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André Porto.Indd Vol. IV, No. 34, December 2012 Disputatio DisputatioInternational Journal of Philosophy Special Issue Logic, Norms and Ontology. Recent Essays in Luso-Brazilian Analytic Philosophy Edited by João Branquinho and Guido Imaguire Disputatio, Vol. IV, No. 34, December 2012 CentroReceived de Filosofia on 14 September da Universidade 2010 de Lisboa www.disputatio.com Disputatio aims at publishing first-rate articles and discussion notes on all aspects of analytical philosophy, but especially those dealing with current issues in the phi- losophies of language, logic, and mind, and also in epistemology and metaphysics, written in English or Portuguese. The discussion notes need not be on a paper originally published in our journal. Articles of a purely exegetical or historical character will not be published. Although book reviews are usually commissioned, we also welcome proposals for reviews of recent books. Disputatio practices double blind refereeing, and follows the ‘Guidelines for the Handling of Manuscripts by the Editors of Philosophy Journals’ of the Association of Philosophy Journal Editors. Disputatio also accepts proposals for special issues of edited volumes on specific relevant topics or philosophical problems. A detailed proposal is to be made to the editors of the journal, including a brief description of the topic, and why it is rel- evant, information about the editor or editors of the special issue, and of the con- tributors. The proposal should also contain an abstract or summary of the papers to be included. The editors of the special number of the journal must guarantee that the papers included are suitably refereed. The editorial committee has the final word on the acceptance of the included articles. Manuscripts with no more than 7,000 words should be typed, and will not be returned. They should also be prepared for anonymous refereeing. Authors are encouraged to submit articles by e-mail (please quote your paper’s title). If sub- mitting by regular mail authors must enclose an electronic version. Authors of ac- cepted articles will be asked to prepare a final electronic version in accordance with Disputatio’s style. Manuscripts are accepted for review under the understanding that the work sub- mitted for publication has not been published elsewhere, that it is not under considera- tion for publication elsewhere, and that it will not be submitted for publication else- where unless the editors of Disputatio have rejected it. Disputatio is published twice a year, in November and May. Submissions and mail are to be sent to the managing editor: Célia Teixeira, Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa, Faculdade de Letras, Alameda da Universidade, 1600-214 Lisboa, Portugal. E-mail: [email protected]. Pub- lishers should send review copies to this address. All material published in Disputatio is fully copyrighted. It may be printed or pho- tocopied for private or classroom purposes, but it may not be published elsewhere without the author’s and Disputatio’s written permission. The authors own copyright of articles, book reviews and critical notices. Disputatio owns other materials. If in doubt, please contact Disputatio or the authors. PUBLISHED BY SPONSORS FCTFundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia MINISTÉRIO DA CIÊNCIA E DA TECNOLOGIA Apoio do Programa Operacional Ciência, Tecnologia, Centro de Filosofia Inovação do Quadro Comunitário de Apoio III. Universidade de Lisboa Directores: João Branquinho e Teresa Marques. Publicação semestral. N.º de registo no ICS: 120449. NIPC: 154155470. Sede da redacção: Centro de Filosofia, Faculdade de Letras de Lisboa, Alameda da Universidade, 1600-214 Lisboa. Disputatio International Journal of Philosophy Vol. IV, No. 34, December 2012 EDITORS João Branquinho (University of Lisbon) and Teresa Marques (University of Lisbon). BOOK REVIEWS EDITOR Teresa Marques (University of Lisbon). EDITORIAL COMMITTEE António Branco (University of Lisbon), Fernando Ferreira (University of Lisbon), Adriana Silva Graça (University of Lisbon), José Frederico Marques (University of Lisbon), Pedro Galvão (University of Lisbon), Pedro Santos (University of Algarve), Ricardo Santos (University of Évora). MANAGING EDITOR Célia Teixeira (University of Lisbon). EDITORIAL BOARD Helen Beebee (University of Birmingham), Jessica Brown (University of St Andrews), Pablo Cobreros (University of Navarra, Pamplona), Annalisa Coliva (University of Modena), Esa Diaz-Leon (University of Manitoba), Paul Egré, (Institut Jean Nicod, Paris), Roman Frigg (Lon- don School of Economics), Kathrin Glüer-Pagin (University of Stock- holm), Sally Haslanger (MIT) Carl Hoefer (Autonomous University of Barcelona), Jonathan Lowe (University of Durham), Ofra Magidor (University of Oxford), Anna Mahtanni (University