HELP, HINDER, OR HESITATE: AMERICAN NUCLEAR POLICY TOWARD THE FRENCH AND CHINESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAMS, 1961-1976
Joshua T. Holloway
A Thesis
Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS
May 2019
Committee:
Walter E. Grunden, Advisor
Marc V. Simon
© 2019
Joshua T. Holloway
All Rights Reserved iii
ABSTRACT
Walter E. Grunden, Advisor
The purpose of this study is to examine American nuclear policy toward the French and
Chinese nuclear weapons programs between the years 1961 and 1976 in order to provide a comprehensive narrative utilizing two parallel case studies of bilateral American nuclear policies. This is accomplished by examining United States government documents obtained from the Foreign Relations of the United States series and the Cold War International History
Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars according to a method of policy analysis based primarily on a six-step model developed by Garry D. Brewer and Peter deLeon. The thesis examines two case studies of bilateral nuclear policies between the United
States and France and the People’s Republic of China, characterizing the formation and enactment of each bilateral policy chronologically according to the six-step model in order to provide a fuller picture of the development of American nuclear policy during 1961-1976 than was possible for previous scholarship for which many of these documents remained unavailable.
The study argues that US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies saw great changes between the
Kennedy and Ford years. US officials explored using aid to the French nuclear weapons program to influence French foreign policy, but eventually severed US-Franco nuclear ties under the Johnson administration in response to Charles de Gaulle’s increasing hostility toward the
United States. Nixon officials reversed this policy and provided direct aid to de Gaulle’s successors, eventually expanding aid under the Ford administration in order to shift French foreign policy in line with American interests. Conversely, American officials explored means iv
to stop Chinese proliferation under Kennedy and Johnson, including preemptive American military action, but warmed to Chinese rapprochement by the end of the Johnson era. Nixon officials continued this rapprochement and unilaterally eased nuclear tensions by removing
American nuclear weapons from Taiwan while simultaneously protecting Chinese nuclear facilities from Soviet military action, a policy which the Ford administration continued in spite of briefly cooled relations. The broad narrative that this thesis presents gives context and expands upon past literature through providing a more complete picture of American nuclear policy.
v
For my parents, Drs. Thomas and Kathy Holloway
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank, first and foremost, the advisor of this thesis, Dr. Walter
Grunden, for his advocacy, mentoring, and friendship throughout both the development of this project and the author’s entire academic career at Bowling Green State University. The author would also like to thank Dr. Marc Simon, also on the thesis committee, for consistently asking challenging questions and pushing this study to be its best possible version. Additionally, the author would like to thank Dr. Gary Hess for his kind words of encouragement and suggestions on an earlier version of this project. Finally, the author thanks the United States Department of
State and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for making the documents this project examines available easily and freely online and encourages any reader who finds them interesting to explore them further using the corresponding hyperlinks in the bibliography of this study.
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW ...... 1
Methodology ...... 2
Literature Review ...... 8
CHAPTER II. US-FRANCO NUCLEAR POLICY, 1961-1976: NUCLEAR PROHIBITION
AND NUCLEAR ENABLING ...... 33
The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 ...... 34
The Johnson Administration, 1963-1968 ...... 49
The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 ...... 59
The Ford Administration, 1974-1976 ...... 72
Chapter Summary ...... 76
CHAPTER III. US-SINO NUCLEAR POLICY, 1961-1976: FROM NUCLEAR THREATS TO
NUCLEAR PROTECTION ...... 81
The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963 ...... 82
The Johnson Administration, 1963-1968 ...... 91
The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974 ...... 105
The Ford Administration, 1974-1976 ...... 126
Chapter Summary ...... 128
CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS ...... 132
The Kennedy and Johnson Eras ...... 132
The Nixon and Ford Eras ...... 139
Final Summary ...... 147 viii
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 149
Primary Sources ...... 149
Secondary Sources ...... 174
APPENDIX A. FIGURES ...... 178
ix
ABBREVIATIONS
ACDA Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AEC Atomic Energy Commission
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
GPO Government Printing Office
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
JCAE [Congressional] Joint Committee on Atomic Energy
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
KT Kiloton
LTBT Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963)
MIRV Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicle
MLF Multilateral Force
MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile
MRV Multiple Reentry Vehicle
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIE National Intelligence Estimate
NPT Nonproliferation Treaty (1968)
NSAM National Security Action Memorandum
NSC National Security Council
x
NSDM National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM National Security Study Memorandum
PRC People’s Republic of China
ROC Republic of China
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM Surface-to-Air Missile
SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
UN United Nations
US United States
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1
CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
On February 13, 1960, France became the world’s fourth nuclear power after successfully detonating a nuclear device in the Algerian desert. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) became the world’s fifth nuclear power less than half of a decade later on October 16, 1964 after exploding their own device in the deserts of northwest China. These developments significantly altered the political calculus of the United States (US), which formerly only needed to worry about the effects of nuclear proliferation from an explicit adversary, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics (USSR), and an explicit ally and junior nuclear partner, the United Kingdom (UK).
The introduction of the French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs into the international system confounded this original dynamic, even though France was ostensibly an American ally and the PRC an American adversary, as both nations would see much more fluidity in their relations vis-à-vis the US during the 1960s and 1970s than would either the UK or USSR.
Although the emergence of France and the PRC as nuclear powers in the 1960s has been acknowledged in works assessing US policy in the context of overall support for proliferation or nonproliferation, there is a gap in the literature assessing the development of bilateral US nuclear policy in relation to individual nuclear weapons states. Additionally, while US government documentation regarding bilateral nuclear policy has been released over time, no studies known to this author offer an analysis of US nuclear policy toward individual foreign nuclear weapons programs as a continuous process marked by particular stages as in the “policy cycle” methodology commonly applied in policy history. This thesis seeks to nuance the narrative of nuclear proliferation history by providing two parallel case studies of the development and enactment of US nuclear policy toward the fourth and fifth publicly acknowledged nuclear 2
weapons programs in France and the PRC, respectively, during the years of the Kennedy,
Johnson, Nixon, and Ford administrations.1 In particular, this study will assess documents from the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series in conjunction with documents from the French Nuclear History and Chinese Nuclear History collections of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars Cold War International History Project to form a continuous, chronological analysis of individual bilateral US nuclear policy toward both the French and
Chinese nuclear weapons programs spanning from the Kennedy through Ford years. As much of the literature on US nuclear policy and nonproliferation more broadly was written before documents from the entirety of 1961-1976 became available, this study represents an opportunity to evaluate the conclusions of earlier scholarship that were based on an incomplete documentary record by providing detailed chronological accounts of the formation of US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies during 1961-1976 rather than discontinuous snapshots of bilateral US nuclear policies that have been presented in the past.
Methodology
The analytical framework utilized by this study to present US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies from 1961 to 1976 is a combination of two policy analysis methodologies. It leans heavily on a process outlined by Garry Brewer and Peter deLeon and is reinforced by a similar one developed by Brian Hogwood and Lewis Gunn. Brewer and deLeon’s method is defined by six chronological, yet often overlapping, stages: initiation, estimation, selection, implementation, evaluation, and termination. Initiation begins the process after the policy
1 This study focuses specifically on the narrow aspect of two case studies of bilateral nuclear policies of these administrations. For more general accounts on the four men who served as US Presidents from 1961-1976 and their lives, see Robert Dalleck’s books on Kennedy and Johnson, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963 (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 2003) and Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), John A Farrell’s book on Nixon, Richard Nixon: The Life (New York: Vintage Books, 2017), and James Cannon’s book on Ford, Gerald R. Ford: An Honorable Life (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013). 3
problem is identified and efforts to define the problem further are undertaken, with creativity taking precedence over practicality. This is followed by estimation, wherein various government intelligence and science organs utilize empirical data to assess the risk-reward balances, potential consequences, and feasibility of proposed actions toward the problem. Once these assessments are finished policymakers move to the next stage, selection, after choosing to either pursue an action developed through the earlier two stages or take no action at all. If an action is chosen, it is then performed in the fourth stage, implementation, by (typically) non-policymakers who physically enact the plan, begin the program, or initiate the action as dictated by the selection stage. After the policy has been implemented the process moves into the fifth stage of evaluation, at which point the policy is retrospectively assessed for its relative success or failure, efficacy, efficiency, and any other specific criteria relevant to the given policy. The sixth and final stage, termination, occurs after the results of the evaluation stage indicate a policy should be ended, adjusted, or taken back to the initiation stage if novel or additional problems were identified through evaluation.2 This framework is a simple but effective way to visualize the various and complex individual components that contribute to the whole of nuclear policy formation and execution. However, the sixth stage of termination is undeveloped and vague in comparison to the other five, a flaw acknowledged by the authors since ending a policy does not necessarily indicate an end or resolution of the problem(s) the policy addressed.3 As such, the analytical framework this study utilizes will modify the termination phase to maintenance, succession, or termination based on the final stage of Hogwood and Gunn’s similar, but more detailed, policy analysis process. This method better represents the reality that the problems that
2 Garry D. Brewer and Peter deLeon, The Foundations of Policy Analysis (Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1983), 17-21. 3 Ibid., 20-21. 4
nuclear policies attempt to address obviously do not disappear simply because a given policy may no longer be enforced. Rather, maintenance, succession, or termination imply more accurately that the policy process is fluid and often cyclical rather than rigid and strictly linear.4
Applying the modified Brewer-deLeon model to general US nonproliferation policy history provides an illustrative example for greater explanatory clarity and broader context.
Initiation of US nonproliferation policy began as Truman officials, and Eisenhower officials even more so, identified French, Israeli, and Chinese proliferation efforts during the 1950s as potential problems following the successful explosion of Soviet and British nuclear devices in
1949 and 1952, respectively. Officials in these administrations, and continuing into the Kennedy administration, gathered intelligence on foreign nuclear weapons programs and studied how to react to foreign proliferation in the estimation stage of nonproliferation policy formation.
Kennedy and Johnson officials, following their experiences during the Cuban Missile Crisis and based on the data and analysis accrued during the estimation stage, eventually made a policy selection for the US not to support foreign proliferation efforts. The Johnson administration followed this policy selection with the implementation stage, wherein they worked in tandem with their Soviet counterparts for several years in the latter half of the 1960s to pass the 1968
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in order to restrain foreign proliferation efforts outside the US-
Soviet sphere. Nixon officials underwent evaluation of this policy and practiced maintenance of it through the 1970 ratification of the NPT at the United Nations (UN), but ultimately chose a succession of the policy with one that was more supportive of American and foreign proliferation during the 1970s.5 This example demonstrates how the application of the modified Brewer-
4 Brian W. Hogwood and Lewis A. Gunn, Policy Analysis for the Real World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 10. 5 This example draws from Chapters 3 through 9 of Shane Maddock’s book, Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 5
deLeon stages can provide an easy to follow, logical narrative of the complex process of policy formation, in this case, that of general nonproliferation policy. The similar application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method to US government documentation from the FRUS series and the Wilson Center regarding individual bilateral US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies provides both a comprehensible chronology of US policies toward the French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs and a means to analyze the distinctive differences and similarities between these policies over time as they were simultaneously developed and enacted in parallel with one another in a novel way.
Through utilizing the modified Brewer-deLeon policy method, this study argues that US nuclear policy toward the French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs underwent substantial changes between the Kennedy and Ford administrations. Kennedy officials initially investigated aiding the French nuclear weapons program as a means to influence French President Charles de
Gaulle’s diverging foreign policy but reconsidered after de Gaulle’s increasingly hostile rhetoric made apparent he would not be dissuaded from his own foreign policy path. The Kennedy administration also viewed Chinese proliferation as unacceptable and examined multiple options to stop or delay the Chinese nuclear weapons program from progressing. The Johnson administration continued Kennedy’s policy and blocked all American avenues of support to the
French nuclear weapons program while choosing not to preemptively act against Chinese nuclear facilities. Johnson officials would eventually come to see rapprochement with the Chinese as possible and began signaling their intent for improved US-Sino relations by the end of their time in office, but continued to refuse aid to the French nuclear weapons program because of de
2010), and Chapters 2 through 6 of Francis Gavin’s book, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012). The primary arguments of both books are addressed in greater detail in the Literature Review. 6
Gaulle’s interminable obstinacy toward US interests. The Nixon administration continued
Johnson’s efforts toward Chinese rapprochement by gradually withdrawing US nuclear weapons from Taiwan to lower mutual nuclear tensions and subsequently decided to shield Chinese nuclear facilities from preemptive Soviet action as a means to maintain the integrity of the international system and stave off further Soviet aggression abroad. Nixon officials also reattempted providing aid to the French nuclear weapons program in post-de Gaulle France as a means to reorient French foreign policy and prevent the formation of an adversarial European bloc organized by its opposition to American interests. The Ford administration continued to maintain measures put in place by Nixon officials to lower US-Sino nuclear tensions and prevent
Soviet aggression toward Chinese nuclear facilities even as US-Sino relations stagnated at the time, preserving previous gains made in improving US-Sino relations and working toward the full normalization of relations. Ford officials expanded upon Nixon era aid to the French nuclear weapons program and contemplated avenues of further aid as US-Franco relations saw vast improvement and the beginnings of a reorientation of French foreign policy to a more friendly, less anti-American line.
Another crucial element for understanding and interpreting the decisions of policymakers as revealed in this study is the concept of political realism as applied to international relations.
W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz defines realists as those who “consider the principal actors in the international arena to be states, which are concerned with their own security, act in pursuit of their own national interests, and struggle for power.” Realists contrast with idealists or liberal internationalists, who emphasize more cooperative means informed by ethical or ideological convictions to achieve their international relations goals, by seeking pragmatic solutions principally concerned with power politics maneuvering enacted through conflict and 7
competition.6 Addressing realism in the context of this study is necessary as American, French, and Chinese leaders within the scope of the study interpreted the international order through a realist lens and often tended to act according to the stipulations of the theory. Previous literature reviewed and addressed by this study also largely uses realist analyses to interpret the actions and dispositions of government officials during this timeframe. A realist interpretation also underpins the divergence between the stated, public policy and actual, clandestine policy of multiple state actors as revealed through the application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method in this study, with the most brazen example being the Nixon administration’s public support for nonproliferation while increasing American proliferation and acting clandestinely to both aid the
French nuclear weapons program and protect Chinese proliferation from Soviet attack.
This thesis is divided into four separate chapters. The first chapter includes a review of relevant literature that pertains to the French nuclear weapons program or US-Franco policy; the
Chinese nuclear weapons program, US-Sino policy, or perspective on either from Chinese scholars; or overall US nuclear policy during the period of study, 1961-1976. Arguments from these works are introduced in the first chapter, revisited within the case study chapters, and reviewed a final time in the conclusions chapter. The second chapter uses the modified Brewer- deLeon policy method as applied to primary sources from both the FRUS series and the Wilson
Center recounting US-Franco nuclear policy formation during the years of the Kennedy through
Ford administrations. The French case is presented chronologically with major steps of the modified Brewer-deLeon method identified as appropriate. The third chapter uses the modified
6 W. Julian Korab-Karpowicz, “Political Realism in International Relations,” in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/#TwenCentClasReal. While beyond the scope of this study, see Korab-Karpowicz’s entry for additional information on how the political philosophies of Thucydides, Niccolò Machiavelli, and Thomas Hobbes influenced the development of Twentieth-century political realism. 8
Brewer-deLeon policy method as applied to primary sources from both the FRUS series and the
Wilson Center recounting US-Sino nuclear policy formation during the years of the Kennedy through Ford administrations, essentially in the same manner as the preceding chapter. The
Chinese case is also presented chronologically with major steps of the Brewer-deLeon method identified as appropriate. The fourth and final chapter contains a review of the results of the application of the Brewer-deLeon method to the French and Chinese case studies as well as a final comparison of these findings against the current body of literature reviewed in the opening chapter. Points of expansion, provision of additional context, disagreement, and overall relevancy regarding the secondary literature are discussed as well as whether US-Franco and US-
Sino nuclear policies were ultimately successful in achieving their respective goals during the years under investigation.
Literature Review
Through assessing documents obtained from the FRUS series and the Wilson Center pertaining to US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies that span the entirety of 1961-1976, this study is able to provide a fuller picture of US nuclear policy development during these years through utilizing a broader range of available documentation than was available for many of the previous studies of US nuclear policy. Relevant literature related to US-Franco or US-Sino nuclear policies or overall US positions on proliferation are reviewed, with the contributions of this study in relation to this previous body of literature discussed afterward.
Several works by Marc Trachtenberg inform this project beginning with the 1999 monograph, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963. Much of the book covers the decades preceding the scope of this project but, nonetheless, establishes that by the early 1960s the US and the USSR came to a general, if unspoken, agreement to preserve 9
the international status quo and avoid nuclear confrontation with one another. Rather than occurring quickly, this understanding was only reached after years of uncertainty and anxiety experienced by Truman and Eisenhower officials in the 1940s and 1950s, when a nuclear conflict with the Soviets appeared exceedingly possible. Numerous crises between the
Americans and Soviets, including those over Berlin and the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, characterized the era. Following the Cuban Missile Crisis, both superpowers decided to avoid provoking the other into a nuclear showdown, agreeing to maintain the status quo in Berlin and
Europe. Trachtenberg argues that these understandings, ostensibly underlying the more generic terms of the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), turned the Cold War into “a different kind of conflict, more subdued, more modulated, more artificial, and, above all, less terrifying” as “the threat of general nuclear war, which had loomed so large in 1961 and 1962, now faded into the background.”7 This implicit agreement would be carried over through the Johnson, Nixon, and
Ford administrations, allowing the 1960s and 1970s to be years of lower tension between the superpowers that facilitated US-Soviet détente.
Two more recent articles by Trachtenberg discussing de Gaulle and US-Franco relations during the Nixon years are more directly applicable to this study. The first, “The de Gaulle
Problem,” challenges the previously held assumption that French President Charles de Gaulle’s foreign policy was entirely coherent and rationally-based. In explaining de Gaulle’s comments on building a “European Europe,” spanning “from the Atlantic to the Urals,” Trachtenberg posits that de Gaulle’s true interest was to create “a freestanding continental Western European bloc” built upon Franco-German cooperation; however, he argues de Gaulle abandoned these
7 Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), 398. 10
aspirations after 1964 out of fear of West German nuclear ambitions.8 He explains French opposition to the American-proposed Multilateral Force (MLF) and North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) Nuclear Planning Group as motivated by French anxiety over any potential increase in West German nuclear participation. Still, Trachtenberg doubts de Gaulle’s sincerity in seriously pursuing Franco-German cooperation, judging there to be “an enormous gap between rhetoric and reality.” In spite of de Gaulle’s seemingly harsh words, Trachtenberg judges overall French foreign policy goals to have been in line with the US, including: keeping
West Germany non-nuclear; having the US continue to play a role in Europe’s defense; reducing
East-West tensions; and working toward an eventual German reunification. Trachtenberg concludes that de Gaulle’s policies during the 1960s should not be taken at face value, as the pieces do not add up to a clear or consistent policy. Instead, Trachtenberg suggests the General may not have been acting entirely rationally, as his harsh rhetoric took “on a life of its own” during his final years in office.9
The second article, “The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou
Period, 1969-1974,” chronicles the rise and fall of US-Franco relations in the years following the end of de Gaulle’s tenure as president. Trachtenberg notes that at the outset of the reset in relations both “Nixon and Kissinger wanted to support the French nuclear program.” In spite of this, US-Franco ties soured by the end of the Nixon years. Trachtenberg attributes the decline in relations to several factors, including: the collapse of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system; negative European responses to the “Year of Europe” initiative; and diverging responses to the
1973 Yom Kippur War. With each conflict, Trachtenberg demonstrates that the US increasingly viewed the Europeans as an adversarial force and sought to keep them from uniting into a
8 Marc Trachtenberg, “The de Gaulle Problem,” Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 1 (2012): 81-84. 9 Ibid., 86-91. 11
cohesive antagonistic bloc. Concerning the American role in nullifying Bretton Woods,
Trachtenberg argues the “whole point of an interventionist policy in this area was not to help the
Europeans with their monetary policy, but to keep the Europeans from coming together as a bloc,” noting that Kissinger claimed at the time the US should work to “prevent a united
European position without showing our hand.”10 After Europe responded poorly to the “Year of
Europe,” Trachtenberg argues the US sought to use aid to the French nuclear weapons program to “drive a wedge between France and the other European countries.” As France emerged as the leading voice of a rebuilt postwar Europe that was increasingly critical of American actions and seeking to reassert itself in global affairs, Trachtenberg postulates that Kissinger sought to use nuclear weapons aid to shift French foreign policy, with “the real quid pro quo” being the reorientation of France’s seemingly anti-American position. Trachtenberg notes that while the
Yom Kippur War effectively saw US-Franco relations sink to their lowest point during the Nixon era, tensions were already high between the US and France such that American nuclear weapons aid was put on hold in September 1973, two months before the outbreak of the war.11
Trachtenberg concludes that the decline in US-Franco relations during this period was more complicated than past scholarship has recognized, which argued France sought to remove US troops from Europe. Instead, he argues that French President Georges Pompidou was aware that
Europe needed an American military presence in Europe to ensure European security, but did not believe this entailed France blindly following the American lead or not being able to make their own policy choices. From the American perspective, Trachtenberg finds that US leaders did not
10 Marc Trachtenberg, “The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 1969- 1974,” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 8, 22. 11 Ibid., 39-43. 12
mind Europe differing in their opinions or policy preferences, but could not abide a Europe that pursued major independent foreign policies without taking American interests into account.12
Interestingly, another article by R. Gerald Hughes and Thomas Robb, “Kissinger and the
Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage in the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United States and
Great Britain, 1969-1977,” also emphasizes the uniqueness of US nuclear weapons aid to France by contrasting the willingness of American officials to simultaneously threaten to pull US nuclear sharing from the British during the same timeframe. The authors challenge previous assertions in the literature that the US-UK “Special Relationship” was “untouchable,” describing
“use of coercion by the United States against the governments of Edward Heath and Harold
Wilson” through threatening to withhold intelligence and nuclear sharing to illicit a favorable shift in British foreign policy. Noting that past American administrations did not link intelligence and nuclear sharing with US-UK areas of disagreement such as the Suez Crisis or the Vietnam War, Hughes and Robb argue these areas became “most vulnerable to the predations of Kissinger and his adherents.”13 The article is also of relevance to this study as it provides further evidence of both Kissinger’s concerns about the emergence of an adversarial European bloc and the close cooperation of Kissinger and Schlesinger in using nuclear weapons ties to influence foreign policy. The authors report that Kissinger foresaw the possibility of a hostile
European bloc developing as early as 1964, writing in an article at the time that “a Europe largely constructed on theoretical models might be forced into an anti-American mould because its only sense of identity will be what distinguishes it from America.” In describing one instance of Kissinger threatening to withhold sharing to the British in 1973, Hughes and Robb note that
12 Ibid., 52-55. 13 R. Gerald Hughes and Thomas Robb, “Kissinger and the Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage in the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United States and Great Britain, 1969-1977,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 4 (2013): 862- 863, 870-871, 875. 13
Schlesinger simultaneously postponed a meeting with his British counterparts. The authors posit this was “concocted in collusion with Kissinger to pressurize the British into bilateral discussions” and judge the “combined actions of Kissinger and Schlesinger had a significant impact on British policy.”14
John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai’s 1988 book, China Builds the Bomb, remains a foundational text on the Chinese nuclear weapons program and informs this study by providing background on the development of the program and context for portions of the Kennedy and
Johnson eras. Lewis and Xue trace the origins of the Chinese nuclear weapons program to several events during the first half of the 1950s that reshaped Chinese leaders’ perceptions of national security, including: facing superior American firepower and technology during the
Korean War; Eisenhower’s nuclear threats during the Taiwan Straits crises; and the signature of an American mutual defense treaty with the Republic of China (ROC). Although they claim in hindsight the PRC faced no actual nuclear danger from Eisenhower, Chinese leaders’ perception of this danger at the time made the Chinese “resolved to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.”
They characterize these decisions and their considerations as those of rational, calculating individuals, noting that “above all, Mao [Mao Zedong, Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Chairman] acted as a realist,” rather than fanatical ideologues as some in the US viewed them contemporaneous to these developments through the 1960s. The authors detail the complex organizational and technological choices made from the decision to create the bomb through its eventual explosion at Lop Nur in October 1964, laying out evidence of a thoroughly planned effort that resulted in a more sophisticated test device than even the US expected. They conclude that the Chinese nuclear weapons program represented “a great accomplishment” and “a marked
14 Ibid., 878, 881-883. 14
contrast to China’s general fate” in the late 1950s and early 1960s, highlighting that “the CCP, even as it reactivated revolutionary leadership systems and norms in the Great Leap Forward, simultaneously modified or scrapped revolutionary techniques and prescriptions in the pursuit of nuclear weaponry” which resulted in the development of a nuclear weapons program that
“promoted an effective synergism among leadership, organization, and technology.”15
Evan Feigenbaum’s book, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic
Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age, primarily deals with developments and changes to the Chinese nuclear weapons program outside the scope of this study but provides another source of important context in its second chapter covering 1950 through 1975.
Feigenbaum notes, similarly to Lewis and Xue, that the PRC’s close ties between science and technology with the military was not an inevitable relationship but was encouraged by the necessity for self-reliance in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split and developed during what he describes as the greatest period of Chinese existential threat from 1950 through 1969.
Feigenbaum identifies Chinese Marshal Nie Rongzhen as one of the primary figures responsible for connecting the development of Chinese nuclear weapons with overall PRC economic priorities, arguing Nie sought to “directly, explicitly, and comprehensively integrate [national] security with core economic development concerns.” Liu Bocheng, a Chinese Civil War hero, is also identified as a “seminal” figure in promoting the use of modern technology for Chinese national security through his lectures at the Nanjing Military Academy arguing against the
15 John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 34, 42, 219-220; While the Great Leap Forward was over before the end of the Kennedy era, the hardships that occurred in the PRC during 1958 through 1962 contrast with the continual support that the Chinese nuclear weapons program received leading to the successful Chinese nuclear test only two years after the end of the Great Leap Forward. For additional information about the Great Leap Forward and its disastrous effects on the PRC, see Frank Dikötter’s Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962 (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010) or Yang Jisheng’s Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2012). 15
existence of a “people’s technology” following Chinese experiences during the Korean War.
Feigenbaum demonstrates how Nie and others convinced Mao and other top Chinese leaders of the importance of the strategic weapons program, effectively shielding the Chinese nuclear weapons program from both competing civilian and military projects and economic woes associated with the Great Leap Forward. Nie’s organizational system of “flexible mobilization,” which included decisions in the hands of scientists rather than bureaucrats; cross system collaboration; flat organizational structures; and performance metrics based on universal standards and international technological developments, is noted to still be in practice today in the PRC as it ultimately became “the backbone of the entire Chinese state-led high technology system.”16
Several recent articles also inform the study by detailing the development of the Chinese nuclear program and relations with the US from the perspective of Chinese scholars. Yafeng Xia and Zhi Liang provide an overview of Chinese conclusions on US-Sino relations over the last century in their article, “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century:
A Survey of the Literature.” In contrast to the assertions of American scholars that there may have been a chance for cooperation between the US and PRC in early 1949, the authors report that several Chinese Communist Party scholars, including Pang Xianzhi, Li Jie, and Zhang
Baijia, disagree and saw confrontation as inevitable, arguing that US/UN troops in Korea posed
“a grave threat to Chinese national security and forced Beijing leaders to send troops to Korea.”17
In regards to the timeframe of this study, Zhang Baijia describes the PRC’s foreign policy as a
“dual adversary policy” intended to counter both the Americans and the Soviets from 1958
16 Evan A. Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 15, 21-22, 40. 17 Yafeng Xia and Zhi Liang, “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century: A Survey of the Literature,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 2 (2017): 255. 16
through 1967 but gradually moved toward rapprochement with the US by the end of the 1960s.
