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American Nuclear Policy Toward the French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons Programs, 1961-1976

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American Nuclear Policy Toward the French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons Programs, 1961-1976 HELP, HINDER, OR HESITATE: AMERICAN NUCLEAR POLICY TOWARD THE FRENCH AND CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS, 1961-1976 Joshua T. Holloway A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS May 2019 Committee: Walter E. Grunden, Advisor Marc V. Simon © 2019 Joshua T. Holloway All Rights Reserved iii ABSTRACT Walter E. Grunden, Advisor The purpose of this study is to examine American nuclear policy toward the French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs between the years 1961 and 1976 in order to provide a comprehensive narrative utilizing two parallel case studies of bilateral American nuclear policies. This is accomplished by examining United States government documents obtained from the Foreign Relations of the United States series and the Cold War International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars according to a method of policy analysis based primarily on a six-step model developed by Garry D. Brewer and Peter deLeon. The thesis examines two case studies of bilateral nuclear policies between the United States and France and the People’s Republic of China, characterizing the formation and enactment of each bilateral policy chronologically according to the six-step model in order to provide a fuller picture of the development of American nuclear policy during 1961-1976 than was possible for previous scholarship for which many of these documents remained unavailable. The study argues that US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies saw great changes between the Kennedy and Ford years. US officials explored using aid to the French nuclear weapons program to influence French foreign policy, but eventually severed US-Franco nuclear ties under the Johnson administration in response to Charles de Gaulle’s increasing hostility toward the United States. Nixon officials reversed this policy and provided direct aid to de Gaulle’s successors, eventually expanding aid under the Ford administration in order to shift French foreign policy in line with American interests. Conversely, American officials explored means iv to stop Chinese proliferation under Kennedy and Johnson, including preemptive American military action, but warmed to Chinese rapprochement by the end of the Johnson era. Nixon officials continued this rapprochement and unilaterally eased nuclear tensions by removing American nuclear weapons from Taiwan while simultaneously protecting Chinese nuclear facilities from Soviet military action, a policy which the Ford administration continued in spite of briefly cooled relations. The broad narrative that this thesis presents gives context and expands upon past literature through providing a more complete picture of American nuclear policy. v For my parents, Drs. Thomas and Kathy Holloway vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The author would like to thank, first and foremost, the advisor of this thesis, Dr. Walter Grunden, for his advocacy, mentoring, and friendship throughout both the development of this project and the author’s entire academic career at Bowling Green State University. The author would also like to thank Dr. Marc Simon, also on the thesis committee, for consistently asking challenging questions and pushing this study to be its best possible version. Additionally, the author would like to thank Dr. Gary Hess for his kind words of encouragement and suggestions on an earlier version of this project. Finally, the author thanks the United States Department of State and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for making the documents this project examines available easily and freely online and encourages any reader who finds them interesting to explore them further using the corresponding hyperlinks in the bibliography of this study. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...................................... 1 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 2 Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 8 CHAPTER II. US-FRANCO NUCLEAR POLICY, 1961-1976: NUCLEAR PROHIBITION AND NUCLEAR ENABLING ............................................................................................. 33 The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 ................................................................ 34 The Johnson Administration, 1963-1968 .................................................................. 49 The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 ..................................................................... 59 The Ford Administration, 1974-1976 ....................................................................... 72 Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 76 CHAPTER III. US-SINO NUCLEAR POLICY, 1961-1976: FROM NUCLEAR THREATS TO NUCLEAR PROTECTION .................................................................................................. 81 The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 ................................................................ 82 The Johnson Administration, 1963-1968 .................................................................. 91 The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 ..................................................................... 105 The Ford Administration, 1974-1976 ....................................................................... 126 Chapter Summary ..................................................................................................... 128 CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................... 132 The Kennedy and Johnson Eras ................................................................................ 132 The Nixon and Ford Eras .......................................................................................... 139 Final Summary .......................................................................................................... 147 viii BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................. 149 Primary Sources ........................................................................................................ 149 Secondary Sources .................................................................................................... 174 APPENDIX A. FIGURES .................................................................................................... 178 ix ABBREVIATIONS ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency AEC Atomic Energy Commission CCP Chinese Communist Party CIA Central Intelligence Agency CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States GPO Government Printing Office IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile JCAE [Congressional] Joint Committee on Atomic Energy JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff KT Kiloton LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle MLF Multilateral Force MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile MRV Multiple Reentry Vehicle NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NIE National Intelligence Estimate NPT Nonproliferation Treaty (1968) NSAM National Security Action Memorandum NSC National Security Council x NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum NSSM National Security Study Memorandum PRC People’s Republic of China ROC Republic of China SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SAM Surface-to-Air Missile SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1 CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW On February 13, 1960, France became the world’s fourth nuclear power after successfully detonating a nuclear device in the Algerian desert. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) became the world’s fifth nuclear power less than half of a decade later on October 16, 1964 after exploding their own device in the deserts of northwest China. These developments significantly altered the political calculus of the United States (US), which formerly only needed to worry about the effects of nuclear proliferation from an explicit adversary, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), and an explicit ally and junior nuclear partner, the United Kingdom (UK). The introduction of the French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs into the international system confounded this original dynamic, even though France was ostensibly an American ally and the PRC an American adversary, as both nations would see much more fluidity in their relations vis-à-vis the US during the 1960s and 1970s than would either the UK or USSR. Although the emergence of France and the PRC as nuclear powers in the 1960s has been acknowledged in works assessing US policy in the context of overall support for proliferation or nonproliferation, there is a gap in the literature assessing the development of bilateral US nuclear policy in relation to individual nuclear weapons states. Additionally, while US government documentation regarding bilateral nuclear policy has been released over time, no studies known to this author offer an analysis of US nuclear policy toward individual foreign nuclear weapons programs as a continuous process marked by particular stages as in the “policy cycle” methodology commonly applied in policy history.
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