Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives), Volume 27, February, 1981 Chad, Page 30693 © 1931-2006 Keesing's Worldwide, LLC - All Rights Reserved. Developments March to December 1980 - Resurgence of Civil War - Mediation Efforts by OAU - Withdrawal of French Forces - Large-Scale Libyan Involvement - Defeat of Forces opposing President Oueddei - French Warnings to Libya

The national reconciliation accord signed by 11 Chad factions in the Nigerian capital of Lagos on Aug. 21, 1979[see page 30067], which led to the formation on Nov. 10 that year of a transitional Government of national unity comprising representatives of all these groups, broke down in March 1980 with the onset of fierce fighting in the Chad capital, Ndjamena.

Whereas in previous years the civil war in Chad had been fought mainly along regional and religious lines, such differences being largely between the Moslems in the north of the country and the Christian and animist Sara population in the south (the latter group having dominated the leadership of Chad from independence in 1960, firstly under President Tombalbaye until 1975 and later under President Malloum until his resignation in 1979— see page 30065), the latest hostilities involved mostly rival northern groups struggling for supremacy in the new Government.

The main protagonists were the Forces armées populaires (FAP) of Mr Goukouni Oueddei, President of the transitional Government of national unity, and the Forces armées du nord (FAN), led by Mr Hissene Habre, the Minister of State for Defence, Ex-Servicemen and Disabled Soldiers. The FAN and the FAP (both formerly members of Frolinat—the Front de liberation nationale du Tchad) together with other factions had retained armed forces in the capital in defiance of a provision in the Lagos accord calling for the demilitarization of Ndjamena by Feb. 5, 1980[see page 30067].

Fighting in Ndjamena continued throughout 1980; between 5,000 and 6,000 deaths and extensive damage were caused in the first part of the year alone, although neither side gained any significant ground during this period, while hostilities also spread to areas outside the capital later in the year. Numerous efforts to reconcile the opposing sides were made by the Organization of African Unity (OAU) but all proved unsuccessful. The situation in the war changed dramatically towards the end of 1980, however, following the large-scale intervention of Libyan troops, and in mid-December, faced with increasing attacks by forces loyal to President Oueddei supported by Libyan troops, the FAN evacuated its positions in Ndjamena. Following the takeover of the capital and other areas, the Governments of Chad and Libya in early January 1981 announced their decision to merge their two countries.[details of this and o;ther associated developments will be given in a subsequent articles.]

Fighting between the FAP of President Oueddei and the FAN of Mr Habre had broken out in Ndjamena by March 21, 1980, the President's forces being subsequently reinforced from outside the capital by the Forces armées tchadiennes (FAT), which were commanded by the Vice-President, Lt. -Col. Wadel Abdelkader Kamougue (a southerner and formerly in opposition to the northern groups), but which later withdrew from the fighting for several months; and (ii) the Front d'action commune (FAC), headed by Mr Acyl Ahmat, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Co-operation who was also leader of the Conseil democratique revolutionnaire (or "New Volcano").

Other members of the FAC were the Front populaire de libération (FPL), led by Mr Mohamat Abba Said, Minister of State for the Interior and security, and the Premiere armee Volcan (or First Army), led by Mr Abdoulaye Adoum Dana, Minister of Public Works, Mines and Geology. (i)Frolinat originel, headed by Dr Abba Sidick (Minister of Higher Education, Research and Scholarships), (ii) Frolinat fondamental, led by Mr Hadjaro Senoussi (Minister of Reconstruction and Land Management who was subsequently dismissed from the Cabinet— see below;) and also (iii) the Mouvement populaire pour la liberation du Chad (MPLT), whose leader, Mr Aboubakar Mahamat Abderaman, resigned on Aug. 11, 1980, because of "grave internal difficulties"— having been detained by members of his own group at the end of July as he was allegedly attempting to flee to Cameroon with large sums of money belonging to the MPL.]

