Stern 2000). Social movement scholars have been rigorously investigating ―how networks matter‖ to movements in various ways (Diani and McAdam 2003). Also in the field of organizational sociology, interorganizational linkages have often been explored (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Kenis and Knoke 2002). Nonetheless, the networks between the established SMOs have received less scholarly attention than interpersonal networks between individuals that lead to protests or SMO building. I treat joint memberships and mediators between SMOs as two important mechanisms of interorganizational networks. Activists‘ participation in multiple SMOs creates overlapping memberships and such overlaps facilitate coalition formation and joint protests (Carroll and Ratner 1996; Rosenthal et al. 1985; Vasi and Strang 2009). The creation and growth of social movement coalitions in Poland suggest that joint memberships play a positive role in increasing the potential for collective action (Osa 2003b). Cross-cutting ties provide a balance against a ―communal closure‖ of a movement and encourage cross-movement solidarity (Ansell 2001:32). In short, ties between SMOs are likely to invigorate cross-movement networking and positively affect both intra- and inter-movement protests. In addition to the density of ties between SMOs, the role of mediators that bridge different SMOs is crucial in activating an alliance. The mediators function as social movement ―brokerage‖ (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001). Also, from the social network perspective, such mediators are primarily located in-between distinct network cliques and provide linkages between them (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973). Likewise, empirical studies have pointed to the role of mediators (Grossman 2001; Rose 2000; Obach 2004; Mische 2007). An empirical study of the Social Democratic Party in Sweden reveals that the role of mediators was of crucial importance for the growth and spread of the organization over the country (Hedström et al. 2000). According to Obach (2004:24), ―coalition brokers‖ play an important role in creating

linkages between different SMOs. The coalition brokers ―typically occupy a position that bridges the divide between the distinct groups allowing them to communicate with both sides and to frame issues in ways that resonate with both constituencies.‖ A study of alliance between labor, peace, and environmental movements also reveals that ―bridge builders‖ are important in ―initiating contacts, communicating inside member groups, dialoguing across movements, and defining a common purpose in public‖ (Rose 2000:176). Consequently, the degrees of social networks in terms of network ties and mediators‘ roles ought to have different consequences in the patterns of protests. However, previous studies have not investigated the implications of SMOs‘ network structure on the patterns of protests. Baldassarri and Diani (2007:776) point out that it is necessary to compare movement networks across different democratic or non-democratic systems because each political context may yield different network patterns. The Korean case I analyze in this dissertation offers a setting where one can study the longitudinal changes in the network structure across different political contexts, since the country underwent a democratic transition. How do the organizational networks in authoritarian contexts differ from stable democracies? How do they change by the democratization process? I attempt to provide answers to these questions by examining the network evolution in Korea‘s social movements. Social network perspectives provide a valuable insight in linking the structure of organizational networks with distinct political contexts. On the one hand, I argue that an absence of network ties and mediators (i.e., network closure) encourages single protests and precludes interorganizational alliances. The traditional approach in social capital theory suggests that network closure—i.e., the presence of cohesive ties within a group—promotes a normative setting in which trust and cooperation between actors are enhanced (Coleman 1988, 1990; Ansell 2001). In this situation, a tendency of interest-specialization and a lack of coalition participation occur in the SMOs (Phillips 1991; Bernstein 1997), but network closure provides them with a close-knit community within each organization that fosters trust and confidentiality between members, which clearly has an advantage under a highly repressive political

context. Thus, this type of network is expected to be prevalent in a very repressive setting where the level of the state‘s surveillance over civilians is high. On the other hand, there is a trade-off between the safety of cooperation within cohesive networks and the flexibility offered by networks with abundant brokerage opportunities (Gargiulo and Benassi 2000). While a network closure may protect SMOs against extreme repression by encouraging small sect-like structures which prevent counterintelligence and make infiltration difficult, such a structure seldom leads to interorganizational collaborations. The presence and absence of interorganizational networks have an implication for movements‘ chance of success. Gargiulo and Benassi (2000:194) suggest that ―organizational success may depend more than ever on the flexibility to build effective cooperative ties across a variety of intra- and interorganizational boundaries, a flexibility that may be at odds with the constraining effects of cohesive networks.‖ In terms of social movements, success might rely on the SMO‘s ability to create linkages between SMOs. Based on closed networks, large-scale mobilization is not feasible. In contrast, dense network ties and active brokerage roles could result in a more successful mobilization than what a closed network structure can achieve. Therefore, I argue that an increase in network ties and mediators will increase collaborative protests. Social network literature that stresses between-group linkages contends social capital is beneficial to the extent that brokerage opportunities are created by disperse ties between groups (Burt 1997; Granovetter 1973), which indicates the importance of establishing linkages between different cliques. Note that no dense networks have a uniform shape; networks are structured differently depending on political contexts. First, I expect to find centralized networks during the liberalization period under authoritarianism. While repression prevents movement networks from emerging, a relaxation of repression through measures of liberalization will facilitate network centralization when large coalitions succeed in coordinating different SMOs based on a shared goal. Centralized networks have an advantage over decentralized networks in terms of being able to produce large-scale protests (Lowe and Goyder 1983; Diani 2003; Baldassarri and Diani 2007), because a few central organizations in the network‘s core can lead other SMOs more easily than when multiple SMOs compete for power. Thus, centralized networks will be more likely

to form during anti-authoritarian struggles when the prodemocracy goal predominates, than during democratization when goals become more diversified. Second, I expect decentralization of movement leadership to occur after the democratic transition. Since democratization promotes civic associational activities, SMOs will become more abundant than before. Also, achieving the goal of political democratization will lead to differentiation of movements‘ goals, which will affect the structure of organizational networks. In stable Western democracies, civic networks seem to be composed of ―polycentric networks‖ in which instrumental ties link multiple clusters of organizations based on strong social bonds (Baldassarri and Diani 2007). Therefore, I expect to find a shift towards a polycentric network structure after the democratic transition, although the shift will not be complete in the early phase of democratization. I will examine how the changing movement networks may affect the pattern of interorganizational collaboration. Both are expected to increase collaborative protests, but different network structures show the changing power dynamics between SMOs. Simply put, SMOs vary in terms of their degree of centrality in the movement networks. By definition, hierarchical networks exhibit a small number of centers, while polycentric networks have multiple centers. I will show that the transformation of network structure is linked to the changes in movements‘ leadership among SMOs (i.e., centrality). I argue that the centrality of the leading SMOs during the prodemocracy struggles that develop in the hierarchical, centralized network structure will decline in proportion to the growth of the previously peripheral SMOs. To summarize, this dissertation will show that the evolution of organizational networks has implications for the likelihood of collaborative protests as well as power dynamics between SMOs in a transitional context.

Ideological Interpretation In addition to organizational structure represented by organizational infrastructure, diversity, and networks, I examine organizational culture with a special focus on the role of ideology as a basis of collective identity. With regard to the role of ideology in social movements, the current literature, which emphasizes macro-structural variables and SMOs‘ mobilization processes, reflects a lack of interest in explaining ideological

orientations of SMOs (Walder 2009). Likewise, the coalition literature also tends to downplay the impact of ideological differences upon creating inter-movement alliance (Obach 2004), as if ideological differences can be easily negotiated within a coalition. I bring this problem to the forefront of social movement research by highlighting that social movements are influenced, shaped and constrained by ideology which is internalized in individuals, social groups, and formal organizations. What is ideology? Hall (1986:25-26) defines ideology as ―the mental frameworks—the languages, the concepts, categories, imagery of thought, and the systems of representation—which different classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, figure out, and render intelligible the way society works.‖ The framing literature in social movement research suggests that frames help individuals ―to locate, perceive, identify, and label‖ their lives and the world (Goffman 1986), but framing is mainly conceptualized as a strategic way for social movement activists to problematize the world and communicate with the audience (Snow and Benford 2000). In contrast, ideology is a ―belief structure‖ (Gerlach and Hine 1970:166) that is more fundamental, stable, and consistent than a frame. Ideology is rooted in politics and the study of politics, and provides coherent systems of ideas (Oliver and Johnston 2000). In this sense, ideology resembles religion in terms of its power to shape individuals‘ mentalities (Gerlach and Hine 1970:100). Furthermore, frame-making processes are constrained by ideologies when frames draw upon master frames within a dominant ideology (Nadeem 2008; Reese and Newcombe 2003; Ferree 2003). As Gould (1995:15) underscores, ―one of the most important things ideologies do is to render a schematic image of the world in terms of collective actors.‖ Simply put, ideology is one of the important sources of an individual‘s worldview as well as collective identity within movement groups. In modern history, ideology has played an important role in the process of revolutionary struggles, as shown by the socialist revolution in Russia or the French revolution (Goldstone 1991). Zald (2000:1) goes so far as to call social movements ―ideologically structured action.‖ According to his argument, when the ideological alternatives of a movement change, the mobilizational and structural potentials of the movement shift as well. Thus, ideology directs action in fundamental ways.

I argue that ideologies matter to SMOs in terms of shaping collective identity and determining their fundamental goals and strategies. In social movements, an ideology ―codifies values and goals, provides a conceptual framework by which all experiences or events relative to those goals may be interpreted, motivates and provides rationale for envisioned changes, defines the opposition, and forms the basis for conceptual unification of a segmented network of groups‖ (Gerlach and Hine 1970:xvii). Ideology guides an organization‘s ―choices of what goals to pursue, what tactics are appropriate to its position and what resources are available for mobilization‖ (Dalton 1994). As Downey (1986:360) notes, ―(a)n organization‘s ideological identity provides a framework of meaning for identifying and evaluating the legitimacy of different categories of resources and strategies.‖ Therefore, ideological affinity enhances the possibility of alliance. Park (2008) finds that the shared ideology of the environmental SMOs facilitated coalition-building. Groups are more ―miscible‖ when they are ideologically similar than different (Vasi and Strang 2009:1749). More broadly, shared characteristics among SMOs increase the possibility of collaboration (Curtis and Zurcher 1973). In a stark contrast, ideological diversity becomes a source of conflict when different SMOs need to collaborate. Since ideology often provides a dichotomous worldview of us vs. them that clearly defines the opposition (Gerlach and Hine 1970:174), it can limit the scope of organizational identities, goals, and strategies. According to Dalton (1994), different ideological orientations of SMOs may lead to differences in terms of choosing tactics and relating with the authorities. Even for the SMOs that belong to the same social movement industry, it is difficult to collaborate with each other if their ideologies differ, since ideology limits the range of potential allies (Zald 2000:13). Thus, the formation of inter-movement alliance is undoubtedly more difficult as such an alliance should include an even wider range of SMOs that belong to various industries. For example, the ideological division between the Catholics and the secular Left was one of the biggest obstacles to collective action in Poland‘s social movements in the 1960s (Osa 2003b). In particular, the problem in forming a broad alliance across the organizational field is the most salient when it comes to integrating the SMOs based on a radical

ideology in a unified front. Radical flanks are the least likely candidates in terms of fitting in coalitional structure. Borland (2008:87) found that the SMOs with radical ideology are less likely to thrive in coalitions than those with moderate goals. According to Obach (2004:23), the issue of joining alliance creates ―coalition contradiction‖ in an SMO because the need for organizational maintenance requires the SMO to distinguish itself from others, which inhibits its potential to collaborate with others. Such a dilemma is extremely salient in SMOs with revolutionary goals. Thus, the SMOs based on a radical ideology will naturally prefer single protests to collaborative protests to a greater extent than those with more moderate, inclusive goals (see Phillips 1991:768). Within the terrain of social movements, radical and moderate groups often disagree with tactics and goals. The flanks might ―taint‖ each other by making each other look less authentic when they join alliance together. Such a conflict was precisely what happened during the Civil Rights Movement in the United States in the 1960s. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee‘s (SNCC) policy of non-exclusion and militancy led to charges of Communist infiltration not only from segregationists but also from white liberals and moderate SMOs (Carson 1995). The criticism arose from the moderates‘ ideological opposition to communism as well as the fears that the taint would cost the public support (Barkan 1986). Given the fundamental gap between radicals and moderates, it is puzzling that the SMOs based on different ideologies do collaborate in broad coalitions (e.g., the movement against the Iraq War, the nuclear freeze movement, the anti-globalization movement). Even in the example of the SNCC and other moderate SMOs in the Civil Rights Movement, they had initially worked together against racial discrimination before conflicts arose. The current literature does not tackle the important question of the conditions under which the flanks join alliances, taking a risk of compromising their ideological authenticity and radical identity. I intend to explore what enables the ideologically dogmatic/radical SMOs to become integrated in a broad alliance. In order to understand the paradox of alliance formation, it is important to note that ideologies are not static but fluid (Goldstone 1991:417). An ideology may not only be composed of multiple parts, but also change over time. Although the dominance of revolutionary goals inhibits alliance with moderates, the increasing salience of inclusive

aspects in radical ideology may lead the radical SMOs to consider establishing an alliance with other groups. The integration of flanks within an overarching alliance will be determined by the extent to which ideological subsets converge between different SMOs. Therefore, ideological interpretation about the changing external political environment as well as movements‘ goals and tactics matters, since it depends on which combination of ideological subsets gains salience within each SMO. As a result of such interpretative processes, the degree of ideological affinity between SMOs determines the breadth of an alliance. In this dissertation, in addition to focusing on the differences in ideological interpretations between SMOs, I will connect this research focus to how factional conflicts unfold within SMOs because Korea‘s social movements—especially the student movement—engaged in ideological competitions in the 1980s (Kim 2000; Koo 2001; Lee 2007). Different ideological factions not only assess the political environment based on distinct ideological doctrines, but also pursue different goals and tactical repertoires in one SMO. Thus, the dominance of a faction‘s ideological interpretation, which exhibits a greater degree of affinity to other SMOs than other factions within the SMO, will increase the likelihood of the SMO‘s participation in interorganizational alliances. I will explore how the dominant ideological interpretations may shift in SMOs over time, and the extent to which changing ideological views affect the ways in which alliances are established, sustained, and renewed between diverse SMOs.

1-3-(6): Arguments: the Impacts of the Macro- and Meso-Level Factors on Korea’s Social Movements As the previous section reviewed the relevant social movement literature on the possible causes of interorganizational collaboration, I will develop my arguments more directly on the Korean case in this section. I will state how the macro-level political environment and the meso-level organizational environment jointly affect the likelihood of interorganizational collaboration during protests by comparing three distinct periods: authoritarianism, liberalization, and democratization. During an authoritarian period where reforms are rare and repression is harsh, I expect the POS to be closed. Division among elites seldom occurs in the institutional

politics as opposition elites are severely underrepresented. In this closed structure, I expect that organizational development of SMOs is considerably stunted. Due to heavy repression on civic organizing, organizational infrastructure is weak, diversity is low, and interorganizational networks seldom form. The closed network structure leads to the radicalization of underground SMOs. Therefore, I expect few collaborative protests between SMOs in this period. As liberalization begins, the POS becomes more open; a few political reforms take place, repression is mildly reduced, and opposition elites are allowed limited access to electoral politics. In order to increase their power, opposition elites sometimes seek alliances with the democracy movement. These changes in the political environment offer more freedom for SMOs to organize above-ground. As both organizational infrastructure and diversity develop, SMOs establish more linkages between themselves and form dense social movement networks around large ecumenical coalitions. SMOs based on different ideological orientations join coalitions at differential rates, where moderates lead coalitional activities and radicals reluctantly follow behind as the goal of political democratization gains salience. Thus, an increase in collaborative protests is expected until the democratic transition. After the transition, the phase of democratization poses enormous uncertainties to SMOs as the new regime is governed by the former authoritarian elites. The conservative democratization consists of a slow pace of democratic reforms and a firm repressive stance towards social movements. Opposition elites acquire more political share within the electoral politics, and attempt to coopt social movement leaders into their parties. Given this situation, after achieving the goal of procedural democratization, SMOs undergo organizational conflicts despite the general expansion of the SMO population after the democratic opening. Nonetheless, strong organizational infrastructure, high organizational diversity, and dense organizational networks, which have been developed in the past, still contribute to sustaining collaborative protests, despite a decline of total protests over time. Ideological realignment along new goals also helps sustain collaborative protests. At the same time, an important qualitative change takes place in the qualitative pattern of collaboration due to network decentralization and ideological

differentiation. SMOs begin to focus on short-term, issue-based collaborations instead of long-term involvement in inter-movement coalitions.

1-4: Data and Methods 1-4-(1): Quantitative Datasets and Methods Korea‘s Democracy Movement (KDM) Dataset (1980 - 1991) The Korea Democracy Foundation recently published Han’guk minjuhwa undongsa yŏnp’yo [The Chronology of Korea‘s Democracy Movement], a chronology of Korea‘s social movements which cover a long historical period from the 1950s to the early 1990s. The chronology was put together by a research team in the Foundation that spent two years documenting the protest and repression events by exhaustively examining newspapers, magazines, statistical yearbooks, and historical studies. The chronology provides extensive lists of social movements which range from a labor strike in a small factory to a mass demonstration coordinated by an ecumenical SMO. I coded all the events that occurred in the period I am interested in (1980 - 1991) and created a statistically analyzable dataset, using the comprehensive coding scheme developed from a coding manual first used by Olzak and West (1995). The total number of protest and repression events exceeds three thousand. This dataset enables me to study the evolution of Korea‘s social movements.

Stanford Korea Democracy Project (KDP) Dataset on SMOs Based on sourcebooks obtained from the Korea Democracy Foundation, my colleagues and I, under the guidance of Professor Gi-Wook Shin at Stanford University, created novel quantitative datasets that provide extensive information on Korea‘s democracy movement. The primary advantage of using the sourcebooks is that they used not only newspapers, but also government documents, organizational archives, personal memoirs, historical research materials, magazines, and so forth. Just like the KDM Dataset, the coders used a comprehensive coding scheme and coded information about more than 250 SMOs. Therefore, I can analyze the organizational characteristics of and linkages between the SMOs.

The codebooks for the two quantitative datasets are provided in Appendix A. With these datasets, I will estimate statistical models by conducting a multivariate regression analysis such as negative binomial regression. I use protest events as the unit of analysis, and analyze single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests as dependent variables.

1-4-(2): Qualitative Data and Method In addition to archival research through fieldwork in Korea, I employ a historical data collection method. I conducted extensive in-depth interviews and collected oral histories from 24 individuals who experienced different degrees and types of social movements in Korea in the period of interest in my dissertation. Oral history is the collection and recording of personal memoirs as historical documentation and focuses on the significance of human experience. Oral history as a research method was established in the 1940s when Allan Nevins, a professor at Columbia University, began recording the memoirs of persons significant in American life (Thomson 1998). Although it is not the best suited for obtaining facts, such as specific dates and places, due to the inaccuracy of human memory, it is the best method for understanding what the past means to individuals. Although oral histories as a type of qualitative methodology tend to be highly individualized and loosely structured when compared to the formal survey method, the method is advantageous to surveys in several important ways: it facilitates open-ended questions that can fully incorporate interviewees‘ life histories without limitation; it also creates a relaxed atmosphere during interviews, as it allows the interviewees to express their feelings and freely talk about their experiences. Moreover, an interviewer can often gain unexpected but helpful information from interviewees which she might not have thought about in designing her own questions for the interviews. My interviews took place in spring and summer of 2008, both in the United States and Korea. In my interviews, the length of each session ranged from an hour to three hours, depending on the interviewees‘ willingness to discuss their life histories. The types of social movements and movement industries to which each individual belonged varied widely. I audio-recorded each interview session and transcribed them in a computerized

format. The interviews were conducted in Korean, but I translated them into English whenever I quoted them in this dissertation. The basic information about each interviewee is provided in Appendix B.

1-5: Contributions 1-5-(1): Theoretical Contributions I make several important theoretical contributions to the sociological and historical perspectives of social movements. First, this dissertation underscores the importance of transitional context in studying the cycle of protest. It is important to examine my research questions across discrete transitions that ought to have different implications for social movement actors in different periods. Studying the questions in comparative contexts (authoritarianism, liberalization within authoritarianism, and democratization periods) will reveal the complex dynamics of alliance formation. Second, this dissertation provides a new perspective in analyzing an evolution of interorganizational collaboration over time. I examine both macro- and meso-level conditions that inhibit or facilitate interorganizational collaboration under a transitional context. I not only look at the shifts in the political environment, but also explore the changes in the organizational environment (i.e., social movement sector). By doing so, I provide a synthetic and systematic analysis through which the mechanisms of interorganizational collaboration can be assessed. Third, this dissertation attempts to address questions that the current literature passes by. The treatment of coalitions as an independent variable that influences collaborative protests will show the actual ―efficacy‖ of organizational infrastructure in mobilizing social movements. Also, identifying distinct network structures based on different political contexts has a general theoretical implication in understanding how movement networks evolve through and adapt to different environments. Finally, I incorporate a cultural perspective in examining the meso-level processes in order to advance understanding of the cultural mechanisms of alliance formation by showing how the changing ideological orientations affect activists‘ views on movements and political environment. By taking a step beyond political and organizational structures, I reveal the active role of cultural processes in making decisions about alliance formation.

1-5-(2): Empirical Contributions The Korean case offers a highly interesting setting to study alliance formation because the country transformed itself from a harsh authoritarianism to a vibrant democracy. Moreover, social movements played an important role in bringing about such dramatic transition by pressuring the state to acquiesce to the popular demand for democratization (Kim 2000). The importance of coalitions in organizing antigovernment protests has historically been acknowledged as well. I employ both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. I use novel quantitative datasets in analyzing interorganizational collaboration: the Korea‘s Democracy Movement Dataset (1980 - 1991) and the Stanford Korea Democracy Dataset on SMOs allow me to conduct an advanced statistical analysis of Korea‘ social movements. In addition, through a fieldwork in Korea, I collected archival data and qualitative interviews with past prodemocracy activists. The extensive qualitative evidence helps my research pay close attention to the historical realities and individuals‘ experiences.

1-5-(3): Korean Scholarship In the 1980s, an interest in analyzing the structure and ideologies of Korean SMOs usually stemmed from the perspective of activists, as they constantly sought ways to innovate a movement‘s tactic by reflecting on their past behaviors. Thus, SMOs and their activities provided practical lessons for further protests and organizational maintenance for activists. Social movements were primarily subject to activists‘ strategic considerations rather than an academic research project. Early works about the history or ideological orientations of the democracy movement were usually written by movement activists and functioned as manuals for protests or as an attempt to give the past activism some historical importance (Kang 1988; P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1987; P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1988b; P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990; Oh 1988). Korean scholars began to pay more academic attention to the 1980s‘ social movements after the democratic transition, roughly around the early 1990s. Im's (1990)

analysis of the process of democratization, which highlighted the role of political elites in negotiating a democratic transition, provoked a series of heated debates with regard to the role of social movements among social science scholars. Due to the influence from the civil society theory by the European scholars such as Habermas and Gramsci, Korean scholars tended to focus on the formation and the nature of the civil society in Korea and pointed to the role of social movements in precipitating the process of democratization (Kim 1992; Han 1992; Yu and Kim 1995; Cho 2001b). From the late 1990s, scholars emphasized the emerging differences between the traditional democracy movement and the new social movements (e.g., feminist, environmental movements) in the 1990s (Song 1997; Im and Yang 1998; H.K. Kim 2001; Kwon, Im, and Song 2001). More recent studies have expanded their scope to include more empirical details and analyses of Korean social movements and their relationship with institutional politics (Cho 2002; J.K. Kim 2003; Jeong 2004; Cho 2004; Chun, Kim, and Kim 2004; H.K. Jeong 2007). In addition, a cultural analysis (Chung 2007) and a historical perspective (Lee 2007) are rigorously applied to the study of Korean social movements. Nonetheless, the current scholarship has largely neglected the organizational dimension of social movements while focusing on the macro-political processes such as the formation of civil society or producing historical descriptions of the cultures and ideologies of social movement groups. In short, SMOs are one of the most underexplored fields in the study of Korean social movements. A lack of attention to movements‘ organizational dimensions is mysterious, considering that SMOs have been indispensible in organizing protests. Moreover, scholars have not engaged in analyzing why and how interorganizational collaborations occur during protests and coalition-building processes. My dissertation aims to fill this hole in the current research by analyzing the organizational processes of alliance formation among the SMOs and situating the SMOs in a broader context of political processes that traversed from authoritarianism to democracy by investigating the dynamics of interorganizational collaboration between SMOs.

1-6: Organization of Dissertation Chapters 2 through 4 are organized in a chronological order. Chapter 2 deals with the period from 1980 and 1983, which was the most repressed period in the 1980s. Chapter 3 starts from the liberalization period since late 1983 and ends with the historic June uprising in 1987. Chapter 4 discusses the post-transition phase between July 1987 and 1992, which roughly covers the Roh regime. These three chapters are designed as primarily qualitative and historical studies with empirical support from the numeric trends based on multiple statistical data. In these chapters, I investigate the macro- and meso-level factors that cause variations in terms of SMOs‘ propensity to join collaborative protests vs. single protests. In Chapter 5, taking a different methodological approach from the prior chapters, I employ multivariate statistical analysis in order to assess relative impacts of political and organizational factors on different types of protests. This chapter examines single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests throughout the period between 1980 and 1991. While the other empirical chapters mostly compare collaborative protests and single protests, this chapter deepens the analysis by providing a comparative approach between single/intra-movement protests and inter-movement protests in terms of goal structure as well as assessing the role of the organizational environment in comparison with the political environment. In the last chapter (Conclusion), I summarize my findings and discuss my dissertation‘s contributions and theoretical/empirical implications in the study of political sociology, social movements, and historical sociology.

CHAPTER 2. THE SEOUL SPRING AND MOVEMENTS IN ABEYANCE (1980 - 1983) 2-1: Introduction This chapter analyzes social movements during the period that saw the origin of Chun Doo Hwan‘s regime and its consolidation. The period between 1980 and 1983 was the most repressive period throughout the 1980s: the expansion of martial law and the massacre in Kwangju in May 1980, except for a brief period of heightened protests in early 1980. Confronting extreme repression, SMOs had to find a way to keep activism alive and prepare for the future. The ruthless repression in the early Chun regime destroyed the open basis for protests and fragmented the democracy movement. SMOs accordingly went underground in order to survive this period of demobilization. I explore the factors that affect the frequency of collaborative protests (i.e., intra- and inter-movement protests) in comparison to single protests. First, based on the social movement perspective, I show that the shifts in the political environments affect the levels of protests. Second, I examine the organizational processes that influence social movements. In order to investigate the macro- and meso-level processes that shape the patterns of protests, I divide the period 1980 - 1983 into two sub-periods, before and after the massacre in Kwangju in May 1980, by which time the state shifted its governing strategy from a relatively liberal to an ironfisted one. Period 1 denotes the first five months in 1980, in which political opening and freedom after the death of President Park Chung Hee revived protests and political activities. However, single protests dominated protests, despite a high degree of total protests. This case shows that SMOs lacked the capacity to create broad alliances even before repression intensified in May 1980. Even though protests were prevalent and often large-scale, the majority of movements were without a strong organizational basis for alliance within the social movement sector and with opposition elites in the polity. At that point, the social movement sector was not ready for massive collaborative protests. Period 2 covers between late May 1980 and 1983, where harsh structural and physical repression seriously undermined protests en masse. In late May of 1980, the state quickly demobilized protests which had been growing rapidly. Due to the unprecedented level of repression, SMOs were forced to go underground if they were to

remain active at all. The environmental constraint inhibited organizational processes that could lead to collaborative protests. In particular, the organizational structure of movement abeyance favored single, committed movements over collaborative protests. As a result, social movements in the early 1980s, if any, were mostly single and sporadic protests. In this chapter, I argue that organization-level factors are crucial in collaborative protests, while macro-level factors shape the level of protests in general. Macro-level factors alone cannot explain why single protests overwhelm collaborative protests in both free and repressive political environments: both Period 1 and 2 tended to be dominated by single protests rather than collaborative protests, although the political environment shifted from relatively free to extremely repressive. The short-lived political opening in Period 1 contributed to the revival of prodemocracy protests at large, but various organizational constraints precluded collaborative projects. As the political environment became more repressive in Period 2, alliance opportunities narrowed even more. Also, the tendency of network closures within SMOs as a coping mechanism against dogged state repression inhibited interorganizational interactions and radicalized underground activism, which led to the dominance of single protests and isolated SMOs.

2-2: Theoretical Framework In this section, I review the current literature with regard to the macro- and meso- level factors that shape the likelihood of protests. I explicate how these factors have ramifications for the dynamics of protests in terms of the number of all protests and the patterns of collaborative protests, in the period 1980 - 1983.

2-2-(1): Macro-Level Political Environment Political Opening and Repression

Students of the political process model tend to emphasize the effect of political environment on protests. As I have already summarized in Chapter 1, political opening and repression have different impacts on protests depending on the historically specific contexts. The Korean case during the period 1980 - 1983 demonstrates significant

changes in terms of the degrees of political opening and repression; political repression in Period 2 quickly replaced a brief period of political opening in Period 1. Here, the classic theoretical insight on the different regime structures helps in explaining the patterns of Korea‘s protests in the period of interest. Tilly (1978), building on Eisinger's (1973) model, proposes that repression and mobilization resemble an inverted U-shaped relationship, whereby dissent is lowest at low and high levels of repression and highest at mid-levels of repression. According to his prediction, protests will be highest in intermediate—partially democratic—regimes, while they will be lowest in both fully authoritarian and fully democratic regimes. Application of this perspective in the Korean context suggests that Period 1 resembles the intermediate stage, while Period 2 represents a fully authoritarian stage. Compared to the later period, more political freedom was available in early 1980 because Chun Doo Hwan had not consolidated his rule and had taken a few democratic measures. Chun instituted repressive laws and regulations after May 17, 1980, when he extended martial law. Therefore, I propose that political opening and reduced repression increased protests in Period 1, whereas the contraction of political opening and increased repression diminished protests in Period 2.

Elites‘ Division The relation between opposition elites and social movements is not clear in the social movement literature. Hipsher (1998) study emphasizes the risk of cooptation that occurs between elites and movements. She points out that a close alliance between movements and political parties results in demobilization when the opposition elites coopt the social movements. In contrast, elite alliance could have a positive impact on collaborative protests. As Sandoval (1998) notes, the achievement of a balance of power between elites and the social movement sector enables social movements to become an important part of the state‘s decision making processes. In either case, the role of elites in protests is an important question to explore. My assertion is that it is crucial to understand the elites‘ propensity to make alliances with movements because it may shape the scope of collaboration. However, I define opposition elites as ambivalent allies because they are structurally located in between

institutional politics and movements under authoritarianism. The basic assumption is that elites are more likely to engage in negotiations with authorities and enter institutional politics than to support protests based on their identity as politicians. This chapter analyzes opposition elites‘ attitudes towards alliance formation in two different periods: I argue that opposition elites were more inclined to engage in institutional politics in order to take advantage of a political opening than to cultivate alliances with the SMOs in Period 1. However, in Period 2, the elites did not enjoy any opportunity to either participate in institutional politics or attempt to create alliances with the SMOs due to the increasing state repression.

2-2-(2): Meso-Level Organizational Processes: Organizational Constraints Empirical studies have shown that severe repression tends to drive activists underground and trigger guerilla activism (Mason 1992; Wickham-Crowley 1993; Kampwirth 2003; Viterna 2006). A period of a high level of repression has implications on the organizational structure of SMOs when political opportunities dwindle. Social movement scholars, however, have tended to examine protests when they are active (see Tarrow 1991, for example). The bias towards large protest waves might result in overlooking sources of continuity between protest cycles. More recent research has focused on the continuity between large protests, even if movements are less intense or dramatic in such a phase. Particularly in a repressive political situation, a specific organizational structure serves as a mediator between protest waves, since ―movements that practice high‐risk activism operate in an adversarial environment and have a special need to create a protected subenvironment‖ (Gamson 1992:62). This structure is theoretically defined as ―movement halfway house‖ or ―abeyance structure.‖ Aldon D. Morris (1984:139) coined the term ―movement halfway house,‖ and defined it as ―an established group or organization that is only partially integrated into the large society because its participants are actively involved in efforts to bring about a desired social change in society.‖ For instance, the movement halfway houses assisted the emerging civil rights movement in the United States in terms of ―disseminating the tactic of nonviolence direct action developing mass education programs and publicizing local movements‖ (Morris 1984:140). Although such SMOs were small and isolated from

mainstream society because of their social change goal, they played an important role in nurturing the civil rights movement before it blossomed. Rupp and Taylor (1987) underscore that movements can survive for a long time despite various difficulties. The term ―abeyance‖ denotes ―a holding process by which movements sustain themselves in nonreceptive political environments and provide continuity from one stage of mobilization to another‖ (Verta Taylor 1989:761). During abeyance, movements tend to be less visible in terms of their interaction with the state, but the intimate and strong networks of dedicated activists preserve the values and identity of a movement. Therefore, abeyance may prepare activists for later protests when a chance rears its head. According to Taylor (1989), the American feminist movement was able to sustain itself through small and committed SMOs such as the National Woman‘s Party even when the support and opportunities for feminist movements were scarce. Tarrow (1989a:20) also argues that repression causes social movements to become ―secret societies, sects of true believers, or terrorist organizations.‖ Although the theory of movement abeyance discussed above provides important insights for studying alliance in movements, it does not explain how such organizational structure affects activism. Taking a step further, I contend that this specific organizational structure shapes the potential for collaborative protests. The theory assumes that the general level of protests is expected to be very low when the political environment is closed. In addition, the abeyance structure is likely to be based on small, isolated organizations run by core members who are sincerely committed to the movement‘s cause. Thus, alliances are much less feasible than in a heightened protest cycle, where more diverse SMOs are visible to one another. I argue that the abeyance structure in Period 2 precluded collaborative protests, while led to the dominance of single protests. In Korea, the abeyance structure also intensified the radicalization of SMOs. Typically, radicalization has been theorized to occur at the end of a movement cycle—the phase of demobilization (Tarrow 1989). For instance, Mueller (1999) describes how social movements‘ claims radicalized over the progress of the 1989 protest cycle in the former German Democratic Republic. The U.S. Civil Rights Movement also revealed a similar tendency of radicalization during demobilization (Haines 1984; McAdam 1999 [1982]). The Korean case, however, reveals that radicalization of SMOs occurred in

between an end of a small protest cycle in 1980 and the beginning of a larger protest cycle in the mid-1980s. Radicalization, thus, should be understood broadly on the continuum of different protest cycles rather than narrowly as a symptom of an ending phase of a movement. Instead of associating radicalization with a naturalistic development of protest cycles, one needs to look at the organizational processes of SMOs in order to explain why radicalization occurs. Providing solidarity incentives is important for SMOs in order to recruit participants and sustain organizations (Fireman and Gamson 1979; Hirsch 1986). Since material incentive is extremely scarce for SMOs to offer to participants during a repressive period, they are pressured to recruit members based on moral and solidarity incentives which they can afford (Loveman 1998). Moreover, in a repressive environment, the formation of oppositional, solidary culture plays an important role in enhancing group attachment and sustaining collective action (O‘Hearn 2009; Nepstad 2004). Thus, radical ideology functions as an effective cultural mechanism that fosters in- group solidarity and collective identity, which in turn contributes to network closure. Social network perspectives offer important clues in analyzing radicalization of SMOs. Network closure fosters radicalization because scattered and isolated organizations create an organizational environment that favors in-group commitment and confidentiality over out-group interactions. Such a structure rarely challenges the assumptions that shape the members‘ world views and encourages groupthink (see Erickson 1982; Knoke 1990, 1993). Thus, radical ideologies are one of the cultural mechanisms that maintain network closure as they provide strong ideational resources for groupthink. Strong ideologies provide solidarity incentives for activists, since ideologies link between organizational maintenance and individual commitment by nurturing a shared understanding of a given political situation, providing tactical manuals to cope with repression and breeding a sense of comradeship or brotherhood among members. This chapter will show that the abeyance structure, caused by an increase of repression, contributed to radicalization; the closed network structure narrowed alliance opportunities between SMOs and created a community of activists armed with strong leftist ideologies within each SMO. Consequently, single protests tended to prevail

compared to intra- and inter-movement protests, while the overall frequency of protests was low. Studying the impact of the abeyance structure on collaborative protests adds a new perspective to current theory. The theory of abeyance structure has underscored the positive roles that the structure plays under highly unfavorable political conditions. In contrast, I investigate a case in which the abeyance structure negatively affects a certain type of protest. In the Korean case, the abeyance structure yields more complicated results in social movements with respect to the patterns of alliance formation. The closed organizational structure uncovers the costs of abeyance as well as the benefits in terms of the ideological tendency and the potential for collaborative action. In this sense, the abeyance structure is linked to alliance potential of a movement. Based on the macro- and meso-level perspectives laid out above, I summarize my theoretical expectations for the aforementioned two historical periods in the following. First, I expect that political opening increases the likelihood of overall protests in Period 1. However, the elites‘ unwillingness to enter into an alliance and the immaturity of organizational capacity discourage both intra- and inter-movement protests. Consequently, single protests occur more often during a short, heightened cycle of protest. Compared to Period 1, I expect that repression decreases the frequency of overall protests and incapacitates opposition elites in Period 2. In this context, organizational constraints (i.e., the abeyance structure) further discourage collaboration between SMOs. Consequently, single protests outnumber collaborative protests during a prolonged period of demobilization. Also, radicalization occurs as network closure is promoted under this repressive period.

2-3: Data and Methods This chapter analyzes the distinctive patterns of protests in the early 1980s in Korea, based on both quantitative and qualitative data. First, I quantitatively examine the Korea‘s Democracy Movement Dataset (the KDM Dataset). The KDM Dataset allows me to show descriptive statistics regarding the contents and trends of protest events. Second, I construct network datasets by using the Stanford Korea Democracy Dataset (the Stanford KDP Dataset) on SMOs, since this dataset provides information about

SMOs and their members. Third, I provide qualitative evidence by referring to numerous in-depth interviews which I carried out with Korean social movement activists during my fieldwork in Korea. Finally, I frequently use various primary sources, personal memoirs, and historical studies when I describe important socio-political contexts and support my arguments. I will not repeat this section in Chapters 3 and 4, as they are based on the same datasets and methods.

2-4: Historical Context Before the democracy movement took off in the mid 1980s, there were important precedents of political protests in Korea‘s modern history. In the April 1960 Student Uprising, students led mass protests against President Syngman Rhee‘s attempt to extend his tenure for a third term. The protests pressured Rhee to resign from the presidency, but a subsequent military coup d'état, initiated by Park Chung Hee, succeeded in continuing authoritarianism in Korea for another two decades. Nonetheless, Park was a popular leader compared to Rhee, and his single-minded focus on Korea‘s economic development and modernization appealed to many Koreans‘ hope to live in better economic conditions. Aside from the student protests against normalizing relations between Korea and Japan in 1964 and 1965, the movements in the 1960s were very small, sporadic and short-lived. The 1970s was also a dark era marked by a low level of protests. In 1971, Park was elected president for a third term. In the same year, he invoked the garrison act, which closed all colleges indefinitely, and declared a state of emergency in December. In 1972, he passed the notorious Yusin (roughly translated as ‗revitalizing‘) Constitution, which paralyzed the National Assembly as well as political parties and concentrated all political power in the office of the president, giving Park the authority to promulgate emergency decrees at his will (Shorrock 1986; Kim 1995). Tenure restrictions for the presidency were lifted and indirect presidential elections were installed. By that time, it became evident that what Park pursued was a presidency for his lifetime and that he had no intention of realizing democratic principles in Korea. This structural condition motivated some segments of Korean people to engage in multiple protests in the early 1970s. However, the promulgation of Emergency Decrees (kin’gŭp choch’i) in 1974 and 1975 considerably suppressed protests as a whole (Chang 2008).

The Yusin structure collapsed when President Park was assassinated by the head of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) in October 1979. However, the shocking incident was followed by a military coup by a young Lieutenant-General named Chun Doo Hwan and his followers in less than two months. In the meantime, social movements grew substantially after a period of initial distress caused by the former President‘s assassination. The protests by workers and students swept the country in the first few months of 1980. The opposition parties resumed political activities and publicly demanded measures of democratization to be taken. Nevertheless, Chun already had been consolidating his power by appointing himself as the director of the KCIA in April, and declared martial law in May 17, ending the brief period of political freedom often referred to as the ―Seoul Spring,‖ named after the Prague Spring of 1968.5 Moreover, the massacre in Kwangju in late May showed how far the state was willing to go in the face of political defiance. When students and ordinary citizens demonstrated in the streets protesting martial law, the martial law troops were sent and killed a massive number of protesters. As the protest developed into an armed struggle which called for democratization and an end to the military rule, paratroopers and army troops entered the city and quelled the protest by a series of brutal massacres (Shin and Hwang 2003).6 After a short initial period of political freedom, Korea again fell under harsh authoritarianism. The repression, both structural and physical, suppressed protests until the dawn of liberalization in 1984. The period between May 1980 and 1984 is characterized by the development of students‘ underground activism and an overall demobilization, which will be explained later in this chapter.

5 This period was also referred to as ―foggy political situation [an’gae chŏngguk]‖ due to the coexistence of both worries about the military‘s potential actions with regard to the political instability and hopes for democratization (Kim 2005:345-46). 6 The Martial Law Command announced that 170 were dead (144 civilians, 22 soldiers, and 4 policemen) and 380 wounded (127 civilians, 109 soldiers, and 144 policemen) on June 2, but the number will go up if it includes those who died later from wounds (Shin 2003:xvii). A different data suggest that 234 were dead during the incident and more than 380 were wounded (Kim 2005:382). Moreover, the alleged involvement of the U.S. in allowing Chun to send troops to the site later became one of the key rallying points in the democracy movement throughout the mid to late 1980s and onward (Shorrock 1986; Shin 1996). 49

2-5: The Seoul Spring: A Surge of Protests (Period 1) 2-5-(1): Political Opening, Opposition Elites, and Protests Before delving into the details of Period 1, I start this section with a brief description of the broader pattern of protests in the early 1980s. Figure 2-1 demonstrates the monthly frequency of protest events (1980 - 1983) based on the KDM dataset. The long-dashed line represents the total number of protests each month. In general, the period from summer 1980 to the end of 1983 is marked by an extremely low level of protests in which the monthly frequency of protest events was kept under ten. The figure indicates that the peak of protests during this period was indeed in the Seoul Spring, 1980. The surge of protests in Period 1 was undoubtedly related to a change in political atmosphere.

Figure 2-1. Monthly Frequency of Different Types of Protests (1980 - 1983)

100

0 1980 1981 1982 1983

Single Intra Inter Total

Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset Notes: Intra = Intra-movement protests / Inter = Inter-movement protests

In spring 1980, protests became widespread, and SMOs began to be founded. Sudden political opening and freedom instigated by the death of Park Chung Hee offered significant opportunities for protests: for instance, 687 individuals who had violated the Emergency Decrees in the 1970s were reinstated in February (Hyun 2007:82). Those colleges that had been closed were finally allowed to reopen in March, and those students and professors who had been purged under the Park regime were able to return to their

schools. The plain-clothed policemen who had been monitoring suspicious student activities in the 1970s retreated from college campuses. On campus, therefore, students initiated movements to rebuild student associations and democratize their campuses. Starting in February, they created tentative organizations in order to build organizational bases for the formal student associations in the upcoming semester. In March and April of 1980, they engaged in massive demonstrations on campus that demanded freedom and democratization of college campuses; they criticized corruption in the college administrations or foundations, demanded pro-government professors to resign, and refused to comply with the military training.7 At last, the first formal student association was founded on March 28, 1980, at Seoul National University (Kyunghyang Sinmun, March 29, 1980). The elite universities such as Seoul National, Korea, and Yonsei University located in the Seoul area played a significant role in leading student activism in the 1980s. Industrial workers were as active as students in protests during this period.8 They participated in protests demanding wage increases or better working conditions, and began to create labor unions. In the 1970s, workers suffered from low income and poor working conditions as the state and the businesses focused on the rapid export-oriented industrialization, which required sacrifice from the low-wage, hard-working labor force (Koo 2001:4). Nonetheless, the labor activism was highly limited to the labor movement and was not extended to other issues such as democratization. Thus, their protests were generally detached from the political movements that were occurring outside their workplaces. In addition, the legacy of social movements in the 1970s persisted during this period. In-Seong Hwang, who was an activist-staff in the Christian Institute for the Study of Justice and Development (CISJD: han’guk kidokkyo sahoe munje yŏn’guwŏn) which

7 The first-years were required to receive compulsory military training for ten days, and the students‘ view of this regulation was that it was intended to militarize college campuses. The anti-military training movement started from Sungkyunkwan University in mid April. Because the media criticized the students for lacking a commitment to the national security, students decided to comply with the regulation in early May (Yu et al. 2005a:252-53). 8 According to the governmental statistics from the KOSIS (Korea Statistical Information Service), the number of labor disputes rose more than three-fold from 102 in 1979 to 407 in 1980. While 14,000 workers were involved in the disputes in 1979, 49,000 workers were in 1980. 51

was one of the prominent Christian prodemocracy SMOs in the 1970s, recalls this period as follows:

The Yusin era in the 1970s diversified the movement participants, but a moderate reform- orientated approach and political criticism were far more dominant than revolutionary ideas. Organized movements were scarce, too. When political opening emerged, the general attitude towards authorities was like, ―Could you please do this and that for us?‖ rather than ―We will do this and that.‖ The movements lacked alternatives….That was why protests were finished so quickly when the military came (Interview 07/31/08).

A lack of strong organizational infrastructure due to a prolonged period of an authoritarian rule and a dominance of reformist visions among activists hindered activists from systematically organizing movements. Moreover, the activists remained optimistic about institutional politics, anticipating that it would lead to democratization in due course. In relation to these inherent shortcomings or naiveté, the movements during this period did not enjoy support from opposition elites. In Period 1, opposition parties were able to function normally since political restrictions by the previous regime were lifted. The New Democratic Party (NDP: sinmindang) was the most powerful opposition party in the 1970s. The party had 61 seats (26%) out of a total 231 seats in the National Assembly since the general election in1978. Kim Young Sam, who had been one of the most influential prodemocracy politicians and a political rival of Kim Dae Jung in the 1970s, was the leader of the NDP since 1979. He had been dismissed from the National Assembly and put under house arrest since he demanded the United States withdraw its support of the Park regime in 1979, but he was able to resume his role as the leader of the NDP in the National Assembly in early 1980. Since the political opening caused by the former president‘s death, Kim Young Sam had been interested in preparing for the next presidential election based on the NDP. Kim Dae Jung also had the same ambition. Thus, the rivalry between the two Kims intensified when Kim Dae Jung wanted to enter the KDP. His negotiation with Kim Young Sam failed due to their competition around the party leadership. As Kim Dae Jung led a political SMO—the Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (CDR: minjujuŭiwa minjokt’ong’irŭl wihan kungmin yŏnhap) founded in March 1979, he gave up entering

the NDP and focused on strengthening the organization and his mass base in spring 1980 (Kim 2005:342-43). Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung had different approaches to social movements. Whereas the latter was supportive of disruptive protests, the former‘s view of social movement was that ―real‖ politics and the democracy movement should be differentiated (Kim 2005:343). Therefore, the NDP and its leader Kim Young Sam were not interested in forming an alliance with the social movement sector and maintained a distance from it. Even though their goal was to promote democratization through institutional politics, however, their philosophy was not effective under the Chun regime. What the NDP came up with during this period was to submit a resolution for the abolishment of martial law to the National Assembly on May 14, 1980. The NDP might have expected a synergy effect by this resolution as student protests were growing rapidly outside the National Assembly at the same moment. Nevertheless, the regime refused to pursue democratization. Instead, the Chun government expanded martial law on May 17 and deprived the politicians from the right from engaging in institutional politics.

2-5-(2): Organizational Constraints By April and May, student demonstrations and labor movements were widespread in Korea. The claims of the labor movement remained the same as its focus on economic demands did not change. However, there were significant transformations in the student movement in May. First, student movements were increasingly politicized and started to criticize the military government, demanding martial law to be lifted. Second, allies appeared. Intra-movement alliance developed when multiple colleges began to coordinate joint protests. For instance, on May 7, 1980, Chung-ang, Ewha Women‘s, Inha, Kookmin, Chungbuk, Chungnam, Youngnam, Wonkwang, Chosun University and Seoul National University of Technology staged a joint prodemocracy protest nationwide. On May 9, the representatives from 23 colleges had a meeting at Korea University and announced a declaration that demanded further democratization. In addition, inter-movement alliance emerged. Some professors supported the student movement by making declarations which pressed for liberalization of campus. On May 15, intellectuals also announced a declaration calling for democratization, followed by journalists‘ declaration against

media censorship on the next day. Movements were finally expanding and diffusing into other fields, stimulated by the series of student protests. However, despite active protests led by students, alliances rarely developed; coalitions were seldom created and the diversity of SMOs remained low, since movements did not penetrate into diverse movement communities. Moreover, organizational networks were scarce. Such an organizational structure contributed to the development of ideological flanks within the social movement sector. I elaborate on these points below. Figure 2-1 reveals that intra- and inter-movement protests were very rare in spring 1980, while single protests prevailed. The number of intra-movement protests slightly increased in May due to student protests, but inter-movement protests seldom took place. Table 2-1 exhibits this trend by each month, and Figure 2-2 shows it graphically. According to Table 2-1 and Figure 2-2, single protests occupy the majority of protest events from January to May 1980. It was not until April and May that both intra- and inter-movement protests substantially increased. My data suggests that the increased student protests and labor unrests did not strengthen solidarity within the social movement sector although intra-movement collaboration was becoming more frequent by May (31.9%).

Table 2-1. Monthly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (Jan - May 1980) 1980 Single Intra Inter Total January 2 (66.67) 1 (33.33) 0 (0.0) 3 (100) February 2 (66.7) 1 (33.3) 0 (0.0) 3 (100) March 12 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 12 (100) April 66 (80.5) 10 (12.2) 6 (7.3) 82 (100) May 45 (62.5) 23 (31.9) 4 (5.6) 72 (100) Total 133 (74.7) 35 (19.7) 10 (5.6) 172 (100) Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset Notes: Row percentages in parentheses

Figure 2-2. Monthly Percentage of Protests by Different Types (Jan - May 1980)

100.00

80.00

60.00

Percent 40.00

20.00

0.00 1980 1981 1982 1983

Single Intra Inter

Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset

Period 1 was plagued with serious organizational constraints. First, organizational infrastructure was underdeveloped as the movements in Period 1 were without strong coalitions. Students were in fact quite effective in mobilizing students at different campuses. When students began to address political issues in early May, they decided to wage a street demonstration, which ended up mobilizing 70,000 students in the plaza of the Seoul Station on May 14. On the next day, about 100,000 students protested against martial law. Hundreds of thousands of students from over 60 colleges protested nationwide. However, the student leadership lacked organizational bases to deal with the unexpectedly large number of participants since student activities had been restrained for many years. There were no student coalitions or liaison committees that could bridge between different colleges let alone inter-movement linkages (Kim 1988:96). The organizational infrastructure was not fully ingrained as student organizations were in an embryonic stage, mostly due to years of state repression (Si-Chun Yu 2007:54). Incapable of expanding their struggle into a mass protest, students retreated from the street when the fear of a military intervention clouded the leadership. A few hours later, the student leaders were arrested by the soldiers and martial law was expanded. The consequence of the retreat was bitter.

Table 2-2. Types of Social Groups during Protests (Jan - May 1980) Social Group Jan Feb Mar Apr May Total % Total Students 2 7 35 40 84 (45.41) Workers 3 1 3 39 23 69 (37.30) Professors 1 6 7 (3.78) Miners 4 1 5 (2.70) Protestants 2 1 3 (1.62) Political parties 1 1 2 (1.08) Citizen 2 2 (0.54) Small businesses 1 1 (0.54) Intellectuals 1 1 (0.54) Journalists 1 1 (0.54) Catholics 1 1 (0.54) Lawyers 1 1 (0.54) Chaeya individuals 1 1 (0.54) Chaeya organizations 1 1 (0.54) Politicians 1 1 (0.54) Prisoners of conscience 1 1 (0.54) Residents 1 1 (0.54) Poor people 1 1 (0.54) Family 1 1 (0.54) Other 1 1 (0.54) Total 3 3 12 87 80 185 (100.00) Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset Notes: Column percentages in parentheses

Second, the participants in protests were not very diverse. Table 2-2 shows the types of social groups that participated in protests during Period 1 from the KDM Dataset. The categorization of each social group is generally based on what is reported in the original sourcebook. Even though almost twenty different groups appeared during protests as a whole, a small segment of groups dominate the landscape; students (45%) and workers (37%) occupy more than 80% of the total number of groups. Beside them, the other groups take up less than 5% of total groups that joined protests. Although the student movement prevailed in Period 1, it lacked active interactions and alliances with other social forces as well as systematically organizing struggles (Yi 1997:59-60; Oh 1988:13). Inter-movement alliance was rare in spring 1980. As I mentioned earlier, the labor unrests were in no relation with the prodemocracy protests led by students. Students occasionally supported the workers‘ struggles in their slogans, but workers did not join political protests. They were preoccupied with addressing economic demands rather than extending their interest into political issues. 56

Likewise, opposition politicians outside the parliament did not collaborate with students although they had been active as a part of the broad democracy movement in the past (Oh 1988:13). The Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (CDR) was one of the political organizations where Kim Dae Jung retained leadership. He was affirmative of organizing a popular movement for democracy (Donga Ilbo, May 2, 1980), and the CDR accordingly maintained its critical stance towards the government.9 For example, on May 7, the CDR announced a declaration and argued that martial law should be lifted and Chun Doo Hwan should resign from the office. The CDR also verbally supported the student movement by stating that the government should listen to the students and begin democratization (Hankuk Ilbo, May 4, 1980). However, politicians were not interested in collaborative protests with students. In sum, opposition politicians tended to keep a substantial distance from the student movement and focused on a moderate strategy of announcing prodemocracy declarations on their own. Moreover, other activists such as Christians, intellectuals and journalists remained relatively passive. Their inter-movement alliance was largely limited to written declarations, which had been one of the most popular protest tactics in the 1970s. This moderate tactic did not result in direct participation in demonstrations, which exemplified a profound generational gap between them and college students. Even though the support from intellectuals and journalists rose by mid May, protests quickly demobilized as a whole when they were met with harsh repression. Also, students were unable to provoke participation from ordinary citizens when they rallied in front of the Seoul Station. The pedestrians were just watching the protest scene from a distance (Hyun 2007:91). To sum up, SMOs in Period 1 can be described as islands of opposition. Although the political vacuum created by Park Chung Hee‘s assassination revived prodemocracy protests in general, this political opportunity did not translate into collaborative protests due to the limitation in SMOs‘ organizational capacity to build alliances. Also, the five- month period was too short for SMOs to build strong organizational bases and expand their organizational capacity. For these reasons, the protests tended to be clustered within each movement group and SMOs were not able to instigate active participation from other fields.

9 Kim‘s political activities were suspended in the Park regime, but he was reinstated in March 1, 1980. 57

2-6: Social Movements in Abeyance (Period 2) 2-6-(1): Repression and Demobilization The Seoul Spring was over. The period from late May 1980 to 1983 was another dark age for social movements. Even Christians‘ prayer meetings were not free from repression, which had generally been conceded in the 1970s.10 Table 2-3 shows yearly counts of different types of protests from June 1980 to 1983. The number of total annual protests ranged from 14 to 46 events. Throughout this period, single protests continued to be more than 80 percent of total protests every year. Both intra- and inter-movement protests remained under ten events each year, even though they became slightly more numerous in the second half of the given period than the first. Note that earlier in this chapter, Table 2-1 showed that the number of protests from January to May 1980 totaled 178 events. The protests that occurred in five months were more numerous than those over three years. This comparison reconfirms the fact that Period 2 was a very difficult time for SMOs to mobilize.

Table 2-3. Yearly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (June 1980 - 1983) Single Intra Inter Total 1980 (6–12) 13 (92.9) 1 (7.1) 0 (0.0) 14 (100) 1981 28 (90.3) 3 (9.7) 0 (0.0) 31 (100) 1982 38 (82.6) 4 (8.7) 4 (8.7) 46 (100) 1983 28 (80.0) 6 (17.1) 1 (2.9) 35 (100) Total 107 (84.9) 14 (11.1) 6 (4.0) 126 (100) Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset Notes: Row percentages in parentheses

The period of harsh repression began by the expansion of martial law at 12 a.m. on May 17, 1980, which mandated suspension of all political activities, prohibition of indoor and outdoor meetings and demonstrations, and an indefinite closure of colleges. Moreover, earlier in the evening, the police stormed into Ewha University and arrested, in the middle of a meeting, 55 presidents of the student associations who had retreated from

10 The prayer meetings were prohibited from late 1979 to February 1982. The Christian SMOs such as the Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC), the Ecumenical Youth Council (EYC) in Korea, and the Korea Student Christian Federation (KSCF) frequently encountered repression by the state even though they pursued non-disruptive strategies and focused on human rights issues (See Hwang 2007). 58

the street demonstration on that day. The government agents also entered the houses of other student activists and arrested them. Those politicians and journalists who had been critical of the government were no exception. The expansion of martial law fueled protests the next day in Kwangju, which retained a long history of defiance and was a locus of support for Kim Dae Jung. The Kwangju uprising lasted approximately ten days, but the military repressed the movement with massive physical violence (see Shin and Hwang 2003). The details about the Kwangju massacre might not have been widely publicized in Period 2 because of the heavy media censorship, but the effect of structural and physical repression on protests was instantaneous. In this section, I describe the features of structural and physical repression, focusing on those which were actively employed in the early 1980s.

