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Zurich Open Repository and Archive University of Zurich Main Library Strickhofstrasse 39 CH-8057 Zurich www.zora.uzh.ch Year: 2018 Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy: themes and implications Djordjevic, Charles Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-158541 Dissertation Published Version Originally published at: Djordjevic, Charles. Wittgenstein’s metaphilosophy: themes and implications. 2018, University of Zurich, Faculty of Arts. Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy: Themes and Implications Thesis Presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Of the University of Zurich For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy By Charles Djordjevic Accepted in the Spring Semester, 2018 On the recommendation of the doctoral committee: Prof. Dr. Hans-Johann Glock (main supervisor) Prof. Dr. Paul Horwich Zurich, 2019 For Talia Abu- a dear friend and a fellow Joyce-ian Acknowledgements: Many individuals and institutions are owed a debt of gratitude for allowing me to complete this work. Chief among them are: the University of Zurich without whose generous Forschungskredit Candoc grant and institutional support, I would not have been able to work on this dissertation; Prof. H.J. Glock for his feedback, help, and for teaching me how to write; Prof. Paul Horwich for his encouragement and insightful criticism; Dr. Stefan Riegelnik for warmth, encouragement and helpful assistance; Dr. Catherine Herfeld for stimulating debates on philosophy of science; Mr. Fritz Senn for reminding me that there is more to nonsense than meets the eye; Dr. David Wörner and Mr. Lukas Winiker for endless conversations and fun; Mr. Pit Genot for providing an always critical yet sympathetic voice; the Department of Philosophy at the University of Zurich for always- fascinating workshops, lectures, conferences, and so on; The People of the City of Zurich for continuing their proud and noble tradition of offering homes to exiled madmen. “Don’t just do something; stand there!” -The White Rabbit “But if I never start, then I can always stop, for my eternal starting is my eternal stopping… It is always difficult for philosophy and philosophers to stop… The point is that I do not stop now but stopped where I began.” -S. Kierkegaard “Philosophy hasn’t made any progress?—If someone scratches where it itches, do we have to see progress?” -L. Wittgenstein List of Abbreviations of Wittgenstein’s Work:1 AWL= Wittgenstein’s Lectures: Cambridge 1932-1935 BLBK= The Blue Book BRBK= The Brown Book BT= Big Typescript: TS 213 CV= Culture and Value L&C= Lecture and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious Belief LFM= Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics: Cambridge 1939 LWPPO= Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions LWVC= Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle NB= Notebooks: 1914-1916 OC= On Certainty PG= Philosophical Grammar PI= Philosophical Investigations PI II= Philosophical Investigations: Part II/Philosophy of Psychology: A Fragment PO= Philosophical Occasions PR= Philosophical Remarks RFM= Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics TLP= Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus VoW= Voices of Wittgenstein: The Vienna Circle WiC= Wittgenstein in Cambridge: Letters and Documents 1911-1951 Z= Zettel 1 See bibliography for complete citation. Contents 0 INTRODUCTION: 2 0.0 Philosophy Does Not Begin nor Can It End: 2 0.1 Chapter-by-Chapter Guide: 6 0.2 Dialectics of the Dissertation- Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic and Clarifying Accounts: 9 Part I 1 THERAPEUTIC METAPHILOSOPHY: 14 1.0 A Partial Taxonomy: 14 1.1 Filling in the Taxonomy and Criticisms: 17 1.1.a Pure Therapy- TLP: 17 1.1.b Pure Therapy-TLP: Criticism: 22 1.1.c Moderate Therapy-TLP: 25 1.1.d Moderate Therapy-TLP: Criticism: 29 1.1.e Pure Therapy- Mixed 30 1.1.f Pure Therapy-Mixed: Criticism: 35 1.1.g Moderate Therapy- Mixed: 38 1.1.h Moderate Therapy-Mixed: Criticism 44 1.1.i Pure Therapy- PI 47 1.1.j Pure Therapy-PI: Criticism: 52 1.1.k Moderate Therapy-PI: 54 1.1.l Moderate Therapy-PI: Criticisms: 59 1.2 Therapy- Common Motifs and Common Criticisms: 64 1.3 The Key Uptake: 66 1.4 Summary: 67 2 ANTIPHILOSOPHICAL METAPHILOSOPHY: 68 2.0 What is Antiphilosophy? 