DOCSLIB.ORG

Security Impact Assessment Measures

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Security Impact Assessment Measures SIAM Security Impact Assessment Measures Past Events & Threat Scenarios Deliverable D 6.1 Past Events & Threat Scenarios Project number 261826 Call (part) identifier Interdisciplinary FP7-Security-2010-1 Center for Technology Funding scheme Analysis & Forecasting At Tel Aviv University Collaborative Project 1 13. 04. 2 0 1 2 Table of Contents Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................3 General Introduction ..................................................................................................................6 Past events & Threat Scenarios ...................................................................................................8 Methodology ............................................................................................................................8 Background ............................................................................................................................. 10 Worldwide Past Security Events ................................................................................................ 15 Country Reports - Past Security Events ....................................................................................... 20 Germany................................................................................................................................. 20 Israel ...................................................................................................................................... 43 Italy........................................................................................................................................ 64 UK .......................................................................................................................................... 73 Threat Scenarios ...................................................................................................................... 90 Findings & Conclusions ........................................................................................................... 113 References ............................................................................................................................ 116 2 Executive Summary In this report we present a summary of the efforts done in task 1 of WP6. In this task we described past threat events which occurred in mass transportation systems as air traffic systems and train platforms, covering the five threat categories our research deals with – terror (T), illegal immigration (II), cyber (C), white collar (WC) and organized crime (OC). We have covered some worldwide events, but focused on events collected by the partners, each in its country, and specifically related to each of the four case studies we base our research on – BGIA (Ben-Gurion International Airport), BER (the soon to be opened new Berlin's Airport), London's Underground and Turino's Train System. The following table maps the partners country's collected events divided by each of the threat categories: Table No. 1: Collected Past Events Categorization 3 The following table lists the threat scenarios as offered by SIAM partners: Table No. 2: Threat Scenarios List Terror (T), Illegal Immigration (II), Cyber (C), White Collar (WC) and Organized Crime (OC). No. Threat Category Scenario 1 T Toxic Gas Attack on a subway train 2 T Sniper attack 3 T Suitcase bombs, self made explosives 4 T Gun rampage 5 T Dirty bomb 6 T Missile attack on a starting/landing passenger aircraft (train..?) 7 T The junky's mummy 1 – coffin contains corpse filled with explosives (similar to #17) 8 T The deadly porter – hotel porter plants explosives/explosive device in an innocent resident 9 T The leaky passenger – terrorist with explosives in his guts 10 T Terror on a railway – remote control / pressure activated explosive device 11 T Contamination injected into fuel supply chain 12 T Armed cell trained commandos (native born) seizes control on a main station 13 T Detonation a massive Ammonium nitrate fertilizer bomb on a train in central London during 2012 Olympics 14 C / T Hacking an underground computer by a loose network of highly skilled individuals. 15 C / T Total shutdown of airport radio communication by terrorists armed with high-power radio transmitters 16 C /WC Same like #15, but caused by pirate radio nearby 17 OC The junky's mummy 2 – coffin contains corpse filled with drugs (similar to #7) 18 Other (D.O) The human flotilla – combine efforts of many people to reach certain location in order to demonstrate 4 The following table maps the offered scenarios based on the above collected country events, similarly divided by each of the threats categories: Table No. 3: Country's Threat Scenarios Map based on the collected events The data was analyzed and a list of various scenarios was obtained for further investigation. As can be seen, most of the events as well as most of the presented scenarios are related to the Terrorism category. While Cyber can be referred to as terror attack or as a crime, the three other crime categories are rarely covered and were found less relevant in relation to the mass transportation security. During the work done, certain issues were raised, regarding the five challenges that SIAM is focusing on. The first issue was about the question whether or not Illegal Immigration should be one of the challenges. An additional challenge that arose was whether the project should also focus on civil disorders in transportation systems. At this stage, the five base challenges were left as is, without change. 