The latest conflict had arisenwhen factions which had formerly not been aligned to the President had rallied behind him to repel what they viewed as an attempt by Mr Habre to ignore the August 1979 Lagos accord and to expand his area of influence in the country, the three leaders of the FAC moreover threatening to leave the Government if President Oueddei did not take action against Mr Habre. The President for his part said that Mr Habre was seeking to keep the French forces in Chad and that this was the main obstacle to implementing the Lagos accord (which called inter alia for their withdrawal— see below), while Mr Habre accused President Oueddei of being dominated by Libya (which supported the FAP, FAT and FAC). Against this background there were sporadic outbreaks of violence in late 1979 and early 1980, and on March 16 fighting broke out between the FAN and the FAC in Bokoro (some 130 miles east of Ndjamena). The hostilities then spread to the capital where by March 21the FAP in the northern (administrative) sector and the FAN in the south—each with approximately 3,000 men—began exchanging heavy cannon, mortar and machine-gun fire. The FAP was supported from the east by the FAC (Mr Ahmat reportedly moving elements south from bases in Libya) and also from the south by the FAT which was said to have fired indiscriminately at Mr Habre's positions causing numerous civilian casualties. Mr Habre', whose army was far better disciplined than those of the coalition forces (which were said to include many young teenagers), relied largely on captured arms and ammunition for supplies but was thought to have also received reinforcements and supplies from Abeche, a major FAN stronghold some 70 miles from the Sudanese border (and almost 400 miles north-east of Ndjamena), while according to some reports he also received support from Sudan and Egypt (both of whom feared Libyan involvement in Chad) although the Sudanese leadership in particular denied giving such aid.

In the first two months of fighting over 1,000 people were believed to have died; the majority of the remaining expatriate population in Ndjamena were evacuated by the French forces, while up to 80,000 refugees fled the Chad capital during this period.

Red Cross officials organized the burial of the dead and the removal of trapped civilians and the wounded from the streets of the capital and, together with French military medical teams, tended the wounded, many of whom were taken to field hospitals set up in theCameroon border town of Kousseri. That town was also the main place of refuge for thousands of civilians who fled across the Chari river to Cameroon with the help of the French forces. On April 2 President Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon set up a special committee to help the Chadian refugees.

In the first few weeks of the fighting numerous attempts to bring about a ceasefire were made by other countries, in particular by OAU member states (with President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo playing a leading role), but all agreements collapsed within a matter of hours.

Despite the initial reluctance of the rival sides to call a halt to the fighting President Oueddei nevertheless, in the course of an OAU economic summit held in Lagos on April 28–30[see 30557A], gave his approval to an OAU plan to send 2,000 troops from Congo, Benin andGuinea to Ndjamena (as had been envisaged under the 1979 Lagos accord). Also at the economic summit it was agreed to entrust the organization of a ceasefire in Chad to an OAU ad hoc committee (then comprising the heads of state of Guinea, Nigeria and Togo under the chairmanship of President Leopold Senghor of Senegal, currently interim chairman of the OAU) and also to establish a budget to finance peacekeeping efforts in Chad. The required budget was subsequently put at $60,000,000 by a meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers held in Freetown (Sierra Leone) on June 23–29 when the Chad crisis was further discussed.[ibid]

While negotiations to bring about a truce were conducted both within and outside Chad, fighting in Ndjamena between the rival groups intensified in mid-April. Moreover, on April 25, the transitional Government held a special meeting in the course of which it was decided to dismiss for "reasons of rebellion" Mr Habre, Mr Mahamat Saleh Ahmat, Minister of Finance, Construction and Materials, and Mr Hadjaro Senoussi, Minister of Reconstruction and Land Development, their portfolios being reallocated to the presidency.

The French Government on April 27 announced that it was to withdraw its remaining troops in Chad (although it would not recall the military medical teams there). The French statement said that this decision had been taken because the troops had "completed their mission of protection" in Chad, although President Oueddei said on April 28 that he had personally asked for them to be pulled out. The final withdrawal began on April 28 (coincidentally with the start of the OAU economic summit in Lagos— see above) and was completed by May 17. The French embassy in Ndjamena and the remaining foreigners in the capital to whom it had given protection-numbering about 900, of whom some 700 were French—moved to Cameroon on May 15 (all other diplomatic missions having been evacuated earlier); a consulate was thereupon set up in Moundou (some 240 miles south-east of Ndjamena) which kept in contact with some 60 French nationals who had remained in the south of Chad.

