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Contextual Metaphilosophy Contextual Metaphilosophy The Case of Wittgenstein Dimitris Gakis Contextual Metaphilosophy The Case of Wittgenstein ILLC Dissertation Series DS-2012-06 For further information about ILLC-publications, please contact Institute for Logic, Language and Computation Universiteit van Amsterdam Science Park 904 1098 XH Amsterdam phone: +31-20-525 6051 fax: +31-20-525 5206 e-mail: [email protected] homepage: http://www.illc.uva.nl/ Copyright © 2012 by Dimitris Gakis Cover design: Sofia Bahlava and Vassilis Stamoulis Printed and bound in the Netherlands by Ipskamp Drukkers B.V., Enschede ISBN: 978-90-5776-247-5 Contextual Metaphilosophy The Case of Wittgenstein ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor aan de Universiteit van Amsterdam op gezag van de Rector Magnificus prof. dr. D.C. van den Boom ten overstaan van een door het college voor promoties ingestelde commissie, in het openbaar te verdedigen in de Agnietenkapel op vrijdag 12 oktober 2012, te 12.00 uur door Dimitrios Gakis geboren te Anthili, Griekenland. Promotiecommissie Promotor: prof. dr. M.J.B. Stokhof Overige leden: prof. dr. J. Früchtl prof. dr. M.R.M. ter Hark prof. dr. M. van Lambalgen prof. dr. ir. G.H. de Vries dr. V. Kindi Faculteit der Geesteswetenschappen to my family, friends, and comrades Contents Acknowledgments xi Abbreviated References xiii Chapter 1 Prolegomena 1 1.1 Introduction: Motives, Structures, Themes, and Goals 2 1.2 Conceptions of (Meta)Philosophy 11 Chapter 2 A Contextual Metaphilosophical Perspective 23 2.1 Kuhn’s Historical Perspective 24 2.2 The Impact of Kuhn’s Work 31 2.3 A Kuhnian Take on Metaphilosophy 45 Chapter 3 Early Wittgenstein in Context: Setting the Background 59 3.1 The Issue of Ethics in Wittgenstein’s Work and Life 60 3.2 The Role of Biographical and Historical Material 63 3.3 Early Wittgenstein on Ethics, Science, and Humanity 67 3.4 Wittgenstein’s Early Life and Thought (1889-1918) 72 3.5 Wittgenstein’s Vienna and Wittgenstein’s Vienna 78 Chapter 4 Early Wittgenstein in Context: Modernism and Modernity 95 4.1 Early Wittgenstein and Modernism 96 4.2 Early Wittgenstein and Modernity 117 ix Chapter 5 Intermezzo: Throwing Away the Ladder Before Climbing it 139 5.1 Historical Ladders 140 5.2 The Role of the Ladder Metaphor in the New Wittgenstein Debate 143 5.3 Metaphysics, Ethics, and Therapy in the Tractatus 153 5.4 Synopsis: Resolute Readings as (non-)Exegetical Endeavours 170 Chapter 6 Later Wittgenstein in Context: Setting the Background 175 6.1 Wittgenstein’s (Middle and) Later Life and Thought (1918-1951) 176 6.2 Wittgenstein’s Later (Meta)Philosophical Perspective 192 Chapter 7 Later Wittgenstein in Context: The Political Wittgenstein 221 7.1 The Ethical and Political Aspects of Later Wittgenstein’s Perspective 222 7.2 Later Wittgenstein, Marxism, and Marx: Historical Connections 236 7.3 Later Wittgenstein, Marxism, and Marx: Systematic Connections 252 Chapter 8 Epilegomena 281 8.1 Later Wittgenstein, Autonomy, and Progress 282 8.2 Postface 290 Bibliography 295 Samenvatting 317 Abstract 319 x Acknowledgments There is no doubt that the person I owe the most regarding this dissertation is my promotor Martin Stokhof. I would need many pages in order to fully spell out how crucial my regular interaction with Martin over the last four and a half years has been for both my personal and philosophical development – if there is a difference between the two. Fortunately, almost everybody that had the chance to work together with Martin, and they are quite many, have already pointed out how great a teacher and supervisor he is. I would just like to add a few things. Martin’s attitude towards his interlocutors, where he always tries to bring the best out the other, trying through his critique to clarify and improve the other’s positions without enforcing his (always clear, well-worked, and insightful) own, is a very rare quality in today’s harsh and antagonistic academic and everyday-life landscape. With regard to his role as a supervisor, I have greatly benefited from our regular discussions not only on my dissertation or philosophy in general, but also on various topics ranging from cinema, music, and literature to personal issues, current affairs, and politics. This dissertation not only would be different (and much worse), but probably would not exist at all if it were not for Martin. And with regard to his role as a teacher, having followed three of his courses as a student and two as his teaching assistant, I can testify that they have been decisive for the route that the lives of many of his students have taken, constituting a living example of how a Socratic conception of philosophy as a life-stance and a life-shaping activity can still be maintained and practiced despite the continuously increasing professionalisation of the discipline. It is no surprise then that Martin receives so much love and respect from his students and colleagues. Martin is a “real human being”, to use one of Wittgenstein’s favourite