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Lithuania and Its War Potential in the Literary Activities of Leon Mitkiewicz, the First Polish Military Attaché in Kaunas

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Lithuania and Its War Potential in the Literary Activities of Leon Mitkiewicz, the First Polish Military Attaché in Kaunas LITHUANIA AND ITS WAR POTENTIAL IN THE LITERARY ACTIVITIES OF LEON MITKIEWICZ, THE FIRST POLISH MILITARY ATTACHÉ IN KAUNAS Waldemar Rezmer ABSTRACT On 17 March 1938, Warsaw delivered an ultimatum to Kaunas. After the 18 years of non- existent official diplomatic relations with Poland due to the occupation of Vilnius in 1920, Lithuania was forced to renew them. The acceptance of the ultimatum in Lithuania heavily influenced the prestige of the authoritarian regime, but opened a new stage in relations 109 between Lithuania and Poland on the eve of the Second World War. In addition to the envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary to Lithuania Franciszek Charwat, Poland appointed Leon Mitkiewicz (1896–1972) as its military attaché to the diplomatic mission in Kaunas. Having scrupulously documented his life and service, Mitkiewicz observed Lithuania both before and after his appointment. He also conducted numerous political-military analyses, trying to assess the direction of international and geopolitical events. The article gives an overview of Mitkiewicz’s notes on Polish-Lithuanian relations, and Lithuania and its war potential both before and after the 1938 ultimatum. KEY WORDS: Lithuanian-Polish relations, war potential, Lithuanian armed forces. ANOTACIJA 1938 m. kovo 17 d. Varšuva paskelbė ultimatumą Kaunui. Dėl Vilniaus okupacijos nutraukusi su Lenkija oficialius diplomatinius santykius 1920 m., Lietuva buvo priversta juos atnaujinti. Ultimatumo priėmimas Lietuvoje smarkiai kirto per autoritarinio režimo prestižą, bet atvėrė naują Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykių Antrojo pasaulinio karo išvakarėse etapą. Be nepaprastojo pasiuntinio ir įgaliotojo ministro Lietuvai Franciszeko Charwato, į diplomatinę atstovybę Kaune Lenkija paskyrė karo atašė Leoną Mitkiewiczių (1896–1972). Skrupulingai dokumentavęs savo gyvenimo ir tarnybos įvykius, L. Mitkiewiczius stebėjo Lietuvą tiek iki jo paskyrimo, tiek ir po jo. Jis paliko daugybę politinių ir karinių analizių, kuriose bandė įvertinti tarptautinių ir geopoliti- nių įvykių tendencijas. Šiame straipsnyje apžvelgiami L. Mitkiewicziaus užrašai apie Lenkijos ir Lietuvos santykius, Lietuvą ir jos potencialą kariauti tiek prieš ultimatumo paskelbimą 1938 m., tiek po jo. PAgrinDiniAi žoDžiAi: Lietuvos ir Lenkijos santykiai, valstybės potencialas kariauti, Lietuvos kariuomenė. Waldemar Rezmer, dr. hab., professor, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Institute of History and Archival Sciences, Department of Military History, ul. Bojarskiego 1, PL-87-100 Toruń, Poland. E-mail: [email protected]. THE UNENDING WAR? BALTIC STATES AFTER 1918 Acta Historica Universitatis Klaipedensis XXXVI, 2018, 109–123. ISSN 1392-4095 (Print), ISSN 2351-6526 (Online) DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15181/ahuk.v36i0.1851 Waldemar Rezmer In public speaking and in literature, even literature devoted to research, and in Internet discussions, people identify war potential (war capability) with military potential (mili- tary strength). They are not aware that they are making a fundamental mistake, be- cause these terms mean different things. The term war potential has a much broader meaning than military potential. In the art of war, the term war potential means all the material and moral capabilities of a state (or coalition of states), which can be used to achieve the aims of war, whereas military potential is understood to be general capa- bilities in terms of conducting a military conflict of a state (or coalition of states), which have a direct impact on the outcome of the war. The dimension of military potential is determined by population factors, i.e. the number and skills of the armed forces in times of peace, and the level of reserves and material: supplies of military equipment and material-technical provisions, and elements of the military infrastructure.1 110 This article describes the views on interwar Lithuania and its war potential of the Pol- ish officer Leon Mitkiewicz-Żółłtek, an open-minded man with great intellectual qual- ities, a brilliant memory for people and situations, and a talent for unbiased, mostly favourable, descriptions of people he met officially or in private. His literary activity, although of great importance, is not very well known, even in Poland. He was the au- thor of numerous scientific and popular-science articles,2 as well as comprehensive works concerning the history of the armed forces of the Second Polish Republic and the Polish armed forces in the west between 1939 and 1945.3 His ‘adventure’ with writing began in the interwar period, when he published articles in Bellona, a lead- ing scientific general military periodical established in 1918, and in ‘Cavalry Review’ (Przegląd Kawaleryjski), a monthly devoted to cavalry issues, published between 1924 and 1939. At the same time, he published a historic-military study entitled ‘The Win- ter Battle of the Masurian Lakes, 6-12 February 1915’,4 and a textbook for cavalry cadets entitled ‘Tactics. Lectures at the Cavalry Training Centre’.5 1 For more information see STAnKiEWiCZ, Wacław. Ekonomika wojenna. Warszawa, 1981, passim; goŁĄB, Zdzisław. Wojna a system obronny państwa. Warszawa, 1984, passim; ProEKTor, Daniił. Siła militarna we współczesnym świecie. Warszawa, 1987, passim. 