The French had previously, in March 1979, announced their decision to leave Chad but had been urged not to do so immediately by Mr Oueddei (who that month became head of state for the first time — see page 30065). In September 1979—in accordance with the Lagos agreement signed the previous month— France withdrew about 1,400 men but, again at the urging of President Oueddei (and also Mr Habre), delayed pulling out the remaining 1,100 men.[see page 30067]

French troops, which had been retained in the country following independence in 1960, had first given military assistance in Chad in 1968 in response to an appeal by President Tombalbaye for help in putting down a rebellion in the north of the country [see23073A]. In 1975,however (in which year President Tombalbaye was killed in a coup— see 27100A), the French Government complied with a demand by Chad to evacuate its military bases although it retained over 1,000 French co- operation workers, teachers and military advisers there[see 2745A], and in 1976 it concluded a military aid agreement[see 27744A]. In 1978 it was reported that France had sent a considerable number of combat troops—mostly paratroopers and members of the Foreign Legion-to Chad to support President Malloum in the face of large offensives launched by northern rebel groups.[see page 28977;page 29397- 98]

The position of the remaining French troops in Chad had become increasingly difficult since the resurgence of fighting in March 1980. The French had avoided participating in the battles (and had instead given aid to the wounded and to refugees, had maintained essential services such as electricity, water and oil supplies and had also offered their assistance in peace negotiations) although both President Oueddei and Mr Habre' had appealed for assistance. Nevertheless, groups loyal to the President accused the French of assisting Mr Habre' (whose appointment as Prime Minister in August 1978 the French had supported— see 29397 A-although they had traditionally backed the southernist Governments), and the Libyans-who had sought the removal of French troops from Chad for several years—-endorsed such allegations.

The current strained relations between France and Libya and the possibility of a confrontation between troops from the two countries in the Chad civil war was thought to have contributed to the French decision to leave Chad. Tension between France and Libya had been heightened at the beginning of the year following French military support for Tunisia after an attack had been launched on the Tunisian town of Gafsa in January allegedly with Libyan involvement[see pages 30262-63]. This led to attacks on the French embassy and cultural centre in Libya and the consequent recall of the French ambassador and his diplomatic staff from that country.[ibid.].[see also below for french warnings to Libya in late 1980.]

Prior to the withdrawal of the French troops, 550 Congolese soldiers who had arrived in Ndjamena in January 1980 as part of an OAU neutral force charged with supervising the ceasefire there were evacuated between March 30 and April 3 against a background of heavy fighting in the capital. This neutral force, which had been created under the August 1979 Lagos accord[see page 30067] was to have comprised also elements from Guinea and Benin.

(Earlier, in the first part of 1979, some 800 Nigerian troops had been sent to the Chad capital as part of an African neutral force but they had similarly proved unable to maintain law and order — see page 30066.) Fighting between the FAN and the coalition forces loyal to President Oueddei continued sporadically, and at times fiercely, in the capital and spread to the north of the country in the middle of 1980. On June 6, FAN elements were understood to have taken control of Faya-Largeau, the principal town in the mountainous northern Tibesti region (about 500 miles north-east of Ndjamena) which had hitherto been a major provincial base for the FAP. The capture of Faya-Largeau was said to have been achieved without fighting, a number of men having allegedly defected from the joint FAP/FAT/FAC forces based in the town (although this was denied by President Oueddei).