5 General Introduction The objective of work package 6 is to provide scenarios that give insights about possible targets for selected crimes. One of the key objectives in WP6 is to come to a deeper understanding of the security challenges that were selected in SIAM, and the impact these challenges might have on concrete targets or contexts. Work in WP6 until now has shown that such expertise is available in literature: global or regional threat assessments already exist. They provide valuable information about emerging and developing security threats on a global or regional level. But these expert reports do not provide information about likelihood or probable outcomes of security threats (occurrence, location, societal and economic cost) and it is beyond the scope of SIAM to calculate the relevant probabilities. The main objective of WP6 is to create a knowledge base of threat scenarios and security incidents representing security challenges to mass transportation systems. The focus is on airports and subways systems, which are in the core of the SIAM projects. The preparation of this knowledge base will be based on six steps: a. Collection of information on specific relevant security events, based on media discourses, interviews, etc. b. A literature review survey of current scientific research and threat analysis. c. Expert workshops to discuss the security events, scenarios, SMT's role. d. Expert workshops to discuss scenario's building techniques and risk analysis. e. Processing and integrating the security events collected into a series of structured generic threat scenarios report. f. Integration of the scenarios into SIAM's database. Security events or incidents refer to past incidents which occurred in public transportation systems (airports, undergrounds, trains, etc.) that included acts of terror, illegal immigration, or crime (cyber, white collar, organized): a. The events we were looking for could be those which happened IN transportation systems (e.g. carrying drugs through airports or using trains for illegal immigration) or those which where aimed AT the transportation systems themselves.(e.g. suicide bombing, hijacking planes) b. The above categories appeared in the proposal but we were not limited to them. The impact of the past events was expected to cover the following issues: Economy – High cost damages, potential damages to economic growth, markets, fiscal policies, taxation, industries, banks, insurance companies; Environment – potential damages to biodiversity, materials, resources, climate, pollution, wastes; Infrastructures – potential damage to energy supply, transportation systems, communications systems, etc.; People – potential damage to individuals, groups, mass populations; Political systems – Impact on the political system, potential damage to political structures, activities, leadership, power relations, stakeholders, policies; Values - Threat events might lead to changes of values, such as changing attitudes towards ethnic minorities, impact on privacy changing of the sense of safety. WP6 has begun in M1 of SIAM (2/11). 6 Following our first plan for WP6 and the discussion that took place during the kickoff meeting in Berlin, ICTAF issued guidelines to the partners for carrying out the abovementioned relevant tasks. This was later revised after the first consortium meeting in New Castle. 7 Past events & Threat Scenarios This report is a summary of the efforts done in task 1, collecting and describing past events and offering a list of suitable scenarios. These scenarios are expected to cover the five security challenges addressed by the SIAM project: acts of terror, illegal immigration, or crime (cyber, white collar, organized). In this context we use the following definitions: a. A security event - A specific event that happened in the past in which a breach of security happened in its broad sense including criminal acts, terrorism, illegal
Load more

Recommended publications
  • IATA CLEARING HOUSE PAGE 1 of 21 2021-09-08 14:22 EST Member List Report
    IATA CLEARING HOUSE PAGE 1 OF 21 2021-09-08 14:22 EST Member List Report AGREEMENT : Standard PERIOD: P01 September 2021 MEMBER CODE MEMBER NAME ZONE STATUS CATEGORY XB-B72 "INTERAVIA" LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY B Live Associate Member FV-195 "ROSSIYA AIRLINES" JSC D Live IATA Airline 2I-681 21 AIR LLC C Live ACH XD-A39 617436 BC LTD DBA FREIGHTLINK EXPRESS C Live ACH 4O-837 ABC AEROLINEAS S.A. DE C.V. B Suspended Non-IATA Airline M3-549 ABSA - AEROLINHAS BRASILEIRAS S.A. C Live ACH XB-B11 ACCELYA AMERICA B Live Associate Member XB-B81 ACCELYA FRANCE S.A.S D Live Associate Member XB-B05 ACCELYA MIDDLE EAST FZE B Live Associate Member XB-B40 ACCELYA SOLUTIONS AMERICAS INC B Live Associate Member XB-B52 ACCELYA SOLUTIONS INDIA LTD. D Live Associate Member XB-B28 ACCELYA SOLUTIONS UK LIMITED A Live Associate Member XB-B70 ACCELYA UK LIMITED A Live Associate Member XB-B86 ACCELYA WORLD, S.L.U D Live Associate Member 9B-450 ACCESRAIL AND PARTNER RAILWAYS D Live Associate Member XB-280 ACCOUNTING CENTRE OF CHINA AVIATION B Live Associate Member XB-M30 ACNA D Live Associate Member XB-B31 ADB SAFEGATE AIRPORT SYSTEMS UK LTD. A Live Associate Member JP-165 ADRIA AIRWAYS D.O.O. D Suspended Non-IATA Airline A3-390 AEGEAN AIRLINES S.A. D Live IATA Airline KH-687 AEKO KULA LLC C Live ACH EI-053 AER LINGUS LIMITED B Live IATA Airline XB-B74 AERCAP HOLDINGS NV B Live Associate Member 7T-144 AERO EXPRESS DEL ECUADOR - TRANS AM B Live Non-IATA Airline XB-B13 AERO INDUSTRIAL SALES COMPANY B Live Associate Member P5-845 AERO REPUBLICA S.A.
