Power-Sharing in Nigeria

Central European University Department of Political Science Power-sharing The Element of Continuity in Nigerian Politics By Nkwachukwu Orji A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Supervisor Nenad Dimitrijevic Central European University - Budapest PhD Committee Raufu Mustapha, University of Oxford - UK CEU eTD Collection Cyril Obi, Nordic African Institute - Uppsala Budapest 2008 I hereby declare that this work contains no materials accepted for any other degrees in any other institutions. This thesis contains no materials previously written and/or published by another person, unless otherwise noted. CEU eTD Collection 1 Abstract This dissertation analyzes elements of continuity in Nigerian politics, focusing on the issues and forces underlying the conception, interpretation, procedures and practices of power- sharing. It challenges the “discontinuity perspective” adopted by most of the literature on Nigerian politics, which emphasizes conflicts and instability without adequately considering the stable, continuous and conflict management aspects of Nigerian politics. Intuitively, it seems justified to characterize Nigerian politics as discontinuous considering the seemly high incidence of institutional changes; however this is only a partial point of view. This study therefore argues that there is a deeper structure of political continuity that exists alongside institutional changes in Nigeria, which requires investigation, interpretation and explication. It suggests that this element of continuity can be found in the practice of power-sharing. The study presents explanations for the adoption, implementation and continuity of power-sharing in Nigeria. The research undertaken was based on process tracing method, involving a re- description of history based on review of published and unpublished literature, government documents, and media reports as well as interpretation of other available data. In framing the theoretical background of this study, I presented an understanding of power- sharing that draws from the three models of power-sharing – the consociational, incentivist, and tri-polar models. When applied to Nigeria, they reveal the existence of three dimensions of power-sharing in the country – the territorial, economic, and political. Five ethno-regional elite groups are identified as the major actors in the struggles for the distribution of territorial, CEU eTD Collection economic and political powers. In the course of their interactions, these groups devised three specific arrangements – creation of states, revenue allocation system, and office distribution system, as the frameworks for the implementation of power-sharing. These arrangements are 2 guided by principles such as population equivalence, federal character, zoning, fiscal centralization, and equality of states. The explanations for the continuity of power-sharing in Nigeria are based on the power- centered perspective of the path dependence framework. They are guided by two analytical premises drawn from observed empirical processes of power-sharing in Nigeria. The first premise underlines the convergence of interests of the dominant elite groups in favor of power-sharing since the 1970s. The convergence of interests is a function of the soul- searching that followed the end of the Nigerian civil war in 1970. The civil war was largely attributable to the zero-sum political competition between the dominant elite groups in the 1950s and 1960s. Consequently, the post-war era witnessed an elite consensus in favor of accommodation, equity, and stability in resource distribution and political governance. This consensus is informed by the relatively balanced elite power relations and the social position and preferences of the elites that made the post-war constitutions. The elite support for power-sharing is based on widely shared perception of the arrangement as the framework through which the various elite groups could realize their interests within non-violent distributive politics. The second explanation for the continuity of power-sharing in Nigeria is based on the premise that power-sharing in itself provides the context for the pacification of the marginal groups in the course of elite struggles for power. This presents power-sharing as a tolerable modality of mediating elite competition, since it reflects the interests of both the dominant and marginal elite groups. The data drawn from political developments in Nigeria CEU eTD Collection since 1970 largely support the above premises. Nigerian politics in the pre-1970 era contrast sharply with the post-1970 period, due to the adversarial elite behavior that dominated the former era compared to the relatively coalescent elite behavior that exists in the latter period. Thus, the observed continuity in Nigerian politics applies to the post-1970 period. 3 Acknowledgments In writing this dissertation I am indebted to many. First, I wish to thank my supervisor, Nenad Dimitrijevic for his invaluable guidance, criticisms and suggestions. His enthusiastic encouragement and support provided the necessary stimulus that helped me complete this dissertation. I also wish to express my sincere gratitude to my external supervisor, Cyril Obi who facilitated my visit to the Nordic African Institute, Uppsala. I owe him many thanks for sparing time from his busy schedule to read through my dissertation and for our numerous discussions, his instructive commentaries and constructive criticisms that helped me to fine- tune my work. My profound gratitude to Carol Harrington for the assistance and guidance I received from her. I wish to thank Zsolt Enyedi and Dorothy Bohle for the useful advice they gave me during the early stages of my research. I am grateful to the Central European University for awarding me a Doctoral Fellowship to undertake my studies, a Doctoral Research Grant to fund my field research in Nigeria, and a Doctoral Research Support Grant to conduct research in Sweden. The Nordic African Institute Uppsala accepted me as a guest researcher and gave me access to its facilities, for this I am very grateful. I benefited greatly from the comments of my colleagues during the departmental seminars and the Annual Doctoral Conferences, for which I want to thank them all. Eva Lafferthon, Kriszta Zsukotynszky, Robert Sata, Noemi Kakucs and Csendi Hopp were very helpful as program coordinators and I wish to express my appreciation to them. I acknowledge my debt to Serihy Pukas, Chris Willott and Alex Fischer, who read different versions of this dissertation and helped to better shape many of my ideas. I owe many thanks to Thanh and Merlinda Dickerson for the great love they showed me throughout my stay in Budapest. I wish to appreciate my friends who I learned a great deal from during my years in Budapest. I am grateful to my colleagues at Ebonyi State University Abakaliki, who nicely filled the gaps caused by my long absence in the department. Finally, words are not enough to thank Ihuoma, my wife and long time companion, who endured long lonely days while I was CEU eTD Collection away. It is to her and our young son, Dabi that I dedicate this work. 4 Table of Contents INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................................................................... 10 CHAPTER ONE. CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ....................................................... 19 1.0 INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................19 1.1 UNDERSTANDING POWER-SHARING.....................................................................................19 I. The consociational model........................................................................................ 20 II. The incentivist model ............................................................................................. 25 III. The tri-polar model............................................................................................. 29 1.2 THE STRUCTURE AND PROCESSES OF POWER-SHARING IN NIGERIA..........................31 1.3 EXPLAINING THE CONTINUITY OF POWER-SHARING IN NIGERIA................................32 I. Convergence of the interests of the dominant elite groups in favor of power-sharing ...... 37 II. Power-sharing as a pacification strategy.................................................................... 41 1.4 METHODOLOGY..........................................................................................................................43 I. Sources of data ...................................................................................................... 44 II. Data analysis and presentation ................................................................................. 45 CHAPTER TWO. THE ROOT OF POWER-SHARING ....................................................................................... 47 2.0 INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................47 2.1 COLONIALISM AND ETHNIC DIVERSITY IN NIGERIA........................................................48 I. Pre-colonial ethnic diversity summarized .................................................................. 48 II. Interpreting ethnic diversity I: the social distance thesis .............................................. 49 III. Interpreting ethnic diversity II: the

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