During the time of this “dual adversary policy” Jiang Ying argues Chinese leaders also viewed
American incursions in Vietnam as a major military threat in the early 1960s, even going so far as to make preparations to counter an American invasion into PRC territory and clandestinely sending Chinese troops to North Vietnam. Li Danhui argues that Vietnam became a “tightrope” by the early 1970s that Chinese leaders walked rather than an explicit military threat, as the PRC sought to improve relations with the US while still “protecting its revolutionary credentials” by continuing to provide supplies to North Vietnam. Yafeng Xia and Kuisong Yang posit that US-
PRC rapprochement was affected by Mao’s constant “vacillating between promoting world revolution and seeking détente with US ‘imperialists,’” claiming his “psychological inner dilemma” caused the PRC to take “a rigid, less creative, and more cautious attitude towards the
United States from 1972-1976.”18
Dong Wang expands on the years of tension between the Americans and Chinese during the Vietnam War in her article “Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and China’s Policy toward the
United States in the 1960s.” Dong argues that US-PRC rapprochement was ultimately motivated by Chinese aspirations to great power status, describing Chinese leaders of the era as “shrewd strategic players” who initially viewed rapprochement as detrimental to this goal but eventually reversed this assessment following the 1969 border conflict with the Soviets. Before then, at the beginning of the 1960s, however, she claims Chinese leaders still saw an anti-US posture as central their overall grand strategy based not on revolutionary or party ideology but realistic calculations, which included seeking rapprochement with the Americans in the next decade or so
18 Ibid., 258-262. 17
after the PRC improved its economic and military strength.19 Like Jiang, Dong also describes
Vietnam as a great source of anxiety for the PRC during the Kennedy and Johnson years, noting the Chinese shifted to war footing in 1965 after an internal report from the previous year found they were grossly unprepared to counter a potential American invasion. Contingencies in case of
American nuclear strikes were made while the Chinese simultaneously continued to supply
North Vietnam with aid, reasoning the US would be deterred from invading the PRC if they remained pinned down in Vietnam. Dong argues that in spite of gestures toward rapprochement by the Johnson Administration in 1965 and 1966, the Vietnam conflict “made the Sino-American reconciliation untenable.” Sino-Soviet relations sunk further following the 1969 Zhenbao Island conflict such that Mao ordered Chinese leadership to be strategically dispersed out of fear of a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike.20 A Chinese military report she highlights from mid-1969, however, indicates Chinese leadership simultaneously concluded “the rise in China’s power had ushered in the dissolution of the bipolar system and the emergence of a multipolar system,” allowing for the possibility of rapprochement with the Americans. Dong argues Moscow’s threats to the Chinese in 1969 backfired, as they did not stifle Chinese resolve and alarmed, rather than assuaged, the Americans. Chinese losses from the Soviet border offensive in August
1969 additionally “reaped an unexpected dividend: Washington’s determination to side with
Beijing in the eventuality of a Sino-Soviet war.”21
Xin Zhan’s article, “Prelude to the Transformation: China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy during the US-China Rapprochement, 1969-1976,” examines how Chinese nuclear policy evolved as the Soviets replaced the Americans as the primary Chinese security threat in the
19 Dong Wang, “Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and China’s Policy toward the United States in the 1960s,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 2 (2017): 265-269. 20 Ibid., 276-279, 286. 21 Ibid., 283-285. 18
1970s. Xin finds that the PRC gradually replaced its “assertive, anti-status quo and arguably revolutionary nuclear strategy” with “an accommodating position on international nuclear arms control and nuclear nonproliferation.” He reiterates that Chinese leadership viewed the
Americans in Vietnam as the primary national security threat in the 1960s but shifted to the
Soviets after the 1969 Zhenbao Island conflict. Xin claims Beijing took Soviet nuclear threats seriously since they were backed up with aggressive actions including the 1968 execution of the
Brezhnev Doctrine in Czechoslovakia and the deployment of one million Soviet troops along the
Sino-Soviet border by 1969. While the eventual rapprochement with the Americans was ostensibly for the Chinese to better resist both superpowers, Xin describes the quieter practical position as a tacit agreement with the US to resist the USSR’s nuclear disarmament initiative.22
Following Nixon’s 1972 visit to the PRC, Xin claims Mao actively sought to cooperate with the
Americans to create an international coalition, or “horizontal line,” to contain the Soviets with these plans becoming the “basis of Chinese nuclear policy.” However, the conclusion of the first round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) agreements between the Americans and the
Soviets caused Mao to suspect by mid-1973 that the US now sought condominium with the
USSR. Xin reports that in a meeting between Mao and Kissinger in November 1973 the
Chairman expressed his belief that a Soviet nuclear attack on the PRC was unlikely, while
Kissinger emphasized his concerns that a preemptive Soviet nuclear strike against the PRC remained a credible threat, describing the Secretary of State as “patronizing throughout the meeting, stoking Mao’s resentment.” Xin argues Mao’s abandoning of anti-Soviet collusion with the US and reversion to his earlier nuclear policy and geopolitical strategy of countering both the Americans and Soviets by cultivating third world relations in 1974 through the end of
22 Xin Zhan, “Prelude to the Transformation: China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy during the US-China Rapprochement, 1969-1976,” Diplomatic History 41, no. 2 (2017): 289-292. 19
his life was a result of his suspicion of American-Soviet détente. He concludes that both nations
“realized the necessity of aligning with each other to cope with the expansionist Soviet Union,” but emphasizes that Chinese cooperation with the Americans during these years was a calculated move intended to “prevent either superpower from using nuclear weapons against China.”23
Works pertinent to this project also include monographs examining US nuclear policy more generally, including those by Shane Maddock and Francis Gavin. Maddock’s book,
Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the
Present, posits that the US sought to restrict access to nuclear weapons by other states, instead creating a system that placed “Washington at the top, followed by its NATO allies and, later,
Israel, with the post-colonial world consigned to the bottom” to accomplish a “deeper imperative
– to maintain a uniquely powerful position for Washington within the international system.”
Maddock finds early American nuclear policy under Truman and Eisenhower to be focused on
American efforts to attain nuclear hegemony with the effects of nuclear proliferation occupying a subordinate position to NATO unity and other American strategic goals, judging Eisenhower as
“unwilling to lead” and failing “to develop an effective nuclear nonproliferation policy from
1953 to 1961.”24 He also criticizes Kennedy as “unwilling to sacrifice his political standing for an agreement with Moscow,” instead resorting to “false machismo and a traditional positions-of- strength policy” which weakened any attempts at arms control. Kennedy is described similarly to his immediate predecessors, lacking any coherent nonproliferation policy while vacillating between proliferative activities, such as providing nuclear weapons aid to France, and nonproliferative activities motivated by a fear of West German and Chinese weapons acquisition.
Maddock judges the eventual 1963 LTBT to be “a weak arms control agreement” since
23 Ibid., 296-302. 24 Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, 1-2, 79, 81-83. 20
“nonproliferation continued to be subordinated to alliance relationship and Cold War competition.”25 The Johnson administration is largely criticized on the same grounds as the
Kennedy administration, with Johnson officials considered by Maddock to be “unwilling to commit to a strategy” which “allowed US nonproliferation efforts to languish” during Johnson’s first term, with the retention of key foreign policy officials, including McGeorge Bundy, Dean
Rusk, and Robert McNamara, ensuring “many aspects of JFK’s nonproliferation efforts remained intact.” Maddock is highly critical of the eventual 1968 NPT, deeming it
“meaningless” and a “pyrrhic victory” since the Nixon administration “abandoned all but the most symbolic efforts at enforcement” after 1969. This agreement, according to Maddock, codified the system of nuclear apartheid as Washington and Moscow controlled access to nuclear weapons in Europe through their alliance systems while discouraging decolonized nations outside of the alliance systems from gaining access to them. Maddock concludes that this established a precedent for the remainder of the Cold War wherein the US publicly endorsed nonproliferation “while aiding or winking at allied countries’ nuclear programs,” including
France.26
Gavin similarly seeks to update the record on American nuclear policy by debunking several commonly held myths in his book, Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s
Atomic Age. While originally setting out to examine US monetary policy, Gavin instead found documents that challenged the conventional nuclear theory. He posits “Eisenhower, Kennedy,
Johnson, [and] Nixon – pressed their aides to find ways to reduce the balance-of-payment costs of stationing US troops in Europe, even if it meant bringing troops home (a policy in direct contradiction to the received story about flexible response).” Broadly, Gavin concludes the “US
25 Ibid., 145, 164, 167, 181-182. 26 Ibid., 217, 221, 251, 284, 288. 21
has often hoped to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons by foe and friend alike, not because of any enlightened notions of world peace, but because a state with nuclear weapons can cancel out every other form of US power.”27 Gavin challenges that the “shift in strategy between the
Eisenhower and Kennedy/Johnson era was nowhere near as stark as the secondary literature contends.” In direct contrast to Maddock, Gavin posits that Johnson actually “laid the foundations for a far more robust nonproliferation policy” that culminated in the 1968 NPT. The treaty is described by Gavin as “a clear departure from that of the Kennedy administration, which did little to halt proliferation,” judging it responsible for “laying the groundwork for détente with the Soviets while constraining worldwide nuclear proliferation.”28 Interestingly, Gavin breaks with Maddock on another key point, that of the effect of the Gilpatric Report on the administration. Rather than Johnson ignoring and burying the report, as Maddock argues, Gavin contends the report had a significant impact on Johnson, who subsequently ordered the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to develop a program to halt the further spread of nuclear weapons. This would require “the US to cooperate with an enemy – the Soviet Union – to hinder friends” but, according to Gavin, “led to the adoption of thoughtful, less reactive policies that were in the long-term interests of the US” such as the less confrontational posture adopted toward the PRC.29 Gavin appears to concur with Maddock that the Nixon administration was not as focused on nonproliferation as their predecessors, but explains this as part of a tradition Nixon officials followed dating from “the time of Metternich and Bismarck” that focused on geopolitical competition rather than the arms race as “the core driver of international politics.” For Nixon and Kissinger, “arms control was considered to be a useful
27 Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 1, 25-26. 28 Ibid., 51-52, 75-76. 29 Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, 250; Gavin, Nuclear Statecraft, 97, 100-102. 22
tool, but not an end in itself,” as neither actually trusted the Soviets and suspected SALT’s true purpose to the USSR was to “get their rear cleared” before attacking the Chinese. Gavin finds the US sought nuclear superiority during the Nixon years, which included supporting both the
French and Israeli weapons programs, as a means to make the American defense of Europe a credible threat to the Soviets rather than simply for superiority’s sake. He concludes that “when judged on their merits, Nixon and Kissinger’s nonconventional views [on nuclear weapons] are at least credible.”30
Several works by former National Security Advisors McGeorge Bundy and Henry
Kissinger also provide perspective from American officials during the 1960s and 1970s.
Bundy’s 1988 book, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years, serves as a history of the years leading to the creation of the bomb and the early decisions of the
Truman and Eisenhower Administrations as well as memoirs of his own time in office advising presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Of interest to this project are Bundy’s thoughts concerning
France and the PRC during the latter period. Bundy notes de Gaulle saw nuclear weapons as a means to reobtain great power status as the sole continental Western European nuclear power and salve their humiliations from decolonization and American domination in the Atlantic
Alliance. He claims the Kennedy Administration turned against the idea of nuclear cooperation with France by 1962, noting that Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara described independent weapons programs as “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent,” but reports nuclear relations between the US and France remained ambivalent because of Kennedy’s respect for de Gaulle. In spite of the rift that formed between France and the US by the end of the Kennedy era, Bundy notes the Americans still gave the French
30 Ibid., 103-104, 109-110, 116-118. 23
important aid by providing refueling aircraft for France’s nuclear bombers in 1962 and advanced computers later. He criticizes de Gaulle’s choice in seeking the bomb, questioning how “the international role of France [has] been larger because of the French bomb,” but also observes that
American officials at the time failed to recognize that France becoming a nuclear power was
“indispensable to [French] national self-respect.” Bundy summarizes US-Franco relations during his tenure by explaining that “Kennedy, and Johnson even more strongly, came to understand further that the right reply to Gaullist provocation was to ignore it.”31 Regarding the
PRC Bundy speaks more generally, claiming the Chinese paid more attention to “noisy
American sympathy with Chiang [Chiang Kai-shek, President of the ROC]” than to quieter indications that American officials thought backing a Taiwanese mainland adventure was “out of the question.” He agrees with Lewis and Xue’s conclusion that Mao sought nuclear weapons from a “genuine perception of the Americans as nuclear bullies” based on his experiences with
Truman and Eisenhower officials. Bundy also claims the PRC overestimated the nuclear danger posed by the US during the American escalation in Vietnam in 1965, arguing Johnson officials sought to take no actions that would provoke Chinese intervention. Bundy denies that American officials seriously considered taking preemptive action against the Chinese bomb as “talk, not serious planning or real intent.”32
A subsequent article by William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the
Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” suggests preemptive action to prevent a Chinese nuclear capability was arguably more than mere talk for
American officials. The authors claim the Kennedy administration “initiated a massive
31 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), 474-476, 483-485, 494, 499-503. 32 Ibid., 527, 532. 24
intelligence effort” … “to break through the secrecy that surrounded the Chinese nuclear program.” They identify Bundy as the “point man” in countering the Chinese nuclear effort with his activities, including: passing Kennedy’s instructions to the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA); conducting secret talks with ROC leaders; and soliciting Soviet aid in a potential joint effort against Chinese proliferation. While Bundy supported taking action against the Chinese nuclear weapons program, Burr and Richelson note that Robert Johnson, an official within the
State Department, pushed for non-intervention against the Chinese beginning in late 1963. They argue that the Johnson administration eventually avoided taking any preemptive action in 1964 because of both election considerations and a lack of Soviet support for taking action to counter the Chinese.33 Noting that Kennedy was “hostile to Mao’s regime and found the prospect of a nuclear China disquieting,” the authors describe direct actions considered in 1963 which ranged from covert action to a tactical nuclear strike on Chinese nuclear facilities with Soviet support viewed as crucial. Johnson officials decided against direct action except in response to Chinese- initiated hostilities in September 1964, instead opting to contain the PRC through the war in
Vietnam. Burr and Richelson highlight the flaws in this strategy noting “Vietnamese nationalists were determined to preserve their independence from the giant to the north.”34
Unlike Bundy’s book, Kissinger’s three volumes of his experiences as National Security
Advisor and Secretary of State under both Nixon and Ford are much more straightforward memoirs. While these books cover the entirety of Kissinger’s experiences as a public servant, only those chapters discussing China and Europe are relevant to this study. The first volume,
White House Years, covers the early years of the Nixon administration before the Watergate
33 William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 54-55. 34 Ibid., 60, 68-69, 87, 96. 25
scandal would engulf it. Kissinger begins by noting he disagreed with the European policy of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, deeming it “generally misconceived,” instead claiming he “was persuaded that a Europe seeking to play an international role, even if occasionally assertive, was more in our interest than a quiescent Europe abdicating responsibilities in the guise of following American leadership.” He explicitly mentions US-
Franco nuclear weapons aid in the context of US-Franco military cooperation that the Nixon administration began to explore, noting “not even the possibility of limited cooperation in the nuclear field was excluded.”35 Kissinger also outlines his interest in breaking the bipolarity of the Cold War by integrating the Chinese into the international system, positing “if relations could be developed with both the Soviet Union and China, the triangular relationship would give us a great strategic opportunity for peace.” He and Nixon’s views on the PRC are highlighted as particularly unorthodox to US strategy at the time, with Kissinger claiming Nixon “startled” the
National Security Council (NSC) in summer 1969 by stating the Soviets were more aggressive than the Chinese and that it would be “against our interests to let China be ‘smashed’ in a Sino-
Soviet war.” As a response of pushback on Chinese rapprochement from the State Department,
Kissinger states Chinese diplomacy was gradually moved into the White House.36
Kissinger’s second volume, Years of Upheaval, recounts his time in dual roles as
National Security Advisor and Secretary of State during the turbulent second half of the Nixon era as Watergate slowly consumed the president and seeped into nearly all other affairs of the administration. He identifies a “new Europe of the Nine” which emerged in 1973 seeking political and economic unity as “bound to articulate its own identity” while registering his own wariness about resurgent European nationalism at the time. On the contentious, poorly received
35 Henry Kissinger, White House Years (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1979), 106, 389. 36 Ibid., 164, 182, 190-192. 26
“Year of Europe” diplomatic initiative intended by Kissinger to revise NATO strategy as US-
Soviet nuclear parity approached, he laments “we thought we were tapping the idealistic tradition of the democracies when we put forward the Year of Europe” but instead “we did not know what we were letting ourselves in for.” Kissinger describes how an April 23, 1973 speech, the purpose of which was “to set forth how the US was prepared to contribute to reinvigorating the
[Atlantic] Alliance, and what we hoped for from Europe,” instead “proved disastrous” from the taint of Watergate. Kissinger blames the scandal as “both a major cause of deadlock and the obstacle to its resolution” which put the US “in the absurd position of appearing more eager to reaffirm and strengthen our commitment to Atlantic relations than Europe to accept it,” with
French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert identified as a key antagonist. Indeed, Kissinger claims
Jobert “exploited the smaller countries’ uneasiness about dictation from the Big Four [France,
West Germany, the UK, and Italy], West Germany’s reluctance to inhibit Ostpolitik within a larger grouping, and [British Prime Minister Edward] Heath’s determination to demonstrate his
European vocation, to weld together a coalition of negation” adversarial in orientation to the US.
As a result of these tensions, exacerbated by the diverging responses of the Americans and
Europeans to the Yom Kippur War in late 1973, Kissinger describes US-European relations by the year’s end as “drifting not only apart, but into competition.”37
US-Sino relations are also described as souring during this period after an initial warm start. Kissinger received a particularly cordial welcome to China in early 1973, which he argues
“that the settlement of the Vietnam War had clearly released,” and explains his relationship with
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai at the time as “an easy camaraderie not untinged with affection.”
He indicates the Soviets also remained the foremost threat in the minds of both, noting the
37 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1982), 131, 133-134, 136-137, 153, 162-165, 189. 27
number of Soviet divisions along the Sino-Soviet border increased from twenty-one divisions in
1969 to forty-five by 1973, and reiterates his view that the PRC remained the lynchpin to global stability, positing:
Should the Soviet Union succeed in reducing China to impotence, the impact on the world balance of power would be scarcely less catastrophic than a Soviet conquest of Europe…Thus we could not possibly wish to encourage a Soviet assault on China. We would have, in my view, no choice except to help China resist.
To accomplish this goal, Kissinger claims Zhou “called on us to take the lead in organizing an anti-Soviet coalition” consisting of the PRC and US, Japan, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Western
Europe while also advocating for Western/NATO cohesion. Interestingly, while the Vietnam issue was now largely resolved between the US and the PRC, Kissinger notes the PRC actually feared the rise of a hegemonic, Soviet-backed Vietnam with historically-based resentments toward the Chinese, viewing the Vietnamese as a potential threat. He also describes his interactions with Mao during this time as a man going “to great pains to show that slogans scrawled on every wall in China were meaningless, that in foreign policy national interests overrode ideological differences,” a marked contrast from early postwar assumptions of the
Chairman and Chinese leaders as irrational ideologues. Still, he describes Mao’s Cultural
Revolution as an attempt to reconcile such ideological convictions of Chinese uniqueness against the necessity of Western-developed technology for modernization, with the aged Chairman realizing continued isolation and ideological purity would only “ensure [the PRC’s] irrelevance and expose it to untold danger.” In spite of these seemingly positive developments in early 1973,
Kissinger recounts that by summer 1973 “little passed between Peking and Washington.” The
Chinese began sending “confusing signals” as Zhou’s power and influence appeared to wane as he was increasingly publicly criticized by an “anti-Confucian campaign” within the Chinese media. Kissinger claims subsequent meetings with Zhou and Mao in late 1973 demonstrated the 28
former to be “uncharacteristically tentative” in his deliberations, while the latter focused on the ability of the Americans to successfully resist Soviet expansionism as the Watergate scandal raged. This November 1973 meeting with Mao “became for the Chinese the bible of US-
Chinese relations” by providing “a floor below which they could not drag Zhou’s work” if radicals came to power in the PRC and caused tensions in the relationship. Indeed, Kissinger claims relations soured in 1974 and 1975 following the rise of the “Gang of Four,” with subsequent meetings becoming “downright chilly” but “never [going] backward.”38
Kissinger’s third volume, Years of Renewal, covers his final years of government service as Secretary of State in the Ford administration. He describes the changeover from Nixon to
Ford as “particularly complex,” as Ford was unelected as both president and vice-president and eventually replaced most of his Cabinet appointments except Kissinger, a stark contrast between the retention of key officials by the Johnson administration reacting to an unexpected change in executives a decade prior. Written over two decades after the attempted “Year of Europe” initiative, Kissinger reflects that naming it such “was perhaps too grandiloquent,” as it
“immediately ran up against the reality that, in the early 1970s, our European allies were far more preoccupied with European integration than with Atlantic cohesion.” Kissinger describes
US-Franco relations as having “deteriorated from irritation into near-confrontation” but vastly improving under Ford and French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, with Kissinger claiming
“Giscard’s presidency transformed them to a close approximation of genuine partnership.” In contrast to the squabbling of Americans and Europeans in the Nixon era, Kissinger claims the
US and Western Europe cooperated closely to thwart Soviet intentions to undermine Western cohesion at the 1975 European Security Conference, noting “extraordinary solidarity…among
38 Ibid., 44-46, 53, 55-59, 67-69, 678-680, 688-694, 698. 29
the leaders of the Atlantic Alliance after Ford came on the scene.” Additionally, Kissinger details cooperative words and actions by Ford and Giscard linking American and French energy interests and exchanges of advisors on energy needs at Martinique in December 1974 as well as on mutual economic interests at the Rambouillet Summit in 1975.39
Kissinger reports that US-Sino relations did not see such improvements during the Ford years. He reiterates that rapprochement was “imposed on each…by their necessities” but occurred quickly and efficiently because both Chinese and American leadership put their mutual interests before ideology. Although he describes Mao as having ended the Cultural Revolution by early 1973 in his previous volume, Kissinger claims Mao reversed course in 1974 and met with him a final time in 1975 as Mao’s health steadily declined. Of Zhou’s replacement, Deng
Xiaoping, Kissinger notes Deng indicated he “would [continue to] work with us on [anti-Soviet] coalition-building” and further describes Deng’s efforts to modernize the PRC as “likely to turn
China into an economic superpower during the twenty-first century” and “surely transform the political structure.” Tensions are noted by Kissinger during these years, including a November
1974 visit to China where, for the first time since Kissinger’s inaugural secret trip in 1971, Mao did not receive the Secretary of State, ostensibly over the latter’s visit to Vladivostok. During the same visit, however, Deng continued to pledge “Chinese cooperation in strengthening relations with Europe as essential parts of the strategy for thwarting Soviet expansionism.”
Kissinger describes his trip to the PRC the following year in October 1975 as “the most difficult of all my encounters with Chinese leaders” as the radical Gang of Four wielded significant power and criticized Deng’s policies as pro-capitalist to appeal to an increasingly feeble and debilitated Mao’s obsession with revolutionary rhetoric. Mao on this visit is noted to have
39 Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999), 170-171, 600, 621, 635, 646, 686- 689, 692-694. 30
accused the Americans of colluding with the Soviets against the Chinese, which Kissinger attributed to Mao’s increasing paranoia and need for struggle and conflict in his last years. Even so, Kissinger claims Ford was received “with impeccable courtesy” during his December 1975 visit to the PRC despite these tensions, with Mao articulating a resigned view that US-Sino relations would remain tense in the short-term until domestic struggles in both nations calmed.
Interestingly, Kissinger also notes Mao escorted Ford to the door at the conclusion of their meeting, which represented a great honor, considering Mao’s frailty and poor health, that was never afforded to Nixon. The Secretary of State concludes that US-Sino relations stagnated for the remainder of his time in office as Deng struggled, eventually victoriously, against the Gang of Four and the Middle Kingdom reacted to the death of Chairman Mao in September 1976.40
This study augments the existing body of literature through offering an expanded account of overall US nuclear policy through the two case studies of bilateral nuclear policy toward the
French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs. Trachtenberg’s argument that de Gaulle did not have a coherent foreign policy is expanded upon through demonstrating the extent to which
Johnson officials not only made a distinction between the policy and rhetoric differences between the General and the French government but also observed a widening gap between de
Gaulle and French officials through the end of their time in office. Additionally, this study picks up where Trachtenberg’s account of US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation during the Nixon-
Pompidou years leaves off by examining documents unreleased at the time of his article that
40 Ibid., 139, 154-155, 163-165, 869-872, 875, 883-884, 886-887, 891-897; Jung Chang and Jon Halliday further contextualize Mao’s changes in mental state and increasing paranoia during his final years by noting that the Chairman used both stimulants and sleeping pills on a regular basis. See Part Six of Chang and Halliday’s 2006 book, Mao: The Unknown Story (New York: Anchor Books, 2006), for more details; Deng Xiaoping did not play a major role in the shaping of US-Sino nuclear policy, in contrast to Mao and Zhou, but would go on to lead the PRC to full normalization of relations with the US during the Carter administration and further modernization of the PRC in the 1980s. See Ezra F. Vogel’s Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) or Michael Dillon’s Deng Xiaoping: The Man who Made Modern China (New York: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2015) for more detailed accounts of Deng and his impact on the PRC. 31
demonstrate a further increase in US-Franco nuclear weapons aid and cooperation under the Ford administration. Hughes and Robb’s account of US officials threatening to withhold nuclear sharing with the UK is given further context through the parallel evidence of Nixon officials, specifically Kissinger and Schlesinger, working in a similar collusive fashion to use nuclear weapons aid to France to meet US objectives. In contrast to Hughes and Robb’s account, however, nuclear ties with France are shown to be used as a carrot to alter French foreign policy rather than a stick as they document Kissinger and Schlesinger using against the UK.
Lewis and Xue’s arguments about the extent of Chinese nuclear efforts undertaken in the
1950s and 1960s are further contextualized through documents reviewed in this study that were released after their 1988 book which reveal the extent to which US officials remained ignorant of the PRC’s rapid technological advancements and construction of nuclear facilities. In a similar fashion, Feigenbaum’s book is also lent further context through documentation released following the publication of his book that demonstrates the extent of American unilateral easing of nuclear tensions and nuclear protection the Nixon and Ford administrations afforded the PRC simultaneous to the progress of the Chinese nuclear weapons Feigenbaum describes occurring through the 1970s. This study offers a parallel narrative of the extent to which Kennedy and
Johnson officials studied preemptive action against Chinese nuclear facilities to the one given by
Burr and Richelson, which similarly refutes Bundy’s claim to the opposite effect in his book, but also demonstrates, using more recently released documentation, that the information gap they identify occurring from 1961 to 1964 continued through both the Johnson and Nixon eras.
Articles written by Chinese scholars about the nuclear and foreign policies of the PRC during the
1960s and 1970s are also further contextualized by providing evidence of US awareness of PRC sensitivity to the Vietnam War and a parallel account of the formation of the tacit US-PRC 32
alliance to resist the Soviets in the 1970s from the perspective of US officials.
Kissinger’s accounts in his memoirs of US-Franco and US-Sino relations during his time in office are given significant context, as all documentation pertaining to his years in the Nixon and Ford administrations became available decades after his memoirs were published. As such, the case studies presented in this thesis reveal the clandestine actions and policy objectives that
Kissinger pursued to achieve the broader foreign policy goals of improved relations between the
US and both France and the PRC that are not addressed in his memoirs. This study also supports
Gavin’s overall conclusions about the development of a robust US nonproliferation policy by the end of the Johnson era while directly providing evidence against Maddock’s competing argument that Johnson officials ignored nonproliferation as a policy objective by revealing the
Johnson administration’s willingness to cut ties to the French nuclear weapons program and refusal to commit to a preemptive nuclear strike against Chinese nuclear facilities. Additionally,
Gavin and Maddock’s less substantiated arguments that the Nixon and Ford administrations did not support nonproliferation are supported through documents released after both of their books demonstrating the extent of American aid and cooperation given to the French nuclear weapons program under Nixon and Ford.
33
CHAPTER II. US-FRANCO NUCLEAR POLICY, 1961-1976: NUCLEAR PROHIBITION
AND NUCLEAR ENABLING
The administrations of Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford took decidedly different approaches to US-Franco nuclear policy during their tenures in office. Kennedy officials did not actively seek to support the French nuclear weapons program but were initially willing to assess whether providing nuclear weapons aid to France would rein in French President Charles de
Gaulle’s increasingly harsh rhetoric toward both NATO and the US. After it became clear that no amount of concessions would discourage General de Gaulle from pursuing an independent foreign policy and continuing to build the French nuclear deterrent, ostensibly at the expense of
NATO and US security interests, Johnson officials cut all strategic and weapons-related nuclear ties with France through the end of de Gaulle’s presidency. Nixon officials took a different tact and enabled French weapons proliferation by offering gradually increasing nuclear assistance to de Gaulle’s successors in the hopes of establishing a means by which French foreign policy could be influenced to American benefit. Weapons-related nuclear aid and cooperation with
France increased throughout Nixon’s time in office and was actually expanded upon by the Ford administration without technically removing the legal obstacles put in place by the Johnson administration.
The application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method of policy development reveals the thought processes and considerations of administration officials in reaching their respective policy decisions as to whether to help or hinder development of the French nuclear weapons program. The Kennedy years began the policy development process and engaged in estimation of the French nuclear problem extensively, but did not make any firm decisions on a policy. 34
Johnson officials, carried over from the Kennedy administration, selected a policy of prohibiting any American efforts that could benefit the French nuclear weapons program. While they were unable to enact any shifts in French foreign policy while de Gaulle remained in power, the
Johnson administration remained open to reestablishing nuclear ties after de Gaulle’s eventual departure from office. Nixon officials, less focused on nonproliferation as a core strategic objective, continued where the Johnson administration left off and gradually reestablished US-
Franco nuclear weapons ties after another period of estimation of the French nuclear problem.
Selecting a policy of nuclear weapons cooperation and support, they sought to use American aid to the French nuclear weapons program to both realign French foreign policy toward American interests and prevent the rise of an adversarial European bloc opposed to US interests. In spite of a brief cooling of overall US-Franco relations near the end of the Nixon era, the Ford administration continued to build on the nuclear weapons cooperation enacted by Nixon officials, maintaining and increasing nuclear weapons cooperation and directly aiding the French deterrent. This resulted in both the US directly contributing to French nuclear weapons proliferation and the improvement of both US-Franco bilateral ties and, more generally, US-
European ties through the end of the Ford years.