    [Show full text]
  • Shaken, Not Stunned
    Shaken, not stunned: The London Bombings of July 2005 1 Work in progress – not for circulation or citation! Project leader: Dr. Eric K Stern Case researchers: Fredrik Fors Lindy M Newlove Edward Deverell 1 This research has been made possible by the support of the Swedish National Defence College, the Swedish Emergency Management Agency and the Critical Incident Analysis Group. 1 Executive summary - The bombings of July 2005 On July 7 th , the morning rush hours in London formed the backdrop for the first suicide bombings in Western Europe in modern times. Three different parts of the London subway system were attacked around 08.50: Aldgate, Edgware Road, and Russell Square. 2 The three Tube trains were all hit within 50 seconds time. A bomb on the upper floor of a double-decker bus at Tavistock Square was detonated at 09.47. In the terrorist attacks, four suicide bombers detonated one charge each, killing 52 people. Seven people were killed by the blasts at Aldgate, six at Edgware Road, 13 at Tavistock Square, and 26 at Russel Square – in addition to the suicide bombers themselves. More than 700 people were injured. Hundreds of rescue workers were engaged in coping with the aftermath. Over 200 staff from the London Fire Brigade, 450 staff and 186 vehicles from the London Ambulance Service, several hundred police officers from the Metropolitan Police and from the City of London Police, as well as over 130 staff from the British Transport Police were involved. Patients were sent to 7 area hospitals. 3 Crucial Decision Problems 1.
    [Show full text]
  • REQUEST Please Confirm Below the Summary of Chronology Into The
    REQUEST Please confirm below the summary of chronology into the Stockwell enquiry to be correct that Parliament, MOPAC does hold information relating to his request. I draw your attention to the Police Reform and Social Responsibility Act 2011 section 42, 48 and Police Act 1996 section 50- Appointment of Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis. 22 July 2005 00:50hrs Review of CCTV images takes place from the four scenes. 01:00hrs Commander Cressida DICK woken at home requesting she attends NSY at 07:00hrs the following morning to be a KRATOS commander. 02:15hrs Intelligence recovered from rucksack left by suspect in area of SHEPHERDS BUSH. Gym club card gives name of Mr Hussain OSMAN, enquiries made earlier give address for OSMAN as 21 SCOTIA ROAD. 04:20hrs Commander MCDOWALL compares photos from gym to the CCTV images from the attempted bombings. good likeness for attempted bombing at SHEPHERDS BUSH. Covert sweep requested for SCOTIA ROAD. Vehicle which is linked to suspects later found in the vicinity. 04:55hrs Commander MCDOWALL makes and records decision to mount directed surveillance at SCOTIA ROAD address. Gold firearms strategy set, and DSO confirmed for potential operation KRATOS, this being Commander Cressida DICK. 05:00hrs Commander DICK arrives at NSY. 05:15hrs Tango 1, Surveillance (Red team) leader receives briefing from 'Alan'. 05:40hrs Tango 1 briefs red team on operation. 05:45hrs Authorisation given for Surveillance personnel to carry firearms for their own protection and the protection of the public. 06:00hrs RIPA Authorisation for directed surveillance on suspects obtained. 06:04hrs Observation Point commenced at SCOTIA ROAD.