Structural Repression As protests seriously declined due to the fear caused by the massacre, Chun quickly introduced several key measures to fully control the society and consolidate his rule. The National Security Law (NSL) was one of the most effective ways to control political dissent. The NSL often targeted individuals whom the government believed were communists or sympathizers of the North Korean Communist regime. While anti- communism was the rhetorical justification to implement the NSL, it was also used to arrest and incarcerate dissidents who participated in anti-government protests and to repress basic political rights. For those in the democracy movement, the NSL was the symbol of structural repression. The NSL was frequently invoked throughout the 1980s. Beside the NSL, several key measures also were taken by politicians, students, workers, and the media to deal with the potential political unrest in the early 1980s:

1) Political Banning: Chun proclaimed a new Constitution in October 1980, dissembled the National Assembly and political parties, and established indirect elections for president.11 The Legislative Council for National Security (kukka powi ippŏp hoeŭi), which was controlled by the congressmen appointed solely by the president, banned

11 What was different from the 1970s was that the new Constitution stated that presidential terms were to be restricted to seven years. 59

political activities from the politicians until 1988. Obviously this special law, named ―the Special Law for Revitalizing Political Customs (chŏngch’i p’ungt’o swaesinŭl wihan t’ŭkpyŏlchoch’i pŏban),‖ targeted those who had fought for democratization in the 1970s, such as Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung, who were later elected president in the 1990s. Kim Young Sam was put under a long house arrest, and Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to death in 1981 for his alleged involvement in a conspiracy of a rebellion.12 The political restriction was maintained without any change until 1984. As a result, there were no strong opposition parties within the National Assembly in Period 2. Although there were a couple of non-government political parties that were able to maintain congressional seats, they were not viable opposition parties since they lacked both criticism towards the regime and were completely excluded from the state‘s decision- making processes.

2) Control over Colleges: After Park Chung Hee‘s assassination, college students actively demanded the freedom of their campuses (hagwŏn chayulhwa) by organizing student associations and rallying on campus in early 1980. Because student protests were extremely heated and widespread, interim President Choi Kyu Hah announced a special statement on April 14, 1980, asking the demonstrators to calm down. After martial law in May, many policemen and secret agents, who were often plain-clothed in order to obscure their identity, were dispatched to college campuses and camped there until the mid 1980s. According to an interview with a former student activist at Seoul National University, one of the elite universities in Korea, the police did not hesitate to throw gas shells even when there were only three students hanging out on the lawns (Interview with Ki-Sik Kim, 4/29/2008). The state put an extremely tight surveillance on college campuses on a daily basis in order to prevent student movements. The autonomous student associations were replaced by the state-controlled student organization called the National Student Defense Corps (NSDC: hakto hoguktan).13

12 As international pressures against the death sentence increased, the Chun government reduced the sentence to a life sentence, and then to 20 years of imprisonment. As the execution was suspended in 1982, Kim sought political asylum in the United States from 1983 to 1985. 13 The NSDC was originally created in the late 1940s in order to control college students in a military-like organizational structure. The NSDC was intended to draft students into armies when a war breaks out. Also, both university staff and students were members of the organization, which constrained the autonomy of 60

Moreover, starting from late 1981, students were forcibly drafted into the military. The Chun government sent student protesters and activists to the military, and they were heavily monitored and harassed during the training process. Si-Min Yu, a student activist in the 1980s and currently a politician, said in his statement of an appeal to the court in 1985, ―I realized that being alive was no more a blessing than a shame when they shaved my hair on the eve of the military entrance.‖ He also mentioned, ―The criticism on us is not because a fine young man turned into a scoundrel, but because this era is unjust enough to create the most devoted fighters out of the most docile individuals‖ (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1987:421-25). Many of those student activists who had been repressed by the state in various ways deeply resented it, which sowed the seeds of their continued anti-government struggles afterwards.

3) Labor Policies: On August 21, 1980, the government ordered the ―Purification of Labor Unions (nodong chohap chŏnghwa chich’im),‖ which was followed a week later by more repression of labor unions. For example, labor unions could not engage in any disputes, and they had to report to the Labor Office anyone who started an unlawful disruption in the workplace. In August, the government dissolved 118 unions, and in September, it forced 191 union leaders to resign. The arrested union leaders were those who had led sit-ins or other kinds of labor activism. Simply put, ―purification‖ meant suppression of independent union activities. The new labor law banned industrial unions and regional labor federations, effectively weakening intra-movement alliances among workers. Moreover, the law banned the third party‘s intervention in labor disputes, the goal of which was to prevent workers from forming inter-movement alliance with others such as student activists.

4) Media Acts: The Chun government employed several repressive measures to control the media. The attempt started by arresting eight progressive journalists and editors in June 1980. The Press Association was submissive to governmental pressure

students. However, the NSDC, reestablished in 1980, had only student members. By 1982, students were able to participate in its election processes, which gradually democratized the organization. Moreover, student activists deliberately penetrated the organization and controlled the leadership (Seoul taehakkyo 60nyŏsa p‘yŏnch‘an wiwŏnhoe [the Editing Committee] 2006:792-815). 61

and released ―Our Determination on Voluntary Purification (chayul chŏnghwa kyŏrŭi)‖ in July. They cooperated with the government in ―purifying‖ the media by prohibiting liberal journalism. Thus, 933 journalists were fired and 172 periodical publications were discontinued.14 In September 1980, the Basic Media Act (ŏllon kibonpŏp) was passed, which was designed to endow the government with full control over media issues. Moreover, in November, a massive media integration (ŏllon t’ongp’yehap) was forced by Chun Doo Hwan‘s military regime. The government began merging and abolishing several media companies: two broadcasting companies, Donga Pangsong and Tongyang Pangsong, were closed and three newspaper companies, Chŏnnam Ilbo, Chŏnnam Maeil, and Kwangju Ilbo, were discontinued. The severe censorship on the media seriously weakened journalists‘ movements in the early 1980s.

Physical Repression Physical repression was as harsh as structural repression. Overall, the repression was perceived to be more severe than in the 1970s because of the strong impact of the Kwangju massacre. In-Seong Hwang recalls, ―Activism used to end with an imprisonment in the Yusin era, but after Kwangju, we realized that people could get killed! So whatever you did, it was risky and tense‖ (Interview 07/31/08). The tragedy was that the Kwangju massacre was only the beginning. One of the most notorious examples was the ―purification camps (samch’ŏng kyoyuktae).‖ The establishment of the camps was based on Emergency Regulation 13 announced on August 4, 1980, which was designed to punish street rogues. However, among those who were sent to the camps, a substantial number were former social movement activists. The regulation was used by the state as a means of retaliation against political troublemakers. Activists were sent to the camps in order to ―purify‖ their rebellious minds and convert them into docile subjects of the state. The trainees received harsh military trainings and inhumane treatment in the camps typically located inside the military grounds. The first rule in the camp was ―those who try to escape or agitate others be shot dead‖ (Kim 2005:469). Moreover, even after returning to ordinary life, the ex-

14 Among the 172 periodicals, 120 were paid magazines (23% of total paid magazines) and 52 were free (5.3% of total free magazines). This totaled 12% of total periodicals excluding daily magazines and correspondence. In terms of paid magazines, it was one-fourth of the total (Yu et al. 2005:287). 62

trainees kept having trouble getting employed due to their particular background and were investigated by state agents at every residential move they planned.15 In addition, protesters were heavily repressed. Particularly, college campuses were under tight surveillance of the secret agents and plain-clothed policemen. Until 1983, writing political slogans was a sufficient reason for an arrest or a forced military draft (Interview with Jeong-Ok Hwang, 08/11/08). According to Jin-Woo Joo, who entered college in 1983, ―The protesters were caught a few seconds after they shouted out their slogans. It became quite a story when they made it for one minute‖ (Interview 08/06/08). In order to buy time until repression, students often resorted to dangerous tactics. They tied their bodies with a rope, hung themselves from the rooftop of a building, and shouted out political slogans until the police came after them. This tactic caused severe injuries, and even the death of a student protester, Chŏng-Ha Hwang, in November 1983. Moreover, a few student activists risked their lives by plunging from a tall building after shouting their slogans.16 There were several attempts to revive street protests among students, but the state was extremely quick to find out the leaders and destroyed their organizational bases. The ‗Murim‘ and ‗Hangnim (Hak-rim)‘ Incidents were among the most well-known cases with regard to the state agents‘ organizational repression. The ‗Murim‘ Incident was instigated by a demonstration at Seoul National University led by an underground student group on December 11, 1980. The police arrested the protesters and subsequently arrested other student leaders who were active underground. The organizational structure, membership, networks, and decision-making procedures were all disclosed by a series of excruciating interrogations. In less than two weeks, all the students who were related to the organization were arrested. This student organization was called ‗Murim‘ by the police, meaning that the ‗organization [rim]‘ had been hidden in a ‗mist [mu]‘ (Yu et al. 2005a:292-97; Chun 2007:171-72).

15 According to the year 2002‘s statistics released by the Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths, 60,755 were arrested based on the Emergency Regulation 13; 40,347 received military trainings; 339 died from the reasons related to the trainings; and 2,700 suffered from crippling injuries (Kim 2005:470). 16 Ta‘e-Hun Kim, a student at Seoul National University, died from a fall after shouting ―Down with Chun Doo Hwan‖ in May 1981. Kyŏng-Hŭi Yang, a student at Yonsei University, was injured from a fall in November 1981. 63

The ‗Hangnim (Hak-rim)‘ Incident was based on a larger student organization called the ―National Democratic Students‘ League (NDSL: chŏn’guk minju haksaeng yŏnmaeng),‖ which was a secret underground student SMO that aspired to grow into a national student umbrella organization. The NDSL was well-organized and militant, and succeeded in leading several student protests in spring 1981.17 However, its leaders were soon arrested and convicted in early June, one of whom received a life sentence. This incident was named ‗Hangnim (Hak-rim)‘ by the police, meaning ‗students‘ [hak] organization [rim]‘ (Yu et al. 2005a:298-303). In sum, due to the physical brutality of state repression and structural repression through various legal measures, social movements tended to be silenced during Period 2. The authoritarian state based on military leadership was capable of harsh, extensive repression, and willing to crack down on dissent. Even a small cell of an SMO was immediately discovered and eradicated by the state. Bu-Young Yi, who was one of the most famous journalist activists in the 1970s, recollects, ―It was as if George Orwell‘s 1984 was staged out here in Korea‖ (Interview 08/28/08). However, this phase of demobilization and frustration led to the development of the abeyance structure within social movements, which became the precursor of the later activism in the mid 1980s. The next section deals with the organizational structure that emerged under the harsh authoritarian rule.

2-6-(2): Organizational Constraints: Abeyance Structure and Network Closure Organizational Infrastructure Since repression was ruthless, organizational infrastructure for alliance was stunted in Period 2. A ―spillover‖ of one movement to another requires mechanisms that bridge between them such as organizational coalitions (Meyer and Whittier 1994). However, activists could not dare to build above-ground coalitions. When it was difficult enough to build and sustain individual SMOs, making coalitions was almost unimaginable. As seen by the Hangnim Incident, those who tried to secretly create a

17 The NDSL had about 30 student members from 12 colleges over the country and 210 students in reserve. This SMO defined students as ―problem-raisers‖ and workers as ―problem-solvers,‖ claiming that students should lead movements and mobilize the labor (Kim 1988:99). 64

coalition among students were quickly caught and punished by the state.18 The state was extremely skilled at infiltration since its security agency had been well-developed for the past several decades. In this situation, making a formal coalition was not a viable option for activists as any impetuous action could result in a significant loss of leaders and members. To make matters worse, incarceration of an organization‘s leader could compromise his entire organization. The government agents often cracked down on an SMO after extorting insider information through interrogating—often torturing—the arrested activists (Kim 2005:403-07). Forming alliances across movements was very costly during this period. Nonetheless, note that this period was not without an effort to create intra- and inter-movement alliances. For instance, the Korean Christian Farmers‘ Federation (han’guk kidokkyo nongminhoe ch’ongyŏnhaphoe) was created in March 1982, for the purpose of advocating farmers‘ rights. Compared to students, Christians were in a relatively better position to create formal organizations as they were considered politically neutral rather than subversive. Also, several young chaeya activists founded the Youth Coalition for Democracy Movement (YCDM: minjuhwa undong ch’ŏngnyŏn yŏnhap) in September 30, 1983, and promoted solidarity across movements. The YCDM opened the door for inter-movement protests in the mid 1980s. The term ―chaeya‖ literally means ―out in the field,‖ and indicates those who are excluded from institutional politics but engage in political movements. I define the chaeya as semi-professional or professional activists who are mostly intellectuals (e.g., writers, journalists) and religious leaders, many of whom came from a student-activist background. Many chaeya activists were semi-professional because an activist career did not provide enough income to live on. They commonly had other occupations such as small business owner, writer, or church pastor in order to make a living, although fulltime activist careers did exist in several formal longstanding SMOs such as Christian SMOs. As long as activists identified themselves as broad prodemocracy fighters rather than narrowly as industry-specific activists (e.g., student activist), I tend to include them in the chaeya category. Nevertheless, I deliberately distinguish the chaeya group from

18 Moreover, the Hangnim group‘s aspiration to create a national umbrella student SMO based on a top- down structure was later criticized as overly ambitious given the repressive situation (Oh 1988:29). 65

opposition politicians for my analytic purpose and conceptual clarity, although the term was applicable to the well-known opposition politicians in the 1970s.19 In addition to the chaeya‘s movements, students became increasingly active in politicizing industrial workers based on their strategy of labor organizing—labor praxis. They disguised themselves as workers in the factories and created small groups within each factory to help the workers organize unions. However, such a strategy seldom crystallized into the creation of a labor union because the student activists‘ attempt at organizing a union often encountered repression by the businesses and the police. Upon being caught, the student activists were blacklisted by the security agency and were prohibited from employment (Koo 2001:102).20 Coping with the repression, students laid the foundation of the student-worker solidarity.

Organizational Diversity The diversity of the SMOs that participated in protests declined from Period 1 since civic organizations and public gatherings were prohibited by law. The average of the monthly Simpson Diversity Index yields .46 for Period 1 and .34 for Period 2.21 For reference, the diversity index for the period 1984 - 1992 is .64, which is substantially higher than Period 1 and 2. A decrease in diversity means that heterogeneity of social movement groups that join protests declined. With the low degree of diversity among the SMOs that participated in protests, the potential for a collaborative protest was limited.

19 The chaeya was composed of a wide range of age groups. For instance, the Reverend Moon Ik-Hwan, who was born in 1918, was commonly identified as a chaeya activist as he pursued broad prodemocracy activism rather than a religious movement. The youngest age group in the chaeya was in their thirties in the 1980s, most of whom had experienced student activism while at college in the 1970s. One such example is Keun-Tae Kim, who was born in 1947, became active in the student movement in the 1970s, and served as the first president at a chaeya SMO—the YCDM—in the 1980s. 20 The government and the media addressed the activists as ―pro-communists, agitators, and troublemakers who were only interested in creating problems instead of being genuinely concerned about the welfare of workers or the nation‖ (Lee 2007:261). 21 The Simpson Diversity Index is calculated with the following equation: S n 2 D  i1 i N 2

Where ni is the number of events participated by each social group in a month‘s time and S is the total number of social groups in the month. The denominator N is the total sum of the number of events participated by all groups in the month. The index (D) ranges between 0 (no diversity, only one group participating in that month) and 1 (a theoretical possibility of complete diversity). 66

Table 2-4. Types of Social Groups during Protests (June 1980 - 1983) Jun - Dec Social Group 1981 1982 1983 Total 1980 Workers 4 (20.00) 9 (29.03) 19 (36.54) 14 (38.89) 46 (33.09) Students 10 (50.00) 15 (48.39) 12 (23.08) 7 (19.44) 44 (31.65) Protestants 1 (3.23) 7 (13.46) 2 (5.56) 10 (7.19) Prisoners 2 (3.85) 3 (8.33) 5 (3.60) Prisoners of conscience 2 (6.45) 1 (1.92) 1 (2.78) 4 (2.88) Intellectuals 1 (3.23) 1 (1.92) 1 (2.78) 3 (2.16) Catholics 3 (5.77) 3 (2.16) Chaeya individuals 1 (1.92) 2 (5.56) 3 (2.16) Family 1 (3.23) 1 (1.92) 1 (2.78) 3 (2.16) Farmers 2 (5.56) 2 (1.44) Politicians 1 (3.23) 1 (2.78) 2 (1.44) Youths 1 (2.78) 1 (0.72) Small businesses 1 (1.92) 1 (0.72) Buddhists 1 (3.23) 1 (0.72) Other religions 1 (1.92) 1 (0.72) Lawyers 1 (1.92) 1 (0.72) Residents 1 (1.92) 1 (0.72) Poor people 1 (1.92) 1 (0.72) Women‘s SMOs 1 (2.78) 1 (0.72) Other 6 (30.00) 6 (4.32) Total 20 (100) 31 (100) 52 (100) 36 (100) 139 (100) Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset Notes: Column percentages in parentheses

Table 2-4 exhibits the types of social groups that joined protests in Period 2. Similar to Period 1, students (32%) and workers (33%) occupy the majority of total groups. However, note that there were some differences. First, Christians‘ role slightly increased. Churches used to play a crucial role as a sanctuary for social movements in the 1970s as authorities were more tolerant towards them than other movements. The state was concerned with being accused of religious persecution by the international communities. Since repression was severe in the early 1980s, churches resumed their role as providers of a political shelter for activists. Second, the proportion of students decreased over the three years. Relative to this trend, the salience of workers increased. This shift shows that students‘ organizational structure during abeyance hindered protests, and also points to the student activists‘ increasing emphasis on labor organizing.22 In this

22 This trend suggests that the student underground activism was sowing the seeds for the future labor movement. However, such movements were not documented well when they did not lead to substantial protest activities. Since many students disguised themselves as workers and secretly endeavored to create 67

sense, although collaborative protests seldom took place in Period 2, the potential for alliance seems to have slowly enhanced underground.

Organizational Networks In this section, I show how a repressive environment affects SMOs‘ ability to build linkages among themselves. With detailed data from the Stanford KDP Dataset on SMOs, I analyze organizational networks during the repressive period (1980 - 1983). In Korea, there was no organizational directory for the SMOs until the 1990s because making a comprehensive list of the SMOs could endanger the SMOs by inviting state repression. Moreover, it was almost impossible to list all the SMOs because of the prevalence of underground organizations. The Stanford KDP Dataset on SMOs was compiled by the Korea Democracy Foundation in the early 2000s, and the researchers retrospectively chose the SMOs that significantly contributed to the democracy movement including labor unions and progressive research institutions. Therefore, the data selection was biased towards popular, leading SMOs. This inevitably makes the data less reliable as a comprehensive source of mapping the entire social movement sector in the 1980s. However, the dataset can show rough snapshots of interorganizational linkages between the relatively well-known SMOs, thereby revealing the leadership structure of the social movement sector. Despite its limitations, I propose that an examination of the dataset illuminates how the leadership structure changed over time in the organizational networks that formed around the theme of democratization. The Stanford KDP Dataset on SMOs contains information about 278 SMOs and 1,378 members in the SMOs, who are likely to be leaders or well-known members. I created two-mode networks by organizations and members through joint memberships each year, and converted them into one-mode networks based on such organizational linkages. I used the NodeXL software to map the patterns and examined SMOs‘ networks through joint memberships—whether or not two SMOs have shared a leader in the past. As a result, I find that the networks are extremely sparse in all years. For each year, less than 10 SMOs appear to be active. In 1980, 1982, and 1983, only two labor unions,

labor unions in factories, their efforts tended to go unnoticed by the mainstream media. This inherent bias towards above-ground protests limits the scope of the KDM dataset as well. 68

which are the same across the periods, are connected through a joint membership. In 1981, two pairs of edges exist—between two labor unions and between a student SMO and a labor union. In short, linkages between the SMOs in the early 1980s were far from being dense. Since the Stanford KDP Dataset contains information about relatively well-known SMOs, it does not have adequate information about which SMOs were active in the early 1980s, during which underground activism was highly prevalent. Most likely, the dataset excludes secret underground groups based on colleges or small groups in factories. The lack of data on SMOs during this period implies the inherent danger of activism in the early Chun era and suggests a limitation of the dataset. During the abeyance structure that emerged under dogged repression, SMOs developed a unique coping mechanism by becoming more inwardly oriented than cultivating inter-movement alliances. College students were the most active in capitalizing on an alternative organizational structure in which they could continue to engage in protest activities. The student circles—extracurricular clubs—played a crucial role as underground SMOs, which were typically addressed as ―underground circles [ŏndŏssŏk’ŭl].‖ According to Jeong (1982), it was estimated that more than 70 underground circles existed in colleges over the country around 1982. As the circles remained underground and secretive, it is plausible that more circles were active than what was estimated. According to the social movement theory discussed earlier, small SMOs with a few committed members tend to proliferate during abeyance, preserving organizational identity, value, and culture (Rupp and Taylor 1987; Taylor 1989). In the same way, the abeyance structure reproduced a small number of dedicated student activists based on underground student SMOs in Korea. Here I elaborate on the particular organizational structure and ideological trend that emerged during abeyance. The most active SMOs during abeyance were the secret underground circles maintained by students, as the SMOs in other fields were almost paralyzed during this period. The circles had a very distinct organizational structure characterized by 1) a strict hierarchy based on clearly defined role sets, 2) a centralized military-like command structure between ranks, and 3) a small number of dedicated members filtered by

organizational and quasi-natural selection processes. This tendency was feeding into the radicalization of the student movement. In the early 1980s, underground circles were no doubt the center of student activism. Even the above-ground student circles, which were supposed to focus on non- political student activities, were actually based on secret underground organizations (Interview with Jong-Joo Yi, 07/22/08). Above-ground circles were very few in number. By 1983, the organizational structure of the underground student activism was firmly established in the case of Seoul National University, which generally assumed the leadership of the student movement in Korea. Given the role played by this college, it is very likely that its organizational structure was widely replicated on other college campuses. First, adopting the practice of cell differentiation in the tradition of communist insurgencies, the student circles developed a hierarchical cell structure, in which different roles were assigned to different cohorts: the first-years and sophomores were at the bottom of the hierarchy under the guidance of the juniors, and the goal of their ideological trainings—often referred to as ―conscientization [ŭisikhwa]‖—was fostering dedicated activists. Juniors played the most active roles; they were responsible for infusing radical ideologies into the first-years and the sophomores, participating in protests as well as organizing labor in the factories or farms and organizing events such as retreats.23 While the first-years, sophomores, and juniors had face-to-face interactions based on a cell structure, seniors and above retained invisible leadership of the entire circle which was composed of multiple cells. The roles played by the fifth-years and above were similar to the seniors except that they provided the seniors with future strategies and their prognoses of the political situations, often in the form of political pamphlets (Eun 2003:208-09). Within each circle, the roles were distributed to members based on a seniority- based hierarchy. Furthermore, the organizational structure of each circle was not fully disclosed to its members due to cell differentiation. One cell was composed of several

23 The readings dealt with a wide range of topics. For instance, students read about the history of Korea, Korean economy, the Soviet Revolution, activism in the Third World, dependency theory, Marx-Leninism, Mao‘s communist theory as well as various essays related to the class perspective, many of which were banned by the state (Eun 2003:213). 70

freshmen and a few number of sophomores and juniors. Cell members hardly knew senior activists who actually controlled the larger circle. In this closed organizational structure, members of each cell closely interacted with others on campus on a daily basis, and received orders from the hidden leadership (e.g., time and place for a demonstration). They collectively engaged in political discussions and various group activities (e.g., retreat, farming experience during summer breaks), which fostered a sense of community. Second, given the repressive situation, students strived to protect themselves from counterintelligence as they worried about preemptive raids on their organizations by the secret agency. Just as secret societies tend to maximize security under risk (Erickson 1981), student activists wanted to keep their organizations secure. One of the ways they used was to carefully control the amount of information transmitted between cells based on a centralized military-like command structure. The chain of command was kept secret, so only those who engaged in direct information transmission knew each other. This was a common practice in communist movements elsewhere (Gerlach and Hine 1970:69). Each cell was articulated to a central command post rather than laterally to a group of linked cells. Although each cell retained a closed structure based on each department or division, cells were secretly connected to the central leadership structure on campus. A small number of senior students in a circle had a dual membership when they were recruited into a central SMO formed amongst the leaders of all underground circles on campus, which was called ―control tower.‖ This uppermost cell provided a leadership in all circles. Thus, the student movement on each campus had both central control and segmented structure. According to Jong-Joo Yi, who entered Seoul National University in 1983, the circles were arranged on the basis of a centralized structure and confidentiality: ―A small number of cadre at the top secretly hand-picked the members of their organization. So, the leadership knew what the organization looked like, but the rank-and-files had absolutely no idea—they only knew who picked them. It was a deliberate strategy because the members would be identified so easily by the police if all knew the organizational structure. This secretive structure did not change until the mid 1980s‖ (Interview 07/22/08). The tree-like (or pyramid) structure in a graph-theoretical term enhanced security: even when a member was arrested and interrogated by state agents, he was hardly

capable of revealing the entire movement networks operating on campus, unless he was among the cadre. This type of network structure may not resemble what is typically conceived of as a network closure based on a loop-like shape, but protected members from external threats by cutting off the campus movement networks from the outside world. In this sense, the abeyance structure created a movement enclave on campus and provided a network closure with maximum security. Third, the circles tended to be kept small because membership required a strong commitment to the movement‘s cause. Circles were popular among students, so the circles used to attract many members in the beginning of a semester every year. However, the political critiques and discussions on the basis of radical texts within the circles were intimidating or overwhelming to students, if they were exhilarating at the same time. The political nature of core circle activities led to an organizational selection process by which only those interested in political debates and trainings remained as members. Moreover, membership often required a sacrifice in terms of the academic aspect of college life, and becoming a committed activist commonly entailed various risks such as expulsion from school, imprisonment, and strong objections from family. This high-risk situation triggered a quasi-natural selection process by which only highly committed students were chosen. Except for a few students, many dropped out over time (Interview with Jong-Joo Yi, 07/22/08). Without a strong devotion to the movement that a circle promoted, it was simply difficult to survive in it. In the end, the most committed students were selected as core members of circles. Because of this radical selectivity, radicalization of the student movement ensued.

Development of Ideological Flanks Due to the secretive organizational structure and a focus on hard-core ideological training, the underground circles became the hothouse of radicalism. The abeyance structure facilitated a cultivation of leftist ideologies and a reproduction of leaders armed with such ideologies. Network closure intensified the radicalizing tendency by reinforcing norms and sanctions between members based on ideological doctrines. There were some precedents of underground student circles in the 1970s and even earlier, which nurtured leftist ideals. Although they were much less stable and organized

than those in the 1980s (Han and Hŏ 1985), they provided a valuable organizational experience for student activism that blossomed later. In the circles, students studied Korean history, economy, and political reality, and participated in protests. Several student circles, such as the Study Group for Korean Culture (hang’uk munhwa yŏn’guhoe) and the Study Group for Korean Society (hang’uk sahoe yŏn’guhoe), were the predecessors of the 1980s‘ student organizations at Seoul National University. While the former focused on the political struggle by students, the latter emphasized politicizing workers (Eun 2003; Kim 1988:95). These two traditions were important origins of the 1980s‘ student activism. Historically, the development of radicalism was largely based on the minjung ideology originated from the 1970s‘ movements. The term ‗minjung‘ literally denotes common people, but it retains a strong association with working class, or the oppressed (Lee 2007:5). The minjung ideology is based on a realization that the people including workers, farmers and the urban poor are oppressed by the modern capitalist structure and that they should be the protagonists of economic and political struggles.24 Influenced by the 1970s‘ tradition of the minjung movement, students radicalized even further in the early 1980s because of several important reasons: First, the Kwangju massacre provided the most important turning point for many student activists as well as other activists in the 1980s. Students felt especially guilty for their retreat from the protest a few days before the massacre. Reflecting on the tragic incident, student activists agreed on the following points: first, the Kwangju incident revealed the brutality of the Chun regime. Second, more devoted and better-organized activism is imperative in order to lead minjung. Third, to overcome the limitation of the 1970s‘ movement, the working class should be politicized and mobilized, modeled after the protesters in Kwangju.25 Lastly, the movement should focus on advancing national

24 The minjung ideology was theoretically influenced by the dependency theory of the Third World, Freire‘s Pedagogy of the Oppressed, and neo-Marxism. In Korean context, the labor struggles exemplified by a young textile worker T‘ae-Il Chŏn‘s self-immolation protest in 1970 stimulated discussions around class consciousness and class-oriented activism (Eun 2003:205). By the late 1970s, students became deeply concerned of workers who were suffering from inhumane conditions (Koo 2001:105), which later developed into discussions on how to awaken their class consciousness and help them to make their voices heard. 25 The Kwangju uprising was viewed as a heroic struggle against a repressive state. The protesters in Kwangju formed the Citizen‘s Army and resisted the military attacks. At the same time, they maintained 73

autonomy since foreign countries such as the United States were supportive of the Chun government (Cho 1993:123-24). The Kwangju massacre strengthened nationalism and anti-Americanism among student activists. 26 According to Ki-Sik Kim, who was a student activist in the 1980s, some student activists were frustrated enough to contemplate an armed struggle and a violent revolution as a strategy to offset the state‘s violence (Interview 06/09/08). Second, student activists viewed the political context through the lens of leftist ideologies and criticized older-generation activists. Starting from the early 1980s, student activists were increasingly baptized with the Marxist-Leninist philosophy by reading Capital or What Is to Be Done? (Lee 2007:162-65).27 The radicalization of the student movement ultimately resulted in the construction of ideological flanks within the democracy movement by the mid 1980s. Student activists maintained a firm antigovernment stance by antagonizing the Chun regime as a ―fascist‖ regime and a ―military dictatorship.‖28 Radicalized student activists also began to criticize the previous activists as ―romantic,‖ as opposed to their identity as revolutionary fighters. In-Soon Nam-Yoon, who went to college in the late 1970s and later became a women‘s movement activist, reflects on this generational gap29:

There were lots of debates between those who entered the college in the 1970s [70 nyŏndae hakpŏn] and in the 1980s [80 nyŏndae hakpŏn]. The latter heavily criticized the former, denunciating the older generation activists as a bunch of ―reformists‖ or

the order in the city and protected public facilities. From a reading of heroic saga of the Kwangju minjung, activists reconfirmed the revolutionary potential of the minjung (Cho 2003:72). 26 On March 18, 1982, the first anti-American protest in the 1980s occurred. A couple of students put fire on the building of the Pusan United States Information Service (USIS), and pamphlets were disseminated on the street at the same time by some other students. The pamphlet was titled as ―Let‘s Continue Anti- American Struggles‖ (Yu et al. 2005a:304-05). 27 In February 1982, some publications on leftist ideologies including Marxism were approved by the state, which had been banned for 35 years (Donga ilbosa 1990:336). Students had already been reading leftist books from various underground sources—especially translated from Japanese sources—but this measure contributed to a more rapid dissemination of leftist ideologies into students and intellectuals. 28 By calling the regime ―fascist,‖ students meant that the regime destroyed political democracy, repressed the people (minjung), stripped them of basic rights, and exploited them in order to fortify the power of the privileged class (S.I. Yi 2007:124). 29 Jeong-Sook Yoon, who belongs to the same generation as Nam-Yoon, also distinguishes the 1980s from the 1970s. She recalls, ―Political ideologies governed the 1980s‘ movements…. We were different from the 80 nyŏndae hakpŏn…. We dreamed of political democracy, but socialism was not our belief‖ (Interview 07/28/08). In short, the 80s‘ generation of student activists was more leftist than those in the 1970s (Interview with Ki-Sik Kim, 06/09/08). 74

―romantics.‖ I guess that the fight against the Yusin dictatorship seemed mediocre to them, and they thought that the movement after Kwangju was qualitatively different from the previous movement. As the 80 nyŏndae hakpŏn was influenced by socialism which underscores class perspective, they criticized the movements by the 70 nyŏndae hakpŏn as romanticism based on liberal democratic ideals and anti-dictatorship. They drew a line. It was baffling to me. (Interview 08/05/08)

In the early 1980s, students were engaged in heated debates on what ought to be their strategic priority. They inherited a tradition of such debates from the 1970s‘ movements. The student movement in the early 1980s was divided into two ideological camps: ―preparation‖ for the future by focusing on labor organizing (chunbiron) versus continuation of political struggles based on ―vanguardism‖ (chŏngch’i tu’jaengnon). The ―preparation‖ camp emphasized students‘ role in politicizing minjung and helping them organize unions by becoming factory workers. On the other hand, the ―vanguardism‖ camp underscored the importance of student activists as the vanguards of political movement who should lead minjung. For instance, the Murim versus Hangnim groups represented the two trends, respectively (Hong 1992:108-09). The Murim group represented the ―preparation‖ camp and argued that students should refrain from political protests and prepare for the future by strengthening working class activism, since the May struggle in 1980 failed due to the lack of minjung‘s mobilization. On the contrary, the Hangnim group, representing the ―vanguardism‖ camp, contended that the failure in May resulted from the absence of vanguard organizations and criticized the former group‘s emphasis on preparation as pessimism or defeatism. Under the influence of Lenin‘s Bolshevism, this group believed that the student movement should immediately play a role as vanguards by continuing political protests and strengthening organizational infrastructure for revolutionary struggles (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990; Kang 1988:24-26). These two orientations were in competition in the early 1980s, 30 which sometimes resulted in

30 Oftentimes political pamphlets stimulated debates among students. The debates around the two strategies were repeated in two pamphlets in 1982: ―Yahak undong pipan [Criticism on the Night School Movement‖ emphasized labor organizing as a way to strengthen the minjung forces. In contrast, ―Haksaeng undongŭi chŏnmang [The Prospect for the Student Movement]‖ underscored political struggles that could lead the labor struggle based on vanguardist ideas (Kim 1988:100-01). Political pamphlets were the primary source of movement strategies for student activists. Thus, the students who could obtain the most recent pamphlet were those who were well-connected to the leadership in the student movement. Other students felt jealous 75

factional conflicts within the student leadership. However, in general, organizing labor and promoting organized protests were recognized as the two pillars of the student movement in Period 2, the consequences of which were yet to be seen. In the beginning, the ―preparation‖ camp dominated the student movement, but the ―vanguardism‖ camp became very powerful by 1983 (Kang 1988:35-37).31 The rise of vanguardism during this period was undoubtedly related to the aforementioned underground circles‘ organizational structure. The SMOs were based on a strict hierarchical structure that restricted information transmission between ranks through a military-like command structure, and were operated by a few dedicated members. Such an exclusive and secretive structure functioned as a hotbed of committed activists, which the vanguard-oriented groups promoted within the student movement. Thus, network closure was more favorable to the ―vanguardism‖ camp than the ―preparation‖ camp. The abeyance structure did not simply preserve the activist culture as suggested by the social movement theory (Taylor 1989), but radicalized it. At the same time, these organizational characteristics became a hindrance to the movement‘s diffusion into different fields. Undoubtedly, radical flanks represented by student activists were not yet integrated in the alliance in their fledgling stage. In order to survive state repression, they mostly focused on organizational maintenance and fostering dedicated student activists. As they were active underground, they were likely to be isolated from the outer environment. According to Lee's (2007) historical study, students formed a type of ―counterpublic sphere‖ on their own. The abeyance structure discouraged dialogues with other SMOs as it was based on exclusivity and confidentiality, which would protect the members from repression. Of course, this is not to say that students were not interested in forming alliances with other movements. Some segments of students kept cultivating an alliance with the working class based on the strategy of labor organizing, and the student leadership learned the importance of solidarity by reading Georgi Dimitrov‘s thesis of the People‘s Front (Interview with Ki-Sik Kim, 06/09/08). However, due to repression, they only because the faster they acquired a pamphlet, the more authoritative they looked (Interview with Hae-Koo Jeong, 08/11/08). 31 Since the Murim group was held responsible for the retreat from the Seoul Station in May 1980, the Hangnim group was relatively in a superior position and able to present itself as an alternative (see Chun 2007:171-72). 76

managed to maintain or establish informal networks amongst themselves, which seldom extended towards a broader audience. By the mid 1980s, the student movement underwent immense organizational changes in order to solve these problems, which will be discussed later in Chapter 3. In sum, various organizational constraints prohibited SMOs from seeking both intra- and inter-movement protests. In Period 2, the SMOs were barely able to engage in single sporadic protests. Nonetheless, activists were not without an anticipation of a broader alliance. Interests in alliance formation were slowly being renewed by the creation of a formal SMO, such as the YCDM, and by students‘ strenuous efforts in labor organizing, which paved the way for the revitalization of collaborative protests in the mid 1980s.

2-7. Conclusion In this chapter, I analyzed the impacts of macro- and meso-level processes on the levels and patterns of protests. I divided the early 1980s into two sub-periods, since they exhibit distinctive protest trends. Overall, Period 1 (January - May 1980) was a period of active protests due to a political opening instigated by President Park‘s assassination, although opposition politicians within institutional politics were lukewarm about collaborating with movements. The relatively free political atmosphere encouraged social movement activists to engage in protest activities. However, several organizational constraints resulted in the dominance of single protests over collaborative protests. The five-month period turned out to be insufficient for SMOs to rebuild their organizational bases and to engage in collaborative projects. Although the student movement became politicized and instigated collaborative protests in May 1980, the weak organizational capacity for alliance limited its further development. In Period 2 (June 1980 - 1983), state repression intensified. Since the bloody massacre of Kwangju, the repressive legal measures and physical repression discouraged protests at large. Social movements, especially student movements, only survived repression by going underground. The abeyance structure developed in the student underground SMOs: strictly controlled seniority-based hierarchy with a high degree of

cell differentiation; a military-like command structure based on central control and segmented structure; and a small number of committed members filtered by organizational and quasi-natural selection processes. Theoretically, such a closed network structure tends to promote groupthink, which seldom challenges the assumptions that construct members‘ shared views of the world (see Erickson 1982; Knoke 1990, 1993). This unique structure resulted in radicalizing the student movement further and kept it from actively seeking alliances outside their organizations except for the purpose of labor organizing. In this situation, network closure was promoted rather than formation of alliances. The growth of ideological flanks sowed the seeds of future activism, but they were not yet integrated in the larger social movement community. Thus, single movements tended to dominate this period of demobilization. Overall, the shift in the political environment from relatively free to extremely repressive narrowed protest opportunities for SMOs. Similar to Eisinger's (1973) and Tilly's (1978) predictions, protests tended to be low in an authoritarian state whereas protests were more frequent in a relatively freer (intermediate) political situation, as was the case in the early 1980s in Korea. While a political opening offered significant opportunities for protests, persistent repression became an unbearable cost of collective action. In both periods, opposition elites were mostly detached from the social movement sector. In the beginning, they mainly focused on establishing their voices in institutional politics and did not seek alliances with SMOs. As the state became more repressive, they were neither allowed to engage in institutional politics nor able to be involved with protest organizing. Thus, opposition elites did not play any supportive role during protests in both periods. My findings with regard to the macro-level factors indicate that political opportunities alone cannot explain why single protests prevailed in both free and repressive periods in the early 1980s. I argue that organization-level variables are crucial in shaping the likelihood of collaboration between SMOs. In Period 1, a lack of organizational capacity provided SMOs with severe constraints against opting for collaborative protests. In Period 2, development of closed network structure and radicalization of activism further restrained interorganizational collaborations.

As a result, the creation of the abeyance structure in the repressive period yielded important consequences for social movements throughout the 1980s. The organizational structure functioned as a shelter which protected the underground activists from counterintelligence, and raised committed and well-trained student activists. However, at the same time, the structure was on the basis of a network closure which prevented the students from seeking alliances outside, as exclusivity and confidentiality hampered dialogues among different SMOs. The abeyance structure, hence, was a hindrance to collaborative protests. Instead of seeking alliances, student movements prepared themselves for the future by maintaining organizations and internalizing hardcore leftist ideologies. At the same time, some of them were sowing the seeds for inter-movement protests underground by actively engaging in labor organizing, which hardly crystallized as protest events, but was a meaningful step forward during the forced dormancy. Certainly social movements in the early 1980s were subject to the harshest state control throughout the decade. Nevertheless, the phase of demobilization was a precursor to another protest wave opportunity. The experiences of extreme repression and formation of ―activist subcultures‖ (McAdam 1994:43) during this period had longstanding impacts on SMOs afterwards. In other empirical cases in Latin America, the veterans of older movements contributed to the revitalization of movements in the long run (Foweraker 1995:52). Even though the SMOs suffered from repression and organizational problems, many of them survived the tumultuous period and played an important role in reinvigorating collaborative protests a few years later.

CHAPTER 3. LIBERALIZATION AND THE GROWTH OF SOLIDARITY (1984 - June 1987) 3-1: Introduction Given the narrow alliance opportunities for and organizational constraints of SMOs during authoritarian consolidation between 1980 and 1983, it is important to investigate the factors that increase solidarity among different SMOs. Which macro- and meso-level variables facilitate interorganizational collaboration before a democratic transition? Exploring this research question not only unfolds the mechanisms of alliance formation during authoritarianism, but also has significant implications for the post- democratic transition period; since SMOs vary in terms of their propensity to participate in a coalition or in collaborative protests, the ways in which an alliance is organized affect how the SMOs fare in the course of democratization. According to conventional wisdom, a lack of collective action and civic associations might be ―the norm‖ within authoritarian regimes (Osa 2003a:100). The public under authoritarian rule tends to react to a dictatorship with ―chronic quiescence‖ (Slater 2009:203). As seen in the previous chapter, Korea‘s social movements in the early 1980s indeed showed such a tendency. Nonetheless, the phase of liberalization (abertura) in authoritarian states is known to provide unexpected opportunities for protests (Pickvance 1999; Osa 2003b; Almeida 2008). Liberalization in Korea also revitalized social movements starting from late 1983. Political opening undoubtedly became a significant political opportunity for protests as suggested by the political process approach (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; McAdam 1999 [1982]). This chapter traces the trajectory of social movements from the onset of liberalization till the democratic transition in mid-1987, and explores the mechanisms of interorganizational collaboration. Besides the impact of political context on protests, the RM theory also points to the importance of SMOs in organizing protests (McCarthy and Zald 1977). In the studies of Korea‘s democratization, the role of coalitions such as the National Committee for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC: minju hŏnbŏp chaengch’wi kungmin undong ponbu, kukpon) created in 1987 has been acknowledged with regard to its contribution to precipitating the democratic transition (Kim 2000; Jeong 2002; D.Y. Kim 2007a).

Despite the tendency to celebrate its significance, however, the organizational processes of alliance formation have been seldom explored systematically. Alliance formation across diverse SMOs was more difficult in practice than in theory, although Korean activists acknowledged that a broad alliance could be an effective strategy against authoritarianism. As my research reveals, either collaborative protests or coalitions did not occur frequently in the course of the democracy movement in Korea. I attempt to fill this gap between theory and practice by analyzing the conditions under which SMOs become increasingly motivated to engage in alliance- building activities. I examine the conditions at both the macro- and meso-level because SMOs come up with their strategies in response to both political environment and organizational processes. The trajectory of the movement up to the June uprising in 1987 reveals that alliance-building between the SMOs was a conflict-ridden and complicated process rather than a smooth one. The impulse of the SMOs that belong to different social movement industries varied with respect in joining an overarching coalition organization; some industries were more proactive in building coalitions than the others. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the SMOs that formed a coalition were able to set aside their differences and cooperate with one another for some period by the mid-1980s. The successful protests in the June uprising of 1987 were a final outcome of a prolonged trial- and-error process of alliance formation which encompassed the broadest range of the SMOs. In this chapter, I primarily focus on exploring the conditions under which SMOs reconcile their differences and engage in collaboration. While doing so, I also intend to highlight potential tensions among SMOs in order to explain the complex nature of the coalitions organized on the eve of the democratic transition and to show that the tensions further influenced the trajectory of the post-democratic transition period. This dual focus theoretically contributes to unraveling both alliance mechanisms and the long-term consequences of such alliance-building processes.

3-2: Theoretical Frameworks 3-2-(1): Macro-level Political Environment Political Opening

The inverted U-shaped relationship between repression and protest as suggested by Eisinger (1973) and Tilly (1978) implies that an intermediate stage between a fully authoritarian regime and a democratic one will yield the highest level of protests. Therefore, I expect that the period between political openings (liberalization) under authoritarianism and a democratic transition will increase collaborative protests compared to the earlier repressive period.

Elites‘ Division

As the previous chapter demonstrated, Korea‘s opposition elites were rarely interested in joining movements and sought institutional solutions for democratization in the early 1980s. In my view, opposition elites were ambivalent allies for SMOs, since they frequently switched sides between ―institutional‖ politics and ―street‖ politics. Thus, I expect them to opportunistically exploit alliance opportunities with SMOs as movements gain momentum through their increasing capacity to mobilize large-scale antigovernment protests.

3-2-(2): Meso-level Organizational Processes As shown in Chapter 1, I emphasize that organizational infrastructure, organizational diversity, organizational networks, and ideological interpretation affect the likelihood of collaborative protests. This section briefly summarizes the theoretical justification of the argument and lay out my expectations.

Organizational Infrastructure The presence of the coalitions that weave diverse strands of SMOs precipitates collaborative protests because they are ―structuring mechanisms that bring a broad spectrum of otherwise distinct organizations into contact, spreading interpretative frames, organizational structures, political analysis, and tactics‖ (Meyer and Whittier 1994:290). Given the importance of coalitions in coordinating activism across various groups, the

presence and absence of coalitions will affect the likelihood of collaborative protests. Therefore, I expect that the more individual SMOs and coalitions are established, the more collaborative protests occur.

Organizational Diversity The diversity of SMOs contributes to a steady flow of movement activities (Oberschall 1973:230). Also, increasing density of SMOs has a signaling effect or demonstration effect (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), as it shows a rising support for a movement‘s cause (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Tarrow 1988). I focus on SMOs‘ diversity during protests because more potential candidates for alliance can be identified when multiple SMOs jointly participate in protest events. Especially in an authoritarian context, the diversity of SMOs that show up at protests ought to increase alliances because the density of the existing SMOs is invisible in secret underground SMOs. Thus, I expect that the more diverse the SMOs that join protests, the more collaborative protests will occur.

Organizational Networks An examination of the period between 1980 and 1983 in the previous chapter revealed that the coping mechanism against state repression was network closure. However, when a political opening arose in the mid-1980s, the SMOs began to explore different ways of organizing protests and SMOs. According to the social network approach, two different mechanisms spur interorganizational collaboration. First, movement activists‘ participation in multiple SMOs creates joint memberships and such overlaps facilitate collaboration among the SMOs (Carroll and Ratner 1996; Rosenthal et al. 1985; Vasi and Strang 2009). Second, the role of mediators that bridge between different SMOs is crucial in activating an alliance. The mediators provide linkages between distinct network cliques (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973). Therefore, I expect that the more joint membership and brokerage form between the SMOs, the more collaborative protests occur.

Ideological Interpretation

In the framing literature, ―master frames‖ are one of the general conceptual frameworks that explain the emergence and effectiveness of an alliance. The importance of a shared goal has been theorized in terms of the creation of a master frame (Snow and Benford 1992). Master frames that resonate among many groups help them be allied in common political struggles. Empirically, Carroll and Ratner (1996) found that cross- movement activism was associated with the use of a broadly resonant master frame. In a similar vein, Meyer and Whittier (1994:290) argue that ―a bellwether issue, generally representing what activists view as either the most threatening and urgent problem or the most promising vehicle for action, comes to unify a broad spectrum of groups that share similar or related concerns.‖ Ryan (1992:290) terms such causes ―unifying issues‖ and contends that they are ―important less for the concrete improvements their success would bring than for their value as symbols that spur mobilization.‖ However, the master frame of democratization was a constant rather than a variable in the course of Korea‘s democracy movement throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, the goal of constitutional amendment raised during the June uprising in 1987 was not new. At least from early 1985 around the general election, many SMOs and the opposition party demanded an adoption of direct presidential election. However, the slogan did not unite the SMOs in 1985 as much as it did in 1987. In order to explain this delay, I turn to the question of ideological orientation. Ideological affinity facilitates interorganizational collaboration (Vasi and Strang 2009). The substantive shifts in ideological orientations served as one of the most important factors that shaped the patterns of alliance in the mid- to late-1980s in Korea. I propose that the more integrated the ideological positions are within an alliance, the more collaborative protests will occur. In order to reveal the process by which radical groups become able to obtain greater ideological affinity to other SMOs, I examine factional politics between various sub-groups within radical SMOs.

3-3: Overview This section illustrates the overall trajectory of prodemocracy protests from 1984 to June 1987. After the liberalization policy in late 1983, protests began to take off. Figure 3-1 shows the patterns of different types of protests by each month during this

period based on the KDM Dataset. The solid line represents single protests, the grey line intra-movement protests, the dotted line inter-movement protests, and the dashed line the total frequency of protests.

Figure 3-1. Monthly Frequency of Different Types of Protests (1984 - June 1987)

100

0 1984 1985 1986 1987

Single Intra Inter Total

Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset

According to Figure 3-1, the most dominant type of protest is single protests. Intra- and inter-movement protests are generally fewer than single protests except for some incidents throughout the period. This reveals the difficulty of creating alliances during protests. However, in June 1987, the number of inter-movement protests suddenly became much larger than single protests. This is not a coincidence because June 1987 was when the June uprising occurred, which pressured the state to begin the democratization process. In the June uprising, inter-movement collaboration occurred very frequently under the leadership of the NCDC. Figure 3-2 graphically presents the changing proportions of different types of protests by month. Although single protests generally dominate protest scenes, the growth of collaborative protests is evident both within a single movement field and across different fields. In particular, the percentage of inter-movement protests dramatically increases in the second half of the given period.

Figure 3-2. Monthly Percentage of Protests by Different Types (1984 - June 1987)

100.00

80.00

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Single Intra Inter

Source: the KDM Dataset

Table 3-1. Yearly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (1984 - June 1987) Year Single Intra Inter Total 84 201 (78.5) 35 (13.7) 20 (7.8) 256 (100) 85 121 (57.6) 56 (26.7) 33 (15.7) 210 (100) 86 164 (66.4) 37 (15.0) 46 (18.6) 247 (100) Jan-Jun 87 38 (45.2) 11 (13.1) 35 (41.7) 84 (100) Total 524 (65.8) 139 (17.4) 134 (16.8) 797 (100) Source: the KDM Dataset Notes: Row percentages in parentheses

Table 3-1 shows the annual trend. The ratio of single protests drops from 79% in 1984 to 45% in mid-1987. In contrast, the ratio of intra- and inter-movement protests increases in general. In the first six months of 1987, single protests occupy 45%, and both intra- and inter-movement protests add up to about 55%. Moreover, the inter-movement protests alone take up 42% of total protests. This trend undoubtedly shows that collaborative protests became increasingly dominant and played an important role in the given period. In addition, the KDM Dataset might underestimate the actual trend of protest events because it treats a coordinated protest by an SMO as one protest event, even if it was a nationwide protest. Therefore, the dataset may not be able to show the sheer size or scale of one large event. In this senses, the statistical data from the police record

supplement the dataset, even if the police had a tendency to underreport the number.32 Since the police record treats protests separately even when they were coordinated by one SMO, it can illustrate the scale of protests better than the KDM Dataset.

Figure 3-3. Annual Frequency of Protests and Participants (1980 - 1987) 14000 3500000

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Number Protestsof Number Number Participantsof Number 2000 500000

0 0 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987

Participants Protests

Source: the National Police Agency, 1992, Annual Police Statistics.

Figure 3-3 shows the trend of annual protest events and number of participants obtained from the Annual Police Statistics (1992). The solid line shows the annual number of protests, and each grey bar marks the annual number of protest participants. As shown in the Chapter 2, the period between 1980 and 1983 exhibits a low level of protests. Protests tend to take off in 1984 and show a slow but steady increase until 1986. In 1987, the number of both protests and participants dramatically goes up. A total of 12,957 protests took place with 3,145,667 participants in 1987. Since the monthly statistics are not available, it is impossible to know how many events happened in the early six months of 1987, given the fact that the labor strikes were very frequent right after June 1987. Despite the ambiguity, however, the scale of protests in 1987 is

32 The statistical data on protest participation often differ depending on who counts it. For example, the police reported that 40,000 people protested on June 10, 1987, while the National Committee for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC) reported that 300,000 participated (Yu et al. 2005b:213). In this dissertation, I mostly use the estimates made by the Korea Democracy Foundation because they are based on numerous media and academic sources rather than a single source. 87

remarkable and does reflect the reality in terms of a dramatic escalation of the democracy movement in the mid-1987. This chapter examines why a level of collaborative protests could develop after a long period of dominance by single protests. As the figures and tables suggest above, the process of alliance formation was tumultuous. Only by 1987, the Korean activists were able to create an ecumenical coalition that included a broad spectrum of groups and wage large-scale protests. Therefore, I investigate the external and internal factors of the SMOs that shaped the patterns of protests, especially in terms of prohibiting or facilitating collaborative protests. The next section turns to the impact of the macro-level political environment on movements.

3-4: Macro-Level Political Environment 3-4-(1): Political Reforms and Repression After consolidating the regime for three years, the Chun government began to loosen its grip on society in late 1983. The reasons for this unexpected political liberalization have been explored by several Korean scholars: first, the government became somewhat confident of their control over society because they had succeeded in achieving economic growth and political stability (Kim 2000:81). Second, the government had to consider that the Asian Games (1986) and the Olympic Games (1988) were soon to follow (Koo 2001:108). These international events compelled the government to try to improve its reputation so that they could carry them out successfully. The government was not only worried that other countries might boycott the events if Korea‘s lack of democratic and basic human rights became a focus, but also agonized over the possibility of mass protests by Koreans during the events (Choi and Kim 2007:265).33 Third, the government was forced to liberalize due to pressures from its political situation. Because the government suffered from a lack of legitimacy caused by the military coup and the Kwangju massacre in 1980, it needed to consolidate its power in the upcoming General Election in 1985 and the presidential election in 1987. In sum, it

33 The liberalization policy was announced right after Korea was designated to hold the 1988 Olympic Games in August 1983. Sŏng-Ik Kim, who was the press secretary under Chun regime, reported that the government‘s priority was to carry out the Olympic Games successfully (Monthly Chosun, January 1992). 88

was crucial for them to publicly demonstrate how democratic their regime could be to potential Korean voters as well as to an international audience. Already as early as 1983, some measures were taken towards liberalization. On February 25, 1983, 250 politicians and dissidents were set free from the political activity ban. From late 1983 to early 1984, a series of liberalization policy were implemented. On December 5, 1983, the government allowed 86 professors who had been fired under martial law to reapply for faculty positions. On December 21, 1983, the government announced the policy of ―liberalization on campus.‖ The policy stated that 1) all police forces would completely withdraw from college campuses, 2) all students who had been expelled due to political reasons would be allowed to come back to school, 3) all professors who had been fired due to political reasons would be allowed to return to their previous positions. Accordingly, 338 students were released from jail, and 1,363 expelled students were reinstated. In late February 1984, the political activity ban was lifted from additional 202 dissidents, and the government announced a completion of the withdrawal of the police forces from the college campuses. In March of the same year, 161 student arrestees were released from the prison and able to go back to school. Nevertheless, the reformative stance of the government did not last long. At first, in relation with the liberalization mood, repression seemed somewhat diminished. For students, the absence of the police on campus meant a great deal of freedom (Interview with Jong-Joo Yi, 07/22/08). Jeong-Ok Hwang, who entered Korea University in 1982, recalls as follows:

The year 1984 was an era of liberalization. So those students who were seniors in 1984 were not arrested even though they instigated demonstrations, while, until 1983, students were arrested and drafted into the military just because they disseminated political pamphlets. It was tough for seniors in 1984, though. Since the police did not arrest them, they went protesting over and over again. In the end, they were so tired that they‘d rather get arrested. (Interview 08/11/08)

However, this phase of mild repression was short-lived. According to Hwang, students began to be arrested again after 73 students‘ occupation protest at the Seoul Unites States Information Service (USIS) on May 23, 1985. For example, Che-Sŏk Son, the Minister of Education, announced that he would react firmly to the violence that

could disrupt the order of college campuses. In July, the government attempted to enact a repressive law for the purpose of stabilizing college campuses, which spurred massive protests by students in the following months. Preemptive raids on the student SMOs occurred often as well in 1985 and 1986. The police arrested 66 student activists who belonged to a student SMO and confiscated 80,000 bottles of Molotov cocktails on June 29, 1985. In October, 1985, 26 students in another student SMO based on Seoul National University were arrested for a violation of the National Security Law. In August 1986, 190 students in leading student SMOs at Seoul National University were arrested with regard to protests and communist propaganda. On August 26, 1986, the prosecutors‘ office announced that 813 students were convicted with regard to the campus unrest from January to June, which was a 577.5% increase from the same period in the previous year (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1987:74). In October, the prosecutors‘ office convicted 74 activists for attempting to create a Marxist-Leninist party. Beside these well-known incidents, there were more cases where SMOs were destroyed by the police‘s raids. Repression was not confined to the student movement. For instance, the People‘s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR: minjut’ongil minjungundong yŏnhap, mint’ongnyŏn), which was one of the most influential coalitions, was closed by the police in November 1986. In January 1987, the police arrested 11 labor activists. The media censorship persisted, and those journalists who revealed that the government had systematically controlled the content of the mainstream media were quickly arrested (S.M. Jeong 2007:83). Many well-known social movement activists were followed by secret agents on a daily basis (Interview with Bu-Young Yi, 08/28/08; Interview with Jae-Keun In, 08/20/08). Moreover, even the opposition party NDP faced repression in late 1986.34 Anyone that expressed some anti-government stance was a target of repression. The continuation of repression in various forms culminated in a death of a student in January 1987. Chong-Ch‘ŏl Pak, who was a student at Seoul National University, was killed by excessive torture by a couple of policemen during the interrogation about his

34 After Sŏng-Hwan Yu from the NDP said ―Our national goal is reunification rather than anti-communism‖ during a congressional session, he was arrested for a violation of the NSL (Kyunghyang Sinmun, October 17, 1986). 90

relationship with other student activists. This incident became a national scandal and exerted an explosive impact on protests. Ignoring the popular movements that demanded change, the government announced that it would maintain the current constitution on April 13, 1987. The government‘s stubborn refusal to amend the constitution instigated a large wave of protests in spring and summer. Moreover, Han-Yŏl Yi, a Yonsei University Student, was severely injured by a tear gas bomb used by the police during a demonstration on June 9, 1987. He remained in a coma for about a month and finally passed away. His injury raised the issue of tear gas at the center of the antigovernment protest throughout the June uprising. A series of mass protests erupted over the streets nationwide, which forced the government to initiate the process of democratization in late June. From 1984 to 1987, the regime‘s reaction to protesters moved from reform to repression. The complicated mixture of reform and repression caused a great deal of confusion in the social movement sector. Liberalization did not guarantee political freedom for the SMOs (Interview with In-Seong Hwang, 07/31/08), but it was true that the situation was different from the earlier period. For instance, the interpretation of liberalization differed in student groups, which led to confusion in devising strategies. In early 1984, students were unable to reach a conclusion with respect to the nature of the liberalization. In suspicion that the state would shortly return to repression, they tried to expose how deceptive liberalization was. Hurriedly, they focused on sending out short- term radical protest squads to the street instead of expanding activism to the student mass. Their prediction turned out to be wrong. It was not until mid-April that students changed their strategies to incorporate a broader student mass into the movement, which would serve as a turning point for alliance formation with other movement industries as well (Kang 1988:52-53). Another aspect of liberalization was that its impact was largely limited to political dissidents and students.35 In the labor movement, activists did not feel that anything was changed (Interview with Ye-Kyo Yi, 08/05/08; Interview with In-Sun Nam-Yun, 08/05/08).