phrases of appraisal, and I want to thank him deeply for everything he has done for me. There are also a number of people with whom I had contact during the years of work on my dissertation, influencing it in many different ways, who I would like to thank. Professors Josef Früchtl, Jeroen Groenendijk, Michiel van Lambalgen, and Göran Sundholm whose courses I had the chance to follow and get interesting things out of them. Those with whom I have shared the office at the xi university over the years and thus also many special academic and non-academic moments as well: Dora Achourioti, Edgar Andrade-Lotero, Inés Crespo, Catarina Dutilh-Novaes, Mathias Madsen, Stefan Pliquett, and Marc Staudacher. And Pim Klaassen and Søren Overgaard for their valuable suggestions at the first stages of the dissertation, Kim van Gennip for the interesting discussions we had over Wittgenstein during the 32nd International Wittgenstein Symposium at Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria, and the co-participants, organisers, and keynote speakers of the 9th Vienna Summer University in 2009 which was a very stimulating experience. I should also mention Benedikt Löwe and Galit Weidman Sassoon and thank my colleagues both at the ILLC and the Philosophy Department of UvA for providing an inspiring and friendly environment for the various academic activities with which I was involved. I owe much both to the ILLC and the Philosophy Department of UvA for providing me with the means for conducting my study. Special thanks to Tanja Kassenaar and Peter van Ormondt from ILLC for always being so helpful with all kinds of administrative matters. My co-students in the various courses I followed and the students in the two courses given by Martin in which I had the pleasure to be a teaching assistant also proved to be a source not only for rethinking and clarifying some of my ideas, but also for the necessary occasional distancing from working exclusively on the dissertation. I would like to thank especially Kristina Kersa, Martijn Wallage (who also helped me with the Dutch translation of the dissertation’s abstract), and Dilek Yamali for both our academic and non-academic discussions and our shared personal moments as friends. The same goes to my long-standing friends from Heraklion and Athens in Greece and especially the ones from csd- lista and Nosotros (they know who they are). The Stamoulis family (Sofia, Vassilis, Giannos, and Kostis) deserves a special mention for their beautiful work on the cover of the dissertation and for being in my life as close relatives and friends. Since English is not my native language, the help of Philibert Schogt, apart from the numerous remarks of Martin Stokhof during our regular meetings, has been really valuable – of course I am the only one responsible for all remaining errors. I also owe special thanks to Alexandros Kanterakis and Ansten Mørch Klev who both have been valuable friends and interlocutors. Nothing of all this would be possible without my parents, Giannis and Vasso, and my sister, Georgia. There are not enough words to describe my deep love and gratitude to them. Finally, my thanks and love to Thaleia Konstantinou who has selflessly been on my side for the last nine years in both good and bad times. Dimitris Gakis Amsterdam, March 2012 xii Abbreviated References BBB The Blue and Brown Books [Wittgenstein (1969)] CV Culture and Value [Wittgenstein (1998)] LAPR Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief [Wittgenstein (1966)] LE Lecture on Ethics [Wittgenstein (1993)] LWPPi Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. I [Wittgenstein (1982)] LWPPii Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. II [Wittgenstein (1992)] NB Notebooks 1914-1916 [Wittgenstein (1979a)] OC On Certainty [Wittgenstein (1972)] PG Philosophical Grammar [Wittgenstein (1974)] PI Philosophical Investigations [Wittgenstein (2001)] PR Philosophical Remarks [Wittgenstein (1975)] RC Remarks on Colour [Wittgenstein (1977)] RFM Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [Wittgenstein (1978)] RPPi Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. I [Wittgenstein (1980a)] RPPii Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology Vol. II [Wittgenstein (1980b)] TLP Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus [Wittgenstein (1922)] VW The Voices of Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein and Waismann (2003)] WCLD Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951 [Wittgenstein (2008)] WLC Wittgenstein’s Lectures Cambridge 1932-35 [Wittgenstein (1979b)] xiii WPO Ludwig Wittgenstein: Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 [Klagge and Nordmann (eds.) (1993)] WPPO Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions [Klagge and Nordmann (eds.) (2003)] WVC Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann [Wittgenstein (1979c)] Z Zettel [Wittgenstein (1981)] References to LWPPi, OC, PI (Part I), RPPi, RPPii, TLP, and Z are to paragraphs (unless otherwise stated).
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