    [Show full text]
  • WALTER CRONKITE – IMAGE #28 the 20Th Summer Olympic Games
    WALTER CRONKITE – IMAGE #28 The 20th Summer Olympic Games were held in Munich, Germany, in 1972. Tensions ran high at these Olympics, because they were the first Olympic games held in Germany since the Nazis hosted them in 1936. The Israeli athletes and their trainers were especially nervous. Many had family members who had been murdered during the Holocaust or were themselves Holocaust survivors. The first few days of the Olympic Games went smoothly. On September 4th the Israeli team spent the evening out, seeing the play, Fiddler on the Roof. Then they went back to the Olympic Village to sleep. A little after 4 a.m. on September 5th, as the Israeli athletes slept, eight members of the Palestinian Liberation Organization terrorist group, Black September, jumped over the six-foot high fence that encircled the Olympic Village. The terrorists headed straight for 31 Connollystrasse, the building where the Israeli contingent was staying. Around 4:30 a.m. the terrorists entered the building. They rounded up the occupants of apartment 1 and, then, apartment 3. Several of the Israelis fought back. Two of them were killed. A couple of others were able to escape out windows. Nine were taken hostage. By 5:10 a.m. the police had been alerted, and news of the attack had spread around the world. The terrorists then dropped a list of their demands out the window. They wanted 234 prisoners released from Israeli prisons and two from German prisons by 9 a.m. Negotiators were able to extend the deadline to noon, then to 1 p.m., then to 3 p.m., then to 5 p.m.
    [Show full text]
  • The Munich Massacre: a New History
    The Munich Massacre: A New History Eppie Briggs (aka Marigold Black) A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of BA (Hons) in History University of Sydney October 2011 1 Contents Introduction and Historiography Part I – Quiet the Zionist Rage 1. The Burdened Alliance 2. Domestic Unrest Part II – Rouse the Global Wrath 3. International Condemnation 4. The New Terrorism Conclusion 2 Acknowledgments I would like to thank first and foremost Dr Glenda Sluga to whom I am greatly indebted for her guidance, support and encouragement. Without Glenda‟s sage advice, the writing of this thesis would have been an infinitely more difficult and painful experience. I would also like to thank Dr Michael Ondaatje for his excellent counsel, good-humour and friendship throughout the last few years. Heartfelt thanks go to Elise and Dean Briggs for all their love, support and patience and finally, to Angus Harker and Janie Briggs. I cannot adequately convey the thanks I owe Angus and Janie for their encouragement, love, and strength, and for being a constant reminder as to why I was writing this thesis. 3 Abstract This thesis examines the Nixon administration’s response to the Munich Massacre; a terrorist attack which took place at the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich. By examining the contextual considerations influencing the administration’s response in both the domestic and international spheres, this thesis will determine the manner in which diplomatic intricacies impacted on the introduction of precedent setting counterterrorism institutions. Furthermore, it will expound the correlation between the Nixon administration’s response and a developing conceptualisation of acts of modern international terrorism.
    [Show full text]
  • Air Traffic Situation: Monday 15 June 2020 & Week 24
    Maggi COVID19 Impact on European Air Traffic EUROCONTROL Comprehensive Assessment Air Traffic situation: Monday 15 June 2020 & Week 24 (08-14 June 2020) (compared with equivalent period in 2019) Key Highlights • Monday 15 June: o 7,930 flights yesterday Monday 15 June – an increase of 1,346 movements / 20.4% against Monday 8 June. This remain -77.9% against the equivalent day in 2019 but is the busiest day on the network since mid-March 2020. o Resumption of operations amongst others at Brussels Airlines and Austrian Airlines o Notable increases in movements at Lufthansa (228, +45.2%), Air France (204, +36.9%), Sun Express (66, +200%), and Netjets (100, +163.2%). • Traffic projections: Latest EUROCONTROL European Network Operations (NOP) 2020 Recovery Plan (published on 12 June), confirms an upward recovery trend: o Network traffic is expected to reach 10,000 flights by the end of June. o By mid-July, we expect 13,000 flights, which is expected to rise to 15,000 as a minimum later in July (mainly intra-European). This will be around 30-35% of normal capacity. • The traffic scenarios we projected on 24 April remain valid for a coordinated opening and EUROCONTROL is becoming more optimistic. 20 25 30 35 40 10 15 5 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 000 1. 0 • Summary points the on networksituation: 07 Mar 2020 -6% • -5% 09 Mar 2020 -10% -14% NM 11 Mar 2020 -14% W -16% 13 Mar 2020 -17% eek # -20% o o o o o o o o o 15 Mar 2020 -24% flights Network -34% 17 Mar 2020 -44% -51% 2 More than 7, Increase of KLM (145) and Bristow Norway (131).