35 Even students felt that the effect of liberalization was limited. One former student activist, Jun-Young Yi, recalls that ―the police used to repress protests on campus beforehand, but they began to do so outside the campus after liberalization. That was all about the change‖ (Interview 09/03/08). 91

However, different from the early 1980s, SMOs became able to use events of repression as a way to legitimize their protests. As mentioned earlier, a student‘s death by police torture spurred massive protests in mid-1987, which eventually led to democratic transition. Also earlier in 1986 when Keun-Tae Kim was arrested and severely tortured, it instigated a broad cross-movement alliance between the chaeya and opposition politicians (Yu et al. 2005b:62). Whereas repression was an undeniable cost for protests in an authoritarian context, the SMOs effectively used repression by strategically turning it into a motivation to fight against the unjust regime. This was a clear departure from the overall organizational paralysis in the early 1980s. Such a display of organizational confidence implies that, first, the political atmosphere had undeniably shifted from total repression to a relatively lesser amount of repression. Second, the considerable growth of the organizational infrastructure resulted in a more resilient social movement sector that could challenge the state more directly than before. This chapter shows that the period between the liberalization and the democratic transition needs a more nuanced explanation than a simple increase of reformative measures. In fact, the ―intermediate‖ phase of repression in Eisinger's (1973) and Tilly's (1978) analysis is marked by a complex blend of reform and repression, which is applicable to the Korean context in the period 1984 - 1987. The level of reform had not yet reached that of a fully fledged democracy, but at the same time, the level of repression had not produced a brutal massacre as it did in May 1980. This ―intermediate‖ nature of the authoritarian regime led to increased protests in Korea. Although liberalization was limited to a very early phase of this period, it had an enormous impact on the growth of social movements. Even when repression increased in the period from 1985 onward, the SMOs were better able to cope with it due to the increases in their organizational capacity during the liberalization period. Thus, the dynamics of reform and repression in the period between 1984 and 1987 contributed to an increase of protests.

3-4-(2): Elites’ Division The elites‘ division caused by the advance of opposition elites into institutional politics had important impacts on alliance formation during this period. The general election in 1985 offered a significant opportunity for the opposition party, the New

Democratic Party (NDP), to enter parliamentary politics. The NDP won 29.36% of the total votes, while the governmental party—the Democratic Justice Party—had 35.25%.36 As a result, 50 politicians from the NDP entered the National Assembly. Also, Kim Dae Jung, who returned to Korea in February 1985, was an active supporter of the NDP. The primary goal of the NDP with respect to democratization was to implement the adoption of a direct presidential election. The party kept demanding that the parliament and government amend the constitution. The democratic orientation of the NDP played a positive role in indirectly legitimating the democracy movement that was occurring outside parliament and popularizing the cause of the movement to the wider public. However, the conservative nature of opposition elites often made social movement activists doubtful of the elites‘ true intention. With regard to the general election in 1985, students were not sure whether they should participate in the election at all, let alone support the newly created NDP. Until December 1984, students rejected the idea of general election itself because they viewed the election as paving the way for the prolonging of the Chun regime. They were also sharply divided in terms of their support for the NDP. Students were generally suspicious about opposition elites, believing that they were too conservative and opportunistic by nature (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:71-75). Despite the disagreement over the election and opposition elites, students agreed that it was important to make the best use of the open political space during the election period. As a result, many student activists took advantage of the NDP‘s campaign by disseminating their own political slogans during the campaign. The NDP‘s campaign sites were often crowded with students, which contributed to the party‘s popularity, although it was ambivalent about the presence of radical students. Different from students, the older generation of activists was divided with respect to the election issue. The young chaeya groups such as the Youth Coalition for

36 There were some important economic reasons for the election result. The macro-economic stabilization and industrial-restructuring programs implemented during the first several years of the Chun regime were very neoliberal. This policy provoked nationalistic opposition from farmers, workers, and the business sector. As a result, the previously symbiotic state-business relationship became contentious. The unpopularity of the state reforms contributed to the setback of the governmental party during the election (Chu and Moon 1997:272). 93

Democracy Movement (YCDM: minjuhwa undong ch’ŏngnyŏn yŏnhap) engaged in debates about the relative weight of collaborating either with the opposition party or with other chaeya and religious groups (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:73). In late 1983, the YCDM was skeptical about an alliance with the opposition party because they thought it was too weak. Nevertheless, it began to collaborate with the NDP around the election period (Interview with Hyoung-Taek Kwon, 08/19/08). In this sense, the chaeya groups were relatively more open to creating an alliance with political elites than students were. The NDP employed some social movement tactics to achieve their aims. In early 1986, the NDP launched a series of protests that demanded constitutional reform. Although the student and chaeya movements had raised the issue of the constitutional reform earlier, the NDP was much more effective in popularizing it (Seong 2007b:348). The NDP‘s moderate strategy of collecting signatures for the petition to amend the constitution, in order to adopt a direct presidential election, appealed to the general public (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989b:64). Large crowds gathered in the NDP‘s plate- hanging ceremonies all over the country, and other SMOs then used this open space to publicize their own claims to the public. As the NDP became stronger over time, the government was pressured to offer some channels for negotiation to the opposition. On February 24, 1986, President Chun met with the representatives from both his and the opposition party, and told them that he was willing to reform the constitution in 1989 after installing the Special Committee for Constitutional Reform within the National Assembly, and a research institution within the government in order to study ways to amend the constitution (Kyunghyang Sinmun, February 24, 1986). In April, Chun met the party leader of the NDP and said that the government and the opposition party could negotiate the process of constitutional reform before his term was over (Donga Ilbo, April 30, 1986). Following this meeting, the Special Committee for Constitutional Reform was launched in May; opposition parties actively participated in this committee. However, this concession was viewed by movements as a cooptation of the NDP, and a withdrawal from its support of popular protests (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1987; Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989b:114). Indeed, from then on, the NDP

constantly oscillated between bargaining with the government and supporting the democracy movement. 37 Accordingly, the relationship between the NDP and the movement became unstable, and activists questioned the opposition party‘s role within the movement. Even the moderate strands of the democracy movement such as the chaeya group found it difficult to maintain a working relationship with the NDP. For instance, when the NDP criticized students‘ disruptive protests in late April 1986, the People‘s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR: minju t’ongil minjung undong yŏnhap, mint’ongnyŏn) seceded from a correspondence organization established between the PMCDR and the NDP (Kyunghyang Sinmun, May 1, 1986). As a result, from late 1985 to early 1986, the relationship between the democracy movement and opposition elites remained contentious. In sum, whereas the opposition‘s entrance into institutional politics strengthened the movement‘s goal of democratization, the government‘s cooptation through a reformative stance in turn became a constraint for the development of an alliance between the elites and the movement. Additionally, the NDP revealed opportunistic attitudes when it came to the matter of taking sides between the government and the democracy movement. Evidently, the relationship between the democracy movement and the opposition party was highly unstable. The NDP‘s inaugural ceremony in Incheon on May 3 of 1986 is a notorious example of such dissonance. A ceremony was supposed to be held at a civic center in Incheon, but the NDP could not even enter the building because of state repression and the large crowd of various SMOs in front of it. The rally ended up being highly disruptive, and violent struggles ensued between the police and protesters, which led to mass arrests. Since the rally lacked coordination, the SMOs were busy yelling their own slogans.38 Such disorganization reveals the profound difficulty that lay in realizing a broad alliance. Creating an alliance with the opposition party posed a dilemma to the

37 As the NDP became conservative, a more progressive part of it left the party and created the Democratic Reunification Party (p’yŏnghwaminjudang) in April 1987. However, the relationship between the two parties was still close. In the end, both NDP and DRP participated in protests in mid-1987. 38 Over 50 pamphlets were disseminated during the day. Ten or more pamphlets belonged to the chaeya SMOs, another 10 or more to the labor SMOs, and over 20 to the student SMOs. Most of them criticized the NDP‘s collaboration with the government (Han 2007:352-53). 95

democracy movement, especially when the movement was not powerful enough to design and orchestrate protests based on clear plans. However, despite the fact that an alliance between opposition elites and SMOs was a complicated and often uncomfortable task, the presence of the opposition party in the National Assembly was important for collaborative protests from the perspective of resource mobilization: first, in terms of material resources, the NDP was able to help the SMOs financially. For instance, the NDP volunteered to pay for printing about 200,000 pamphlets during the June uprising in 1987 (Interview with Si-Chun Yu, 08/26/08). Second, since the NDP was popular, it was able to mobilize ordinary people wherever it ran its own political campaign. The SMOs took advantage of the campaign by disseminating their own fliers and shouting their slogans (Interview with Bu-Young Yi, 08/28/08). 39 Third, the party‘s democratic orientation legitimized the democracy movement to some extent. Since both of them pushed for democratization—although the breadth and depth of demands differed, many well-known lawmakers‘ support for democratization publicly justified the movement‘s cause. In short, the NDP played a key role as a provider of material support, space for protest, and a degree of public legitimization. Even though skepticism and doubt towards the opposition party were ubiquitous among the SMOs, collaboration with the NDP was beneficial to the movement in several ways. This is why the movement activists did not stop looking for an opportunity to legitimately collaborate with it. Since the opposition party frequently shifted its position depending on the effectiveness of its negotiations with the government, the SMOs had to walk a fine line between gaining benefits and tainting their movement by working with an unreliable partner. When the negotiation between the government and the NDP was aborted, the NDP returned to the arena of social movements in late 1986 (W.S. Park 2007:365). After the NDP gave up on bargaining with the government, an alliance between the party and the SMOs became stronger. Opposition elites and the SMOs were able to collaborate more effectively towards the shared goal of constitutional reform in

39 The presence of the SMOs during campaigns was beneficial to the NDP as well. The NDP was able to use the help of the SMOs, as the politicians were often surrounded by riot police and thus unable to speak to the public without physical breakthrough by movement activists (Interview with Bu-Young Yi, 08/28/08). 96

1987. When the Chun government failed to be a reliable negotiation partner, the NDP finally determined which side they should be on. The formation of an alliance between the NDP and the democracy movement resulted in mass protests in mid-1987.

3-5: Meso-Level Organizational Processes So far, I have explored the dynamics of reform, repression, and elites‘ division in relation with collaborative protests. The shifts in the macro-level political environment shown by these factors were significant in explaining the pattern of protests and alliance formation, but the meso-level factors with regard to the internal dynamics of SMOs should be included in the equation as they mediate political environment. In 1987, the broadest alliance was materialized by the creation of the NCDC, which played a leading role in coordinating a series of nationwide protests. What happened during this four-year period that enabled the movement communities to become united to the extent that a coalition attained a national leadership? Given the level of demobilization in the early 1980s, the rapid growth of alliances is impressive. To investigate this phenomenon further, this section analyzes the organizational processes that led to the creation of a broad alliance in the social movement sector. I argue that, besides the macro-level factors such as reform, repression, and elites‘ division, organizational factors were conducive to the occurrences of collaborative protests. I explicate the impacts of organizational infrastructure, diversity, networks, and ideological interpretation on collaborative protests.

3-5-(1): Organizational Infrastructure The onset of liberalization policies became a catalyst for protests. Quickly responding to the liberalizing mood, social movements began to revitalize in 1984. As Huntington (1968:362) famously stated, reform became a ―catalyst‖ instead of a ―substitute‖ for a revolutionary upsurge. It was an unexpected consequence for the regime that its reformative stance encouraged activists to raise their voice for further democratization. This section explores how the organizational infrastructure for both intra- and inter-movement protests developed from 1984 to June 1987. The mid-1980s began with

the founding of a number of formal individual SMOs in the public arena, which had been suppressed in the earlier period, and culminated in the formation of several coalitions that were effective in organizing collaborative protests. I propose that a closer look at the trajectories by which the various SMOs became finally integrated into the coalitions despite many stumbling blocks reveals one of the key organizational mechanisms of collaborative protests. More importantly, the different groups of SMOs varied with respect to their propensity to join coalitions. An investigation of the organizational structure of the groups offers a clue to understanding their diverging preferences towards alliance formation.

The Growth of Formal SMOs Around the onset of liberalization, the opposition politician Kim Young Sam‘s 23-day hunger strike starting on May 18, 1983, the third anniversary of the Kwangju uprising, encouraged many other activists to engage in prodemocracy protests. Kim‘s demands were for; 1) release of all political prisoners; 2) the total abolition of banning on the opposition‘s political activities; 3) reinstatement of all fired professors, workers, and expelled students; 4) freedom of speech; and, 5) constitutional reform and abolition of repressive laws (S.D. Jeong 2007:382). Due to media censorship, his hunger strike was reported in the media after he announced the termination of the strike on June 9, devoid of any detail about his demands for democratization (Kyunghyang Sinmun, June 9, 1983). Nonetheless, his hunger strike led to other chaeya activists staging hunger strikes in support. Kim Dae Jung also supported his protest in the United States by announcing a declaration and marching towards the White House (Kim 2005:460). Kim Young Sam began to collaborate with Kim Dae Jung‘s group from around this period. Their collaboration led to the co-founding of a political SMO, the Council for the Promotion of Democratization (CPD: minjuhwa ch’ujin hyŏbŭihoe, minch’uhyŏb) in May 1984. The CPD‘s activities included announcing declarations to support other movements, holding lectures or seminars, attending rallies, and participating in coalitional projects such as creating an anti-torture coalition organization (Minjuhwa ch‘ujin hyŏbŭihoe [the Council for the Promotion of Democratization] 1988). Since the CPD was composed of opposition politicians, the KDP was created on the basis of the CPD on January 18, 1985.

Kim Young Sam‘s hunger strike motivated other social movement activists to revitalize the democracy movement. One such example was the creation of the Youth Coalition for Democracy Movement (YCDM: minjuhwa undong ch’ŏngnyŏn yŏnhap, minch’ŏngnyŏn) in September 30, 1983. 40 Despite the overall impasse in the social movement sector until 1983, an emphasis on alliance formation was renewed by the young chaeya activists. While students were still preoccupied with maintaining underground circles, those activists who were in their 30s and had been to college in the 1970s founded the SMO. They were the generation of the 1970‘s. Evidently, they were taking a big risk since the YCDM was a formal SMO with an office in Chongno, a downtown area in central Seoul.41 The simple fact that nineteen members were arrested by the police on the founding day of the YDCM shows the risk of opening a formal SMO. Keun-Tae Kim, who was the first president of the YCDM, discusses his motivation for creating the SMO as follows:

I thought that we needed symbols and banners. There were movements supported by the church, but one religion cannot represent all people….I believed that fighting against repression could provide a vital motivation for determination and participation (Interview 08/12/08).

Since the general atmosphere in the social movement sector was overwhelmingly defeatist after three years of unyielding repression, the YCDM‘s move was pacesetting (Oh 1988:47). 42 The phase of liberalization positively influenced the creation of the YCDM as well. Keun-Tae Kim predicted that that imprisonment would not be very long because of the liberalization mood, and he was correct. He was released soon after an arrest for the creation of the YCDM, and it reassured other movement activists that it was now less costly to protest than before (Interview with Keun-Tae Kim, 08/12/08).

40 The Egalitarian Council for Women (yŏsŏng p’yŏnguhoe) was founded three months earlier in June, but the YCDM had a greater impact on other movements since it made it clear that it was an SMO with the broad goal of democratization. 41 Due to the concern about repression, the YCDM maintained a semi-open structure. Whereas the administrative part was open, some other parts that were connected to the minjung movement were closed (Interview with Hyoung-Taek Kwon, 08/19/08). 42 Of course there were reservations with regard to the creation of a formal above-ground organization. Many activists thought that it was not worth making an SMO that was doomed to be crushed. In particular, those in the labor movement thought that a formal SMO would only cause sacrifices and repression due to its exposure to authorities (Interview with Hyoung-Taek Kwon, 08/19/08). 99

An interest in creating a broad alliance across all movements began to emerge soon afterwards. Although the YCDM was an SMO based on individual membership, it was a proponent of an ecumenical alliance that transcended the boundaries of all the social movement industries. The inaugural issue of the YCDM‘s official magazine, Minjuhwaŭi Kil [The Road to Democratization], emphasizes the importance of alliance:

Each [movement] sector should try hard to recover the strength to struggle, reconstruct the strategy for each movement, and create firm solidarity…. [We] need to make alliances with the labor, farmers‘, student, religious, chaeya, intellectual, and cultural movements in order to overcome the limitation of fragmented movements, and develop the democracy movement to the next level (Minjuhwaŭi Kil [The Road to Democratization], February 1984).

The importance of an overarching inter-movement alliance became a recurrent theme for this magazine. As exemplified by the YCDM, the chaeya group was the most active in seeking a broad inter-movement alliance beyond the boundary of each group. For example, the YCDM collaborated with student activists, if not openly, from 1985 (Interview with Hyoung-Taek Kwon, 08/19/08). After the founding of the YCDM, many other SMOs emerged in 1983 and 1984. The SMOs functioned as the representatives of different fields. A group of fired professors created the Council for the Fired Professors (haejik kyosu hyŏbŭihoe) in December 1983. Journalists founded the Council for the Fired Journalists (haejik ŏllonin hyŏbŭihoe) in April 1984 and the Council for Democratic Media Movement (minju ŏllon undong hyŏbŭihoe) in December 1984. Artists created the Council for the People‘s Cultural Movement (minjung munhwa undong hyŏbŭihoe) in April and writers created the Council for the Democratic Writers (chayu silch’ŏn munin hyŏbŭihoe) in December 1984. In 1985, the Coalition of the Minjung‘s Buddhist Movement (minjung pulgyo undong yŏnhap) and the Families‘ Council for Realizing Democratization (minjuhwa silch’ŏn kajok undong hyŏbŭihoe) were created. In the following year, the Council for Democratic Education (minju kyoyuk silch’ŏn hyŏbŭihoe) and the Council for the Publication and Cultural Movement (han’guk ch’ulp’an munhwa undong hyŏbŭihoe) emerged.

100

The creation of formal above-ground SMOs indicates the revitalization of Korea‘s social movements in the mid-1980s. Each movement industry began to consolidate into independent movement organization, which became an important organizational basis for their development into broader coalitions in the late 1980s. Without the establishment of a multi-organizational field, the potential for a broad collaboration was limited. During the June uprising of 1987, most of the formal SMOs which arose in the mid-1980s joined coalitions and participated in mass demonstrations.

The Politicization of the Labor Movement During the 1980s, the labor movement along with the student movement constituted one of the largest movement industries in Korea. Responding to the liberalization mood, workers created a public labor SMO named the Council for the Korean Workers‘ Welfare (CKWW: han’guk nodongja pokchi hyŏbŭihoe, nohyŏb) in January 1984. This moderate SMO played a role of supporting the democratic union movement and educating workers (Chang 2007:359). By this time, many students who had entered factories in order to build democratic labor unions within workplaces transformed into professional labor activists. The penetration of those labor activists rapidly politicized the labor movement in the mid-1980s (Koo 2001:103). 43 Most importantly, alliances among the labor SMOs solidified during this period, as exemplified by the Kuro solidarity strike in summer 1985. After several years of the democratic union movement activity located at separate workplaces, labor unions in different workplaces in Kuro industrial complex were able to wage a joint struggle with the support of other social movement groups including students and the chaeya activists. This strike was the first intra-movement protest among labor unions since the 1950s. The claims raised by the labor unions included both the bread-and-butter issues and broader demands such as labor law reform and anti-media censorship (S.O. Park 2007a:342). More than ten labor unions and over 2,500 workers participated in the strike. Although state repression quelled the movement with physical

43 Several hundred students a year entered factories between 1983 and 1986. By the mid-1980s, more than 3,000 student-turned-workers existed in the industrial arena and about a half of them were women. Since labor organizing was one of the most dominant trends in the student movement in the 1980s, entering factories was considered a natural path for many student activists (Koo 2001:105-06). 101

power and destroyed the newly created labor unions, the solidarity strike made a strong impression on many labor activists. Whereas the main strategy of the democratic union movement in the early 1980s was to create small groups that could develop into unions, the labor activists‘ strategy became much bolder after the Kuro solidarity strike. They criticized the small-group approach as a mild strategy and emphasized building regional labor coalitions and participating in political struggles (Koo 2001:107). This new approach inspired the creation of regional labor coalitions in 1985 and 1986 (S.O. Park 2007a:349). In August 1985, The Workers‘ Alliance in Seoul (sŏul nodong undong yŏnhap, sŏnoryŏn) was founded by collaboration between four Seoul-based labor SMOs including labor unions. Although it launched joint protests with students‘ organizations, this SMO was destroyed in October 1986 by repression and factional struggles. Similarly, the Workers‘ Alliance in Incheon (inch’ŏn chiyŏk nodongja yŏnmaeng, innoryŏn) was established in the industrial area located in Incheon, but soon destroyed in 1986. The labor movement was not yet capable of creating a national umbrella SMO, but kept focusing on cultivating regional alliances among unions and small groups and engaging in political protests in collaboration with students. Both the Workers‘ Alliance in Seoul and the Workers‘ Alliance in Incheon often produced highly progressive political declarations. With the growth of the labor movement, the labor and student movement ideologically influenced each other.44 In general, the politicization of workers in the mid-1980s contributed to the growth of their collective identity as a working class (Koo 2001:151) and their interest in political struggles such as the June uprising in 1987. Since most of the June protests took place during the daytime, workers could not easily leave their workplaces and join protests. Most of them also lacked unions that could systematically mobilize workers. Nonetheless, they participated in protests after work, and the workers‘ participation in the

44 The politicization of the labor movement fragmented the CKWW when the student-turned-labor activists left the organization in order to join the Workers‘ Alliance in Seoul in 1985. The criticism against the CKWW was that it was too moderate to lead the labor movement because it only played a supportive role to the movement (Chang 2007:363). An ever-increasing emphasis on political struggles among the leading labor activists brought about a backlash that the labor movement should advance the interests of the mass— ordinary workers (S.O. Park 2007a:349). 102

protests in the Incheon area was very high (S.O. Park 2007b). Ye-Kyo Yi was a student- turned-labor activist based in Incheon around that time. She says as follows:

Workers did come out and protested around their factories. I think that the episodes of the June uprising are very Seoul-centered. Because it mainly took place in the middle of Seoul, the white collar workers, students, and religious people could join easily. But there was no factory in central Seoul. That‘s why the stories of workers are not written much. However, those who participated do remember it. It was massive! Small groups and other labor organizations protested. Why wouldn‘t they participate? It was simply not written as a history. The labor protest was pretty remarkable there (Interview 08/05/08).

The mid-1980s witnessed a tremendous growth in the labor movement primarily due to many student activists‘ unswerving commitment to labor organizing and politicization of workers. The student and labor movements were tightly coupled during this period. However, the organizational development of the labor movement was slow compared to the rapid politicization of workers in the period 1984 - 1987. Since the labor movement suffered repression from both the state and businesses, it was extremely difficult to organize and mobilize workers. Moreover, the progressive workers‘ coalition SMOs did not last long during this period. Due to the organizational instability and fragility, the progressive labor SMOs could not play a leading role within broader coalitions such as the PMCDR.45 For instance, among those who participated in creating the NCDC, only 39 individuals were related to the labor movement whereas 253 were from the Protestant movement and 162 were from the women‘s movement (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:71). Also, the majority of the labor SMOs which joined the coalitions was relatively moderate. Most of the regional labor SMOs that joined the regional chapters of the NCDC from May to June 1987 were either the Protestant or Catholic labor SMOs (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:72-73). The close relationship between the religious and labor SMOs was a classic feature of the 1970s‘ labor movement. Since the religious labor organizations were based on humanitarian principles rather than on progressive ideals, it is feasible that the moderate strands of the labor movement were

45 The Workers‘ Alliance in Seoul (sŏul nodong undong yŏnhap, sŏnoryŏn) did join the PMCDR (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989b:67), but it was destroyed in a year. 103

more likely to join the inter-movement coalitions than more progressive ones during this period. The interactions between student activists and workers politicized the labor movement in the mid-1980s. The solidarity among workers and with the student movement became solidified and resulted in a number of inter-movement protests. However, the labor SMOs were not strong enough to play a leading role in creating the inter-movement coalitions. In particular, the radical, progressive part of the labor SMOs had a more difficult time maintaining their organizations than the moderate part due to frequent repression. Suffering from various obstacles and organizational immaturity, the labor SMOs were relatively less active in joining the inter-movement coalitions than other formal SMOs that could operate openly during this period.

The Evolution of the Student SMOs The organizational development of the student movement was the most complex among all social movement industries. To begin with, students reacted to the liberalization in 1984 by creating tentative student organizations that developed quickly into formal student associations. Since the underground circles were at the forefront of student activism from the early 1980s, the student movement operated on the base of a dual structure of formal student associations and semi-underground struggle committees. On the one hand, students reorganized formal student associations in order to expand the movement into the wider student mass by public student activities. On the other hand, students created struggle committees (Struggle Committee for Anti-Dictatorship and Democratization (pandokchae minjuhwa t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe, mint’uwi)) that could supplement the student associations by specializing in organizing protests. As the vanguard camp became dominant in 1984, the student leadership based on vanguardism pursued a dual strategy of mass-penetration and vanguard-oriented protests led by core student activists. Since the student associations were not fully developed yet, the role of the struggle committees was more pronounced during this period. The organizational inertia from earlier underground experiences had a strong and enduring impact on the student movement and it became a major constraint for alliance formation.

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In early November 1984, two nationwide coalitions were founded by college students. The National Student Coalition for the Struggle for Democratization (chŏn’guk minjuhwa t’ujaeng haksaeng yŏnhap) was a coalition of the struggle committees and the National Council for the College Students‘ Representatives (chŏn’guk taehaksaeng taep’yogigu hoeŭi) was a federation of the student associations. The name of the latter changed into the National League of Students (chŏn’guk haksaeng ch’ongyŏnmaeng) in November 1984, and into the National Coalition of Students (NCS: chŏn’guk haksaeng ch’ongyŏnhap, chŏnhangnyŏn) in April 1985. The NCS had a struggle committee known as sammint’u (the Struggle Committee for Minjung Democratization and National Reunification (minjung minjuhwawa minjok chajut’ongirŭl wihan t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe). The NCS and sammint’u played an important role in organizing disruptive protests on- and off-campus in 1985. 46 The disruptiveness of student protests was due to the dominance of vanguardism in the student leadership. The NCS‘s focus on political struggles was often criticized for alienating the student mass (Oh 1988:69). Student coalitions actively sought alliances with workers. In 1984, students supported the labor protest in the Kuro industrial area of Seoul. In fall 1985, the NCS organized a protest against the IMF/IBRD Annual Meeting in Seoul, in which both students and workers participated. Students also absorbed the political slogans of the labor movement known as the 3-min ideology.47 As many student activists penetrated the labor sector by disguising themselves as industrial workers at that time, the student- turned labor activists had a substantial influence in the student movement. By late 1985, however, the vanguard camp which dominated the leadership of the student movement was weakened by state repression. Criticizing the vanguard camp, a new ideological camp appeared roughly from early 1986 and emphasized anti-

46 Students rallied nationwide around the issue of the Kwangju massacre. On May 15, 1985, about 10,000 students from 29 colleges demonstrated. On May 16, the number doubled. On the next day, a total of 38,000 students from 80 colleges protested (Kang 1988:97). The scale of the events revealed the power and competence of student activism. On May 23, 73 students from the NCS occupied the Seoul USIS until May 26 and criticized the U.S. role in the Kwangju massacre, although the students denied that they were anti- American. In late 1985, the NCS organized a number of occupation sit-ins at the training institute of the governmental party and the Kwangju USIS, to name a few. 47 Three min denotes common people (minjung), democracy (minju), and nation (minjok). The Workers‘ Alliance in Seoul (sŏul nodong undong yŏnhap, sŏnoryŏn) supported the idea of the ―3-min Constitution (sammin hŏnpŏp)‖ based on the minjung‘s liberation, democratization, and national reunification (Kang 1988:123). 105

imperialism—especially anti-Americanism. 48 As a result, the newly created anti- American camp and the mainstream vanguard camp fell into severe factional struggles between their struggle committees, the minmint’u and the chamint’u. Minmint’u stands for the Struggle Committee for an Anti-imperialist, Anti-fascist National Democracy (panje panp’asyo minjok minju t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe) based on vanguardism and chamin’tu is an abbreviation of the Struggle Committee for Anti-United States, Antifascist, and Autonomous Democratization (panmi chajuhwa panp’asyo minjuhwa t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe) based on anti-Americanism. Both emphasized an intra-movement alliance, so the former created the National Student League for an Anti-imperialist, Anti-fascist National Democracy (chŏn’guk panje panpasyo minjok minju haksaeng yŏnmaeng, minminhangnyŏn) in April 1986, and the latter the National Patriotic Student Coalition for Anti-imperialism and Anti-dictatorship (chŏn’guk panoese pandokchae aeguk haksaeng t’ujaeng yŏnhap, aehakt’uryŏn). The student movement was far from being united until 1986. The factional struggles between the two groups weakened the student movement. By late 1986, a large number of student leaders were arrested during protests and preemptive raids on the student SMOs. For instance, 1,274 students were arrested due to the rally which announced the creation of the National Patriotic Student Coalition for Anti-imperialism and Anti-dictatorship in October 1986 (W.S. Park 2007:365). The tremendous loss of leadership compelled student activists to reflect on their flaws more seriously. By late 1986, the chamint’u group took over the leadership in the student movement. At the same time, all underground circles dissolved themselves for the purpose of centralizing the movement leadership based on the formal student associations (Kang 1988:159). In 1987, the chamint’u group expanded the roles of the student associations that could carry out more popular activities with ordinary students. Until then, the student associations only played a marginal role in the student movement due to the dominance of the struggle committees. As a result, the Council of Student

48 A political pamphlet known as Panje minjung minjuhwa undongŭi hwatpurŭl tŭlgo minjukhaebangŭi kisuro puhwalhaja [Let Us Be Resurrected as the Flagmen of National Liberation with the Torch of Anti- Imperialist, Minjung, and Democratization Movement] popularized anti-Americanism. The pamphlet begins from the assertion that ―the last 100 years of Korean modern history is the history of imperialist invasions, and the minjung‘s struggles against imperialism,‖ and defines the United States as the only enemy. 106

Representatives in Seoul (sŏul chiyŏk taehaksaeng taep’yoja hyŏbŭihoe, sŏdaehyŏp) was created in May as a coalition of the Seoul-based student associations, and played a critical role in organizing student protests in the June uprising of 1987 (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:195-96). In-Young Yi, currently a politician since the early 2000s, was the first president of the Council of Student Representatives in Seoul in 1987. He says, ―From then on, organizational collaborations with the chaeya group started. The student who took charge of alliance activity unofficially participated in the NCDC. I also met the leaders of the PMCDR‖ (Interview 08/27/08). Only with organizational centralization, the student movement was ready to seek for a broader alliance. Under the influence of the Council of Student Representatives in Seoul, students began to withdraw from violent tactics such as throwing rocks and gasoline bombs at the riot police. They realized that their radicalism was alienating the public as well as other social movement groups (Wu et al. 2007:236). The new emphasis on mass-orientation enabled them to change their tactical repertoires. The first example was a street protest on May 23, 1987. About 2,000 students gathered in the street of Chongno in the middle of heavy rain, and sat or laid down on the paved road. Jun-Young Yi was one of the protest organizers for that day. He reminisces as follows:

Until then, the typical fight with the riot police was a long-distanced one. We threw rocks and Molotov cocktails to keep some distance from the police so that we could dodge repression. But by May, we became convinced that the power that resists violence is non- violence. However, we were not confident because it was too scary that we could not fight back... Finally we decided to jump onto the street, yell out slogans, sit on the road if the police came, lie down if they tried to take us, get arrested if they took us—without ever fighting back. We believed that such a scene would appeal to the bystanders…. In the end, some elders struck the policemen with their umbrellas, saying ―Don‘t arrest the students! Don‘t hit them!‖ (Interview 09/03/08)

Such warm support from the ordinary citizens greatly impressed students. After the street protest, the attitudes from other chaeya SMOs to the student movement warmed up as well (Wu et al. 2007:234-37). Students‘ shift to a moderate strategy facilitated the formation of broader alliances with diverse social movement groups. Students capitalized on political openings created by the liberalization policy and revived the student associations in 1984. They created various intra-movement coalitions

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in order to coordinate student activism. By the creation of such organizational apparatuses, the student movement was able to wage large-scale protests and support workers‘ protests. However, they did not overcome the organizational inertia from underground activism, and tended to overemphasize the role of the militant struggle committees as compared to the role of formal student associations. Moreover, the student movement was incessantly swayed by factional power struggles, and the internal conflicts caused a narrow view among radical student activists that hindered interactions with other groups. Such organizational conflicts were essentially linked to each camp‘s ideological position, which will be discussed later in this chapter. Although the strategy of mass-mobilization was often underscored in the student movement, the mass was treated as bystanders rather than protesters (Kwon 1987:284). Students mostly focused on building alliances with the labor movement and within the student movement, neglecting other SMOs. Jun-Young Yi recalls that the student movement was detached from other social movements until 1986 because it was more urgent to organize itself first (Interview 09/03/08). Only in late 1986 and early 1987 did the student movement finally reach out to other movements for a broader collaboration. Similar to the case of the labor movement, the student movement was less likely to join coalitions than other formal SMOs during this period. Various organizational constraints tended to confine the student movement inside its own narrow boundary and incapacitated it from engaging in broader coalitional activities.

The Chaeya‘s Coalitions In contrast, the chaeya movement played a leading role in building the coalitions that could encompass a broad range of SMOs in diverse fields. The chaeya elders were especially well-known and widely respected prodemocracy activists, including the religious leaders such as Ik-Hwan Mun, Hyŏng-Kyu Pak, and Hun-Che Kye, and intellectuals such as Sŏk-Hŏn Ham, who led the anti-Yusin and prodemocracy movement in the 1970s. They were symbolic figures of the democracy movement. Beside the elders, the relatively younger chaeya activists were also the participants in the democracy movement in the 1970s when they were in their 20s. In the mid-1980s, many young

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chaeya activists in their 30s who had not left the arena of social movements worked for the YCDM or other formal SMOs as part of the staff members. In 1984 the chaeya activists successfully created two important political SMOs. The Council of Movement for People and Democracy (CMPD: minjung minju undong hyŏbŭihoe, minminhyŏb) was created on June 29, and the National Congress for Democracy and Reunification (NDCR: minju t’ongil kungmin hoeŭi, kungminhoeŭi) was founded on October 16. The former was an inter-movement coalition of 12 SMOs including labor, farmers‘, youths‘, cultural, intellectual, journalist, and religious SMOs. The YCDM played a leading role in the creation of this organization. In contrast, the latter was based on the individual membership of the chaeya elders who were well- known and highly respected public figures from the 1970s. Both were built around the broad goal of democratization, but the former was more progressive—minjung-oriented—than the latter (D.Y. Kim 2007a:97). Also, the SMOs had differences in organizational structures. The CMPD had a broad organizational basis because it retained an organization-based membership structure, but had difficulties in integrating the member SMOs effectively within the organization. Moreover, it was not well-known to the public. On the contrary, the NDCR was based on individual membership of the popular chaeya elders. Although the members were well- integrated in the somewhat popular NDCR since they were all long-time fellow activists, the NDCR lacked mobilizational capacity (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989b:5). Nevertheless, the two SMOs‘ view of institutional politics was similar. These two SMOs kept the opposition party at arm‘s length because of their distrust of and skepticism about institutional politics in the Chun regime. In response to the general election in early 1985, both SMOs announced that they would boycott the election (Seong 2007c:329). However, their view on institutional politics and the opposition party quickly altered after the election because of NDP‘s incredible electoral advance in 1985. The chaeya activists contemplated the election results and concluded that the division between the two leading chaeya SMOs—the CMPD and the NDCR—should be overcome in order to build a larger inter-movement alliance and gain more grassroots support.

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In addition, the coexistence of the two SMOs with similar organizational goals created conflict and competition for resources when they tried to create regional chapters. Unlike the situation in Seoul, local activists in the provincial areas did not enjoy financial or human resources that could sustain two broad-based SMOs (Seong 2007c:332). In- Seong Hwang recollects the reaction from the provinces as follows:

The condition of the merger between the two was created mainly due to the regional demand. When the activists from the two organizations came to the countryside and talked about similar issues, people naturally thought that there was a no big difference between the two. In the provincial areas, people hated a change in the central leadership. For instance, they had to remake all the envelopes for newsletters, you know. For them, the center had to be unified (Interview 07/31/08).

The pressures from the regional SMOs and concerns about available resources led to the merger of the CMPD and the NDCR. Yet, the merger between the two was not without tension and power struggle around the leadership of the democracy movement (Interview with Keun-Tae Kim, 08/12/08). The NDCR was more aggressive in the merger because it lacked a strong organizational base due to the individual-based membership structure. In contrast, due to a federated structure without a central leadership, the CMPD had more internal problems accommodating the member SMOs. In particular, the YCDM and the Christian SMOs rejected the idea of merger at first. They took six months to finally decide to join after the creation of a merged SMO.49 Since the YCDM was composed of ―the strikers‖ who knew how to organize demonstrations and the Christian SMOs were ―the supporters‖ who provided material resources, an absence of the two could cripple the organization (Mint‘ongnyŏn ch‘angnib 20 chunyŏn kinyŏm haengsawiwŏnhoe 2005:99-100). Finally, the People‘s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR: minju t’ongil minjung undong yŏnhap, mint’ongnyŏn) was created on March 29, 1985. The merger was a result of debates and compromises between the NDCR and

49 The YCDM thought that it was more progressive than the NDCR, so it was reluctant to collaborate with it. For the Christian SMOs, there was no clear incentive to join the organization because of three reasons. First, they had large organizational bases that had been built in the 1970s and they could easily mobilize churches. Second, they enjoyed financial stability thanks to their international support networks. Lastly, they were relatively better-protected from state repression because they were religious organizations (Interview with Keun-Tae Kim, 08/12/08). In addition, they preferred a federated structure to a centralized one (Seong 2007c:338-39). 110

the CMPD. 50 The PMCDR was based on both individual and organization-based membership, modeled after the two parent organizations. The PMDCR was ambitious to become the center of alliance in the democracy movement. In its mission statement, it stated, ―We will pursue alliances with any group or individual that considers democratization and reunification as the primary tasks,‖ and emphasized that they would work hard for the equality and liberty of the minjung (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989b:8). This SMO assumed the leadership of the democratization and reunification of Korea, as well as the minjung movement. The PMCDR waged a number of inter- movement protests including demonstrations that commemorated the Kwangju uprising and supported the student and labor movement (Seong 2007c:336-38). By late 1985, the PMCDR arose as the largest coalition in Korea, and became a nursery for the creation of the NCDC on May 27, 1987. There were several important motivations behind the creation of the NCDC. First, President Chun announced a statement on April 13 that he would maintain the current constitution, which infuriated SMOs. Second, the death of a student named Chong-Ch‘ŏl Pak from excessive torture by the police shocked activists and the general public, and morally damaged the regime. Third, due to state repression in late 1986, the PMCDR could not function normally as the leading organization of the democracy movement.51 Lastly, the chaeya movement and the NDP had experienced organizational collaboration in late-1985 within a temporary coalition named the Collaborative Committee for the Prevention of Torture and False Communist Accusation (komun mit yonggong chojak chŏji kongdongdaech’aek wiwŏnhoe). The two protested together in reaction to the incident in which Keun-Tae Kim, the president of the YCDM, was severely tortured and wounded by state agents. This experience led to the founding of the NCDC (Kwon and Han 2007:206).

50 Chong-Chŏl Kim, who was the spokesperson of the PMCDR, recalls, ―from my personal experience, it was the most annoying and painful discussion ever….The shortest meeting took six hours, and the longest one could last overnight. We discussed how we should merge, how we should constitute the administrative section, where the office should be, and so on‖ (Mint‘ongnyŏn ch‘angnib 20 chunyŏn kinyŏm haengsawiwŏnhoe 2005:99). 51 From mid-1986, leaders of the PMCDR began to be arrested starting from the president Ik-Hwan Mun. The total number of arrestees adds up to 19 between May and November. Also, this organization‘s office was closed by authorities in November (Seong 2007a:354-57) 111

The NCDC brought together the PMCDR and 25 other social movement groups.52 A total of 2,191 individuals participated in founding the NCDC. About 150 members gathered in a church located in central Seoul on May 27, 1987, and declared that their immediate goal was a democratic constitutional amendment (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:11-12, 70-71). In its founding statement, it reads, ―Now we agree that we should unify the isolated and scattered movements and expand the movements into the people. We create the National Coalition for Democratic Constitution for the purpose of unifying the Catholic priests, Protestant pastors, Buddhist monks, women, democratic politicians, workers, farmers, urban poor, writers, educators, cultural artists, journalists, publishers, and youths, and we will sacrifice ourselves for the democratization of this country‖ (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:12). Most importantly, the PMCDR and opposition elites collaborated together for the creation of the NCDC. It was the first time in the 1980s that an alliance between the SMOs and opposition elites was formally established. Both Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung were included in the leadership positions of the organization along with the chaeya elders and the representatives from other SMOs. The NCDC was no doubt the grandest coalition that encompassed the broadest spectrum of the SMOs. Built upon years of experiences, the NCDC was a showcase of the evolution of how to organize an effective coalition. The leadership structure based on the well-known chaeya activists and opposition politicians maximized its appeal to the general public, and the creation of regional chapters which quickly diffused into various provincial areas in a matter of days helped mobilize nationwide large-scale protests (D.Y. Kim 2007a:102-03). Between late May and July 1987, 9 regional chapters were created by collective efforts between diverse local SMOs. In the district-level, 10s of local branches were founded all over the country. Additionally, several sector-specific organizations emerged within the NCDC in order to group the SMOs with similar backgrounds together. For instance, cultural activists, Buddhists, workers, and farmers created their own

52 The organization also included 253 Catholic priests, 270 Protestant pastors, 160 Buddhist monks, 35 from the PMCDR, 213 opposition politicians, 162 women‘s movement leaders, 308 from the Council for the Promotion of Democratization (minch’uhyŏp), 161 peasant activists, 39 labor activists, 18 urban poor activists, 43 publishers and journalists, 43 authors and writers, 66 artists, 55 educators, 12 youth movement leaders, and 74 lawyers, including regional representatives – 11 from Kyŏnggi, 73 from Kangwŏn, 29 from Ch‘ungnam, 56 from Pusan, 89 from Kyŏngbuk area (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:71). 112

coalitional branches under the umbrella of the NCDC (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:74-78). Thus, the leadership of the NCDC was able to penetrate every corner of the Korean society. One problem was whether or not to accept student SMOs. Students expressed their wish to join the coalition, but the NCDC did not include them even though it strived to represent all social movement industries. The most important reason was students‘ radicalism, which was often demonized by the mainstream media and state authorities as communist or pro-North Korea (Wu et al. 2007:236). Moreover, opposition politicians did not want to collaborate with students because they thought that students were extremely violent and leftist (Interview with Chung-Il Oh, 09/13/08). Until early 1987, students‘ primary tactic was throwing rocks and Molotov cocktails at the police, which made the chaeya SMOs such as the YCDM and the PMCDR reluctant to openly form an alliance with them. However, the dilemma was that students were the most powerful in waging street protests since they were exceptionally well-trained and experienced activists, and that they could mobilize a large number of students for every protest. Therefore, even though the students were not allowed to join the NCDC officially, they were able to keep unofficial networks with the leaders of the NCDC and collaborate under the surface (Wu et al. 2007:237). During the June uprising, the NCDC employed several key strategies. First, organizing nationwide mass-demonstrations simultaneously was the most effective strategy. Chung-Il Oh was a pastor and the president of the NCDC. He recalls with regard to the necessity of a simultaneous protest:

From the 1970s, each movement sector protested. But they fought separately and were crushed quickly. Say there was a protest in Kwangju, 70,000-80,000 policemen were dispatched from Seoul, Masan, Changwon, and other areas to repress this single protest. Every day, the police forces moved up and down on the freeways….We needed a coalition because scattered protests could be repressed so easily….When we hit them with massive simultaneous protests, it turned out to be effective (Interview 09/13/08).

Second, the NCDC emphasized non-violence during protests. The principle of non-violence lowered the barrier of participation in demonstrations and deterred potential conflicts between the radical and moderate groups within the organization. In-Seong

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Hwang played an important role in strategizing protest tactics in June 1987. He reflects on the tactics below:

If you throw Molotov cocktails to the police, people run away. If you hold flowers during a protest, people watch you. Then, if the policemen brutally repress you, people step out from the pedestrian road to support you and try to stop the policemen (Interview 07/31/08).

Lastly, the NCDC devised popular slogans and used several cultural symbols that could easily appeal to the general public (Yu et al. 2005b:207). Instead of radical slogans, the NCDC focused on the slogans such as ―Down with the Dictatorship‖ and ―We Want to Live in a World without Torture.‖ Female activists waved purple scarves during demonstrations and put flowers on the uniforms of the riot police. Protesters sang familiar songs such as the Korean national anthem. Based on the past trials and errors, the activists in the NCDC were able to coordinate a series of inter-movement protests that had a wide popular appeal. As a result, only two weeks after the founding of the NCDC, it successfully mobilized more than 240,000 people on June 10, and 1,400,000 on June 26. The gradual accumulation of organizational experiences in creating coalitions helped activists find the best formula. The demonstrations on June 10 were the biggest protest since 1960 (Yu et al. 2005b:213). The sheer size of the demonstrations that sprang from all over the nation paralyzed police forces as expected, and pressured the Chun regime to make concessions. The creation of the SMOs in the diverse fields paved a way for organizational collaboration, and led to the founding of multiple coalitions during this period. Since the coalitions were organizations of the SMOs, they could mobilize large-scale protests in terms of the number of participants and regional diffusion. Furthermore, they were able to effectively coordinate the strategies that could appeal to the public. By encompassing a wide array of social movement groups, they could take advantage of group-specific traits such as the chaeya elders‘ popularity and students‘ mobilization capacity. After years of promoting inter-movement alliances across different social movement industries, the arduous efforts crystallized in the achievements of the NCDC, which contributed to the opening of a new era of democratization.

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3-5-(2): Organizational Diversity In Korea, an increase of organizational diversity provided organizational resources to the democracy movement by supplying potential candidates for alliance. According to the KDM Dataset, the average Simpson Diversity Index is .53 in 1984, .67 in 1985, .76 in 1986, and .62 from January to June 1987. From 1980 to 1983, the average diversity index is .40. The SMOs tended to diversify after liberalization, although the trend was not linear. Table 3-2 reports the annual rates of participation in protests by different social groups. Over time, the movement became more diverse, as different groups joined the movement.53 Students and workers were the majority of the protest groups during this period, which is not very different from the earlier period. However, the ratio of students‘ participation to all movements tends to decline from 36% in 1984 to 21% by June 1987. Students no longer dominated the scene of protests. This suggests a substantial growth of protests by other movements during this period. In the case of workers, the ratio fluctuates between 25 to 36% from 1984 to 1986, and surges to 41% in June 1987. The growth of the labor movement is clearly reflected in this increase.

Table 3-2. Types of Social Groups during Protests (1984 - June 1987) Jan-Jun Social Group 1984 1985 1986 Total 1987 Workers 115 (42.12) 102 (44.54) 68 (24.29) 40 (41.24) 325 (36.97) Students 97 (35.53) 70 (30.57) 70 (25.00) 20 (20.62) 257 (29.24) Chaeya SMOs 6 (2.20) 9 (3.93) 14 (5.00) 8 (8.25) 37 (4.21) Protestants 11 (4.03) 7 (3.06) 12 (4.29) 3 (3.09) 33 (3.75) Professors 1 (0.44) 27 (9.64) 2 (2.06) 30 (3.41) Family 4 (1.47) 7 (3.06) 9 (3.21) 1 (1.03) 21 (2.39) Catholics 2 (0.87) 12 (4.29) 5 (5.15) 19 (2.16) Citizen 1 (0.37) 1 (0.44) 3 (1.07) 5 (5.15) 10 (1.14) Journalists 3 (1.10) 7 (2.50) 10 (1.14) Political parties 2 (0.73) 7 (2.50) 1 (1.03) 10 (1.14) Youths 7 (2.56) 3 (1.31) 10 (1.14) Farmers 4 (1.47) 2 (0.87) 3 (1.07) 9 (1.02)

53 Even those who did not directly participate in any movement tried to support activists in various ways. For example, Ok-Ja Han started her career as a nurse in the 1980s in Suwon area, and became active in the women‘s movement in the 1990s. She said that she was able to provide shelters for student activists, help them contact and meet families, and give financial support, because health care facilities were relatively free of state surveillance (Interview 08/07/08). In this sense, support for the movement was on the rise at the backstage of protests. 115

Lawyers 1 (0.37) 6 (2.14) 2 (2.06) 9 (1.02) Women‘s SMOs 3 (1.31) 6 (2.14) 9 (1.02) Writers 2 (0.73) 3 (1.31) 2 (0.71) 2 (2.06) 9 (1.02) Buddhists 1 (0.37) 4 (1.43) 2 (2.06) 7 (0.80) Poor people 2 (0.73) 4 (1.75) 1 (0.36) 7 (0.80) Residents 6 (2.20) 1 (0.36) 7 (0.80) Teachers 2 (0.87) 4 (1.43) 1 (1.03) 7 (0.80) Chaeya individuals 3 (1.10) 1 (0.44) 2 (0.71) 6 (0.68) Environment SMOs 1 (0.44) 4 (1.43) 1 (1.03) 6 (0.68) Politicians 1 (0.37) 1 (0.44) 3 (1.07) 5 (0.57) Miners 2 (0.73) 1 (0.44) 2 (0.71) 5 (0.57) Intellectuals 2 (0.73) 1 (0.44) 1 (1.03) 4 (0.46) Artists 1 (0.44) 2 (0.71) 1 (1.03) 4 (0.46) Publishers 2 (0.87) 2 (0.71) 4 (0.46) Other religions 1 (0.37) 2 (0.71) 3 (0.34) Small businesses 1 (0.37) 1 (0.44) 1 (0.36) 3 (0.34) Fishermen 2 (0.87) 2 (0.23) Street vendors 2 (0.71) 2 (0.23) Civic organizations 2 (0.71) 2 (0.23) Pharmacists 1 (1.03) 1 (0.11) Prisoners 1 (0.44) 1 (0.11) Political prisoners 1 (1.03) 1 (0.11) Victim, human rights 1 (0.37) 1 (0.11) Labor activists 1 (0.44) 1 (0.11) Other 2 (0.71) 2 (0.23) Total 273 (100) 229 (100) 280 (100) 97 (100) 782 (100) Source: Korea Democracy Movement Dataset Notes: Column percentages in parentheses

The chaeya SMOs are the third most dominant group in terms of the entire trend from 1984 to June 1987. Since this category primarily captures the coalitions, its increase shows the growth of the coalitions. Note that this category tends to be underrated because the KDM Dataset reports a coordinated nationwide demonstration as one protest. Since many nationwide protests occurred in 1987, the actual significance of the coalitions is larger than it looks in the table. The Protestants and Catholics, if merged together, are also one of the most active groups that joined protests. The ratio of Christians‘ participation in events from 1984 to 1987 doubled. With the creation of the coalitions, the Christians became very important. Their significance will be explained in the next section that deals with organizational networks, because it is closely related to their role as a network mediator.

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Beside these dominant groups, a broad spectrum of social groups participated in protests. Several new groups entered the arena of protest during this period. Street vendors, writers, artists, publishers, teachers, civic organizations, environmental SMOs, and pharmacists were added to the list, even though they were a minority. Some of them were based on formal SMOs, but others were not. Movements were diffusing into the social groups who had not considered themselves protesters before. The diffusion itself was indicative of the expansion of the pool for potential recruitment. The diversity of social groups that joined protests had a significant impact on collaborative protests and coalitions. In-Sun Nam-Yun was a women‘s movement and labor activist in the 1980s. She recalls about the experiences of diversity during protests:

At first, we did not know what kinds of or how many groups existed….After years, we finally met in a street demonstration. At the rally, I was really surprised to find out that there were so many of us….It was an experience of ascertaining the strength of one another….It was the same for the women‘s movement. From 1985, we continued to experience solidarity through joint protests….Solidarity forms based on the experiences of fighting together. Only after such experiences, mutual trust, and leadership are established, it becomes possible to make an organization together (Interview 08/05/08).

As Nam points out, the social movement groups could not identify each other before they came out to protest. After liberalization, the diversity of protesters increased and raised the opportunity for protesters to get acquainted with other activists and assess the leadership or strength of each SMO. Fighting together against repression also provided the protesters with a collective experience that nurtured mutual trust. The better they knew one another, the easier it became to protest together. In this sense, joint participation in a protest was a source of collective identity (Klandermans et al. 2002). The increasing diversity of social movement groups that joined the protests further encouraged alliance formation.

3-5-(3): Organizational Networks As seen in the previous chapter, the SMOs were largely fragmented and isolated due to the unprecedented severity of repression during the period of 1980 to 1983. Under the circumstances, underground activism flourished but became more segregated. This

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increasingly segregated structure of the network closure inhibited alliances among different SMOs. After the liberalization, however, significant changes occurred in the social movement sector. This section uses a network perspective to explain why alliances began to form across diverse sets of the SMOs. Even before liberalization, some level of informal inter-movement interactions did occur among social movement activists. Since formal SMOs were not allowed to organize, alternative forms of public space were created. One of the important examples was the Research Institute for the Study of Pollution (konghae munje yŏn’guso) founded in 1982. Byoung-Ok Ahn was an environmental activist in the 1980s, and is still one of the leaders of the environmental movement. According to him, ―The institute was in a very unique position. At that time, it was difficult to be active in public, but the institute dealt with environment-related problems. Under the identity of a research institute, the place functioned as a meeting place for the chaeya figures, at least until 1986‖ (Interview 08/04/08). The institute was not exempt from state repression,54 but it enjoyed a relative freedom compared to other social movement groups and provided a space for ―submerged networks‖ (Melucci 1989) among activists. For example, the YCDM frequently used the space for their meetings (Kwon and Han 2007:204). Under a repressive period, activists were able to meet one another in such politically neutral places and maintained informal networks among themselves. When the political atmosphere became more open with the onset of liberalization, formal above-ground SMOs started to emerge. From that point, joint memberships began to appear between the SMOs. Figure 3-4 gives annual snapshots of the organizational networks from 1984 to 1987 based on the Stanford KDP Dataset on SMOs, showing how SMOs are interconnected by joint memberships. The KDP Dataset provides extensive lists of leaders in SMOs. The nodes represent SMOs and the lines (edges) between them are formed on the basis of whether or not two SMOs have shared a leader in the past. The letters written next to the nodes indicate which social movement fields the listed SMOs belong to (see ―Notes‖ at the bottom of the figure). I do not show them for the year 1987

54 Ahn reminisces that several government agents often visited and examined the organization. He explains the reason for such repression: ―Those who pointed out the problems of pollution were viewed as pro-North Korea by the government. From the government‘s perspective, those who stood in the way of Korea‘s economic development must have had a subversive intention‖ (Interview with Byoung-Ok Ahn, 08/04/08). 118

since the networks become too dense. Also note that isolates are excluded in the figure. I listed the number of isolates in the upper right side in each box.