The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963
Initiation of an effort to devise a coherent US-Franco nuclear policy began early in the first year of the Kennedy presidency. In contrast to the years of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, France was now a full-fledged nuclear power determined to continue nuclear weapons testing. Shortly after the inauguration, Kennedy officials began the process of identifying the features of the problem of a nuclear-armed France. A January 24 memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk from State Department official Foy Kohler noted that French 35
attitudes on nuclear issues and European identity were not unique to de Gaulle himself, despite the General’s dominating figure in French politics, and were likely to persist regardless of de
Gaulle’s presence. Kohler also identified problems that Eisenhower experienced with de Gaulle, particularly his attempts to deal with global and nuclear affairs in a tripartisan manner with the
British and the Americans. The Eisenhower administration previously rebuffed these efforts in favor of NATO-based solutions.41 France made clear by March 1961, however, that they sought to make this same push for tripartisanship to the Kennedy administration after sending the president of the French National Assembly, Jacques Chaban-Delmas, to Washington to advocate the US-UK-Franco triple partnership as a means to solve global problems. Kennedy replied to
Chaban-Delmas’s overtures by stating that American coordination with the French was sufficient in many areas of mutual interest, while those of disagreement in nuclear policy were not urgent and could be dealt with in time.42 Only two months into his presidency, Kennedy was already establishing that he did not seek greater collaboration with the French on nuclear issues.
The president’s thoughts on this appeared to have solidified to some extent only a couple of months later. A May 1961 telegram from President Kennedy to his British counterpart, Prime
Minister Harold MacMillan, stated clearly the president’s belief that “it would be undesirable to assist France’s efforts to create a nuclear weapons capability.” Kennedy worried that aid to the
41 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk, “Tripartitism,” January 24, 1961, US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (hereafter referred to as FRUS with appropriate years, volume, document number, and page numbers), 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller (Washington: Government Printing Office (GPO), 1994), Doc. 223, 642-644; Charles de Gaulle served as President of France during half of the scope of this study, obtaining a mythical status buttressed by his larger-than-life personality not unlike Mao in the PRC. While this study only deals with de Gaulle’s role in the formation of US-Franco nuclear policy, more detailed accounts of his life and role in shaping the modern French Republic include Charles Williams’s The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General De Gaulle (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1993), Jonathan Fenby’s The General: Charles De Gaulle and the France He Saved (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012), and Julian Jackson’s De Gaulle (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018). 42 Memorandum of Conversation, “Tripartite Consultation between France, the United States and the United Kingdom,” March 10, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 225, 649-653. 36
French program could harm NATO’s integrity and instead proposed attempting to give France a greater role in setting global policy to counter their nuclear ambitions. Even so, he expressed doubt that de Gaulle would be dissuaded but hoped efforts to include France might slow the nuclear enthusiasm of de Gaulle’s eventual successors.43 This represented a significant decision to come out of the initiation stage of the process, as Kennedy was willing to give France greater leadership roles in areas of international policy formation but now made clear American policy should not aid French nuclear weapons proliferation. Although efforts would now continue to be explored in estimation, the initiation stage could be considered concluded by May 1961 since
Kennedy signaled American policy would not be oriented toward directly aiding the French capability.
Much remained in flux in terms of forming a broader, more coherent nuclear policy toward France as the June 1961 meeting between Kennedy and de Gaulle drew near. Talking points for the president indicated agreement with the French on multiple European and African issues, but that disagreements remained over the French desire for American nuclear “secrets” and de Gaulle’s disdain for a nuclear-armed NATO.44 Prior to this meeting, it appeared conduits to indirectly aid the French nuclear capability technically remained open; however, Kennedy’s advisors cautioned the president against exploring such indirect channels further with de Gaulle.
Both the US Department of State and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) recommended against exploring the possibility of sharing nuclear submarine propulsion technology with the French, the former on the basis that it would lead to further requests and the latter fearing the French, who the JCS contended “really cannot keep secrets,” may leak the technology. National Security
43 Department of State Cable 5245 to Embassy United Kingdom, “Message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan,” May 08, 1961, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 44 Talking Points, “President’s Visit to de Gaulle,” May 27, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 228, 657-659. 37
Advisor McGeorge Bundy also noted he was still actively exploring potentially providing inertial guidance systems, ostensibly required for delivering nuclear warheads by land, air, or sea, to
France up to the moment Kennedy left for Paris.45 At this point in the estimation stage,
American officials continued to explore whether it was feasible to provide non-nuclear, but technologically critical, components to the French.
The eventual June 1961 meeting went largely as the talking points sheet suggested.
Kennedy and de Gaulle agreed to cooperate on several international issues in Africa, Europe, and
South America but remained apart on nuclear weapons policy and NATO. De Gaulle expressed frustration with NATO in its current state, as Europe was not nearly as fragile as when it was formed in 1949 and the Americans no longer presided over a nuclear monopoly. The General also complained to Kennedy that the American policy of nuclear weapons use remained ill- defined. Some of Kennedy’s responses on this topic remain classified; however, what is apparent is that he sought to consult with the French, as Eisenhower had with the British, before any American weapons would be used against a hostile power. Additionally, Kennedy agreed further consultations between the three powers on nuclear matters should increase, while at the same time implying that Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) supplied to
NATO submarines would adequately guarantee French national security needs.46 In reporting the meeting to American Congressional leadership after returning to Washington, Kennedy claimed that de Gaulle “seemed to want help from us on missile guidance systems, but there had been no discussion on the point.”47
45 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy, “Specific answers to your questions of May 29th (de Gaulle)” May 29, 1961, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 229, 660-662. 46 Memorandum of Conversation, “President’s Visit to de Gaulle,” June 2, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 230, 663-667. 47 Memorandum of Conversation, “Memorandum of Conversation with the President and the Congressional Leadership,” June 6, 1961, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 231, 668-669. 38
Bundy describes de Gaulle in his memoirs as a man convinced that “France cannot be
France without greatness” but could now only aspire to great power status through possession of nuclear weapons, a decision Bundy attributes to France’s humiliating experience of decolonization; fear of German rearmament; ancient rivalry with a nuclear-armed UK; and apprehension of American domination of the Atlantic Alliance. He posits France felt it could stand up to the US as a fellow nuclear power, highlighting a 1960 article in the French newspaper La Croix which argued French nuclear weapons were not intended for use “against those who could become her [France’s] adversaries, but to be able to be respected in the camp to which she belongs.” With this in mind, Bundy finds de Gaulle’s attempts at creating a triangular
US-UK-Franco organization to be a genuine goal the General sought rather than a cynical move intended to be rejected.48
While estimation continued, two minor policy decisions were selected by the president in the wake of the June 1961 Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting. First, Kennedy sought to pursue additional channels of coordination and cooperation with the French following an uptick in
Soviet aggression toward West Berlin. In addition to instructing his Secretary of State to work toward this goal, Kennedy also proposed the French, British, and Americans meet in a tripartite fashion later in fall 1961 if the Berlin crisis continued to escalate.49 Second, Kennedy officially extended to de Gaulle a guarantee of consulting the French before American use of nuclear weapons against an enemy target. This was identical to the assurance offered to the UK by the
Eisenhower administration in 1954 and officially enshrined American commitment to keep the
48 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 473-476. 49 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, July 2, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 232, 670-671. 39
French informed of American nuclear intentions on an equal basis with the British.50 Neither of these represented a concrete decision on what American policy toward French proliferation would be. Both did, however, illustrate American willingness at the time to work toward greater cooperation with France and even deal with them on a French-sought tripartisan basis while the
US continued to investigate its long-term options and overall policy position regarding the
French force de frappe.
Even though Kennedy was no longer considering directly supporting the French nuclear weapons program, that did not preclude others from doing so. The American Ambassador to
France, James Gavin, advocated in November 1961 that the US provide France with enriched uranium specifically for military applications. The reasons for the proposal’s rejection through
Rusk’s response reveal some of the estimation processes that had occurred to this point on US-
Franco nuclear policy within the State Department. Reflecting what Bundy reported in May
1961, Rusk feared giving such aid would lead to further requests directly relating to French nuclear weapons; increase calls for a national deterrent in West Germany; and further divide
NATO. Rather to the point, Rusk wrote to Gavin in late 1961:
I also believe it is already clear to [the] French that we will undertake no action likely to result in any direct or significant aid to France in developing or securing [an] independent nuclear warhead or effective nuclear weapon delivery capability. As you have just reiterated to [the] French Defense Minister, we otherwise stand ready to continue our mutual cooperation with France in scientific matters and in peaceful applications of atomic energy as well as in such mutual defense matters as [the] recently signed 144(b) Atomic Cooperation Agreement with France. I believe [the] French recognize that cooperation in mutual defense matters can proceed only in conjunction with full cooperation by France as [a] NATO partner, and I recognize you will continue [to] pursue this line with Messmer [Pierre Messmer, French Minister of the Armed Forces]. We shall also press this point with him during his forthcoming visit here.
50 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, July 2, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 233, 672. 40
Rusk accentuated his response by noting the president reviewed and approved their message, implicitly approving the State Department’s arguments over Ambassador Gavin’s.51
Estimation of US-Franco nuclear policy continued through 1962. Bundy claims in his memoirs that the Kennedy administration shifted against nuclear weapons cooperation with
France by the end of 1962, in particular citing Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara’s public comments describing independent weapons programs as “dangerous, expensive, prone to obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent” as evidence of this shift. Still, he attributes the ambivalent nature of US-Franco nuclear policy at this time to the respect that
Kennedy had for de Gaulle.52 A February 2 letter from Kohler to Ambassador Gavin still remains completely classified at present, underscoring the sensitivity such deliberations continue to have on national security considerations even today.53 Gavin reported at the end of the month his belief that de Gaulle considered “NATO to be a US headquarters in Europe,” and that the
General would continue to pursue his own efforts to organize Europe “whether or not we respond to his desire for a triumvirate organization.” In light of this assessment, Gavin recommended the Americans continue to deal with the other European powers through NATO and be wary of de Gaulle’s current lip-service being paid to NATO, which Gavin suspected belied de Gaulle’s intentions to ultimately undermine NATO to pursue France’s own goals.54
US-Franco tensions continued to build in early 1962 as the Americans became more concerned about calls in West Germany for a German nuclear force and continued to investigate their
51 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France, November 29, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 237, 679. 52 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 484-485. 53 Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to the Ambassador to France (Gavin), February 2, 1962, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 238, 680. 54 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, February 21, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 239, 681-682. 41
nuclear policy options toward France.55 McNamara indicated openness to providing missile aid to France in early March 1962 that could contribute to savings that could then go into French conventional forces or warhead production, while State Department officials appeared to remain driven not to contribute to the French national force in any way, even preferring to supply the
French with American conventional weapons than support the force de frappe for fear of sparking further European nuclear requests.56 Rusk echoed this latter view at the State
Department, where he instructed American diplomats in the same month to avoid discussing anything pertaining to missile technology or MLF proposals with their French counterparts, hoping to avoid any potential miscommunication that American leanings against supporting
France’s nuclear weapons program had shifted.57
The cause of Rusk’s concern for a miscommunication can be seen through a March 1962 letter from Ambassador Gavin to President Kennedy advocating for direct aid to the French nuclear weapons program. Even the ambassador now faced the reality that French
“determination to build a modern military force clashes with our policy not to assist the development of independent nuclear deterrents.” Gavin, however, argued that American actions including refusing to sell France enriched uranium, while doing so to the UK, and failing to provide nuclear submarine assistance to the French promised by the Eisenhower administration were exacerbating US-Franco tensions, which he feared could spill over into general economic and trade fields. The Ambassador to France, even at this point in time, still advocated finding common ground between American and French nuclear policies, even if it meant providing
55 Memorandum of Conversation, “US-France Divergencies: Berlin, The Nuclear Question and NATO,” February 28, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 240, 683-685. 56 Note from Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler, “Secretary McNamara’s Views on Nuclear Sharing,” March 01, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 57 Memorandum of Telephone Message from Foy D. Kohler to Paul H. Nitze and Roswell L. Gilpatric, March 09, 1962, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 42
missile technology to France. For Gavin, the potential damage to other areas of US-Franco cooperation was too great a risk to not provide nuclear technology that the French would inevitably obtain on their own. He also argued it would provide a show of American intent to cooperate on military matters rather than abide by an inflexible interpretation of restrictions stipulated by the Atomic Energy Act.58
Similar to his earlier November 1961 response to Gavin, Rusk again dissented with this opinion, declaring in a May 1962 telegram to the State Department that he informed his West
German and Canadian NATO counterparts in an Athens meeting of detailed reasons why the US was “strongly opposed to nuclear sharing with France.” The Secretary of State outlined reasons against sharing with France, which included: Franco-centric policies toward Europe and NATO which countered US strategic goals; continued pressure by France for triumvirate decision- making; open French contempt for NATO and the UN; instability in the French government; and
American estimates that the French deterrent’s purpose was “not to cooperate with US and the
Alliance, but to ensure France’s independence of [the] US and [the] Alliance.” Rusk emphasized that these considerations indicated a much more complex situation than whether France could merely qualify for aid according to the Atomic Energy Act. 59
Gavin’s pleas do not appear to have persuaded the president either, who did not raise the issue in a May 1962 meeting with Hervé Alphand, the French ambassador. Instead Kennedy expressed bewilderment at de Gaulle’s actions which the Americans understood as a preference for “a Europe without Great Britain and independent of the United States – a powerful force which France would speak for.” This conversation did not have the level of congeniality seen in
58 Letter from the Ambassador to France (Gavin) to President Kennedy, March 9, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 242, 687-688. 59 Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Department of State, May 4, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 245, 690-691. 43
the Kennedy-de Gaulle meeting of June 1961, as Kennedy circled back to de Gaulle’s increasingly antagonistic comments and actions as well as the disparity of American to French resources committed to collective European security several times throughout the meeting.60
This was the first of many meetings of a frostier nature with the French which would become characteristic of the latter part of the Kennedy and Johnson years. In another meeting between
Ambassador Alphand and McNamara the same month, the French ambassador illustrated another characteristic the French government would embody during the same time: that of downplaying or attempting to recontextualize de Gaulle’s statements while reaffirming overall French commitment to the Atlantic Alliance.61
Bundy attributes the beginnings of the rift in US-Franco relations to an interpretation mistake of the word “inimical” used by Kennedy regarding the French nuclear weapons program, where Kennedy apparently intended that the term communicate it would be inimical for the US to aid the French nuclear weapons program due to the US nonproliferation policy at the time.
Meanwhile, the French took Kennedy’s use of the word to mean the American president found the entire idea of the independent force de frappe to be inimical. Bundy claims this misunderstanding, seemingly caused by confusion regarding the intent behind a single word, led to an “unpleasant split” that became apparent by mid-1962.62
In spite of these growing tensions, the Americans tried to find common ground with the
French as they continued to account for recent French actions and craft an appropriate nuclear policy. Rusk met with de Gaulle in June 1962 in one of a series of meetings to try to bridge outstanding US-Franco nuclear policy differences. In a lengthy discussion both men laid out
60 Memorandum of Meeting, May 11, 1962, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 249, 695-701. 61 Memorandum of Conversation, “US-French Exploratory Talks; First Session,” May 28, 1962, FRUS, 1961- 1963, Vol. XIII, Document 253, 708-713. 62 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 486-487. 44
their positions for why each maintained their current path. The Americans sought to arm NATO with their weapons and shun a competing French national effort, while the French sought the opposite. The General indicated that he did not view the American-Franco nuclear impasse as a solvable problem. Rusk recounted in a telegram to the State Department that to de Gaulle:
These problems were not only difficult but perhaps unsolvable. The US has fantastic means and faces the enemy with similarly fantastic means. Therefore, the US considered that strategy and defense policy belonged to it. Any other power in the place of the US would probably do the same. However, the problem is how to reconcile this policy with the need to maintain the Alliance. States like France must have their own personality and must be their own masters. He [de Gaulle] was not angry with us (“je ne vous en veux pas”). He did not see how the problem could be settled. [De Gaulle suggested that] Perhaps it was best for each of us simply to play his own game and live with the situation. This was not a deadly matter since our aims are the same.
De Gaulle disparaged Rusk’s calls for the indivisibility of NATO forces as a façade for
American control, but reassured the Secretary of State that “if a fight should come we would stand together.”63 This represented a significant piece of information gleaned during the estimation stage, as de Gaulle himself essentially admitted that while compromise on nuclear policy was likely impossible, as both nations sought their own independent nuclear goals, France still saw its overall strategic goals aligned with the US in spite of these differences.
Gavin and Rusk continued to argue over de Gaulle’s intentions, but not the reality of unwavering French pursuit of an independent nuclear deterrent. Rusk now felt convinced that de
Gaulle’s nuclear motivation was “primarily psychological and subjective” and “based upon his desire for status to place France on roughly the same level as the United States and clearly distinctive from other European countries.” He argued US-Franco nuclear and NATO disagreements should be put on hold until the European Common Market discussions concluded, apparently not adopting de Gaulle’s conviction in their prior meeting of the impossibility of a
63 Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, June 20, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 255, 719-724. 45
compromise. Rather, Rusk found progress was being made “in reducing [the] Washington-Paris temperature” and clarifying US-Franco differences while emphasizing agreements.64 Gavin disagreed with Rusk’s interpretation of de Gaulle’s motives, instead explaining the General’s motivation as political and anticipatory of a future European nuclear force separate from
American-supplied NATO weapons, a potential development the Ambassador to France claimed to hear with increasing frequency in Paris. Both men agreed that French nuclear ambitions existed beyond de Gaulle and that dealing with them should wait until Common Market discussions were complete.65
Policy development was essentially frozen in the estimation stage for the remainder of the year as US officials became occupied with developments in Berlin and avoiding an outbreak of hostilities during the Cuban Missile Crisis.66 France went through its own domestic difficulties during this time, culminating in Gaullist-backed changes to the constitution of the
Fifth Republic to directly elect the president successfully passing in a referendum.67 During this same time Charles Bohlen, a career diplomat, replaced Ambassador Gavin as Ambassador to
France. A December 1962 meeting between Rusk and de Gaulle after these crises were managed was warm on the surface. Rusk thanked de Gaulle for France’s support during the missile crisis,
64 Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, June 21, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 256, 725-727. 65 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, July 6, 1962, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 257, 727-730. 66 The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the defining events of the Kennedy era and arguably the closest the world ever came to the outbreak of nuclear war. For accounts by those who participated in the crisis, see Chapter 9 of McGeorge Bundy’s book, Danger and Survival, and Robert F. Kennedy’s book, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1971). For more recent retrospective accounts about the crisis, see Norman Polmar and John D. Gresham’s DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), Michael Dobbs’s One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War (New York: Vintage Books, 2008), or Sheldon M. Stern’s The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 67 For more information about the early days of the Fifth Republic, as well as additional details about de Gaulle’s 1962 referendum election victory, see Chapter 2 of Nicholas Atkin’s The Fifth French Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 46
while the General graciously attributed the crisis’s successful resolution to Kennedy’s “firmness and lucidity” under pressure. Tensions still bubbled just beneath the surface, however, over
NATO commitments and the force de frappe but did not exceed past each acknowledging these problems still existed.68
US-Franco tensions finally boiled over in 1963. De Gaulle noted in a January 1963 meeting with Rusk, in contrast to the tone of his comments to the Secretary of State only one month prior, that the Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated to him that the Americans would deal with direct threats to themselves swiftly and effectively, but gave lesser priority to matters that did not. This reinforced the General’s view that he must account for France’s own security, including an independent nuclear deterrent, regardless of American continental security promises. Rusk noted at the time that although de Gaulle was “extremely amiable and indeed for him cordial,” it was clear he had “no intention of committing France even to any definite form of negotiation or discussion” for multilateral nuclear cooperation.69 Relations became even more complicated by late January after de Gaulle denied the UK entry into the European Common
Market. Rusk linked to the results of the Nassau Agreement,70 which de Gaulle surprised the both Kennedy officials and his own government by rejecting, to his denial of British entry into the Common Market in a meeting with the French ambassador.71
68 Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, December 13, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 261, 740-742. 69 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, January 4, 1963, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 263, 745-748. 70 The December 1962 Nassau Agreement between President Kennedy and British Prime Minister Macmillan resulted in the US agreeing to supply the UK with Polaris missiles effectively under national control. Marc Trachtenberg argues Kennedy sought to provide Polaris to both the UK and France under national control at the time of the agreement, but changed his mind after State Department Undersecretary George Ball sabotaged the plan to promote the MLF. See Trachtenberg’s A Constructed Peace, 360-369 for additional details. 71 Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Rusk and the French Ambassador (Alphand), January 19, 1963, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 265, 750-753. 47
As these and other developments occurred, the estimation stage of developing a US-
Franco nuclear policy once again went into motion. A particularly important piece of information was transmitted to American officials in March 1963 from Bohlen. Through French politician Louis Joxe, Bohlen reported that de Gaulle was “in a very bad humor” and “suspicious of virtually everyone and everything and appeared to be brooding about something.” Bohlen noted with surprise that practically all of de Gaulle’s ministers, even loyal, long-time Gaullists, showed “extraordinary ignorance” about the General’s frame of mind. In Bohlen’s personal assessment, de Gaulle was a product of a traditional France that was “conservative, hierarchical, religious and military” rather than some “Machiavellian plotter who thinks through his various moves in foreign affairs with any calculated purpose to be immediately achieved in mind.”
Bundy adds credence to this assessment in his memoirs as well, arguing that de Gaulle’s refusal of Kennedy’s post-Nassau Agreement offer was “rooted in conviction” rather than a calculated move.72 Indeed, he opined that much of de Gaulle’s trouble with misinterpretations of his statements in the press were because his comments often referred to hypothetical events potentially decades away (i.e., eventual German nuclear weapons acquisition or withdraw of
American troops from Europe). Rather than take this intended meaning, listeners of such remarks would then assume he was referring to current French policies or attitudes. Bohlen judged that US-Franco relations could probably not be improved and de Gaulle not be dissuaded from his current path, but he, nevertheless, encouraged President Kennedy to pursue written dialogue with the General to “attempt to avoid a deepening of his suspicion and an increasing
72 Letter from the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), March 2, 1963, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 270, 762-769; Bundy, Danger and Survival, 493. 48
tendency to take every minor action of the United States and feed it into a preconceived pattern.”73
Kennedy raised the issue of de Gaulle’s hostile comments in a May 1963 meeting with
French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville, registering his continued bewilderment of the General’s public antagonism against American commitments to European security since, in his view, “the danger of a Soviet attack against Europe nowadays was minimal” and “Europe was quite secure militarily now.” The president also reminded the French Foreign Minister that the US previously offered France an “open door held out” for a path to nuclear weapons cooperation through the Nassau Agreement, but de Gaulle responded by blocking the UK’s membership in the European Common Market. Couve de Murville’s responses indicated French support and alignment with American foreign policy positions of multiple points of contention, quite the opposite of the positions de Gaulle espoused with which the Americans took issue.
This discrepancy between what the French president said in public and what French diplomats said in private was explained by the latter to Kennedy as a misunderstanding or was ignored entirely.74
In terms of forming a coherent US-Franco nuclear policy during the Kennedy years, the documents support Shane Maddock’s argument that no coherent nonproliferation policy was formed during this time. Kennedy indeed wavered between supporting the French nuclear weapons program, or at least providing the French with American weapons under the Nassau
Agreement, and viewing support to the French nuclear weapons program as a political liability to both NATO stability and nonproliferation efforts. The documents also support Francis Gavin’s
73 Letter from the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), March 2, 1963, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 270, 762-769. 74 Memorandum of Conversation, “Review of French Foreign Policy,” May 25, 1963, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 271, 769-775. 49
argument that US nonproliferation efforts during this time were motivated by an American desire to limit the number of nations that could effectively mitigate forms of US power with nuclear weapons possession. Kennedy officials interacted with an increasingly adversarial de Gaulle as the General ostensibly was not dependent upon the US for its defense requirements, at least politically if not in actual practice, to the same degree as the rest of continental Europe. While
Bundy is critical of the actual strategic role and value of the force de frappe, the documents do lend credence to his supposition that the US failed to realize at the time that nuclear weapons possession, no matter how rudimentary or ineffective in practice, were “indispensable to
[France’s] national self-respect.”75
The Johnson Administration, 1963-1968
In the wake of the Kennedy assassination, Ambassador Bohlen passed a memorandum of his thoughts on de Gaulle and French foreign policy after one year at his post for Rusk and
President Johnson in December 1963. Bohlen described de Gaulle with fewer glowing terms than earlier in his tenure as Ambassador to France:
The character of de Gaulle is completely formed by his education, experience and his own characteristics, which are highly egocentric [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Insofar as I can ascertain from conversation and reading, he has never been induced to change any of his basic views by conversations with others nor as a result of concessions or favors done him by other countries. The only conceivable circumstances that can produce a shift or change in his policies, if not his attitude, would be an actual change in the conditions under which he is operating. (This was noticeable in the case of the Algerian question.)
Bohlen also speculated the cold level of US-Franco relations were where de Gaulle wanted them in order to sell his brand of French nationalism and calls for French independence from international organizations to the French public. De Gaulle would not, he claimed, make any
75 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 502. See 499-503 in the same source for a fuller exposition of what Bundy thought nuclear weapons possession did and did not convey to the UK and France in terms of geopolitics and national identities. 50
shift in France’s current foreign policy path regardless of “any conceivable offer we might make on atomic matters.” The Ambassador to France also painted a rather dysfunctional picture of a
French leader at odds with the rest of his government. De Gaulle was “according to all reports withdrawing more and more from any intimate contact with his colleagues,” with Bohlen emphasizing “he quite literally has no close friends or even associates.” In contrast to de
Gaulle’s antagonism toward the Americans, much of his government were “favorably disposed to the US” and were perturbed by de Gaulle’s attitudes and apparent views. Bohlen recommended the US give de Gaulle nothing, as he would take any concession “as a natural right and as recognition of his ‘greatness,’” but treat France with “utmost courtesy.” Doing so, Bohlen argued, would deny de Gaulle anti-American propaganda ammunition and signal American intent to continue to work with amiable officials within the French Government.76 Other than an early 1964 paper by Bohlen that Bundy forwarded to Rusk largely reiterating these same points, the estimation stage of US-Franco nuclear policy appears to have ended following Bohlen’s
December 1963 report.77 Unlike his predecessor James Gavin, who continually advocated for nuclear weapons aid to France in order to influence French policy, Bohlen finally came to the same conclusion that the General had matter-of-factly stated to Rusk in June 1962 – compromise was simply impossible.
The transition from Kennedy to Johnson did not cause a shuffle in key foreign policymakers. McNamara, Rusk, and Bundy, Kennedy’s key foreign policy officials, all remained throughout most or all of the Johnson years. As such, these men were able to read
76 Memorandum from the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk, December 13, 1963, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 277, 790-793. 77 Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen), “Reflections on Current French foreign Policy and Attitudes toward the United States and Recommendations,” undated, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller (Washington: GPO, 2001), Doc. 27, 43-47. 51
Bohlen’s December 1963 report based upon three years of prior experience dealing with de
Gaulle and observing his gradual shift in attitude. In spring 1964, Johnson officials came to a concrete decision on US-Franco nuclear policy. Enshrined in the April 20 National Security
Action Memorandum (NSAM) 294, the policy that US officials selected severed any and all avenues of nuclear aid to France that could contribute in any way to the French national nuclear weapons capability:
Given current French policy, it continues to be in this government’s interest not to contribute to or assist in the development of a French nuclear warhead capability or a French national strategic nuclear delivery capacity. This includes exchanges of information and technology between the governments, sale of equipment, joint research and development activities, and exchanges between industrial and commercial organizations, either directly or through third parties, which would be reasonably likely to facilitate these efforts by significantly affecting timing, quality or costs or would identify the US as a major supplier or collaborator. However, this directive is not intended to restrict unduly full and useful cooperation in non-strategic programs and activities.
Therefore, the President has directed that effective controls be established immediately to assure that, to the extent feasible, the assistance referred to above is not extended either intentionally or unintentionally.78
Though obviously a major policy decision several years in the making, NSAM 294 was classified as Top Secret and not publicly known until decades after its adoption. The adoption of
NSAM 294 also indicated a transition from the prolonged estimation stage to the policy selection stage.
Interestingly, the extent to which NSAM 294 cut nuclear weapons ties to de Gaulle’s
France has not appeared extensively within the literature. Shane Maddock does not discuss the severing of US-Franco nuclear weapons channels in his book but does report that Johnson gave a well-publicized foreign policy speech on the same day as the directive was issued, April 20,
78 National Security Action Memorandum No. 294, “US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France,” April 20, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 30, 50- 51. See Figure 1 in the appendix for the full text. 52
1964. The speech emphasized Johnson’s support for the NATO-based MLF, a specific point of contention for de Gaulle.79 NSAM 294 contextualizes this speech to a great degree, as it appears to have been an implicit rebuke to de Gaulle both publicly and privately as the Americans were signaling that they would forge ahead without French support on the MLF and felt no obligation to provide nuclear weapons assistance to an increasingly antagonistic France. This would also appear to support Francis Gavin’s argument that the Johnson administration viewed nonproliferation as a serious, high priority goal. This contrasts with Maddock’s argument that
Johnson officials gave nonproliferation a low priority which does not address the implications of the official severing of US-Franco nuclear weapons communication and support channels.