In the wake of this defeat and the withdrawal of the French from Chad, an eight-point "treaty of friendship" was signed on June 15 in the Libyan capital of Tripoli between the Chad transitional Government and Libya although details of its text were not made public by theLibyan leader, Col. Moamer al Kadhafi, until Sept. 28. The first article of the treaty declared that "both parties undertake to mutually defend each other in the event of one of the two parties being threatened by direct or indirect external aggression", while the other main points of the treaty, as detailed in Le Monde of Dec. 5, were as follows:

The two countries undertook to "exchange information regarding military plans and plans for internal and external security" (Art. II). Libya would contribute to the reconstruction of Chad in the sphere of its "economic and military plan" (Art. VI), while Chad would undertake not to permit the installation of any "foreign base" or ''military, colonialist or imperialist troops on its territory'' (Art. VII). The preamble of the treaty underlined the "spiritual, economic and human ties" between the two countries as well as bonds of "civilization" which had been formed by "geography and centuries of history between the two peoples".

In late 1980 reports were received in the West of the introduction of Libyan troops, supported by tanks and aircraft, into Chad to fight on the side of the coalition forces supporting President Oueddei. According to French and US estimates at least 3,000 troops, including an "Islamic Legion" under Libyan command, had entered Chad and had occupied areas in northern Chad (which they claimed were no longer effectively administered because of the war) and also in the centre of the country, including Douguia, some 40 miles north of Ndjamena, where they were said to have set up a staging area including a landing strip.

Libya had been involved militarily in northern Chad on a number of occasions in the past[see page 29399] and had more recently, while giving aid to several different Chadian factions, sent a large force into northern Chad in June 1979 which was, however, repelled[see page 30067]. Earlier, between 1973 and 1975 Libya had occupied the Aouzou strip along Chad's northern border, claiming that it belonged to Libya[see 28136B;27780C].

President Oueddei and Col. Kadhafi refused to reveal the extent of Libyan involvement, which Libyan leaders described as being merely "technical and humanitarian aid" provided in response to a request by the Chad Government. (There was however understood to be certain opposition to the Libyan involvement among the elements supporting the President, and Lt.-Col. Kamougue said that he did not recognize the existence of a friendship treaty between Libya and Chad.)

Following a number of earlier reports, the presence of Libyan troops in Chad was confirmed on Nov. 7 by M. Robert Galley, the French Minister of Co-operation, who stated that elements of an Islamic Legion had moved south from Libya into Chad and were actually participating in the conflict in Ndjamena. While initially he could not say how many troops were involved he subsequently, while addressing the foreign affairs commission of the French National Assembly on Dec. 11, estimated that the elements placed in Chad under Libyancommand totalled 4,000 men stationed at Douguia, Faya-Largeau and other areas north of the capital. US officials on Nov. 8 substantiated M. Galley's statement of the previous day and on Nov. 19 US military sources estimated that between 3,000 and 4,000 Libyans were "preparing to attack the[Chad] capital". (Subsequent French reports however suggested that in mid- December there were as many as 6,500 Libyan soldiers in Chad of whom 2,500 were in Ndjamena.)

The Islamic Legion was said to include soldiers from Libya and other Arab and African states, including Benin which was participating in the OAU mediation efforts. (President Kerekou of Benin had recently, in the course of a visit to Libya in September 1980, converted to Islam and had also signed a co-operation agreement with Col. Kadhafi— see 30646B.)

On Oct. 18, Libyan Air Force planes were said to have attacked areas around Faya- Largeau while fighting between FAN elements and Libyan (or Libyan-backed) troops took place on the ground, and by the end of October President Oueddei had regained control of Faya-Largeau and nearby areas hitherto held by the FAN. On several occasions in mid-October, and again on Nov. 5 and Nov. 7, Libyan aircraft attacked Mr Habrés positions in Ndjamena; on or around Nov. 18, a new ground offensive was launched by the Libyan-backed coalition forces against the FAN in the capital but this failed to dislodge Mr Habre&-given its protection to the remaining 60,000 civilians in the capital and helped to maintain essential services, run the hospital with the help of volunteers and bury the dead.) Against this background the OAU ad hoc committee on Chad (whose membership was now stated to be Benin, Togo, Congo and Guinea), after holding inconclusive meetings since the June Council of Ministers' meeting in Freetown, 'came together again in the Togolesecapital of Lome´ on Nov. 27–28 under the joint chairmanship of President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone (current OAU Chairman) and President Eyadema of Togo. At the end of their meeting the ad hoc committee issued a communique´; on a ceasefire agreement (which had initially been drawn up at an earlier meeting in Lome´ in mid-October attended by both President Oueddei and Mr Habre´ but which failed to bring immediate results) the main points of which were as follows:

(1)"A ceasefire shall be observed throughout Chad territory with effect from Dec. 15, 1980, at midnight local time.