Figure 3-4. Network Evolution (1984 - 1987) 1984 1985

1986 1987

Source: the Stanford Korea Democracy Project Dataset Notes: i=Number of isolates, C=Chaeya, F=Family, I=Inter-movement Coalition, J=Journalist, L=Labor, P=Politician, S=Student, W=Woman

In this four-year period, more and more SMOs became interconnected by joint memberships over time. The overall trend shows a clear pattern of an increase of the linkages between SMOs. Evidently, the coalitions played a central role in linking diverse SMOs. Since the coalitions primarily relied on organization-based memberships, many SMOs were linked to them by joint memberships. In Figure 3-4, the top left cell presents the interorganizational networks in 1984. Within the cell, two distinct cliques of SMOs exist. The most central SMO in the clique on the right side is the CKWW, which

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connects several labor unions(L) and one women‘s organization(W) (the Egalitarian Council for Women) by joint memberships. Next to this group, three SMOs (the YCDM, the CMPD, and the Council for Democratic Media Movement) are interconnected by joint memberships. Overall, interorganizational linkages are not dense, but increasing in 1984. The top right cell shows that more SMOs begin to establish linkages in 1985. The PMCDR is at the center of the cluster. The PMCDR connects the two cliques of SMOs that appeared in the previous year. The pattern is similar in the following year, in 1986, when the PMCDR again plays a central role in integrating the SMOs, expanding its networks into two student SMOs and one SMO formed by the families of the prosecuted. Finally, the bottom right cell exhibits more complex interorganizational networks in 1987. In this network snapshot, the NCDC holds the most central position in terms of betweenness centrality, which is marked by a small circle. Briefly put, the NCDC takes the baton from the PMCDR and plays the most central role. A large number of SMOs are interconnected through their memberships in the NCDC, while the two student SMOs on the bottom right side are disconnected from them. Overall, the network evolution reveals the role of the inter-movement coalitions, which is to centralize the networks through connecting different SMOs that belong to diverse industries. Over time, the coalitions were capable of recruiting more and more SMOs, and were indirectly linked to other non-member SMOs through the member SMOs‘ independent organizational networks. The overall networks evolved from a relatively scattered structure into a more centralized one during this period. The number of linkages among the SMOs increased over time as well. Joint membership across the SMOs was crucial in forming an alliance between them. When there were organizational conflicts around the issue of a merger between the CMPD and NDCR, the Catholic, labor, and farmer SMOs that had memberships in both organizations played an important role in facilitating discussions (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989b:353). Given the role of the coalitions, another important question arises: what are the internal mechanisms that induce the SMOs to join the coalitions? The coalition literature often points out that the maintenance of a coalition requires the processes of negotiation

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and compromise between member organizations in order to deal with organizational conflicts (Rose 2000; Obach 2004). Surprisingly, however, many SMOs seldom found problems in joining the coalitions in the Korean case. They were more than eager to join. Besides the chaeya group who had been advocating the importance of coalition-building for a long time, a number of SMOs embraced the idea without internal conflicts. Jeong- Sook Yoon was a women‘s movement activist in the 1980s. She says that joining a large coalition was rather a natural decision:

At that time, we thought that the women‘s movement was a part of the broader reform- oriented movement. In our minds, women‘s rights could be enhanced only when they were conjoined with the broader social institutional reforms….We held banners about both women‘s liberation and democratization. We believed that women would be liberated only after democratization (Interview 07/28/08).

Byoung-Ok Ahn makes a similar comment. He says, ―Yes, we thought that the environmental movement was a part of the democracy movement.‖ He notes that the rage against the government motivated the environmental activists to take the issue of democratization seriously:

In the workplaces, workers were exploited by the employers. Such exploitation existed as well for those who suffered from pollution. People got sick. Children showed us their bodies with various skin diseases. When we saw that, we were in a towering rage. The government did not do anything even when the media publicized the pollution issues. They announced that there were no such problems. And we thought that monopolized capital was behind the government, which guaranteed profits for the capitalists. The government had no intention to resolve the pollution issues at all (Interview 08/04/08).

Of course there was no guarantee that a new democratic government would be interested in women‘s rights or environmental problems more than the authoritarian government. However, Korean activists attributed the fundamental source of social problems to the authoritarian regime and hoped that democratization would create a better—more egalitarian and just—society for the problems to be resolved. With that consensus in mind, activists deliberately positioned themselves as a part of the broader prodemocracy movement, and did not hesitate to participate in the coalitions that openly

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promoted political democratization. By doing so, they were expecting to increase their public appeal, gain legitimacy, and enjoy the fruit of democratization later on. Nevertheless, it was sometimes frustrating for the minority SMOs to work with the mainstream movements such as the chaeya. For instance, the chaeya SMOs were not very interested in environmental issues. The environmental movement had to prove itself in order to be recognized as a part of the broader movement:

We tried hard to participate in the democracy movement. We protested in the big Incheon protest in May 1986. But we were disappointed that the mainstream movements such as the labor and the farmers‘ movement did not recognize the importance of the environmental movement. They thought that our movement was a middle-class, bourgeois movement. So we tried to stand in the frontline whenever a protest took place, in order to show that our issues are inseparable from the minjung movement. We went to most of the street rallies where many groups protested together (Interview with Byoung- Ok Ahn, 08/04/08).

In a similar vein, the women‘s movement rarely took the initiative in leading the coalitions. Although the value of participating in the broad alliance was acknowledged within the movement, the women‘s SMOs tended to be ―mobilized‖ into the coalitions rather than proactively ―organize‖ the coalitions (Kang 2003:117). Since the democracy movement led by the chaeya and minjung activists based on students was the mainstream movement in the 1980s, many SMOs tried to be a part of the larger movement entity rather than differentiating themselves. They set aside their own agenda and focused on the goal of political democratization. In addition, the role of mediators was essential in bridging between the different SMOs. Two distinct types of network mediators can be identified in Korea‘s democracy movement in the mid-1980s. First, it is important to note that the CPD (minch’uhyŏb) did not disappear after playing a lead role in creating the New Democratic Party (NDP) in early 1985. The NDP intentionally kept the CPD active as the party‘s auxiliary organ. The focus of the CPD was specifically aimed towards engaging in the democracy movement outside the parliament and continuing dialogues with the chaeya group. Before the CDP was created, the chaeya elders went great lengths to persuade opposition politicians to create a political organization that could carry out prodemocracy struggles (Minjuhwa ch‘ujin hyŏbŭihoe [the Council for the Promotion of Democratization]

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1988:109). From its birth, the CDP maintained a close relationship with the chaeya. Due to the CPD‘s unique position in between a political party and SMOs, the CPD was able to bridge between the two. Such a role was imperative since managing the relationship between the NDP and the chaeya SMOs was challenging given the NDP‘s shifting focus between institutional politics and protests. Second, Christian—Protestant and Catholic—activists and SMOs played a bigger role than the CPD in mediating between the different SMOs both when the SMOs created the coalitions and when organizational conflicts mounted within the coalitions. Some of them significantly overlap with the chaeya elders because several important chaeya elders such as Ik-Hwan Mun, Hyŏng-Kyu Pak, and Hun-Che Kye were Christian activists. Christians were capable of moderating between the SMOs because of two important features with respect to the Christian movement‘s status within the democracy movement. First, they had a very strong organizational basis—that of churches and formal Christian SMOs. According to Chung-Il Oh, the creation of the NCDC was strongly supported by the Christian organizations:

We were determined to make a national organization, Protestants and Catholics together. None of other organizations would have worked. We have nationwide networks. Moreover, we meet very often because we have religious services three, four times a week. Churches are everywhere. No other organization can beat us in terms of organizational capacity (Interview with Chung-Il Oh, 09/13/08).

Chung-Il Oh later became the president of the NCDC. The Christian activists, especially Protestants, retained a good amount of power within the coalitions. Their opinions were important in running the organizations because the participation of the Christian SMOs mattered when it came to organizing large-scale protests. Moreover, the Christian SMOs enjoyed stable financial resources through their international networks with international NGOs (Chu and Moon 1997:273). The NCDC received a substantial amount of financial support from such international Christian networks (Interview with Si-Chun Yu, 08/26/08). In the 1980s, the Christian SMOs were the most economically resourceful of all the SMOs. With organizational and financial resources, the Christian activists could maintain their power and voice in the coalitions.

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Second, Christian activists projected impartiality and morality because of their identity as religious leaders. Ideologically, they occupied a centrist—or center-leftist— position within the democracy movement. Also their long-time involvement in the democracy movement since the 1970s legitimized their leadership. They were respected by social movement activists and the public. Thus, they were often appointed as the advisors of the individual SMOs, and had leadership positions in the coalitions such as the PMCDR. For instance, activists had a number of debates whether or not to include the opposition party within the NCDC. The chaeya SMOs were generally reluctant to work with the opposition party because they worried that collaboration might taint the purity of their movement (Interview with Si-Chun Yu, 08/26/08). In this situation, the Catholic activists supported the PMCDR in including the opposition party, and, therefore, the opposition party could join the NCDC (S.B. Park 2007:271-72). In conclusion, the network evolution based on the formal relationship between the SMOs in the period 1984 - 1987 shows that joint memberships increased with the creation of the coalitions, and the brokerage role of Christians tended to be pronounced within the coalitions. Therefore, joint membership and brokerage had an indirect and positive impact on the likelihood of collaborative protests.55

3-5-(4): Ideological Interpretation Ideological interpretation is one of the most important dimensions of organizational processes that shape collaborative protests, since ideology shapes the ways in which activists assess the external environment and devise goals and tactics. In the Korean case, the ideological landscape was very complex in the 1980s. Even within the same group (e.g., a student group), widely different ideological orientations existed. Figure 3-5 shows a simplified map of the SMOs in terms of how ideological orientations affect the breadth of public appeal, in order to sketch the overall ideological differences between movement groups. This figure indicates the ideological landscape from 1984 to 1987.

55 Since the scope of the network data is confined to the formal interactions between the SMOs through joint membership, it does not show the informal interactions at the individual and organizational level, which might have more implications for the role played by informal social networks in collaborative protests. 124

The horizontal axis represents the spectrum of ideological orientations, and spans from radical to moderate. The vertical axis shows the degree of public appeal and ranges from narrow to broad, which depends on ideological orientations. While radical groups have narrow public appeal, moderate ones enjoy broader appeal (Downey and Rohlinger 2008). The figure shows each social movement industry that dominated the 1980s movements and their relationship with opposition politicians. I grouped them into three broad categories: (1) labor/student; (2) chaeya/Christian/other SMOs, and (3) opposition politicians.

Figure 3-5. Spectrum of Ideological Orientation and Public Appeal (1984 - 1987)

Broad

Opposition Politicians

Christians

Public AppealPublic Chaeya Elders

Other SMOs

Young Chaeya

Labor

Narrow Students

Radical Moderate Ideological Orientation

The labor and student SMOs are located at the bottom left side of the figure, indicating their radical ideology and narrow public appeal. In contrast, opposition politicians are placed on the top right side of the figure, as the group was seen to have the most moderate ideology and the broadest public appeal compared to the rest. The chaeya, Christian SMOs, and other formal SMOs (e.g., environmental SMOs, women‘s movement SMOs) are in the middle, although the Christians and the chaeya elders have

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more moderate ideology and enjoy a broader public appeal than the young chaeya activists and other formal SMOs.56 The young chaeya group was seen as skewing slightly more radical, towards the left end, than most of the other formal SMOs in terms of their ideological identity. However, the broad chaeya group was closely interconnected and overlapped in many aspects. Many activists in these groups had been engaging in movement activity since the 1970s, and they pursued liberal democratic principles with a strong focus on social egalitarianism associated with the emphasis on the minjung. They were the generation in between the chaeya elders and college students. They were very active in participating in coalition activism and worked closely with the chaeya elders and Christian SMOs. The integration of these groups into a united front was rather smooth since all of them anticipated a dawn of liberal democracy in Korea despite differences in specific goals. In this sense, these groups belonged to one broad category, as shown by the large dotted circle in Figure 3-5. Given the larger ideological distance between them, a bigger challenge was to integrate both the most conservative right wing and the most radical left wing of the movement into a coalition. Certainly, some degree of difference existed between the chaeya/Christian SMOs and opposition politicians. The chaeya/Christian SMOs tended to have a stronger minjung-orientation and hence exhibited a deeper concern for social inequality, human rights, and injustice mostly in humanitarian terms than did the politicians. In my view, they were likely to occupy center-leftist or centrist position in terms of ideological orientation. In contrast, the opposition politicians were more conservative and anticommunist than any social movement groups. However, the

56 The young chaeya group was more sensitive to ideological arguments than the older generation chaeya. The young chaeya activists in the YCDM engaged in ideological debates in 1985, which in turn influenced the student movement. The debate was called the C.N.P. debate, taken from the initials which represented three different ideological trends: the CDR (civil democratic revolution), NDR (national democratic revolution), and PDR (people‘s democratic revolution). These three ideological tendencies were different in multiple ways, but here I lay out their differences with regard to the issue of alliance. First, the CDR is the ideology of the chaeya groups and emphasizes the importance of creating a broad formal coalition among various social movement groups including the democratic bourgeoisie. Second, the NDR acknowledges the minjung‘s initiative in the movement more than the CDR, but reveals a similarity to the CDR in terms of stressing the importance of a broad alliance. Lastly, the PDR prioritizes the minjung-oriented struggles and does not focus on an alliance with the democratic bourgeoisie (Kang 1988:57-65). The YCDM tended to support the NDR thesis (Interview with Keun-Tae Kim, 08/12/08; Interview with Hyoung-Taek Kwon, 08/19/08). In this sense, the young chaeya group lay ideologically in-between the chaeya elders and the student movement. 126

ideological difference between the broad chaeya/Christian SMOs and the opposition politicians was not as profound as the one between the opposition politicians and students. They easily agreed that democratization through institutionalizing a direct presidential election overrode their mutual differences, and both essentially pursued liberal democratic ideals rather than leftist ones. Moreover, they had had a history of interactions with one another when collectively struggling against the repressive state from the 1970s on, and hence trusted each other. Opposition leaders such as Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam not only had professional political careers but also maintained close ties with the chaeya group. Thus, they rarely encountered serious ideological conflicts, even though their alliance stalled from time to time. Their interpersonal connections were helpful in muting their differences. The most daunting obstacle to integrating the whole social movement sector under a unified leadership was the student SMOs, which constituted the left wing along the ideological spectrum. The issue of working with the labor SMOs was inseparable from this problem because the student movement retained a considerable influence in the labor movement, although the moderate strands of the labor movement were more closely aligned to the broad chaeya group than students. Thus, it was instrumental to make some type of alliance with the student movement because student SMOs could mobilize hundreds and thousands of students at a time, and even mobilize workers through dense network connections. Then, what propelled the student movement into seeking alliances with other SMOs? According to the coalition literature, compared to groups with broad goals, radical groups tend to have more difficulty supporting coalitions (Borland 2008). Moreover, by definition radical groups reject comprehensive goals (Phillips 1991:768). Korea‘s student movement was also capable of mobilizing large protests on its own thanks to its large size. Thus, it is an important task to investigate the change process within a radical group, by which it becomes more interested in seeking an alliance. One may expect that the student movement‘s large size provided students enough resources to sustain their organizations and, therefore, enabled them to resist coalition participation. However, in my view, the size of SMOs was less important than SMOs‘ ideological orientations in terms of their motivation to join a coalition. For example, even

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though Christian SMOs enjoyed a large organizational base and plenty of resources based on local church organizations, they were one of the most passionate advocates of inter- movement coalitions. It was true that many students were reluctant to join coalitions in the beginning and they could sustain themselves without joining, but they gradually changed their attitude towards coalition participation by the June uprising in 1987. My argument here is that an ideological and tactical shift within the student movement allowed it to collaborate with other SMOs. The student movement‘s public appeal greatly increased in the period between 1986 and 1987, after they endorsed a more inclusive ideological approach towards protests. Although the student movement remained fundamentally radical in its leftist ideology, it deliberately transformed its primary tactic into non-violent and mass-oriented strategies in order to accommodate a broader constituency by late 1986 / early 1987. The shift from vanguardism to a unified front approach enabled such a dramatic tactical renovation in the mainstream student movement. Focusing on the importance of such ideological transformation, I will buttress my argument with various historical and qualitative data.

The MT-MC Debates It was not until the late 1980s that student groups began to modify their rigid ideological approach to interorganizational collaboration. Student activists were caught up in ideological debates between factions until the mid-1980s. The two radical wings— the preparation camp and the vanguard camp—that had existed from the early 1980s continued to compete with each other. Figure 3-6 illustrates a simplified map of the history of the student movement through the 1980s. The rectangular boxes broadly indicate different ideological camps. The white ovals mean SMOs, which are students‘ coalitions based on the different camps. The grey ovals show the struggle committees which were in charge of protest-related activities, auxiliary to the coalitions.

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Figure 3-6. The Trajectory of the Student Movement: Ideological Camps and Organizations

Struggle Committee for Anti- Council of Students in United States, Antifascist, Seoul for the Democratic and Autonomous Constitutional Amendment Democratization (chamint’u) (sŏhakhyŏp)

National Patriotic Student Council of Student Coalition for Anti- Representatives in imperialism and Anti- Seoul (sŏdaehyŏp) dictatorship (aehakt’uryŏn)

1980 1984 1986 1987 Preparation MC NL Camp (Murim)

Vanguard Camp MT CA (Hangnim)

National Coalition of National Student League Students for an Anti-imperialist, (chŏn’guk haksaeng Anti-fascist National ch’ongyŏnhap) Democracy (minminhangnyŏn)

Struggle Committee for : Ideological Camp Minjung Democratization Struggle Committee for and National Anti-imperialist, Anti- : Coalition Reunification (sammint’u) fascist National Democracy (minmint’u) : Struggle Committee

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Roughly from 1980 to 1983, the student movement was divided into a preparation and a vanguard camp, although their differences were relative rather than absolute. In the mid-1980s, the preparation camp remained as the majority and was called ―MC,‖ and later turned into the ―NL.‖ The vanguard camp was changed into the ―MT,‖ and later into the ―CA.‖ Over time, the mutual differences widened and solidified. Each camp built its own coalition and competed with the other. This section investigates their longitudinal ideological shifts and the implications of these on collaborative protests. In the mid-1980s, the preparation camp was called ―MC,‖ abbreviated from ―Main Current,‖ and claimed to be the mainstream of the student movement. The vanguard camp was rearranged as ―MT,‖ named after the Struggle Committee for Anti- Dictatorship and Democratization (pandokchae minjuhwa t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe) which followed the vanguardist line. The MC and MT were locked in a fierce factional struggle during this period. Jong-Joo Yi, who was a student activist in the 1980s, explains the conflicts in the case of Seoul National University:

From late 1983 to early 1984, ideological conflicts intensified, like between the MT and the MC. The MT created a factional organization and won the MC group after mid-1984. The MT was in charge of the leadership of the student movement, occupying all important positions. The MC lacked theories, while the MT emphasized organized activism. The MC had nothing but so-called mass orientation. In contrast, the MT wanted to create a Leninist organization. It was the first revolutionary organization with the theory of basic strategies and tactics. The identity of the MC wasn‘t clear in term of its theory of organizing. It was like that from the earlier Murim-Hangnim debate….Lots of pamphlets were produced in 1984, and 70-80% of them contained the MT‘s basic ideas. The idea was that we should create a revolution beyond the democracy movement, and that we ought to have strategies, tactics, a political party based on vanguards, as well as armed struggles (Interview 07/22/08).

At Seoul National University, the underground circles were dominated by the preparation camp centralized within a hierarchy referred to as the ―Po-System‖ in 1983. This group was the MC. ―Po‖ is an abbreviation of ―post,‖ which denotes the leaders of the underground circles from each university division (e.g., a leader of the underground circles from the Social Sciences division). The entire group of leaders had a separate organization called ―CT (control tower),‖ which consisted of the entire leadership of the student movement at the university. The MC mainly focused on reviving student

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associations (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:77-80) in order to mobilize the student masses. In contrast, the MT criticized the MC as reformist and opportunistic, and expanded its own student organization based on a vanguardist ideology modeled from Bolshevik theory. A student vanguard organization named the Committee for the Promotion of Democratization (minjuhwa ch’ujin wiwŏnhoe), which was an underground SMO created in October 1984, led the MT group. The MT organized those students who were excluded from the structure of the Po-System and emphasized political struggles. This group argued that the semi-underground struggle committees were more effective in implementing the goals of the student movement than the formal student associations (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990; C.U. Park 1989:40).57 The MT criticized the MC for idolizing the masses, and maintained that the student movement should prioritize political struggles over students‘ everyday activities and guide the labor movement (Kang 1988:72). The MT‘s straightforward argument and radicalism appealed to many student activists. By late 1984 and early 1985, the MT had taken over the leadership in various college campuses. The National Coalition of Students (NCS: chŏn’guk haksaeng ch’ongyŏnhap, chŏnhangnyŏn) founded in April 1985 was a national student coalition based on the MT group, and it had a struggle committee, the sammint’u (the Struggle Committee for Minjung Democratization and National Reunification or minjung minjuhwawa minjok chajut’ongirŭl wihan t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe in Korean). Due to the MT‘s leadership, the student-labor alliance became more active. The MT valued the potential of the working classes and highlighted that the student-labor alliance should have a permanent basis for collaboration (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:92). In this sense, the MT‘s leadership had a positive impact on the inter- movement protests between students and workers. Also, the creation of the NCS was effective in mobilizing intra-movement protests among multiple student SMOs. Therefore, the alliance within the student movement became much stronger than before.

57 The debates between the MC and the MT were also called ―Flag vs. Anti-Flag debate [kitpal-pan’gitpal nonjaeng]‖ because the MT disseminated a pamphlet titled ―Flag [kitpal]‖ in 1984, which the MC criticized. The ―Flag‖ defined the roles of the student movement as: 1) carrying out political struggles, 2) making alliances with the minjung, 3) supplying vanguards (C.U. Park 1989:42). 131

However, the MT shed light on several problems. Since the MT underscored the leadership of the student vanguards, it tended to alienate the masses (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990; C.U. Park 1989:46). Thus, the student movement was alienated from ordinary students and the public, because the MT overemphasized the role of the struggle committee and neglected the student associations, which could become an important means to mobilize the student masses (C.U. Park 1989:40). Further, the vanguards were not systematically integrated as a group (Kang 1988:84). Moreover, its focus on political struggle resulted in disruptive political protests which in turn induced state repression. In 1985, many leaders of the MT group were arrested, which had a devastating effect on its leadership (Kim 1988:107).

The Rise of the NL: Anti-Americanism and Nationalism When both the MC and the MT were somewhat weakened in 1985, the 3-min ideology became influential in the student movement, which was promoted by the Workers‘ Alliance in Seoul (sŏul nodong undong yŏnhap, sŏnoryŏn) (Kang 1988:123). The 3-min ideology highlighted the importance of the minjung, the Korean nation, and democratization in carrying out the democracy movement. However, the ideology was soon criticized by the student movement due to its conceptual ambiguity. Between late 1985 / early 1986, a new ideological group based on anti-imperialist beliefs emerged within the student movement, particularly within the former MC wing. This group— which was called the A.I.(anti-imperialist) group—was later addressed as the ―NL,‖ abbreviated from ―National Liberation People‘s Democracy Revolution (NLPDR).‖ The NLPDR indicates the goal of the NL group, which was to liberate the Korean minjung from exploitation by foreign powers by way of a revolution. The NL group‘s rhetoric was couched in nationalism and denounced the history of U.S. intervention in the Korean economy and politics as a form of imperialism. As the political pamphlet written in 1985 with the title of ―Let Us Be Resurrected as the Flagmen of National Liberation with the Torch of Anti-Imperialist, Minjung, and Democratization Movement [Panje minjung minjuhwa undongŭi hwatpurŭl tŭlgo minjukhaebangŭi kisuro puhwalhaja]‖ stated, the NL group promoted anti-Americanism and claimed that the student movement should immediately engage in direct anti-

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American protests and anti-war/anti-nuclear protests. The NL‘s anti-American thesis stated that Korean history was about the struggles between U.S. imperialism and the Korean minjung. The main argument was that it was impossible to achieve democratization without anti-American protests because the contradictions caused by the history of the unfair relationship between the United States and Korea outweighed other domestic problems. The NL ideology was heavily influenced by North Korea‘s chuch’e ideology (Hong 1992:143). One of the core ideas of this ideology created by Kim Il-Sung was that South Korea had been colonized by the United States. Consequently, the origins of domestic problems were traced back to the U.S.‘s hegemony in Korea (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1988b:205-75). By antagonizing the United States based on the chuch’e ideology, the NL called for the sovereignty and autonomy of the Korean nation, and aimed to resurrect it by engaging in anti-American struggles (Shin 1995). Those who supported the NL ideology ―found the Northern system a facile solution to the longstanding historical search for an alternative future for Korea‖ (Lee 2007:8). Students began to study the chuch’e ideology and some of them listened to North Korean radio broadcasts in 1985 and 1986.58 Since the chuch’e ideology was imbued with fervent nationalism and the history of North Korea revealed the country‘s continuous struggle for independence from the imperialist forces such as the United States, young student activists were quickly attracted to the ideology, and supported it without much knowledge about North Korea itself (Lee 2007:134-35). The NL‘s emphasis on the nationalist struggle against the United States was like a fresh breeze to those student activists who had been enmeshed in anti-government protests that did not answer the broader question of how to resolve the national division and tensions between the North and South. Anti-American struggles provided a way to overcome the anticommunism that had plagued South Korea since the territorial division occurred almost a half century ago.

58 Yong-Soon Yi was active as a student-turned-labor activist in the Incheon area around 1986. She was exposed to the chuch’e ideology from a church which had a strong minjung-orientation. She says, ―I was very impressed by the ideology. It was as if I were reading the bible. I read a book called Kim Il Sung’s Chuche Ideology. What the book said felt like the Genesis in the Bible. The bible taught a way of life very conceptually, but my heart pounded because the chuch’e ideology provided something alive, something real‖ (Interview 08/01/08). 133

Furthermore, the alleged U.S. involvement in the Kwangju massacre, 1980, justified the claim that anti-American struggle was inevitable (Shin 1995). Consequently, in early 1986, while the NDP was promoting the constitutional amendment, the NL waged radically different protests: this group organized anti-war and anti-nuclear protests based on anti-Americanism. During the NL‘s protests in April 1986, two students died from self-immolation after shouting several slogans including ―Yankee, Go Home.‖ Moreover, the NL began to create an independent student SMO within each campus, starting with the League of Patriotic Students (kuguk haksaeng yŏnmaeng, kuhangnyŏn) at Seoul National University on March 29. The NL student SMOs spread rapidly into a number of college campuses, and were followed by the founding of the struggle committees known as the chamint’u (the Struggle Committee for Anti-United States, Antifascist, and Autonomous Democratization (panmi chajuhwa panp’asyo minjuhwa t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe)). In reaction to the NL‘s organizational and ideological expansion, the MT group created the minmint’u (the Struggle Committee for an Anti- imperialist, Anti-fascist National Democracy (panje panp’asyo minjok minju t’ujaeng wiwŏnhoe)) in April. The NL consciously differentiated itself from the MT by criticizing the culture of underground circles. In addition, the League of Patriotic Students (LPS) defined itself as a ―revolutionary mass organization‖ as opposed to a vanguard organization (Interview with Jong-Joo Yi, 07/22/08). In contrast to the previous underground organizations, the LPS promoted democratic centralization of the organizational structure instead of a secretive hierarchy controlled by a handful of leaders, and it also emphasized the cultivation of moral character and self-discipline among activists. For example, the LPS‘s principles included maintaining a healthy body as a revolutionary fighter by restraining from drinking and smoking (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:206). The main implication of the NL camp in terms of its relevance to alliance formation is that it was more open to a broad alliance among various social movement groups than the MT camp was, since it embraced the theory of a united front, which modeled Kim Il-Sung‘s approach to the anti-imperialist struggle in the early 20th century (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1988b:190-91). The LPS argued that ―only the anti- American united front could successfully carry out a revolution, based on the

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collaboration among the workers, farmers, patriotic youths and students, mid- or small business owners, urban poor, and patriotic soldiers,‖ while the MT camp upheld the supremacy of the student-labor alliance over other types of alliance and promoted a vanguard party. The NL camp criticized the MT as ―Russians living in 1917,‖ while the latter disparaged the former by calling them ―nationalists who underestimate the hegemony of working class‖ (Kang 1988:177). By this time, the division between the two ideological camps was deep and irreparable, which translated into emotional conflicts and power struggles between factions around the issue of who would lead the student movement. By 1986, the NL won the struggle and became the majority within the student movement:

Korea University was unified in mid-1986 under the NL leadership. It happened fast. Why? Actually, we were very tired at that time. 1986 was the worst. There was the minmint’u (MT‘s struggle committee), but the other group (the NL) made another organization and named it minmint’u, too, intentionally. It was declaration of war. So when the first minmint’u was having its inaugural ceremony in front of the main library, another minmint’u marched towards it. Physical struggles broke out between the two. They fought with wooden poles and called names….It was so ridiculous in the eyes of the ordinary students. Some students wept. The first-years and sophomores would not listen to the seniors any more. In the end, the biggest underground circle, Kyŏsa, accepted to break up the organization because of the serious nature of the conflicts (Interview with Jun-Young Yi, 09/03/08).

Even though the LPS and the NL groups in other campuses promoted a united front among other social groups, they were more concerned with winning the power struggles and taking over the leadership. Therefore, until late 1986, the idea of a united front was no more than a theory. For example, the LPS was preoccupied with the project of rearranging the student organizations under its leadership on campus. The biggest project entailed dissolving all the underground circles. By early 1987, all of the underground circles were demolished (Eun 2003:217). In the view of the LPS, these circles inhibited mass protests and only nurtured factionalism. However, the dissolution of the circles did not solve the problem but instead weakened the mobilizing capacity of the LPS, because the organization had found itself unable to perform a leadership in mass protests, even though it had set out to be just such a mass organization.

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Contrary to its ambition, the LPS remained a factional underground organization. Similar to the MT‘s organizational structure, the NL had separate struggle committees— chamint’u—that were designed to mobilize students in protests. Since the power of the formal student associations was not strengthened due to the dominance of the underground organizational structure, the NL retained the same problem of alienating the student mass and the public as the MT did (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:193). Concomitantly, the NL‘s slogans such as ―Anti-War and Anti-Nuke‖ seemed too abstract and radical to the public (Kang 1988:192). Students were obsessed with the notion of direct action, and pressured to wage disruptive protests in order to show their militancy and power. However, their violent and radical protests were not favorably accepted by the public and the media, and this made it extremely difficult for other SMOs to collaborate with students. Moreover, the LPS did not last a year, even though it was built on multiple layers of student activists designed to survive the state‘s repeated raids on the organization. In late 1986, the student movement in Seoul National University was stripped of protest capacity because of dogged state repression. To make matter worse, in October 1986, the NL‘s attempt to create a national student coalition, named the National Patriotic Student Coalition for Anti-imperialism and Anti-dictatorship (chŏn’guk panoese pandokchae aeguk haksaeng t’ujaeng yŏnhap, aehakt’uryŏn), was frustrated due to the massive state repression. This devastating experience motivated the NL to shift their focus from exclusive revolutionary struggles to more inclusive mass protests.

Vanguardism: from MT to CA As mentioned above, the MT camp lost dominance in the student movement due to the rise of the NL camp around summer in 1986. Within the MT camp, a faction called the ―CA‖ gradually became powerful, inheriting most of the MT‘s ideology. The CA stands for the Constitutional Assembly, as the main mission of the camp was to convene a transitional constitutional assembly that could amend the constitution. Unlike the NDP‘s support for a direct presidential election, the CA‘s idea about new Constitution was modeled after Lenin‘s theory of revolution. Accordingly, the CA‘s pamphlets often quoted Lenin‘s writings (Hong 1992:153).

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The CA argued that the new revolutionary government should be led by the proletariat—working class and farmers, and thus, the immediate political struggle should be organized around the theme of a new constitutional assembly which implemented the hegemony of the proletariat (Kang 1988:271). The CA ideology guided the minmint’u organizations in 8 colleges, politicized workers, and organized several student-labor protests (Kang 1988:296). The CA defined themselves as vanguards, and believed that the present political situation was foretelling a revolution. Therefore, they contended that socialist vanguards should lead the minjung‘s revolutionary struggles. Different from the NL‘s theory of a united front, the CA argued that a coalition should be created solely among leftists. Consequently, opposition politicians or the liberal bourgeois were not included in its list of potential allies (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:129), since the CA group perceived them to be a group of opportunists (Kim 1988:109). Therefore, the CA was not satisfied with the NCDC‘s moderate ideological stance, since the NCDC embraced opposition politicians and promoted a direct presidential election rather than espousing more fundamental political reform. Chung-Il Oh used to chair the meetings of the NCDC in 1987. He recounts, ―The students from the CA group came to our meetings. They were on their own. About 200 or 300 of them sat among us, criticized us, and went away. It was a headache‖ (Interview 09/13/08). The CA camp did participate in street protests during the June uprising because it agreed with the abdication of dictator Chun Doo Hwan. In fact, the CA engaged in many violent fights against the riot police, which helped protests cross the police line (Interview with Ki-Sik Kim, 06/09/08). However, the CA tended to carry out independent struggles with the police and kept other social movement groups at arm‘s length.

Strategic Innovation: The NL‘s Mass-Orientation Replacing Seoul National University which was considerably weakened by state repression, Korea University took over the leadership of the student movement from late 1986 onward. Just like Seoul National University, Korea University was dominated by the NL faction at that time. The activists from the NL line were extremely skilled at winning students over from rival organizations. Jun-Young Yi was a student activist at

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Korea University in the mid- to late 1980s. He discusses the cultural difference between the NL and the CA:

The CA was very good at logical thinking—analyzing social phenomena. They were sharp. So they emphasized disciplines and forced students to study hard. They were not very affectionate. On the contrary, the NL did not force students to study. They emphasized affection, warm-heartedness, and comradeship….You don‘t have to study theories in order to galvanize nationalist sentiments. The NL had that kind of emotional power. It won over the student movement so easily (Interview 09/03/08).

The NL‘s focus on nationalism and anti-Americanism appealed to a large number of student activists. Thus, the NL undeniably became the mainstream of the student movement in many colleges by the late 1980s. As a result, the CA became a minority group within the student movement. After experiencing a trial-and-error period of operating the revolutionary mass organizations such as the LPS, students criticized their own previous flaws in organizing the student masses. The student leaders‘ conclusion was that it was imperative to strengthen the formal student associations and create diverse forms of mass organizations around them.59 Also, they decided to adjust their slogans and tactics to the level of the general public, while agreeing to keep focusing on their original goals—national sovereignty, democratization, and reunification (Kim 1988:113). Simply put, the student activists upheld the principle of the mass-orientation, based on the theory of a united front. This change occurred from late 1986. On October 28, the National Patriotic Student Coalition for Anti-imperialism and Anti-dictatorship (chŏn’guk panoese pandokchae aeguk haksaeng t’ujaeng yŏnhap, aehakt’uryŏn) was founded as a national student coalition under the NL‘s leadership. Although this rally was quelled by a massive number of riot police and portrayed as a communist riot by authorities as well as by the mass media, and the SMO itself was destroyed, students expressed a more inclusive stance towards other social movement groups as well as towards the opposition party

59 In late 1986 and early 1987, the NL camp dominated the elections for choosing the Presidents of the student associations. While the CA camp focused on violent revolutionary struggles to convene the constitutional assembly, the NL camp stressed non-violent and peaceful protests, democratization of campuses, and the democratic transition during the campaign. The latter won more support from the student masses (B.S. Kim 2007:185-86). 138

during the rally. Furthermore, some students participated in the NDP‘s inaugural ceremony in Seoul in late November and supported the NDP‘s goal of constitutional amendment. Student activists‘ public support for the NDP induced severe criticism by the CA camp (Choi 1990; Kwon 1987:281). By early 1987, the student movement primarily focused on academic issues on campus (B.S. Kim 2007:187). Instead of using violent protests to achieve their goals, the student activists chose alternative tactics such as holding cultural events which could catch the attention of students. Of course they confronted objections from some students. A wall poster on a college campus said ―the student association that yells out national sovereignty, democracy, and reunification only under a blanket should resign!‖ around that time. Some students complained about a lack of political protests. However, in the end, the tactical modification within the student movement served to convince other movement groups as well as the general public that the student movement could be trusted (Wu et al. 2007:238). The culmination of such a dramatic transformation was the creation of the Council of Student Representatives in Seoul (CSRS: sŏul chiyŏk taehaksaeng taep’yoja hyŏbŭihoe, sŏdaehyŏp) in late May, 1987.60 As the CSRS‘s motto, ―one step of ten people rather than ten steps of one person‖ implied, the CSRS gave priority to mass protests rather than ideologically training student activists (B.S. Kim 2007:190). The CSRS played an important role in mobilizing students during the June uprising in 1987 along with other regional student coalitions. The CSRS even expressed a wish to enter the NCDC. However, the NCDC did not allow this because it was afraid of jeopardizing itself by including a highly leftist student organization. However, compared to the CA group, the NL group was more likely to employ public-friendly and non-disruptive strategies during protests and refrain from radical slogans. In this way, the NL‘s dominance in the student movement narrowed the

60 The CCRS did not completely overcome the tradition of the struggle committee. An auxiliary organization equivalent to the previous struggle committee was created under the CCRS, and called the Council of Students in Seoul for the Democratic Constitutional Amendment (hohŏn ch’ŏlp’yewa minju kaehŏn chaengch’wirŭl wihan sŏul chiyŏk haksaeng hyŏbŭihoe, sŏhakhyŏp). Since the status of the two organizations overlapped, they sometimes had trouble in organizing protests during the June uprising (Kwon 1987:287). 139

gap between the mainstream of student activism and other movements for the first time in this tumultuous period. Interestingly, the irony was that the NL‘s ideology was essentially pro-North Korea, which most of the social movement activists from the older generation found wholly unpalatable. Even the young chaeya activists in the YCDM, who had been to college in the 1970s, did not embrace the communist ideology. The chaeya group and most of the formal SMOs generally aspired towards the democratization of Korea through implementing liberal democratic principles by extensive reforms. They were neither revolutionaries nor leftist. It goes without saying that opposition politicians were leaning even farther right within the ideological spectrum. In-Young Yi, the president of the CSRS in 1987, explains this situation:

Other social movement groups thought that it was better to keep student movement at a distance because the student movement was viewed as communist and leftist by authorities. On the other hand, they were too liberal to become one entity with us. I guess, other social movement groups thought that a coalition with us would make it too difficult to collaborate with the opposition party. Because Chun Doo Hwan denunciated us as communists, we were a burden to the party (Interview 08/27/08).

Despite nonnegotiable ideological differences, the student movement‘s tactical shift to mass orientation and non-violence resulting from the NL‘s dominance enabled them to form an alliance with other social movement groups in 1987. Since the NL underscored the importance of pursuing a united front among all possible social groups including the bourgeoisie in order to fight against the regime (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:129), the NL renovated its tactic to be more flexible and moderate. Even if the student movement neither became fully incorporated within an ecumenical coalition nor ideologically moderate in 1987, the increasing inclusiveness of the students‘ ideological tendency and ensuing tactical flexibility facilitated their collaboration with the coalition movement.

The Implication of Coalition Activism in 1987 In mid-1987, the ecumenical coalition established among the broadest groups of social movements in modern Korean history had a significant impact on the movement

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during the June uprising. Although the alliance between the students and other social movement groups took place under the surface in order to evade state repression and to minimize organizational conflicts, their collaboration successfully led to a waging of a series of mass demonstrations that pressured the Chun government to offer concessions. In sum, the popularity of the NCDC‘s central leadership including the chaeya elders and opposition politicians, the financial support from the opposition party and the Christian SMOs, active participation by a large number of formal SMOs, and the student movement‘s mobilizational power were effectively combined and coordinated during this formative period. The watershed created by the June uprising was an outcome that was ultimately produced by the complex sequences of organizational and ideological processes involving a number of SMOs from various backgrounds. However, this chapter reveals that different groups of SMOs showed differential rates of participation in the broad inter-movement coalitions, based on their organizational and ideological characteristics. The student and labor movements were the least likely to join or thrive in coalitions. For most of the time during this period, the former was not interested in forming a broad coalition due to its exclusive organizational structure and ideological radicalism. The latter did join a coalition, but could not last long because of the fragile organizational structure which was susceptible to repression. Formal SMOs including intellectual, cultural, environmental, women‘s, and moderate labor organizations were relatively more active in joining coalitions. They positioned themselves as a part of the broad democracy movement by temporarily setting aside their own specific goals and working for the coalitions. They did not have initiatives in running the coalitions due to the chaeya‘s hegemonic role, but they anticipated that the democratic transition would result in expanding political freedom which would allow them to address their own goals. Finally, chaeya SMOs were likely to retain a leadership role in coalitions. Since they were the groups that could collaborate with the opposition party with the least amount of conflict in terms of shared ideological tendencies, historical experiences, and interpersonal networks, they played an important role in courting the opposition elites into the NCDC. At the same time, their hegemonic status in the organization and their relationship with the elites was manifested in the agenda that the NCDC promoted. The

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NCDC‘s goal of introducing a direct presidential election during the June uprising had been the NDP‘s basic goal since 1985. Given the NCDC‘s ideological orientation and leadership structure, it was not a coincidence that a consensus on procedural democracy and the use of non-violent tactics was formed where the platforms of the chaeya and the NDP converged. Since more progressive groups such as the labor and student movements could not, or would not, play a key role in the coalition due to their organizational and ideological constraints, their agenda was not likely to be the guiding principle for the coalition. Also, the status of the other formal SMOs was not as prominent as that of the chaeya elders or Christian activists, since they were not very well known in Korean society as yet. Their specific organizational interests could not be fulfilled in the course of the prodemocracy struggle as they themselves prioritized overthrowing the authoritarian political system over movement-specific goals. Thus, the immediate goal of a direct presidential election by amending the Constitution was destined to be minimalist vis-à-vis the broad range of goals that each SMO promoted in the 1980s. The NCDC did have a laundry list of goals from each movement industry, but it could not address all of them in the June uprising. The goal of this uprising was devised based on the principle of maximizing the SMOs‘ public appeal and minimizing radicalism, which was exactly where the opposition party positioned itself. Certainly, in order to persuade the opposition party to work with the coalition, it was most effective to set a realistic and short-term, rather than idealistic and long-term, goal. By doing so, nonetheless, the coalition was inevitably biased in favor of incrementalism and moderatism. Due to this organizational limitation, the coalition became a tinderbox of interorganizational conflicts, which would burst into flame when the peak protest cycle was over. The NCDC did not last long after the transition due to various conflicts regarding its future direction. Over time, the SMOs in the post-transition period became internally diversified and independent from one another.

3-6: Conclusion My findings suggest the importance of the interplay between macro- and meso- level variables in shaping patterns of coalition formation and collaborative protests. I

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examined the macro-level factors such as political environment and elites‘ division with regard to collaborative protests.61 The intermediate phase between the liberalization and the democratic transition saw increased instances of protests. The state‘s policy fluctuated from liberalization to repression around this period, but never returned to the high levels of the previous period. Also, since the organizational capacity of SMOs substantially grew, they were better able to cope with the repression. Thus, the dynamics of reform and repression provided the SMOs with more political opportunities for protests than before. On the other hand, the impact of elites‘ division on the collaborative protests was complex. The advance of a considerable number of opposition elites in the National Assembly increased the leverage of the opposition party. Opposition politicians tended to oscillate between collaboration with SMOs, and parliamentary bargaining with the government; this opportunism created mistrust and contention regarding the role of the opposition party in the democracy movement and its reliability as a collaborative partner. However, the opposition party was a powerful ally when they finally joined the democracy movement in 1987, since they had material resources as well as broad public appeal. These characteristics of the opposition party compelled other movement groups to seek alliance with it. The institutional status of the opposition party helped social movements expand and grow, despite mutual disagreements. Thus, alliances with elites had somewhat positive, but highly inconsistent, effects on protests. As important as the external factors above, I analyzed the meso-level organizational processes that affected the likelihood of the collaborative protests ever occurring. First, the strong organizational infrastructure represented by the creation of formal individual SMOs and coalitions facilitated collaborative protests both among a wide array of social movement groups and within each social movement industry. Second, the diverse nature of these SMOs that came to join the democracy movement expanded the pool of alliance partners and nurtured trust and solidarity among the participating groups. Third, the increasing networks among the diverse SMOs played an important role in the orchestration of the collaborative protests, as the interorganizational networks

61 In addition to the factors discussed this chapter, some important international circumstances affected the trajectory of the democracy movement. For example, the fall of Marcos of the Phillippines in February 1986 encouraged the popular movement for democratic reform (Chu and Moon 1997:270). Also, the Chun government was not entirely independent from U.S. influence in determining whether to repress or acquiesce to popular demands. 143

became denser and more centralized. An increase in joint memberships which crisscrossed the diverse SMOs facilitated the creation of coalitions which wove different strands of the SMOs together. The role of mediators was also significant in bridging mutual differences and conflicts between the SMOs in the course of creating coalitions. Lastly, ideological interpretation was important in determining the breadth of an alliance. An adoption of mass-orientation and non-violence as the primary strategy within the mainstream student movement enabled dialogues between the radical student SMOs and other SMOs. Regardless of the strong anticommunist sentiment displayed by opposition politicians, SMOs with different ideological orientations could work together under the umbrella of the coalition. However, the coalition activism formed in the mid 1987 was not without serious limitations. Since the primary goal of the NCDC was set mostly based on a shared platform of the chaeya and the opposition party, it was rather minimalist. The goal of introducing a direct presidential election by constitutional amendment was prioritized in the June uprising over other movement-specific goals. The formation of a consensus, the least common denominator, facilitated collaboration between many social movement groups, particularly accommodated opposition elites, but narrowed the organization‘s scope to incrementalism and moderatism. Indeed, this ―civic unity‖ was paradoxical because the moments of unity were fragile and plagued with submerged conflicts, which may be common in broad-based coalitions (Mische 2007:21). The way in which the NCDC was organized resulted in organizational conflicts and turmoil after the democratic transition occurred, combined with changing external conditions. To summarize, the intermediate phase of reform and repression enabled the growth of SMOs and the development of coalitions. Also, the organizational and ideological characteristics of social movements in the period 1984 - 1987 were consequential in shaping the pattern of the coalitional activism in 1987. Further, the structure and characteristics of coalitional protests had a long-lasting impact on the pattern of protests in the post-transition period. The next chapter traces the evolution of SMOs after the June uprising and discusses the consequences of the coalitional activism of the pre-transition period upon the social movements during the democratization process.

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CHAPTER 4. AT A CROSSROAD: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS DURING DEMOCRATIZATION (JULY 1987 - 1992) 4-1: Introduction A social movement‘s outcome is an important topic to study because protests occur for the purpose of achieving specific goals. Recent studies of social movements mostly ask of social movements‘ effects on governmental policies as one of the movement outcomes (Skocpol and Lehmann 1993; Kriesi and Wisler 1999; Giugni 1998; Cress and Snow 2000; McAdam and Su 2002; Burstein and Linton 2002; Soule and Olzak 2004; McCammon et al. 2008). However, the literature has been less attentive to the question of how goal attainment in turn affects the pathways for social movements. Since goal attainment meant a regime change and democratization in the Korean context, it is crucial to analyze the impact of democratization on movements. Goal attainment is typically associated with a movement‘s decline. Theoretically, both a failure to achieve a desired goal and a successful goal achievement lead to demobilization (Miller 1983; Lara and Molina 1997), because both failure and success mean goal displacement. A cycle of protest ends with goal displacement, which leads movement participants to step back to the sidewalk from the roadway (see McVeigh 2009, Ch.9). According to this theoretical framework, the outcome of a democratic transition should demobilize protests which contributed to the transition. Nevertheless, within the particular context of democratization, what ought to be a period of demobilization is confounded by the fact that democratization opens up new political opportunities and freedom for citizens. The classical theory of political opportunity structure (POS) predicts that political openings will lead to more protest activities (Eisinger 1973). Democratization is such a political opening by definition; democratization entails implementation of democratic rules such as competitive elections and a reduction of state repression of political dissent by increasing freedom of speech and assembly. Naturally, after a democratic transition, institutional politics become invigorated and civic organizational activities are revitalized, as seen in the Eastern European (Szabó 1994) and the Latin American cases of democratization (Kaufman and Alfonso 1997). In other words, institutional politics and civil society which were suppressed under authoritarianism become reenergized by the opening of political space

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after the democratic transition. More political opportunities arise within formal political institutions as democratizing regimes typically establish ―legislatures, judiciaries, executives, contested elections, political parties, enumerations of political rights, and public guarantees of civil liberties‖ (Tilly 2004:245). More SMOs naturally emerge in order to ―take advantage of the increased propensity for participation‖ (Tarrow 1989:19) as a result of diffusion from the previous cycle of protests. During democratic transition, the number of social movements rapidly increases (Foweraker 1995:106). Individuals become more politically efficacious and the cost of civic participation becomes lower as state repression declines. Then, does democratization lead to more protests despite the pressure towards demobilization after achieving the goal of procedural democracy? Although democratization opens up political opportunities through democratic reforms and normalization of parliamentary politics and increases the number of SMOs which could operate as mobilizing structures, it rarely leads to another wave of protests. At this point, historical experiences of past democratizations seem contradictory to the prediction based on the political process model that increasing political opportunities lead to protests. Democratization could have negative impacts on movements because ―it can also remove authoritarian rulers against which opposition forces unified and mobilized, inject divisive forms of partisan competition into social organizations, and resurrect political parties and electoral activities that can siphon off energy from social networks‖ (Roberts 1997:139). Several empirical cases of transitional societies support that demobilization typically takes place after the democratic transition. In Latin America, with the transition to democracy, social movements tended to enter into decline (Foweraker 1995:104), or underwent a ―cooling off‖ period (Almeida and Johnston 2006:15). Also, a comparative study on the cases of Latin America, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe shows that democratization caused a decline of movements (Pickvance 1999). However, demobilization should be measured by degree rather than in an absolute term. Not all countries have experienced the same level of demobilization. Although the number of protests tended to decline after the democratic transition, Korea posits a unique case of contentious democratization as it retained a larger volume of protests than other cases such as Spain and Chile (Hipsher 1996). Although the three countries

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commonly exhibit the ―conservative‖ democratization in the presence of strong authoritarian traditions, protests were very active after the democratic transition in Korea. In terms of protest events, moreover, Korea is compatible with the cases that had more ―progressive‖ transitions. Compared to the Eastern European countries which democratized from communism (Ekiert and Kubik 1998), Korea seems to be one of the most contentious, as estimated by the frequency of protests. Thus, the Korean case presents an important empirical puzzle when compared to the other third-wave democracies. Despite the conservative transition in which the authoritarian legacies still perpetuated, Korea remained one of the most contentious countries even compared to the other cases that exhibited a clear break from the past political structure. What accounts for this uniqueness—a relatively high amount of protests in the post-transition period in Korea, and what are the implications? What are the political opportunities and organizational capacity that contributed to this trend? In order to answer this question, I highlight that democratization creates a period of uncertainties in which new democratic political opportunities and the previous authoritarian legacies coexist and clash. Democratic transition is not ―a nice neat linear movement from one clear-cut regime type (authoritarian) to some other type (democratic)‖ (Malloy 1987:251). If authoritarian leadership remains powerful even after the democratic transition, as was the case in Korea, the political situation is much more in flux: the hope for democratic consolidation coexists with the fear of de-democratization. For SMOs, ―(t)he relationship with the state remains ambiguous, and the process of political representation is tortuous, unpredictable and reversible‖ (Foweraker 1995:106). Since democracy does not mature overnight, it requires a relatively long-term transitional period during which democratic experiments take place. The first regime after the democratic transition is likely to introduce such a prolonged transitional context. When such uncertainties prevail in the institutional environment, it becomes very difficult for SMOs to accurately interpret the environment and to make strategic decisions in terms of goals and tactics (Armstrong 2005). Therefore, the ways in which SMOs engage in collective action including collaborative protests are likely to be differentiated depending on how differently SMOs perceive their changing environment. During the

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prolonged transition period, SMOs strive to define, challenge, or adjust to the new political environment based on their organizational identities. What were the authoritarian legacies and democratic changes after the transition, and how did they affect the pattern of interorganizational collaboration in Korea, given that the rise of interorganizational solidarity became the important basis of large-scale protests that pressured the authoritarian state to launch democratization? This chapter examines this research question by looking at the macro-level environment and the meso- level organizational processes that conditioned the prospects for protests in the process of democratization. I examine the impacts of both the past legacies and new changes of the political opportunity structure, organizational structure, and cultural processes on interorganizational collaboration.

4-2: Theoretical Frameworks 4-2-(1): Macro-level Political Environment The Conservative Democratization In line with the previous chapter, I examine the impact of reform-repression dynamics on protests based on the political process model. Democratization has enormous impacts on SMOs, as changes in the political climate ―alter the constellation of political opportunities for each organization, leading to a reconsideration of previous political choices and alliances‖ (Meyer 2007:76). The democratization process is expected to occur with increasing democratic reforms and decreasing state repression. According to both Eisinger's (1973) and Tilly's (1978) prediction, the more democratic a country, the less protests occur in comparison with the intermediate stage in between authoritarianism and democracy. Thus, demobilization is expected to occur in the course of democratization. Cohen and Arato (1992) even praise demobilization based on the notion that movements should be controlled and demobilized in order for institutional politics to be facilitated after democratic transition. Demobilization is also understood as a natural development of a protest cycle; when a movement cycle nears to its end, movement participants tend to drop out from collective action, either returning to their daily lives or becoming incorporated into institutional politics as interest groups (Tarrow 1989:55). According to

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these theoretical perspectives, I expect to observe the impulse for demobilization in the post-transitional Korea. The general level of protests will tend to decline as democracy becomes consolidated. However, Korea‘s democratization, led by authoritarian elites, calls into question the degree of the country‘s democratic consolidation. The new regime led by the president Roh Tae Woo was indeed a complex blend of authoritarianism and democracy. First, Roh himself was not free from the military authoritarian tradition because he was the hand-picked successor of Chun Doo Hwan, the former authoritarian leader. Second, the bureaucratic apparatus was carried over to the new regime. Since Roh‘s first cabinet retained many key officials from the previous government known as the Fifth Republic, the Roh government was jeered as the ―Five-point-five Republic‖ (New York Times, February 25, 1988). Due to such conservative leadership structure, the Roh regime is generally understood as a prolongation of the previous military authoritarianism (Cho 2002:10) or at best a dictablanda (―soft dictatorship‖) (Choi 1993:135). In light of the regime‘s unique political structure which fell short of a clear break from the past, Korea was virtually located in between the ―intermediate‖ and ―democratic‖ phases in Tilly‘s (1978) framework (also see Eisinger 1973), where the level of protests is somewhere in between the highest and the lowest, and the overall level of protests is expected to decrease in proportion with democratic consolidation. Accordingly, even though the general level of protests declines over time, I expect that the combination of slow democratic reforms and firm repression should lead to a large volume of protests and alliance activities. In this sense, the Roh regime represents a period of the de facto ―transition‖ that bridged an authoritarian era and a consolidated democracy in the aftermath of the democratic transition. I argue that political protests continued to react more strongly to state repression as the democratizing state‘s repressiveness was perceived as illegitimate by SMOs, than to the increase of democratic reforms which SMOs anticipated.

Elites‘ Division During the process of democratization, institutional allies might have negative consequences for social movements if they are able to control and coopt movements.

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Hipsher (1998) argues that a close alliance between movements and political parties causes demobilization when the opposition elites control the social movements, since popular protests ought to decline as opposition elites prefer institutionalized forms of political challenge to disruptive tactics. The congressional strength of the opposition parties might negatively affects movements‘ vitality (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Diani 1998:215-22). In the Korean context, I argue that a close relationship between the opposition parties and SMOs contributed to democratic reforms within institutional politics, since their allied efforts put more weight on enacting such reforms. However, I also argue that the force of institutionalization of electoral politics and increasing cooptation by the opposition parties damaged organizational autonomy of key coalitions, created a vacuum of leadership within the organizations, and resulted in severe organizational conflicts. Therefore, I contend that the appropriation of movement issues by political elites and elites‘ cooptation of movement leadership had a negative impact on movements.

4-2-(2): Meso-level Organizational Processes I examine the impacts of the same set of organizational variables used in the previous chapters on interorganizational collaboration such as organizational infrastructure, diversity, network, and ideological interpretation, for the post-transition period. I intend to analyze how the impacts of the variables change depending on the context of democratization. Given the importance of such organizational mechanisms in explaining alliances as shown in the previous chapter, it is vital to ask whether or not the same factors function in the same way in the context of democratization. Consistent with my assertions in the previous chapter, I argue that organizational infrastructure, organizational diversity during protests, organizational networks, and the shared ideological interpretation will have positive impacts on the level of collaborative protests in the course of democratization. Having a strong social movement sector as such is crucial in sustaining protests because the weakness of SMOs in terms of organizational structure, resources, and planning lead to rapid dissolution of movements after the democratic transition as they fail to adjust to the new political opportunity structure

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(Szabó 1994:302). Therefore, the stated organizational mechanisms are no less important during democratization than in an authoritarian setting. However, in my view, these organizational mechanisms have different consequences in interorganizational alliance, since they are mediated by the shifting political environment. Thus, I focus on several significant changes in the mechanisms caused by the process of democratization. I argue that decentralization of movement leadership in SMOs’ networks coupled with ideological realignment within the social movement sector will challenge the previous pattern of interorganizational collaboration. Here I offer theoretical arguments about the last two mechanisms: leadership decentralization and ideological realignment.

Organizational Networks: Leadership Decentralization The political process model provides an explanation of movement diffusion. Tarrow (1989, 1998a) suggests that a large cycle of protests is likely to diffuse into other movements. In a large protest cycle, three types of diffusion take place. First, protest activities spread across diverse movement communities. Second, new ideas are disseminated across movements. Finally, new tactics spread into various movements. McAdam (1995) identifies this process as the emergence of the ―spinoff‖ movements which are spurred by the preceding ―initiator‖ movements. Empirical studies also confirm the importance of diffusion process in expanding a movement‘s boundary (Meyer and Whittier 1994; Soule 1997; Szabó 1994). The diffusion process is facilitated by the strength of interorganizational ties between different types of SMOs (McAdam 1995:237). Therefore, in the case of Korea where interorganizational collaboration rapidly increased in the mid- to late-1980s, diffusion should occur at great speed in the post-transitional period. As a result of the transition, a large number of new SMOs emerged in the arena of social movements in Korea. According to the NGO Directory in Korea (2000), 56.5% of the listed NGOs were founded in the 1990s while 21% were in the 1980s (Cho 2001b:77), which indicates that the democratization process led to the creation of more civic organizations than the authoritarian period.