2 Among others, MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. 2 Pułk Szwoleżerów. Przegląd Kawalerii i Broni Pancernej, 1959, t. ii, nr. 15; MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. Powstanie Warszawskie (z mojego notatnika w Waszyngtonie). Zeszyty Historyczne, 1962, nr. 1, s. 95–156; MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. Przedwrześniowe wojsko polskie w krzywym zwierciadle. Zeszyty Historyczne, 1965, nr. 8, s. 227–230; MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. Smutne post-factum. Zeszyty Historyczne, 1968, nr. 13, s. 221–225; MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. Działania grupy operacyjnej Kawalerii gen. Romana Abrahama. Przegląd Kawalerii i Broni Pancernej, 1969, t. Vii, nr. 56; MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. Placówka „Star”. Zeszyty Historyczne, 1970, nr. 17, s. 173–193; MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. Likwidacja Polskiej Misji Wojskowej w USA w 1945 roku. Zeszyty Historyczne, 1972, nr. 21, s. 169–180; MiTKiEWiCZ, Leon. Szarża 18 P. Uł. pod Krojantami. Przegląd Kawalerii i Broni Pancernej, 1973, t. iX, nr. 70. 3 The most well-known are: MITKIEWICZ, Leon. Kawaleria samodzielna Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej w wojnie 1939. Toronto, 1964; MITKIEWICZ, Leon. Z gen. Sikorskim na obczyźnie (fragmenty wspomnień). Paryż, 1968; MITKIEWICZ, Leon. W Najwyższym Sztabie Zachodnich Aliantów 1943–1945. Londyn, 1971. 4 MITKIEWICZ, Leon. Bitwa zimowa na Mazurach (6-21.II.1915) (Studia z Wojny Światowej 1914–1918, t. 7). Warszawa, 1936. 5 MITKIEWICZ, Leon. Taktyka: wykłady w Centrum Wyszkolenia Kawalerii. T. 1–3. grudziądz, 1927–1929. LITHUANIA AND ITS WAR POTENTIAL IN THE LITERARY ACTIVITIES OF LEON MITKIEWICZ... The works based on his memoiries are of particularly high value. First-person ac- counts, diaries, testimonies and memoirs, have always had their followers, even fierce devotees. Their popularity comes from the fact that they constitute very at- tractive, inspirational material for historians, politicians, screenwriters, authors of radio and television programmes and publicists. Not only do memoirs broaden our knowledge of past times, but they also introduce the reader to the atmosphere and the ambience of a past era. The value of such literature increases if the narrator is one of the main figures in the events being described, when he stands right at the centre of events. This kind of literary activity becomes a real pearl when the author of the story is a perspicacious observer, taking a factual and unbiased look at the world and the people around him, and possessing brilliant storytelling skills. Leon Mitkiewicz was certainly such a person. In 1938, Colonel Leon Mitkiewicz was appointed Polish military attaché in Lithuania. 111 The article will show how this appointment changed the Polish officer’s views of the neighbouring country, and how he described Lithuania and its war potential both before and after March 1938. Biographical sketch Leon Mitkiewicz was an outstanding line and staff officer in the Polish army, a cav- alryman, and a well-educated person who spoke five foreign languages (Russian, French, German, English and Lithuanian). He was born on 20 February 1896 in Zambrów, the Łomża governorate of russia’s Privislinsky Krai (formally non-existent Congress Poland). After leaving high school in Białystok (Hrodna governorate), he received a commission in the Russian army, and in May 1915 he went to the Cavalry School in Yelizavetgrad (Kherson governorate, now Kropyvnytskyi). After finishing his training, he was assigned to the 4th Regiment of Mariupol Hussars, stationed at the time in Võru (Werro), governorate of Liflandiia. The regiment was part of the 4th Cavalry division fighting the German army in the Baltic governorates. Influenced by news concerning the formation of Polish national units in Russia, he went to Minsk in mid-November 1917, where the staff of the 1st Polish Corps under general Józef Dowbor-Muśnicki was stationed. Due to the surplus of officers, he was not appointed to the cavalry regiment. As a result, he decided to join a partisan unit under Lieutenant ignacy golec. After the disbanding of general Dowbor-Muśnicki’s corps by the germans in May 1918, he set off to visit his parents in Białystok. At the be- ginning of november 1918, he joined the Polish army. After briefly being trained in the Officer School by the Infantry Cadet School in Warsaw, he was assigned to the General Waldemar Rezmer Staff. However, on 15 January 1919, he was sent to Rava-Ruska in Galicia (now western Ukraine)
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