(2)"A ceasefire monitoring commission, comprising representatives from Benin, Congo, Guinea, Togo and Sierra Leone, headed by the OAU Secretary- General or his representative, shall go to Ndjamena to see the implementation of the ceasefire.

(3)"Benin, Congo, Guinea and Togo shall send contingents to set up a neutral peacekeeping force. If necessary, the United Nations shall be consulted for the provision of the necessary assistance for peacekeeping in Chad.

(4)"The city of Ndjamena shall be demilitarized. All persons shall be disarmed. All hidden arms and ammunition depots shall be taken over and placed under the control of the neutral forces. All troops shall be withdrawn from the capital [to a radius of 100 km].

(5)"In the event of any violation by any of the parties of the ceasefire, such violation being established by the ceasefire monitoring commission,… appropriate action will be taken against the party concerned."

The ceasefire agreement was signed by the heads of state of Togo, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Benin, by the OAU Secretary-General (Mr Edem Kodjo) and also by President Oueddei. Mr Habre', on the other hand, declared on Nov. 28 that he was not prepared to come to Lome and sign the agreement as long as the OAU refused to denounce the "Libyan invasion" of Chad and to expel from the peace negotiations "Libyan agents".

This was a reference to President Kerekou of Benin, who, as stated above, had recently established closer ties with Libya, and also to Mr Kodjo, the (Togolese) Secretary-General of the OAU. However, at the end of their meeting on Nov. 28 the ad hoc committee issued a separate document which inter alia demanded the "immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces present in Chad", urged all countries to abstain from "intervening in the internal affairs of Chad" and also called on Nigeria to convene as soon as possible a meeting of all the signatory countries of the Lagos accord of 1979.

On Dec. 6 Chadian forces loyal to President Oueddei, backed by some 2,000 Libyan troops, Mirage fighter aircraft and T-54 and T-55 Soviet-built tanks (used for the first time in the war), launched a major offensive against Mr Habre´s positions in Ndjamena. The FAN, however, succeeded in withstanding the onslaught for several days (winning renewed support from the local population) and inflicted heavy casualties on the coalition forces although there was also a high civilian death toll.

However, notwithstanding their earlier resistance to the Libyan-backed onslaughts, the FAN during the night of Dec. 14–15 evacuated their positions in the capital and the President's forces and Libyan soldiers thereupon took control of the city and imposed a curfew. Many FAN fighters, together with Mr Habre´; (and up to 10,000 civilians) fled to Cameroon, while others retreated to Abeche', although this town was also taken over by the coalition forces on Dec. 17. Ati, a key town halfway between Ndjamena and Abeche', had already fallen on Dec. 11.

(The operations of the government and Libyan forces in and around Abe´che´ gave rise to an exodus of civilians to nearby Sudan, sources in that country stating on Dec. 30 that so far 8,000 Chadian refugees had reached the south of Sudan.)

Upon reaching Cameroon Mr Habre' travelled first to Maroua (some 180 miles south- west of Ndjamena) and then boarded an aircraft for the capital, Yaounde´;, where he was received by President Ahidjo and, on the latter's urging, on Dec. 16 signed the ceasefire agreement already signed by President Oueddei on Nov. 28[see above]. Mr Habre´ declared at the same time, however, that he considered the Chad transitional Government "illegal" and that he would continue his struggle against it, and also reiterated his objection to the participation of Libya and Benin in negotiations on the settlement of the Chad conflict.