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Organizational diffusion has a particular impact on the organizational network structure. According to Osa (2003a), diverse SMOs leads to network fragmentation rather than coordination due to increased conflicts. Until the democratic transition, mutual differences between SMOs may be able to be contained and moderated within the framework of ecumenical inter-movement coalitions such as the PMCDR and the NCDC in Korea. However, the post-transitional diffusion of SMOs changes the organizational dynamics. First of all, building an overarching consensus that most of the SMOs can agree with becomes increasingly difficult given the uncertain political context, which causes more organizational conflicts. Since SMOs could now operate in a more open political space, they are freer to address the issues that reflect their identities instead of postponing their organizational tasks for a bigger cause as they did before in the authoritarian regime. In this sense, diffusion increases the organizational impulse for centrifugal dispersion or differentiation. Differentiation of movements is a typical phenomenon that has been often observed in other empirical cases of democratic transitions (Szabó 1994; Mische 2007). While I use the term ―diffusion‖ as a contagion- like process by which SMOs and/or protests increase in diverse localities and various movement fields, ―differentiation‖ denotes that SMOs increasingly perform mutually distinct tasks, which occurs as a result of movements‘ diffusion in the case of Korea‘s democratization. The current diffusion literature, nonetheless, does not examine how organizational diffusion affects movements‘ leadership structure or ―centrality‖ in social network terms. The theory needs to be modified in the Korean context because organizational diffusion strongly affected the leadership structure of movement networks. Organizational diffusion process might not automatically scatter SMOs from the central leadership if there is a single source of leadership which the SMOs still acknowledge. What is unique in the Korean context is that the past experiences of interorganizational collaboration strengthened various types of coalitions—both intra- and inter-movement coalitions, which arose as the source of independent leaderships after the democratic transition. Accordingly, the previous center of the networks was no longer able to dominate or integrate the dramatically increasing organizational population. The leadership structure became decentralized due to the increasing autonomy of multiple coalitions which could

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compete with the previously central SMOs for organizational resources and leadership. By this ―equalizing‖ effect of decentralization, the pattern of interorganizational collaboration ought to undergo significant transformation during democratization and onward. Thus, I expect that the leadership decentralization is caused by organizational diffusion, growing autonomy of multiple coalitions, and the decline of the power of the previously dominant inter-movement coalitions. Consequently, stable interorganizational collaborations led by formal inter-movement coalitions will dissipate and be replaced by short-term, issue-based collaborations.

Ideological Interpretation: Ideological Realignment The extant literature tends to emphasize a decrease of interorganizational collaboration during movement decline. First, according to the theory of protest cycles proposed by Tarrow (1989), movements are likely to split between moderates and radicals at the end of a protest cycle. This theory, which I refer to as the ―radicalization thesis,‖ states that demobilization has an effect of radicalizing some of activists and alienating moderates and that the split in turn accelerates demobilization. The implication of this thesis in understanding collaborative protests is that the collaboration between radicals and moderates will become less likely towards the end of a protest cycle because demobilization triggers polarization between radicals and moderates. Likewise, the coalition literature contends that interorganizational alliance ―is most difficult and least likely during movement decline‖ (Hathaway and Meyer 1997:67). While a growing movement encourages coalitional activism, a declining one discourages it. ―As collective participation or commitment declines in a social movement or political mobilization, communal groups are likely to maintain commitment through communal closure‖ (Ansell 2001:34), rather than reaching out to other groups. Both the radicalization thesis and the coalition literature assume that coalitional activism must be in sync with the broader protest cycle, whereby a decline of the whole movement scatters previous alliances apart by promoting factional or sectarian tendencies. Even though the current theoretical perspectives do explain the increase in organizational conflicts within coalitions after the democratic transition in Korea, they

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are inadequate to explain why collaborations continued between different ideological groups during protests despite the general decline of protests. Regardless of the level of protests, I argue that the ideological affinity plays a role of straddling between different movement groups as it provides shared ideological interpretations regarding movements‘ external environment, goals, and tactics. Since an ideology is a collection of ideational subsets rather than a single monolithic entity, interorganizational collaboration could continue independently from the general level of protests if radicals and moderates share a certain degree of ideological affinity. The current theories oversimplify the multifaceted nature of movements‘ ideological affinities and their impacts on alliances, failing to explain the ideological mechanisms of why interorganizational collaboration could be sustained in the aftermath of a large protest cycle. Note that the ideological environment is not static. The broad changes in the political environment do alter the ideological environment, which in turn shapes the patterns of ideological alignments between social movement groups. In the Korean context, two changes in the political environment set conditions for ideological realignments, as the goal achievement (i.e., the democratic transition) coincided with the end of the Cold War. First, the goal achievement pressured existing SMOs to devise an alternative goal if they were to continue protests. Second, SMOs began to diversify based on the process of ideological differentiation, either adhering to or questioning the efficacy of the previous ideological principles. Radicals and moderates renewed their alliance by creating a new goal based on their ideological affinity. However, the demise of the communist regimes in the late 1980s to early 1990s affected Korea‘s social movements in three different ways: exit, voice, and loyalty, when applying Hirschman's (1970) theory which predicts how individuals react to dissatisfaction with organizations. First, some activists left movements because they were disillusioned and lost their ideological justification (exit). Second, the ―new‖ moderate movements substituted a different ideological alternative— the liberal democratic values—for leftism (voice). Finally, the radicals and moderates who belonged to the ―old‖ prodemocracy front maintained their commitment based on rearranged goals (loyalty).

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I argue that this complex ideological environment affects interorganizational solidarity in the following ways. As long as the loyalty holds within the ―old‖ movements based on ideological affinity, both radicals and moderates will sustain interorganizational collaboration. If the loyalty wanes due to the conflicts about the efficacy of the new goal, it leads to the fissure between radicals and moderates in the ―old‖ movements. Thus, moderates will tend to differentiate themselves from radicals and gradually gravitate towards the ―new‖ moderates based on their propensity for moderate activism. Such ideological realignment will pose a challenge to the traditional model of interorganizational collaboration and transform the power dynamics between SMOs.

4-3: Overview This section describes numeric trends of protest events roughly between 1987 and 1992. In terms of the frequency of protest events, Korea experienced a decline of protests. Figure 4-1 presents the annual frequency of Korea‘s protest events reported by the East Asia Institute (EAI), a research institution in Korea, and compares it with Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and East Germany—four Eastern European countries which democratized from communism in the late 1980s. The data are comparable across the five countries because the researchers used identical data collection methods for all cases. All data are censored to the left depending on the timing of the democratic transition for each country. The analysts for the Eastern European cases conclude that the countries did not experience a high level of protests right after the democratic transition (Ekiert and Kubik 1998:553). The Korean case also suggests a decline of protests after the transition. However, note that Korea‘s level of insurgency remained much higher than the other countries for the initial three years immediately following the transition (1988 - 1990). Only by 1991, protests dropped to the level of Poland‘s or East Germany‘s, which are considered more contentious than Hungary and Slovakia. In fact, post-transitional Poland is considered a strong case where the level of protests remained ―contentious‖ (Bond et al. 1997). However, even Poland does not match up to Korea‘s level of protests immediately following the transition. This comparison poses an important question of why Korea retained such a high level of protests for several years after the transition

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despite the general decline. Why were Korea‘s protests much more contentious than the other cases of democratization?

Figure 4-1. Comparison of Protest Patterns between Korea and Four Eastern European Countries 1400

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Korea Poland Slovakia Hungary E. Germany

Source: 1) Ekiert, Grzegorz, and Jan Kubik. 1998. ―Contentious Politics in New Democracies: East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia, 1989-93.‖ World Politics 50: 554. 2) The East Asia Institute. 2008. ―Logic of Civil Society: Contentious Politics in New Democracies.‖ http://www.eai.or.kr/english/project/mainscr/projectDBCat2View.asp?cat1_code=40& cat1_name=Politics+%26+Society&cat2_code=40&cat2_name=Contentious%20Politi cs (Accessed April 3, 2009).

What about a longer-term trend? Figure 4-2 demonstrates both a longitudinal trajectory of Korea‘s protest events from 1989 to 2007 and the ratio of street protests to all types of protest tactics from 1989 to 2003. After the initial years of extensive protests, the level of protest drops and remains relatively constant throughout the 1990s approximately until the Asian financial crisis, when protests surge to a great deal. The ratio of street protests to all types of protests remains very high—more than 50% on average—from late 1980s to the mid 1990s, which shows the prevalence of disruptive protests in Korea even after the democratic transition.

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Figure 4-2. Annual Frequency of Protests and Street Protest Ratio (1988 - 2007) 90 1400

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Source: The East Asia Institute. 2008. ―Logic of Civil Society: Contentious Politics in New Democracies.‖ http://www.eai.or.kr/english/project/mainscr/projectDBCat2View.asp?cat1_code=40& cat1_name=Politics+%26+Society&cat2_code=40&cat2_name=Contentious%20Politi cs (Accessed April 3, 2009).

However, the extent to which protests were maintained in the early 1990s is a question for debate. Figure 4-3 illustrates the police‘s annual estimation of protest events and protest participants from 1988 to 1992. According to this data, the level of protests is consistently high from 1988 to 1991, and declines only by 1992. Nationwide, more than 6,000 protests occurred from 1988 to 1991. In terms of protest participants, the peak is in 1991, when more than two million individuals protested. Although protests were in decline, a large number of people showed up in the protest scene. Even in 1992, when protests dropped by 24% from the previous year, more than 1.5 million people protested en masse.

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Figure 4-3. Annual Frequency of Protests and Participants (1988 - 1992) 8000 3000000 7000 2500000 6000 2000000 5000 4000 1500000 3000 1000000

Number ProtestsNumber of 2000

500000 ParticipantsNumber of 1000 0 0 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

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Source: the National Police Agency, 1992, Annual Police Statistics.

The data from the EAI suggest a substantial decline of protests from 1988 to 1991, but the police data indicates that the decline was not that dramatic. The difference between the two data is most likely to stem from the difference in the data collection and coding methods, although such information is unavailable at the current stage. My speculation is that the EAI data might resemble the KDM Dataset which treats a coordinated protest in multiple locations as one protest, while the police statistics count each local protest separately. Regardless of the potential source of mutual differences, however, both of the protest trends reveal the high intensity of Korea‘s protests in the initial period of democratization from 1988 to the early 1990s, which is radically different from the aforementioned Eastern European cases. Moreover, the large proportion of street protests seen in the EAI report and the magnitude of protest participation based on the police statistics reconfirm the confrontational nature of Korea‘s social movements in the process of democratization.

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Figure 4-4. Monthly Frequency of Different Types of Protests (July 1987 - 1991)

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Source: the Korea Democracy Movement Dataset

Figure 4-5. Monthly Percentage of Protests by Different Types (July 1987 - 1991)

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Source: the Korea Democracy Movement Dataset

How were protests sustained after the democratic transition? I find that collaborative protests played an important role in sustaining the level of protests. Figure 4-4 reveals the monthly frequency of protests by different alliance types from July 1987 to 1991, based on the KDM Dataset. The total protest count peaks in 1987 due to the labor unrest right after the June uprising. Protests seem to dwindle afterwards, but peak

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again in 1990 and 1991. To help observe this temporal pattern better, Figure 4-5 exhibits the changing percentages of different types of protests between July 1987 and 1991. What is striking is the decreasing proportion of single protests, represented by a dark solid line, in comparison to intra- and inter-movement protests. Clearly, the percentage of single protests tends to decline over time, despite some dramatic fluctuations in 1990 and 1991. In contrast, collaborative protests remain in high percentages. Intra-movement protests particularly show a marked growth over time. Table 4-1 converts the above figures annually. Different from the same set of figures in the previous two chapters, a new category of ―Other‖ is added to the trend, which signals a new feature of social movements in this particular period. This category represents SMOs‘ formal involvement in election campaigns. The frequency is the highest in 1987 due to the presidential election in December. Before democratization, SMOs were not officially involved with election campaigns, but the transition facilitated their direct participation in electoral politics. The instances of participation in electoral campaigns signal that the time has changed from the previous authoritarian era where the parliamentary politics was much less accessible.

Table 4-1. Yearly Counts of Protests by Different Types of Protests (July 1987 - 1991) Year Single Intra Inter Other Total Jul-Dec 87 144 (63.2) 47 (20.6) 12 (5.3) 25 (11.0) 228 (100) 88 173(55.8) 100 (32.3) 28 (9.0) 9 (2.9) 310 (100) 89 72 (48.6) 59 (39.9) 15 (10.1) 2 (1.3) 148 (100) 90 59 (37.1) 73 (45.9) 20 (12.6) 7 (4.4) 159 (100) 91 78 (39.6) 66 (33.5) 51 (25.9) 2 (1.0) 197 (100) Total 526 (50.5) 345 (33.1) 126 (12.1) 45 (4.3) 1,042(100) Source: the Korea Democracy Movement Dataset Notes: Row percentages in parentheses

Moreover, single protests decline from 63% in late 1987 to 40% in 1991. On the other hand, the ratio of collaborative protests that aggregate intra- and inter-movement protests increases over time. In the second half of 1987, the proportion of collaborative protests is relative low because the series of labor strikes in summer emerged as separate events without central coordination. Intra- and inter-movement protests take up 41% of

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total events in 1988, and between 1989 and 1991, they occupy more than 50% of the total. In 1991, almost 60% of protests are collaborative protests. Based on the KDM Dataset, democratization resulted in the dominance of collaborative protests. Ever since the June uprising in 1987 proved the efficacy and power of coalitional activism, SMOs continued to engage in interorganizational collaboration even years after the democratic transition. When it comes to the number of protests, collaborative protests were no doubt the major contributor. In addition, note that the ratio of intra-movement protests (33%) is much higher than the inter-movement protests (12%) between July 1987 and 1991. Compared to the previous period (1984 - June 1987), when the proportions of both protest types were around 17% (see Table 3-1 in Chapter 3), the proportion of intra-movement protests substantially increased in the initial years of democratization. The dominance of collaborative protests in the post-transitional phase suggests that a type of ―coalitional capital‖ (Weiss 2005:3) had been accumulated through repeated collaborative experiences between SMOs in the past. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the macro- and meso-level variables that affected the continuation of interorganizational collaboration in the post-transition period, and explore the implications of such dominant organizational tendency in the phase of democratic consolidation.

4-4: The Macro-Level Political Environment 4-4-(1): Political Reforms and Repression The June uprising in 1987 was becalmed by the state‘s concession known as the ―June 29 Declaration‖ delivered by Roh Tae Woo, the presidential candidate of the ruling party. The main point of the declaration was an immediate introduction of a direct presidential election through constitutional amendment, which was the primary demand raised by the June uprising. Evidently, social movement activists tended to acknowledge it as an important achievement of their prodemocracy struggles. The NCDC viewed the declaration as a ―tentative success‖ (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:85). The concession was followed by constitutional amendment and a direct presidential election in late 1987, which officially marked Korea‘s democratic transition.

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This section examines the impact of reform-repression dynamics on coalitions and collaborative protests in the midst of this dramatic political shift. The period I examine spans from late 1987 to 1992, which roughly covers the first presidential term after the transition. In the beginning, the new regime had to accommodate both the bottom-up pressures from social movements for and the opposition parties‘ push towards democratic reforms. Consequently, various reforms were implemented. However, in the later phase of Roh‘s term, the government and the parliament became more conservative and increased the levels of repression on protests. In this section, I first discuss how the pace of democratic reforms affected the ebb and flow of social movements. Second, I analyze the impact of a shifting pattern of repression on protests.

Slow Reforms and the Reaction from Social Movements The democratic transition resulted in broad reform processes. I divide this section into three important processes of democratization: 1) legislative reforms, 2) liquidation of the last vestiges of the authoritarian structure, and 3) increasing openness to North Korea. Such changes in the political environment had very complex effects on social movements. SMOs anticipated democratic legislative reforms, and remained inactive when the pace of reforms was considered satisfactory. However, they reacted to legislative stalemates and incomplete liquidation of the authoritarian vestiges with increased protests. Also, the regimes‘ increasing openness to North Korea which limited civic participation tended to be paralleled by protests that demanded reunification. In short, when reforms were not fully implemented, SMOs responded to them with large inter-movement protests. However, the rise of the reunification movement resulted in a backlash from the state in the later phase of the Roh regime, which severely constrained protests.

1) Legislative Reforms: Under the Roh administration, a considerable amount of legislative reforms were proposed and enacted. However, at the same time, several important reform bills failed to pass through parliament or were vetoed by the president. Legislative reforms were both a success and a failure in terms of the extent to which the movements‘ goals were realized through institutional reforms. SMOs tried to drive institutional politics into a more progressive direction by means of massive bottom-up

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pressures when the reforms were delayed or incomplete. When the reform efforts were aborted by the conservative politicians or the administration, SMOs waged antigovernment demonstrations, since they viewed such an outcome as a sign of Korea‘s retrogression to the past. Overall, SMOs perceived many reforms slow, lukewarm, and incomplete, which served as their rationale to engage in antigovernment protests. The first and the most important reform after June 1987 was constitutional amendment. Institutional politics became invigorated by the active discussion of constitutional amendment between the government and the opposition parties. The process of constitutional amendment was confined within the realm of institutional politics. SMOs tended to assume the attitude of critical observers in the process of constitutional reform and to provide suggestions (D.Y. Kim 2007b:202-03). Hae-Koo Jeong, who was a graduate student in 1987, recalls that the social movement activists ―did not know that Constitution was so important because it had never been made by the people‖ (Interview 08/11/08). Also, SMOs were optimistic about the result due to the favorable political atmosphere after the June uprising. On October 27, the new Constitution was approved in a referendum. Despite SMOs‘ passive attitude, the amended Constitution accommodated a great deal of progressive agenda due to the popular pressure of democratization. The new Constitution not only contained various reform measures to the political system by setting up control mechanisms in the exercise of the state‘s power, but also emphasized the protection of broad civil rights. The revision included the adoption of a direct presidential election and a single five-year term of presidency, the improvement of the freedom of speech, press and association, and the protection of labor rights such as the guarantee of the minimal wage, to name a few (Hyun 2006). Moreover, the new Constitution had specific content for enhancing reunification efforts with North Korea, which had been one of the most important goals in the history of the democracy movement. The amendment led to a series of reforms in late 1987. New laws regarding the freedom of press were enacted in November. The periodicals which had been discontinued by the previous regime were reinstated, and a number of publications on the government‘s banned list were allowed to be sold as a result of the reform. Also, the Gender Equality in Employment Act was passed in December. However, until 1987,

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SMOs were more or less indifferent to the reform processes or unable to intervene in them, letting politicians take care of them on their own. In the case of the Gender Equality in Employment Act, the women‘s movement was not capable of pushing forward a more progressive reform agenda, which later caused internal criticism about the movement‘ lack of voice (Y. Kim 2003:200). Generally, the reform bills which were likely to pass the Assembly without much conflict between political parties seldom caused protests. Moreover, when the progressive force was strong within institutional politics, the reform process did not require external supports. In the case of the Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration (ACAD), some measures were taken in favor of movements by the reform led by the opposition parties in 1989. This act had been used most frequently in order to restrict and control political dissent. The revised act was more accommodating to the requests for protest permits and allowed an appeal after a denial of permission (Chosun Ilbo, April 29, 1989). At least on paper, the act was a slight improvement compared to the strict restrictions on demonstrations and public assembly in the previous regime. In this case, protests rarely occurred.62 Movement remained silent when reforms were clearly in progress. On the contrary, the controversial reform bills which were deemed very difficult to pass in the Assembly attracted more attention from SMOs, as their interests were directly at stake. The most notable cases were the National Security Law (NSL) and the Labor Law. Since these laws were very difficult to reform because of conservatives‘ firm resistance, which included the President and the governmental party, protests occurred more frequently in order to support the reform bills during the reform processes. When both bills failed to be enacted, antigovernment protests erupted. The failure to achieve their goal of reforming the laws did not discourage movements, but served as legitimate reasons to put up a fight with the repressive state. The NSL was one of the most notorious laws in Korean history as it had been used by a succession of authoritarian governments to suppress dissent and keep political opponents in jail. Also the Labor Law considerably restricted labor rights by restricting

62 Another reason behind the lack of mobilization lies in movements‘ historical experiences. Since SMOs had been used to organize protests without any legal permission under authoritarianism, they remained somewhat indifferent to the reform process of the ACAD. As legal SMOs were rare as well, the success or failure of the reform did not have significant consequences on the level of protests until this period. 164

union activities and prohibiting the third-party interference with labor problems. At first, Roh Tae Woo said in his inaugural speech in 1988 that ―the days when freedoms and human rights could be slighted in the name of economic growth and national security ended‖ (Chosun Ilbo, February 26, 1988). Nevertheless, the governmental party and the administration were extremely hesitant over amending these two laws because of their past authoritarian background, anti-communism, and conservative orientation. In the case of the NSL, the reform bill which contained only a minimal change in the existing law was passed along with the Police Law in forty seconds by the governmental party in May 1991, in spite of fierce physical struggles with the opposition parties (Seoul Sinmun, May 11, 1991). Since the revision was so slight, it still remained a crime to praise or have a contact with any anti-state organizations under the new law. Similarly, with respect to the Labor Law, although the bill did pass through the National Assembly, the reform was frustrated as the President vetoed it in March 1989. Thus, the new law still placed restrictions on organizing labor unions and prohibited the public officials‘ and teachers‘ unionization. By additionally announcing in June that the wage increase should remain under 10%, the regime clearly demonstrated its intention to control labor in the favor of the business sector (Hwang 1991). Since the NSL concerned most SMOs as it fundamentally restricted the freedom of speech based on anti-communist ideology, several inter-movement protests took place against the law (Chosun Ilbo, February 23, 1992; Chosun Ilbo, August 17, 1992). Among all movement groups, students and the chaeya led demonstrations since they often faced accusations of being pro-North Korea by authorities. In terms of the Labor Law, protests were understandably organized by labor SMOs. In November and December in 1989, tens of thousands of protesters were mobilized for a series of inter-movement protests nationwide, demanding a reform (H.J. Park 1989; Chosun Ilbo, December 1, 1988; Chosun Ilbo, December 10, 1988). Since the issue directly spoke to workers‘ interests, labor unions and SMOs led the protests and other SMOs from different fields supported them. Even after the bill was vetoed, the labor SMOs organized antigovernment

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protests.63 In this sense, the contentious nature of the aforementioned reforms created opportunities for short-term protests for SMOs and encouraged interorganizational collaborations. Multiple SMOs fought together during protests since they shared common goals. Since legislative reforms increasingly drew attention from SMOs, they learned to create new tactics in influencing the reform processes. One of the most relevant examples is women‘s movements. Women‘s movements became more and more policy-oriented compared to other movements and actively promoted legislative reforms by means of offering public lectures, disseminating educational pamphlets, and lobbying politicians (Y. Kim 2003). The Korea Women‘s Association United (KWAU, han’guk yŏsŏng tanch’e yŏnhap, yŏyŏn), the largest coalition of women‘s SMOs created in 1987, situated itself as a part of the broader democracy movement and focused on political protests until 1989, but changed its strategy into a more legal approach since 1990. Between 1990 and 1992, the movement continued to set annual policy goals such as creating a family day care act (1990), legalizing a maternity leave (1991), and enacting a special law on sexual harassments (1992) (N.S. Kang 2004:413). Moreover, the women‘s movement was able to achieve its key goals without serious objections in the National Assembly in the early 1990s, even though the results may not have been entirely satisfactory. For instance, the Infants and Childcare Act was enacted in 1991. According to Jeong-Sook Yoon, who was a women‘s movement activist during this period, the movement was successful partly because ―the regime tried to internationally show off its democratic stance on the women‘s issues‖ (Interview 07/28/08). During the general election periods, all major political parties including conservative ones tended to include the protection of women‘s rights in their agenda (Y. Kim 2003:201). The women‘s movement was able to utilize the political opening after the democratic transition for its own interests based on increasing awareness of the efficacy of policy-oriented tactics. Although such a tactical innovation was still at a burgeoning stage during this period, the legal strategy widely influenced other

63 Later, when the government attempted to conservatively revise the law in 1991, a series of mass protests were mobilized by the labor SMOs. More than 30,000 workers participated in the protest in Seoul on November 10, 1991 (Chosun Ilbo, November 11, 1991). 166

movements and gradually became one of the most common social movement tactics throughout the 1990s. In sum, the process of democratization through legislative reforms influenced movements in various ways. In 1987, the process of constitutional amendment and related reforms did not affect protests and was carried out almost exclusively amongst politicians due to SMOs‘ inexperience in getting involved in institutional politics. Those reforms which did not create much tension between political parties during the legislative processes seldom affected protests, but those controversial reform bills which faced huge challenges during the legislative processes were likely to draw attention from and be supported by SMOs. The reform processes regarding the laws such as the NSL and the Labor Law garnered protest participation across various movement industries. SMOs organized protests in order to rally against retrogressive legislative outcomes. Overall, SMOs tended to protest against potential and real negative outcomes from legislative reform processes, while remaining inactive when progressive reforms did take place. The reform processes also spurred tactical innovation in some movements; the women‘s movement was increasingly interested in legislative reforms and began to adopt more institutionalized policy-oriented tactics such as educational programs and lobbying. The reform processes were important learning experiences for SMOs as they provided key policy goals to pursue and offered political opportunities for protests, interorganizational collaboration, and tactical innovation.

2) Liquidation of the Past Vestiges of the Authoritarian Structure: After the democratic transition, investigation and punishment of authorities in the Fifth Republic was considered an important goal for democratization among activists. For SMOs, this issue formed a common ground for collective action regardless of their specific interests. A consensus was easily made based on the importance of liquidating the past vestiges of the authoritarian structure in order to advance democracy in Korea. From mid-1988 to 1989, opposition parties outnumbered the governmental party. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the opposition invoked the parliamentary right to investigate the past corruption and atrocities committed by the previous regime and created special committees for investigation (Chosun Ilbo, June 28, 1988). Investigations

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began, and the ensuing parliamentary hearings between late 1988 and 1989 became sensational events, which drew tremendous attention when they were broadcasted on national television. Outside the National Assembly, mass demonstrations occurred at the same time, demanding a more thorough investigation and harsher punishment of Chun Doo Hwan, his relatives, and other governmental officials related to the past atrocities and corruption. The central issues were the government‘s corruption as well as the degree of the Chun government‘s involvement in the Kwangju massacre. SMOs viewed that punishing the past wrongdoings of the authoritarian government was an indispensible step towards democratization, since the Fifth Republic was a symbol of ―anti-nation, anti- minjung, and anti-democracy‖ (Kim 1990). Students formed special committees on campus, which addressed the issue of investigating and punishing Chun. As a result of the parliamentary hearings and a series of investigations, a number of key personnel in the previous regime were dragged into the National Assembly in front of TV cameras and had to go through endless questions and accusations. The investigations led to the conviction of several figures including Chun‘s relatives for bribery and the former president of the Agency for National Security Planning with regard to the agency‘s human rights abuses. In November 1988, Chun Doo Hwan held a press conference for a public apology and withdrew into a Buddhist temple. The synergy of the intense parliamentary hearings, convictions, and the mass protests which erupted all over the country put a burden on the Roh government, which had a close relationship with the previous authoritarian regime. The government was reluctant to punish the previous regime‘s high-ranking personnel including Chun Doo Hwan, but had no choice but to offer concessions in order to calm down protests. In December 1989, the government amnestied more than two thousand political prisoners. In February 1990, the government enacted a special law to compensate the victims for the past atrocities including the Kwangju massacre. The government was obviously on the defensive in this investigative process. In sum, the course of the parliamentary investigations and hearings regarding the Fifth Republic pressured the state to make significant concessions. However, the result of the whole process was not completely satisfactory for those who wished more thorough punishment of the past authoritarian government. For instance, Chun Doo Hwan

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managed to escape formal punishment, and even when he was summoned for a parliamentary hearing, he remained extremely vague about his past wrongdoings or denied his responsibility. Also, the details about how the Kwangju massacre had been orchestrated still remained tangled (Seo 2005:336). Nevertheless, the process of liquidating the vestiges of the authoritarian system was moderately successful, considering the magnitude of public pressures it gave to the Roh administration. Also, the parliamentary hearings instigated mass demonstrations, which in turn strengthened the opposition‘s status vis-à-vis the government. Thus, this whole process which spanned between mid-1988 and 1989 was a win-win situation for both opposition parties and SMOs. Both of them actively exploited the political opportunities for their own interests, during with SMOs played the role of ―watchdog‖ against incomplete liquidation of authoritarian vestiges. Similar to SMOs‘ reaction to various legislative reforms, SMOs waged protests in order to uphold progressive agenda.

3) Increasing Openness to North Korea: With the demise of communism in Eastern Europe and the Societ Union since the late 1980s, the Roh regime became more open to trade relations with former communist countries. The list of normalization includes Hungary in 1990, the Soviet Union in 1990, Albania in 1991, and China and Vietnam in 1992. Spurred by the détente, the government began to focus on enhancing the relationship with North Korea. The Special Declaration for National Self-Esteem, Unification, and Prosperity of 1988 (hereafter the July 7 Declaration) was proclaimed in 1988, and the Korean National Community Unification Formula was declared in September 1989. According to the Ministry of Unification, the July 7 Declaration was the cornerstone of the cooperative policy towards North Korea because it ―recognized the North not as a hostile enemy but as a member of the national community with whom the South together needed to pursue co-prosperity through mutual trust and cooperation‖ (The Ministry of Unification 1996:38). The Korean National Community Unification Formula became the important basis of the later governmental policy towards North Korea, which articulated that ―the political unification should be achieved after the establishment of a national community predicated on peaceful coexistence of both Korean regimes‖ (The Ministry of Unification 1996:40). The two Koreas resumed trade

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relations as well. South Korea lifted its economic sanctions against North Korea in October 1988 and enacted the Guidelines for Intra-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation in June 1989, which encouraged trade exchanges between the two Koreas. With the establishment of the Intra-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation Act, more stable intra- Korean trade relations started (The Ministry of Unification 1996:137). Moreover, in December 1991, the two Koreas jointly became members of the United Nations. On February 19, 1992, the two Koreas signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North at the sixth round of the Intra-Korean High-level Talks. In the Roh era, there were significant improvements in the state-level relations between the two Koreas. The question here is how such improvements affected protests given the importance of the reunification issue for the democracy movement. At first, the intensification of protests around the issue of reunification was precisely what pressured the state to advance the reunification agenda. In 1988, the primary goal for the chaeya and the student SMOs was to precipitate the reunification process between the two Koreas. The reunification issue had been tabooed by the state under the authoritarian regimes. Only after the democratic transition, many SMOs began to pursue the goal in the form of above-ground protests. Since the reunification movement was so widespread and intense, the state had to take a conciliatory approach towards the reunification issue. However, despite the democratization process and the improving relationship with North Korea, the reunification movement was often condemned by the government as radicalism that threatened national security. For instance, the President remarked that ―those who pursue the goal of class-oriented revolution should be destroyed‖ (Chosun Ilbo, March 22, 1989), and that he could not ignore ―the leftist threats‖ (Chosun Ilbo, April 21, 1989) with regard to the reunification movement. The reunification movement led to extremely harsh and consistent state repression, although the movement initially put pressure on the state‘s reunification policy as early as 1988. Clearly, the regime‘s increasing openness to North Korea did not translate into its tolerance towards the domestic reunification movement. As a result, SMOs were extremely skeptical about the state‘s reunification policy. Progressive intellectuals and student activists denounced the regime‘s unification policy

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as ―an empty shell‖ because of two evident inconsistencies. First, the government was unwilling to abolish the NSL even though the law was clearly an obstacle to enhancing relationship with the North, since pro-North Korean activities were to be severely penalized by the law. Second, the government used a double standard in dealing with South Korean visitors to North Korea. While successful business owners such as Chu- Yŏng Chŏng and U-Chung Kim were allowed to visit North Korea, social movement activists such as Ik-Hwan Mun and Su-Kyŏng Im were punished using the NSL when they crossed the border without permission they were unable to obtain from the government. Activists perceived that the state monopolized the reunification agenda and prevented civilians from participating in developing it into a more progressive direction (Korea Progressive Academy Council 1992:25). The state‘s top-down policy of establishing relations with North Korea only by a single official channel was at odds with the bottom-up approach of the social movement activists who attempted to promote reunification by means of increasing free civilian contact. The bottom-up drive for reunification made the government nervous about its leadership in dealing with the North and resulted in increased repression rather than accommodation of the reunification movement. Their mutual distrust and competitive attitude also contributed to the mounting tension. To sum up, the reunification movement initially pressured the government to take a major step towards reunification, but later encountered an increase of state repression. Therefore, collaborative protests around this issue led by the chaeya and the student SMOs were very prevalent in 1988, but gradually declined due to repression.

To summarize the impact of broad reforms on protests, the uneven process of democratization provided multiple rallying points for SMOs. SMOs remained inactive when reforms were in progress, but reacted to the potential and real negative legislative outcomes with collaborative protests. In the early half of the Roh regime, many reforms of the previous authoritarian practices were introduced by the opposition parties in the National Assembly and SMOs endorsed such reforms by remaining more or less silent. Also, SMOs were unfamiliar with the legislative processes and unable to make a strong voice right after the democratic transition.

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However, when several reform measures failed to be implemented within the parliament, large collaborative protests occurred in order to protest against the decision and criticize the government. SMOs demanded more thorough democratic implementation through progressive reforms and liquidation of the last vestiges of the authoritarian structure. Since the democratization process was slow and incomplete, it provided important political opportunities for alliances in protests. Moreover, increasing awareness of the importance of legislative reform influenced tactical innovation in some part of the movement communities such as women‘s movements. Additionally, the state‘s increasing openness towards North Korea was initially pressured by the reunification movement from below. However, the government‘s policy focused on enhancing the state-level relationship through a single official channel instead of opening up civilian-level channels pursued by social movement activists. Such a gap eventually led to mass movements and harsh repression in the later period of the Roh regime. Simultaneously, due to the rise of conservatism within the National Assembly and the government, the movements had to deal with increasing repression. The next section analyzes the impact of repression on protests.

Repression: The Backlash As discussed above, in the first year of the Roh regime, the government remained relatively pro-reform due the pressures from social movements and the strong opposition parties within the National Assembly. Right after June 1987, state repression weakened compared to the earlier period. According to Jae-Keun In, who held an executive position at the NCDC and is the wife of Keun-Tae Kim, she could feel the difference. ―Before the June 29 declaration, I was allowed to visit my husband in prison only once a month. But after it, they allowed me to visit him much more often‖ (Interview 08/20/09), she remarks. Although she recalls that state repression remained severe in terms of arresting activists during protests, she says that both protesters and police became ―softer‖ in their interactions. Indeed, Roh seemed conciliatory towards dissent. In early 1989, the U.S. media complimented Roh, saying that ―he developed a healthy relationship with the main opposition parties, helping nudge Korean politics away from dangerous brinkmanship‖ (New York Times, March 25, 1989).

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However, in response to the reunification movement—especially after several activists‘ forbidden visits to North Korea, the government dramatically shifted its approach towards social movements from tolerance to repression. In 1991, the same American newspaper stated that Roh ―has done far less to relax the cold war legacy in South Korean politics‖ (New York Times, May 24, 1991). The rise of the reunification movement strengthened the government‘s hard-line policy towards radical protests. Since early 1989, authorities were determined to quell disruptive and violent movements (Chosun Ilbo, March 24, 1989). When the Reverend Ik-Hwan Mun visited North Korea in March, repression finally escalated. The state established the Public Security Investigation Headquarter (kongan haptong susa ponbu) in April in order to investigate related SMOs, and quickly arrested Bu-Young Yi, the president of the KNCDM, since Mun belonged to the SMO‘s advisory board. In March, the President even authorized police to fire on violent leftist protesters (Chosun Ilbo, March 23, 1989). After five policemen were kidnapped and beaten by student protesters at Dong- Eui University in Pusan, and seven policemen died during the rescue operation in May 1989, repression became even more severe. In May, U-Hyŏn Kim, the newly appointed Chief of the National Police Agency, said in an interview that the police would make sure to ―exercise force on the leftist aggression‖ (Chosun Ilbo, May 5, 1989). In the same month, the Law Punishing the Use of Molotov Cocktails was enacted, which aimed at outlawing the student movement‘s frequent use of Molotov cocktails during demonstrations. The government‘s relative strength vis-à-vis the opposition within the National Assembly also matters in explaining the variation of its repressive capacity. Since the governmental party obtained the majority of the seats within the Assembly as a result of a merger between three political parties in early 1990, the government‘s power considerably increased. The government became able to boldly exercise its power without worrying about serious opposition within the parliament, and the power realignment significantly affected the way it dealt with radical movements. 64 The

64 The increase of the government‘s confidence also has to do with the cancellation of the plebiscite scheduled within a year of Roh‘s term. During the election campaign, Roh proposed the plebiscite which offered voters an insurance policy on his conversion to democratic principles. However, the plebiscite was delayed as a result of political bargaining between political parties in early 1989, which in fact meant its 173

government‘s repressive stance to disruptive movements was reaffirmed by Roh‘s public declaration of ―the War against Crimes‖ on October 13, 1990. The mounting repression is reflected in the statistical trends related to the use of repressive laws. Figure 4-6 shows the annual number of the prosecuted based on the NSL and the ACAD, the primary laws which were used to punish political dissent under authoritarianism. The data is based on the annual reports named The Criminal Analysis published by the Supreme Prosecutors‘ Office. The record in this figure shows the actual number of the prosecuted. The solid line represents the total number of prosecution. The short-dashed line and the long-dashed line are based on the cases based on the NSL and the ACAD, respectively.

Figure 4-6. Annual Number of the Prosecution Cases Based on the NSL and the ACAD 1800 1600 1400 1200 1000 800 600 400 200 0 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

The National Security Law The Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration Total

Source: Choi, Jeong-Ki. 2002. ―Han‘gugŭi chŏngch‘ibyŏndonggwa sabŏpchŏk ch‘ŏbŏrŭi pyŏnhwa [Korea‘s Political Shifts and the Changes in Legal Punishment].‖ in Kukka p’ongnyŏk, minjujuŭi t’ujaeng, kŭrigo hŭisaeng [State’s Violence, Democratic Struggles, and Sacrifices], edited by Hee-Yeon Cho. Seoul, Korea: CoBook: 413.

The total number of the prosecuted is in decline in 1987 and 1988, but bounces back afterwards. In 1990 and 1991, around a thousand individuals a year were prosecuted based on the NSL and the ACAD. Despite the democratic transition in 1987, repression cancellation. At the expense of cancelling the plebiscite, the opposition parties earned the government‘s promise to deal with the compensation issue with regard to the Kwangju massacre and to hold the municipal elections (Kyunghyang Sinmin, May 17, 1990). 174

did not taper off except for the year 1988. The trend is very similar in terms of the annual number of arrestees (Choi 2002:413). What this figure tells is that democratization initially reduced repression but repression quickly resumed in the later period of the Roh regime. According to the police report, the number of protests and protesters declined by 26% and 63% respectively between January and March 1990 compared to the same period in 1989. However, the amount of teargas used by the riot police increased by 27%. This trend evidently shows the overreaction of the police in dealing with protests (Hankuk Ilbo, March 30, 1990). The Human Rights Report (1992) by the Korean Bar Association reported that, in 1991, the violation of the NSL took up 41% of the total cases related to political issues, which was a 9% increase vis-à-vis the same period in 1990 (Kyunghyang Sinmun, December 14, 1992). The Report expressed a concern about the NSL because the NSL violation took up 13% and 14% in 1988 and 1989, but was more than doubled afterwards—over 40% in 1991 (Donga Ilbo, November 6, 1991). In addition, labor movements were no less repressed. For instance, the government disavowed teachers‘ right to unionize. The Korean Teachers and Education Workers‘ Union (chŏn’guk kyojigwŏn nodongjohap), founded in late May in 1989, incessantly suffered from state repression since its birth. More than 1,500 teachers were fired because of their involvement in it (Cho and Cho 2002:127). As a whole, labor unions were under severe repression. President Roh‘s veto of the revised Labor Law in 1989 reveals the state‘s determination to control the labor activism from a traditional, conservative perspective. A quick look at the numeric trends in the labor movement helps understand its relationship with the mounting repression in the early 1990s. After June 1987, the labor movement experienced an outstanding growth. A big wave of labor strikes which is called the Great Workers Struggle erupted in summer 1987, and a large number of labor unions emerged as a result (Koo 2001:157-58). Figure 4-7 shows the annual number of union members, unions, and labor disputes between 1986 and 1992 based on the data in the Korean Statistical Information Service‘s website (www.kosis.kr). The grey bars indicate the number of union members. The solid line is number of unions, and the dotted line is the number of labor disputes.

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Figure 4-7. Annual Number of Union Members, Unions, and Labor Disputes 9,000 2,500,000 8,000 7,000 2,000,000 6,000 1,500,000 5,000 4,000

1,000,000 Members

3,000 Unions Disputes & Unions 2,000 500,000 1,000 0 0 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992

Members Unions Disputes

Source: the Korean Statistical Information Service (KOSIS) (www.kosis.kr)

The peak of labor disputes is found in 1987 when the Great Workers Struggle swept the country. In 1988 and 1989, the number stays relatively high at more than 1,500 disputes a year, but dramatically drops in the following three years around a couple of hundred disputes per year. In terms of the number of labor unions and members, both increase until 1989, but slowly decline afterwards. When juxtaposed with Figure 4-6, the decline of labor activism tends to be accompanied by the rise of repression, which was prompted by the state‘s resumption of its interventionist policy towards labor relations (Koo 2001:189). Repression weakened the labor movement in the later period of the Roh regime. The National Congress of Trade Unions (NCTU, chŏn’guk nodong chohap hyŏbŭihoe, chŏnnohyŏp), which was the main target of state repression on the labor movement due to its leading role, lost almost half of its members within a year of its foundation. The government defined the NCTU as an illegal organization, so the NCTU had to operate outside the legal boundary and was put under consistent repression (K.S. Kim 2004:248). The government‘s pro-business policy controlled labor by restricting wage increases and increasing repression on labor activism (Hwang 1991). In terms of qualitative effects of repression, the increase of repression in the later period of the Roh administration had a negative effect on political and labor protests, as it

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damaged the leadership of SMOs and scared members away. However, repression often sparked protests. One of the most well-known examples is the death of Kyŏng-Dae Kang during a demonstration in May 1991. This tragic incident led to more than 2,000 protests in May only, where more than a million people rallied in solidarity protests (The National Police Agency 1991:270-71). State repression backfired when SMOs succeeded in mobilizing public sentiment and organizing solidarity protests against the state‘s outright coercion and abuse of force. According to a study about Korea‘s protests in 1990 and 1991, protests tended to occur in reaction to previous repression events (Nam 2006). In the case of the labor movement, protests tended to become more confrontational with an increase of repression (Heo 2002:271). As disruptive protests continued, SMOs began to lose public legitimacy. The contention between the riot police and protesters sometimes resulted in tragic incidences. Surprisingly, more individuals sacrificed their lives during protests by self-immolations and other types of suicidal attempts in the Roh era than the Chun era (Chun 2002:204-05). The increase of suicides during protests reflects the intensity of desperation and frustration among activists. The police and protesters blamed each other for the mounting violence during their interactions (Hankyoreh Sinmun, November 8, 1992). The continuation of violent clashes between the police and protesters resulted in an increase of apprehension about social movements in the mainstream conservative media. For instance, an editorial stated that, ―even when the claims are just and the motive is pure, destructive and violent methods cannot receive any support from the public‖ (Hankuk Ilbo, March 16, 1990). Most of all, the contentious police-protester interactions enormously hurt the legitimacy of political movements led by students and the chaeya groups who had been at the forefront of the democracy movement. The movements‘ moral high-ground vis-à-vis the government was severely damaged by vilification from the media and waning public support. Also, the labor movement had to confront soaring internal criticism about its rigid strike-oriented tactics in addressing labor problems (Heo 2002:271). Moreover, the state selectively targeted radical political movements led by the student and the chaeya SMOs, and routinely cracked down on labor movements. Since the ideological and tactical spectrum became more diversified after the democratic

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transition, a type of ―radical flank effect‖ emerged by which the bargaining power of moderates became enhanced when their claims look more reasonable than radicals‘ by the authorities (Freeman 1975; Haines 1984). An environmental activist mentions the fact that the regime enacted contradictory efforts of repression. Hye-Jeong Kim took the environmental movement as a career in the late 1980s, and served as the 7th president of the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement, the biggest environmental NGO in Korea:

It is correct that our movement was less repressed than other movements….At that time, for instance, those who organized a labor union were automatically arrested. The movements with strong ideological orientations were heavily repressed. We are different from them. We share with them the goal of democratizing Korea and resolving structural contradictions, but we mainly represent the living rights of the people victimized by environmental problems. It is not very ideological. We experienced relatively less repression….Even when we were arrested, the intensity differed (Interview 12/12/08).

Similarly, In-Soon Nam-Yoon, one of the most well-known women‘s movement activists since the 1980s, recalls as follows:

Since it was a period of the democratic transition, authorities did not repress protests as they had done before….They repressed workers and students more, but did not repress the women‘s movement because they thought we were not threatening to them. They thought that we were not subversive. They did not know anything about us. They did not repress us severely, because they thought that we did not pose an immediate threat to their system (Interview 08/05/08).

In contrast, Hyoung-Taek Kwon was a chaeya prodemocracy activist in the Youth Coalition for Democracy Movement in the 1980s. He expresses his doubt about the democratic implementation after 1987:

I did not think that anything improved after the regime change. Of course it was not that brutal any more, but the ruling elites did not change at all from the Chun regime. Therefore, the repression on the democracy movement did not change at all….I did not think that there was a fundamental difference (Intereview 08/19/08).

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Jin-Woo Joo participated in the labor coalition named the National Congress of Trade Unions (NCTU: chŏn’guk nodong chohap hyŏbŭihoe) in the early 1990s. He recalls the severity of repression as follows:

Any activity was dangerous. Whenever we organized a rally and took to the street, we were soon arrested. The raids on the member unions were frequent in the name of investigation. The size of the NCTU shrank over time. Those members based on each industry fell apart, and the unions based on large corporations also left the NCTU….All presidents in the NCTU‘s history have been arrested or wanted by the police. Although the organization was an open, formal organization, we had to hide somewhere in order to have ordinary meetings (Interview 08/06/2008).

Just as important, the rise of a new type of moderate and liberal social movements, which were called the citizens‘ movement (simin undong) as opposed to the minjung movement, polarized the social movement sector. One of the most famous examples is the Citizens‘ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ: kyŏngje chŏngui silch’ŏn yŏnhap), founded in 1989. The CCEJ brought a new stream of movements to the forefront of Korea‘s social movements by achieving an enormous growth based on the slogan of ―movement without ideology,‖ which was an antithesis to the 1980s‘ democracy movement that had focused on the minjung-oriented political struggles against the regime.65 Following the example of the CCEJ, a number of new moderate-liberal SMOs were also created in the 1990s. The addition of this trend to the social movement sector magnified the relative difference between the new species of movements and the traditional democracy movement. Such a division seems to be associated with the pattern of state repression. A study notes that moderate movements developed in the 1990s due to the selective state repression on their counterparts (Yu 1995:378). Similarly, research reveals that the Roh regime employed the strategy of differential repression exclusively on the labor, student, and other prodemocracy groups and tried to isolate them from ordinary people (Choi 1993:189). The regime sought to repress radical activism while allowing the moderate part of movements to maneuver more freely. This approach can be seen as a type of

65 By 1993, the CCEJ enjoyed over 8,000 members, 60 paid staff, and a yearly budget of roughly $700,000, which was a tremendous growth considering its origin as a smaller urban-centered movement about land ownership (Lee 1993:106). 179

divide-and-rule strategy. As a result, radical movements were considerably weakened in the 1990s. Scholars have shown that the support for the traditional democracy movement declined in the 1990s, giving way to the rise of new social movements such as the CCEJ‘s (Im and Kong 2001:96). In sum, repression oftentimes sparked intense protests in the Roh era, particularly in the cases of radical, political, and labor activism. State repression provided SMOs with sufficient justification for sustained protests. However, the escalation of violence caused by the police-protester interactions damaged the moral reputation of many prodemocracy groups, although periodic instances of excessive repression served as motives for collaborative protests. In the beginning of the Roh regime, repression was moderate because the government was on the defensive due to the strong reform wave in institutional politics. However, due to both the rise of the reunification movement and the increase of the government‘s power within the National Assembly, the state resumed its repressive policy towards protests. Just as important, state repression selectively targeted the aforementioned movements while relatively tolerating moderate movements. The contentious police- protester interactions resulting from the selective repression of the political, radical, and labor movements often escalated into violent clashes, which made the public weary of disruptive protests. Qualitatively, this pattern of repression had a negative effect on these movements by undermining the efficacy of protests in the long run, while opening more opportunities for moderate movements represented by the citizens‘ movement. Therefore, the differentiation within the social movement sector became more accelerated by state repression in the early 1990s.

4-4-(2): Alliance with Elites: A Double-Edged Sword The relationship between the opposition elites and social movements had positive and negative impacts on protests. As discussed earlier, the strength of the opposition within the National Assembly was indispensible in actualizing movement‘s long- cherished goals of democratic reforms. When dealing with various reform agenda, the opposition was reform-oriented and liberal, although they tended to be moderate. The

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stronger the opposition parties were within institutional politics, the easier the democratic reforms were able to pass the National Assembly. When the opposition was powerful within the domain of institutional politics, having institutional allies invigorated protests and resulted in several attempt to realize movement goals within the National Assembly. The balance of power between the government and the opposition was favorable to movements. Since their cooperation helped advance democratic reforms, the two remained as close allies when major reforms were in progress. However, cultivating alliances with elites was a double-edged sword in two respects: the opposition‘s opportunism and movements‘ institutionalization. First, the opportunistic behaviors of the opposition parties, which had been a continuous source of conflicts before democratization, were still a lingering problem. In general, the opposition mainly focused on institutional politics, but quickly turned to SMOs and engaged in protests when institutional politics did not turn out in its favor.66 Since the opposition parties could maneuver between institutional politics and extra-parliamentary protests and exercise influence in both realms, they constantly oscillated between the two strategies. By all means, ―street politics‖ of protests simply functioned as the last resort for opposition politicians as institutional politics could handle the majority of policies. Since SMOs had been aware of such opposition parties‘ habits, they seldom created a broad coalition organization. In this way, movements tried to keep the opposition party at arm‘s length in order to sustain themselves as an independent force in political process. Movements were never fully incorporated into formal political parties. However, there were a couple of attempts to build coalitions between political movements and the opposition parties. The National Coalition for Abolishing the Dictatorship of the Democratic Liberal Party and Winning the People‘s Basic Rights (the National Coalition: minjadang ildangdokchaebunswaewa minjunggibon’gwŏnjaengch’wi kungminyŏnhap, kungminyŏnhap) was founded between multiple SMOs in April 1990 in response to the newly created Democratic Liberal Party, which was a merger between three major political parties including the governmental party. The National Coalition created the Emergency Council (pisangsigukhoeŭi) in collaboration with the opposition

66 For instance, Kim Dae Jung threatened the government by saying that his party would collaborate with the chaeya in protests outside the National Assembly, when the three-party merger between the governmental party and two opposition parties took place in 1990 (Kukmin Ilbo, January 23, 1990). 181

and held several rallies including a large antigovernment protest in Seoul on July 21, 1990. This collaborative rally mobilized hundreds of thousands of participants (Hankyoreh Sinmun, July 24, 1990). However, their collaboration short-lived and was not much more than a matter of formality in many respects (S.B. Park 2007:300).67 Similarly in June 1991, the National Council for Abolishing Repressive Governance and Establishing a Democratic Government (the National Council: kongant’ongch’ibunswaewa minjujŏngbu suribŭl wihan kungminhoeŭi, kungminhoeŭi) was created between 55 SMOs and the opposition parties, but tended to depend on the opposition and could not exercise adequate leadership in managing collective action (K.I. Yi 2007:243). When the municipal election approached, the opposition stayed away from collaborating with movements (Hankyoreh Sinmun, June 13, 1991). As the opposition did not win the election, the National Council redirected its focus towards creating an inter- movement coalition through a bottom-up approach instead of cultivating ties with the opposition, which later led to the National Alliance for Democracy & Reunification of Korea (NADRK: minjujuŭi minjok t’ongil chŏn’guk yŏnhap, chŏn’guk yŏnhap). Collaboration with the opposition parties enhanced SMOs‘ mobilizational capacity in the short term due to the parties‘ publicity and material resources, but did not help SMOs in terms of leading their movements and gaining public recognition, since they were often overshadowed and swayed by the opposition. The relationship between the opposition and SMOs remained unstable because of their power disparity and the former‘s opportunistic behavior. Even when they collaborated extensively, the opposition elites tended to play a central role in organizing protests, which substantially undermined the inter-movement coalitions‘ status. Nonetheless, while the problem of the opposition‘s opportunism was not new to social movements, the second issue was new and caused a far more serious problem to SMOs. According to the social movement theories, elections are likely to cause institutionalization of movements by cooptation by the existing political parties or creation of new political parties (Gamson 1975; Piven and Cloward 1977; Joppke 1993;

67 The Emergency Council planned another antigovernment protest in October when a report was released with regard to the government‘s surveillance activities on civilians. However, participation considerably decreased compared to the previous rally in July, and the SMOs and the opposition parties tended to advertise their own organizations during the protest (Hankyoreh Sinmun, October 14, 1990). 182

Meyer 1993; Kriesi 1996; Meyer and Tarrow 1998). Cooptation by the existing parties frequently occurred by recruiting movement activists during this period. In particular, since the opposition parties and the chaeya SMOs had maintained a very close relationship since before the democratic transition, the chaeya group was most affected by the opposition‘s course of action during election periods. Since the chaeya had leadership positions in the inter-movement coalitions, the large coalitions such as the NCDC were severely affected by election processes. The forces of institutionalization exacerbated organizational conflicts with regard to forming political parties or entering institutional politics. Organizational conflicts weakened the basis of inter-movement coalitions by reducing their organizational capacity and damaging legitimacy as the center of political struggles. In short, the impacts of elections on protests were twofold. First, elections increased cooptation and caused organizational splits when the opposition parties attempted to coopt prominent activists. A good number of activists were recruited into the existing opposition parties. Even when activists did not enter political parties, their different preferences of specific candidates caused intra-organizational conflicts and often led to splits. Second, most of the unfavorable results from the elections frustrated SMOs and created fatalism. Except the general election in 1988 by which the opposition parties outnumbered the government party in the National Assembly, all other election results exhibited a drift towards conservatization. In particular, such a trend tended to disturb the organizational cohesion of inter-movement coalitions with the sense of disappointment in terms of their inability to make change in institutional politics. After the June uprising in 1987, competitive elections became revitalized and received extensive attention. Several elections took place between 1987 and 1992: presidential elections in December 1987 and 1992; general elections in April 1988 and March 1992; municipal elections in March and June 1991. Usually election periods are accompanied by the hustle-bustle of election campaigns, which was no exception in Korea. Many SMOs and social movement activists actively participated in the election processes. Among all the SMOs, due to the close relationship between opposition politicians and the chaeya activists, the chaeya-centered inter-movement coalitions were most likely to be involved.

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Undoubtedly, elections were perceived as a crucial political opportunity to democratize institutional politics by activists. The presidential election was to be held on December 16, 1987. The NCDC was determined to carry out a ―democratic revolution by democratic elections‖ (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:85). Nonetheless, movement leaders‘ emphasis on the election became the source of tremendous organizational tension and conflicts which shaped the movements‘ trajectory in the following years. The biggest problem was that the two Kims—Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam—wanted to run for President. The impact of the fissure between the two powerful opposition figures on the social movement sector was catastrophic. SMOs and activists began to split based on their presidential candidate preferences. Although the NCDC kept arguing that the two Kims decide on which one between the two should run (Kungmin Undong, October 5, 1987), it was unlikely that any one of them would give up his political ambition given their long-term rivalry. Kim Young Sam ran based on the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP), and Kim Dae Jung founded the Party for Peace and Democracy (PPD) and became its candidate. A short period of peaceful cooperation between the two Kims was officially over. The failure to produce a unified candidate caused a decrease in morale and a great deal of confusion within the social movement sector (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:106). Because of the sense of disappointment with the opposition leaders and the government‘s relentless repression of the labor struggles which swept the country during summer, by late 1987, the NCDC announced that the June 29 Declaration turned out nothing but an illusion or a deception (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989:110; Kungming Undong, September 19, 1987). At last, by November, the NCDC formally abandoned its policy of formal collaboration with the opposition parties (S.B. Park 2007:274), although collaboration between the opposition and the chaeya often resurged afterwards. Given the close ties between the opposition leaders and the chaeya group in terms of both interpersonal relations and ideological orientation, the opposition‘s split was a lethal blow to the internal cohesion of the leading inter-movement coalitions which had led the democracy movement. Chung-Il Oh, who served as the president of the NCDC in 1987, expresses deep regrets, anger, and a sense of betrayal about the two Kims as follows:

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The political split between the two Kims was unfortunate. What was even more unfortunate was that movements bifurcated because of that. The division created lots of conflicts and remorse, and perhaps the legacy still lives….It‘s like we offered the fruit of the democracy movement to the politicians because we could not engage in politics….Both Kims told me, ―Don‘t worry about unifying a candidate.‖ I believed them, even until three days before the candidate registration date….I became desperate enough to think about killing or kidnapping one of the two….Their behaviors just did not make any sense, after all the sacrifices from students and workers (Interview 09/13/08).