Bundy does not address NSAM 294 or its implications in his memoirs either, arguably because it remained classified at the time of his memoirs’ publication; however, Bundy may indirectly be addressing the NSAM through his broad conclusion that “Kennedy, and Johnson even more strongly, came to understand further that the right reply to Gaullist provocation was to ignore it.”80
De Gaulle appeared to have received the message, as a last-minute summons to see
American diplomat Bob Anderson in June 1964 signaled de Gaulle sought to explore whether
US-Franco relations could be improved under Johnson. De Gaulle claimed “he did not get on well with President Kennedy.”81 This is a stark and interesting contrast from the contemporaneous observations of Kennedy officials who recalled warm interactions between
Kennedy and de Gaulle, but particularly so in light of Ambassador Bohlen’s noted concerns
79 Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, 226. 80 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 503. 81 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, “Bob Anderson’s Call on General de Gaulle,” June 1, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 32, 53-54. 53
about that de Gaulle may attempt to mislead President Johnson with a charm offensive only months later.82
With a policy course now determined, the challenge of the implementation stage was to follow. Disagreements over how best to implement NSAM 294 arose by the end of 1964. Rusk, while acknowledging that the purpose of the action memorandum was to deny France significant assistance in their effort to acquire an independent nuclear arsenal, asserted its purpose was also to continue to cooperate with France as with any other friend and ally in non-weapons related matters. As such, he advocated following through on a 1959 deal with the French for what amounted to an insignificant amount of uranium while remaining wary of supplying advanced computers that could potentially directly aid the force de frappe at indeterminate levels.83 In contrast to Rusk’s line at the State Department, McNamara took a decidedly more rigid approach in his interpretation at the Defense Department. McNamara commented that American denial of equipment or technology to the French may often be non-determinative, but insisted that the export controls established in NSAM 294, “as one of several means of carrying out the anti- proliferation policy, will – by cumulative effect – retard, increase the cost of, or discourage
French and other national efforts.” McNamara saw no exceptions in enforcing NSAM 294’s restrictions as Rusk did, instead choosing to block the uranium transfer and advising Bundy to block the advanced computer transfers as well. Doing so, McNamara wrote to Bundy, “should eliminate a major obstacle to implementing the NSAM 294 policy effectively.”84
82 Memorandum of Conversation, “Franco-American Relations,” September 10, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 34, 56-57. 83 Letter from Secretary of State Rusk to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), December 1, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 36, 59-60. 84 Letter from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), December 4, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 37, 61-64; As evidenced by McNamara’s interpretation of NSAM 294, McNamara would become a staunch opponent of nuclear proliferation following his time in office. See his book, Blundering Into Disaster: Surviving the First 54
As US-Franco nuclear policy implementation progressed it also underwent simultaneous and continuous evaluation. An assessment of the effectiveness of the policy in late December
1964 prepared by State Department official Llewellyn Thompson for Bundy found that
American nuclear weapons aid denials stipulated by NSAM 294 were likely to delay French nuclear weapons development as well as potentially spur increased French self-reliance.
Thompson recalled that France up to that point had never made an official request for nuclear weapons aid through high level channels of government, but regularly engaged in probing through unofficial channels for transfer of American nuclear weapons-related technology, materials, or cooperation. In citing multiple examples of such probes and US officials denying, ignoring, or redirecting such efforts on a regular basis, Thompson posited that the policy NSAM
294 embodied had mostly been in practice even before 1964.85 Ambassador Bohlen reported shortly afterwards in early January 1965 that French foreign policy goals remained unchanged and that he saw “no possibility of any US diplomatic or political action directed specifically at
France which would significantly change French attitudes or policy.”86 In effect, NSAM 294 in officially severing US-Franco nuclear weapons channels of communication and exchange could also be viewed as a continuation and legitimization of this same unofficial American nuclear policy of non-responsiveness to French nuclear weapons requests in the years preceding the official action memorandum.
Century of the Nuclear Age (New York: Pantheon, 1986) for further discussion by the former Secretary of Defense on his nonproliferation positions and criticisms of the subsequent nuclear policies of both Reagan and Gorbachev. 85 Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), “Denials of US Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Vehicle Assistance to France,” December 29, 1964, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964– 1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 41, 72-77. 86 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, January 5, 1965, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 42, 77-81. 55
Strains in diplomatic relations between the French and Americans finally manifested in
1965. French acts of public antagonism toward the US in early 1965, including the rather insulting proposition of a Franco-Soviet policy summit on Vietnam, were decried by Bohlen as behavior “not befitting an old ally.” Bohlen noted there were “abundant signs both latent and apparent of stress in our official relations,” even though, surprisingly, nuclear disagreements between the two remained dormant at the time.87 French officials continued to downplay the now publicly apparent diplomatic rift between the US and France as merely “a figment of the journalists of both Washington and Paris.”88 US officials also sought to relieve these tensions, issuing a review of current and planned covert, clandestine, or overt activities engaging France to prevent additional strains to US-Franco relations.89
Further US-Franco nuclear policy evaluation in early 1966 following de Gaulle’s reelection saw Rusk deliberately separating “the foreign policy of President de Gaulle and our continuing friendship, courtesy and respect for France and French officials.” The Secretary of
State now described the General as leading French foreign policy “based on his messianic belief in the glory and importance of France” that were “not subject to reasoned argument,” while echoing past American assessments that no compromise with the General was likely to work.
Instead, Rusk now positioned de Gaulle as a temporary impediment to US policy that would eventually pass to a more reasonable successor government. Instructing US missions in NATO member states in March 1966, he wrote:
Policy toward President De Gaulle cannot be considered in isolation. It is and must remain an integral part of our over-all foreign policy. While it would be possible to
87 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, March 11, 1965, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 45, 89-92. 88 Memorandum from Horace Busby of the White House Staff to President Johnson, “Conversation, Ambassador Alphand,” June 10, 1965, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 49, 97-98. 89 National Security Action Memorandum No. 336, “Potentially Embarrassing Activities in France or in Areas Outside France which are Controlled by France,” August 6, 1965, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 51, 106-107. 56
devise a US policy which could bring about an accommodation with President De Gaulle, this would require abandonment or modification of major US objectives. Such a price is far too high to pay, particularly in view of the recent evidence that President De Gaulle does not presently have majority support in France for many of his policies. The US should make no substantial concessions to the policies of President De Gaulle, but should pursue whatever policies it finds appropriate, irrespective of his position.
Since de Gaulle and his followers would not stray from their foreign policy path, and with more agreeable French partners waiting in the wings, the US would simply need to hold its current policy positions until the General inevitably left office.90 Rusk’s March 1966 circular telegram to the US missions indicated that US policy toward France in all areas was now intertwined because of de Gaulle’s intransigence. Giving any concessions in one area was judged only to embolden the General to continue his independent foreign policy quest to recover France’s greatness at the expense of US foreign policy goals and the integrity of the Atlantic Alliance.
American foreign policy moves to counter or mitigate France from American nuclear weapons calculus, through both the promotion of the MLF publicly and the enforcement of NSAM 294 secretly, would continue through the end of both Johnson and de Gaulle’s terms in office.
The characterization of de Gaulle presented by the documents as increasingly erratic and irrational toward the end of his tenure in office supports Trachtenberg’s challenge of the long- held assumption that de Gaulle’s antagonistic line toward the US was based on a calculated strategy to enact a clear, consistent policy vis-à-vis US-Franco relations. US officials appear to have been keenly aware that the General’s rhetoric was not representative of the actual policy objectives of the French government as a whole, and that both sides would have to simply wait until de Gaulle’s time in office was up and acknowledge that they could not take his words at
90 Circular Telegram from the Department of State to All NATO Missions, March 2, 1966, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 55, 111-113. 57
face value in the meantime.91 Bundy does not address de Gaulle’s apparent changes in demeanor in his memoirs.
Although the US-Franco nuclear policy of cooperative denial would remain in a maintenance stage until de Gaulle’s departure, its effects on the French nuclear weapons program and US-Franco relations continued to be evaluated throughout. Americans observed the rift between de Gaulle and his foreign service widen significantly throughout 1967. French
Ambassador Charles Lucet found himself opening the new year accounting for the General’s
“unfortunate and inexplicable remarks” about American involvement in Vietnam.92 By midyear
Ambassador Bohlen registered concern about the apparent “degree to which under De Gaulle’s one-man rule personal and subjective prejudices have been translated into political action” regarding his response to the 1967 Six-Day War. The General’s anti-Israeli attitudes were not shared by many in his government, which Bohlen appraised only weakened the Gaullist position further.93
Around the same time in July 1967, Bohlen reported that de Gaulle’s demeanor recently had shifted quite noticeably. Though famously outspoken, the General still always “had a sense of measure, of timing, of place and appropriateness.” De Gaulle now noticeably lacked these abilities, with the Ambassador concluding rather grimly that it was perhaps “too soon to state that De Gaulle is ‘becoming senile,’ but certainly the restraint which used to accompany his actions and characterize his words seem to be slipping very badly.”94 These changes seemingly did not escape French officials either, as French Ambassador Lucet was visibly flustered after
91 Trachtenberg, “The de Gaulle Problem,” 91-92. 92 Memorandum of Conversation, “Conversation with French Ambassador,” January 9, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 71, 139-140. 93 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, July 12, 1967, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 74, 143-144. 94 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, July 27, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 76, 145-147. 58
Bohlen remarked that “the United States did not seem to be popular with President De Gaulle these days.”95 De Gaulle’s increasingly antagonistic behavior would nearly precipitate an insurrection against him in mid-1968, leading incoming Ambassador to France Sargent Shriver to conclude de Gaulle had lost considerable influence both at home and abroad.96
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 22-68, a December 1968 assessment of the progress of the French nuclear weapons program, found the French pushing multiple deadlines for missile and submarine systems into the next decade, with only a Mirage IV-A bomber force carrying 70 kiloton (KT) fission-type bombs currently operational. American Intelligence judged economic hardships and domestic turmoil throughout 1968 to be hampering progress as France was spending “as much as, or more than, they can afford on their nuclear force.” The estimate also indicated that the French had “dropped broad hints” in the latter half of 1968 that they sought to explore improving US-Franco nuclear relations with the incoming administration. De Gaulle’s positions were expected to remain unmovable, but the NIE speculated his eventual successors might be more amenable to the idea of an integrated European nuclear force than the General.97
The documentation appears to favor Francis Gavin’s argument that Johnson officials were keenly aware of the consequences of proliferation and sought to do what they could to limit the spread of nuclear weapons over Shane Maddock’s argument that the Johnson administration severely neglected nonproliferation as a policy objective. While Maddock charges that Johnson officials were “unwilling to commit to a strategy” and “allowed nonproliferation efforts to languish” during the early Johnson years, the documents reveal that NSAM 294 directly
95 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, July 22, 1967, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 75, 144-145. 96 Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State, “Possible Effects of Present Crisis on French Foreign Policy,” May 28, 1968, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS, 1964–1968, Vol. XII, Doc. 79, 151-153. 97 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 22-68, “French Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities,” December 31, 1968, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 59
contradicts this by demonstrating a distinct commitment to a strategy to specifically limit proliferation vis-à-vis the French nuclear weapons program. While the continued US focus on implementing the MLF, or at least paying lip-service to it, does agree with Maddock’s argument that the US sought to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of decolonialized nations and potentially available to European allies, it is also apparent that Johnson officials were not prepared to simply give their European ally, France, a blank check to use American nuclear weapons support or weapons in any way the French saw fit independent of US concerns. This represents a significant contrast to the apparent willingness of President Kennedy to do allow
France to essentially do the opposite under the Nassau Agreement offer. The hinderance to the
French nuclear weapons program through NSAM 294 also supports Francis Gavin’s argument that the Johnson administration was not willing to support foreign proliferation based solely on whether a nuclear-armed nation was an ally or enemy, instead preferring that no other nations obtain weapons to mitigate US strategic options.98
The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974
As the Nixon administration entered office in January 1969, the situation was much different than it was for incoming Kennedy officials in 1961. Relations with the USSR had improved and the overall prospects for nuclear war breaking out between the superpowers seemed much less likely than during the Kennedy-Khrushchev era.99 Additionally, Nixon officials inherited a cohesive nuclear policy in regards to France as NSAM 294 remained in effect. This did not necessitate a new initiation stage of US-Franco nuclear policy, as the US currently had a clear policy position against aiding or cooperating with the French nuclear
98 See Chapters 8 and 9 in Maddock’s Nuclear Apartheid and Chapter 4 of Gavin’s Nuclear Statecraft for more detailed explanations of both arguments. 99 For additional information about the easing of US-Soviet tensions that took place at the end of the Kennedy- Khrushchev years, see Chapter 9 of Trachtenberg’s A Constructed Peace. 60
deterrent. The Nixon administration did, however, begin to reevaluate the problem, essentially jumping past problem identification in initiation and straight into the estimation stage.
In a March 1969 meeting with de Gaulle, President Nixon signaled a very different view of the force de frappe than his predecessors held. The president told the General “he thought it was good for the US to have another power like France with a nuclear capability” and spoke positively about a possible “extension of military cooperation consistent with the French independent position” in the future.100 Though far from a policy selection, Nixon’s statements to de Gaulle indicated an intent to shift US-Franco nuclear policy toward a more cooperative nature. This was followed by a directive from Nixon issued under National Security Study
Memorandum (NSSM) 47 in April 1969 in which he quietly directed a review of possible policy options for nuclear weapons cooperation with the French.101 Broader and more numerous studies on general US-Franco policy changes took place concurrently in a more open fashion following de Gaulle’s resignation, a seismic event in French politics.102 As these broader policy studies were ordered and organized efforts were made to keep NSSM 47 separate and insulated from the bureaucratic exposure the other studies would undergo.103 By October 1969 several options for
US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation were identified, including: French participation in the
NATO Nuclear Planning Group; strategic weapons targeting coordination; encouraging UK-
Franco nuclear cooperation; and American support or aid to the French nuclear weapons
100 Memorandum of Conversation, March 1, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook (Washington: GPO, 2012), Doc. 118, 445- 454. 101 National Security Study Memorandum 47, “Military Relations with France,” April 21, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 123, 463-464. 102 Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting, “US Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France; US Policy Toward Peru,” May 22, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 128, 471-474; For additional information about the turbulent last year of de Gaulle’s tenure as President of France leading up to his resignation, see Chapter 4 of Atkin’s The Fifth French Republic. 103 National Security Study Memorandum 60, “United States Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France,” May 29, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 130, 475-477. 61
program. These options would require new policy decisions, but options to work within standing
US-Franco nuclear policy were also highlighted at the time. The response to NSSM 47 indicated
“the extent to which cooperation can develop will depend in part on whether a forthcoming or a restrictive interpretation is given to present guidelines.”104 The NSC, then chaired by National
Security Advisor Henry Kissinger, commissioned further studies on these options and their potential benefits and consequences near the end of 1969.105 The French catalyzed this process by requesting direct aid through military channels for their missile program in December 1969, although it was not disseminated outside of the Defense Department until January 1970. The
Nixon administration decided to wait until French President Georges Pompidou’s planned visit to the US in late February 1970 to decide how to respond.106
Kissinger identifies Nixon as intending to increase nuclear and military cooperation with
France in his memoirs, noting the president would “not let NATO theology” deter such efforts and explicitly states that “not even the possibility of limited cooperation in the nuclear field was excluded” from their deliberations. Kissinger also gives a positive account of American interactions with Pompidou, describing de Gaulle’s successor as similar to the General in his distrust of “multilateral organizations or decisions as dissolving French identity,” but claims that even “with all his doubts and innate suspicions, relations with France improved dramatically under Pompidou.” Nixon’s National Security Advisor also explicitly mentions increased
104 Response to National Security Study Memorandum 47, October 20, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969- 1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 132, 479-481. 105 Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting, “US Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France (NSSM 60),” December 11, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 134, 488-489. 106 Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, “Memo from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense to France on Ballistic Missiles,” January 23, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive; Pompidou, while not nearly as personally antagonistic to the US as de Gaulle was, continued to toe the Gaullist line throughout his time in office. See Chapter 2 of Philip Thody’s book, The Fifth French Republic: Presidents, Politics, and Personalities (New York: Routledge, 1998), and Chapter 6 of David S. Bell and John Gaffney’s, eds., book, The Presidents of the Fifth Republic (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), for additional information about Pompidou’s political life and role as President of France during the first half of the 1970s. 62
military cooperation between the two, claiming that “while he [Pompidou] would not reverse de
Gaulle’s policy of national defense, he favored practical cooperation in the military field” and noting that “practical arrangements were made for intimate consultation” between himself and
French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert.107 In spite of this reference to the possibility that the US may have considered nuclear cooperation with the French in the first volume of his memoirs,
Kissinger remains silent on the extent to which American support for the French nuclear weapons program eventually grew to.
By February 1970 the Nixon administration entered the policy selection stage by deciding to offer American nuclear aid and cooperation to the French nuclear weapons program. The
State Department indicated support for providing nuclear weapons assistance to French officials in a meeting preceding Pompidou’s visit.108 Nixon suggested in a February 24 meeting with
Pompidou during the latter’s visit to the US that both nations allow their militaries to begin exploring ways to better communicate and cooperate. The president claimed that once such channels were established the US could potentially “go quite a distance further” by consulting on
French development questions regarding submarine and tactical nuclear weapons.109 Following the Nixon-Pompidou meeting, and the positive reception of the French President to beginning to explore avenues of nuclear cooperation, Nixon officials began the gradual process of implementation of this new policy of US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation. NSAM 294 was sidestepped for the time being as not applicable to these preliminary exploratory actions, as the
107 Kissinger, White House Years, 389, 419-423; Kissinger describes how Michel Jobert later acted as a major antagonist during 1973 in his attempt to unite Europe politically in its opposition to US interests in Chapters 5 and 16 of his second volume of memoirs, Years of Upheaval. 108 Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, “Minutes of Meeting on Post-de Gaulle France,” February 23, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 140, 499-504. 109 Memorandum of Conversation, February 24, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Document 141, 505-512. 63
NSC feared formal rescission of the NSAM would risk leaks and ensuing controversy.110 The next month Nixon approved measures to begin a dialogue with French officials about providing limited technical assistance to specific French missile development requests.111 Gerard Smith, the chief American SALT negotiator, notably registered dissent against pursing a policy of US-
Franco nuclear weapons cooperation for fear it would jeopardize both the SALT negotiations and
US-West German relations.112
Preliminary assessments of these limited discussions began to occur by September, with
Nixon officials interested in the current status of the dialogue, potential alternative actions, and anticipated conflicts of choosing to pursue further action. American officials also began to study the feasibility of providing American-made advanced computers to France for their missile program.113 Analysis of these options continued into early 1971. A lengthy January 1971 report assessing the various advantages and disadvantages of continuing nuclear weapons aid prohibition compared against initiating nuclear weapons cooperation with France noted the decision to pursue US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation would be highly consequential:
Any change in US policy toward nuclear cooperation with France would, of course, represent a major departure from past US policy and would be seen as such both by other nations and by the US Congress and public. We should expect strong criticism and opposition to such a change in policy from many internal and external sources. Within the government some elements of Congress will be opposed, as will agencies and individuals charged with or interested in safeguarding information or in furthering anti- proliferation and nuclear testing measures. The Soviets will probably oppose any major increase in cooperation and may utilize every move in that direction to stress the hazards of proliferation, to charge US insincerity and jeopardy to SALT, and to arms control in
110 Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger, “Military Cooperation with the French,” February 28, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 111 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “Follow-up Actions on Military Cooperation with the French,” March 10, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969- 1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 142, 512-513. 112 Letter from Gerard C. Smith to Henry A. Kissinger, June 30, 1970, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 113 National Security Study Memorandum 100, “Military Cooperation with France,” September 1, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 144, 515-516. 64
general. A number of news media and public representatives will fight any move toward relaxation for similar and additional reasons.114
By early March 1971, Nixon officials decided against lifting restrictions to sell advanced computers to France and providing significant assistance to the French missile program. Instead, they advocated reopening nuclear weapons safety talks as a means of fostering US-Franco nuclear dialogue.115 Kissinger recommended the president provide minimal support by restricting most, but not all, advanced computers and offering limited, non-critical missile assistance, subject to continuous review, as a means to keep the door open for further cooperation in the future. Nixon elected to both follow these suggestions from Kissinger and restart US-Franco nuclear weapons safety talks.116 The Nixon administration made efforts to quickly inform the French and British of these decisions after they were leaked domestically to the Congressional Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE) in order to mitigate the effects of any further leaks internationally.117
These additional policy decisions began to be implemented soon after, as plans were made for how to respond to the press in the event American assistance became public knowledge.118 The Nixon administration redefined advanced computer restrictions to only include “computers with a maximum theoretical bus rate exceeding 200 million bits per
114 Response to National Security Study Memorandum 100, January 15, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969- 1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 148, 524-530. 115 Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, “Military Cooperation with France,” March 3, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 150, 535-547. 116 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “Military Cooperation with France,” March 25, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 152, 550-554. 117 Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), “Follow-up on Military Cooperation with France,” April 8, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 155, 557-560. 118 Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to Melvin R. Laird and William P. Rogers, “Military Cooperation with France, NSDM’s 103 and 104," April 15, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 65
second.”119 Ground rules restricting American missile aid to only improving current French technology rather than collaborating on development of new French systems were developed and approved during summer 1971.120 By the end of 1971 the administration informed the
Congressional JCAE and the French about the specifics of the planned US-Franco nuclear weapons safety talks.121 The proposed American scope of safety talks was broad, centering around “operational nuclear safety procedures followed in the field by our respective commanders” regarding “strategic sea-based missile systems; strategic land-based missiles; strategic bombers; tactical missiles; and tactical aircraft.” The Americans also indicated the
French could ask about “general principles of safe nuclear designs” and equipment and methods of measurement intended to safeguard against inadvertent detonations of nuclear devices, but safety discussions could not include American information classified as “Restricted Data or
Formerly Restricted Data.”122 The first round of US-Franco nuclear safety talks eventually occurred in May 1972.123
Once again, Nixon officials evaluated the success of this policy of limited assistance and continuing dialogue on shared nuclear safety after implementing the policy during the latter half of 1971 and early 1972. French Minister of National Defense Michel Debré in July 1972
119 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird, “Redefinition of Advanced Computers,” April 21, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 156, 560-561. 120 Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), “Status Report on Missile Cooperation with France,” August 4, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 157, 562-563. 121 Memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger, “Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Hearings on Projected Nuclear Safety Talks with the French,” November 16, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 122 Cable from William P. Rogers to American Embassy Paris, “Military Relations with France," November 15, 1971, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 123 Memorandum from Holsey G. Handyside, “Status Report on Proposed Nuclear Safety Talks with the French," May 03, 1972, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 66
“expressed great satisfaction about the US-Franco talks on technical subjects.”124 Nixon instituted another comprehensive review of US-Franco bilateral arrangements in December 1972 through NSSM 166, which included all relevant issues “except those that are the subject of
National Security Decision Memorandums (NSDM) 103 and 104.”125 A separate review of these issues came in January 1973 from Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to the president. Laird reported to Nixon that American missile aid had saved the French “appreciable time and money” while still remaining “within the limits of your guidance” and noted both sides found the first two nuclear safety talks highly beneficial. French requests over the second half of 1972 sought aid beyond the scope of the current policy limits to more sensitive areas of nuclear weapons assistance. Laird recommended the US continue to expand missile assistance using general information to comply with French requests on a short-term basis until a new policy directive to either expand or contract American nuclear weapons assistance to the French was decided.126
Nixon directed Laird in March 1973 to follow through with Laird’s previous recommendations in January 1973 until further study of the matter could be conducted.127
Shortly thereafter, Nixon initiated another in-depth study, NSSM 175, to examine the benefits, disadvantages, and additional legal requirements needed to increase missile assistance to France; the possibility of French testing at the underground Nevada nuclear testing site; and the possibility of sharing information classified as Restricted Data with France. The study also
124 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird, “Meeting with French Defense Minister Debré,” July 8, 1972, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 160, 579-580. 125 National Security Study Memorandum 166, “Review of US-French Bilateral Issues,” December 26, 1972, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XLI, Doc. 163, 589-590. 126 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon, “US-French Relations: The Defense Dimension,” January 23, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen (Washington: GPO, 2014), Doc. 304, 929-933. 127 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Richardson, “US Assistance to the French Missile Program,” March 9, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 305, 933-934. 67
considered the effects of increased US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation on SALT and the
US-UK “Special Relationship” as well as the possibility of developing “roughly equivalent nuclear relationships” with both the UK and France. The study, as with prior ones, demanded the utmost discretion be used.128 Potential ways to leverage further nuclear weapons cooperation to suit US interests continued to be discussed throughout 1973. The Defense Department suggested aiding the effectiveness of the French deterrent, through additional missile development assistance or encouraging the development of a missile warning system in France, may be potentially useful to tie to Kissinger’s “Year of Europe” initiative to encourage greater
European defense integration.129
The documentation supports Shane Maddock’s conclusion that Nixon officials did not support nonproliferation, as it seems evident that the Nixon administration, at least in regards to
France, actively sought to allow French proliferation to continue. Additionally, the documents also appear to validate Francis Gavin’s argument that Nixon and Kissinger viewed geopolitical concerns rather than nuclear weapons as what drove the international system and ensured overall global stability.130 Both Kissinger and Nixon were clearly more interested in bringing about an improvement in US-Franco relations and a reorientation of French foreign policy more in line with American defense concerns than stopping proliferation out of sheer principle. Rather, the
French case demonstrates Nixon officials were willing to enable French nuclear proliferation in order to achieve these goals.
128 National Security Study Memorandum 175, “US Nuclear Defense Policy Toward France,” March 13, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 306, 934-935. 129 Memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy to William G. Hyland, “Jobert Meeting: US-French Nuclear Cooperation," June 27, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. 130 See Maddock’s Nuclear Apartheid, 282-283, 286-290 and Chapter 5 of Gavin’s Nuclear Statecraft for more detailed expositions of these arguments. 68
Kissinger does not detail the extent to which US options to support the French force de frappe were both explored and enacted during the Nixon era in his memoirs. He does, however, recount in great detail the extent to which relations with France and other European allies soured during 1973 and 1974.131 Sources in the literature identify summer 1973 as a point where US officials actually sought to sow European division in spite of public US support for European unity. Trachtenberg recounts Kissinger’s comments on breaking Europe’s unity and posits that
Nixon officials sought to use nuclear aid to the French nuclear weapons program as a means to
“drive a wedge between France and the other European countries” by stoking jealously in other
Europeans through US-Franco bilateral nuclear weapons cooperation. This would ostensibly serve as a means to stop the formation of an antagonistic and adversarial united European bloc interested in reasserting its identity in international affairs through differentiating itself from the
US.132 Additionally, R. Gerald Hughes and Thomas Robb contrast this relationship of explicit
US-Franco nuclear cooperation with what they term as “coercive linkage” undertaken by
Kissinger toward the UK regarding the US-UK “Special Relationship” to fulfill the same policy of European division. They note not only Kissinger’s concerns about the potential for the development of an adversarial Europe dating back to his writings from 1964, but also highlight his and Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger’s close cooperation and coordination in threatening to withhold intelligence and nuclear sharing with the British to achieve US policy goals during the same timeframe in 1973.133 In the sense that US nuclear aid to the force de
131 Chapter 5 of Kissinger’s Years of Upheaval gives his reflective account of the “Year of Europe” initiative. Originally intended to increase Atlantic Alliance cohesivity, it became a point of contention as Europeanists, led by Michel Jobert, sought to create a unified Europe identified by its opposition to US interests. While Jobert and his allies ultimately failed, they significantly exacerbated tensions between the US and France bilaterally and between the US and Europe broadly. 132 Trachtenberg, “The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 1969-1974,” 39. 133 Hughes and Robb, “Kissinger and the Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage in the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United States and Great Britain, 1969-1977,” 878, 881-883. 69
frappe was intended essentially as a carrot to influence French foreign policy, rather than a stick as Hughes and Robb report vis-à-vis the UK, this could perhaps be termed “persuasive linkage.”
The documentation supports Trachtenberg’s and Hughes and Robbs’s claims that US officials sought to use nuclear weapons support to France and threats to the US-UK “Special
Relationship” as a means to avoid the formation of an adversarial Europe. Kissinger suggested in an August 1973 meeting that nuclear weapons aid to France could be used as a means to keep
European nations divided enough from one another that they could remain within the ability of the US to manage. After discussing the various problems the Europeans were causing to
American interests, Kissinger explained “we are going to try to bust the Europeans. The French can be useful in this. We will hit the British, ignore the French and deal with the Germans and the Italians.” Kissinger reemphasized his point later in the conversation not once but twice, stating first “if we can use the French and break their unity, we can deal with the Europeans” while later remarking “we must break up the Europeans. And the French are essential.” French nuclear weapons cooperation as well as “hit[ting] the British” were the vehicles through which
Kissinger and Defense Department officials proposed to accomplish this objective. When
Schlesinger noted that “we could always use the Germans,” Kissinger dissented, retorting “that is dangerous. The Germans would use it for nationalist purposes.” Further nuclear weapons aid offered to France was still proposed to be substantive and meaningful in spite of these clandestine policy goals, with Kissinger reasoning “if they are going to build a deterrent, it ought to be good.”134 An extensive and detailed meeting between Nixon officials and French defense officials regarding the current status of the French nuclear deterrent, American suggestions for its
134 Memorandum of Conversation, “Visit of French Defense Minister Galley; Strategic Problems,” August 17, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 312, 955-957. 70
improvement, and potential additional American nuclear assistance occurred soon after at the end of August 1973.135
A private meeting between Kissinger and Schlesinger and their assistants the following month reveals the motivation behind the push to use US-Franco nuclear aid as a means to divide
Europe, wherein Kissinger divulged:
On the Poseidon [missile]. We want to keep Europe from developing their unity as a block against us. If we keep the French hoping they can get ahead of the British, this would accomplish our objective. If we gave the British MIRV [multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles] while the French were so far behind, it would be bad. If we could give the British the dispensing mechanism and hold open the MIRV for the French a few years, we could keep them even.