    [Show full text]
  • Combating Political Violence Movements with Third-Force Options Doron Zimmermann ∗
    Between Minimum Force and Maximum Violence: Combating Political Violence Movements with Third-Force Options Doron Zimmermann ∗ Introduction: Balancing the Tools of Counter-Terrorism In most liberal democratic states it is the responsibility of the police forces to cope with “internal” threats, including terrorism, since in such states terrorism is invariably defined as a criminal act rather than a manifestation of insurgent political violence. In many such instances, the resultant quantitative and qualitative overtaxing of law en- forcement capabilities to keep the peace has led to calls by sections of the public, as well as by the legislative and executive branches of government, to expand both the le- gal and operational means available to combat terrorism, and to boost civilian agen- cies’ capacity to deal with terrorism in proportion to the perceived threat. The deterio- rating situation in Ulster in Northern Ireland between 1968 and 1972 and beyond is an illustrative case in point.1 Although there have been cases of successfully transmogrifying police forces into military-like formations, the best-known and arguably most frequent example of aug- mented state responses to the threat posed by insurgent political violence movements is the use of the military in the fight against terrorism and in the maintenance of internal security. While it is imperative that the threat of a collapse of national cohesion due to the overextension of internal civil security forces be averted, the deployment of all branches of the armed forces against a terrorist threat is not without its own pitfalls. Paul Wilkinson has enunciated some of the problems posed by the use of counter-ter- rorism military task forces, not the least of which is that [a] fully militarized response implies the complete suspension of the civilian legal system and its replacement by martial law, summary punishments, the imposition of curfews, military censorship and extensive infringements of normal civil liberties in the name of the exigencies of war.
    [Show full text]
  • Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism
    Journal of Strategic Security Volume 2 Number 2 Volume 2, No. 2: May 2009 Article 1 Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism Thomas Byron Hunter Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss Part of the Defense and Security Studies Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Portfolio and Security Analysis Commons pp. 1-52 Recommended Citation Hunter, Thomas Byron. "Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism." Journal of Strategic Security 2, no. 2 (2010) : 1-52. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.2.2.1 Available at: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Strategic Security by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Targeted Killing: Self-Defense, Preemption, and the War on Terrorism Abstract This paper assesses the parameters and utility of “targeted killing” in combating terrorism and its role within the norm of state self-defense in the international community. The author’s thesis is that, while targeted killing provides states with a method of combating terrorism, and while it is “effective” on a number of levels, it is inherently limited and not a panacea. The adoption and execution of such a program brings with it, among other potential pitfalls, political repercussions. Targeted killing is defined herein as the premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to represent a present and/or future threat to the safety and security of a state through affiliation with terrorist groups or individuals.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 Organizing to Counter Terrorism: Sensemaking Amidst Dynamic
    ORE Open Research Exeter TITLE Organizing to counter terrorism: sensemaking amidst dynamic complexity AUTHORS Colville, Ian; Pye, Annie; Carter, Mike JOURNAL Human Relations DEPOSITED IN ORE 02 June 2014 This version available at http://hdl.handle.net/10871/14946 COPYRIGHT AND REUSE Open Research Exeter makes this work available in accordance with publisher policies. A NOTE ON VERSIONS The version presented here may differ from the published version. If citing, you are advised to consult the published version for pagination, volume/issue and date of publication Organizing to Counter Terrorism: Sensemaking amidst dynamic complexity By Ian Colville, University of Bath, [email protected] Annie Pye, University of Exeter [email protected] & Mike Carter, University of Exeter [email protected] Corresponding author: Annie Pye, Centre for Leadership Studies, University of Exeter Business School, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4PU, UK. Version 1 of the manuscript which was subsequently published in Human Relations (2013: 66(9) 1201–1223). This paper was subsequently awarded the Human Relations 2013 Paper of the Year Award which is “given to the article that the Editorial Team considers best encapsulates broad readership appeal, sound methods, and whose theory advances our understanding of human relations at work”. Abstract Organizations increasingly find themselves contending with circumstances that are suffused with dynamic complexity. So how do they make sense of and contend with this? Using a sensemaking approach, our empirical case analysis of the shooting of Mr Jean Charles de Menezes shows how sensemaking is tested under such conditions. Through elaborating the relationship between the concepts of frames and cues, we find that the introduction of a new organizational routine to anticipate action in changing circumstances leads to discrepant sensemaking.