Three broad camps emerged with different election strategies. The first camp, which was called the ‗Piji (pip’anjŏk chijip’a),‘ supported Kim Dae Jung. The PMCDR and the student SMOs based on the NL theory belonged to this camp. The second camp, the ‗Hudan (hubo tanilhwap’a),‘ tended to endorse Kim Young Sam. The last camp named the ‗Tokhu (tokja hubop’a)‘ sought a different path to create a progressive labor party with the help from the labor SMOs and championed Ki-Wan Paek, a well-known chaeya prodemocracy activist, as its presidential candidate.68 Over the passage of the Roh era, the first two groups were gradually incorporated into the existing political parties, while the last group created a series of progressive minority parties. Since the Roh regime, such a division has become the important origin of broad factional politics in Korea. As a result of such a split in the opposition, Roh Tae Woo, the designated successor of the former leader Chun, won the election. Roh won 36.6% of the votes, while Kim Dae Jung and Kim Young Sam had 27% and 28%, respectively (Chosun Ilbo, December 18, 1987). Right after the election, many disruptive protests occurred, arguing that the election was rigged. However, such an accusation was not effective enough to reverse the outcome when the dice had already been thrown. The fact that Korea ―acquired through elections the same leader they would have inherited had there been no demonstrations or changes in the Constitution‖ (New York Times, December 17, 1987) was no doubt detrimental to the leading coalitions and greatly disappointed the majority of SMOs and activists. For instance, the PMCDR underwent a factional split due to the

68 Feeling responsible for failing to unify the presidential candidate, Ki-Wan Paek dropped out of the race on December 14 (Kim 2005:621).The League of Democratic Workers in Incheon (inch’ŏnjiyŏk minjunodongja yŏnmaeng, inminnoryŏn) was at the center of his camp, which was created in the midst of the June uprising in 1987. This SMO became one of the mainstream PD (People‘s Democracy)-line SMOs in terms of its ideological orientation, which replaced the CA camp since 1987 and underscored the empowerment of the minjung, especially the working class. 185

mounting internal criticism on its organizational support of Kim Dae Jung, even before the election (K.I. Yi 2007:230). In a similar vein, the NCDC lost its leadership and was considerably weakened after the election (S.B. Park 2007:274). By early 1988, the organization was little more than a name (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:10). The SMOs which had played a leading role in the prodemocracy struggles had a difficult time overcoming the past mistakes, frustration, and organizational splits caused by the election. The general election in April 1988 also affected SMOs by opening up an opportunity for activists to enter institutional politics. In particular, Kim Dae Jung‘s RDP was the most active in recruiting social movement activists for the election.69 The Piji group, which had endorsed Kim Dae Jung during the 1987‘s presidential election, founded the Research Group for Peace, Democracy, and Reunification (RGPDR: p’yŏnghwa minju t’ongil yŏn’guhoe, p’yŏngmillyŏn), and its 97 members entered the RDP. In the general election, 15 out of 23 candidates from the RGPDR were elected, which was 21.1% of the total elected from the RDP.70 With the transfusion of the fresh blood from the chaeya activists, the RDP was able to stabilize itself (D.Y. Kim 2007b:211). Other social movement activists created their own political parties for the election. On the one hand, the Hudan group created the Democratic Party of Korean Nation (han’gyŏre minjudang) based on moderate liberal democratic value. On the other hand, the Tokhu group formed a progressive labor party, named the People‘s Party (minjungŭidang). Both of the parties failed to obtain any parliamentary seat, which resulted in their dissolution.71 After the election, the political situation seemed more promising for democratic reforms. The DJP—the governmental party—won the most by having 34% of the votes,

69 In early 1988, some tensions emerged between the PPD and the chaeya activists based on the Piji group with regard to how to allocate the number of candidates for the two groups if the chaeya agreed to enter the party. The chaeya group produced 10 candidates based on the PPD in Seoul area only, which caused a strong resistance among the original members of the PPD (Chosun Ilbo, March 27, 1988; Chosun Ilbo, March 31, 1988). 70 For example, among the congressmen with an activist background, Hae-Ch‘an Yi, Tong-Hwan Mun, and Kyŏng-Wŏn Sŏ were from the NCDC, Yŏng-Suk Pak was a women‘s movement activist, and Chŏl-Young Yi was a poor people‘s movement activist. Ch‘ae-Jŏng Im also belonged to the PPD, who had been a member of the NCDC. 71 The Democratic Party of Korean Nation and the People‘s Party attempted to merge but failed due to their differences in terms of ideology and constituency. In the election, the former had 1.28%, and the latter won 0.33% of the total votes (S.B. Park 2007:277-79). 186

but the opposition parties, when combined, outnumbered the DJP in the National Assembly by obtaining 43.1% (23.8% for the RDP and 19.3% for the PDP). While the DJP took 125 seats in the National Assembly, the two opposition parties obtained total 129 seats (59 for the RDP and 70 for the PDP). Since the opposition force overpowered the governmental party in the Assembly, the opposition was able to advance more democratic reforms in the parliament. Accordingly, SMOs were somewhat energized by the dominant status of the opposition within institutional politics. By replacing the old center of political movements represented by the NCDC or the PMCDR, a new inter- movement coalition was created with a new ambition to become an umbrella coalition for all movements in January 1989, named the Korea‘s National Coalition for Democracy Movement (KNDCM: chŏn’guk minjok minju undong yŏnhap, chŏnmillyŏn). The existence of strong opposition elites within the parliament was a catalyst for renewed activism. At the same time, from 1988 to early 1989, social movements were dominated by the reunification movement which pursued reunification between South and North Korea. Due to frustration towards the opposition leaders around the presidential election, students and religious leaders sought an alternative goal to pursue and stood aloof from politicians (New York Times, April 1, 1988). They began to engage in the reunification movement which promoted a dialogue with North Korea. The strength of the opposition‘s power within the National Assembly further stimulated the radical protests, which had long been considered taboo by the authoritarian state. However, the KNDCM was caught in the middle of internal conflict with regard to transforming into a political party which could represent the broad chaeya group. In 1989, a vacancy election in a district in Seoul precipitated the internal discussion of whether to run for the election in the name of the KNDCM. The KNDCM decided to run despite strong opposition within the organization, but failed to win a seat. By then, the KNDCM was trapped in a serious organizational turmoil. The leaders‘ opinions were sharply divided regarding the issue of transforming the organization into a political party. Since the majority wanted to preserve its identity as a social movement organization, those who hoped to create a political party left the SMO (D.Y. Kim 2007b:214). Those who left the KNDCM created a tentative organization in order to prepare for a new

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political party. In November 1989, this organization merged with a similar organization which had been active since the year before. The newly merged organization was named the Preparatory Organization for the Creation of a Progressive Mass Party (chinbojŏk taejungjŏngdang kŏnsŏrŭl wihan chunbimoim). In 1990, a significant realignment in the elites‘ power structure occurred by the merger of three major political parties. On January 22, 1990, the DJP and the two opposition parties, RDP headed by Kim Young Sam and the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) headed by Kim Jong Pil, decided to merge into a new conservative majority party, leaving Kim Dae Jung‘s PDP a lone opposition party (Chosun Ilbo, January 23, 1990). The new party, the Democratic Liberal Party (LDP), was to control 217 out of 299 seats, which would certainly skew the course of policy decisions in favor of conservatives. This merger drove the nation in a state of shock because such a political alignment was completely unexpected. In response, a series of mass protests took place and denounced the merger in early 1990. The turn of political conservatization prompted a number of massive collaborative protests led by the KNDCM and other SMOs. From then on, however, SMOs had to confront the increased power of the government and its persistent repression on movements. Although they were able to organize rallies and demonstrations against the government, they could not pressure the government to make significant concessions for them. From the period of the three-party merger, movements tended to decline in general. Since 1990, the KNDCM again faced internal conflict with regard to creating a political party. In early 1990, many famous activists who had been occupying key leadership positions decided to leave the SMO, arguing that a new political party should be immediately created in order to deal with the unfavorable political climate. Those who left the SMO formed the Committee for the Democratic Coalition (CDC: minju yŏnhap ch’ujin wiwŏnhoe, minyŏnch’u) in collaboration with the Preparatory Organization for the Creation of a Progressive Mass Party in April. Some labor activists also joined this organization later (S.B. Park 2007:298-99). Roughly, the CDC was a blend of the broad-Piji group including some of the Hudan and the Tokhu groups. The intra-organizational conflicts between the factions

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resulted in an organizational split within a month. While the former led by Bu-Young Yi pursued a broad liberal democratic coalition including the existing opposition parties, the latter led by Ki-P‘yo Chang sought to create a progressive minjung-oriented party. The former left the CDC and created a new organization (t’ongch’uhoeŭi), which was considered the neo-Piji group (Hankyoreh Sinmun, July 20, 1990), but gradually became incorporated into the existing political parties (S.B. Park 2007:308). The latter created the People‘s Party (minjungdang), inheriting the party with the same name as of 1988, and aimed to represent the interest of the working class. The People‘s Party won one seat in the municipal election in 1991, but failed to win a seat in the National Assembly in the general election in 1992, which resulted in its dissolution. In the course of such complex political realignments, the KNCDM became more and more powerless and was no longer able to function as the center of Korea‘s social movements. A significant portion of the labor movement group also left the KNDCM in order to join the drive towards creating a minjung-centered party, arguing that the KNDCM was under the influence of the Kim Dau Jung‘s party (K.I. Yi 2007:249). The democratic opening and its ensuing institutionalization of movements tremendously affected SMOs—especially the inter-movement coalitions. The chaeya group‘s affinity to the opposition elites since before the democratic transition contributed to the demise of the inter-movement coalitions, since the chaeya constituted the leadership of the SMOs. In 1991, the KNCDM turned into a new SMO named the National Alliance for Democracy & Reunification of Korea (NADRK: chŏn’guk yŏnhap), but the inter- movement coalition had already lost its hegemony. Later on, the municipal elections in 1991 and the presidential election in 1992 provided some opportunities for SMOs to mobilize and make alliances, but the conservatization of institutional politics due partly to the results from elections and the elites‘ political bargaining frustrated SMOs to a great extent and negatively affected the level of protests. Kim Young Sam‘s rise to the presidency in 1992 officially marked the power of the conservative leadership in Korean politics. To make the matter worse, the coexistence of multiple large inter-movement coalitions (e.g., the KNDCM, the National Coalition, and the National Council) became a source of interorganizational competition and confusion with regard to which SMO

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should play a leading role in political struggles, which weakened the KNDCM‘s leadership (K.I. Yi 2007:242). Although the NADRK was launched anew by succeeding to the KNDCM, it repeated the past mistakes by failing to balance itself between movements and the pressure of institutionalization. For the presidential election in 1992, the NADRK endorsed Kim Dae Jung and closely cooperated with his party, but Kim again failed to be elected. The NADRK neither could attain political power because of its partisan strategy in the election, nor could maintain its leadership in the political movements by assuming an ambiguous position between institutional politics and grassroots mobilization. In sum, the opposition party used political movements as leverage to offset the governmental party‘s dominance in the parliament, to gain more popular support by occasional street politics, and to secure parliamentary seats by recruiting well-known chaeya activists into their own political parties, rather than collaborating with them on an equal playing ground. The opposition elites‘ opportunism often hindered their collaboration with SMOs. Even when collaboration occurred, there was a trade-off for the inter-movement coalitions between forming a broad front of collaborative activism and inadvertently yielding their leadership to the opposition elites. The dependence on the elites incapacitated the coalitions from playing a leading role in large protests, which undermined their hegemony and moral legitimacy in political movements. Just as important, elections became both an opportunity and a constraint for SMOs. SMOs actively rallied in election periods in order to make democratic changes in institutional politics. Many activists either entered the opposition parties or created new parties with the hope of contributing to the democratization process. However, by the same process, the leading inter-movement coalitions had to undergo enormous organizational conflicts. The unfavorable election results and the loss of influential leaders to political parties turned out to be detrimental to SMOs. While all SMOs were somewhat affected by institutional politics to different degrees, the chaeya group and the inter-movement coalitions were the most seriously affected. They were extremely vulnerable to the electoral processes and their turnouts. Their commitment to the democratization of institutional politics was not totally unfounded given their prime focus on transforming the power structure. The democratic

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opening provided them with an important opportunity to make their dreams come true. However, their sensitivity and involvement in the electoral process in turn handicapped their SMOs as they were heavily influenced by the external political pressure of institutionalization. The increasing institutional pressure towards electoral politics caused cooptation of key prodemocracy activists and thus weakened the coalitional leadership and organizational cohesion. In the worst case, institutionalization resulted in organizational splits. Collaboration with the elites increased protests on the surface in pushing forward democratic reforms as the elites sought the grassroots pressure outside the National Assembly, but under the water, it led to incurable internal conflicts which eventually stripped the inter-movement coalitions of their hegemony within the social movement sector.

4-5: The Meso-Level Organizational Mechanisms The nature of external environment and organizational characteristics explain the ebb and flow of interorganizational collaboration between SMOs. In addition to the impacts of the macro-level political environment, I discuss how the meso-level organizational mechanisms may affect protests after the democratic transition. I argue that strong organizational structure and protest participation by diverse social movement groups increase the likelihood of collaborative protests, in the same way they did before the democratic transition. However, I also contend that both decentralization of movement leadership and ideological differentiation negatively affect the quality of movements by weakening inter-movement coalitions and propelling disruptive tactics, while intra-movement coalitions become stronger by the same variables.

4-5-(1): Organizational Infrastructure Some parts of the organizational mechanisms which shaped interorganizational solidarity during the authoritarian era continued to play an important role in anchoring the SMOs in organizational coalitions and collaborative protests during the early phase of democratization. During the Roh era, three different types of SMOs existed in the landscape of activism. First, as discussed in the previous section, a series of inter- movement coalitions emerged mostly based on the chaeya‘s leadership. Second, interest-

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based formal SMOs began to be created both in the form of intra-movement coalitions and individual SMOs. Third, clandestine SMOs based on underground activism still remained active despite the democratic transition. The first two contributed to the sustained level of collaborative protests in the Roh regime in spite of the former‘s decline. In particular, the interest-based formal SMOs accomplished a notable growth during democratization. On the contrary, the last type of SMOs tended to be small and sectarian, and engaged in radical single protests. They sometimes operated in close connection with the formal minjung-centered SMOs, but became increasingly marginalized in the course of democratization. In this section, I will focus on the second type of SMOs—the interest-based formal SMOs. In the previous section, I already explained the limitation of the inter- movement coalitions as a function of the pressure of institutionalization. These SMOs were capable of mobilizing inter-movement protests as their basic strategy in the Roh regime, but their hegemony in the social movement sector dramatically deteriorated. About the third group—the radical clandestine SMOs, I will explain them in greater detail later when I discuss the impacts of ideological differentiation on movements. In contrast with the chaeya-centered inter-movement coalitions which were threatened by cooptation and organizational decline, other SMOs were able to carve their niche within the social movement sector. The intra-movement coalitions and individual SMOs based on homogeneous membership and specific goals became more numerous and stronger over time. The wave of prodemocracy protests caused the diffusion of movements into various strands of socio-vocational groups. The diffusion process was composed of two distinctive trends. The first trend is expansion of existing movement industries; the mainstream groups which had actively participated in the democracy movement such as students, workers, and other social groups began to expand their existing organizational bases. The second trend is addition of new movement industries; new socio-vocational groups began to enter the arena of social movements by taking advantage of the new political opportunities given by the democratic opening. Powerful intra-movement coalitions arose along with these processes and contributed to the high proportion of collaborative protests despite the general tendency of movements‘ decline in the Roh era.

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After the democratic transition, those SMOs who had been already a part of the broad democracy movement began to expand and also formed intra-movement coalitions based on specific interests. For instance, students, workers, farmers, the poor, teachers, intellectuals, artists, writers and environmental activists successfully created SMOs including intra-movement coalitions which could represent their particular industries. After the June uprising in 1987, college students succeeded in creating a coalition for themselves based on the growing strength of the formal student associations. The National Council of the College Student Associations (NCCSA: chŏn’guk taehaksaeng taep’yoja hyŏbŭihoe, chŏndaehyŏp) was founded in August 19, 1987. Over 4,000 students from 95 colleges participated in the inaugural ceremony (Chosun Ilbo, August 20, 1987). Since the mainstream student movement was dominated by the NL ideology, the NCCSA was led by the NL group. Since the students thought that it was premature to establish a coalition based on individual student activists, they created the NCCSA as a coalition of the formal student associations (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:196- 97). The NCCSA led the student movement with the Council of Student Representatives in Seoul (CSRS: sŏdaehyŏp). Later, the CSRS transformed into a new entity, the Federation of the Student Associations in Seoul (sŏuljiyŏk ch’onghaksaenghoe yŏnhaphoe, sŏch’ongnyŏn) in early 1988, by incorporating the weakened CA group which had also been trying to build a similar coalition. Foundation of other regional student coalitions followed. By 1991, the NCCSA had 177 student associations out of the total 250 colleges over the country as its members (Hong 1992:163). The NCCSA was a powerful student coalition and able to organize large number of collaborative protests. Based on its united front approach which underlines collaboration with diverse social classes, the NCCSA did not lose interest in joining inter-movement protests. During the presidential election in 1987, the student movement was divided with regard to which candidate to endorse, and the election result caused deep frustration and fatalism within the movement. However, unlike the chaeya group, students were able to quickly redirect their focus on other campus-related issues and recover from the wounds. Moreover, since the division occurred along preexisting ideological lines within the

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student movement, it rarely caused new conflicts among activists, while it exacerbated the existing tension.72 The NCCSA‘s confidence and competitiveness as a leading national student coalition directly affected its propensity to enter the inter-movement coalitions. The NCCSA became strong enough to compete for leadership in the coalitions. The NCCSA joined the NCDC in late 1987, but it was no more than a matter of formality, since the NCDC was dramatically weakened. The NCCSA did not join the KNDCM because it was excluded in the process of creating the KNDCM and the KNDCM‘s centralized organizational structure could not accommodate various member SMOs‘ opinions in its decision making process (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1991:48-50).73 However, the NCCSA later joined the National Coalition (kungminyŏnhap) in 1990 and the NADRK in 1991, as it took the initiative in the process of creating the SMOs. In the Roh era, the NCCSA sought an independent leadership in the democracy movement rather than occupying a subordinate position in the inter-movement coalitions. Many other social groups were very active in building representative SMOs based on each movement industry. In particular, six large intra-coalitions including the NCCSA were founded after the democratic transition. 74 The five other coalitions were the National Congress of Trade Unions (NCTU: chŏn’guk nodong chohap hyŏbŭihoe, chŏnnohyŏp), the Korean Peasants League (chŏn’guk nongminhoe ch’ongyŏnmaeng, chŏnnong),75 the National Coalition of the Poor (chŏn’guk pinmin yŏnhap, chŏnbinyŏn), the Korean Teachers and Education Workers‘ Union (chŏn’guk kyojigwŏn nodongjohap, chŏn’gyojo), 76 and the National Council of Youth Organizations (chŏn’guk

72 The CA and NL groups championed different candidates. Whereas the labor-centered CA group supported the ‗Tokhu‘ camp, the NL group tended to endorse Kim Dae Jung (the ‗Piji‘ camp). The minority in the CSRS maintained that the movement should produce one unified candidate (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:198-99). 73 The NCCSA was listed as only one of the auxiliary visiting organizations. The NCCSA‘s refusal to join the KNDCM was related to its mainstream NL group‘s opinion. The minority such as the CA group argued that it was important to join the KNDCM despite its limitations (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1991:48-52). 74 These 6 coalitions were referred to as the ―6-chŏn group‖ because all their official names contained the Korean word ―chŏn‘guk,‖ meaning ―national.‖ 75 This SMO succeeded to the National Coalition of Farmers‘ Movements (chŏn’guk nongminundong yŏnhap, chŏnnongyŏn) founded in March 1989. 76 This SMO succeeded to the National Council of Teachers (chŏn’guk kyosa hyŏbŭihoe, chŏn’gyŏhyŏp) founded in September 1987. 194

ch’ŏngnyŏndanch’e taep’yoja hyŏbŭihoe, chŏnch’ŏngdaehyŏp).77 All of them were based on the growing popular interest in organized mass movements, and arose as important organizational backbones in Korea‘s social movements which typically underscored the minjung-centered approach. Particularly, the growth of the labor movement was remarkable since the June uprising.78 In summer 1987, a large wave of labor strikes erupted all over the country. Between July and September, 3,255 strikes occurred and 1,220,000 workers participated across the country, which was twice as large as the number of strikes in the previous ten years (Y.S. Kim 2004:231). This Great Workers Struggle was not a type of coordinated activism since workers were incapable of establishing a large coalition due to the heavy repression from the state and business. As the strikes were completely unexpected and unplanned, other SMOs such as the NCDC could not either exercise any leadership or direct the strikes in a more organized way. The Great Workers Struggle, which was the largest labor protest since 1945, revealed the fundamental gap between the labor movement and the student movement. The student movement had assumed throughout the 1980s that they could play a leading role in advancing the minjung‘s interest through broad prodemocracy struggles. No doubt that the student movement did play an important role in politicizing workers and supporting labor movements. However, when the massive labor strikes occurred, the strikes were predominantly initiated by the working class, without any substantial guidance from the student movement (Choi 1990:263). 79 The latter was absolutely stunned by the wave of labor strikes which they had not anticipated. Workers were

77 The Korean Coalition of Democratic Youth Organizations (han’guk minju ch’ŏngnyŏndanch’e hyŏbŭihoe, hanch’ŏnghyŏp) succeeded to this SMO in February 1992, and became dissolved due to internal disagreements in 1998. These organizations originated from the YCDM, so their members were the younger generation of the broad chaeya group who were roughly in their 30‘s in the 1980s. These SMOs mostly focused on the reunification movement based on the NL theory throughout the 1990s. 78 In the middle of the uprising, the League of Democratic Workers in Incheon (inch’ŏnjiyŏk minjunodongja yŏnmaeng, inminnoryŏn) was founded on June 26, 1987, which later became one of the leading labor SMOs which represented the PD (People‘s Democracy) theory as opposed to the mainstream NL theory. The activists from this labor SMO constituted the mainstream ―Tokhu‖ group who pursued an independent labor party and supported Ki-Wan Paek during the presidential election in late 1987. 79 This is not to say that there was no underlying connection between workers and the student-turned labor activists in planning the event, given many activists‘ dedication to organizing labor in the 1980s (Lee 2007:266). 195

greatly empowered by the June uprising and began to cultivate their own niche as one of the independent and powerful social movement groups (Lee 2007:265). Workers also pointed out that the Great Workers Struggle did not lead to many coordinated protests because strikes were very isolated, scattered, and narrowly based on each workplace (K.S. Kim 2004:141). Against the backdrop of the dramatic increase of labor unions and mid-size labor coalitions in the aftermath of the Great Workers Struggle, workers founded a national umbrella coalition for workers named the National Congress of Trade Unions (NCTU: chŏn’guk nodong chohap hyŏbŭihoe, chŏnnohyŏp) in January 1990.80 Although the number of members rapidly decreased due to harsh state repression, the power of the NCTU was still stronger than the state-sponsored labor coalition and played a significant role in leading the progressive labor movement (Jeong, Kim, and Yu 1995:195). The creation of the NCTU was the successful outcome of the democratic union movement, and the NCTU is the very origin of the current Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) founded in 1995. The growing power of the labor movement was reflected in its increasing leadership in the inter-movement coalitions. The labor movement organized a tentative organization in June 1988 in order to prepare for the NCTU, and led the discussions leading to the creation of the KNDCM. The tentative labor organization grew out of the labor committee in the NCDC. The labor group challenged the previous chaeya-centered leadership and argued that the new coalition should be founded upon the strong basis of workers and farmers (K.I. Yi 2007:236), which emphasized the minjung‘s leadership in the inter-movement coalition. The newly founded KNDCM‘s leadership was a combination of the chaeya elders and the representatives from each member SMO, in which the labor group constituted 250, and 230 from the farmer‘s movement group, out of the total 1,103 delegates in the KNDCM (S.B. Park 2007:289). Similar to the student movement, by the early 1990s, the labor movement arose as one of the most powerful

80 The NCTU was based on 14 regional federations and 2 industry-based coalitions, in which 456 labor unions and 166,307 individual workers participated (Y.S. Kim 2004:223). The NCTU was based mainly on the manufacturing industry, non-manufacturing industries created a different coalition in May 1990, including the white-collar, professional, and service industries (K.S. Kim 2004:161). The limitation of the NCTU was that the unions based on the large-scale (conglomerate) manufacturing enterprises did not participate in it. 196

forces in the social movement sector, which could compete for hegemony in Korea‘s social movements. Beside the large intra-movement coalitions, other SMOs which had developed in relation to the democracy movement also experienced outstanding organizational expansion in the aftermath of the June uprising. They successfully built individual SMOs or intra-movement coalitions which represented each unique social movement industry. Various organizations emerged based on idiosyncratic movement goals and identities. Triggered by the rise of the reunification movement, an international coalition was created in Berlin in November 1990, named the Pan-Korean Alliance for Reunification (PKAR: choguk t’ongil pŏmminjok yŏnhap, pŏmmillyŏn).81 In addition, environmental activists founded a coalition named the Korea Anti-Pollution Movement Association (konghae ch’ubang undong yŏnhap, kongch’uryŏn) in September 1988, which later developed into the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (hwan’gyŏng undong yŏnhap, hwan’gyŏngyŏn) in 1993.82 The Korea Women‘s Association United (han’guk yŏsŏng tanch’e yŏnhap, yŏyŏn)—a women‘s movement coalition created only a few months before the June uprising—became increasingly active after the transition as well. Additionally, diverse occupational groups built their own organizations. Artists created a coalition named the Korean People‘s Artist Federation (minjok yesurin ch’ongyŏnhap, minyech’ong) in December 1988. Succeeding to the Council for the Democratic Writers, which was active since 1984, writers created the National Council of Writers (minjok munhak chakka hoeŭi) in September 1987. Also, professional groups largely based on the middle class began to form their SMOs, many of which had been active participants in the prodemocracy struggle in the 1980s. Professors founded the National Association of Professors for Democratic Society (minjuhwarŭl wihan chŏn’guk kyosahyŏbŭihoe) right after the June uprising and expanded it into the Korea Progressive

81 The PKAR‘s Seoul branch was established in January 1991, and Ik-Hwan Mun served as its first president. The PKAR has hosted the Pan-Korean Convention every year since 1990 simultaneously in South Korea (Seoul), North Korea (Pyongyang), and somewhere else outside of the Korean peninsula (mostly Berlin). 82 This SMO had 25 paid staff and about 2,000 members in 1988. Between 1988 and 1992, a number of regional and civic environmental research institutes were created. By mid-1993, the number of members increased to about 7,000 based on the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (Jeong, Kim, and Yu 1995:197). 197

Academy Council (haksul tanch’e hyŏbŭihoe, hakdanhyŏp) as a coalition of 10 academic organizations in November 1988. Based on the Society of Lawyers for Justice (chŏngŭi silch’ŏn pŏpchoinhoe, chŏngbŏphoe) made in 1986, lawyers made the Lawyers for a Democratic Society (minjusahoerŭl wihan pyŏnhosamoim, minbyŏn) in May 1988. The professionals who worked in the area of health and medical care began to create SMOs for each specific sector: physicians founded the Council of Humanitarian Doctors (indojuŭi silch’ŏn hyŏbŭihoe, inŭihyŏp) in November 1987; dentists created the Korean Dentists for Democratic Society (kŏn’gang sahoerŭl wihan ch’igwaŭisahoe, kŏnch’i) in April 1989; pharmacists made the Korean Pharmacists for Democratic Society (kŏn’gang sahoerŭl wihan yaksahoe, kŏnyak) in April 1990. While all of these groups shared some history of participation in the past democracy movement before the democratic transition, the surge of prodemocracy protests in the June uprising and the ensuing democratic opening provided an exceptional opportunity to expand their activities and create their own SMOs. The movement groups such as women and environmental activists, whose interests had been underrepresented in the previous democracy movement due to the focus on political protests, could grow larger and become more empowered after the transition. In this sense, they can be conceptualized as ―spinoffs‖ (McAdam 1995) which were largely spurred by the previous cycle of the broad democracy movement. Some Korean scholars refer to them as ―new‖ social movements according to their similarity to the European new social movements based on identity-related issues (Song 1997; S.K. Kim 1998; Kwon and Song 2001).83 Just as important, the democratic opening led to a new strand of activism which emerged as the antithesis of the previous type of activism. The most relevant example is the Citizens‘ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ: kyŏngjejŏngŭisilch’ŏn siminyŏnhap, kyŏngsillyŏn) founded in July 1989. The CCEJ created and gradually expanded a new niche for social movements based on the middle class support, liberal reform-oriented incrementalism, and moderate tactics. Although this trend was certainly a minority in the Roh regime when the democracy movement was still hegemonic, the CCEJ paved the

83 Other scholars are more or less hesitant about the application of the ―new social movement‖ theory to the Korean context. Kim (1999), Cho (1999), and Jeong (2006) criticize a lack of scrutiny and theoretical contemplation in the academia in applying the concept to Korea‘s social movements because of their differences in origins and socio-political contexts. 198

way for the moderate middle-class movement which had a considerable impact on the trajectory of Korea‘s social movements in the 1990s. Throughout the 1990s, the preexisting movements such as the women‘s and the environmental movements, professional middle-class movements such as the health and medical care movements, and the new type of reform-oriented movements such as the CCEJ‘s economic justice movement gradually converged into the category of the citizens‘ movement (Cho 2004:41), based on the notion that they dealt with more diverse social issues than the democracy movement, were less interested in changing the political structure, and were based on the middle class or professionals (Paek 1991:59-60). Such a blending of different streams of movements in the broad definition of the citizens‘ movement did not occur yet in the Roh regime since many of them still retained a strong commitment to the democracy movement. Nevertheless, movements‘ differentiation within and beyond the former democracy movement did embark in the Roh era spurred by movements‘ widespread diffusion. A large number of SMOs including individual SMOs and intra-movement coalitions began to emerge after the democratic transition. Some of them expanded their preexisting organizations, and the others entered the arena of social movements only after the transition. As they grew in their size, they became stronger and more independent over the passage of the Roh regime and afterwards. The student and labor movements became powerful enough to challenge the established authority of the chaeya group within the inter-movement coalitions. Also, many other SMOs based on diverse goals and interests arose by encompassing various professional, middle-class, and liberal reform- oriented groups, which became the foundation of the citizens‘ movement in the 1990s. In the late 1980s to early 1990s, the rise of intra-movement coalitions which addressed industry-based concerns and demands helped sustain collaborative protests despite the general decline of the inter-movement coalitions and the level of protests. The high proportion of intra-movement collaboration during protests indicates the strength of the intra-movement coalitions as a key organizational infrastructure. Moreover, the coalitions tended to be active in collaborating across movements‘ boundaries, which will be discussed in greater detail in the next section.

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4-5-(2): Organizational Diversity The democratic transition diversified the social movement sector by introducing new groups of activists in the terrain of social movements. Table 4-2 portrays the annual rates of participation in protest activities by different social groups. The table shows both consistencies and inconsistencies compared to before the democratic transition (1984 - June 1987).

Table 4-2. Types of Social Groups during Protests (July 1987 - 1991) Social Group Jul-Dec 87 1988 1989 1990 1991 Total Workers 166(66.67) 181(55.35) 75(47.47) 85(50.60) 83(37.73) 590(52.58) Students 14(5.62) 46(14.07) 24(15.19) 21(12.50) 45(20.45) 150(13.37) Chaeya organization 25(10.04) 18(5.50) 7(4.43) 14(8.33) 18(8.18) 82(7.31) Teachers 3(1.20) 4(1.22) 10(6.33) 13(7.74) 4(1.82) 34(3.03) Farmers 3(1.20) 14(4.28) 5(3.16) 3(1.79) 5(2.27) 30(2.67) Journalists 5(2.01) 10(3.06) 2(1.27) 5(2.98) 5(2.27) 27(2.41) Politicians 5(2.01) 5(1.53) 2(1.27) 5(2.98) 17(1.52) Citizen 1(.40) 3(.92) 3(1.90) 4(2.38) 3(1.36) 14(1.15) Miners 7(2.81) 4(1.22) 1(.63) 1(.45) 13(1.16) Family 4(1.61) 5(1.53) 3(1.90) 12(1.07) Protestants 1(.40) 3(.92) 2(1.27) 2(1.19) 2(.91) 10(.89) Intellectuals 4(1.22) 1(.63) 1(.60) 4(1.82) 10(.89) Professors 2(1.27) 8(3.64) 10(.89) Women SMOs 2(.80) 2(.61) 2(1.27) 4(1.82) 10(.89) Youths 3(1.20) 5(1.53) 1(.45) 9(.80) Chaeya individuals 2(.80) 3(1.90) 1(.60) 2(.91) 8(.71) Researchers 6(1.83) 1(.60) 7(.62) Artists 1(.31) 2(1.27) 1(.60) 3(1.36) 7(.62) Writers 1(.40) 1(.31) 1(.63) 1(.60) 2(.91) 6(.53) Economic justice SMOs 1(.63) 1(.60) 4(1.82) 6(.53) Poor people 3(1.20) 1(.31) 1(.63) 5(.45) Residents 1(.63) 4(1.82) 5(.45) Environment SMOs 1(.31) 1(.63) 1(.60) 3(1.36) 5(.53) Soldiers, policemen 1(.31) 1(.63) 1(.60) 1(.45) 4(.36) Catholics 1(.40) 3(1.90) 1(.45) 4(.36) Lawyers 1(.31) 2(1.27) 1(.45) 4(.36) Civic organizations 4(1.82) 4(.36) Reunification SMOs 2(1.19) 1(.45) 4(.36) Victim, human rights 3(.92) 1(.63) 4(.36) Street vendors 3(.92) 1(.45) 4(.36) Buddhists 1(.31) 1(.63) 1(.45) 3(.27) Labor activists 1(.60) 2(.91) 3(.27) Lecturers 1(.31) 1(.60) 1(.45) 3(.27) Political parties 1(.60) 2(.91) 3(.27) Publishers 1(.31) 1(.45) 2(.18) Physicians 1(.40) 1(.63) 2(.18) Fishermen 1(.40) 1(.45) 2(.18)

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Small businesses 1(.45) 1(.09) Moviemakers 1(.31) 1(.09) Other religions 1(.31) 1(.09) Pharmacists 1(.60) 1(.09) Political prisoners 1(.45) 1(.09) Readers 1(.60) 1(.09) Other 1(.40) 1(.60) 1(.09) Total 249(100) 327(100) 158(100) 168(100) 220(100) 1,122(100) Source: the KDM Dataset/ Notes: Column percentages in parentheses

In comparison with the earlier period, several new groups entered the arena of social movements. Researchers, economic justice SMOs, soldiers/policemen, reunification SMOs, physicians, moviemakers, and readers are new categories. Although they do not make up a large proportion, the entrance of new social groups indicates the wide impact of the democratic opening on the society. White-collar or professional groups such as ―researchers‖ and ―physicians‖ joined movements as well as new cultural groups such as ―moviemakers.‖ The category ―readers‖ had one event, which is the creation of a small group based on the readers of the Hankyoreh Sinmun, a newly created progressive newspaper. Broadly, this category is a part of new civic organizations. The category of ―economic justice SMOs‖ means the CCEJ, which was also a new type of SMO based on the middle class. The appearance of the ―reunification SMOs‖ shows that the wave of reunification movement led to the creation of special SMOs which specialized in the reunification issue. The category of ―soldiers, policemen‖ is an interesting one because after the democratic transition, several soldiers and policemen started to ―come out‖ by exposing the wrongdoings of the regime to the public with the support of the existing SMOs. Overall, the top three groups remain stable compared to the previous period (1984 - June 1987). Table 4-2 reveals the outstanding growth of the labor movement. Workers constitute the largest proportion of the total social groups during this period, and the proportion is even bigger than the previous period. Given the dramatic increase of union activism after the summer in 1987, this statistical trend makes sense. Students are roughly the second largest group by occupying the average 13%, followed by the chaeya SMOs which have the average 7%. While the weight of the student movement is reduced from that in the previous period, the chaeya SMOs which capture the inter-movement coalitions have more weight than in the previous period. Even though the inter-movement 201

coalitions were in decline in terms of their internal quality, their organizational existence enabled a stable supply of collaborative protests. Many other groups also became more and more active. For instance, teachers and farmers considerably grew during this period. In the mid-1980s, both groups occupied about 1% of total groups, but their proportion grew more than two-fold. As a whole, the social movement sector was enriched by new social groups who joined protests after the democratic transition. Moreover, I argue that interorganizational collaboration became highly routinized in the period of democratization. One of the most surprising trends in terms of the type of protests in the post-transitional period is that movement‘s diffusion did not lead to a dramatic increase of single protests, as seen by Table 4-1. In terms of organizational diversity during protests, participation remained very diverse in the Roh regime. According to the KDM Dataset, the average Simpson Diversity Index is .53 between July and December 1987, .64 in 1988, .59 in 1989, .61 in 1990, and .67 in 1991. Between July 1987 and 1991, the average index score is .62. This index score is not a sizeable decrease compared to the average index score of .65 for the earlier period (1984 - June 1987). After the democratic transition, many social movement industries were still interested in holding joint protests across fields. For instance, doctors and pharmacists treated injured protesters while students engaged in physical struggles with the riot police during an anti-government protest in May 1991 (Donga Ilbo, May 10, 1991). As long as diverse groups show up and fight together in a protest, such an experience serves as a further motivation to maintain alliances with diverse groups. In spite of the crisis in the inter-movement coalitions, diverse social movement groups still valued and actively joined inter-movement protests as one of their important protest strategies. Moreover, the newly created individual SMOs tended to be aggregated in the framework of an intra-movement coalition rather than protesting alone. In particular, the past experience of successful collaborative protests in the June uprising provided an experiential basis with respect to trusting the efficacy of interorganizational collaboration. Figure 4-8 shows the number of coalitions between 1971 and 2002. The data is compiled by Su-Mi Eun, and partially released in her study of coalitional activism (Eun 2004). She coded total 248 coalitions which included multiple social movement industries. Figure 4-8 reveals that coalitional activism was very rare until the mid-1980s.

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The solid line presents the total number of coalitions each year. Only after the liberalization policy in the Chun regime, the number of coalitions begins to take off. Ever since, the number tends to increase rapidly until the early 2000s except for a few dips.

Figure 4-8. Annual Foundings of Coalitions (1971 - 2002) 35

1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002

Permanent Momentary Total

Source: The data compiled by Sumi Eun (Eun, Sumi. 2004. ―Chŏnsŏn undong, chŏhang damnon, kŭrigo sahoegwan‘gye [The Coalition Movement, Oppositional Discourse, and Social Relations].‖ in Han'gugŭi chŏngch'isahoejŏk chŏhangdamnon'gwa minjujuŭi tonghak [The Politico-Social Opposite Discourse and Dynamics of Democracy in Korea], edited by Hee-Yeon Cho. Seoul, Korea: CoBook.)

Additionally, I divided the types of coalitions depending on whether an organization was intended to last permanently or only momentarily. The dotted line presents the SMOs which were designed to be a permanent organization, and the dashed line shows those which were to last for a short time in order to deal with temporary issues. While the ―permanent‖ type of coalitions increases after the liberalization, it declines after 1987. This trend implies the deteriorating efficacy of formal inter-movement coalitions such as the KNDCM as I discussed earlier. However, the ―momentary‖ types

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do not follow the same path. They tend to increase over time since the liberalization, which demonstrates that interorganizational collaboration continued in the form of momentary cooperation despite the crisis in formal inter-movement coalitions. Over time, SMOs increasingly preferred to work with one another for short-term goals rather than creating a permanent coalition. By shifting their focus from long-term to short-term coalitional strategy, SMOs continued to engage in inter-movement protests. Moreover, since the majority of SMOs emerged against the backdrop of the democracy movement, they tended to maintain their enthusiasm in political movements. They kept joining the inter-movement protests even when those protests did not directly address their specific interests. Several accounts from activists support the SMOs‘ sustained interest in inter- movement collaboration. Hye-Jeong Kim started her career as an environmental activist during this period:

The inter-movement collaboration was an integral part of our movement. It was not an extraordinary thing at all. The social movement organizations did not differentiate between the collaborative activism and their own activities. The democracy movement was everyone‘s movement….We had a sense of indebtedness to the democracy movement because workers had been repressed so much. We believed that we should fight for the minjung, so pursuing Korea‘s democratization was one of the most fundamental projects for us. Participating in those movements did not bother us at all. We fought together during the day, and came back to our own work at night….It was so commonsensical to collaborate (Interview 12/12/08).

The experience of the fight for democracy instilled a sense of comradeship and duty, which motivated SMOs to engage in interorganizational collaboration. A labor movement activist tells a similar story. Jin-Woo Joo worked for the NCTU during this period:

We continued to collaborate with the reunification movement as well as the student movement. The relationship was very close because the alliance between workers and students was strongly pursued. We collaborated with the NCCSA and other student organizations. For instance, we conventionally had very large rallies in May and November, and students hosted them for us on their campuses. We proceeded in collaboration with the student associations….We also worked with the chaeya organizations like the KNCDM by forming coalitional organizations based on the

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imminent issues….Overall, we collaborated with the mainstream minjung movement like students, the chaeya, the poor, and farmers (Interview 08/06/08).

Each organization not only represented its own constituency based on specific interests, but also valued collaborative activism across diverse movement industries. Such commitment to the democracy movement or the minjung movement was one of the most important resources that sustained collaborative protests in the post-transitional period. However, the pattern of collaboration underwent a significant change. Witnessing the demise of formal inter-movement coalitions, SMOs preferred to collaborate on the basis of short-term coalitional structure than building a permanent coalitional SMO which might end up with severe factional conflicts. At the same time, the failure to sustain durable inter-movement coalitions itself enormously pressured them to change their familiar method of interorganizational collaboration. The tactical shift may be viewed as a deliberate choice made by SMOs as well as an inevitable result from the weakening of coalitional organizations. In sum, diverse social groups participated in protests in the post-transitional period. On the one hand, several new groups entered the arena of social movements compared to the previous era. Although the new groups were small in number, they indicate the diffusion impact of the democratic opening. On the other hand, the three most active groups did not change even after the transition; workers, students, and the chaeya constituted the largest groups, although their relative weight changed to some extent compared to the previous authoritarian period. The continued dominance of these groups shows that Korea‘s social movements were still led by the prodemocracy groups. Since the Roh regime was not a full-fledged democracy, the leading groups of the democracy movement still retained a considerable power and leadership in the post- transitional era. Another interesting phenomenon is that diverse social groups continued to engage in inter-movement protests across their borders. I contend that SMOs‘ sustained interest and participation in collaborative protests shows that interorganizational collaboration became highly routinized after the democratic transition. As most of the SMOs experienced the dramatic success of inter-movement protests in the June uprising, they

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valued interorganizational collaboration and continued the practice as one of the effective protest strategies even after the transition. I also notice that SMOs began to shift their focus from the strategy of permanent formal coalitions to the strategy of short-term, issue-based collaboration based on a temporary coalitional apparatus. Such a tactical shift was not only the result of the situational pressure from the weakening of inter-movement coalitions, but also a deliberate choice made by SMOs that wished to continue to make alliance with one another. In this way, SMOs sought a strategic balance between their own specific industry-based interests and broader demands for interorganizational collaboration. Eventually, this tendency became the dominant pattern of inter-movement protests in the 1990s and onward.

4-5-(3): Organizational Networks So far I have demonstrated that the inter-movement coalitions underwent internal conflicts and sectarian splits due to the pressure of institutionalization by the elites‘ cooptation, while other SMOs including the intra-movement coalitions grew in number and became more and more autonomous from those coalitions. I also argued that SMOs were still interested in joining inter-movement protests across diverse industries despite such a divergent trend. The routinization of interorganizational collaboration emerged in post-transitional Korea. Social network analysis supports these arguments by two distinctive tendencies by investigating how the network structure of SMOs changed after the democratic transition. First, decentralization of movement leadership occurred by the decreasing centrality of the inter-movement coalitions conjoined with the increasing centrality of other SMOs in the network. Second, despite the diffusion of SMOs after the transition, a substantial number of SMOs still maintained their joint memberships across diverse SMOs. The maintenance of joint memberships that cut across different SMOs helped sustain collaborative protests by providing close and dense network ties. In the period between 1984 and 1987, the organizational networks gradually became centralized under the leadership of several inter-movement coalitions. The PMCDR and the NCDC played a leading role as the central actors. The increase of joint

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memberships and brokerage across SMOs helped organize collaborative protests. SMOs, such as the NCDC, exercized leadership and power in organizing prodemocracy protests, since other SMOs were willing to cooperate under the umbrella of an inter-movement coalition by defining themselves as a part of the broad prodemocracy struggle. What changed then after the democratic transition? Figure 4-9 shows the annual snapshots of the network structure between 1988 and 1992 that appear in the Stanford KDP Dataset. The connection between SMOs is based on their joint membership. The KDP Dataset does not provide a full list of members in each SMO, but does record the names of the leaders. Thus, I can identify SMOs‘ interorganizationl ties by looking at shared leaderships—whether or not two SMOs have shared a leader in the past. This data structure neither allows me to take the ties of rank-and-files into account, nor demonstrates subtle longitudinal changes in terms of SMOs‘ interorganizational relations. Nonetheless, it shows how the leadership may be shared across different organizations at one point, which ought to imply very strong relationships between SMOs. Isolates are excluded in the figure, but I listed the number of isolates in the upper right side in each box. I also labled the largest inter-movement coalitions in all years. These coalitions were created one after the other, succeeding to the previous organizational apparatus. Since the X-Y coordinates for the nodes which do not change over the period of interest are fixed in all networks in the figure, one can easily trace how networks evolve over time. The shape of the networks becomes increasingly complex over the passage of time. Generally, a large cluster connects a number of SMOs each year, and a few other SMOs which are not connected to the cluster tend to be mostly isolates or to form small, separate networks. Thus, two distinctive tendencies exist. First, the cluster of multiple SMOs which began to form before the democratic transition became larger during this period and remained as a stable core in the networks in all years. This trend means that many of the newly created SMOs joined the existing cluster after the transition.

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Figure 4-9. Network Evolution (1988 - 1992) 1988 1989

1990 1991

1992

Source: the Stanford Korea Democracy Project Dataset Notes: i=Number of isolates

Social movement theory predicts that the demobilization process has a ―scattering‖ effect on social movements (Meyer 1993). Cho (2001a) also argues that ―centrifugal

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differentiation‖ occurred after the democratic transition in Korea. Although these theories apply to the organizational splits in inter-movement coalitions in Korea, they do not explain why interorganizational collaboration between SMOs continued during protests. I argue that collaborative protests were sustained since a significant number of SMOs came from the pre-transition period and established ties with new SMOs.84 The routinization of interorganizational collaboration was supported by this particular network structure which held both continuous and new ties between numerous SMOs. Second, the growing population of SMOs in the post-transitional era added different dynamics to the network structure. Many new SMOs stayed unattached to the existing cluster of SMOs. Table 4-3 shows the annual variation of network density between 1984 and 1992 based on the KDP Dataset. The Stanford KDP Dataset includes relatively well-known SMOs as well as a few progressive parties and research organizations. Thus, the data may not be a systematic collection of the total SMOs in Korea. Despite its limitation, since the KDP Dataset does record all major SMOs, it enables me to track down the network positions of the leading SMOs. Table 4-3 shows the annual network density from 1984 to 1992. The density of a network is defined as the proportion of the number of real edges(lines) E to the number of total possible edges, N(N−1)/2 (N is the number of nodes (Total SMOs)) (Scott 2000:71). The more nodes that are connected to one another, the more dense will the network structure be. In this table, both total number of SMOs and the number of real edges increase over time. However, note that the average network density between 1984 and 1987 (=.019) is much higher than the density between 1988 and 1992 (=.008). This difference means that given the organizational population, after the democratic transition, less proportion of SMOs was connected to one another than before. In short, the core cluster in the network stayed relatively stable after the democratic transition, but many other SMOs stayed disconnected from the core. This indicates the decreasing leadership of the core network in the social movement sector.

84In fact, many of the new SMOs which emerged after the transition were not composed of new personnel, new organizations, and new issues when compared to their predecessors (Kwon and Yi 2001:220), which suggests a strong historical continuity between the pre- and post-transitional periods in terms of movements‘ internal structure. 209

Table 4-3. Network Density (1984 - 1992) Year Total SMOs (N) # of Edges (E) Possible # of Edges Network Density 84 28 7 378 .019 85 44 23 946 .024 86 58 26 1653 .016 87 94 81 4371 .019 88 150 109 11175 .010 89 172 104 14706 .007 90 189 165 17766 .009 91 204 178 20706 .009 92 213 159 22578 .007 Source: the Stanford Korea Democracy Project Dataset

The weakening of the inter-movement coalitions is associated with such a trend. Recall that Figure 4-9 displayed the names of the largest inter-movement coalitions between 1988 and 1992, which successively appeared based on the same organizational origin. To recap, those inter-movement coalitions gradually moved out of the central networks over the years. Figure 4-10 clarifies this trend better: I compare the pre- and the post-transition periods by showing two detailed network snapshots for the years 1987 and 1992. The X-Y coordinates of the overlapping nodes are consistent across time. I listed the number of isolates in the upper right side in each box, and attached abbreviated identifiers (e.g., L=Labor) to all nodes to indicate SMOs‘ social movement industries.85 As I focus on the changing network positions of the leading inter-movement coalitions, I spelled out their abbreviated names: the National Committee for a Democratic Constitution(NCDC) and the National Alliance for Democracy & Reunification of Korea(NADRK). They were based on the same organizational structure because the latter succeeded the former.

85 Since I focus on the major inter-movement coalitions‘ change in terms of brokerage capacity, I labeled the other minor inter-movement coalitions as ―chaeya (C),‖ given the dominance of the chaeya group in the inter-movement coalitions. Thus, those nodes labeled as ―C‖ actually represent more than one social movement industry. 210

Figure 4-10. Network Comparison: 1987 vs. 1992 1987

1992

Source: the Stanford Korea Democracy Project Dataset Notes: i=Number of isolates, A=Art, AC=Academic, B=Buddhist, C=Chaeya, CH=Christian, CV=Civic, E=Environment, F=Family, J=Journalist, L=Labor, P=Politician, R=Rural, S=Student, W=Woman

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In addition to the increase of isolates which did not establish linkages with other nodes, an interesting change emerged in terms of the network positions of the leading inter-movement coalitions. In contrast to the year 1987 when the NCDC obviously held the most central position, the NADRK moved slightly out of the networks‘ core, although it was still linked to many other SMOs. Besides the NADRK, others such as labor, academic, and politicians‘ organizations including progressive parties became almost equally—or more—central. Apparently, the brokerage capacity of the inter-movement coalitions gradually declined as other SMOs moved into the center. The growth of diverse SMOs resulted in decentralizing leadership structure in the post-transition period. In order to mathematically show the inter-movement coalitions‘ declining brokerage capacity, I calculated the normalized betweenness centrality for those inter- movement coalitions. The concept of betweenness measures ―the extent to which a particular point lies ‗between‘ the various other points in the graph,‖ and the betweenness of a point measures ―the extent to which an agent can play the part of a ‗broker‘ or ‗gatekeeper‘ with a potential for control over others‖ (Scott 2000:86). Thus, an SMO is central if it is located between other SMOs on their geodesics. Since the normalized betweenness centrality is the betweenness divided by the maximum possible betweenness in terms of a percentage, I can use the measure as a means to compare how central an SMO may be across different time periods.

Table 4-4. Normalized Betweenness Centrality for the Inter-movement Coalitions (1987, 1989, 1991) Year Name Normalized Betweenness Centrality The National Committee for a Democratic 87 2.902 Constitution (NCDC) The Korea‘s National Coalition for 89 .902 Democracy Movement (KNDCM) The National Alliance for Democracy & 91 .459 Reunification of Korea (NADRK) Source: the Stanford Korea Democracy Project Dataset

Table 4-4 reports the normalized betweenness centrality of the NCDC, the KNDCM, and the NADRK for each year they were founded, all of which are the largest inter-movement coalitions in the given period. A simple comparison between the three

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major inter-movement coalitions measured by the normalized betweenness centrality reveals that the brokerage capacity of the inter-movement coalitions tends to decline over time. Compared to the NCDC‘s centrality score (2.902), the KNDCM and the NADRK have much lower scores (.902 and .459, respectively). The decreasing centrality of the inter-movement coalitions in the organizational networks demonstrates the decline of their relative power in terms of brokerage vis-à-vis the other SMOs during the process of democratization. Moreover, the internal conflicts of the inter-movement coalitions contributed to the decline of their centrality in the network. For instance, the KDP Dataset includes the People‘s Party (minjungdang) which was founded partly as a result of the factional strife in the KNDCM in 1991. In 1991‘s entire networks, the People‘s Party rises into the most central organization, which overpowers the KNDCM. This suggests that the internal conflicts in the KNDCM resulted in its deterioration, while transferring its power to a different type of center that intersected between institutional politics and the social movement sector. Such a phenomenon reveals the inherent risk involved with the institutionalization of SMOs, which confirms my earlier argument that the elites‘ cooptation weakened the inter-movement coalitions in Korea. The decline of the coalitions‘ betweenness centrality also means the increasing difficulties of the inter-movement coalitions in playing the brokerage role between different SMOs. Entrenched in the inter-movement coalitions, the chaeya activists used to play an intermediary role which wove different strands of SMOs in the mid-1980s. However, the chaeya group was tangled in the internal conflicts after the democratic transition. Deteriorating leadership of the inter-movement coalitions in the broader social movement networks incapacitated the previous intermediaries from playing the brokerage role. Simultaneously, such a transformation in the network structure is related to the increase of the relative centrality of the other SMOs which have not been as central as the inter-movement coalitions. For example, whereas the NCDC is the most central actor in the networks in 1987, the KNDCM is pushed to the fourth in 1989 and the NADRK ranks only as the fifteenth-most central in 1991. As a whole, this network process can be defined as the decentralization of movement leadership as exemplified by the declining

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power of the ―center‖ coupled with the increasing power of the ―periphery‖ in the dominant cluster in the organizational networks. As a matter of fact, a hierarchical relationship between the core and the periphery persisted right after the democratic transition. Since the movements such as the environmental movement were a minority within the democracy movement compared to the student, chaeya, labor, and other minjung-centered movements, the peripheral movements rarely had power within the inter-movement coalitions. For instance, Hye- Jeong Kim recalls that the KNDCM did not pass on its official tactics to her environmental SMO:

Our office and the KNDCM were right against each other. But the KNDCM people did not tell us their tactics for a coalitional protest. I don‘t know why. But we were used to it. We walked to the KNDCM office, copied down what was written in the blackboard, and went to the protest (Interview 12/12/08).

Even after the democratic transition, the mainstream democracy movement was still hegemonic within the social movement sector. Nevertheless, the dynamics changed over time with the decentralization of movement leadership despite the enduring stability of the networks‘ core. As the relative power of the peripheral SMOs enhanced, they began to focus more on their own issues than adhering to the framework of a formal ecumenical coalition. They became strong, competitive, and independent enough to exit the formal coalitional structure. For instance, although the women‘s movement had been always willing to engage in the inter-movement coalitions as a minority status in the 1980s, internal debates arose about women‘s role in the broad political movement after the democratic transition. Ultimately, the KWAU devised a new slogan, ―Together and Separate,‖ and decided to pursue a dual strategy of participating in the inter-movement protests and focusing on its own interests. In reality, however, the women‘s movement‘s priority was more directed toward the popularization of the women‘s movement itself than the broader political struggles (N.S. Kang 2004:412). One example of such a tendency is that the KWAU did not enter the NADRK founded in 1991; the KWAU activists criticized the overly chaeya- centered coalition and decided that it no longer appealed to the populace (Interview with

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In-Soon Nam-Yoon, 08/05/2008). Since the early 1990s, the dominant form of inter- movement collaboration transformed from the previous coalition-based activism to the short-term, issue-based collaboration, as discussed in the previous section. Until the June uprising, SMOs gradually overcame the lack of interorganizational collaboration and were brought together under the framework of the inter-movement coalitions which successfully coordinated protests. However, after the democratic transition, the shape of organizational networks began to change as SMOs became more differentiated. On the one hand, the existing cluster of SMOs tended to remain stable and large, which provided the basic foundation for interorganizational collaboration. On the other hand, the SMOs which were disconnected from the cluster tended to remain isolated or kept a small number of ties with others. Clearly, the diffusion process after the large cycle of prodemocracy protests produced various type of SMOs which were not linked to the mainstream movements, while expanding the preexisting networks among many SMOs. This is associated with the declining centrality of the inter-movement coalitions during this period. The chaeya group‘s role as an intermediary between different SMOs was undermined by the decreasing centrality of the coalitions in which they held powerful positions. In short, the decentralization of movement leadership occurred by the corrosion of the previously hegemonic inter-movement coalitions vis-à-vis the rising power and autonomy of the peripheral SMOs. The peripheral SMOs had been marginalized in the course of the prodemocracy struggle before the transition, but were able to address their own specific interests because their network positions relatively improved and the goal of political democratization had been achieved. Since decentralization process is analogous to equalizing process, the previous periphery could enhance its autonomy in terms of deciding how and the extent to which it may pursue collaboration with other SMOs. Therefore, throughout the 1990s, the decentralizing tendency contributed to the increasing dominance of the short-term interorganizational collaboration which deals with specific issues as opposed to working under the framework of the permanent coalitional apparatus.

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4-5-(4): Ideological Interpretation In the beginning of this chapter, I pointed out that two critical changes occurred in the macro-political environment in the Roh regime. First, the leading groups of the democracy movement realigned themselves toward a new goal in order to continue protests despite the democratic transition. Second, the ideological differentiation resulting from the global collapse of communism constructed a new ideological landscape in the post-transitional Korea. The ideological differentiation is composed of three distinct pathways for activists: exit, voice, and loyalty. Activists may exit from movements due to ideological disillusionment (no movement), push for a change by making a voice— substituting a different ideology for their previous ideology (emergence of the ―new‖ movements), or stay loyal to their previous ideological allegiance (commitment to the ―old‖ movements). Given these premises, my arguments about ideological patterns of SMOs are twofold: as long as the loyalty holds between radicals and moderates in the ―old‖ movements based on a shared goal, both will sustain interorganizational collaboration. However, if the loyalty wanes for reasons related to the efficacy of the goal, it will lead to the fissure between the two parties within the ―old‖ movements. Thus, some moderates will differentiate themselves from radicals and gradually gravitate toward the ―new‖ moderates based on their increasing propensity for moderate activism.