“De-MIRVed” Poseidon missiles supplied to the British were discussed as a possible means to pursue this goal, as the French were apparently making progress toward MIRV technology of their own development. Kissinger noted that in return for continued American nuclear aid, “the real quid pro quo is the basic orientation of French policy. Galley [Robert Galley, French
Minister of the Armed Forces] said he understood but it would take them time.”136 Further meetings between Nixon officials and French defense officials continued throughout autumn
1973.137 US-Franco relations suffered a serious and unplanned setback, however, following a rift over the October War.138
135 Memorandum of Conversation, August 31, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 313, 957-970. 136 Memorandum of Conversation – Kissinger and Schlesinger, September 05, 1973, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive. See Figure 2 in the appendix for the full text. 137 Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), October 13, 1973, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Doc. 316, 975-978. 138 Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry Kissinger, “US-French Military Cooperation," July 04, 1974, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive; For additional information on the 1973 October War and its effects on US-European relations, see Trachtenberg’s “The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon- Pompidou Period, 1969-1974,” 43-51 or Bundy’s Danger and Survival, 518-525. 71
US-Franco nuclear policy stalled in an extended evaluation stage throughout 1974 following a chilling of overall US-Franco relations in the aftermath of the October War and subsequent US nuclear alert along with leadership changes in both nations by mid-1974. A
March 1974 analysis of the current state of US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation deemed that previous US-Franco nuclear safety talks had now provided all possible information of value to both sides. Missile assistance to the French established in 1973, and intended as a short-term solution until an official policy decision on the extent of further cooperation was made, continued. Defense Department officials recommended a “suspension of new [nuclear weapons cooperation] initiatives and warning on the remainder of the programs.” This would serve as a gentle but firm reminder that valuable US nuclear technical information would not continue to flow freely to French nuclear technicians if France continued to act “abrasively” toward the US in other foreign policy matters.139
Trachtenberg characterizes the state of US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation by the time of Pompidou’s death and Nixon’s resignation as “in tatters”, but disagrees with past conclusions that France sought to oust the US from Europe, instead suggesting that the French were still interested in defense and nuclear cooperation with the Americans. Indeed,
Trachtenberg reports that while US sources indicate the US-Franco nuclear weapons relationship was “suspended” at this point, French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing wrote in his memoirs that Kissinger asked Giscard at a July 1974 breakfast meeting whether the French president
“wanted the [nuclear weapons] relationship to continue.”140 Maddock also writes that US-
139 Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic and Space Systems, Department of Defense (Walsh) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, “Missile Cooperation with France,” March 6, 1974, Washington National Records Center, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 320, 984-987. 140 Trachtenberg, “The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 1969-1974,” 40, 51-53. 72
Franco nuclear cooperation “continued into the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations,” but does not provide detailed documentation to support these claims.141 Trachtenberg’s conclusions that France sought to continue nuclear collaboration with the US and Maddock’s claims of continued nuclear cooperation following the Nixon era are confirmed by recently released documents from the Ford administration. Nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and
France not only resumed according to the previous course set by Nixon officials, but actually increased under Ford and Giscard as relations between both the US and France bilaterally and the US and Europe as a whole improved. Kissinger remains silent on US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation that occurred during the Ford era in his memoirs; he does, however, discuss at length the improvement of US-Franco and US-European relations that occurred during this same period.142
The Ford Administration, 1974-1976
Similar to the transition of the Kennedy to Johnson administrations, the transition from the Nixon to the Ford administration did not cause an immediate shift of key foreign policy advisors. Ford chose to keep both Schlesinger and Kissinger in their positions from the Nixon administration initially.143 The State Department, conversely, expected France to have a more dramatic shift in its foreign policy following the death of Pompidou and the election of
Giscard.144 Ford officials speculated that US-Franco relations were likely to improve under
141 Maddock, Nuclear Apartheid, 288. 142 After reflecting on the state of US-Franco relations at the end of the Nixon era in the early pages of Chapter 20 of Years of Renewal, Kissinger recounts how relations between the US and France, as well as other key European allies, improved during the Ford years in the remainder of the chapter and in Chapters 21 and 22. 143 Kissinger discusses how relations between Schlesinger and Ford soured, leading to the former’s replacement by Donald Rumsfeld, and how he both maintained his position as Secretary of State and was replaced by Brent Scowcroft as National Security Advisor during the October 1975 “Halloween Massacre” in Chapter 6 of Years of Renewal. 144 Giscard, as the first non-Gaullist president of the Fifth French Republic, did not hold antagonistic feelings toward the US as Pompidou or de Gaulle, even more so, did before him. See Chapter 7 in Bell and Gaffney’s, eds., book, The Presidents of the Fifth Republic, and Chapter 2 of Thody’s book, The Fifth French Republic: Presidents, 73
President Giscard, as the new president was not a Gaullist but rather a center-right politician noted to have quickly adopted “a more pragmatic, unemotional approach to our relations” in contrast to de Gaulle and Pompidou.145 The Ford administration expected that Giscard would revive US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation talks in a December 1974 meeting in Martinique between the French and American presidents, remaining cautious not to oversell potential
American nuclear weapons aid pending legal and political obstacles.146 Ford officials indicated renewed interest in providing further nuclear weapons aid to France at the Martinique meeting, but indicated clearly that such aid would not be broad and comprehensive. US officials requested that the French give the US a list of specific items and communicate directly through the White House rather than at the technical level until cooperative boundaries were established.147 Ford officials also made efforts to keep these talks quiet so as not to agitate the
British, who remained unaware of the proposed extent of expanded US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation.148 This is in contrast to the earlier attitude of Nixon officials who made sure to inform the British of initial US intent to strengthen US-Franco nuclear ties after the information leaked domestically.
The Ford administration subsequently received an extensive list of requests from the
French the next year in January 1975, with several items that went “far beyond the scope” of US nuclear weapons assistance to that point. Additional requests included multiple reentry vehicle
Politics, and Personalities, for additional information about Giscard’s more centrist political leanings and role as President of France during the latter half of the 1970s. 145 Paper Prepared in the Department of State, “Issues Paper for the Secretary’s Briefing of the President,” undated, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 323, 990-996. 146 Briefing Memorandum from the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger, “Missile Assistance at Martinique,” undated, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 325, 998-1001. 147 Memorandum of Conversation, “Defense Cooperation; CSCE; F-104 Replacement; Monetary Issues,” December 15, 1974, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 326, 1001-1008. 148 Memorandum of Conversation, January 29, 1975, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 327, 1009-1010. 74
(MRV)149 system development; assessing French nuclear force vulnerabilities to Soviet attack; warhead designs; allowing testing of French devices in Nevada; and underground testing. Many of these requests were particularly sensitive, requiring Congressional approval as stipulated by the Atomic Energy Act or potentially compromising information on US nuclear weapons designs or American intelligence on Soviet nuclear weapons. Kissinger recommended that the US bypass any requests that would require Congressional intervention or sensitive information and instead provide aid in areas that would not be subject to publicity, oversight, or legal obstacles.150
By the end of June 1975, the Ford administration indicated that it had finally made a policy selection through NSDM 299. Ford directed that US-Franco nuclear safety talks, originally created through NSDM 104 under Nixon, expand to include underground testing using American information through Secret classification, excluding Restricted Data, but would not accept
French nuclear devices for testing in Nevada.151 Ford also ordered the expansion of missile assistance to France started under Nixon through NSDM 103 to include: MRV design and assistance to the next generation of French missiles; missile penetration; scenarios for addressing vulnerabilities of and defending French nuclear capabilities against Soviet attack; and data on materials behavior for missile engineering purposes. Information shared with the French included up to Secret classification but still excluded Restricted Data.152 Ford officials began implementation of this policy of expanded US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation shortly
149 MRVs are simpler than MIRVs, as they have multiple warheads in a missile that are able to hit a single target while MIRVs have multiple warheads in a missile that are capable of hitting multiple independent targets. See Bundy’s Danger and Survival, 550-552 for a more detailed explanation of MIRV missile technology and its implications. 150 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford, “Cooperation Programs with the French,” June 19, 1975, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 329, 1014-1016. 151 National Security Decision Memorandum 299, “Cooperation with France,” June 23, 1975, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 330, 1016-1017. See Figure 3 in the appendix for the full text. 152 Memorandum from President Ford to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, “Missile Cooperation with France,” June 23, 1975, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 331, 1017-1018. 75
thereafter, with US-Franco talks on underground testing and increased missile assistance occurring in summer and fall 1975.153
Evaluation of the Ford administration’s decision to pursue further nuclear aid and cooperation with France and the success of the implementation stage occurred throughout 1976.
Schlesinger’s replacement as Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, suggested further review of US nuclear weapons aid to France may be necessary in order to make the purpose of such aid work toward French integration into NATO and a strengthened Atlantic Alliance. Rumsfeld suggested that slowing down the rate of American support may work to encourage France to gravitate toward these US interests.154 Ford officials also continued to debate whether to supply
France with a single CDC-7600 computer for use in their weapons program without altering or withdrawing NSAM 294, which specifically prohibited such transfers.155 By the latter end of the year US officials wondered whether they could “have demanded and obtained more from the
French.” Still, the Defense Department noted that the settlement of costs of relocation of
American forces from France, additional planning for wartime cooperation with NATO’s
Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and planning for wartime operation of
American forces within France had occurred, ostensibly, because of US nuclear rapprochement with France. Ford officials continued to review these issues through the end of their time in office.156
153 Memorandum from Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger, “Cooperation with France,” September 10, 1975, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 333, 1021-1025. 154 Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to President Ford, “Cooperation with France,” May 13, 1976, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 336, 1029-1030. 155 Memorandum from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford, “Control Data Corporation Request for Export License,” undated, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 337, 1031-1032. 156 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McAuliffe) to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, “French Connection,” November 1, 1976, Washington National Records Centers, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 341, 1041-1043. 76
Chapter Summary
The application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method reveals that the Kennedy and
Johnson administrations took a decidedly different approach than the Nixon and Ford administrations to forming and enacting US-Franco nuclear policy. Kennedy officials began identification of the problem of French nuclear proliferation shortly after entering office, with
President Kennedy reaching a general conclusion by May 1961 that US efforts should not be made to aid French proliferation. Though policy to this effect would not be concretely decided upon until several years later, the Kennedy administration continued to assess and gather information about the French nuclear weapons program in a prolonged estimation stage through this eventual decision. Kennedy did not want to directly aid French proliferation other than potentially in a limited way on equal terms with the UK through the Nassau Agreement, but the
US State Department and de Gaulle ensured that this would not happen. The Kennedy administration made efforts to compromise with France by giving them a greater role in setting global policy, guaranteeing consult with France before any potential American nuclear action was taken against the Soviets, and even attempted to deal with France on a tripartisan basis as a specific concession to General de Gaulle. Despite these concessions and attempts to foster closer military coordination and cooperation in the face of the Berlin Crisis and Cuban Missile Crisis in
1962, de Gaulle’s intense nationalism and unwavering pursuit of the restoration of France’s great power status through possession of an independent French nuclear deterrent could not be tempered. Tensions between Kennedy and de Gaulle grew over the course of 1963, leading to
Johnson officials concluding at the end of the year that no amount of concessions or compromise would affect de Gaulle’s disposition. This resulted in Johnson officials making a definitive policy selection in April 1964 through NSAM 294, severing all channels of nuclear 77
communication and cooperation with France that could conceivably aid the French nuclear weapons program. Implementation of this decision determined that no exceptions would be made, even on honoring previous agreements for transfer of nuclear material inconsequential to
French nuclear weapons efforts. Subsequent evaluation of NSAM 294 indicated that French nuclear progress slowed as a result, but de Gaulle was not dissuaded from pursuing the independent French nuclear deterrent or influenced in his independent foreign policy direction.
Johnson officials then settled on maintenance of the policy to continue to block US nuclear weapons support to France while de Gaulle remained in power with the understanding that the issue may be revisited if de Gaulle’s successors proved to be more agreeable to compromising to
US interests. Kennedy-Johnson officials thus made a complete “cycle” of the six policy stages, beginning with initiation of the problem of French proliferation and following it through to maintenance of the nonproliferation policy they selected through the end of the Johnson era.
Nixon officials did not share the same conviction as Kennedy and Johnson officials that
French nuclear proliferation was an explicitly adverse development. Nixon signaled an interest in reviving US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation early in his first term while de Gaulle was still in office. Estimation of how to approach the issue resulted in Nixon ordering secretive studies, including NSSM 47, to be performed assessing potential cooperative options with the force de frappe. Nixon selected a policy of offering gradual nuclear weapons aid to France following the reestablishment of US-Franco military coordination and cooperation. This began a common approach for offering nuclear aid that would begin with the administration selecting to provide specific aid or cooperation to the French, implementing these choices, then evaluating their efficacy and determining whether additional aid or cooperation should be pursued based upon the results. Nixon officials continued to pursue this course clandestinely, as many elements 78
within and without of the US Government were thought to be hostile to this proliferation- supporting approach. The Nixon administration expanded support in 1971 to include nuclear safety talks, redefinition of advanced computers to provide France with access to some, but not all, advanced computers, and the beginnings of American provision of missile aid to France.
Evaluation of nuclear weapons aid and cooperation in 1972 found France was saving both time and money on achieving their deterrent goals, leading to French requests for more sensitive information and advanced aid. Further evaluation of the policy through 1973 considered whether further aid should be given to France, with Kissinger notably remarking that US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation could be used to disrupt the possibility of an adversarial European bloc from forming against the US by aiding French nuclear weapons development while simultaneously impeding British nuclear weapons advancement. A chilling in US-Franco relations following the 1973 October War, the death of Pompidou, and the resignation of Nixon delayed further movement on these efforts. Ford officials picked up where the Nixon administration left off in talks with Giscard in late 1974, culminating in the selection of a policy of even further expanded US nuclear weapons support and cooperation through NSDM 299.
This was again implemented clandestinely to avoid agitating allies or enemies critical of seemingly preferential treatment to the French or proliferation overall. Evaluation in 1976 of nuclear weapons aid directed under NSDM 299 found France was receiving much and showed the beginnings of moving French foreign policy in line with American preferences.
From this case study it is apparent that both the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford administrations sought to use nuclear weapons cooperation with France as a means to influence
French foreign policy in a way that suited American interests. Kennedy and Johnson officials sought to use it as a means to further integrate France into the NATO apparatus and common 79
Western defense, but were unable to dissuade de Gaulle from pursuing both his own independent foreign policy and nuclear deterrent. Johnson officials eventually chose to close off all avenues of nuclear weapons aid and cooperation once it became clear that nuclear offers would not persuade de Gaulle toward this path while remaining open to reopening these channels to post-de
Gaulle France. Nixon officials seemingly intended to use nuclear aid for the same purpose, but additionally did so as a means to keep Europe from forming an antagonistic bloc that asserted its identity through opposing the US, a development that Nixon officials feared would potentially weaken NATO and threaten American security interests. The Ford administration continued to broaden US-Franco nuclear weapons cooperation started under their predecessors, eventually leading to a scenario wherein the US directly contributed to advancing France’s nuclear deterrent while US-Franco and US-European relations simultaneously improved.
This case study expands upon the available secondary literature by providing continuations of the accounts given in previous literature on US-Franco nuclear policy and US-
Franco relations overall. Marc Trachtenberg’s argument that de Gaulle’s foreign policy was not coherent is lent further credence through documentation which emphasizes not only that the US viewed de Gaulle as a separate entity from the consensus of the French government, but that they were well aware of the extent to which the rift between de Gaulle and his government grew during the 1960s. Additionally, Trachtenberg’s account on US-Franco nuclear cooperation is supplemented with documentation unavailable at his time of writing that reveals US aid to the force de frappe not only continued under Ford officials, but actually expanded. Hughes and
Robb’s account of Nixon officials threatening to withhold nuclear sharing with the UK is further contextualized by providing a parallel account of Kissinger and Schlesinger using nuclear aid to the French as a carrot during the same period. This case also provides significant context to 80
Kissinger’s account in his memoirs of the rise, fall, and subsequent rise of US-Franco relations during the Nixon and Ford administrations by revealing the extent of his role in arranging gradually increasing clandestine American aid to the French nuclear weapons program through documents not available until decades after his memoirs’ publications. Documentation not addressed by Shane Maddock regarding NSAM 294 and its after effects, but available at the time of his book’s publication, provide evidence in favor of Francis Gavin’s argument that Johnson officials maintained a robust nonproliferation focus and against Maddock’s argument to the opposite. Documentation regarding the extent of gradually increasing aid to the French nuclear weapons program unavailable to both Gavin and Maddock, however, substantiate their arguments that the Nixon and Ford administrations did not maintain a focus on nonproliferation during their terms. A more detailed analysis and discussion of the efficacy of these administrations in using nuclear weapons support to influence France to meet American interests is provided in Chapter IV.
81
CHAPTER III. US-SINO NUCLEAR POLICY, 1961-1976: FROM NUCLEAR THREATS TO
NUCLEAR PROTECTION
The administrations of Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford also chose diverging approaches to developing US-Sino nuclear policy. Kennedy officials studied the Chinese nuclear problem intensely and considered multiple options to stop the PRC from obtaining nuclear weapons while remaining wary of the consequences such unilateral action could introduce from both the Soviets and international community. Johnson officials decided against preemptive action, preferring not to introduce more uncertainty and chaos into the situation by attacking the PRC’s nuclear facilities unilaterally or supporting covert actions by the ROC. As the possibility of rapprochement appeared viable in a post-Mao PRC, Johnson officials signaled near the end of their time in office that the US was open to increasing dialogue between the two.
Nixon officials continued this foreign policy thrust as well as intense study of the problem, eventually adopting a policy of nuclear cooperation with the PRC that gradually increased from the removal of American nuclear forces from Taiwan to a highly clandestine policy of protecting the Chinese nuclear weapons program from Soviet preemptive attacks, which continued into the
Ford years.
Again, the application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method of policy development reveals the changing considerations and conditions that influenced the formation of US-Sino nuclear policy. Kennedy officials identified the Chinese nuclear problem as a threat to US national security and estimated the problem through extensive exploration of possible American options to hinder or destroy the Chinese nuclear weapons program. Kennedy officials did not make any firm decisions as information about the program remained difficult to obtain. The 82
Johnson administration continued to estimate the problem, eventually selecting a policy of non- action toward the Chinese nuclear weapons program by 1964. Johnson officials maintained the
US-Sino nuclear policy throughout the remainder of their term in office while simultaneously continuing to close the information gap on Chinese proliferation and signaling US interest in potential US-PRC rapprochement. The Nixon administration continued the estimation process, making additional studies into the Chinese nuclear problem and the possibility of rapprochement.
Following Nixon’s trip to the PRC in 1972, Nixon officials selected a US-Sino nuclear policy of unilaterally easing tensions between the US and PRC by removing American nuclear weapons from the ROC. This policy was augmented in 1973 to include sharing sensitive information on
Soviet preemptive strike intentions and actively deterring a Soviet attack on the PRC’s nuclear facilities, as Nixon and Kissinger feared the effects such an attack would have on international stability and precedent. Ford officials maintained the policy but did not make any additional changes as US-Sino relations stagnated in 1975 and 1976. Nevertheless, Ford officials continued to implement the cooperative, tension-reducing US-Sino nuclear policy crafted by the Nixon administration as well as protecting the Chinese nuclear weapons program by continuing to deter
Soviet military action.
The Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963
Initiation in forming US-Sino nuclear policy began prior to the Kennedy years as
Eisenhower officials encountered the prospect of the PRC – an adversary hostile to American interests and allies – acquiring nuclear weapons as a development they viewed as unacceptable.157 While both Truman and Eisenhower engaged in nuclear saber-rattling during
157 CCP Chairman Mao Zedong dominated the PRC as its absolute leader for nearly three decades, including the entirety of the scope of this study. For additional information on Mao’s life and impact on the development of the PRC, see Jonathan D. Spence’s Mao Zedong: A Life (New York: Penguin Books, 1999), Alexander V. Pantsov and Steven I. Levine’s Mao: The Real Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012), or Chang and Halliday’s Mao: The 83
their terms, Eisenhower followed through with his threats by stationing nuclear Matador missiles in Taiwan in 1957.158 Intelligence reports from Eisenhower’s final year in office indicated the
PRC was now actively pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program with “a substantial amount of Soviet aid.” American Intelligence estimated the first Chinese reactor would go critical by late 1961, with plutonium becoming available for weapons purposes the following year and a Chinese weapons test estimated to occur as early as 1963.159
American ignorance of the details of the Chinese nuclear weapons program as indicated by the documents contextualizes Lewis and Xue’s account of the Chinese bomb, as developments such as the PRC’s decisions to build a test site at Lop Nur in October 1959 and to fabricate a uranium rather than plutonium device in April 1960 remained unknown to American
Intelligence for several years after being made. Lewis and Xue also indicate growing Sino-
Soviet antagonism observed by the US prior to the outbreak of border hostilities in 1969, claiming the Chinese saw the 1963 LTBT as a Soviet betrayal of the Socialist camp.160 The shock with which American officials reacted to the speed by which the Chinese accomplished the October 1964 nuclear test, and the sophistication of the test device, as evidenced in the documentation, also contextualizes Evan Feigenbaum’s account of the organization of the PRC’s
Unknown Story. For a more general account of CCP history, see Thomas Kampen’s Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1999). 158 Telegram from Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State, May 15, 1957, US Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, Vol. III, China, eds. Harriet D. Schwar and Louis J. Smith, (Washington: GPO, 1986), Doc. 251, 522-523; For more information about how the Eisenhower administration wrestled with the role of nuclear weapons use when confronting the PRC in the 1950s, see Bundy’s Danger and Survival, 238-245, 273-287. For a summary of complementary views from the perspective of Chinese scholars, see Yafeng and Zhi, “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century,” 253-256; Additionally, while the early years of CCP rule in the PRC are not discussed in this study, a detailed account leading up to Eisenhower’s 1957 Matador missile decision can be found in Frank Dikötter’s book, The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945-1957 (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2013). 159 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-2-60, “The Communist Chinese Atomic Energy Program,” December 13, 1960, US Department of State, FRUS, 1958-1960, Vol. XIX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar (Washington: GPO, 1996), Doc. 364, 744-747. 160 Lewis and Xue, China Build the Bomb, 113, 177, 192-193. 84
nuclear weapons program. He notes that by November 1962 the Chinese instituted what he describes as “the most important structure of all in the entire history of Chinese strategic weapons development,” the Central Special Commission of the CCP, for institutionalizing contact between technicians on the strategic weapons program and Chinese leadership at a time when the US still struggled to identify Chinese nuclear facilities and gauge the extent of Chinese ambitions.161
Chinese scholar Zhang Baijia’s assertion argues that the PRC practiced a “dual adversary policy” after the Great Leap Forward in 1958 through 1967, as Chinese receptiveness to US rapprochement efforts would not appear until 1968. Dong Wang asserts that Chinese actions and overall anti-US posture during this same period were central to Chinese Grand Strategy crafted to bring the PRC to great power status. She also agrees with both Lewis and Xue’s and
Feigenbaum’s characterizations of Chinese geopolitical considerations at this time as based on realistic calculations motivated by power politics rather than ideology, arguing Chinese leaders during the 1960s were “shrewd strategic players.”162
Kennedy officials inherited these conditions and their accompanying dire predictions in
January 1961. Initiation and early estimation of US-Sino nuclear policy development continued through the early months of the Kennedy administration as officials sought to understand the extent of Chinese nuclear ambitions. An intelligence estimate released three days before
Kennedy’s inauguration found that Chinese requests for additional Soviet nuclear aid and cooperation were outpacing the USSR’s willingness to help.163 The JCS identified their view to
161 Feigenbaum, China’s Techno-Warriors, 53. 162 Yafeng and Zhi, “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century,” 258; Dong, “Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and China’s Policy toward the United States in the 1960s,” 266-269. 163 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-61, “Probable Short-Term Reactions to US Resumption of Nuclear Tests,” January 17, 1961, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson (Washington: GPO, 1995), Doc. 1, 1-7; Relations between the Chinese and Soviets became strained during the 1950s as Soviet nuclear support for the Chinese nuclear weapons program waned, eventually 85
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in March 1961 that the PRC and USSR shared the same overall geopolitical goal of orienting the world away from the West and, “ultimately, toward achieving world domination” through the Communist world revolution as a “basic threat to US security.”164 Kennedy officials also noted the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split during the same spring. In anticipation of Chinese resistance to potential nuclear disarmament treaties, US officials observed that “Chinese leaders are determined to acquire a nuclear capability and appear to suspect (probably rightly) that Soviet disarmament policy is designed in part to delay or prevent this.”165 In contrast to recent and projected improvements in Soviet air defense systems, American Intelligence found Chinese surface-to-air missile (SAM) defenses to be weak or virtually non-existent by mid-1961.166 Even so, by August the JCS recommended to
McNamara that the US increase its “flexibility by providing for the possible withholding of attacks against Communist China and the satellites and/or governmental control centers in any
Communist country.”167
Some deliberations on potential American responses to the anticipated Chinese nuclear test, expected to occur as early as 1962, remain classified. A memorandum from Secretary of
State Dean Rusk to the State Department keeps these specific potential actions hidden, but does
resulting in a geopolitical division between the two Socialist giants. See Lewis and Xue’s China Builds the Bomb, 60-72 for more information on the nuclear aspects of the Sino-Soviet split. 164 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, “Nuclear Arms Control Measures,” March 23, 1961, Washington National Records Center, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 9, 21-27. 165 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-2-61, “Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament Issues,” April 6, 1961, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 13, 35-38; See Chapters 2 through 5 of Lorenz M. Lüthi’s book, The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), or Chapter 1 of Danhui Li and Yafeng Xia’s book, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1973: A New History (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018), for additional details about the beginnings of the Sino-Soviet split leading up to the start of the Kennedy era. 166 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-61, “Probable Short-Term Reactions to US Resumption of Nuclear Tests,” January 17, 1961, Central Intelligence Agency Files, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon (Washington: GPO, 1996), Doc. 36, 115-118. 167 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 41, 125. 86
note Rusk’s suspicion of encouraging further, presumably friendly, foreign proliferation to counter the Chinese. Rusk dissented to using proliferation for this end:
In connection with the policy planning paper of September 13 [the substance of which remains classified] on the subject of a Chinese Communist nuclear capability, I am not convinced that we should depart from our stated policy that we are opposed to the further extension of national nuclear weapons capability. For us to assist some other country, even for important political or psychological reasons, would start us down a jungle path from which I see no exit. Our problems with other countries and other continents on this matter could become quite unmanageable. Further, we must keep in mind that our policy rests upon the geometric progression of political difficulties as the number of atomic powers increases.168
Other elements in the State Department advocated for nonproliferation-based policies as well at the close of 1961. A December 1961 paper in the State Department suggested the US should engage in policies which “place the onus for continued hostility between Communist China and the US more squarely on [Beijing]” to “mobilize free world support in resisting Chinese
Communist expansion.” Additionally, the paper recommended that the US encourage the Sino-
Soviet split to progress as well as the Soviet “preference for negotiation over fighting.”169
Further estimation of the Chinese nuclear problem progressed slowly in 1962. An April
1962 intelligence estimate on Chinese nuclear weapons progress “acknowledged important gaps in available information,” rendering predictions of eventual Chinese nuclear weapons deployment difficult. Updated American estimates expected the first Chinese nuclear test to occur in 1963 or 1964 in light of recent Soviet-imposed constraints to the Chinese nuclear weapons effort. The US found the Soviets had reduced their nuclear weapons assistance to the
Chinese beginning in mid-1960, which slowed American expectations for eventual Chinese
168 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle), October 7, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 80, 194. 169 Draft Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council, December 5, 1961, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 62, 222-224. 87
advanced missile, submarine, or thermonuclear devices becoming operational in the 1960s.”170
By October 1962, while some in the Kennedy administration continued to believe the PRC could still be deterred from pursuing an independent nuclear weapons program, officials at the CIA dissented that the Chinese could be dissuaded. The CIA found, in contrast to more optimistic appraisals, “that the Communist Chinese are determined to go ahead with their nuclear weapons program.” “The Soviets,” they feared, “do not have (and are not likely to acquire) the leverage to produce a change in this decision.” The CIA also postulated that any potential “nuclear non- diffusion agreement” was unlikely to feasibly restrain the continuation of Chinese nuclear weapons development.171 A November 1962 memorandum from National Security Advisor
McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy indicates even Bundy still considered differing approaches to dealing with Chinese nuclearization. Bundy advanced one option, which was to
“raise with Khrushchev directly the question of Chinese Communist agreement to a test ban” as
“without the ChiComs [Chinese Communists], after all, the agreement is not going to mean much.” Bundy also offered an alternative option to the president, the text of which remains classified. Although the substance of this alternative option remains unknown, Bundy’s justification for it suggests US-Sino nuclear policy was still far from reaching a definitive decision. Of the classified possible option Bundy stated it, “in my view deserves, real study, with all its obvious hazards. But we need information first.”172 Interestingly, the JCS recommended to McNamara in December 1962 that the PRC be deleted from proposed basic
170 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 81, 274. 171 Letter from the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster), October 1, 1962, Central Intelligence Agency, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 234, 582-583. 172 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy, “Test Ban: Black Boxes, Khrushchev, and China,” November 8, 1962, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961- 1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 243, 597-598. 88
national security policy considerations “until completion of [the] reconsideration of China policy.”173 Estimation would continue into 1963.