According to a report in Le Monde of early January 1981, Chadian authorities were in late December concerned that Mr Habre´; and his followers were using the territory of "certain neighbouring countries'' to relaunch their fight against President Oueddei, and on Dec. 30the Chad press agency denounced what it described as "subversive manoeuvres noisily orchestrated" by Mr Habre´;s forces in Cameroon (which country had refused to give Mr Habre´ political asylum). On Dec. 26 President Oueddei had described Mr Habre' as a "great criminal", said that efforts were under way to secure his extradition and announced that a special court of justice would shortly be set up to try him.

A conference organized by the Chad ad hoc committee was held in Lagos on Dec. 23– 24 and was attended by 11 heads of state (including President Oueddei), the Libyan Foreign Minister (Dr Ah Abdessalam at Turayki) and the Sudanese Industry Minister (Mr Izzeldin Hamid). Mr Habre´; was asked not to attend. President Oueddei had arrived at the conference only after considerable persuasion, having initially, on Dec. 21, described the holding of a reconciliation meeting as' 'nonsense" and indicated that he was only interested in the holding of a conference to deal with the rebuilding of Chad, which, he said, was first and foremost the responsibility of the French Government.

Following President Oueddei's remarks the OAU Chairman, President Stevens, described the main points of the conference as(i) the establishment of an interim government of national unity; (ii) the holding of elections and the formulation of a political programme; (iii) aid and national reconstruction; and (iv) repatriation, including the rehabilitation of Chadian refugees.

The Lagos conference however ended in failure on Dec. 24 as the participants were unable to reach agreement on a final communique´, considerable disagreement having arisen over demands by certain countries that the text should include a call for the withdrawal of Libyantroops from Chad.

At the beginning of the conference seven countries—'Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Guinea, Niger, Senegal, Sudan and Togo‐-had tabled a draft resolution which inter alia called for the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Chad and in addition demanded an end toLibyan involvement not only in the internal affairs of Chad but also of certain West African states[see also below]. However, five of the other six countries participating in the conference, namely Benin, Congo, Libya itself, Nigeria and Sierra Leone (President Oueddei arriving in Lagos after the talks had commenced), moved a series of amendments with the result that the resolution made no specific mention or criticism of Libya. The Nigerian head of state, President Shagari, in particular refused to support a specific attack on another country in the final resolution (although he was known to be anxious about Libyan involvement in the internal affairs of certain African countries and himself expelled Libyan diplomats in early 1981 — see below).

The changes to the draft resolution prompted a sharp attack from the Sudanese delegation whose leader, Mr Hamid, criticized President Stevens for "managing the conference session in a manner not conducive to reaching agreement between the participating delegates" and also attacked the host country, Nigeria, for having in his view "changed its declared position since the Libyan intervention in Chad", "completely confirmed the Libyan viewpoint" and "exerted pressure on certain other countries to change their positions and accept the status quo in Chad". Mr Hamid added that Sudan rejected "any formulation of a statement which does not clearly refer to the Libyan occupation and the need for the immediate withdrawal of Libya from Chad" (the Sudanese head of state, President Nemery, having earlier, on Dec. 20, made an "urgent appeal" to Col. Kadhafi to withdraw his troops from Chad "in the interests of peace in that country").

In the event the six countries opposed to specific mention of Libya in the resolution— Benin, Chad, Congo, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Libya itself-reportedly put their signatures to a communique on Dec. 24 which inter alia advised that no foreign troops should be stationed inChad "except in accordance with the provisions of the Lagos accord". Other points of this communiqué which were apparently not disputed were appeals to the Government and people of Chad to work towards achieving national unity, to organize elections in collaboration with the United Nations by the end of January 1982 and to allow a monitoring force to be stationed in Chad, to ensure that these elections were free and fair. In addition the United Nations was urged to "render all possible assistance" to the transitional Government and to "co-operate with it in its programme of national reconstruction", while the OAU Secretary-General was called upon to arrange a further conference to deal with aid for the rebuilding of Chad.