The Pattern of Ideological Realignment I described in the previous chapter that the mainstream of ideological flanks—the NL camp—in the student movement developed the notion of broad coalitional activism which transcends movements‘ boundaries shortly before the democratic transition, and such change in its ideological interpretation enabled broad inter-movement protests during the June uprising in 1987. After the democratic transition, the NL camp consolidated itself as the mainstream student movement, and the NL theory became widely influential in other parts of the social movement sector as well. In contrast, the CA camp, which was a small minority faction compared to the NL, became almost nonexistent in a couple of years after the transition as its majority was absorbed into the NL group. Instead, the new Marxist-Leninist group named the ―PD

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(People‘s Democracy)‖ camp filled its void approximately around late 1988 to early 1989 (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1991:10, 140). The PD inherited the previous tradition of class-centered activism which presupposes the hegemony of the working class in Korea‘s social movements based on the Marxist-Leninist vanguard-oriented strategies. The PD line became the factional origin of Korea‘s labor parties since PD ideology stresses the importance of a vanguard party which could challenge the political power structure. However, the PD remained a minority in the leftist movement because of the NL‘s unassailable dominance. Led by the NL‘s theory of the importance of a united front which crisscrosses class boundaries, the attainment of procedural democracy prompted SMOs to create an alternative goal which could straddle different ideological groups for further protests. Since Roh Tae Woo‘s ascendance to presidency implied a continuation of previous authoritarian legacies, SMOs seldom believed that the goal of democratization was fully achieved. The ―partial‖ success of the June uprising led SMOs to agree that protests should go on in order to implement democratization. Another important reason to come up with a new goal was that, by early 1988, movements were in the state of deadlock because of their frustration over the presidential election results of December 1987. While the inter-movement coalitions and the chaeya group were most damaged by the election process, other SMOs were not free from the impact of the polarization generated by the election. The internal division deeply wounded activists by exacerbating the preexisting ideological fissures or creating new cleavages, which had a paralyzing impact on overall protests. Since the NCDC and the PMDCR could not function as umbrella coalitions anymore, the coalitional leadership was in deep crisis as well. In early 1988, Christians tended to stay detached from politicians, and students retreated back to campus issues and contemplated disruptive tactics because they felt that moderation had failed them (New York Times, April 1, 1988). In fact, immediately after the June uprising, the student movement became very skeptical about the chaeya‘s leadership in the coalitional activism. Even though the CSRS—the federation of the Seoul-based student associations largely based on NL theory—acknowledged that the June uprising was a partial success, the organization pointed out several limitations in the

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coalitional activism; 1) the lack of participation by the working class, 2) the lack of anti- American protests, 3) the lack of well-trained activists, and 4) the adherence to non- violence during protests (Cheon and Song 2004:590). Students were disillusioned from the principle of non-violence in the face of the neo-authoritarian state; as the chances for thorough democratization seemed too slim, they sought to achieve more fundamental and radical goals by the means of radical mass movements. The CSRS‘s emphasis on working class organizing and anti-Americanism shows that the NL‘s primary concerns focused on class inequality and national sovereignty in the aftermath of the June uprising. In order to revolutionize Korea, the majority of the NL camp increasingly sought an alternative in the North Korean system.86 The NL tended to prioritize the goal of national sovereignty over working class mobilization by focusing on establishing ties with North Korea and getting away from the political and economic influences from the United States, while the PD emphasized the importance of the working class organizing over other goals. Particularly those who deeply embraced the North Korean chuch’e ideology formed the largest factional stream called as the chusap’a—literally meaning that they endorsed the chuch’e ideology—within the broad NL camp (Lee 2007:139). The chusap’a emphasized the importance of the highly committed and well-trained activists, and created clandestine activist organizations on campus despite the presence of growing student associations (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1991:130). Thus, even after the democratic transition, the student movement maintained a dual leadership structure stemming from the coexistence of two different levels of organizations, which inhibited democratization of student organizations. Nonetheless, in spite of the dual leadership structure, the NL did not seek to go entirely underground. The NL‘s strategy was different from what the student movement did in the early 1980s, because the NL remained firm on its theory of a united front which encompasses a broad range of social groups. The NL kept its interest in maintaining an inter-movement coalition as the organizational basis of a united front predicated on diverse mass SMOs (Cho 1988). In this sense, the NL‘s principal strategy was to

86 The NL group thought that North Korea was ―essentially an egalitarian society with no discernible wealth disparity; moreover, North Korea had done a better job of preserving national essence and cultural autonomy‖ (Lee 2007:141), although they lacked the actual data and information about North Korea‘s reality (Lee 2007:131). 218

collaborate across different SMOs and to create a united front against the enemies—the government and the United States. Therefore, the NL attempted to collaborate with the opposition parties, while the PD defined the opposition elites as adversaries (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1991:80-81). In short, the NL was a heterogeneous group of leftist activists, which was not only radical and revolutionary but also collaborative with other SMOs and opposition elites. The fact that the majority of the NL camp endorsed Kim Dae Jung during the presidential election in 1987 (Chun 2007:188), rather than calling for a revolution, demonstrates that the NL was committed to forging alliances with the elites. On the one hand, the NL‘s flexibility and inclusiveness in terms of making broad alliances enabled student activists to work with other SMOs after the democratic transition. Also their networks with the elites served as an important bridge for the ambitious student activists to enter the National Assembly since the late 1990s. On the other hand, the ideological polarization between the NL and the PD became one of the organizational problems which constantly plagued the inter-movement coalitions. For instance, the ideological tensions between the two factions created internal fissures within the KNDCM when it encountered with the pressure of cooptation by the elites. Those who had an affinity to the NL approach tended to seek a close relationship with existing parties—especially with Kim Dae Jung‘s party. The others along the PD line tended to participate in labor parties such as the People‘s Party (minjungdang) based on vanguardism. Although the ideological tendencies were bifurcated and antagonistic to each other, the NL student movement and the diffusion of the NL theory contributed to creating an alternative goal in the period of fatalism in the social movement sector in 1988. Against the backdrop of the general impasse in the social movement sector and SMOs‘ desperate need for a breakthrough, reunification arose as a new collective goal, in addition to the classic democracy movement which challenged the Roh government. There were ideological, historical, and international backgrounds for such a choice. First, the mainstream student movement as well as other movements was largely dominated by the NL‘s theory, fine-grained internal differences notwithstanding. The NL prioritized the reunification issue as it was fused with strong nationalism and influenced by the chuch’e

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ideology. Second, the reunification issue had been traditionally one of the most central goals in Korea‘s social movements since the division between North and South. Thus, the reunification issue had a potential to develop into a broad nationalist movement among those who had been part of the democracy movement. Third, the issue resonated among ordinary Korean people. Since the territorial division after the end of World War II, the reunification issue remained crucial to Korean people, with families and cultural ties extending across the DMZ. Lastly, internationally, the neo-Détente indicated by the Soviet Union‘s economic opening seemed favorable to advancing discussions regarding reunification. In short, the choice of reunification as an issue was a strategic consideration on the basis of both its nationalist appeal to a broad range of activists and the overall populace, and the global relaxation of the Cold War. By mobilizing nationalist sentiments, the reunification movement played a role of sustaining alliances between moderates and radicals. On February 29, 1988, the Korean National Council of Churches (KNCC) released ―the Declaration for the Korean Nation‘s Reunification and Peace,‖ stating the five basic principles of reunification such as autonomy, peace, pan-Korean alliance, humanitarianism, and civilian participation (J.K. Kang 2004:616-17). The student movement quickly responded to the declaration. In March 1988, Chung-Ki Kim, a candidate of the president of the student association at Seoul National University, proposed a letter to the students at the Kim Il Sung University in North Korea. He suggested a sports competition and a march across the Korean peninsula, co-hosted by the students from the two Koreas. Such a proposal was a reaction to the upcoming Olympic Games which was going to be held in Seoul without any collaboration with the North (Choi 1990:264). The rise of the reunification movement contributed to the state‘s conciliatory attitude toward North Korea, but the state was not willing to accommodate all demands raised by the movement. A competition between the state and the social movement sector emerged in terms of taking the initiative in leading the relationship with the North. The chaeya including the KNDCM and the student SMOs kept testing the ideological boundary of the Roh government by devising various strategies such as organizing big rallies, planning cultural events, creating reunification SMOs, and even visiting North

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Korea. As I discussed earlier in this chapter, in the end, the reunification movement resulted in the escalation of state repression. In addition to the state‘s negative attitude toward the reunification movement, the movement faced intensified internal criticism. The PD camp criticized that the NL‘s strategy resulted in a reformist and petit-bourgeois movement which ignored the importance of class antagonism and class-centered struggles (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1991:89). In-Young Yi, who worked as a staff for the KNCDM in 1988 after his involvement in the student movement, recalls that debates emerged after the Reverend Ik- Hwan Mun‘s visit to North Korea:

The visit to North Korea led to the debate about how to organize the reunification movement. Given the obvious problems in the North Korean government, was it ok to ignore them and pursue reunification for the sake of the nation, or should we criticize them? Some part of Korea‘s social movements was critical of the North Korean regime. There were debates in the KNDCM as well (Interview 08/27/08).

Mun‘s visit to North Korea resulted in a sharp division between ideological factions. Bu-Young Yi was the president of the KNDCM. He recalls what happened as follows:

I did not agree with him (Mun) about visiting North Korea. He was a poet. He did not think deeply about the impact of his visit because he thought that nothing mattered for the sake of reunification. He was extremely passionate….However, to me, it was crystal clear what would happen to the KNDCM if he crossed the border—it would be labeled as a pro-North Korean organization….I did not know what to do. I did not say yes or no to him….I was arrested because I was responsible for his visit as the president of the KNDCM. While I was in jail, the KNDCM was seriously broken apart because of the issue. The PD was absolutely against the visit, while the NL was for it (08/28/08).

Also, since the student movement resorted to disruptive tactics during protests, public opinion turned against the movement. A professor at Seoul National University conducted a survey on the public opinion about current politics. He reported that 71.4% of the respondents agreed that they were unhappy about students‘ protests even though the students had contributed most to the democratic transition (Hankuk Ilbo, August 17, 1988). The Center for Campus Life in Seoul National University also did a survey on

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college students and 61.8% of the respondents said that protests were necessary but the tactics should become more peaceful (Hankuk Ilbo, December 1, 1988). The public was becoming weary of disruptive movements shortly after the democratic transition. To make the matter worse, the existence of clandestine student organizations based on the chuch’e ideology led to far more harsh criticism against students‘ radicalism, despite the existence of non-chusap’a activists in the student movement. The Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) arrested the members of several underground student organizations and reported that the pro-North Korean chusap’a activist groups had been controlling the students‘ national coalition (NCCSA) from behind by implementing orders from the North (Kukmin Ilbo, December 26, 1990; Seoul Sinmun, September 17, 1991). In the mainstream media, the student movement was portrayed as pro-North Korean, radical, violent, and anachronistic. The reunification movement suffered from harsh state repression and the media‘s criticism along with the student movement. The Pan-Korean Convention hosted by the PKAR was labeled pro-North Korean by the mainstream media, and the PKAR was reported as a chusap’a organization controlled by North Korea (Seoul Sinmun, June 27, 1992). The chaeya-centered inter-movement coalitions such as the PMDCR and the NADRK were subjected to the same type of accusation due to their active role in the reunification movement. Given these circumstances, prodemocracy protests did not enjoy as much public appeal as before. However biased the media‘s accusation was, the unyielding militancy and disruptive political rallies which generally defined the reunification movement alienated the middle class and the masses from its constituency (Chun et al. 2004:49). Moreover, North Korean influence in Korea‘s social movements did exist to some degree in the underground student activism and estranged many activists from the NL group. Some part of the NL student movement went so far as to embrace the notion of supreme leadership, which meant comradely love and loyalty to the North Korean leader. Many activists found such a cult-like behavior repulsive or inappropriate in South Korean context. Jun-Young Yi was an ardent student movement activist in the 1980s, but grew critical about the chusap’a:

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The chuch’e ideology was so widespread in the late 1980s. They sang a song about admiring Kim Il Sung in taverns. One of them asked me, ―Do you know why the North Korean people wear a badge with Kim Il Sung‘s picture on their chest and hang his photo framed on the wall?‖ I said I didn‘t know. He said, ―They do it because they feel refreshed by looking at the leader‘s face whenever they get tired.‖ I said, ―I see.‖ Then, you know what? He opened his jacket and showed me his badge! After the presidential election, they became so outspoken about the dear General Kim. I really hated it (Interview 09/03/08).

Hae-Koo Jeong had a similar experience about the chusap’a:

When they dug into the NL theory, they fell too deeply into the chuch’e ideology. I didn‘t want to get involved. For example, when I was a graduate student, I hid an undergrad NL student activist in my place for a couple of months because the police was after him. He often listened to the North Korean radio broadcast. I did not feel right about it. An activist should think rationally… He would listen to the North Korean radio as if he were a North Korean spy, but he was not one after all. It seemed extremely bizarre and even laughable to me (Interview 08/11/08).

It is difficult to discern how powerful the chusap’a was in the student movement. Numerically the chusap’a was quite dominant, but it created a backlash within the movement due to its lack of accurate evaluation of the obvious shortcomings of the North Korean system including its personality cult. The broad NL faction was divided into several sub-groups with regard to whether to endorse the chuch’e ideology. Over the 1990s, the non-chusap’a group grew in numbers, while the chusap’a group became more and more marginal. Nevertheless, an important fact is that the democracy movement was often identified as the chusap’a movement as a whole by the state, regardless of the movement‘s internal ideological variations (Lee 2007:139-40). Although the reunification movement fueled inter-movement protests and sustained a united front between the moderates and radicals, it was castigated as a radical pro-North Korean movement by authorities and the media. What was even more problematic was that such accusation was not entirely unfounded, considering the presence of the chusap’a. As a result, those who engaged in general political protests were at risk of being labeled as pro-North Korean agitators, even though the internal ideological spectrum was highly diverse which included both a pristine form of nationalism and the pro-North

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Korean chuch’e ideology. To the government, accusing the democracy movement of being communist was a convenient and effective tool to repress political dissent, given that the dominant ideological climate in Korea was anti-communist (Chun et al. 2004:49). The spiral of radicalism, tactical militancy, the media‘s criticism, and state repression severely undermined the legitimacy and the public resonance of the democracy movement. Although reunification was a compelling goal since it appealed to the widespread nationalist sentiment, placing the goal at the forefront of the democracy movement had the serious side effect of compromising the moral high-ground of the movement, primarily because the goal contributed to rising suspicions of its proponents‘ association with North Korea. Compared to the general reform goals for implementing democratization, the goal of reunification was detached from the Korean people‘s immediate daily demands (Interview with Si-Chun Yu, 08/26/08). Just as problematic was that anti-government protests became less efficacious than before. The May uprising in 1991 is indicative of the democracy movement‘s dilemma in the era of conservative democratization. At first glance, the May uprising in 1991 resembled the June uprising in 1987. After a college student named Kyŏng-Dae Kang was beaten to death during a demonstration by several riot policemen armed with steel clubs, anti-government protests were fueled in May 1991, just as the death of a student galvanized the June uprising five years before. According to the police‘s statistics, more than 2,000 protests occurred in that month alone, with more than a million people participating (The National Police Agency 1991:270-71). Due to the high level of protests, the May protests were anticipated by many activists to become the second June uprising (J.H. Kim 1998). However, different from the June uprising, the result was a complete disappointment to those who participated in the protests in May 1991. Protests seldom spilled over to the ordinary citizens—especially the middle class—and did not garner much public support (New York Times, May 10, 1991). Moreover, the government party won the municipal election in a landslide right after the uprising, which signaled that the public antigovernment sentiment was not as high as estimated by the SMOs. Thus, Korean scholars who study this movement do not hesitate to define it as a ―failed struggle‖ (Cheon, Kim, and Kim 2004:11).

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May 1991 was the zenith of the traditional democracy movement in terms of SMOs‘ mobilizational capacity and interorganizational solidarity. However, the protests failed to reach ordinary citizens and caused a severe backlash which undermined the movement‘s efficacy and legitimacy. Large political rallies and street demonstrations based on ideological slogans and disruptive tactics no longer appealed to the public, no matter how justifiable they were.

Ideological Differentiation and Its Consequences The aforementioned problems were coupled with ideological differentiation within the social movement sector influenced by the Détente and the collapse of communist regimes. SMOs began to diverge in terms of their interpretation of external environment. Three different outcomes emerged in relation to the global ideological shift and the expansion of SMOs: exit, voice, and loyalty. Some radical activists were shocked and disillusioned by the demise of communism and left the arena of social movements (‗exit‘). Jeong-Sook Yoon was a women‘s movement activist in the 1980s. She reflects on the impact of the global ideological shift as follows:

What affected the rearrangement of the social movement sector most was the collapse of communism in the late 1980s. So many of my friends became frustrated, and left movements. Some of them sought seclusion in the Buddhist temple, some became businessmen. We still have a regular meeting for the former activists, some of whom became successful leaders of each professional area. They rebooted their career since the 1990s, hoping to have a fresh start from scratch (Interview 07/28/08).

In-Sun Nam-Yoon, who was also a women‘s movement activist, agrees with Yoon. She recalls that ―many students left movements. They believed that socialism was their vision, and the vision was taken away. They thought that there was no future‖ (Interview 08/05/08). The disillusionment by the collapse of the communist regimes had a profound psychological impact on activists and many of them dropped out from movements. The increase of ‗exiting‘ was even justified by crude reformulation of the NL theory. In the late 1980s to early 1990s, the theory of extension (san’gaeron) became

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popular within the NL camp. Kyu-Ui Song was a Christian labor activist influenced by the NL theory in the 1980s. He became a minister at a progressive church in 1990.

The theory of extension was the last strand of the NL theory. Perhaps it was indicative of the failure of the NL ideology. Anyways, the theory means that social movement groups should enter the arena of diverse social life….Become active in the social professions. If you come from a seminary, start a minjung church. Carve out a progressive social movement in the field that fits your talent, background, and personality….Because the collapse of communism fundamentally uprooted our belief from the ideology, we sort of gave up our visions for immediate social reforms (Interview 08/08/08).

The spread of the theory of extension shows how desperate Korean activists were upon the ideological earthquake. They tried to justify their retreat from the social movement arena, but they knew that exiting meant recognition of the failure of their past ideological beliefs. It was not only the ideological shift that drove a number of activists out of protests. In addition to the collapse of communism, Song was also exhausted by the deep factional antagonism between the NL and the PD. His personal experience made him recognize the moral hazard associated with strong ideological factionalism. He recounts as follows:

In 1989, No-Hae Pak, who was the major PD activist, was arrested because of his underground activism. We (NL) thought, ‗He deserves to have a hard time.‘ We believed that the PD‘s extreme socialism contracted our front when the front should be broadened even into small merchants by focusing on anti-American protests. So we did not like the PD‘s strategy of focusing narrowly on labor issues and isolating the whole movement from the masses….Then all of a sudden, I realized that we were completely self-righteous. Those arrestees would experience severe tortures and inhumane treatments, but we were not sympathetic at all. We were glad that those annoying brats were gone. Such a realization totally shocked me, in addition to the shock from the demise of communism (Interview 08/08/08).

Nevertheless, some part of the social movement sector remained resilient to the external ideological impact. Since radicals and moderates who belonged to the previous prodemocracy front maintained their ties by pursuing new goals such as reunification based on their ideological affinity and a shared interpretation of external environment, they were able to remain loyal to their commitment (‗loyalty‘). Students and the chaeya

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sustained political movements, and other diverse strands of SMOs followed behind. They quickly built a consensus that reunification should become the next goal to achieve and the democracy movement should go on. They argued that there still were many fundamental social, political, and economic reforms to be implemented, which the Roh government seemed inadequate to carry out. Some extreme radicals within the prodemocracy group even sought a revolutionary path for their nation, believing that the North Korean model was still viable given it did not collapse like other communist countries. However, since the new goal of reunification was difficult to attain without substantial inter-governmental dialogue and demilitarization, the prodemocracy group‘s focus on opening up civilian channels for inter-Korean relations was not sufficient to achieve reunification, at least in the short term. The slim prospect for reunification and repeated violent confrontations with South Korean authorities internally drained prodemocracy activists and made ordinary bystanders weary of the efficacy of the movement. As a result, several SMOs gradually focused more on their specialized interests and distanced themselves from the traditional structure of coalitional activism. For example, although the labor movement was plagued with factional conflicts because of its strong connection with the student movement, its focus on labor issues helped them remain relatively undamaged by the chaeya leadership‘s collapse in the inter-movement coalitions. Those mass-based SMOs such as the labor and the farmers‘ movements were able to grow by means of addressing tangible goals based on specialized interests of each socio-vocational group in the 1990s. In the long run, the student-chaeya nexus which was created around reunification and political protests based on generalist orientations was the most likely to be affected by ideological turmoil. Contrary to the growth of specialized mass movements, the chaeya and the student movements dwindled in the 1990s. Another serious challenge came from within the social movement sector. New moderates emerged by substituting liberal reform-oriented incrementalism for leftist ideology (‗voice‘). The citizens‘ movement represented by the Citizens‘ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ) fits this category. While the ―old‖ democracy movement attempted to bring about fundamental changes in the Korean society, the ―new‖

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movement was not interested in such radical goals. Kyŏng-Sŏk Sŏ, the founder of the CCEJ, used to be a Christian activist in the 1970s, but went to the United States to study theology in the mid-1980s. After struggling around the question of whether socialism and revolution could be the future of the Korean society and observing the existing communist societies, he disavowed socialist ideals. Also, Korea‘s economic advancement in the U.S. economy convinced him of Korea‘s potential as an advanced capitalist nation. When he returned to Korea and worked for a popular Christian SMO, his anti-socialism caused conflicts with other prodemocracy activists. Nevertheless, capitalizing on the notion that movements should be organized in the legal boundary by employing non- violent tactics, he created the CCEJ predicated on liberal representative democracy and capitalism (Choi 1992:128). To other SMOs, the CCEJ was an alien creature. The CCEJ forbade ideological debates within the organization and focused on producing policy alternatives in socio- economic issues. In addition, its constituency and membership was predominantly middle class, professional, and Christian. In reaction to the CCEJ‘s rapid growth, the traditional minjung-oriented movements were concerned that the CCEJ was leaning extremely towards the right and diluting progressive movements. Prodemocracy activists thought that ―a movement without ideology‖ was destined to be a ―lifeless movement‖ (Choi 1992:130). Since the CCEJ emerged as the antithesis of the traditional movement in every aspect, tensions emerged between the two in the Roh era. The ideological gap between the two was not to be easily reconciled and hence inhibited interorganizational collaboration. The mainstream/conservative media strongly supported the new wave of social movements. Chosun Ilbo published an editorial about the creation of the CCEJ, which expressed a cordial welcome to the organization, recommending two strategies for its prosperity and public support: first, draw a line between itself and the prior movements. Second, be exemplary of a peaceful movement (Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 1989). An editorial in Sekye Ilbo noted, ―The citizens‘ movements have appealed to a large population in a way that is very different from the movements driven by radical slogans and tactics‖ (June 26, 1990). The media tended to promote the CCEJ‘s movement as a more socially desirable way of engaging in social movements. Indeed, the ―new‖ citizen‘s movement‘s

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ideological orientation and non-violent tactics made the ―old‖ movements look extremely radical and violent (Jeong, Kim, and Yu 1995; Oh 2000; S.K. Kim 2001; Im and Kong 2001). Ideological differentiation began to appear in other fields of movements as well. For instance, a non-leftist trend emerged on college campuses in opposition to the student radicalism. In 1990, several non-leftist groups won the elections for president of student associations. Five colleges which elected non-leftist presidents withdrew their membership from the NCCSA and asserted that the student movement ought to become more rational in order to create a liberal democratic society (Kukmin Ilbo, February 1, 1990). In May 19, the student associations which left the NCCSA created a new coalitional organization by arguing that the student movement should stop being the servant of the chuch’e ideology and the champion of violence (Hankuk Ilbo, May 11, 1990). While the NL camp was extremely dominant in the student movement, non-leftist groups emerged and promoted themselves as an antidote to the mainstream leftist student movement.87 Moreover, in order to win elections, leftist groups had to accommodate popular demands related to the campus issues and students‘ welfare rather than political slogans (Sekye Ilbo, November 16, 1992). This change suggests that ordinary students‘ interest in broader political issues was waning over time. Even though leftist groups were successful in self-innovating in terms of addressing the day-to-day demands of their constituents, their adaptation required a substantial modification of their ideological identity as socialist revolutionaries. Students‘ demonstrations and sit-ins were reportedly in decline since 1987 (Hankuk Ilbo, October 1, 1992), which reflects the decreasing support for the student movement. In general, ―old‖ movements tended to underrate the growing liberal atmosphere, as their ideological interpretation of the Roh regime was not very different from their assessment of the former Chun regime in terms of how authoritarian they both were.

87 Results of the presidential elections on college campuses in November 1990: non-leftist groups won 31 elections, the PD had 9, and the NL won 50 (Seoul Sinmun, December 5, 1990). In 1991, 67 colleges had leftist presidents including the NL(54) and the PD(13), while 39 campuses elected non-leftists (Donga Ilbo, November 30, 1991). In 1992, the NL became even stronger. The NL won 39 out of 62 colleges, while the PD and non-leftist groups won 9 and 14, respectively (Sekye Ilbo, November 16, 1992). The election results indicate that the leftist groups had much stronger organizational infrastructure and mobilizational capacity than non-leftists, and that the NL still remained hegemonic in the Roh regime. 229

However, public opinion diverged from the prodemocracy groups. The Bureau of Public Information surveyed 1,000 adults by phone through a public survey organization in June 1992 as a commemoration of the fifth anniversary of the June 29 Declaration. As results, 65.5% of the respondents answered that Korea had become very (15%), or somewhat (50.6%) democratized since June 1987, and 67.1% was hopeful for the future prospect of democratization. Also, 73.9% said that the definition of democratization as claimed by the student movement was ―different‖ from the respondents‘ definition (The Bureau of Public Information 1993:518-21). Given that the survey was done by a government agency, the results might be somewhat exaggerated. Nonetheless, the survey results suggest a profound gap between ordinary citizens and prodemocracy activists in their outlook and assessment of democratization. Due to ideological differentiation within the social movement sector, the previous loyalty and alliance within the ―old‖ movements started to falter. Since the mainstream ―old‖ movements failed to adapt to gradual democratization—however conservative and slow it was—and global ideological liberalization, some of the ―old‖ moderates gravitated towards the direction of the ―new‖ moderate movements. Those movements which used to play a marginal role in the traditional coalitional structure were likely to emulate the ―new‖ movements in terms of their tactic, ideological orientation, and constituency. The women‘s movement is a prime example. In the early 1990s, the women‘s movement changed its primary tactic from political protests to legal, policy- oriented approaches, focused more on issues related to women‘s identity and roles rather than revolutionary politics, and broadened its constituency to the middle class (N.S. Kang 2004:413). The environmental movement stepped onto a similar path in the early 1990s. The Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), which has been the largest environmental coalition since its creation in 1993, broadened its membership from dedicated activists to general citizens, which was a major departure from its predecessor, the Korea Anti-Pollution Movement Association. Also, the KFEM‘s political discourse became more moderate and reform-oriented than before (Koo 2004:673-75). These movements maintained their ties to the ―old‖ movements and participated in political struggles whenever collective goals arose, but they left the top-down

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coalitional structure led by the chaeya and established their niche as autonomous, specialized SMOs outside the boundary of the inter-movement coalitions. Ideological differentiation due to the demise of global communism caused substantial changes in the social movement sector by contributing to the ideological realignment of SMOs. While the mainstream, hegemonic SMOs such as the chaeya‘s and students‘ tended to remain intact as broad prodemocracy groups, the emergence of new liberal movements as well as the internal ideological diversification within preexisting movements weakened the traditional leadership of the democracy movement. Throughout the 1990s, the new citizens‘ movements replaced the mainstream democracy movement which underwent a severe organizational decline (Im and Kong 2001:96). Although interorganizational collaborations remained active in the post-transitional period, the internal ideological spectrum went through tremendous transformation and contributed to the changing pattern of collaborative protests.

4-6: Conclusion In the post-transitional Korea, neither increased protests spurred by the democratic opening nor a complete demobilization due to goal displacement occurred. Instead, Korea‘s protests exhibited sustained protests which gradually declined over the passage of the Roh regime. What sustained protest activities was the collaborative protests organized across diverse SMOs in the same or different industries. Different from the expectation that movements fragment at the end of a protest cycle, interorganizational collaboration frequently took place after the democratic transition in Korea. In fact, interorganizational collaboration became highly routinized. I examined both macro- and meso-level variables which affected patterns of collaborative protests and coalition-building. Changes in the macro-level political environment seen by reform-repression dynamics and elites‘ division had important impacts on protests. Since the Roh regime entailed both authoritarian legacies and democratic reforms, Korea‘s democratization process was conservative and slow. Roughly between late 1987 and early 1989, popular pressure for democratization and the growing strength of opposition elites in institutional politics enabled important democratic reforms to be implemented. SMOs tended to

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remain passive or silent about reforms such as Constitutional amendment as they endorsed relatively progressive reforms. Successful reforms did not encourage protests. Also, experiencing the importance of legislative reforms in terms of advancing movement agenda, women‘s SMOs introduced a tactical innovation by employing policy-oriented tactics such as lobbying, which later became one of the most dominant social movement tactics in the 1990s. In contrast, protests occurred more frequently in reaction to the potential and real negative legislative outcomes. In particular, between early 1989 and 1992, the state became more repressive towards the social movement sector due to the rise of the reunification movement which the state had politically tabooed and the government party‘s dominance over the opposition in the National Assembly. The failures to implement democratic reforms as seen in the cases of the National Security Law and the Labor Law led to various anti-government protests between diverse SMOs. In this sense, unsuccessful reforms instigated more protests than successful ones. Repression had complex effects on protests. The increase of repression provided short-term opportunities for large-scale anti-government protests. However, prodemocracy groups were prone to authorities‘ and media‘s criticisms towards their disruptive tactics and radical goals. Moreover, the state selectively targeted the ―old‖ democracy movement while relatively tolerating the ―new‖ moderate movements including several marginal groups of the traditional democracy movement (e.g., women‘s SMOs, environmental SMOs) as well as the new liberal movement (e.g., the CCEJ). The routinized violent confrontations between the police and the democracy movement harmed the movement‘s public reputation and polarized the social movement sector. In addition to the impacts of the reform-repression nexus, the relationship between SMOs and the opposition elites had profound effects on movements, particularly on the inter-movement coalitions. Similar to the pre-transition period, the opposition elites tended to alternate between institutional politics and popular protests. The alliance with elites often helped increase the volume of protests, and SMOs courted opposition parties into the broad collaborative framework in order to create a synergy in pressing their claims on the unresponsive state whenever necessary. Although they rarely worked under the umbrella of formal coalitional organization due to the opposition‘s

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opportunistic tendency, they maintained their mutual connections which could be utilized in case of an emergent political protest. However, at the same time, institutionalization of competitive politics significantly affected the trajectory of SMOs. In short, elections and cooptation by elites caused serious organizational conflicts. The inter-movement coalitions led by the chaeya group were the most damaged by the processes due to its close relationship with the elites since the past authoritarian period. Around election periods, activists were divided by endorsing different candidates. Particularly, the presidential election in 1987 severely weakened the internal cohesion of the NCDC, which had contributed to the democratic transition. Also the opposition parties attempted to recruit well-known prodemocracy activists in order to strengthen themselves. The pressure of being seen as coopted resulted in conflict and splits in the inter-movement coalition. Some remained in the domain of social movements, but others either joined the existing parties or created their own progressive parties. Therefore, the election processes and elites‘ cooptation of movement activists tended to exacerbate factional conflicts and created a void in the movement‘s leadership. The traditional leadership of the chaeya considerably declined because of this relationship with the elites and formal inter-movement coalitions were highly fragmented from within. Just as important, the meso-level organizational variables are crucial in explaining the changing dynamics of interorganizational collaboration. The previous mechanisms of collaborative protests which had developed under authoritarianism remained effective in sustaining protests: organizational infrastructure, organizational diversity during protests, organizational networks, and the shared ideological goal still had positive impacts on the level of collaborative protests in the initial years of democratization. In the aftermath of the June uprising in 1987, the organizational population dramatically expanded. The organizational infrastructure became stronger and more diverse, whereby new individual SMOs and powerful intra-movement coalitions emerged representing each industry‘s specialized interests. Since most of the SMOs were rooted in the tradition of the democracy movement, they tended to value interorganizational collaboration and actively participated in inter-movement protests. Organizational diversity remained high and stable during protests, and organizational networks were

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densely organized on the basis of joint memberships. Also, creation of an alternative goal such as reunification based on ideological affinity contributed to sustained collaboration despite having attained the goal of democratization. In terms of how active SMOs were in joining collaborative protests, collaboration did not dwindle at all after the democratic transition. Rather, interorganizational collaboration during protest events was established as a routinized tactical repertoire in between various SMOs. However, democratization brought about significant qualitative changes as well. The decentralization of movement leadership in SMOs‘ networks coupled with ideological realignment within the social movement sector challenged the traditional style of interorganizational collaboration. First, over the passage of the Roh era, SMOs were willing to collaborate on a short-term basis for the inter-movement issues, but no longer preferred the framework of inter-movement coalitions. Although collaborations increased based on the permanent intra-movement coalitions maximizing industry-based interests, the inter-movement coalitions became vulnerable and powerless over time. In connection with the declining hegemony of the inter-movement coalitions, power relations between SMOs became decentralized. The growth of the powerful intra-movement coalitions challenged the traditional leadership of the chaeya group, and the previously marginal SMOs became increasingly independent and strong. This power dynamics resulted in SMOs‘ departure from the top-down structure of formal inter-movement coalitions. Throughout the 1990s, the pattern of interorganizational collaboration was dominated by short-term collaborations based on temporary organizations for specific goals rather than working under the permanent coalitional apparatus. Second, ideological realignments due to both the democratic transition and the global demise of communism had important impacts on SMOs‘ pattern of collaboration. The goal achievement of the democratic transition led activists to devise a new goal. The NL-dominated student movement and the chaeya promoted the goal of reunification based on their nationalist affinity. The reunification movement had a broad appeal to Koreans and facilitated interorganizational collaborations. However, the reunification movement encountered several obstacles. The NL camp‘s focus on reunification and collaboration with opposition elites deepened factional tensions with the PD camp, which emphasized class-oriented protests based on vanguardism. Also, the NL‘s dogmatic

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ideology and tactics represented by the chusap’a, which championed North Korea‘s chuch’e ideology, caused harsh repression and the media‘s criticism, and alienated public support. The collapse of communist regimes also divided the social movement sector. Those prodemocracy groups who remained loyal to one another tried to sustain their front by waging political protests. They continued prodemocracy protests and the reunification movement in order to implement substantive democratization in the Korean peninsula. However, some part of the movement exited the domain of contention after losing their ideological cornerstone and growing weary of ideological conflicts between factions. Moreover, the ―new‖ movement based on incrementalism and moderate tactics began to ideologically challenge the mainstream democracy movement. With the weakening of the mainstream democracy movement, the peripheral movements such as the women‘s and environmental movements tended to gravitate towards the liberal democratic stream in terms of ideology, tactic, and constituency. 88 In the 1990s, contrary to the ―old‖ movements‘ decline, the ―new‖ movements became dominant and influential in Korea‘s social movements.

88 This replacement of doctrinal, militant movements by plural, particularlized movements is also observed elsewhere around the globe. During the democratization in Brazil, movements became diversified and adopted a more apolitical, non-partisan stance, which drew a stark contrast with the partisan-oriented movements before the 1990s (Mische 2007). 235

CHAPTER 5. INSULARITY OR SOLIDARITY?: A QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 5-1: Introduction Chapters 2 through 4 analyzed the mechanisms of interorganizational collaboration by examining both quantitative data and qualitative evidence in Korea‘s social movements. I identified changing patterns of alliance in three different periods, 1980 - 1993, 1984 - 1987, and 1987 - 1991, and emphasized differences between each period. I compared single, intra-, and inter-movement protests, paying particular attention to the causes of different longitudinal patterns between single protests and collaborative protests (i.e., intra- and inter-movement protests). This chapter also compares single, intra-, and inter-movement protests, but it deepens my analysis by exploring different combinations of the protest types. I not only apply a comparative approach to the difference between single/intra-movement protests and inter-movement protests in terms of their goal structure, but also assess the role of the organizational environment in mobilizing protests vis-à-vis the political environment. I ask the following research questions in order to explore these issues. First, how does goal structure matter in shaping the patterns of protests? On the one hand, single/intra-movement protests share similar goal structure as both address industry-specific goals, although they differ in many other aspects as explained in the previous chapters. On the other hand, inter-movement protests are very unique in terms of their goal structure: they ought to offer boundary-spanning goals in order to attract SMOs from a wide variety of social movement fields. With this distinction in mind, I explore how these two broad groups may react differently to the changes in political and organizational environments. Second, I examine the role of organizational environment on protests: to what extent do coalitions and organizational diversity matter in mobilizing protests, relative to the effects of political environment? Answering this question expands my research agenda as it enables me to rethink the roles of the political opportunity structure and to analyze the impacts of organizational structure on protests relative to those of political environment. By employing multivariate statistical analysis, I investigate which macro- and meso-level variables affect the likelihood of different types of protests. For the macro-

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level variables, I examine impacts of the political opportunity structure such as reforms, repression, and elites‘ division. For the meso-level variables, I focus on effects of coalitions and organizational diversity. Although the currently available quantitative data do not allow me to include network-related variables and cultural variables, I can assess the impacts of key political and organizational factors on different types of protests.

5-2: Theory and Hypotheses 5-2-(1): Protests and Goal Structure Consistent with the previous chapters, I differentiate types of protests between single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests. In this chapter, I additionally highlight one important difference between single/intra-movement protests and inter- movement protests. Since both single and intra-movement protests belong to one movement industry, they tend to pursue ―industry-specific‖ goals. For instance, the protests organized by either labor unions or larger labor coalitions are likely to emphasize the goal of improving working conditions. In contrast, inter-movement protests exhibit a multi-layered goal structure because of their ―boundary-spanning‖ nature. Inter- movement protests espouse multiple goals because they are required to address the demands from the SMOs coming from different movement industries. One example is a prodemocracy coalition that pursues the goals of a direct presidential election, media freedom, freedom of campus, a release of political prisoners, and so forth. As Kleidman and Rochon (1997:51) suggest, because ―the broader the coalition, the wider the range of goals emphasized by member groups,‖ inter-movement protests face greater coordination problems than the other types of protests. One important consideration for inter-movement alliance is that SMOs from diverse industries would not join a collaborative protest unless it is based on a common goal which could appeal to them (Bystydzienski and Schacht 2001). In order to create such a boundary-spanning incentive, inter-movement protests avoid specialized issues. Because of the differences between industry-specific protests and boundary- spanning protests in term of how broad their goal structure is, I expect them to respond differently to the changes in the political opportunity structure as well as organization- level processes. I provide related hypotheses in the next section.

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5-2-(2): Political Opportunity Structure I explore the macro- and meso-level variables which affect the likelihood of different types of protests. The macro-level factors denote the commonly stated components of the political opportunity structure (POS) (McAdam et al. 1996; Tarrow 1998a): political reform, repression, and elites‘ division. For the meso-level factors, I examine the organizational level properties measured by coalitions and movements‘ diversity in the social movement sector (SMS).

Reform-Repression Nexus Conflicting views exist in predicting the level of protests based on the reform- repression nexus. A reform-oriented stance taken by the state may encourage protests (Olzak et al. 2003:40). However, increasing institutional access could dampen social movements, since the state fragments, co-opts, and weakens social movements through the process of institutionalization (Meyer 1993; Koopmans 1993; Piven and Cloward 1977). A democratic transition is supposed to bring about more political reforms which implement democratization. Since ―with the transition to democracy, the struggle for citizenship moves to the constitutional sphere, and social movements lose their pre- eminent role as defenders and promoters of legal and political rights‖ (Foweraker 1995:105), movements may decline after the transition. I expect the impacts of reforms to differ by the types of protests. Given the aforementioned characteristics of boundary- spanning protests, inter-movement protests tend to articulate their goals around broader reform processes than other types by definition. Since reforms fulfill the demands raised by inter-movement protests, inter-movement protests will decline as their previous grievances are resolved, while other types remain less affected by reform outcomes. Thus, I expect that reforms are more likely to affect inter-movement protests than the other types of protests:

Hypothesis 1. Political reforms are more likely to decrease inter-movement protests than single or intra-movement protests.

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With respect to repression, repression has traditionally been linked to the closing of political opportunities, which contributes to social movements‘ loss of vitality (Gamson 1975; Tilly 1978). Nonetheless, several empirical studies have found that repression can motivate protests (Olivier 1990; Khawaja 1993; Francisco 1995; Jenkins et al. 2003). Crises or threats increase inter-movement alliance (McCammon and Campbell 2002; Van Dyke 2003; Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Chang 2008). Also in non-democracies in Latin America and Africa, repression tends to fuel protests (Carey 2009). The general consensus is that state repression could serve as a motive for further protests, unless the state constantly deploys ―total‖ repression. I expect that repression could trigger protests by providing justification for sustained struggles, but that its effects differ across different types of protests. Previous literature notes that ―broad threats‖ are more likely to affect inter-movement protests than the other types of protests (Van Dyke 2003). In light of this theoretical insight, I propose that broad repression is more likely to increase inter-movement protests than the other protests:

Hypothesis 2. Broad repression represented by legislative sanctions and preemptive raids on organizations is more likely to increase inter-movement protests than single or intra-movement protests.

Elites‘ Division According to the political process model, elites‘ division is one of the important political opportunities that potentially increases protests (Tarrow 1998b; McAdam 1999 [1982]; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Piven and Cloward 1977). I focus on the role of opposition elites: the politicians who belong to the opposition parties in the institutional politics. Opposition political parties usually take up the demands of social movements under repressive regimes (Almeida 2003). In particular, I examine the effect of opposition elites‘ entrance to the institutional politics on alliance during protests. According to the current social movement theories, the opposition elites‘ advancement to parliamentary politics may or may not increase social movements. The

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congressional strength of the opposition parties might negatively affect movements‘ vitality (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Diani 1998:215-22), but the opposition parties could encourage protests (Minkoff 1997). Given the strong role of opposition elites in political protests in non-democratic countries, I expect the elites‘ entrance into parliamentary politics galvanize all protest activities:

Hypothesis 3. Opposition elites’ entrance into parliamentary politics increases all types of protests.

5-2-(3): Social Movement Sector Coalitions Students of RM theory often emphasize the role of SMOs in organizing protests (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983). SMOs are one of the importance resources for social movements besides financial and social/human capital (Zald and Ash 1966; Zald and McCarthy 1980; McAdam 1999 [1982]). The proliferation of SMOs has been theorized to pertain to the vitality of social movements. According to the organizational ecology theory, also, organizational density promotes diffusion of protests (Minkoff 1997). The presence of the coalitions that weave together diverse strands of SMOs precipitates collaborative protests. Coalitions are ―structuring mechanisms that bring a broad spectrum of otherwise distinct organizations into contact, spreading interpretative frames, organizational structures, political analysis, and tactics‖ (Meyer and Whittier 1994:290). Given the importance of coalitions in coordinating activism across various groups, the presence and absence of coalitions will affect the likelihood of protests. Since coalitions include both intra- and inter-movement coalitions, I expect them to affect intra- and inter-movement protests to a greater degree than single protests:

Hypothesis 4. An increase of coalitions is more likely to subsequently increase both intra- and inter-movement protests more than single protests.

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Diversity of SMOs Social movement scholars have only recently analyzed the role of diversity on protest levels. Olzak and Ryo (2007) illuminate the importance of diversity with regard to protests. Their findings show that tactical diversity has a strong impact on protest levels and goal diversity on movement outcomes. If tactical and goal diversity matters to movements, one should ask about the role of the SMOs‘ diversity on protests as well. Social movement scholars have stated that increasing density of SMOs has a signaling effect or demonstration effect (Meyer and Minkoff 2004), as an increase of density of organizations shows a rising support for a movement‘s cause (Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Tarrow 1988). In addition, the SMOs‘ diversity during protests has a substantial implication for collaborative protests. Increasing diversity of the SMOs which participate in protests means that potential candidates for alliance can be identified in highly diverse organizational fields. Especially in an authoritarian context, the diversity of the SMOs that show up at protests ought to matter greatly when it comes to the possibility of alliance because, unlike the stable Western democracies, the density of the existing SMOs is hardly identifiable due to the proliferation of secret underground SMOs. In this specific situation, SMOs are likely to locate their potential partners once they achieve significant levels of protests, since participation in a protest demonstrates how committed the SMO is to collective action and qualifies it as a likely candidate for future alliance. Since diversity demonstrates the power of movement to anyone interested in the movement regardless of single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests, I expect that diversity will increase all types of protests:

Hypothesis 5. An increase in the diversity of SMOs during protests increases all types of subsequent protests.

5-3: Data, Variables, and Methodology 5-3-(1): Data In the following data analysis, I analyze the Korea Democracy Movement (KDM) Dataset (1980 - 1991), which has been used for a descriptive purpose in the previous chapters.

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5-3-(2): Dependent Variables I treat the monthly count of protest events as the unit of analysis. I employ three dependent variables for each type: single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests. I examine the monthly count of the three types of protests that spanned from 1980 to 1991 in Korea, which includes both authoritarian and democratizing periods. Figure 5-1 portrays annual counts of protest events, and Figure 5-2 displays annual proportions of protest events. The protests events are grouped into different types of alliance. The dark solid line in each figure shows the trajectory of the total protest events. The authoritarian leader Chun Doo Hwan took power in 1980 and violently quelled popular protests that demanded democratization of Korea. Protests declined from 1980 until 1983, and dramatically increased in 1984 when liberalization took place. Movements peaked in 1987 and 1988, in which mass protests occurred and the subsequent democratization began. Since then, the number sharply declined in 1989 and 1990, while slightly increasing in 1991. The new democratizing regime (1987 -1991) tended to fluctuate between reforms and repression on protests because of its strong authoritarian legacies, which spurred a large amount of popular protests.

Figure 5-1. Annual Frequency of Protests (1980 - 1991)

350

300

250

200

150 Frequency

100

0 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

Single Intra Inter Other Total

Source: the Korea Democracy Movement Dataset 242

Figure 5-2. Annual Proportion of Protests (1980 - 1991) 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5

Proportion 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91

Single Intra Inter Other

Source: the Korea Democracy Movement Dataset

Within the broad trajectory of the total protests, different types of protests can be distinguished. In both figures, the grey solid, dotted, and short-dashed lines respectively represent single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests. In general, single protests are the most numerous. Given the well-understood difficulties involved in creating alliances between different SMOs, the predominance of single protests is not a surprise. Nonetheless, a close look at both intra- and inter-movement protests reveals the significant growth of both types of collaborative protests over the passage of time. Particularly, intra-movement protests show a relatively steady growth since the mid- 1980s, becoming as frequent as single protests by the late 1980s through the early 1990s. Inter-movement protests tend to grow between 1984 and 1987, decrease after the democratic transition, and increase again in 1991. Particularly, Figure 5-2 shows the dramatic decline of the ratio of single protests and the relative increase in the ratio of both intra- and inter-movement protests. In the current social movement literature, different types of protests are lumped into a single entity known as ―protest events‖ (Koopmans and Rucht 2002). As my work begins to highlight, delineating the alliance patterns demonstrates that each type of

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protest strategy retains a unique trajectory over the passage of time. The distinctive patterns of each category justify my attempt to analyze them separately in the following statistical examination. I compare single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests by analyzing the effects of various independent variables listed below.

5-3-(3): Independent Variables I examine the impacts of both political opportunity structure and social movement sector on the types of protests. In this section, I briefly describe all the explanatory variables included in the following regression analysis.

Political Opportunity Structure

1) Political Reform I count all known political reform measures in the period of interest based on various sources such as governmental records, newspaper, and secondary sources. The measure of political reforms includes various levels of reforms such as lifting political sanctions, legislative reforms (e.g., Constitutional amendment), withdrawing the military from college campuses, reduction of censorship on publications and other media, and elections. I use the monthly count of reforms in the following data analysis.

2) Repression Repression here denotes the state‘s structural repression such as the declaration of martial law and making repressive labor or media laws, as well as the state‘s preemptive raids on SMOs. This measure includes repression by legal means, preemptive, targeted crackdowns on SMOs, and violent repression such as tortures and killings. This measure is based on the KDM Dataset. On-site repression, such as situational repression during protests, is not included in this measure as the record is unavailable and it would introduce problems of endogeneity. I counted the number of repression events monthly.

3) Elites‘ Division I use the ratio of opposition party congressmen in the National Assembly in order to measure the presence of elite allies within the polity. The political parties I include in

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the analysis are relatively liberal and progressive.89 Among opposition parties, I excluded those which retained the legacy from the previous dictator Park Chung Hee‘s reign in the 1970s as well as extremely minor parties, since they were proponents of authoritarianism. General elections took place every two years. The data is obtained from the official website of the National Assembly of the Republic of Korea (http://assembly.go.kr).

Social Movement Sector

1) Coalitions I use the number of foundings of intra- and inter-movement coalitions as principal indicators of organizational infrastructure for alliance. In Korea, most of the individual SMOs founded under authoritarianism cannot be located due to their underground existence, but the foundings of the intra- or inter-movement coalitions are relatively well- documented. I use the Han’guk minjuhwa undongsa yŏnp’yo [The Chronology of Korea‘s Democracy Movement] for the documentation of intra-movement coalitions, and use Sumi Eun‘s data on inter-movement coalitions (Eun 2004).

2) Diversity of SMOs I use ―social groups‖ as a proxy for the number of SMOs that join protests. The KDM Dataset generally records which social groups participated in a protest (e.g., students and workers waged a joint protest), even when there is no name of a specific SMO. Therefore, the measure of ―social groups‖ is one indicator of the degree of inter- movement diversity during a protest. While is a conservative measure because the actual number of SMOs might exceed the number of social groups, it is an effective way to capture the heterogeneity of movement actors during protests. I calculated the Simpson Diversity Index for each month‘s participation of social groups in protests.

5-3-(4): Control Variables First, I control for the liberalization period under authoritarianism. Although the pattern of protests in a transitional setting is generally unknown, several empirical studies

89 The parties I included are New Korean Democratic Party (Sinhanminjudang) in the 12th Assembly, Party for Peace and Democracy (P’yônghwaminjudang), Reunification and Democracy Party (T’ongilminjudang) in the 13th Assembly, and Democratic Party (Minjudang) in the 14th Assembly. 245

shed some light on the issue. In authoritarian countries, some degree of liberalization in authoritarian regimes such as reducing state surveillance activities and allowing civic associations tends to increase protests (Almeida 2008; Weiss 2005; Osa 2001). However, after a democratic transition, protests tend to decline (Hipsher 1996; Foweraker 1995). In Korea, the authoritarian Chun Doo Hwan regime launched a liberalization policy in late 1983 by relaxing its control over the society and offering relatively more freedom for activists and politicians. Thus, I intend to capture the period effect by creating a dichotomous variable between the onset of liberalization late 1983 and the democratic transition marked by the presidential election in December, 1987. The second control variable I use is the degree of international openness of Korea. I use two types of international factors: the monthly count of new international trade relationships with the post-Soviet or communist countries and Korea‘s annual memberships in the international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs). Since increasing embeddedness in international community might legitimize domestic democratization efforts including prodemocracy struggles (Levitsky and Way 2005), the effect ought to be controlled for. Finally, I include two economic variables: monthly GDP and unemployment rate. In Latin American cases such as Mexico, economic crises tended to accompany political conflicts and popular movements (Bennett 1992). Therefore, it is necessary to control for the effect of fluctuations in economic trends.

5-3-(5): Methodology The standard method for event count data is a Poisson regression. However, since the variances of the dependent variables in my analysis are larger than their means, I suspect overdispersion. Evidence of overdispersion indicates inadequate fit of the Poisson model. Negative binomial regression (a generalization of the Poisson model) deals with the problem of overdispersion by including a stochastic component to the model (Beck and Tolnay 1995) and calculates coefficients through maximum likelihood methods. Therefore, I employ this model in the following data analysis.

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5-4: Results Table 5-1. Negative Binomial Regression on the Types of Protests (N=144) Single Intra-movement Inter-movement VARIABLES Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 POS

Reform (t-1) .08 .05 .05 .03 -.14 -.19* (.08) (.08) (.09) (.09) (.10) (.10)

Repression (t-1) -.07 -.07 .08 .08 .14* .15* (.06) (.06) (.08) (.08) (.07) (.07)

Elites‘ Division (t-1) .12 -1.10 2.25* 1.01 3.40* 2.17 (.98) (.98) (1.24) (1.28) (1.34) (1.35) SMS

Coalitions (t-1) .18** .20** .17** (.06) (.07) (.06)

Diversity (t-1) 1.14*** 1.24** 1.38* (.32) (.46) (.58) Controls

GDP (t-1) -.22** -.24*** -.21* -.22* .00 .00 (.06) (.06) (.08) (.09) (.10) (.10)

Unemployment (t-1) .06 .07 -.05 -.03 .12 .15 (.09) (.09) (.12) (.12) (.13) (.13)

International Rel. (t-1) -.10 .09 .02 .23 -.42 -.24 (.19) (.18) (.21) (.21) (.31) (.32)

INGO Membership (t-1) .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) 1984 - 1987 .96*** .83*** .73** .55* 1.36*** 1.12*** (.17) (.16) (.22) (.22) (.25) (.25) Intercept .50 -.07 -.77 -1.37 -3.11* -3.94* (1.09) (1.04) (1.33) (1.31) (1.49) (1.50) Dispersion parameter 635.93*** 574.12*** 226.35*** 209.20*** 86.74*** 74.76*** (LRalpha χ2 )( df) 35.78***(8) 56.52***(10) 44.49***(8) 58.34***(10) 60.79***(8) 72.40***(10) LR Test 20.74*** 13.85** 11.61** Notes: *** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05 (two-tailed test)

Table 5-1 demonstrates the results from negative binomial regression. The dependent variables are monthly counts of single, intra-movement, and inter-movement protests. Regression coefficients are provided and standard errors are in parentheses. In order to avoid multicolinearity, I measured all explanatory variables, except for the dichotomous time dummy (1984 - 1987), a month prior to the dependent variable. Each dependent variable is regressed on two sets of explanatory variables: first, I added ―political opportunity structure (POS)‖ variables with controls. Second, I included ―social

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movement sector (SMS)‖ variables to the initial model. In all cases, the models significantly improve upon their predecessors as seen by the likelihood ratio (LR) test. For single protests, POS does not have significant impacts in both Model 1 and 2. This result confirms Hypothesis 1 and 2, when compared to the result pertaining to inter- movement protests. In addition, I expected elites‘ division to increase single protests in Hypothesis 3, but the variable fails to have an effect in both models. Although the effect is not significant, the sign of the repression variable is interesting: it is negative for single protests, although it is positive for the other protests. This difference indicates that the impact of repression differs across types of protests, suggesting that single movements may be more likely to be crushed by structural and preemptive repressions than the other alliances strategies, while forging alliances between SMOs builds resilience against repression. Additionally, both the founding of coalitions and SMOs‘ diversity during protests have significant and positive effects on single protests. In Hypothesis 4, I expected that coalitions are more likely to increase intra- and inter-movement protests. However, the result unexpectedly suggests that coalitions also increase single protests. With respect to Hypothesis 5, the positive impact of diversity on protests is validated in the case of single protests. For intra-movement protests, POS does not have any significant effect, which confirms Hypothesis 1 and 2. In terms of elites‘ division, although it has a positive first- order effect on intra-movement protests in Model 3, the effect loses its significance in Model 4 after adding organizational variables. Hypothesis 3 is not supported. On the other hand, organization-level factors significantly improve the fit of the model, and have positive effects. As expected by Hypothesis 4 and 5, the founding of coalitions and organizational diversity increase the likelihood of intra-movement protests. Interestingly, inter-movement protests show distinct trends vis-à-vis the other types. On the one hand, in Model 6, reform decreases inter-movement protests, while repression increases them. Hypothesis 1 and 2 are supported in this case. This result shows that inter-movement protests tended to be more sensitive to broad political reforms as well as structural repression and preemptive raids than single or intra-movement protests. On the other hand, similar to the case of intra-movement protests, elites‘

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division has a positive first-order impact in Model 5, but its impact is mediated by organization-level processes (Model 6). As predicted by Hypothesis 4 and 5, the founding of coalitions and organizational diversity significantly increase inter-movement protests. Coalitional infrastructure and movements‘ heterogeneity positively affect the frequency of collaborative protests that span across different social movement industries. Besides the independent variables, several control variables show interesting effects. An increase in GDP dampens single protests and intra-movement protests. Intra- labor strikes or sit-ins may be particularly affected by the changes in economic conditions, given that labor movements were very frequent in the 1980s in Korea (Koo 2001). Compared to the single and intra-movement protests, inter-movement protests are not affected by GDP. Since inter-movement protests deal with broader political issues, they remain unaffected by economic trends. The two variables indicating Korea‘s international openness do not have any significant impact across all the models in the table. Since the time period in the data ends in 1991, the data only covers early periods of democratization. Possibly, international opening might have had greater effects on protests later in the 1990s as Korea became more globalized. Finally, the dichotomous time variable (1984 - 1987), indicating the period between the liberalization in the Chun regime and the democratic transition, has a significant and positive impact on all types of protests. This result shows that liberalization within an authoritarian regime may lead to more protest activities than either a repressive period or a democratization period. Theoretically, this tendency confirms both Eisinger's (1973) and Tilly's (1978) prediction that protests are more likely to happen in the ―interim‖ political system.