While Bundy is not the primary focus of this study, the documents reflect William Burr and Jeffrey Richelson’s account that Bundy was both directly involved with and interested in exploring covert or military action against the PRC to halt development of their nuclear weapons program. As their article does, the documents examined in this project also refute Bundy’s own account from his memoirs where he explicitly dismisses contemporaneous claims by journalist
Stewart Alsop about an American preemptive strike against PRC nuclear facilities as “talk, not serious planning or real intent.”174 Rather, the US examined and actively investigated preemptive options, including American military action against Chinese nuclear facilities, both unilaterally and with the Soviets to stop the Chinese from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.
McNamara received the results of the China policy reconsideration at the end of April
1963. Options including persuasive, pressure-based, and coercive tactics to encourage Chinese acceptance of a nonproliferation agreement ran “a wide gamut within the diplomatic, political, economic, and military spheres.” Proposed indirect actions included: a widespread, coordinated diplomatic campaign to dissuade the PRC’s nuclear ambitions; increased propaganda and psychological warfare; encouraging severing diplomatic ties between other nations and the PRC; and encouraging trade embargoes against the PRC. The JCS also proposed seven direct actions that could be taken to motivate the Chinese to accept a nuclear agreement. Six of them remain classified, but the third of the seven proposed actions, which is unredacted, recommended
173 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, “Review of Basic National Security Policy – Short Version,” December 7, 1962, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 119, 436-438. 174 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 532. 89
“conduct[ing] increasingly severe maritime control measures up to and including blockade.” In contrast to the views within the American Intelligence community, the JCS still held out hope that the PRC’s nuclear weapons ambitions could be curbed. They insisted “the best means of effectively bringing about Chinese adherence to a nuclear test ban treaty lies in joint US/Soviet measures,” as the Soviets apparently “recognize[d] the difficulties inherent in such a cooperative approach but believe this has the major potential for success.”175 Deliberation of options still considered sensitive at present appears to have been shared by Kennedy and his advisors as well.
A June 1963 entry from nuclear chemist Glenn Seaborg’s personal journal described discussions on how to curb Chinese nuclear ambitions in a Cabinet meeting he attended as such:
The President asked how we might handle the discussion with respect to the Chinese. Foster [William C. Foster, Director of the ACDA] indicated that if we could get together with the USSR, the Chinese could be handled [DELETED] Bundy agreed that the Russians may insist to the Chinese that they desist from their nuclear weapons development…
The President raised the Chinese Communist question, stating that he felt we could take considerable risk in the treaty with assurance that the Chinese Communists would not proceed with their nuclear weapon development. McCone [John McCone, Director of the CIA] raised the question as to how the treaty would accomplish this. Others answered that 70 or 80 countries would be party to the treaty and that we would have to work out some arrangement with the French and the Soviets with the Chinese, and Harriman [Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, W. Averell Harriman] would have to develop this.176
Around the same time, American Intelligence reported in late June 1963 that they did not expect that upcoming PRC nuclear weapons development milestones would shift overall Chinese
175 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, “Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability,” April 29, 1963, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 283, 689-691. 176 Editorial Note, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 297, 734-735; Glenn Seaborg, who previously discovered plutonium and other transuranic elements, served as the Chairman of the US Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) during this time. For additional information about Seaborg’s role in shaping US science and nonproliferation policies during the Kennedy and Johnson years see Chapters 3 and 4 of his book, A Chemist in the White House: From the Manhattan Project to the End of the Cold War (Washington: American Chemical Society, 1998). Additionally, see his posthumously published memoirs, Adventures in the Atomic Age: From Watts to Washington (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001), for a broader account of his contributions to nuclear chemistry and his experiences in roles as both a scientist and an administrator for the US government. 90
policy to one of “open military aggression, or even become willing to take significantly greater military risks.” Rather, they expected a nuclear-armed PRC to “increase Chinese self-confidence and prestige and reinforce their efforts to achieve Asian hegemony.”177 While Chinese nuclear weapons acquisition was not expected by American intelligence agencies to spark a global nuclear war, one CIA official, Sherman Kent, did note his personal view that the Soviets “must harbor the profoundest apprehension of Chinese attainment of an early nuclear capability” as any unforeseen Chinese nuclear aggression would see either Eastern communism “knocked into a cocked hat” or the USSR pulled into “a nuclear war with the US for reasons not of their own choosing.”178 Khrushchev seemingly validated this suspicion later the same month in discussions with US officials where he downplayed the amount of Soviet aid given to the
Chinese prior to the Sino-Soviet split. Indeed, he replied he “could only say [the] Sov[iets]s had no info[rmation] whatsoever on this matter” while still indicating the Soviets sought to prevent further nuclear proliferation.179 New photographic evidence gathered about Chinese nuclear facilities by July 1963 also caused the US to adjust their predictions for Chinese proliferation.
Chinese nuclear weapons ambitions were now thought to be originally intended toward “a more ambitious advanced weapons program than we had earlier thought likely.” While progress notably slowed following Soviet withdrawal of nuclear assistance beginning in mid-1960,
177 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-63, “Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems,” June 28, 1963, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 301, 747-749. 178 Memorandum from the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for National Estimates (Kent) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman), “What the Soviets Must be Thinking as They Perceive the Chinese Communists Working Towards an Initial Advanced Weapons Capability – Nuclear Weapons and Missiles,” July 8, 1963, Library of Congress, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 314, 771-772. 179 Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State, July 27, 1963, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VII, Doc. 354, 856-863. 91
confident estimates of Chinese nuclear weapons progress could not be provided by American
Intelligence since “the gaps in our information remain[ed] substantial.”180
The Johnson Administration, 1963-1968
Investigations on the feasibility of a preemptive strike, conventional or nuclear, on
Chinese nuclear facilities began to made by some in the administration during the second half of
1963. A February 1964 memorandum from NSC staff member Robert W. Komer to Bundy indicates several lines of thought on American preemptive action against Chinese nuclear facilities. The State Department judged in a mid-October 1963 paper that an eventual PRC nuclear capability would pose “not much of a military threat but [was] of some political ‘scare’ potential,” with Komer recommending President Johnson be briefed on these conclusions. The
JCS, in a December 1963 reply to a request for a conventional preemptive strike plan on PRC nuclear facilities, recommended utilizing nuclear weapons for an American preemptive strike rather than conventional weapons. While Bundy indicated interest continuing to explore preemptive action, he appeared to maintain a patient view of the situation in claiming an ad hoc study group on the matter was unnecessary at this point.181 Prior to any decision being made,
McNamara also noted in a December 1963 memorandum to the president that retaliatory nuclear forces planned for deployment from 1965 through 1969 included Minuteman strategic nuclear weapons capable of destroying the PRC’s industrial base in several still classified configurations.182
180 Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-3-63, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” July 24, 1963, US Department of State, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 138, 492-494. 181 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), February 26, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar (Washington: GPO, 1998), Doc. 14, 23-24. 182 Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson, “Recommended FY 1965- FY 1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces,” December 6, 1963, National Archives and Records Administration, FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. VIII, Doc. 151, 546-564. 92
Estimation of the Chinese nuclear problem continued throughout 1964 in spite of calls early in the year by some Johnson officials, including Counselor of the State Department and future National Security Advisor Walt Whitman Rostow, that a NSAM directive was now needed on US policy toward the PRC’s nuclear weapons progress. Bundy swatted this idea down in late February 1964, instead recommending further review of the subject.183 An April
1964 study by the State Department concluded that striking Chinese nuclear facilities could potentially “put them out of operation for a few years (perhaps four to five),” but was associated with numerous political risks and unknown factors that would only become apparent after the strike occurred. The study judged covert action to be the most feasible means of delaying
Chinese nuclear weapons development, excluding an outright American assault in response to explicit, unambiguous Chinese aggression, but continued to recommend against preemptive action as both the technical considerations of an American strike and the wide, unresolved information gaps regarding Chinese nuclear facilities could not provide confidence the strike would be decisive, let alone successful. The State Department also thought the Soviets were
“most unlikely to agree explicitly or implicitly to US action against ChiCom facilities or to cooperate in helping lay the political basis for such action.”184 Additional options considered at the time included increasing US military postures; increasing American nuclear proliferation actions and allied defense planning; and providing increased conventional military hardware and assurances to US allies in Asia, with the State Department recommending these and preemptive
183 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), February 26, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 14, 23-24. 184 Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council, “An Exploration of the Possible Bases for Action Against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities,” April 14, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 25, 39-40. 93
actions continue to be studied.185 ROC President Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek notably registered his opinion to Rusk around the same time that he was opposed to using nuclear weapons against the PRC and advocated not rushing any decision of action.186 The CIA informed the president in late July 1964 of their assessment that the Chinese had now “overcome some, if not all, of their problems associated with the Soviets’ withdrawal of technical assistance,” although estimates for when a Chinese nuclear test would occur remained inconclusive.187 By August 1964 these estimates moved a potential Chinese test to after 1964, but noted evidence of construction of a test site at Lop Nor as well as supply of additional fissionable material as information provided by a non-Soviet, still classified foreign source.188
By September 1964 the Johnson administration finally selected a preliminary US-Sino nuclear policy decision – that of taking no “unprovoked unilateral US military action” against
Chinese nuclear facilities to stop or delay a potential Chinese nuclear test. Johnson officials instead preferred to implement short-term measures to further support the multiyear estimation process of gathering intelligence about the Chinese nuclear weapons program. These included conducting additional surveillance flights over suspected Chinese test facilities and quietly
185 Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council, “The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability,” undated, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 30, 57-58. 186 Memorandum of Conversation, “US and GRC Policies in East Asia,” April 16, 1964, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 26, 41-49; In a parallel of Mao’s rule in the PRC, Chiang Kai-Shek and his family would autocratically lead the ROC as a staunch US ally from 1950 through his death in 1975. Chiang’s considerations regarding the PRC’s nuclear weapons program would thus remain relevant to the US throughout the scope of this study. See Jay Taylor’s books, The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009) and The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), for detailed accounts of Chiang Kai-Shek’s and his son’s political lives as well as the latter’s role in presiding over the ROC’s transition to democracy. 187 Memorandum for the Record, “Meeting with the President,” July 24, 1964, Central Intelligence Agency, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 38, 69. 188 Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-4-64, “The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” August 26, 1964, Central Intelligence Agency, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 43, 78-81; The Chinese test site at Lop Nur ultimately proved to be where the successful October 1964 Chinese nuclear test occurred. For more information on the clandestine site’s selection, construction, and the test that occurred there, see Chapter 7 of Lewis and Xue’s China Builds the Bomb. 94
exploring potential collaborative measures with the Soviets, ranging from diplomatic warnings to joint preventative military action, to “hold the Chinese accountable if they test in any way.”189
Preemptive strikes continued to be preferred by some at the Defense Department, including deputy assistant Secretary of Defense for international security affairs Harry Rowen, who continued to fear Chinese ambitions would grow in the long-term if the PRC continued to proliferate. Rostow and others within the State Department, however, continued to predict that
Chinese nuclear weapons possession would have a sobering effect on the PRC. At the same time, a memorandum from Komer to Bundy indicates the National Security Advisor and others on the NSC were likely still quietly investigating or planning preemptive options independently, with Komer recommending “the best cover for it [preemptive action planning] might be simply to put out the word that we’ve taken a negative decision on the matter.”190 Later that same month Rusk’s discussions with Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin on Chinese nuclear progress revealed the Soviets were not prepared to discuss joint action against the Chinese, instead arguing Chinese weapons would have “no importance against the Soviet Union or against the US” but “only psychological impact in Asia.” Dobrynin did, however, confirm the “depth and strength of the existing split” between the Soviets and Chinese. The Soviet Ambassador placed the blame for this squarely at Chairman Mao’s feet, claiming to Rusk that “Stalin at his worst had never insisted upon the kind of personal worship which was now accorded to Mao.”191
The PRC became the fifth nuclear power the next month in October 1964, successfully testing a device at the Lop Nur site ahead of earlier US estimates. Still, the US was not caught
189 Memorandum for the Record, September 15, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 49, 94-95. 190 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), September 18, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 51, 96-99. See Figure 4 in the appendix for the full text. 191 Memorandum of Conversation, “Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin,” September 25, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 54, 104-105. 95
completely off-guard and was able to send warnings to American embassies abroad on
September 29 after evidence suggested a Chinese test was imminent.192 Potential responses discussed now included a shift in approach to the PRC in light of the high chances of a rapid shift in Chinese global prestige and position resulting from the nuclear test. NSC staff member
James C. Thomson, Jr. recommended to Bundy a substantial pivot in overall strategy toward the
PRC:
It seems to me increasingly clear, however, that our present approach actually serves [Beijing]'s interests—and that [Beijing] has no intention of “shaping up" in terms of taking tension-relieving initiatives with us, either now or in the foreseeable future. On the contrary, [Beijing] is seriously intent on isolating us—while we, in turn, are generally blamed for trying (unsuccessfully) to isolate [Beijing].
I would therefore urge consideration of a different approach—one designed to cut our losses, to reduce our isolation, and to improve our look as a confident, realistic, and responsible world power.
My objective would be to try to bring our China policy into line with both reality and our long-term interests. Our aim has always been the “domestication" of Communist China. A strategy of containment plus moral preachment has achieved little success in this regard. So why not try modified containment—plus subversion? By the latter, I simply mean the careful use of free world goods, people, and ideas—instruments which have proven their long-term corrosive value in our relations with other totalitarian societies.
In effect, Thomson advocated that the PRC should now be treated “much as we see the Russians: an appropriately touch response wherever or whenever they seriously cause us harm; but otherwise, a groping toward coexistence on the basis of mutual self-interest.”193 This is particularly noteworthy, as Thomson appears to be advocating for a multipolar international system by treating the PRC as essentially a peer or competitor of the USSR, an overall
192 Memorandum for the Record, “President’s Meeting with Congressional Leadership,” October 19, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 60, 113-114. 193 Memorandum from James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), “The US and Communist China in the Months Ahead,” October 28, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 63, 117-120. 96
geopolitical goal of the Nixon administration in later years and, in particular, of Henry
Kissinger.194
The PRC’s October 1964 nuclear test drastically changed the ROC’s views on the
Chinese nuclear problem from a wait-and-see approach to one of seemingly open panic. A
November 1964 letter to the president from ROC President Chiang suggested the Generalissimo no longer sought a patient approach to the Chinese nuclear problem and was deeply rattled by the
PRC’s test, now claiming they were a greater threat than even the Soviets. He requested US assistance to either arm ROC troops for an invasion of the Chinese mainland or to give them “the wherewithal to destroy the ChiCom nuclear installations.”195 Johnson attempted to allay
Chiang’s fears in a reply delivered on December 24, confirming the commitment of the US to the
ROC’s defense against PRC aggression but recommending against military action, arguing
“success against the Communists is to be won principally by political means, not by force.”196
Lewis and Xue note that in spite of the continued dearth of information on the PRC’s nuclear weapons program during the latter half of the 1960s, the Chinese continued to progress methodically from producing test devices to deliverable weapons.197
Chinese scholars argue the PRC saw US warfare in Vietnam as a major military threat in the years of Johnson’s second term. Jiang Ying notes that the Chinese took the prospect of
194 Kissinger discusses his and Nixon’s desire to transform the bipolar Cold War international system into a multipolar one that would expand US strategic options toward both the Soviets and Chinese. See the opening pages of Chapter 6 in Kissinger’s first volume of memoirs, White House Years, for a detailed discussion of his thoughts on triangular diplomacy. 195 Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson, November 25, 1964, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 69, 112-113. 196 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, December 21, 1964, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 74, 142-143. 197 While the methods the PRC used to build functional nuclear weapons remained empirically sound, Lewis and Xue argue that Mao did not develop a coherent nuclear strategy as the details of the Chinese nuclear weapons program were left to his subordinates without a clear doctrinal purpose. See Chapter 8 of Lewis and Xue’s China Builds the Bomb for additional details. 97
American military action against the PRC spawning from Vietnam very seriously, such that they made active preparation to counter a potential US invasion and clandestinely sent Chinese troops to North Vietnam. Dong also highlights Chinese anxieties about Vietnam spilling over to the
PRC, noting the Chinese thought the best strategy to deter the US from expanding the war into
China was to keep the Americans pinned down in Vietnam while supporting the North
Vietnamese with aid. She argues that the Chinese at this point viewed the Americans as a significantly greater national security threat than the Soviets as Vietnam made any potential rapprochement “untenable” despite reconciliatory gestures during this same time by the Johnson administration.198 As no serious efforts at rapprochement occurred during the height of the
Vietnam War, both appear Jiang’s and Dong’s arguments to be supported by the documentation.
As 1965 opened, Johnson officials found themselves continuing the long process of policy estimation as they continued to seek additional information about projected Chinese nuclear weapons capabilities, the geopolitical consequences of PRC nuclear weapons possession, and address their ongoing information gaps. The JCS recommended the US explore ways to expand defense collaboration with Asian allies, such as “the possibility of increased nuclear support including some form of nuclear sharing with our allies in Asia when such is required in the US national interests.”199 American Intelligence reported updated details in a February 1965
198 Yafeng and Zhi, “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century,” 259; Dong, “Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and China’s Policy toward the United States in the 1960s,” 276-279; While this study only deals with the Vietnam War peripherally as a US strategy to contain Chinese and Communist expansion, many detailed books focused on the more specific aspects of the conflict are available. For a summary of the changing interpretations within the scholarship of the conflict, see Gary R. Hess’s book, Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008). For examples of more recent scholarship on the conflict, see Max Hasting’s comprehensive book, Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-1975 (New York: HarperCollins, 2018), covering the decades-long modern struggle of the Vietnamese for independence or Brian VanDeMark’s book, Road to Disaster: A New History of America’s Descent Into Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 2018), for an account of the US role in the conflict during the 1960s. 199 Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara, “Possible Responses to the ChiCom Nuclear Threat,” January 16, 1965, Washington National Records Center, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Document 76, 144-146. 98
NIE about the October Chinese nuclear test and projections for eventual PRC missile, bomber, and SAM defense deployments, but still could not give any predictions “with any high degree of confidence” because of “remain[ing] serious gaps in our information.”200 A subsequent NIE from March 1965 on overall Chinese military capabilities echoed these sentiments, claiming the
PRC’s “intensive and highly effective security measures” made it a “difficult intelligence target.”
Using what information was available, however, the NIE estimated the Chinese would likely carry out an active testing program and begin to stockpile bombs, perhaps as many as ten by
1967, as they became available over the next few years. Advanced missile and submarine elements were not expected until the 1970s.201 Concurrent to these studies, the ROC requested additional SAMs in late March 1965 in response to evidence suggesting the PRC was preparing for a second nuclear test to be conducted via air-drop. Johnson officials reassured Chiang of the effectiveness of the American nuclear deterrent to prevent a potential PRC nuclear air attack on
Taiwan while privately noting the SAM requests were well beyond the ROC’s capacity of trained personnel to handle the proposed increase.202 Intensive studies on the Chinese nuclear problem and potential US nuclear policy options continued throughout summer 1965.203 These were again accompanied by further requests in September 1965 by the ROC for American- supplied military hardware to destroy the PRC’s nuclear facilities. Johnson officials remained opposed to furnishing the ROC with the means to destroy the PRC’s nuclear facilities.
Diverging views of the PRC between the US and ROC were also apparent by this point. In a
200 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-2-65, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Programs Conclusions,” February 10, 1965, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 77, 146-148. 201 National Intelligence Estimate, “Communist China’s Military Establishment,” March 10, 1965, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 80, 152-154. 202 Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, March 23, 1965, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 81, 155-157. 203 Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting on China Study,” August 27, 1965, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 99, 197-201. 99
September meeting between Rusk and the ROC’s first lady, Madame Chiang Kai-shek, Rusk opined that PRC leadership were “rational men, not lunatics” while Madame Chiang opined the opposite, regarding the PRC as “insane with power and will[ing to] resort to any means to accomplish their objectives.”204 Other elements of the ROC tempered these views with more sober assessments, however, including ROC Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo who expressed consciousness in a September meeting with McNamara only days after the Rusk-Madame
Chiang meeting that any direct US aid in the form of military strikes could morph the conflict
“from an internal Chinese war to a foreign war, a change which would aid the Communists.”205
The earlier US decision to not preemptively attack the PRC’s nuclear facilities appeared to have become the de facto US-Sino nuclear policy by 1966. No major US-Sino nuclear policy selections or changes regarding the Chinese nuclear weapons program occurred during the remainder of the Johnson era; however, further estimation of the Chinese nuclear problem through intelligence gathering and consideration of future policy options, as well as evaluation of the effectiveness of the policy selection of non-action against Chinese nuclear facilities, continued unabated. Since the US chose not destroy the PRC’s nuclear weapons program or support an ROC effort to attack mainland nuclear facilities, American efforts now focused on resisting Chinese expansionism while still encouraging greater communication and easing of tensions between the US and PRC.206 Johnson officials in April 1966 even entertained the idea of the president proposing a “Sino-US foreign ministers meeting” directly to Mao or a similar
204 Memorandum of Conversation, “China,” September 20, 1965, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 103, 207-209. 205 Memorandum of Conversation, “Call on the Secretary of Defense by the Chinese Minister of Defense,” September 22, 1965, Washington National Records Center, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 104, 209-214. 206 Letter from Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Poland (Gronouski), February 5, 1966, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 124, 254-255. 100
such meeting between the five nuclear powers.207 ROC leadership did not reflect this opinion and gave US officials a chilly welcome during a November 1966 American visit to Taiwan.
President Chiang personally emphasized to Johnson officials, in contrast to other ROC officials, that the latest PRC missile test indicated the Chinese would now threaten nuclear strikes against
South Vietnam. Johnson officials found this line of reasoning unfounded and ridiculous, but noted that an increased effort to engage President Chiang more directly “could at least help to ease the feelings, which are not wholly incomprehensible, of a crotchety old man who still has the power to make decisions that can affect our interests seriously.”208 Such efforts as well as positive developments for the ROC in the UN smoothed this brief diplomatic rough patch over by December 1966, but the Generalissimo still remained convinced that the PRC represented a constant nuclear threat and sought to initiate a nuclear strike against the ROC. US officials did not engage Chiang further on these conjectures, as they suspected “he would immediately recommend a first strike against mainland Chinese nuclear installations.”209
Efforts to maintain and increase surveillance of the Chinese nuclear weapons program continued throughout 1966 as well. A November 1966 SNIE confirmed the Chinese claim of a successful missile test launch in late October 1966, which successfully traveled around one hundred miles before detonating. Information gaps about the program, however, still made it difficult for the US to determine if the successful test launch indicated significant Chinese advancement in short to medium range missiles, and therefore imminent mass production of
Chinese missiles, or was merely a propaganda exercise utilizing equipment that was cobbled
207 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson, April 19, 1966, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 141, 285-286. 208 Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State, November 3, 1966, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 196, 410-411. 209 Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State, December 10, 1966, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 224, 489-490. 101
together. American Intelligence also surmised the PRC were likely actively developing “a much larger and more complex missile system” and beginning to experiment with thermonuclear technology but were still several years away from fabricating a functional warhead.210 A
December 1966 NIE assessed that relations between the Chinese and Soviets would likely
“continue to deteriorate so long as the Mao Zedong – Lin Biao leadership group retain[ed] authority” but did not expect official relations between the Communist giants to be severed.
Still, the NIE noted that this could change in the short-term pending developments in Vietnam and in the PRC domestically. American Intelligence at this point deemed long-term judgments on the subject difficult to make, as post-Mao leadership possibilities in the PRC were thought to run the gamut from Soviet sympathizers to those even more vehemently anti-Soviet than Mao.
The US also expected any possible future Sino-Soviet rapprochement to “have definite limits,” with “little or no positive cooperation at the party level and a continuing general atmosphere of barely suppressed suspicion and mistrust” between the two.211
Developments in 1967 revealed the limits to the Johnson administration’s attempts to seek communication with the PRC. Rostow, now serving as Johnson’s National Security
Advisor, and Rusk both objected to a proposal by Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield to seek a settlement for Vietnam through a clandestine and “clearly conciliatory approach to
China,” which both men feared could upset both the Soviets and Free World Asian allies.212
Johnson officials indicated wariness about the political turmoil occurring in the PRC by mid-
1967, particularly for the uncertainty that could result, but still did not expect any major changes
210 Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-8-66, “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program,” November 3, 1966, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 198, 415-416. 211 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-12-66, “The Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations,” December 1, 1966, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 223, 479-489. 212 Editorial Note. FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 255, 551. 102
to the Chinese emphasis on improving its military and nuclear weapons capabilities should new leadership emerge.213 ROC leadership indicated a more subdued line on Chinese nuclear weapons in a May 1967 meeting with Johnson officials, only mentioning the Chinese nuclear problem as a means to praise close US-ROC intelligence cooperation on the matter and to highlight the weapons program as a resource-draining foil of the PRC’s economic woes to the
ROC’s contrastingly booming economy. The ROC did not, as they had in the past, call for US support for a ROC preemptive attack on PRC nuclear facilities at the meeting.214 An August
1967 NIE speculated that “with wise management of their limited resources” the PRC could continue its steady rate of progress toward meeting its initial nuclear weapons goals, including medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) deployment by 1968 and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) deployment by the mid-1970s. The intelligence estimate also identified the extent to which continuing political turmoil in the PRC continued to impact the Chinese economy as the primary factor that could delay, but not smother, Chinese nuclear weapons progress.215
The US continued to monitor the situation in the PRC as the political crisis proceeded into 1968. A February 1968 memorandum from Rostow to the president summarizing the views of the State Department, CIA, and NSC noted agreement between all three about the seriousness of the turmoil in the PRC. They described it as “a mess, with widespread but mostly small-scale factional fighting, with lawlessness, transportation stoppages, and growing disrespect for authority.” While the conflict clearly disrupted industrial and agricultural production in the
213 Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas, May 5, 1967, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 257, 553-555. 214 Memorandum of Conversation, “Meeting of Chinese President C.K. Yen with the President: Review of Events on Mainland China; Sino-Soviet Relations; Viet-Nam,” May 9, 1967, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964- 1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 259, 556-561. 215 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-8-67, “Communist China’s Strategic Weapons Program,” August 3, 1967, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 277, 593-594. 103
PRC, the nuclear weapons program, surprisingly, did “not seem to have been badly hurt.” The
US expected no change in the PRC’s overall US policy until Mao was no longer in power.
Nevertheless, Johnson officials agreed that “certain steps [should] be taken unilaterally [by the
US], where reciprocation is not expected, designed to increase contact [with the PRC] and to signal to potential successors to the Maoists that they will have policy options in our regard.”216
The Johnson administration continued to communicate with the PRC through established diplomatic backchannels in the American Embassy in Poland, emphasizing in a January 1968 meeting the need for greater communication on nuclear arms control and disarmament. The US also proposed exchanging medical, scientific, academic, and media personnel; reassured the PRC that the US did not seek to invade North Vietnam or to enact a wider war with the Chinese; and indicated to the PRC clearly that the US sought to continue to meet with them to increase dialogue between the two.217
An October 1968 NSC paper by NSC staff member Alfred Jenkins examining future potential US-Sino policy courses called attention to Chinese societal ambitions to reestablish themselves as the preeminent global power, rooted in humiliations from foreign colonization beginning in the previous century, as directly tied to the PRC’s nuclear weapons ambitions:
China is desperately trying to re-establish its old position and stature in a nuclear world. In a sense it is trying to do what the rest of the world is so anxious about its not having done: become a part of the modern world. The tragedy is that it is not doing so cooperatively. So far it has been unwilling to join the world except on its own terms, which are absurd. It wants literally to become the “center of the universe” again, and to refashion the rest of the world in its own image. Its efforts to regain its central position have produced crazily compressed time schedules, costly disruptions, and superhuman requirements for discipline and austerity. ...
216 Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson, “Comparison of Four Memoranda on China,” February 24, 1968, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 305, 662-665. 217 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland, January 4, 1968, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 294, 624-629. 104
If China's nuclear potential develops as expected, its world status and its blackmail potential toward some may be enhanced, but it is not likely to pose a significant threat directly to the United States until it develops a strong naval tradition. This may come, but it will take a long time. We have a fairly comfortable grace period in which we do not, for instance, have to allow [Beijing] to “shoot its way into the United Nations” or make other comparable forced accommodation, come what may.218
As the Johnson era came to a close, Jenkins reported to Rostow in November 1968 that intelligence remained difficult to procure from “behind the reinforced bamboo curtain,” as
“many of [their] sources [had] dried up.” The US viewed the Cultural Revolution, now apparently shifting between destructive to constructive periods, as an expression of Mao’s struggle between ideological purity and the need for modernization in the PRC. Even if this drive for purity would ultimately prove quixotic for Mao, Jenkins argued the Chairman would still try:
Mao's basic problem is fairly obvious. While there are times when ideological motivation may serve as the prime mover of a country seeking modernization, no predetermined, fixed view of an environment can hope to cope with the galloping modern world, which is so variable in so many of its elements.