70 2.1 Antiphilosophical Accounts of Wittgenstein's Metaphilosophy: 76 2.1.a Antiphilosophy-TLP: 77 2.1.b Antiphilosophy-TLP: Criticism: 80 2.1.c Mix-Antiphilosophy: 83 2.1.d Mix-Antiphilosophy: Criticism: 88 2.1.e Antiphilosophy-PI: 91 2.1.f Antiphilosophy-PI: Criticism: 93 2.2 Antiphilosophy and Wittgenstein: 96 2.3 The Key Uptake: 98 2.4 Summary: 98 3 ANTI-THEORETICAL METAPHILOSOPHY: 99 3.0 Diachronic Consistency- A Tragic View: 100 3.1 Later Wittgenstein's Consistent Method Against Theory: 106 3.2 Two End Games: 116 3.2.a Horwich's End Game: The-End-of-Philosophy: 116 3.2.b Irrationality and the Ends of Philosophy: 126 3.2.c From Forms of Logic to Forms of Life: 133 3.2.d Forms of Life, Silence, and The Mystical: 137 3.3 The Key Uptake: 141 3.4 Summary: 142 4 THE GRAMMATICAL METAPHILOSOPHICAL INTERPRETATION: 143 4.0 Wittgenstein’s Metaphilosophy From a Grammatical Point of View: 144 4.0.a Philosophy as Non-cognitive and Second Order: 144 4.0.b Rules; Constitutive and Implicit: 149 4.0.c Convention, Correction, and Implicit Constitutive Rules: 152 4.0.d Understanding, Circles, and the Immanence of Meaning: 158 4.0.e Perspicuous Representation as Focused Description: 160 4.0.f Metaphilosophy, Mapping Grammar, and Rationality: 164 4.0.g Summary: 168 4.1 Normative Descriptions, Constitutive Rules, and Forms of Life: 169 4.1.a Philosophical Statements and Constitutive Rules: 169 4.1.b Correct Uses and Meanings: 184 4.1.c Bare Normativity of Meaning and Non-Rationalism: 188 4.2 The Key Uptake: 192 4.3 Summary: 193 Part II 5 CHAPTER FIVE: CLEAR THINKING: THE PHILOSOPHY OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE TRACTATUS: 195 5.0 A Straightforward Reading and Straightforward Problems: 196 5.1 Distinctions, Differences, and Definitions; Oh My!: 202 5.2 Learning How to Think Clearly: 208 5.3 The TLP's Metaphilosophy: Simple Clear Thinking: 217 5.4 Conclusion: 223 6 CHAPTER 6: DESUBLIMATED LOGIC AND PRAGMATIC REPRESENTATION: 224 6.0 The Formal Aspects of Thoughts and Ghosts of the Third Realm: 224 6.1 A Diagnostic Examination of the TLP's Philosophy of Logic: 230 6.2 The Corrective: The Pragmatics of Representation: 233 6.3 Summary: 241 7 CHAPTER SEVEN: DESCRIPTION ALONE! THE METHOD OF THE PI: 243 7.0 Setting the Stage: 243 7.1 Described Descriptions: 251 7.2 PI § 109 and Describing in Philosophical Investigation: 261 7.3 Conclusion: 266 8 CHAPTER 8: LATER WITTGENSTEIN'S METAPHILOSOPHY: FINDING HOMES FOR WORDS: 267 8.0 Semantic Content, Picturing Facts, and the Pneuma of Understanding: 268 8.1 Reified Pictures and Pneumatic Problems: 272 8.2 Understanding(s): 277 8.3 Understanding and the Role of Philosophy: 288 8.4 Philosophy, Clarity, and Peace- a Close Reading of PI § 133: 298 8.5 Summary: 309 9 CONCLUSION: THE ENDS OF PHILOSOPHY AND TO “BEGIN” AGAIN (AND AGAIN): 311 1 0 Introduction: 0.0 Philosophy Does Not Begin nor Can It End: In many ways, Wittgenstein's reflections on the nature of philosophy, philosophical methodology, and the ends of philosophical investigation are among the most difficult and widely contested features of his thought. Indeed, the TLP, and its self-condemnation of nonsense, and the PI, and its insistence that philosophy cannot advance theses while seeming to advance many theses, are prima facie metaphilosophical absurdities. Thus, to take a representative and apt remark from an otherwise sympathetic philosopher, "Wittgenstein's work is full of very general remarks about what philosophy is, such as philosophy should propound no theses, or at least none that could be questioned. This is… the weakest part of his work….indeed, it seems to me that his actual practice belies them" (Dummett (1978), 434). This dissertation aims to offer an apt, coherent, and consistent interpretation of Wittgenstein's philosophy of philosophy (hereby, for ease of reference, "metaphilosophy"). By doing so, it seeks to show that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical reflections are not the weakest part of his work, one that his own practice belies, and so on. Instead, my overall objective is to show that Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical thoughts are, if anything, one of the most impressive, innovative, and profound features of his thought. Specifically, I argue that for Wittgenstein, both earlier and later, philosophy is best understood as a practice or activity. Further, pursuant to this, I also argue that the inherent result of this practice (when it is successful) is clarity. As it were, “to philosophize” is akin to an accomplishment verb and the end-state that it results in is clear thinking or understanding.2 In turn, this implies that the philosophy is internally connected to clear thoughts or perspicuous understanding in the same way that construction of a house (when it is successful) is internally connected to a house. As it were, philosophy simply is the process whereby one comes to have clear thoughts or a perspicuous understanding. Indeed, if this rather simple shift in emphasis from philosophy as a discipline to philosophy as a process (that may go on in a certain department in a university), is 2 cf. Vendler (1957) for the original discussion of “accomplishment verbs” 2 correct, then the way that much metaphilosophical inquiry is conducted may be deeply problematic. Specifically, much as Duhem (1991)'s brilliant work, The Aim and Structure of Scientific Theory, on scientific inquiry begins with an assessment of the aims of scientific theory, the structures that best accord with these aims, and the methods that most fruitfully realize these aims, so too does metaphilosophical inquiry into the nature of philosophy (e.g.
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