of Oxford), José Martínez (University of Barcelona), Manuel Pérez-Otero (University of Barcelona), Duncan Pritchard (University of Edinburgh), Josep Prades (University of Girona), Wlodek Rabinowicz (University of Lund), So- nia Roca (University of Stirling), Sven Rosenkranz (University of Bar- celona), Marco Ruffino (Federal University of Rio de Janeiro), Pablo Rychter (University of Valencia) and Jennifer Saul (University of Shef- field). ADVISORY BOARD Michael Devitt (City University of New York), Daniel Dennett (Tufts University), Kit Fine (New York University), Manuel García-Carpin- tero (University of Barcelona), James Higginbotham (University of Southern California), Paul Horwich (New York University), Christo- pher Peacocke (University of Columbia), Pieter Seuren (Max-Planck- Institute for Psycholinguistics), Charles Travis (King’s College London), Timothy Williamson (University of Oxford). Published by Centro de Filosofia da Universidade de Lisboa ISSN: 0873 626X — Depósito legal n.o 106 333/96 Table of Contents Introductory Note Uma lógica da indistinguibilidade. J.R. Arenhart and D. Krause.......555 What is existence? João Branquinho......................................575 Philosophy as a protoscience. Cláudio F. Costa..........................591 On the notion of object. A logical genealogy. Fernando Ferreira.....609 Será o contratualismo reconciliável com o consequencialismo? Pedro Galvão.......................................................................625 Physicalism and early behaviourism. Nelson G. Gomes.................635 A typology of conceptual explications. Dirk Greimann...............645 On identifying and identification. Breno Hax Jr........................671 On the ontology of relations. Guido Imaguire..........................689 Spontaneous lingusitic understanding. André Leclerc..................713 Relativo ma non tropo: de novo a favor da objectividade na execução musical. António Lopes......................................................739 Wittgenstein on mathematical identities. André Porto................755 Deferred utterances and proper contexts. Marco Rufino............807 Ser de uma maneira sem ser claramente dessa maneira: um problema para o supervalorativismo. Ricardo Santos..............................823 Ceteris paribus laws and the human sciences. Rui Silva..............851 Metaphysical analyticity. Célia Teixeira...................................869 On what there must be: existence in logic and some related riddles. P.A.S. Veloso, L.C. Pereira and E.H. Haeusler................................889 Contributors J.R. Arenhart, Federal University of Fronteira do Sul João Branquinho, University of Lisbon and LanCog Group (UL) Cláudio F. Costa, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte Fernando Ferreira, University of Lisbon Pedro Galvão, University of Lisbon and LanCog Group (UL) Nelson G. Gomes, University of Brasília Dirk Greimann, Fluminense Federal University E. Hermann Haeusler, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Ja- neiro Breno Hax Jr., Federal University of Paraná and LanCog Group (UL) Guido Imaguire, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and LanCog Group (UL) D. Krause, Federal University of Santa Catarina André Leclerc, Federal University of Ceará António Lopes, University of Lisbon and LanCog Group (UL) Luiz Carlos Pereira, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro André Porto, Federal University of Goiânia Marco Ruffino, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and LanCog Group (UL) Ricardo Santos, University of Évora and LanCog Group (UL) Rui Silva, University of the Azores and LanCog Group (UL) Célia Teixeira, University of Lisbon and LanCog Group (UL) Paulo A. S. Veloso, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro Introductory Note The present special issue of Disputatio brings together some of the best work recently done in Brazil and Portugal in the tradition of analytic philosophy (broadly conceived). Over the past ten years or so we have witnessed an impressive growth of analytic philosophy in both countries, either in terms of quantity or in terms of quality of the produced philosophy. We hope that this volume capture, at least partly, the dynamics and strength of such development. The range of philosophical problems and topics covered by the contributed essays is vast, cutting across several philosophical disciplines. Indeed, one can find therein issues in philosophical logic, meta-philosophy, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mathematics and metaphysics. Such variety of subject-matter is also a trait of recent Luso-Brazilian analytic philosophy. The Editors João Branquinho Guido Imaguire Uma Lógica da Indistinguibilidade J.R. Arenhart Universidade Federal da Fronteira Sul D. Krause Universidade
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