China's immense social forces moved chiefly through Mao for about a decade. But constant stimulation is proving to be no substitute for pragmatism, and the basic eclecticism of Chinese society is bound to assert itself. Mao is anti-urban (he speaks rapturously of “the quality of village life,” much like a Taoist sage) at a time when urbanization is inevitable. He is anti-intellectual at a time when “knowledge is power” to a degree unique in history. China's leader is now largely in confrontation with the social forces of his country, which have striven uncertainly for a century toward modernization.
So far Mao has sufficient power, however, to make another try. In doing so he is now manifesting in extreme form a classical trait of the visionary with a corner on ersatz truth: pathological secrecy, coupled with fear of contamination from the outside. This will give us added problems in following developments.219
218 Paper Prepared by Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff, “Further Thoughts on China,” October 9, 1968, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 328, 709-718. 219 Memorandum from Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow), “Developments Behind the Reinforced Bamboo Curtain,” November 19, 1968, Johnson Library, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 330, 720-721; While the Cultural Revolution is only discussed peripherally in this study, many detailed accounts about the Cultural Revolution and its effects on the PRC are available. See Michael Schoenhals’s, ed., China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), Paul Clark’s The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), or Frank 105
Johnson officials also once again rebuffed a renewed request by President Chiang in November
1968 for additional US-supplied military hardware for the ROC, in this latest case a permanent squadron of F-4C interceptors, as the requested aircraft were already scheduled to continue to rotate through the ROC on a temporary basis through the end of 1968. This request contrasted with the conversations between Chiang Ching-kuo and McNamara one year prior, but US officials postulated the request was “motivated more by reasons of prestige and desire to attain some reaffirmation of US defense commitment” by President Chiang personally than any actual
ROC reanalysis of their defense requirements.220
The Nixon Administration, 1969-1974
Kissinger criticizes the views of previous administrations, which “considered China as a brooding, chaotic, fanatical, and alien realm difficult to comprehend or impossible to sway,” in his memoirs. He argues this assessment of the PRC was flawed in both its view of Vietnam as a
“reflection of Chinese expansionism” and of the Cultural Revolution as a reflection of Chinese
“obsession with ideological purity.” Kissinger offers an alternative assessment of the PRC’s goals, arguing they sought “strategic reassurance, [particularly] some easing of their nightmare of hostile encirclement,” which the Nixon administration “was prepared to provide.” He acknowledges tensions between these views, which Nixon shared, and those of the officials at the State Department, who “did not share our hopes for a new beginning [with the PRC]” and were unaware of secret communications and signaling between the Nixon administration and the
PRC through Pakistani intermediaries.221
Dikötter’s The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962-1976 (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016) for more information. 220 Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China, November 2, 1968, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 329, 718-720. 221 Kissinger, White House Years, 684-686, 698-702. 106
Chinese scholars note a pivot in overall Chinese strategy by the opening of the Nixon era.
Dong Wang argues Mao originally sought to use the Zhenbao Island conflict in March 1969 to project national will and determination and to reunite the Chinese people by mobilizing for a potential conflict as the divisive Cultural Revolution wound down.222 While Mao apparently thought the conflict would deescalate quickly, instead the Soviets vowed revenge for their humiliations incurred during the border skirmishes. Dong judges that a July 1969 Chinese military report circulated among CCP leadership was accurate in positing “the rise in China’s power had ushered in the dissolution of the bipolar system and the emergence of a multipolar system.” She concludes that Soviet threats against the PRC as well as Chinese losses during
August 1969 Sino-Soviet border skirmishes galvanized American resolve to seek rapprochement with the Chinese, essentially completing the shift in overall PRC policy from an anti-American posture in the early 1960s to a US-Sino rapprochement-based policy as the decade closed. Xin
Zhan similarly argues that the Zhenbao Island conflict changed Chinese geopolitical calculations, as PRC leadership grew anxious about Soviet nuclear threats which “appeared real to Mao” as they were backed up by both actions and expansionist rhetoric in the Brezhnev Doctrine. Xin credits Mao with conceiving an alliance with the US to counter Soviet expansionist ambitions in
1970, with the official Chinese position remaining opposition to both superpowers while the practical position became a tacit agreement with the US to resist Soviet nuclear disarmament initiatives ostensibly intended to isolate the PRC. Li Danhui argues that the role of Vietnam also changed for the Chinese as tensions between the US and PRC lessened, with the Chinese
222 Although it was suspected but not known for sure at the time, scholars including Lyle J. Goldstein and Yang Kuisong have confirmed that the Chinese actually initiated hostilities against the Soviets in March 1969. See Goldstein’s article, “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters,” The China Quarterly, no. 168 (2001): 985-997, or Yang’s article, “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino- American Rapprochement,” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21-32, for more information on the conflict and its implications toward improving US-Sino relations. 107
walking a “tightrope” of improving relations with the US while simultaneously continuing to supply North Vietnam in the war.223
As the Nixon administration came into office in early 1969, intelligence estimates on the
PRC continued to address the incessant information gaps both prior administrations experienced.
A late February 1969 NIE estimated that the PRC had now achieved “a regional nuclear strike capability” and speculated the Chinese now possessed a few thermonuclear weapons and multiple fission weapons deliverable via their bomber force. American Intelligence continued to note difficulty in determining long-range estimates for additional Chinese nuclear weapons systems operability. While continuing to speculate more advanced Chinese weapons would become operable by the early to mid-1970s, the US remained unsure whether the PRC would maintain their current levels of nuclear research and production or slow down to address domestic economic requirements.224 Another estimate from the following month in March 1969 repeated earlier analyses that Chinese policies were unlikely to change until Mao was gone, but also noted a less ideologically-driven PRC might not guarantee an improvement in US-Sino relations. Indeed, the report concluded:
A less ideological approach would not necessarily make China easier to deal or live with in Asia. Pursuit of its basic nationalist and traditional goals could sustain tensions in the area, and a China that was beginning to realize some of its potential in the economic and advanced weapons fields could become a far more formidable force in Asia than is Maoist China.225
223 Dong, “Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and China’s Policy toward the United States in the 1960s,” 282-285; Xin, “Prelude to the Transformation,” 289-292; Yafeng and Zhi, “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century,” 260. 224 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-8-69, “Communist China’s Strategic Weapons Program,” February 27, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips (Washington: GPO, 2006), Doc. 7, 16-17. 225 Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-69, “Communist China and Asia,” March 6, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 9, 22-24. 108
An August 1969 NIE also provided an updated assessment of the Soviet-Sino split, noting that relations between the two had “deteriorated even further since the armed clashes on the Ussuri River last March” with the Communist world expected to remain fragmented.
American Intelligence did not expect the PRC to launch “a deliberate Chinese attack on the
USSR” or for the Soviets to “wish to become involved in a prolonged, large-scale conflict
[against the PRC],” but thought there was still “some chance that Moscow might think it could launch a strike against China’s nuclear and missile facilities without getting involved in such a conflict.” The NIE also found potential shifts in the foreign policies of both, with the Soviets now seeking to isolate the PRC by seeking rapprochement with the West and the Chinese now viewing the USSR rather than the US as their primary national security threat.226
Nixon officials also began their own series of studies on US-Sino relations and the
Chinese nuclear problem, essentially beginning a fresh estimation stage building on the initiation and estimation efforts of the previous administrations as it had with US-Franco nuclear policy.
Nixon requested in February 1969 that a broad study, NSSM 14, be made to assess the state of current US-Sino relations; PRC threat and intentions; areas of interaction between the US’s and
US allies’ China policy; and risk assessment of alternative China options. In July 1969, Nixon authorized a more specific study of US nuclear policy in Asia through NSSM 69. The study examined current and possible US strategic capabilities against the Chinese; US nuclear capabilities within the Pacific to both deter and defend against Chinese aggression in the region; current statuses of and possible modifications to American nuclear security agreements and
226 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11/13-69, “The USSR and China,” August 12, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 24, 65-66; See Bundy’s Danger and Survival, 525-535 for a summary of the Sino-Soviet border conflict and the nuclear factors that precipitated and influenced it. 109
assurances with regional nations; and the degree to which any of the three preceding areas would affect nuclear proliferation.227
The Nixon administration also began to explore potential policy options if the Sino-
Soviet conflict intensified or burst into open hostilities.228 By September 1969 Nixon officials narrowed the possible scenarios of Sino-Soviet conflict which would require a US response to two: the outbreak of major hostilities between the USSR and PRC or a Soviet surgical strike against the PRC’s nuclear facilities. The NSC noted at a September 1969 meeting that the US would need to make a concerted effort to discourage nuclear exchange for the dangerous precedent it could set. Additionally, Kissinger argued at this meeting that the PRC’s perception of any potential American response was particularly important, as this could “establish a position which in the next decade would focus Chinese resentment entirely on the Soviets, and not on the
US.”229 By the end September 1969, Nixon approved measures to indicate clearly to the Soviets, in response to their increasing probes of the matter, that the US would not approve of a Soviet strike on PRC nuclear facilities.230 Further study into possible US nuclear policy options continued through the remainder of the year. An October 1969 NSC paper, after discussing such options and registering US interest in avoiding Sino-Soviet hostilities, noted that other than stating opposition to a Sino-Soviet conflict the US had “little ability to influence directly either
Moscow or [Beijing] on the question of relations with the other.”231 As potential contingencies
227 National Security Study Memorandum 69, “US Nuclear Policy in Asia,” July 14, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 18, 48-49. 228 National Security Study Memorandum 63, “US Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences,” July 3, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 15, 41-42. 229 Memorandum for the Record of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, September 4, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 29, 76-77. 230 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China,” September 29, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Document 37, 101-103. 231 Draft Response to National Security Study Memorandum 63, “US Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences,” October 17, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 40, 108-112. 110
continued to be explored and planned by Nixon officials, the interim policy decided by the end of 1969, for use in case of the outbreak of Sino-Soviet hostilities, called for emphasizing that neither side use nuclear arms in the conflict while remaining impartial and uninvolved in the actual conflict itself.232 US-Sino nuclear policy thus began to become directly tied to changes in overall US foreign policy as the Sino-Soviet conflict unfolded.
Nixon officials continued to signal that they sought to decrease tensions between the US and the PRC in January 1970, instructing American diplomats to inform the Chinese that the US no longer viewed the PRC as an aggressor in Asia; that the US sought to reduce troop numbers from Southeast Asia; and that Nixon officials would not remain as rigid on their Taiwan policy as their predecessors.233 President Chiang registered his disapproval and “shock” at these
American postures toward the PRC by March 1970, causing the Nixon administration to reemphasize their commitment to the ROC’s defense and indicate “that due deference is given to his sensitivities.”234 Nixon wrote to Chiang in late March 1970 that he had not forgotten the threat the PRC posed to the ROC, reminding the Generalissimo that only months earlier he publicly “cited the potential danger to the United States posed by the growth of Communist
China’s nuclear weapons capability.” Even so, Nixon stated he thought it was his responsibility to explore any means to reduce tensions and the risk of conflict breaking out with the PRC for both Americans and their allies.235 A May 1970 SNIE judged Chinese nuclear weapons possession was having “a sobering effect” on the PRC. American Intelligence noted the PRC
232 Washington Special Actions Group Report, “Immediate US Policy Problems in Event of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities,” November 10, 1969, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 43, 118-121. 233 Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, “Guidance for Sino-US Ambassadorial Meeting, January 20, 1970,” January 14, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 61, 165-166. 234 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “Personal Letter to You from President Chiang Kai-shek Protesting Warsaw Talks,” March 7, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 71, 187-188. 235 Letter from President Nixon to the President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek, March 27, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 74, 193-194. 111
abstained from directly engaging the US in Vietnam and attempted to deescalate Sino-Soviet border tensions in 1969 rather than engage in nuclear threats.236 Subsequently, Nixon requested another study on overall US-Sino policy, NSSM 106, in November 1970 to examine long and short range US goals regarding the PRC, as well as the potential effects on relations with the
Soviets and US Asian allies to changes in the US’s China policy.237
Estimation of possible US-Sino nuclear policy options continued the next year in March
1971 as Nixon officials explored increasing dialogue and information sharing with the PRC both generally and on non-weapons nuclear matters. Among other recommendations, including the institution of a Washington-[Beijing] hot line, Nixon officials suggested that the US offer an exchange of information on nuclear weapons safety with the Chinese and propose a conference of the five nuclear powers “to discuss accidental war, command and control, and arrangements for emergency communication.” The proposal, which included providing the Chinese with a
“considerable amount of unclassified material available on [the] US nuclear weapon safety program,” was not followed through at the time but demonstrated the lengths Nixon officials were willing to go to signal their intent to communicate and cooperate with the Chinese, even on nuclear matters.238 Kissinger also indicated interest in and probed the possibility of removing
US military forces from the ROC if the PRC would agree to forego force in solving the Taiwan reunification question.239
236 Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-9-70, “Chinese Reactions to Possible Developments in Indochina,” May 28, 1970, Central Intelligence Agency, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 82, 214-217. 237 National Security Study Memorandum 106, “China Policy,” November 19, 1970, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 97, 246-247. 238 Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), “China and Arms Control,” March 18, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969- 1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 109, 274-277. 239 Memorandum for Record of the Senior Review Group Meeting, “Senior Review Group Meeting of 12 March 1971, on NSSM 69, US Nuclear Policy in Asia and NSSM 106, US China Policy,” March 12, 1971, Washington National Records Center, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 108, 269-274. 112
Kissinger made a secret diplomatic trip to the PRC in July 1971, a visit that established an informal diplomatic working relationship between the Americans and Chinese and set the stage for the president’s own trip to the PRC the following year.240 In the wake of this development, Kissinger broached the topic of removing American forces from the ROC in exchange for Chinese renunciation of force toward Taiwan in an October 1971 meeting in
Beijing between himself and Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The National Security Advisor stated the US did not view American military forces stationed in the ROC as a permanent solution and would be willing to withdraw all forces from the island if the PRC and ROC could eventually reach a peaceful agreement to reunite the two.241 A late October 1971 NIE reported the Chinese appeared to be progressing as expected with the development of their strategic nuclear forces.
The PRC by that point deployed ten CSS-1 MRBMs and possessed at least thirty operational
TU-16 nuclear bombers. American Intelligence still expected Chinese ICBMs and nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarines to be deployed by the middle of the decade.242
The following year, Nixon made his first foreign trip to the PRC in February 1972. This signified a major foreign policy achievement for the Nixon administration and of American efforts to increase avenues of US-Sino communication and cooperation. Kissinger identifies this event in his memoirs as the point “where the bipolarity of the postwar period was over,” as the
240 Kissinger recounts his the highly secretive inaugural visit to China, as well as his early experiences working with Zhou Enlai and Huang Hua, in Chapter 19 of the first volume of his memoirs, White House Years. 241 Memorandum of Conversation, October 21, 1971, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 162, 498-517; Zhou Enlai remained an important figure in CCP leadership throughout the timeframe of this study and played a key role in reorienting US-Sino relations and shaping US-Sino nuclear policy with Kissinger. For more information on Zhou’s political life and influence on the PRC, see Han Suyin’s Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1898-1976 (New York: Kodansha America, 1994), or Gao Wenqian’s Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007). 242 National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-8-71, “Communist China’s Weapons Program for Strategic Attack,” October 28, 1971, Central Intelligence Agency, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 168, 574-578. 113
US and PRC now “enjoyed diplomatic ties in all but name.”243 Nixon emphasized to Zhou in a
February 23 meeting during the trip that both the US and USSR sought to avoid a nuclear conflict breaking out between the two. Zhou agreed that a nuclear war would be detrimental to
“not only the two big countries but also to the people of the whole world.” After chastising the
Soviets for their “refusal to cease the arms race,” the Chinese Premier clarified the PRC’s position on nuclear weapons thusly:
But the more nuclear weapons [there are], the more difficult it is to engage in a nuclear war. Nuclear weapons cannot be eaten, not worn as clothing, nor can they be used as utensils. They can’t raise the standard of living. The only thing they can do is lie there waiting to be used. Mr. President probably knows much better than I what a great waste they are. The people in the next century will blame us for this waste.
Nixon assured Zhou that the US did not seek to engage in the nuclear arms race, and indeed wished to end it, but could not allow the Soviets to gain the advantage. Zhou acknowledged that the US was in this position without condoning or condemning American proliferation in response to continued Soviet nuclear build-up.244
In the wake of these groundbreaking meetings, the Nixon administration selected a policy of clandestine unilateral easing of nuclear tensions between the US and the PRC. This took the form of removing American tactical nuclear forces, ostensibly in place since the Eisenhower era to deter PRC aggression against the ROC, from Taiwan.245 In April 1972, Kissinger informed
243 Kissinger, White House Years, 1092, 1096; Interestingly, Chinese scholar Dong Wang disagrees with Kissinger on when multipolarity came about in the international system, instead arguing the PRC broke the multipolarity of the Cold War by resisting Soviet aggression and nuclear threats during 1969. Kissinger dates the ending of the bipolar era of the Cold War, contrastingly, to Nixon’s February 1972 visit nearly three years later after US-Sino relations improved substantially and bilateral cooperation developed between both. 244 Memorandum of Conversation, February 23, 1972, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 197, 719-752. 245 The Eisenhower administration apparently began stationing Matador cruise missiles on Taiwan beginning in May 1957 and, presumably, continued to replace them with upgraded technology as tactical nuclear weapons became smaller and mountable on US aircraft armaments. See “Telegram from Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State, May 15, 1957, US Department of State, FRUS, 1955-1957, Volume III, Document 251, 522-523,” which is viewable via the corresponding hyperlink in the bibliography, for more information. 114
Zhou that Nixon “ordered that the number of nuclear weapons on Taiwan be reduced by 50 per cent before the end of this year.” The National Security Advisor also informed the Chinese
Premier that this would be done without fanfare and was expected to “be treated confidentially by [Beijing].” Kissinger indicated that this was not simply a one-off reduction in American nuclear forces stationed against the PRC, stating that “this is a process which will continue.”246
The Americans also emphasized their intent to continue to ease US-Sino tensions to the Chinese the next month in a May 1972 meeting, noting that they previously rejected a Soviet proposal for a “bilateral nuclear nonaggression pact.” The US informed the PRC that they suspected the
Soviet proposal was intended to, in the Americans’ estimation, “sanctify nuclear weapons against third countries” and, specifically, to isolate the PRC.247 By mid-1972, US-Sino nuclear policy began to shift from an antagonistic posture to a cooperative one that actively sought to ease overall tensions in the US-PRC relationship by removing American nuclear weapons from
Taiwan which threatened the PRC’s national security.
As these policy changes began to be implemented the US continued the long, uninterrupted process of estimating the Chinese nuclear problem by continuing to fill information gaps on the PRC’s nuclear weapons program. A July 1972 NIE examining Chinese military prospects through 1977 highlighted that Mao “assigned first priority to ambitious and costly programs aimed at providing China with a credible deterrent against nuclear attack.” The estimate found the PRC approached modernization of air, navy, and army forces, while ongoing concurrent to nuclear efforts, with less urgency. In addition to Chinese efforts at developing
246 Memorandum of Conversation, April 12, 1972, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 220, 875-884. 247 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “My May 16 Meeting with the Chinese,” undated, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 227, 899- 902; Kissinger claims in his memoirs that the level of strategic information the US and PRC shared with one another during these years rivaled, and even surpassed, that of other authentic American allies. See Kissinger’s Years of Renewal, 155-162 for more information. 115
thermonuclear weapons for their ICBM force, American Intelligence also expected the Chinese to develop tactical nuclear weapons, beginning with bombs and gradually progressing to missiles or rockets, within the same timeframe.248 Interestingly, a November 1972 SNIE suggested that the US maintained an information deficiency regarding a parallel nuclear issue: ROC nuclear weapons ambitions. As the ROC continued to develop an advanced nuclear power industry, evidence now suggested President Chiang may have ordered a clandestine effort to achieve an independent nuclear weapons capability in the aftermath of the PRC’s October 1964 nuclear test.
The Taiwanese were now thought to be able to pursue this goal by utilizing plutonium produced by reactors ostensibly intended for power generation. Similar to the information gaps on PRC nuclear weapons activities, American Intelligence again clarified that they had “no reliable information on the military and political calculations behind the [ROC’s] activities in the nuclear field.” The intelligence estimate expected the ROC to continue toward an independent nuclear capability “as a potentially useful hedge for the unknown exigencies of the future, when Taiwan may be alone and facing great risks” using its publicly known nuclear energy and research activities as a cover. While American Intelligence postulated a ROC nuclear weapons capability could be operational by the end of the 1970s, they predicted the ROC would instead avoid provoking the PRC or estranging the US and Japan by following through with nuclear tests and weapon fabrication while still continuing to “keep its weapons option open.”249
The following year in 1973, Nixon officials selected an augmentation of their US-Sino nuclear policy to include clandestinely sharing sensitive strategic information with the PRC in
248 National Intelligence Estimate, “China’s Military Policy and General Purpose Forces,” July 20, 1972, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Doc. 240, 1017-1023; Evan Feigenbaum details the efforts of Nie Rongzhen and others to win favor among Chinese leadership for top priority support for the development of the Chinese nuclear weapons program over other competing strategic projects in Chapter 2 of China’s Techno-Warriors. 249 Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 43-1-72, “Taipei’s Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Nuclear Weapons Development,” November 16, 1972, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVII, Document 266, 1114-1118. 116
order to gain their formal agreement on a Soviet-proposed nuclear initiative they intended to jointly resist. Rather than trapping the PRC with the agreement, as the Soviets hoped to do, US officials instead argued it would “buy us good Russian behavior” for the foreseeable future.250
Kissinger let Chinese Ambassador Han Hsu in on the plot in a highly secret White House meeting in May 1973. Ambassador Han clarified that the Chinese “hope [was] that this meeting
[would] be, as previous meetings, kept secret.” Kissinger assured Han that this was indeed the case, explaining:
You can be sure that from our side there will be no discussion of it. Just on the one chance in a thousand that someone sees you drive out—this has never happened before— we will just say this is a routine visit connected with technical arrangements for housing. There’s no possibility. I’m just protecting against the possible chance. I use this room for meetings when I do not want them to become known.
With these fears assuaged, the National Security Advisor proceeded to outline his plan to the
Ambassador. A nuclear agreement with the Soviets would serve multiple purposes, including: buying the US additional time; establishing a legal obligation that the USSR must consult the US before attacking a third party, essentially extending US-Soviet agreements to third parties (i.e., the PRC); and reducing the chance of nuclear conflict by lessening the chances for force of any kind to be used. Kissinger also stated that the US sought “to continue to accelerate normalization [of US-Sino relations] to the point where it becomes clear that we have a stake in the strength and independence of the People’s Republic.” He emphasized this point by recalling a recent conversation with Soviet General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
(CPSU) Leonid Brezhnev about preventing Chinese nuclear weapons ambitions for Ambassador
Han:
250 Conversation between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), February 1, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles (Washington: GPO, 2007), Document 5, 18-21. 117
But then he [Brezhnev] said the Soviet Union and the United States had a joint obligation to prevent China from becoming a big nuclear power. And he said, “do you consider China an ally?” I said, “no, we don’t consider it an ally—we consider it a friend.” He said, “well you can have any friends you want, but you and we should be partners”— he meant Moscow and Washington. He repeated again that we have a joint responsibility to prevent China from becoming a nuclear power. And I said we recognize no such joint responsibility. That was it, in effect. The rest was simply tirades about China which there is no sense in repeating—things like big power chauvinism, and as soon as you are strong enough you will also turn on us. That sort of thing, immaterial.
Kissinger then promised to keep the Chinese informed about how the Soviet nuclear proposal developed. He again reemphasized the intent of the US to cooperate with the PRC, claiming that anything the US was “prepared to do with the Soviet Union, we are prepared to do with the
People’s Republic.” In addition, Kissinger indicated the US was also “prepared to do things with the People’s Republic that we are not prepared to do with the Soviet Union.”251
Unsurprisingly, given the sensitive nature of the contents of this meeting, Kissinger did not chronicle this exchange in his memoirs. He does leave clues, however, indicating a pattern of personal clandestine contact with top Chinese officials and articulates his overall motivation for pursuing secret cooperation with the PRC. Kissinger claimed that “from 1971 until May
1973, I traveled to New York on a score of occasions for face-to-face meetings with Huang Hua
[Chinese Ambassador to the UN], usually in a CIA-provided ‘safe house’ in mid-Manhattan, a seedy apartment whose mirrored walls suggested less prosaic purposes.”252 Kissinger also emphasizes the danger he believed a Soviet attack on China posed to the stability of the international system, a conviction which undergirded the evolution of US-Sino relations.
Kissinger apparently feared that “if Moscow succeeded in humiliating [Beijing] and reducing it to impotence, the whole weight of the Soviet military effort could be thrown against the West.”
251 Memorandum of Conversation, May 15, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 32, 254-262. See Figure 5 in the appendix for the full text. 252 Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 61. 118
Protecting the PRC from Soviet aggression, specifically from a preemptive Soviet strike against
PRC nuclear facilities, would restrain the USSR from gaining confidence that such aggressive tactics may be feasible against Europe and other vital American interests where the Soviets sought to expand their influence. The PRC “needed us to break out of its isolation and as a counterweight to the potentially mortal threat along its northern border,” Kissinger writes, while the US “needed China to enhance the flexibility of our diplomacy.”253
While Kissinger notes that he and Zhou had established by this point that the US-PRC
“strategic partnership would have to come into being by means of tacit understanding based on parallel views regarding the details of the [global] balance of power,” as publicly announcing parallel policies would “evoke a firestorm,” he also recounts a change in Mao during his final years as Ford’s Secretary of State in his memoirs. He describes an October 1975 visit to China as “the most difficult of all my encounters with Chinese leaders” and notes the Chairman continuously accused the US of colluding with the USSR against the PRC and expressed doubts about American commitments to the PRC’s security. Kissinger also claims in spite of his and
Zhou’s immense cooperation during prior visits, discussions on strategy remained dependent upon conceptual conversations rather than firmly plotted strategy.254 Lewis and Xue’s account echoes this portrayal of Mao’s preference to conceptual consensus rather than determining the intricate details of plans, noting that Mao’s subordinates understood “the more mundane doctrinal ramifications” of Chinese nuclear weapons would be considered “at some future date.”
Indeed, they claim Chinese studies into these matters would not occur until several years after
Mao’s death.255
253 Kissinger, White House Years, 764, 1049. 254 Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 157, 874-875, 881-886. 255 Lewis and Xue, China Builds the Bomb, 217-218. 119
Chinese scholars also find Mao’s disposition toward the US changed around this same time. Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia argue that throughout the US-Sino rapprochement “Mao was constantly vacillating between promoting world revolution and seeking a détente with US
‘imperialists,’” with the Chairman’s “revolutionary instinct outliv[ing] the Mao-Nixon summit.”256 Xin Zhan claims tacit US-PRC efforts to thwart Soviet arms control measures peaked in 1972, with Mao reaffirming his desire for an international anti-Soviet coalition as late as a February 1973 meeting with Kissinger. Although this “horizontal line” alliance eventually turned into the “basis of Chinese nuclear policy,” Xin argues that by mid-1973 Mao became convinced the US had betrayed him in favor of the Soviets through the SALT I agreements and, in response, shifted PRC geopolitical goals in 1974 toward gathering third world unity to counter both the US and USSR for his remaining years in power. Xin confirms Kissinger’s account of a chilly reception in October 1975, claiming much of this antipathy flowed from Chinese suspicion of the ongoing SALT II negotiations concluded immediately prior to this visit.257
The PRC rejected Kissinger’s proposal as explained to Han Hsu after a US-Soviet
“Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War” was deemed to be “an attempt to establish a
‘US-Soviet nuclear hegemony’” by the Chinese.258 Nixon denied this charge in a June 1973 letter to Zhou, emphasizing numerous times that the US did not seek nuclear hegemony over
China with the agreement but rather to set a means of legal recourse against potential Soviet aggression.259 The next month in July 1973 during a meeting with PRC Ambassador Huang
Chen at Nixon’s “Western White House” in San Clemente, Kissinger informed his Chinese
256 Yafeng and Zhi, “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century,” 261-262. 257 Xin, “Prelude to the Transformation,” 294-302. 258 Editorial Note. FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 36, 271-272. 259 Letter from President Nixon to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, June 19, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969- 1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 38, 278-279. 120
counterpart of another recent conversation with he had with Brezhnev focused on countering the
Chinese nuclear weapons program. Ambassador Huang declared to Kissinger after the National
Security Advisor indicated he would divulge the contents of Brezhnev’s conversations to him,
“you are a dangerous man.” Kissinger revealed to Huang that the Soviet General Secretary mentioned the PRC often during his June 1973 visit to the US, where he attacked CCP leadership and reiterated the Soviet view that allowing Chinese nuclear weapons proliferation to continue was “intolerable and unacceptable to the USSR.” In contrast to the hints Brezhnev gave to
Kissinger about cooperating against Chinese proliferation earlier in the year, Kissinger reported that “now he [Brezhnev] was making a formal and more explicit proposal:”
He [Brezhnev] proposed as well that the US and USSR begin exchanging information on your nuclear program. We said we would not exchange military information and were not interested. Brezhnev then asked if we are prepared to exchange other information on China. We said we could not make one country the subject of regular exchanges. They could always tell us what they had on their minds, but we would make no such undertaking. Brezhnev then said he expected our relations with you to improve, and that they could not object to this. But if military arrangements were made between the US and the PRC, this would have the most serious consequences and would lead the Soviets to take drastic measures. Those were the key points.