Prior to the fall of Ndjame´na the office of the French Presidency had on Dec. 13 issued a warning to Libya (although not specifically mentioning that country's name), stating that France was "gravely concerned at the latest deterioration in Chad caused by the intervention of foreign forces" and pledging "support for any collective effort by African states to restore peace in Chad, preserve its unity and maintain its independence"; earlier, on Nov. 24, France had expressed its "grave preoccupation" at the situation in Chad and at the "new dimension" created by the introduction of "foreign armed elements".

On Dec. 22 M. Jean Francois-Poncet, the French Foreign Minister, told Mr Ahmed al- Shahati, Secretary of the Libya Foreign Liaison Bureau (and widely regarded as being more influential than the Foreign Minister, Dr at Turayki), who had arrived in Paris on Dec. 19, thatFrance, while supporting the efforts of the forthcoming Lagos conference to find a "peaceful and lasting settlement" to the Chad conflict, insisted on the principle that other countries should respect Chad's independence and territorial integrity and should not interfere in that country's internal affairs.

The French communique of Dec. 13 (which the Chad Government on Dec. 14 said was incomprehensible as it came at a time "when the end of the war was near in Ndjame´na and elsewhere in the country") caused considerable speculation that France was preparing to reintroduce troops in Chad or to intervene militarily in some other way if Libya did not withdraw. Earlier, on Nov. 27, France had sent four Jaguar aircraft and ground support aircraft to Gabon in what was seen as a reaction to Libya's growing involvement in Chad.

According to Le Monde on Dec. 17, later reports had indicated that the French statements of Dec. 13 had been intended to encourage Mr Habre´ to sign the Lome´ ceasefire agreement by promising to support its execution. France would, if necessary, provide logistics for the African peacekeeping force in Chad, and would intervene more directly if the Libyan forces, in contravention of the ceasefire agreement, were not withdrawn from Ndjame´na. (On Dec. 18 President Oueddei accused France of organizing the signing of the ceasefire agreement by Mr Habre´ with a view to "jeopardizing the victory of the government forces over the rebellion".)

French intervention in Chad had been urged by a number of African (principally West African) countries, several of which had expressed their concern not only at Libya's involvement in Chad but also in their own internal affairs. A number had moreover either broken off diplomatic relations or taken other action against Libya in 1980.

President Senghor of Senegal, who had on a number of occasions in 1980 accused Libya of attempting to disrupt Chad, Mali and Niger as well as his own country with a view of creating a "Saharan Islamic republic" under Libyan domination, broke off diplomatic relations onJuly 1[see 30647A]. On Oct. 29 The Gambia also severed ties with Libya[see 30687, while Gabon and Ghana were reported, on July 30 and Nov. 17 respectively, to have decided to expel Libyan diplomatic staff. In late December Mauritania asked certain Libyandiplomats to leave the country and announced its decision to close down the Libyan cultural centre in Nouakchott, and in early January 1981 both Nigeria and Niger expelled Libyan diplomatic staff. (Both Niger and Mauritania—as well as Mali—had Tuareg populations which Col. Kadhafi had allegedly sought to persuade were of Islamic and Arab origin.)

The refusal of Libya to heed the French warnings and the success of the Libyan troops in Chad (who had transported up to 60 tanks as well as heavy artillery across several hundred miles of desert terrain) was seen both within and outside France as representing a severe defeat for French policy in Africa. Moreover, the failure of the French to halt the Libyans' involvement in Chad was criticized by several leaders in West Africa, one of whom, President Bongo of Gabon, declared on Dec. 29 that France had not fulfilled its responsibilities towards Chad and had abandoned that country to "subversion" exerted by "certain large powers, letting Chadians "kill one another". (Le Monde - Neue Zurcher Zeitung - New York Times - International Herald Tribune - Guardian - Times - Sunday Times - Financial Times - Daily Telegraph - Economist - BBC Summary of World Broadcasts)(Prev. rep. Chad Internal Affairs and Relations with Libya and France 30261A)

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