5-5: Discussion and Conclusion This chapter uncovered the conditions for protests by exploring Korea‘s social movements between 1980 and 1991, which includes both authoritarian and early democratization periods. Here I will summarize my central findings about the impacts of

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political opportunity structure (POS) and social movement sector (SMS), and discuss their implications to studying social movements in transitional contexts. I found that reform and repression do not uniformly affect all types of protests. POS is often treated as a fundamental and general condition for protests, regardless of how movement groups are allied with one another. My analysis calls for a modification of the common theoretical assumptions by unraveling the differential impacts of POS on the types of protests. Regression analysis shows that only inter-movement protests were affected by the reform-repression nexus in the Korean case. My findings indicate inter- movement protests‘ particular sensitivity to fluctuations in the broad reform-repression dynamics, which is different from single or intra-movement protests. What is even more interesting is the variation in the directions of the POS‘s effects: whereas political reforms discourage inter-movement protests, broad repression encourages it. Such a result hints at how inter-movement alliance reacts to the state‘s concession and coercion. My analysis demonstrates that implementation of democratic principles during democratization dampens inter-movement alliances during protests. Once reforms are enacted, SMOs have less incentive to pursue inter-movement protests since their demands have already been met. As the state‘s concession reduces collective grievances which diverse SMOs share, inter-movement protests decline. In contrast, coercion does not erode inter-movement protests since such threats can be articulated as a reason for further resistance. The tendency that inter-movement protests are more susceptible to the broad shifts in the political environment than those with industry-specific goals is both a strength and a weakness. Umbrella organizations are more resilient to repression as their large-scale protests make targeted repression difficult (Schock 2004:51), which makes coalitions crucial for an effective prodemocracy struggles. My finding that repression increases inter-movement protests reveals that those protests may be more likely to respond to structural and preemptive repressions by articulating them as justifications for further protests than the other types of protests. However, at the same time, the progress of political reform may discourage inter-movement collaboration. Empirical evidence can be found in the cases of democratization: large prodemocracy coalitions did not last long after achieving democratic transitions in the Philippines and South Africa (Schock 2004).

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As reforms take over the previous functions of inter-movement alliances which tend to pursue broad political goals (Deonandan, Close, and Prevost 2007), inter-movement protests are constrained in the process of democratization. In addition, division among opposition elites also fails to have an effect on protests as the SMS variables mediate its effect. Some existing literature also notes that, when opposition elites gain standing in electoral politics, their advances could make the environment less open to protest (Jenkins and Eckert 1986). Also, the congressional strength of the opposition parties might negatively affect movements‘ vitality (Kriesi et al. 1995; della Porta and Diani 1998:215-22), since political parties could reinforce ―the isolation and fragmentation of grassroots movements‖ (Mainwaring 1987:147). My findings may also reflect the opposition elites‘ particular structural position in the Korean context. Opposition parties were ambivalent allies because they were structurally located in-between movements and institutional politics. They hence had a tendency of engaging in their usual business of institutional politics when they were active in the parliament and sporadically participated in protests when they were overpowered by the hegemonic governmental party in the legislative processes. In short, Korea‘s opposition parties showed an opportunistic behavior between the two political strategies. Their behavior made social movement activists reluctant to establish stable alliances with them (P‘yŏn‘jippu [Anonymous Editors] 1990:70-75). Thus, I suggest that opposition elites‘ entrance into parliamentary politics may not affect the likelihood of protests, under the condition that they are neither powerful in institutional politics nor fully established as reliable allies for movements. My finding calls for a more nuanced analysis of the role of opposition elites in protests and their political status in-between institutional politics and movements. The Korean case indicates that opposition elites may not supply the resource of stable ―elite alliance‖ for movements, which signals the importance of building a strong and autonomous SMS. The nature of opposition elites should be further examined across different political contexts where opposition elites maneuver between ―institutional‖ and ―street‖ politics. Coalitions and movements‘ diversity during protests not only increase intra- and inter-movement protests, but also boost the number of single protests. These two variables are powerful predictors of all types of protests, holding the POS variables

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constant. My findings indicate that the strong SMS which facilitates interorganizational contacts contributes to all levels of protests. The establishment of alliance structure equipped with coalitions and diverse SMOs may indicate the strength of the SMS in a transitional society. These findings can be interpreted by understanding the relationship between single SMOs and coalitions. Coalition participation not only has a profound cultural impact on members, but also provides important resources. Since coalitions are composed of various organizations, they try to build the basis of internal cohesion in order to reach consensus and mobilize protests effectively. During the prodemocracy struggle in Korea, coalitions empowered single SMOs by providing a wide range of social movement issues as well as creating small internal committees for member SMOs, which provided a channel for interorganizational communications, information exchanges, and a community which nurtured a sense of solidarity among members. Coalitions benefit member organizations in various ways. SMOs are able to broaden their scope by building connections with and increasing trust in other SMOs in a coalition (Obach 2004:187). They may expand their interests by learning from other SMOs from different industries. Moreover, frequent contacts between coalition participants function as important solidarity incentives (Hathaway and Meyer 1997). Essentially, coalitions are ―schools for building community‖ (Rose 2000:159). The formation of networks among coalition participants could serve later as a foundation of a new SMO. For instance, the labor committee in an inter-movement coalition named the National Committee for a Democratic Constitution (NCDC: minju hŏnbŏp chaengch’wi kungmin undong ponbu, kukpon) became the origin of a large labor umbrella coalition after the democratic transition in Korea (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:10). Inter-movement coalitions nurtured intra-movement collaboration within their organizations, which provided incentives for single SMOs to join them. Furthermore, coalitions can provide significant resources by helping single protests and SMOs. In Korea, coalitions helped smaller SMOs by providing material and cultural supports. For example, the NCDC supported labor and farmers‘ protests by reporting their details in its official newsletter. The organization helped publicize the issues raised by specialized movements. The NCDC also released a supportive statement

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when journalists launched a struggle against media censorship (Minjok minju undong yŏn‘guso 1989a:401-10). This coalition not only engaged in its own activities, but also willingly supported single SMOs‘ protests. In addition to coalitions, diversity of SMOs during protests contributed to all types of protests. Apparently, diversity has a demonstration effect on all levels of SMOs, as increasing diversity of protesters signals that support for overall movement is on the rise (Meyer and Minkoff 2004). The signaling might trigger bandwagoning by various SMOs, thus resulting in a greater participation rate of SMOs across all types of protests. The strong and broad effects of alliance structure in the SMS illustrate the importance of alliance-building across diverse social movement industries during the democratization process. Creating infrastructure for inter-movement cooperation is crucial in increasing all levels of protest activities. Once such an organizational environment is established, all types of protests are empowered by the learning experiences and supportive networks formed through the accumulation of ―coalitional capital‖ (Weiss 2005:3), which foster cross-movement cooperation, conflict management, and mutual understanding. 90 Coalitions play an active role of providing connections between SMOs and facilitating broad participation which is important for a movement to be effective (Lichbach 1998; Marwell and Oliver 1993), and organizational diversity during protests signals the rising power of movement. In conclusion, the conditional factors I discuss in this chapter might be applicable to other empirical cases which exhibit similar trajectories of protests during the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. A study even asserts that the countries with a strong alliance structure that straddles different streams of movements during prodemocracy struggles (e.g., Thailand, South Africa, the Philippines, and Nepal) are more likely to succeed in achieving democratization than their counterparts (e.g., China and Burma) (Schock 2004). The importance of strong alliance structure in terms of galvanizing protests is reconfirmed by my analysis of Korea‘s social movements.

90 More broadly, the benefits of broad alliances can be acknowledged. Social movement actors can create ―an alternative system of resources‖ through ties among themselves (Rosenthal et al. 1985:1052), since they do not have access to resources and constituencies enjoyed by institutional actors. When a number of groups cooperate and present a united front, political influence is enhanced (Hathaway and Meyer 1997; McAdam 1999 [1982]). Moreover, the visibility of collaborative protests or coalition organizations enhances their efficacy (Meyer 2007:75). A broad alliance may mobilize a wide range of people and tactics (Meyer and Corrigall-Brown 2005; Vasi and Strang 2009). 253

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION: THEORIZING POLITICAL STRUCTURE, SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS, AND IDEOLOGIES IN TRANSITION

6-1: Summary This dissertation has analyzed the conditions under which interorganizational alliances occur among different social movement organizations (SMOs) that belong to diverse social movement industries. Korea‘s social movement originated between 1980 and 1992 embody the trajectory of alliance-building processes which operated within dramatically-changing political conditions. By looking closely at the Korean case, I identified important mechanisms of interorganizational collaboration by applying both macro- and meso-level perspectives. Most importantly, I employed a synthetic approach that captures the dynamics of alliance formation. The shifts in the political environment in terms of reform, repression, and elites have important effects in shaping the conditions for building bridges between different SMOs. Concomitantly, the changes in organizational structure and culture enormously affected the ability and willingness of SMOs to engage in collaborative projects across their borders. I combined a top-down perspective that focuses on the effect of political opportunity structure with a bottom-up perspective that underscores the effects of SMOs‘ organizational processes. By doing so, I demonstrated the interactive nature between the two levels of social movement dynamics: structure and agency. Chapter 2 through 4 dealt with three chronological periods which are characterized by the differences in political conditions for protests and patterns of alliance-making. I compared collaborative protests (i.e., intra- and inter-movement protests) with single protests. In Chapter 2, I argued that political opportunities alone cannot explain why single protests overwhelmed collaborative protests in both relatively free and extremely repressive political contexts in the early 1980s. While the macro-level factors did influence the level of protests in general, since the former period saw more protests than the latter, they do not explain why interorganizational collaboration was scarce in the two different political contexts. I emphasized the importance of organizational factors in terms of increasing the amount of collaborative protests.

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Between the time when Park Chung Hee was assassinated in late 1979 and the Kwangju Massacre in May 1980 by which Chun quelled political dissent and consolidated his power, SMOs were relatively active in waging protests. This brief period of political freedom revived protests at large. However, opposition elites were not interested in making alliances with the largely-fragmented social movement sector. SMOs were not well developed given the prolonged period of authoritarian rule which spanned several decades. The time allowed for SMOs was too short to build strong organizational bases. Although single protests occurred frequently, such organizational constraints prevented SMOs from building alliances, while alliance activities were slightly increasing until May 1980. After the Kwangju Massacre, repression intensified in terms of both legal restrictions and physical coercions, which dampened overall protests. Opposition elites were excluded from participating in electoral politics and monitored by the state. Due to the tight surveillance on civic activities, SMOs were unlikely to survive above-ground. The increased repression inevitably drove activists into an underground organizational apparatus and culture. This was especially true for student activists. The abeyance structure developed in the student underground SMOs promoted network closure, led to a highly segregated organizational environment and thus hampered interorganizational collaborations. This closed structure had a radicalizing effect on activists since they embraced leftist ideologies as interpretative mechanisms to understand the political situation and to resist the repressive, undemocratic regime. Although the abeyance structure functioned as a shelter for committed activists and prepared them for the future opportunity, it discouraged dialogues among different SMOs, except for the repeated attempts to build connections between the student and labor movements based on Marxist-Leninism. Therefore, the period between 1980 and 1983 was dominated by single, sporadic protests rather than collaborative protests. Chapter 3 analyzed the conditions under which collaborative protests may arise under an authoritarian regime by examining the Korean case between 1984 and June 1987. The onset of liberalization initiated by the Chun regime in 1984 provided a valuable opportunity for the emergence of formal, above-ground SMOs and revitalization of protests. Interorganizational collaboration substantially increased during this period

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and culminated in the June uprising in 1987. The liberalization opened up significant political opportunities for protests. SMOs became more diverse, numerous, and stronger, which helped them cope better with state repression by using it as a motive for further protests. Opposition elites also participated in forming alliances with SMOs to a greater degree than before. As opposition elites gained electoral power within the National Assembly, they oscillated between institutional politics and protests. However, their public legitimacy and material resources generally convinced SMOs that it was worth working with such ambivalent allies. The organizational level processes were equally important in understanding the alliance dynamics. The creation of multiple coalitions facilitated interorganizational collaboration by providing loci of interaction between SMOs. Coalitions were crucial in coordinating protests on a large scale. Organizational diversity expanded the pool of potential coalition partners, increasing joint memberships, and active brokerage by the chaeya group between SMOs facilitated organizational interactions. Additionally, ideological differences impeded broad coalitions, depending on the scope of goals and tactics. An adoption of the mass-orientation and non-violent tactics by the student movement encouraged more frequent interorganizational collaborations. Regardless of the strong anticommunist sentiment of opposition politicians, multiple SMOs espousing a wide spectrum of ideological orientations temporarily worked together under the umbrella of inter-movement coalitions. However, the coalitional activism based on the least common denominator among various SMOs, which aimed at introducing a direct presidential election, reflected the tendency of incrementalism and moderatism stemming from the chaeya-centered leadership in the powerful inter-movement coalitions. The process of building consensus temporarily marginalized the specialized goal of SMOs which were organized around industry-based demands, while disproportionally endorsing a moderate perspective in the coalition‘s agenda-setting process. This later became a liability within coalitions because it increasingly frustrated radical groups. The disagreement between different groups within coalitions had long-term negative consequences on the maintenance of catchall coalitions after the democratic transition. However, the formation of a strong alliance was

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effective in organizing the successful mass protests in the June uprising in 1987, which pressured the state to make important concessions by launching democratization. In Chapter 4, I examined the pattern of interorganizational collaboration in the aftermath of a democratic transition. Democratization led to diffusion of SMOs by opening up political space, and SMOs began to pursue differentiated goals as the collective goal of democratization had been achieved. I asked why Korea‘s social movements remained active despite the fact that the main goals were attained. I noticed that, contrary to some findings, interorganizational collaboration during protests sustained the level of protests. In spite of the democratic transition, the proportion of both intra- and inter-movement protests in total protests increased, meaning that SMOs tended to pursue collaborative strategies in the Roh regime. Interorganizational collaboration became highly routinized. At the macro level, the newly established Roh regime revealed a transitional phase of democratization since it was a curious blend of authoritarian legacies and democratic experiments. Due to the regime‘s rootedness in military authoritarian tradition, it was not willing to fully accommodate progressive democratic principles but combined conservative democratization and slow reform with firm repression on protests. The regime was forced to be conciliatory and enacted several key reforms pressured by the majority power of opposition parties within the National Assembly in the first two years. However, the government intensified repression of protests and stalled reform processes as soon as the governmental party won the majority in the Assembly in 1990 and when the reunification movement increased, which had long been illegal. SMOs were more likely to respond to repression than reform, since they were yet unfamiliar with the idea of influencing legislative processes from below. Over time, SMOs gradually learned to voice in support for the reform processes. However, routinized violent interactions between the police and the democracy movement damaged the movement‘s public reputation and polarized the social movement sector. Furthermore, the government selectively repressed the protests, which were linked to the ―old‖ democracy movement and not ―new‖ movements, which included several marginal groups in the democracy movement as well as new liberal movements.

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On the other hand, opposition elites remained ambivalent allies for SMOs. They were likely to support movements only when their position in the Assembly was threatened by the government‘s power and their legislative actions were frustrated. Although elites and activists rarely worked under the umbrella of formal coalitional organization, they maintained their mutual connections which could be utilized in case of an emergent political protest. At the same time, institutionalization of electoral politics significantly affected the pathways of SMOs. Elections and cooptation by the elites caused serious organizational conflicts, and the inter-movement coalitions led by the chaeya group were the most damaged by the processes due to its close relationship with the elites. Thus, the election processes and elites‘ cooptation of key activists exacerbated factional conflicts. The chaeya‘s leadership in the democracy movement faltered because of their relationship with the elites, and formal inter-movement coalitions were highly fragmented from within. In addition, the mechanisms of collaborative protests remained effective in sustaining protests: organizational infrastructure represented by the number of SMOs and coalitions, organizational diversity during protests, dense organizational networks, and the shared ideological interpretation which spurred the reunification movement retained positive impacts on the level of collaborative protests after the transition. Since many new SMOs originated from the previous prodemocracy struggles, they tended to value interorganizational collaboration. However, the decentralization of movement leadership in SMOs‘ networks coupled with ideological realignment within the social movement sector posed a serious challenge to the previous style of interorganizational collaboration. First, SMOs were willing to collaborate on a short-term basis for the inter-movement issues, but no longer able to maintain the framework of inter-movement coalitions. Particularly, the weakening of the inter-movement coalitions contributed to such a trend. In relation to this tactical shift and adaptation in the pattern of collaboration, power relations between SMOs became decentralized. The growth of the powerful intra-movement coalitions challenged the leadership of the chaeya group, and the previously marginal SMOs became more independent and stronger.

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Second, the ideological realignments due to both the democratic transition and the global demise of communism had crucial impacts on the pattern of collaboration. The mainstream student movement and the chaeya promoted the goal of reunification based on their nationalist affinity, which had a broad appeal and facilitated interorganizational collaborations. However, the reunification movement did not go smoothly; the deep factional conflicts between ideological wings stayed unresolved, and the presence of the extreme leftist flanks in the reunification movement caused harsh repression and media‘s criticism, regardless of the wide ideological spectrum in the movement. Although the core prodemocracy groups tended to remain loyal to the cause of the democracy movement, some part of the movement exited the domain of contention after losing their ideological ground due to the demise of communist regimes or from disappointment with factional strife. Moreover, the ―new‖ movement based on incrementalism and moderate tactics began to prevail and ideologically challenge the movement. The peripheral movements, such as the women‘s and environmental movements, within the democracy movement tended to quickly gravitate towards the liberal democratic stream in terms of ideology, tactic, and constituency. In the 1990s, the ―new‖ movements became more and more dominant in Korea‘s social movements in the face of the ―old‖ movements‘ decline. Chapter 5 deepened my analysis by disaggregating different types of protests. Different from the previous chapters which compared single protests with collaborative protests, I shifted the axis of comparison and examined the difference between single/intra-movement protests and inter-movement protests in terms of goal structure. Also, I evaluated the role of organizational factors in mobilizing protests in comparison with macro-political factors. I employed a quantitative approach by a multivariate regression analysis based on a protest event dataset. I assessed the relative effects of political and organizational environments on the likelihood of different types of protests between 1980 and 1991. Thus, this chapter contributes to understanding how protests differentially respond to the political environment based on their goal structures, and how the organizational environment matters to protests. First, I found that political opportunity structure may not exert a uniform effect on the types of protests. Political opportunity structure is often treated as a fundamental and general condition for protests, but my analysis suggests a modification of the theoretical

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perspective by capturing the differential impacts of political opportunity structure on the types of protests. Since inter-movement protests pursue generalist orientation, claiming broader goals than single or intra-movement protests, they tend to identify and articulate their goals at the level of broad political processes to a greater extent than other protests. This predominant tendency of generalist orientation in inter-movement alliances explains inter-movement protests‘ particular susceptibility to the broad reform-repression dynamics, which is different from single or intra-movement protests based on specialized goals. I discovered that political reforms discouraged inter-movement protests, while broad repression encouraged it. Whereas institutional politics replaced the function of generalist movements and dampened inter-movement collaborations by offering concessions through reforms, repression served as a motive for further allied resistance. On the other hand, the impact of elites‘ division was not salient in my data analysis when organization-level variables were included in the models. My finding suggests the importance of a strong alliance structure in a democratizing context. Second, the type of prior alliance structures increased the rate of single protests as well as collaborative ones. A strong social movement sector, which facilitates interorganizational contacts, seems to broadly contribute to all levels of protests. The strengthening of an alliance structure shown by both the increasing number of foundings of coalitions and the increasing diversity of movement participants had a positive feedback effect on single movements which occurred without any cooperative structure. The strong effects of an alliance structure illustrated the importance of alliance-building across diverse social movement industries during the democratization process.

6-2: Korea’s Social Movements in the 1990s and Beyond Studying Korea‘s social movements in the 1980s and the early 1990s is important for understanding the pattern of protests afterwards. Now, the social movement sector remains as one of the most active forces for democratic consolidation in Korea (S. Kim 2003, 38). Those movements analyzed in this dissertation were the origin of more recent movements that occurred during the 1990s and beyond. In particular, a close look at the movements in the Roh era reveals the budding stage of new mobilizational patterns which fully blossomed later on.

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First of all, the process of Korea‘s democratization revealed the efficacy and difficulty in organizing large inter-movement coalitions. Towards the goal of democratization, activists experimented with the form of longstanding coalitions that weave different movement fields together and succeeded in coordinating large protests. However, inter-movement coalitions revealed weaknesses in managing internal conflicts and resisting external cooptation, which prompted SMOs to devise an alternative strategy in engaging in interorganizational collaboration. What pushed this trend even further was the increasing specialization of SMOs, which started in the aftermath of the June uprising in 1987. As large inter-movement coalitions failed to function as the center of movements after the democratic transition, activists have cultivated—both forcedly and voluntarily— different ways to engage in social movements and interorganizational alliances. SMOs strengthened themselves as specialists, by carving their own niches based on diverse constituencies and goals. Intra-movement coalitions that represented each social movement industry continued to grow and became influential organizations that behave as both interest organizations and industry-specific SMOs. However, in my view, the decline of inter-movement coalitions does not mean increasing insularity of SMOs or movement industries. SMOs kept engaging in short- term, issue-based collaborations even when coalitions were in decline. For example, they created a loose federation that specialized in interorganizational collaborations: the Civil Society Organizations Network in Korea (siminsahoedanch’e yŏnsŏkhoeŭi) was built in 2001 for the purpose of facilitating alliances between member SMOs. SMOs‘ general interest in collaborative works has not evaporated since they witnessed the power in alliance through multiple collaborative projects in the 1980s. The routinization of interorganizational collaboration, which succeeded in establishing the culture of collaboration by collectively waging a struggle towards democratization, is a distinct phenomenon in Korea‘s social movements. Building networks and solidarity between SMOs was almost an impossible mission until the mid-1980s, but became realized by the sustained efforts of activists who believed in the power of collective action and proactively exploited political opportunities in the course of democratic transition. A study of social networks between SMOs in the early 2000s shows that SMOs are still

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densely connected (Yoon 2004). The culture of collaboration emerged through the 1980s‘ contentious experiences and is deeply embedded in Korea‘s social movements. In addition, Korea‘s movements underwent significant changes in terms of ideological landscape. On the one hand, although the 1980s‘ movements were characterized by a strong leftist tendency, the leftist wing in Korea‘s movements was considerably weakened upon the collapse of communist regimes in the world. For instance, students‘ radical movements lost public support due to their ideological rigidity and disruptive strategy and became ―a thing of the past‖ (Lee 2002:156) by the mid- to late 1990s. With the progress of democratization, the adherence to Marxist-Leninist principles or North Korean ideology no longer appealed to the mass that were enjoying the fruit of democracy and advanced capitalism. The left generally had a tough time in sustaining itself in the changed ideological environment. Nevertheless, the formation of a strong leftist tradition in the 1980s left a profound legacy in Korean society, academia, and politics. For instance, the rise of the ―386 generation,‖ which stands for people in their 30s, educated in the 1980s and born in the 1960s, shows the enduring impact of the 1980s‘ activism on the life course of many student activists. The 386 generation is thought to retain the spirit of the 1980s which values leftist ideals. The progressive administrations headed by Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun also allowed key figures in the 1980s‘ student movement to enter electoral politics in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. The political experiments of the 386 generation are still ongoing. With the irresistible forces of globalization and neo- liberalism, the prospect for leftism has not been so bright. In order to remain influential, many Latin American and African leftist counterparts had to compromise their leftist identity and accommodate the rhetoric of globalization when they took power or became political parties (Deonandan et al. 2007). The left wing in Korea had to adjust itself to the rapidly changing society as its Latin American and African peers did, but it also had to live with the negative consequences such as identity crisis and a lack of viable alternative agenda which could compete with growing conservatism in Korea. On the other hand, movements in the 1990s generally gravitated towards moderate tactics and less extreme ideologies; the citizens‘ movement became mainstream instead of the 1980s‘ minjung movement (Cho 2004), while the latter‘s focus on the

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rights of the oppressed is still visible in the class-based activism such as unions‘ activities. The diversification of SMOs‘ agenda and tactics is one of the most notable trends in movements in the 1990s. As the ideological and tactical horizons were expanded, new core groups appeared in the social movement sector. In 1994, the People‘s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) was founded by the former prodemocracy activists- turned-professionals, which advocated grassroots-level democracy by assuming the position of watchdog against the abuse of power. The PSPD attempted to unify the two streams of the citizens‘ and the minjung movements (S. Kim 2004), and became a highly central SMO in the movement networks by playing a brokerage role in transmitting information. Also, the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) remains as one of the most central SMOs in movement networks, which exemplifies the enduring legacy of the 1980s‘ minjung movement (Kwon and Yi 2001:218). Overall, Korea‘s social movements tended to remain progressive—if not entirely leftist—by embracing democratization, adding new moderate tactics (e.g., legal petitions, newsletters, press conferences) to their traditional repertoires (e.g., declarations, demonstrations), and yet promoting social-democratic ideals. In sum, Korea‘s social movements are fundamentally entrenched in the tradition of the minjung activism in the 1980s which emphasizes human rights and social justice, but evolved through the democratization process by acquiring multiple facades as interest groups, advocacy NGOs, community/grassroots organizers, and countervailing forces against the misgovernance in the state and the elite-level politics.

6-3: Theoretical Implications and Contributions 6-3-(1): Political Opportunity Structure of Democratic Transition I juxtaposed three distinct periods in this dissertation: a repressive authoritarian period, a liberalization period, and an initial period of democratization. Which period is the most likely to engender protests? The Korean example predicts that the liberalization period in an authoritarian regime will produce the most numerous protests. In this sense, Eisinger's (1973) and Tilly's (1978) classic theory, that an intermediate stage between full-fledged democracy and totalitarianism ought to lead to the highest level of protests, seems to fit the Korean case in general.

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The theory of political opportunity structure (POS) is applicable to the protest trend in authoritarian regimes in terms of the positive impact of political openings on protests. However, I showed that the POS theory‘s general prediction that increasing political opportunities lead to more protests does not fully explain the process of democratization. The sustained protests in the initial period of democratization in Korea do not conform to the known empirical pattern of movements‘ rapid demobilization during democratization either. I found that an emergent democracy sends mixed signals to SMOs by frequent fluctuations between the reform agendas and a repressive impulse, under the condition that the new democratizing state retains strong authoritarian legacies. Therefore, SMOs are placed under a tumultuous political environment (i.e., cross- pressure), which encourages the old-fashioned anti-authoritarian protests and concomitantly mandates tactical and ideological adaptation to democratic institutionalization. This unique blend of political contexts results in sustained protests, which decline over the long term; this is because SMOs opt for sustained protests in order to cope with the uncertainties caused by the combination of a lingering risk of de- democratization and the opening of political space for civic engagement during the process of democratization. In addition to examining the effects of reform-repression dynamics on movements, I revealed that elites‘ division also has complex effects on protests and SMOs. Previous literature on elites‘ impact on movements has taken a unidirectional approach by predicting either consistently positive or negative impact. However, my research underscores the fluid nature of elite-movement relationships in a transitional society. In the Korean context, opposition elites were ambivalent, unreliable allies in carrying out prodemocracy struggles. As opposition elites‘ structural position was in between electoral politics and social movements, they often behaved opportunistically by switching sides. SMOs were aware of such limitations, but frequently engaged in alliances with them in order to maximize their public legitimacy and garner resources. Their marriage of convenience had context-specific effects on movements. Under an authoritarian context, the temporary alliance between the two groups created powerful and explosive protests which pressured the state to give concessions. However, during democratization, the increasing cooptation by opposition parties weakened the leadership in the prodemocracy

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group in SMOs and deteriorated the inter-movement coalitions. Although alliances between SMOs and opposition elites may lead to successful movements in terms of scale, public appeal, and impact on authorities, the close relationship could damage the autonomy of SMOs by increasing the risk of cooptation/institutionalization. Overall, my analysis of conventional measures of reform, repression, and elites‘ division shows that these factors may be necessary but not necessarily sufficient conditions. What is particularly interesting about the Korean case is a lack of dramatic demobilization after the democratic transition. Different from the cases of Spain and Chile where elites were able to control movements at a low level after a democratic transition (Alvarez-Junco 1994), a balance was maintained between elites and movements. When the relationship is too close, like in Spain and Chile, movements are likely to be coopted by elites when electoral channels become accessible. When the relationship does not exist, as seen in the early 1980s in Korea, movements are less appealing to the general public. I argue that the ―balancing act‖ between the two political forces may contribute to the establishment of an autonomous social movement sector which is capable of both negotiating with elites and maintaining its cohesion. My analysis has a general implication for the vitality of movements in terms of how to manage relationships with elites, which points to the importance of SMOs‘ balancing strategy between keeping the channels of alliance open and maintaining their status as agents of civil society rather than auxiliary organs of political parties.

6-3-(2): Organizational Dynamics: Organizational Structure and Culture The macro-level variables discussed above only offer a partial explanation to the question of why interorganizational collaboration occurs between SMOs. The bottom-up organizational mechanisms ought to intervene with the top-down process in order to create sufficient conditions for protests. It is necessary to assess how the social movement sector internally grows and becomes powerful in an authoritarian setting as well as how it changes in accordance with the process of democratization. I pointed out four distinct organizational mechanisms in order to explain the changing patterns of interorganizational collaboration: organizational infrastructure, diversity, networks, and ideological orientation. First, consistent with the resource

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mobilization (RM) theory, I showed that organizational infrastructure and diversity during protests have consistently positive impacts on interorganizational collaboration in both authoritarian and democratizing contexts. I particularly emphasized the unique role of coalitions in terms of simultaneously coordinating large-scale protests in multiple locations, which is an effective method to disperse repressive forces and to demonstrate the power in scale. I also argued that coalitional infrastructure may empower all types of protests by facilitating interorganizational communications and networks. In addition, the demonstration effect of diversity during protests is important in order to facilitate diffusion of movements across different social movement industries. Second, I discussed the time-varying effects of organizational networks and ideological interpretation in the changing political contexts. Different shapes of network structure become dominant in different political contexts. Network closure is promoted in a repressive period, which inhibits alliance formation but protects movements in underground structure. During liberalization, dense networks and active brokerage between SMOs emerge and construct a strong foundation for alliances. Network centralization occurs with the increasing hegemony of powerful inter-movement coalitions, which facilitates coordinated protests. With the onset of democratization, however, a decentralizing tendency is likely to take place if the balance of power between SMOs changes due to the decline of inter-movement coalitions and the growth of specialized SMOs. SMOs in Korea still tend to be somewhat centralized around a small number of popular SMOs (Yoon 2004), but no single organization leads Korea‘s movements any more. The evolution of SMOs‘ networks since the 1980s seems to be in the direction towards a more polycentric structure (Baldassarri and Diani 2007). My findings add a new theoretical insight in examining the social movement sector by focusing on the formation of linkages between SMOs with respect to network density, centrality, and brokerage, which considerably vary over time in a transitional setting. Finally, building on the collective identity theory, I undertook an in-depth cultural analysis of various ideological trends in various SMOs in order to understand why and which groups seek alliances. I found that radical ideologies can become a source of collective identity, a nursery of committed activists, and a method to sustain movements under severe repression, but that radical flanks are less likely than moderates to join

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coalitions. I highlighted that ideological flexibility and inclusiveness, which may develop among radicals, could trigger the broadest interorganizational alliance possible, which could play a positive role in expanding inter-movement protests. Moreover, such flexibility of ideological interpretation facilitates ideological realignments in a time of crisis, which could sustain a movement front despite dramatic changes in the political environment. However, democratization and the global demise of communism create a different ideological environment which fosters moderatism and liberalism. Thus, movement ideologies become differentiated with the expansion of SMO population. The broader ideological shifts require SMOs to seek new identities, which poses a challenge to radical flanks while facilitating moderates‘ rise to the hegemonic status in the social movement sector. Until the democratic transition, the growth of organizational infrastructure, organizational diversity during protests, centralized networks, and the dominance of an inclusive ideological interpretation in radical flanks all contribute to the increase of interorganizational collaboration, during which large inter-movement coalitions play a leading role, and to the formation of the culture of collaboration. After the transition, while strong organizational infrastructure and sustained organizational diversity still function as important mechanisms for joint protests, decentralization of SMOs‘ networks and ideological differentiation change the pattern of alliance: a multi-central social movement sector emerges based on specialized agendas where SMOs engage in temporary issue-based collaborations. Thus, I contribute to the literature by exploring multi-layered organizational factors which cause interorganizational collaboration. In conclusion, I contribute to capturing the shifting dynamics of interorganizational collaboration in social movements during democratization. I showed how SMOs consciously react to the shifting external conditions with differing levels of success and failure, revealing that movements continuously evolve through the changing political environment. I also illuminated the importance of analyzing the changes in SMOs‘ organizational structure and culture, which have crucial impacts on both the capacity and the willingness of SMOs in terms of joining alliances. I analyzed why and how transformation of interpretations with regard to a movement‘s environment, goals, and tactics occurs in SMOs, which are embedded in the broad political process of

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democratization. On the assumption that democracy does not mature overnight in terms of both elite-level politics and social movement sector, I engaged in the substantive project of uncovering the changing calculus and learning processes within SMOs in terms of how they interpreted the shifting political environments and their future directions in the wake of democratization. Therefore, I broaden the current theoretical perspectives by unraveling the microcosms of movement dynamics and linking them to the broad context of democratization.

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Appendix A

1. Korea’s Democracy Movement Dataset (1980-1992) Compiled by Jung-eun Lee (2008), Stanford University

Coded from the Chronology of the Korea’s Democracy Movement (2007) (han’guk minjuhwa undongsa yŏnp’yo), The Korea Democracy Foundation

ID: Identification number

AGENT: 0=Protest event 1=Repression event 99=Other (concession, result, relevant event)

YY: Year (e.g., 88=1988) MM: Month (e.g., 04=April) DD: Day

DURATION: How long an event took (in days)

WHERE: Location of the event

PROTEST EVENTS

ISSUE1-4: Specific Issues (Code-specific in the table) ISSUEGEN1-4: Generalized Issues (Code-general in the table) TOT-ISSUEGEN: Total number of general issues per event

Code- General Code- Specific Issues general Issues specific 1 Repression Repression events 1 Killing from torture, violence 2 Torture 3 Repressive political situation, agencies 4 Teargas 5 Surveillance, yonggong 6 Other repression issues 7

2 Labor Labor unions/government-sponsored union 8 Better conditions 9 Wage-related issues 10 Labor law and policies 11 Firing/blacklisting 12 Industrial injuries 13 Labor rights 14 Closing down/Moving 15

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Other labor issues 16

3 Memorial event Kwangju 17 4.19 Student Uprising 18 Funeral, Memorial event 19 Other memorial event 20

4 Political issues Antigovernment 21 Constitutional reform 22 Abolish evil laws/policies 23 Three party merger 24 Election-related issues 25 Democratization 26 Making new party 27 Investigation on the 5th republic 28 Other political issues 29

5 Student Freedom/democratization on campus 30 School-related laws/policies 31 Reinstatement 32 Forced military draft, military education 33 Tuition 34 Other student issues 35

6 Media Censorship 36 Media freedom/democratization 37 Criticism on media practice 38

7 Movement Internal issues 39 Support other movements 40

8 Ideology Socialism 41 Sammin Constitution 42 Constitutional Assembly 43

9 International Anti-American 44 Anti-Japanese 45 Globalization(opening market) 46

10 North Korea Reunification 47 Know North Korea 48

11 Urban poverty Urban planning 49 Street vendors 50

12 Women Sexual harassment/torture 51 Gender equality 52

13 Environment Environment 53

14 Human rights Human rights 54 Yangsimsu(political prisoners) 55

15 Rural issues Farmers/Fishermen/Miners 56

16 Education Democratic education 57

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17 International Asian Games, Olympic Games, Sending troops, 58 Against joining UN

18 Economy Economic policies, reforms, justice, finance 59 Conglomerates 60

99 Other Miscellaneous 99

SMI1-6: Social Movement Industries (only specific SMIs are coded)

Code- Code- General SMI Specific SMI general specific 1 Student Students 1 Youth 2

2 Labor Workers 3

3 Merchants Street vendors 4 Small businesses 5

4 Intellectuals Intellectuals 6 Professors 7 Researchers 8

5 Cultural Writers 9 Artists 10 Moviemakers 11

6 Media Journalists 12 Publishers 13

7 Religion Protestant 14 Catholic 15 Buddhist 16 Other religion 17

8 Teacher Teachers 18 Lecturers 19

9 Professionals Lawyers 20 Doctors 21 Pharmacists 22

10 Rural Farmers 23 Miners 24 Fishermen 25

11 Chaeya Chaeya individuals 26 Chaeya organization 27

12 Political Politicians 28 Political party 29

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13 Prisoners Prisoners 30 Yangsimsu 31

14 Citizen Citizen 32 Residents 33 Poor people 34 Readers 35

15 Civic Civic organizations 36 Economic justice SMO 37

16 Women SMO 38

17 Environment SMO 39

18 Reunification SMO 40

19 Victim, human rights 41

20 Family 42

21 Soldiers, policemen 43

22 Labor activists 44

99 Other 99

TYPE: Movement type in terms of the basis of solidarity

Single protest 1 Intra-movement protest 2 Inter-movement protest 3 Other (e.g., creating a political party) 4

TACTIC1-4: Tactics

Tactics Detail Code Rally/demonstration 1 Sit-in 2 Occupation 3 Strike 4 Work-related tactics (Coming to work, working slowly) 5 Founding SMO 6 Propaganda (Pamphlets) 7 Use media (Publishing, broadcasting) 8 Religious activities 9 Fasting 10 Declaration Determination, statement 11 Memorial event (Memorial event, funeral) 12 March 13 Meeting 14

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Burning oneself 15 Hurting or killing oneself 16 Violence (Arson, beating, breaking in, killing) 17 Refusal, interruption (Class, ride, payment, lunch, etc.) 18 Suing, reporting, requesting 19 Talk (Lecture, seminar) 20 Cultural event 21 Press conference 22 Pro-bono lawyer work 23 Sending letter, Collecting signatures 24 Symbolic action (Wearing ribbons, destroying statues) 25 Disclosure 26 Institutional politics (Recommending candidates) 27 Expanding organization (Branching, opening offices) 28 Going to North Korea 29 Other 99

NUMBER: number of participants ORGNUM: number of SMOs

REPRESSION EVENTS

REPTYPE1-3: Type of repression

Type Code Laws, policies 1 Organizational repression (investigation, search, organization's case) 2 Physical violence, struggle, breaking in, torture, kidnapping, locking 3 Killing by torture 4 Killing 5 Conviction, arrests, wanting 6 Preemptive disruption 7 Disruption, repression 8 Censorship/ideological threat 9 Firing, suspending individuals 10 Disbanding, closing down organizations 11 3 party merger, creation of minjadang 12 Other 99

REPGRP: Who is repressing?

REP1-3: Who is being repressed? (similar to SMI/ only specifics are coded)

Code- Code- General SMI Specific SMI general specific 1 Student Students 1 Youths 2

2 Labor Workers 3

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3 Merchants Street vendors 4 Small businesses 5

4 Intellectuals Intellectuals 6 Professors 7 Researchers 8

5 Cultural Writers 9 Artists 10 Moviemakers 11

6 Media Journalists 12 Publishers 13

7 Religion Protestant 14 Catholic 15 Buddhist 16 Other religion 17

8 Teacher Teachers 18 Lecturers 19

9 Professionals Lawyers 20 Doctors 21 Pharmacists 22

10 Rural Farmers 23 Miners 24 Fishermen 25

11 Chaeya Chaeya individuals 26 Chaeya organization 27

12 Political Politicians 28 Political party 29

13 Prisoners Prisoners 30 Yangsimsu 31

14 Citizen Citizen 32 Residents 33 Poor people 34 Readers 35

15 Civic Civic organizations 36 Economic justice SMO 37

16 Women SMO 38

17 Environment SMO 39

18 Reunification SMO 40

19 Victim, human rights 41

20 Family 42

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21 Soldiers, policemen 43

22 Labor activists 44

23 Nationwide Law, policy 45 99 Other 99

PAGE: page number in the Chronology COMMENT: Explanation of the event (A summary of the Chronology) RESULT/CONCESSION: Explanation of any result or concession achieved

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2. Stanford Korea Democracy Project Dataset on SMOs

Codebook for Korea Democracy Foundation‘s Sourcebook: Organizational Dictionary (Vol. 2), 1970s, 1980s

EDIT HISTORY Person(s) Action Date Paul Y. Chang Created October 21, 2005 Alex Lim Revised March 1, 2005

Paul Y. Chang Revised April 20, 2006

Chan S. Seo, Yeojoung Suh, Revised (Coding 70s) April 25, 2006 Heewon Kim, Paul Y. Chang Chan S. Seo, Yeojoung Suh, Revised (Coding 70s) May 9, 2006 Heewon Kim, Paul Y. Chang Chan S. Seo, Yeojoung Suh, Revised (Coding 70s) May 23, 2006 Heewon Kim, Paul Y. Chang Chan S. Seo, Yeojoung Suh, Revised (Coding 70s) May 29, 2006 Heewon Kim, Paul Y. Chang Chan S. Seo, Kunbok Lee, Revised (Coding 80s) July 27, 2006 Soojung Choi, Youngjae Kim Chan S. Seo Revised (Cleaning 70s) September 3, 2006 Chan S. Seo, Soojung Choi Revised (Coding 80s) September 10, 2006 Chan S. Seo, Soojung Choi Revised (Cleaning 80s) November 13, 2006

I. TIMING

Variable Type Code Code Define Comments ID Continuous 1-999 Arbitrary number Recording number assigned to each organization. ORGNAME1 Script Nominal Name of org. Formal name of org. (O1). ORGNAME2 Script Nominal Other name of org. Nickname or other names of org. (O2). FOUNDYR Continuous 1-99 Last two digits of year Founding year of org. (e.g. 1974=74). (O5). FOUNDMT Continuous 1-12 Month in the year Founding month of org. FOUNDDY Continuous 1-31 Day in the year Founding day within a year‘s time . (O5) Year when org. ceased to exist (e.g. 1984=84). ENDYR Continuous 1-99 Last two digits of year (O5) ENDMT Continuous 1-12 Month in the year Month when org. ceased to exist ENDDAY Continuous 1-31 Day in year Day when org. ceased to exist . (O5)

II. ORGANIZATIONAL NETWORK

Any branches, committees, or other 0 = No lower orgs organizations mentioned that are usually LOWORG Dummy 0,1 1 = Yes lower orgs subordinate in the hierarchy between organizations. Total count of lower LOWORGCT Continuous 0-99 orgs. Mentioned. LOWORGNM1 Script Nominal Name of lower org. LOWORGNM2 0 = No middle orgs. Any affiliated organizations mentioned that are MIDORG Dummy 0, 1 1 = Yes middle orgs. on par with central in hierarchy between orgs. Total count of middle MIDORGCT Continuous 0-99 orgs. mentioned.

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MIDORGNM1 Script Nominal Name of middle org. MIDORGNM2 0 = No higher orgs. Any affiliated organizations mentioned that are HIORG Dummy 0, 1 1 = Yes higher orgs. higher in the hierarchy between orgs.. Total count of higher HIORGCT Continuous 0-99 orgs. mentioned. HIORGNM1 Script Nominal Name of higher org. HIORGNM2

III. ORGANIZATION‘S CHARACTERISTICS

CITY Categorical 0 Not applicable City where org. was most active (O6). 1 Seoul 서울 2 Kwangju 광주 3 Pusan 부산 4 Taejon 대전 5 Masan 마산 6 Inchon 인천 7 National 전국 8 Mokpo 목포 9 Gumi 구미 10 Daegu 대구 11 Chuncheon 춘천 12 Wonju 원주 13 Siheung 시흥 14 Anyang 안양 15 Gimpo 김포 16 Uijeongbu 의정부 17 Asan 아산 18 Cheonan 천안 Gwangju(Gyeonggi- 19 광주 (경기도) Do) 20 Cheongju 청주 21 Andong 안동 22 Gyeonggi-Do 경기도 23 North America 북미 24 Bupyeong 부평 25 Sungnam 성남 26 Kyungsang-Do 경기도 27 Chungcheong-Do 충청도 28 Hwasung 화성 29 Guri 구리 30 Bucheon 부천 31 Suwon 수원 32 Yongin 용인 33 Osan 오산 34 Ansan 안산 LEGSTAT1 Categorical 0 Not applicable Legal status of org. (O7). 1 Legal 2 Semi-legal 3 Illegal 0 = No legal LEGCHGE Dummy 0, 1 Whether legal status of org. changed over time. change.

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1 = Yes legal change. LEGSTAT2 0 = No formal offices or positions mentioned. If there are any formal positions or titles within organization‘s OFFICE Dummy 0, 1 1 = Yes formal hierarchy. offices or positions mentioned.

Total count of the OFFCT Continuous 0-99 Total count of position or office mentioned office.

OFFTYP1 Categorical 0 Not applicable Name of title of position or office mentioned in Korean 1 President 회장, 의장 2 Vice President 부회장, 부의장 3 Chairman 위원장 Manager of Branch 4 지부장 Office Vice Manager of 5 부지부장 Branch Office President of Local 6 분회장 Chapter Vice President of 7 부분회장 Local Chapter 8 Board of Directors 이사장 혹은 이사회 9 Secretary 간사 10 Auditor 감사 11 Advisor 고문 12 Central Committee 대표위원회, 중앙위원회 13 Steering Committee 운영위원회 14 Spokesperson 대변인 15 Clerk 서기 16 General Office 총무국, 총무부 17 Executive Office 사무국, 사무부, 집행국, 집행부 18 Publishing Office 출판부, 편집부 19 United Front Office 통일전선부 20 Organization Office 조직부 21 Womenfolk Office 부녀부 22 Dispute Office 쟁의부, 투쟁부 23 Intersection Office 교선부 24 Farm Youth Office 농촌청년부 25 Minister 목사 26 Presbyter 장로 27 Consultant 컨설턴트 28 Vice Chairman 부위원장 29 Committee 위원 30 Priest 신부 31 Office Manager 사무실장 32 Survey Office 조사통계부 33 Education Office 교육부 34 Women Office 여성부 (different from ‗21 부녀부‘) Delegation (group 35 공동대표 혹은 회장단 of representatives) 36 Propaganda Office 홍보부, 선전부

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37 General Meeting 총회 38 Policy Office 정책부, 정책기획부 39 Planning Office 기획부 40 Youth Office 청년부 41 Academic Office 학술부, 연구부 Election Campaign 42 선거대책부 Office 43 Culture Office 문화부 44 Unification Office 통일부 45 Financial Office 재정부 46 Cooperation Office 대외협력부 OFFTYP2 PURP1 Categorical 0 Not applicable The main purpose or issue motivating the organization. 1 Political 2 Economic Labor Issues mostly. 3 Human Rights 4 Anti-Corruption 5 Media 6 Reunification 7 Anti-Repression Direct political repression for specific events, only. Consciousness 8 Raising/Literature 9 Local Issue 10 Military Including Issues on Military Mandatory Service Civil Rights or 11 Basic Rights 12 Religion International 13 Including the U.S. or Japan Imperialism Relations 14 Urbanization 15 Agricultural 16 The Poor 17 Educational Internal for the 18 Movement 19 Women 20 Environmental 21 Customer 22 Legislation 23 Anti-Americanism 24 Medical 25 Anti-Globalization 26 Socialist Revolution 27 Culture Including Literature, Movie, Cultural Assets 28 Peace Peace Movement, for example. 99 Other PURP2 TARGET1 Categorical 0 Not applicable The general target of org‘s activities. Government 1 General 2 Park Chung-hee Directly to Park Chung-hee. 3 Military 4 KCIA 5 Local Actors e.g. university administration, local officials (city, region, etc.,) Employers or others who side with employers (e.g. company 6 Employers union). 7 Urban Poor

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8 Foreign Actors The U.S. 9 The Press 10 Education 11 Patriarchy 12 Law 13 Chun Du-Hwan Directly to Chun Du-Hwan 14 Rho Tae-Woo Directly to Rho Tae-Woo 15 Choi Kyu-Ha 16 Opposition Party Shin-Min Party 17 Kim Jong-Phil 18 Church 19 Globalization 99 Other TARGET2 TACTIC1 Categorical 0 Not Applicable General Tactic used by org. Spontaneous 1 Minimal amount of organization or planning. disruption Rally or Organized meeting targeting the public or other external 2 Demonstration groups. Meeting, internal discussion and Organized meeting not targeting the public (e.g. prayer 3 decisions, meetings, organizational meetings, etc.). Also negotiations determination. with target group. Negotiations 4 Picketing Rally where main protest tactic is the use of pickets. Specific action designed to prevent customers from obtaining 5 Boycott services or products from some organization. 6 Riot, Vandalism Organized use of violence as main protest tactic. Rally where main protest tactic is the reading of a formal 7 Declaration declaration. 8 Strike Organized absence from work by employers of an organization. Consciousness Raising, Study groups or other consciousness raising activity (e.g. UIM 9 publications, labor laws class, Christian Academy night schools). debates, forums 10 SMO founding Formal founding of an SMO. Sit in, take over 11 Sit in protest space 12 Informal Requests Letters, signing petitions, Visiting, or other forms of requests. Self torture, 13 defacement, Protest by hurting oneself. immolation, etc. 14 Silent rally 15 Memorial event Symbolic Dramaturgical expression of protest (e.g. mock case, symbolic 16 protest/dramaturgy exorcism, play or reenactment, etc). 17 Print Spreading literature, placards, newspapers, or other materials. 18 Parade or march 19 Fasting Prayer or religious 20 ceremony Protest via Formal 21 e.g. Registering complaint formally or legally. (or Legal) Channels 22 Violence Attack on individuals or property, etc. 23 Press Conference Meeting the press Monitoring 24 elections Resignation, quit 25 work/job

280

Criticize, spoken 26 protest, denounce, We didn‘t use this category because it was ambiguous. etc. 27 Investigation 28 Fundraising 29 Naked protest Protest by taking clothes off Networking (Ask 30 for Support to other Org.) Ask for Solidarity 31 (within Org.) Support other Org. 32 or Person Protest via media 33 Advertise on T.V. or newspaper channel 34 Hostage Volunteering 35 Activity 36 Win the Election Policy 37 Recommendation Conference with 38 North Korea 39 Hanging Ribbons 40 Exhibition 41 Concert 42 Marathon Visiting North 43 Korea Opening a 44 Including Writing or Painting Cometition Competition 45 Making Calendar Joining the 46 Government Policy 99 Other TACTIC2

The Subject of the Movement. Social group participating in SMI1 Categorical 0 Not specified org. or its main constituency. 1 Students or youths 2 Laborers 3 Christians 4 Other Religious 5 Intellectuals Authors, professors, etc. 6 Politicians 7 Farmers 8 Women 9 Economically Poor 10 Journalists/media 11 Christian students General activists, 12 civil groups 13 Professionals e.g. lawyers, doctors, corporate, etc. 14 Foreigners Including Korean diaspora 15 Citizens (general) Judges, judicial 16 Including Lawyer system 17 School officials,

281

High school teachers 18 Merchants Shopkeepers, entrepreneurs Family of 19 persecuted Other religious 20 students 21 Prisoners 22 Military personnel 23 Urban Problems 24 Entertainer Actor, Singer, Movie Director. 25 Victims 26 North Koreans 99 Other SMI2

IV. HISTORY OF ORGANIZATION

PREHISNM Script Name of the former org. PREHISSMI Categorical SMI of the former org. HIST1 Categorical 0 Not applicable Description of how organization was founded (O10). 1 Reaction to repression Founding was reaction to moment of repression. Reaction to political Founding was reaction to political policy (e.g. Park 2 policy Chung Hee‘s attempt to run for third term). Reaction to economic 3 Founding was reaction to specific economic policy. policy Founding was motivated by general political situation 4 General political (e.g. democracy oriented orgs.). Founding was motivated by general economic 5 General economic situation (e.g. concerned with labor or urban poor). 6 Specific political issue 7 Specific economic issue Internal for the Not founded as a Reaction to Repression, Policy, or 8 Movement General/Specific Issue. 99 Other HIST2 MORT1 Script Nominal Reason of Mortality Write down the reason why the Org. died. 0 = No organizational transition in org. history. Whether the org. transitioned from one organizational TRANS Dummy 0, 1 1 = Yes organizational entity to another. transition in org. history. TRANSTYP Categorical 0 Not Applicable The type of transition the org. went through. 1 Merger Partnership with another org. 2 Transition Org. became a different org. 3 Name Change Org. stayed the same but changed names. 4 New Branch Org. established new branches. 5 Acquisition Add another org. 6 change to Higher Org. Change to higher organization 7 Split 99 Other CHAR Dummy 0,1 character change

CHARTYP Categorical 0 Not Applicable Pro-Company to 1 Democratic

282

Democratic to Pro- 2 Company from company to 3 society 4 Broaden the character 5 Narrow the character TRANSNM1 Script Nominal New name of org. In cases where org. changed names. TRANSYR Continuous 1-99 See FOUNDYR The year that org. transitioned. TRANSMT Continuous 1-12 See FOUNDMT The month that org. transitioned. TRANSDY Continuous 1-31 See FOUNDDY The day that org. transitioned.

V. EVENTS RELATED TO ORGANIZATION EVNAME Script Nominal Name of event Name or basic description of event EVISSUE Categorical See PURP1 Main issues in the event. EVSYR Continuous See FOUNDYR The year the event started. EVSMT Continuous See FOUNDMT The month the event started. EVSDY Continuous See FOUNDDY The day the event started. EVFYR Continuous See FOUNDYR The year the event finished. EVFMT Continuous See FOUNDMT The month the event finished. EVFDY Continuous See FOUNDDY The day the event finished. EVTRGT Categorical See TARGET1 Main targets of event. EVTACT Categorical See TACTIC1 Tactics used in the event. Total Count of other org. OHTRORGCT Continuous 0-99 related OTHRORGNM Continuous ID of other Org. related OTHRORGSMI Categorical See SMI1 SMI of other org. related OTHRORGNM2 Continuous OTHRORGSMI2

VI. PEOPLE RELATED TO ORGANIZATION NAME Script Nominal Name of the Person ORG_ID Continuous 1-999 ID of the Org. related SOCGRP Categorical See SMI1 Social Group of the person ROLE Categorical 0 Not applicable 1 Founder 2 Leadership 3 Middle-Level Leadership 4 Financial Support 5 Member 6 Not Related but Connected 0 = good person SIDE Dummy 0, 1 1 = bad person RELEV Script Nominal Name of the Event related 0 = Male SEX Dummy 0, 1 1 = Female BORN Continuous . See FOUNDYR Born Year of the Person. ID of the Democratic ORG Other ORG Continuous to which the person is related COMMENTS

VII. OTHER Total number of important people PEOPLE Continuous 0-99 Number of people mentioned (O12). Any Type of Negative Action to the REPRESS Dummy 0, 1 0=No Repressions Organization INTERTUR Dummy 0, 1 0=No Internal Turmoil Any Internal Turmoil in the Organization

283

Other org. in the database that is Numeric The ID Number of other org. in OTHRORG1 connected to, or has worked together Script the Data Set. with central org. OTHRORG2 Numeric Page number in KDF KDFPAGE Script sourcebook The main characteristics of the Comments Script Text Short description of org. organization, one or two main events related to the organization.

Structure of KDF Data Sourcebook: O1: name of organization O2: nickname or other names or organization O3: included groups in organization and local branches or regional committees O4: status of organization, affiliated organizations O5: historical trajectory of organization O6: regions where organization was active or nationwide organization O7: legal status of organization (legal, semi-legal, illegal) O8: construction of organization O9: main concerns and principles relating to violent action by organization O10: how organization was formed O11: important activities of org., especially during important transitional period of org. O12: places where important activities were held by organization O13: related groups/orgs., orgs. Separated from original org., org. structure O14: related source materials, important signed documents, printed document.

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Appendix B Birth College ID Name Interview College Active in Gender SMI Current job year entrance 1 Ki-Sik Kim 4/29/2008 65 84 Seoul Seoul M student, labor civil society SMO 2 Jong-Joo Yi 7/22/2008 64 83 Seoul Seoul M student publication 3 Jeong-Sook Yoon 7/28/2008 58 76 Ewha Seoul F student, women civil society SMO 4 In-Seong Hwang 7/31/2008 53 71 Seoul Seoul M student, Christian politician 5 Keun-Su Hong 8/1/2008 37 56 Seoul Seoul M Christian, reunification reunification SMO 6 Yong-Sun Yi 8/1/2008 62 81 Kamshin Incheon F student, labor social worker 7 Byoung-Ok Ahn 8/4/2008 63 80 Seoul Seoul M student, environment environment SMO women labor 8 Ye-Kyo Yi 8/5/2008 63 81 Kamshin Incheon F student, labor, women SMO 9 In-Sun Nam-Yoon 8/5/2008 58 77 Sudosa Incheon F student, labor, women women SMO 10 Jin-Woo Joo 8/6/2008 64 83 Seoul Seoul M student, labor peace SMO 11 Ok-Ja Han 8/7/2008 56 76 Suwon Nursing Suwon F student, women women SMO student, labor, 12 Kyu-Ui Song 8/8/2008 60 79 Kamshin Incheon M pastor Christian 13 Hae-Koo Jeong 8/11/2008 55 75 Yonsei Seoul M student, intellectual professor 14 Jeong-Ok Hwang 8/11/2008 64 82 Korea Seoul F student, labor civil society SMO 15 Keun-Tae Kim 8/12/2008 47 65 Seoul Seoul M student, political politician 16 Hyoung-Taek Kwon 8/19/2008 56 74 Seoul Seoul M student, political civil society SMO 17 Jae-Keun In 8/20/2008 53 78 Ewha Seoul F student, labor, political social worker 18 Si-Chun Yu 8/26/2008 50 70 Korea Seoul F political writer 19 In-Young Yi 8/27/2008 64 84 Korea Seoul M student, political politician 20 Bu-Young Yi 8/28/2008 42 61 Seoul Seoul M political, journalist politician 21 Jun-Young Yi 9/3/2008 63 84 Korea Seoul M student civil society SMO 22 Myoung-Su Jeong 9/11/2008 66 85 Yonsei Seoul M student civil society SMO 23 Chung-Il Oh 9/13/2008 40 59 Yonsei Seoul M Christian, political pastor 24 Hye-Jeong Kim 12/12/2008 63 86 Keonkuk Uljin F environment environment SMO

285

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