    [Show full text]
  • Princeton Diplomatic Invitational 2020
    Princeton Diplomatic Invitational 2020 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Committee Chair: Person ‘year Director: NATO PDI 2020 Contents Contents .......................................................................................................................................... 2 Introduction to NATO ................................................................................................................ 3 Topic A: Russia Today ................................................................................................................. 5 Questions to Consider ................................................................................................................ 14 Bibliography A ............................................................................................................................. 15 Topic B: Counter-terrorism ....................................................................................................... 15 Questions to Consider ................................................................................................................ 27 Bibliography B ............................................................................................................................. 28 2 NATO PDI 2020 Introduction to NATO The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is a military and political alliance made up of 28 member states throughout Europe and the Americas. First established on April 4th, 1949 with the North Atlantic Treaty, NATO’s creation at the beginning of the Cold
    [Show full text]
  • The Munich Massacre
    The Munich Massacre Munich, Germany Munich Olympic Headquarters September 4, 1972 7:00 pm Sunlight glittered on the West German flag, causing the bottom gold strip to shine almost as bright as the stars. Kathrin glanced up at the beauty of her country's flag and said a silent prayer in her head. Nine days ago the Olympic games had started and gone forward without a hitch. She and the rest of the Federal Republic of Germany could not help but feel a swell of proudness in their hearts as the games continued. For so long the world had gazed at them through the eyes of the deeds their parents and grandparents had committed more than 3o years ago. These games marked an opportunity to show the world that they were no longer the blood stricken country they had been in the past. They were a new Germany. Kathrin let her eyes roam the flag once more and the smile waivered on her face. The games were not over yet. She knew well enough the potential that destruction had and she refused to give it a foothold. Entering the Olympic Headquarter building, she brisked her way through security and into her office, where her appointment was already there waiting. “Good evening, Shmuel.” Kathrin said in a warm voice, that filled the room. She smiled and shook his hand. Earlier that day he had asked to meet with her, and by the tone of his voice Kathrin knew that this was not just another friendly visit . She expressed an attitude in which any hostess should have when the head of the Olympic Israeli delegation should ask to meet.
    [Show full text]
  • Postal Stamp Auction Tuesday 17 March 2020 521
    POSTAL STAMP AUCTION TUESDAY 17 MARCH 2020 521 Lot 451 MOWBRAY COLLECTABLES, PRIVATE BAG 63000, WELLINGTON, NEW ZEALAND 6140 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 519 520 521 522 523 524 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 534 535 536 543 545 546 537 554 558 559 561 562 566 569 577 585 595 597 681 706 710 714 715 725 762 779 765 774 784 808 816 POSTAL AUCTION 521 Closes: Tuesday 17th March 2020 INDEX OF LOTS 820 879 903 904 912 1 - 232 Collections & Accumulations 233 - 273 Collectables 274 - 374 Thematics 375 - 386 Accessories 387 - 393 Catalogues 394 - 398 Literature 399 - 476 New Zealand - Postal History 477 - 507 - Postal Stationery 508 - 1167 - Definitives 992 1039 1064 1066 1168 - 1196 - Airmail 1197 - 1369 - Commemoratives 1370 - 1464 - Health 1465 - 1633 - Officials 1634 - 1700 - Life Insurance 1701 - 1732 - Postal Fiscals 1733 - 1752 - Booklets 1753 - 1865 - Other 1866 - 2002 - Revenues - Cinderellas 1191 1201 1202 2030 - 2029 2030 - 2098 Polar 2099 - 2169 Flight Covers 2170 - 2313 Australia 2314 - 2612 Pacific Islands 2613 - 2807 Great Britain 2808 - 3294 British Commonwealth 3295 - 3798 Foreign IMPORTANT INFORMATION: 1208 1211 1214 1469 1472 - You can bid by mail, phone, fax, email or via our website - see contact details below. - For enquiries on any lots, contact our office as above. - Lots are listed on a simplified basis unless otherwise stated. - Stamps illustrated in colour may not be exactly true to shade. - Bids under 2/3rds of estimate are generally not considered. - NZ Bidders: GST of 15% will be added to successful bids.
    [Show full text]