The extremely sensitive nature of Kissinger sharing this information with Ambassador Huang again mirrored earlier revelations by Kissinger to Ambassador Han only months prior. The
National Security Advisor reiterated this to Huang and stated unequivocally that the contents of
Kissinger’s discussion with Brezhnev “must be kept totally secret,” as even Nixon and Kissinger had “told no one in our Government of this conversation.” Ambassador Huang reassured
Kissinger of his discretion, replying that “the Chinese side is very careful.” Kissinger then reported that he was setting up “a very secret group of four or five of the best officers I can find” to examine potential US options to deter Soviet aggression against the PRC, again to be kept “in the strictest confidence.” He also revealed to Huang that the French too maintained an interest in 121
“strengthening the PRC” and would work with Nixon officials aware of this secret objective to
“encourage our allies to speed up requests they receive from you on items for Chinese defense.”
Once again appealing for the Chinese to trust him, Kissinger stressed “if we [the US] wanted to cooperate with the USSR, then we would not have to be so complicated” in attempting to “gain time and be in a position for maximum resistance [against Soviet attack on the PRC] should it happen.”260
It seems evident that by July 1973 elements within the Nixon administration, namely
Nixon and Kissinger, clandestinely selected to augment US-Sino nuclear policy even further to be not only cooperative but to also protect the Chinese nuclear weapons program against Soviet aggression. The policy of the US was now to actively deter Soviet preemptive attacks on
Chinese nuclear facilities using a US-Soviet nuclear agreement as legal leverage to restrain potential Soviet military actions. As Kissinger and Nixon appear to have been the only top administration officials aware that this was the true aim of US-Sino nuclear policy, the administration continued to indicate that the PRC remained a military threat and adversary of the
US through directives given to the rest of the American foreign relations apparatus. In August
1973, the Nixon administration signaled in a NSDM to the State and Defense Departments that
US forces in Asia “should be planned so that US and Allied forces would be capable of conducting a combined conventional defense against a joint PRC/Communist ally attack in either
Northeast or Southeast Asia.” This included the continued deployment of tactical nuclear options “planned in Asia as a hedge against the failure of a conventional defense.”261 While these actions on the surface would appear antithetical to the objectives of Kissinger and Nixon’s
260 Memorandum of Conversation, July 6, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 41, 288-296. 261 National Security Decision Memorandum 230, “US Strategy and Forces for Asia,” August 9, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 48, 315-316. 122
clandestine policy, Kissinger claims in his memoirs that Nixon’s outward actions and true goals did not always match, noting president’s utilization of the NSC system “for the intelligence it supplied him about the views of a bureaucracy he distrusted and for the opportunity it provided to camouflage his own aims.”262
Despite this apparent directive indicating the president viewed the PRC as a dangerous adversary, Kissinger communicated the same message he had to Ambassador Huang months earlier in San Clemente in a November 1973 meeting in Beijing with Zhou. Kissinger, by now serving as both Nixon’s National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State, repeated
Brezhnev’s approaches to Nixon in June 1973 to deal with the “China problem” and noted that the CPSU General Secretary also indicated the USSR would react violently to any potential US-
Sino military agreements in the future. Kissinger finally revealed what was compelling him to inform the Chinese of Brezhnev’s continual probing for US interest in joint action against the
Chinese and the decision of Nixon officials to move US-Sino nuclear policy toward a cooperative and protective path:
I tell you this, Mr. Prime Minister, not out of altruism, but because I believe the destruction of China by the Soviet Union, or even a massive attack on China by the Soviet Union, would have unforeseeable consequences for the entire international situation. (The interpreter indicated that there was not total understanding of this point.)263 I don’t tell this out of abstract altruism because I believe it is in our interest to prevent such an attack. You know as well as I do, Mr. Prime Minister, the consequences on Japan, Europe, South Asia, and the Middle East if such an attack even had the appearance of success.
Before these conversations, I believed the Soviets had a generalized hostility toward China, but I did not believe they had a specific plan. You may have had another idea. I do not now exclude the possibility of some specific ideas.
262 Kissinger, White House Years, 163-164. 263 Kissinger notes in his memoirs that even though Zhou understood English perfectly well, the Chinese Premier continued to use a translator. He speculates that Zhou did this to give himself a diplomatic advantage by making Kissinger repeat his comments while having twice as much time to consider his own response. See Kissinger’s White House Years, 743 or Years of Upheaval, 46. 123
Kissinger judged that the persistent requests by Brezhnev for information exchanges on the
Chinese program actually had little to do with actual intelligence on the Chinese deterrent, as the
Soviets “probably [already] have what they need.” Rather, the agreement to exchange information would represent a “symbol of cooperation” and American acceptance of “the desirability of destroying China’s nuclear capability or limiting it.”264 During the same trip,
Kissinger also informed Zhou that the US would continue to reduce its forces on Taiwan as a means to “discourage any military moves from Taiwan against the Mainland” in 1974. In addition to recalling two Phantom II squadrons and U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, Nixon officials planned to “remove the [remaining] nuclear weapons which are in Taiwan,” essentially stripping the American presence on the island “to communications and logistics.” Kissinger again reaffirmed to Zhou that Nixon intended to “complete the full normalization of the relations between China and the United States during this term of office, before the middle of 1976.”265 In addition to the augmentation of US-Sino nuclear policy to include protecting Chinese proliferation against Soviet aggression, the policy continued to maintain earlier objectives to actively lower US-Sino tensions by removing, even if only symbolically, potential American sources of nuclear danger toward the PRC from Taiwan.
After returning from his November 1973 trip to the PRC, Kissinger provided a thorough evaluation of the progress of the policy to Nixon. Kissinger judged the trip to be “a positive success on all planes” and credited Nixon’s “strong policies, the Chinese concerns about encirclement, our developing mutual trust and reliability [during] the past few years, [and] our profound exchanges at the highest levels” as contributing to “move us forward at a steady pace.”
264 Memorandum of Conversation, November 10, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 55, 326-331. 265 Memorandum of Conversation, November 11, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 56, 331-359. 124
Kissinger postulated that the present severity of the Sino-Soviet split placed the US “in probably the ideal situation with regard to the two communist giants: they both want and need to deal with us because they cannot deal with one another,” but acknowledged the situation would require caution and finesse to maintain an American advantage:
We [the US] are walking a delicate tightrope of public détente with Moscow and tacit alliance with [Beijing]. This will continue to require the most careful handling. The meticulous care and feeding of the Chinese on our Soviet policy has paid off, but [Beijing] sees our détente pursuit as at least objectively threatening its security, whatever our motives. And even if we don’t make mistakes, events beyond our control could turn one or the other against us or propel them toward each other.
He also revealed the extent to which Chinese and American geopolitical goals now aligned, reporting “Mao seemed basically optimistic about containing the Soviet Union, citing his familiar axis of potential or tacit allies [emphasis added in original text] in China, Japan, the
United States, Europe, and the Near East-South Asia axis.”266
While a realignment of major geopolitical considerations and foreign policy goals appeared to be successfully developing between the heads of the American and Chinese governments and their closest aides, this shift was apparently not shared by other Chinese officials within the PRC bureaucracy. A December 1973 memorandum from NSC staff member
Richard H. Solomon to Kissinger informed him that “strong political and bureaucratic forces within China [were] limiting the institutionalization of a durable relationship between the US and
PRC,” as Mao and Zhou apparently faced stiff resistance within the bureaucracy against the normalization of US-Sino relations. The Chinese state bureaucracy also reportedly worked to befuddle public efforts at US-Sino nuclear cooperation, including canceling a planned exchange
266 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “My Visit to China,” November 19, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 62, 430-441; For additional information on the further deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations that occurred during the Nixon era, see Chapter 6 of Danhui and Yafeng’s book, Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1973. 125
of “Chinese physicists to American laboratories to do work on basic nuclear science” to instead focus on “closer cooperation with European researchers.” Solomon suggested Kissinger engage the Chinese bureaucracy further to convince them to support Mao and Zhou’s push for US-Sino normalization.267 Interestingly, Chinese sources detailing Mao’s change of heart regarding the
US during this time do not mention this apparent struggle of consensus between Mao and Zhou and the Chinese bureaucracy that Solomon mentioned, instead focusing on Mao’s suspicions of
US-USSR collusion against the PRC.
The following year in 1974, the Nixon administration continued to implement measures to lower US-PRC tensions and promote cooperation in non-weapons nuclear areas by authorizing
American companies to sell nuclear light-water power reactors and slightly enriched uranium fuel to the PRC. The State Department determined in April 1974 that the sales “would be consistent with our policy of facilitating the development of trade with the PRC, would have no adverse strategic implications, and would not be contrary to our obligations under the NPT.”
While technically unrelated to the Chinese nuclear weapons program, the approval of the sale of
American nuclear power reactors to the PRC demonstrates the continued efforts the US made in cooperating with the PRC on nuclear matters as “no Communist country [had] purchased
Western power reactors” to that point.268 Nixon approved these nuclear sales in a July 1974
NSDM ensuring that they would be under either US or International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards and indicating that further sales to Communist nations should “continue to be treated on a case-by-case basis.”269 A CIA paper from the same month on the long-term
267 Memorandum from Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, “The Current State of US-PRC Relations: Parallelism in International Affairs; Shaky Bilateral Ties,” December 31, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 65, 447-451. 268 Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “Nuclear Sales to the PRC,” April 24, 1974, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 79, 499-500. 269 National Security Decision Memorandum 261, “Nuclear Sales to the PRC,” July 22, 1974, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 83, 513-514. 126
prospects of Chinese nuclear proliferation estimated that China would become a “great power, probably the greatest in East Asia” by the turn of the century with its nuclear forces
“constitut[ing] a formidable deterrent.”270
The Ford Administration, 1974-1976
The Ford administration continued to evaluate how an increasingly cooperative American attitude toward the Chinese on both general and nuclear matters affected its relationship with the
ROC. Ford officials sought to “find the narrow ground on which the contradictory objectives of advancing normalization with the PRC while assuring the security of the ROC can be successfully pursued.” The US projected the ROC would possess “most of the technological know-how for the development of a nuclear device” by the end of 1974, with US officials growing concerned that an abrupt freeze or reversal of supplying American military hardware to the ROC could hasten Taiwanese “efforts to develop nuclear weapons.” The PRC was not expected to instigate hostilities or exacerbate tensions with the ROC, however, as nearly half of their ground and air forces as well its strongest naval fleet were deployed along the Sino-Soviet border to counter potential Soviet military aggression.271
No additional US-Sino nuclear policy decisions were made during the last two years of the Ford administration. However, evaluation and maintenance of the established US-Sino nuclear policy continued. A briefing given prior to a US Congressional delegation visit to the
PRC in July 1975 indicated that the PRC continued to progress with developing its nuclear deterrent. US officials expected the Chinese to be capable of inflicting “unacceptable damage”
270 Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “China in 1980-85 and in the Year 2000,” July 1974, Central Intelligence Agency, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 84, 514-517. 271 Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asia and the Pacific, “US Security Assistance to the Republic of China,” November 12, 1974, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 90, 545-558. 127
on Soviet forces by the end of the 1970s.272 Relations between top US and PRC officials showed outward signs of cooling near the end of 1975, with “a very frail” eighty-two-year-old Mao now judging the US as “not reliable,” Europe as “soft,” and Japan as seeking “hegemony.” The aged
Chairman increasingly referred to his old revolutionary rhetoric as the solution to these perceived changes in an October 1975 meeting with Kissinger, claiming the PRC would counter the Soviet threat on its own by digging tunnels and storing millet.273 A June 1976 CIA paper evaluating the expected foreign policy of the PRC’s post-Mao leadership judged that Mao’s successors would
“be confronted with the same foreign policy problem Mao has been facing for a long time – namely, a desire to project China’s influence globally but a limited capability to compete with the superpowers in doing so, or even to defend itself against them.” The paper judged Chinese fears of a Soviet invasion or “disarming nuclear strike” would continue to drive the PRC to “try to use American influence to deter the USSR from attacking China and to offset Soviet efforts to encircle China,” with the CIA concluding that, for the time being, post-Mao leaders would “have nowhere else to go.” As the ROC would likely be “impelled to withhold a decision to gear up for an invasion [on the Chinese mainland] until well into the 1980s or even later,” the CIA estimated the Taiwan issue would remain a muted issue to post-Mao leadership for the foreseeable future.274
272 Memorandum of Conversation, “Secretary Kissinger’s Briefing of Congressional Delegates Before Their Visit to the People’s Republic of China,” July 22, 1975, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 115, 706-712. 273 Paper Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord), “Analysis/Highlights of Secretary Kissinger’s Meeting with Chairman Mao, October 21, 1975,” undated, Ford Library, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc.128, 828-831. 274 Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, “The Foreign Policies of China’s Successor Leadership,” June 1976, Central Intelligence Agency, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 148, 931-935. 128
Chapter Summary
The application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method reveals a stark difference in both the perception of the Chinese nuclear problem and gradual formation and enactment of US-Sino nuclear policy between the Kennedy-Johnson and Nixon-Ford administrations. Kennedy officials continued identifying the Chinese nuclear problem in the same manner as the
Eisenhower administration, as an extension of the PRC’s ambitions to spread a Communist world revolution. A years-long estimation process comprised the entirety of Kennedy’s term and the first year of the Johnson administration, with officials struggling to gather intelligence on the
Chinese nuclear weapons progress from the notoriously closed society. Kennedy and Johnson officials considered options to stop Chinese proliferation including diplomatic and economic pressure, encouraging Sino-Soviet tensions, and direct American military action against Chinese nuclear facilities. Johnson officials eventually ruled out the latter choice, as it would only temporarily hinder Chinese nuclear weapons progress and likely draw Soviet ire, and instead selected a policy of non-action against the Chinese nuclear weapons program unless first provoked. The Johnson administration also implemented short-term measures to increase
American intelligence on Chinese nuclear weapons development and probe the Soviets for interest in mutual action to counter Chinese proliferation. Johnson officials continued to estimate the Chinese nuclear problem, hold off ROC calls for military action, and signal an interest in rapprochement to the PRC through the end of their tenure in office. Nixon officials continued and increased these estimation efforts, as well as studying the wider effects of a shift in the US’s China policy. The Nixon administration selected a US-Sino nuclear policy of unilaterally easing tensions by agreeing to withdraw American nuclear weapons from the ROC in the wake of Nixon’s February 1972 visit to the PRC. This policy was further expanded in 129
1973 to include sharing sensitive strategic information on Soviet preemptive strike intentions and actively deterring such an attack against the PRC’s nuclear weapons program, as Nixon and
Kissinger wished to avoid introducing the instability and precedents a Soviet preemptive strike would introduce into the international system. Ford officials maintained this policy, continuing to deter Soviet aggression against Chinese nuclear facilities and reduce US-Sino tensions, but did not continue to augment it further as relations between the US and PRC stagnated briefly in 1975 and 1976.
This case study demonstrates that the Kennedy-Johnson administrations took a much more indirect approach in determining US-Sino nuclear policy than their successors in the
Nixon-Ford administrations. Kennedy and Johnson officials deliberated potential options to stop
Chinese nuclear weapons proliferation for years, viewing it as an explicit threat to the US and
American Asian allies before deciding unilateral action to hinder Chinese progress would generate more uncertainty and problems than allowing the Chinese efforts to continue. This also allowed Johnson officials to begin early steps toward overall US-Sino rapprochement. The
Nixon administration continued where Johnson officials left off and expanded upon rapprochement efforts while simultaneously analyzing how US-Sino relations were changing with shifting geopolitical realities. Nixon officials eventually adopted a policy of nuclear cooperation with the PRC, beginning with unilateral efforts to ease nuclear tensions between the two and expanding to include efforts to actively deter Soviet attacks against Chinese nuclear facilities. Ford officials continued these efforts to deter Soviet aggression against the Chinese nuclear weapons program and to lower US-PRC tensions.
This case study also expands on the available secondary literature by providing continuations of accounts given in previous literature and parallel accounts of American officials 130
compared with Chinese accounts on US-Sino nuclear policy and US-Sino relations overall. The case provides a parallel account of Burr and Richelson’s argument that US officials explored preemptive action against Chinese nuclear facilities and suffered from an expansive intelligence gap regarding the program, but takes this further by revealing through subsequently released documents that this information gap continued through, at least, both the Johnson and Nixon administrations. The case study also further contextualizes John Wilson Lewis and Xue Litai’s account of the rapid and extended Chinese nuclear weapons effort that occurred during the 1950s and 1960s by revealing through documents released after their book that US officials were largely ignorant of the extent of the Chinese effort until the Chinese nuclear test in October 1964.
Similarly, documents released after Evan Feigenbaum’s book demonstrate that while the Chinese nuclear program continued to make substantial progress in the 1970s, Nixon and Ford officials made unilateral efforts to both lower nuclear tensions between the US and PRC and protect
Chinese proliferation against Soviet aggression. This case study also provides context to
Chinese scholarship on PRC nuclear and foreign policy during the 1960s and 1970s by providing evidence that US officials became aware of the PRC’s anxiety about the possible spread of the
Vietnam War to the PRC and a parallel account of the formation of the tacit US-PRC alliance during the 1970s from the perspective of US officials. As with the French case study, this case study provides significant context to Kissinger’s memoirs released decades before the corresponding documentation became available by revealing the extent of his involvement in unilaterally lowering US-PRC nuclear tensions by removing American nuclear weapons from
Taiwan, protecting the Chinese nuclear weapons program from Soviet attack, and keeping the
Chinese consistently informed about developments regarding the latter. As documentation of US efforts to lower nuclear tensions and shield Chinese proliferation are not discussed in either 131
Francis Gavin’s or Shane Maddock’s books, even though they were available before their respective publications, the account presented through this case study further substantiates their arguments that Nixon and Ford officials did not view nonproliferation as an overarching policy objective. A more detailed analysis and discussion of the efficacy of these administrations in countering, then subsequently protecting, the Chinese nuclear weapons program to maintain the integrity of the international system is provided in Chapter IV.
132
CHAPTER IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this final chapter, the results of the application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method to US documents spanning 1961-1976 from both the FRUS series and the Wilson Center for both cases studies are reviewed. Points where this study expands upon or provides further context to the previous secondary literature, as well as any points of disagreement or differentiation, are highlighted and discussed. Finally, whether the US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies as revealed by the Brewer-deLeon stages were ultimately successful in achieving their respective policy objectives is discussed. The chapter concludes with a brief recitation of the individual
US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies revealed by through the application of the modified
Brewer-deLeon method.
The Kennedy and Johnson Eras
The Kennedy administration made no major decisions on American nuclear policy toward the French or Chinese nuclear weapons programs, instead undertaking extended stages of estimation as they continued to gather additional information about the programs and consider a number of different policy directions. In the French case, this included considering whether providing some form of American aid to the force de frappe could be used to influence de
Gaulle’s increasingly adversarial relationship with both the US and NATO. Kennedy officials were not unanimous about whether such a move would serve US interests, with some such as
Secretary of State Dean Rusk opining that aiding the French weapons program would give few benefits while disrupting European relations and working against overarching American nonproliferation goals. Conversely, others, such as the American Ambassador to France, James
Gavin, thought providing aid to the French weapons program would build closer US-Franco ties. 133
This included Kennedy’s offer, espoused in the Nassau Agreement, to furnish the French with
American Polaris SLBMs and essentially bring France to an equivalent level of nuclear partnership as the UK maintained with the US. Gradually, Kennedy officials came to the conclusion that nothing would dissuade de Gaulle from continuing to pursue an independent
French nuclear deterrent or alter his personal convictions and increasingly antagonistic attitude.
In the Chinese case, the Kennedy administration considered options that were the polar opposite of their concerns about France – that of whether to explicitly act to delay or destroy the
Chinese nuclear weapons program to mitigate the risk of the emergence of an aggressive, nuclear-armed PRC. As with the French case, Kennedy officials were not unanimous about how the US should counter Chinese nuclear ambitions. Elements of the NSC, including National
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and the JCS, thoroughly investigated options to hinder
Chinese nuclear weapons progress up to and including unilateral US military action against the
PRC’s nuclear facilities. These considerations were confounded by a persistent dearth of information on the program, leading to fears that such preemptive US action may not completely destroy all Chinese nuclear facilities. At the same time, American Intelligence continued to posit that the PRC would become less, rather than more, aggressive upon becoming a nuclear weapons state. By 1963, Kennedy officials were actively exploring potential cooperation with the Soviets to ensure the Chinese halted their nuclear weapons development.
The Johnson administration made significant policy selections on both US-Franco and
US-Sino nuclear policies in 1964, which underwent policy implementation, evaluation, and maintenance throughout the remainder of Johnson’s second term. Since many key Kennedy officials remained in the transition to the Johnson administration, including McNamara, Bundy, and Rusk, these decisions built directly on the estimation stages which occurred during the 134
preceding years of the Kennedy era. Johnson officials, based on their prior experiences with de
Gaulle, concluded that no amount of American nuclear aid to the French nuclear weapons program would have any effect in altering de Gaulle’s independent and increasingly anti-
American foreign policy. As such, in April 1964 they enacted a policy of severing all channels of American nuclear cooperation and communication that could possibly contribute toward the development of the force de frappe through NSAM 294. As this policy was implemented, the
Johnson administration continued to evaluate the effectiveness of the policy on hindering the
French nuclear weapons program and its effect on changing French foreign policy. Johnson officials gradually came to differentiate between the erratic, monolithic figure of de Gaulle and their relationship with French officials, eventually concluding that any improvement in US-
Franco relations would likely come from de Gaulle’s successor government. As de Gaulle remained in office through the end of the Johnson era, US officials maintained their policy of nuclear severance with the French nuclear weapons program while observing increasing rifts between de Gaulle and his own government as well as further shifts in his volatile demeanor.
As with the French case, Johnson officials were able to build upon their prior years of estimation of the Chinese nuclear problem they experienced during the Kennedy years. While the situation remained more fluid because of the lack of available information on the Chinese nuclear weapons program and intentions, as opposed to substantial evidence that de Gaulle would remain intransigent, the Johnson administration eventually selected a policy of non-action in 1964 rather than taking unilateral action against PRC nuclear facilities. At the same time,
Johnson officials continued the earlier process of estimation of the Chinese nuclear problem through intelligence efforts and quiet investigation on preemptive action by Bundy and other
NSC officials. This policy decision was not enshrined in an official document, such as with 135
NSAM 294 and the French nuclear weapons program, but became the de facto policy by 1966 that was maintained through the end of the Johnson era. Johnson officials continually reassured the ROC of its security and rebuffed Taiwanese requests for increased American military aid, while eventually coming to view rapprochement with the PRC as possible and beginning to signal their intentions to improve US-PRC relations near the end of Johnson’s second term.
This study expands upon Marc Trachtenberg’s argument that “there was an enormous gap between [de Gaulle’s] rhetoric and reality” as the General’s anti-American line clashed with his actual objectives to restrain West Germany through the presence of the Americans in Europe.
Trachtenberg concludes that de Gaulle’s foreign policy during the 1960s was “not to be understood in entirely rational terms,” noting that the “rhetoric seemed to take on a life of its own, and in the last years of de Gaulle’s presidency his language became a little wild.”275 While
Trachtenberg focuses on the political calculus of de Gaulle in spite of his rhetoric, this study details the extent to which this rhetoric, in spite of de Gaulle’s true objectives, disturbed and affected US officials. In essence, this study provides evidence that de Gaulle’s rhetoric played a large role in the Johnson administration’s decision to sever channels of nuclear weapons aid and cooperation to France. Kennedy himself even raised concerns about de Gaulle’s continual antagonism in May 1963, nearly one year before NSAM 294 was enacted, to the French Foreign
Minister while also reminding the latter that the US offered France an “open door held out” for nuclear aid through the Nassau Agreement which de Gaulle refused.276 While Trachtenberg is likely correct that de Gaulle’s true objectives did not match with his public rhetoric, this study
275 Trachtenberg, “The de Gaulle Problem,” 89, 92. 276 Memorandum of Conversation, “Review of French Foreign Policy,” May 25, 1963, Kennedy Library, FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. XIII, Doc. 271, 769-775. 136
indicates that US officials did not perceive the General’s words as such at the time, instead viewing them as a major problem even if they were in truth hollow.
William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson’s account of an extensive American effort to gather intelligence and plan for a preemptive attack against Chinese nuclear facilities between
1961 and 1964 is offered a parallel account in this study. Similar to their conclusions, this study also provides evidence that US officials, particularly Bundy and the JCS, were both interested in and actively explored options to militarily hinder or completely halt Chinese nuclear progress.
The account given through the application of the modified Brewer-deLeon method also provides an additional refutation of Bundy’s claim that preemptive plans to mitigate the Chinese nuclear weapons program was only “talk, not serious planning or real intent.”277 Although Bundy’s claim appears to be false, it makes sense that he would have made it at the time of his book’s publication in 1988. Since information on such planning that he denied occurred would remain classified until well into the next decade, revealing the extent of American interest in unilateral action in 1988 arguably may have increased tensions between the US and PRC, something the former National Security Advisor was likely well aware of and had no interest in doing. In addition to providing this parallel narrative, this study also expands on Burr and Richelson’s findings by indicating that the intelligence gap on the Chinese nuclear weapons program remained a long-term issue that continued into both Johnson’s second term and the Nixon era.
Documentation that this study reviews also provides additional context to John Wilson
Lewis and Xue Litai’s account of the Chinese effort to achieve a nuclear weapons capability.
Originally published in 1988, documents regarding the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were unavailable at the time of publication and thus could not indicate the extent to which US
277 Bundy, Danger and Survival, 532. 137
officials were aware of the rapid technological advances the Chinese underwent to become a nuclear weapons state in the first half of the 1960s. The intelligence gap which Burr and
Richelson report is further emphasized by contrasting the accounts of this study with that of
Lewis and Xue’s, as the documents released following their study indicate US officials were largely ignorant of the details and scope of Chinese nuclear ambitions that Lewis and Xue recount until evidence of an impending Chinese nuclear test became incontrovertible by late
September 1964.
Accounts of the Kennedy-Johnson years from the perspective of Chinese scholars are also substantiated and further contextualized by this study. Dong Wang’s description of Chinese leaders in the 1960s as “shrewd strategic players” is a view that was apparently shared by
Johnson officials by at least 1965, as evidenced by Dean Rusk’s September 1965 statement to
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek that PRC leaders were “rational men, not lunatics.”278 Dong’s argument that improved relations between the US and PRC were impossible at the time because of the PRC’s anxiety about the consequences of the Vietnam War, a factor which Jiang Ying likewise highlighted as a source of great anxiety to the PRC, is also supported by the lack of serious rapprochement efforts until late in Johnson’s second term. This argument is also validated in documentation this study reviews through National Security Advisor Walt Whitman
Rostow and Rusk’s joint objection to Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield’s suggestion of a clandestine, “clearly conciliatory approach to China” to settle Vietnam, as doing so was politically untenable for the potential to upset both the USSR and Free World Asian allies.279
Both Dong’s and Jiang’s arguments that Chinese leadership viewed the Vietnam conflict as a
278 Dong, “Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and China’s Policy toward the United States in the 1960s,” 266; Memorandum of Conversation, “China,” September 20, 1965, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 103, 207-209. 279 Editorial Note. FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 255, 551. 138
major national security threat are reflected by the account this study provides. Johnson officials appear to have eventually come to the same conclusion, as they provided explicit assurances to the PRC through the American Embassy in Poland’s backchannel in January 1968 that the US did not intend to invade North Vietnam or militarily engage the PRC through the Vietnam conflict.280
In terms of overall nonproliferation policy, the documents reviewed by this study appear to support Francis Gavin’s argument that nonproliferation was not vigorously pursued by
Kennedy officials, but that Johnson officials did make nonproliferation a central priority underpinning their decisions. This contrasts with Shane Maddock’s argument that the Johnson administration continued in the same vein as the Kennedy administration and maintained a weak focus on nonproliferation. Rather, this study provides evidence that Johnson officials severed any possible channels of nuclear weapons aid and communication with the French through
NSAM 294 and refused to attack Chinese nuclear facilities for fear of the uncertainty doing so with incomplete intelligence would bring about – two actions that arguably worked toward nonproliferatory objectives and were not addressed in the account given in Nuclear Apartheid.
Conversely, these two examples revealed through the modified Brewer-deLeon method support
Gavin’s argument by providing parallel examples of US actions that furthered nonproliferation objectives simultaneous to the account he provides detailing the efforts of the US and USSR to jointly limit the spread of nuclear weapons.
In reviewing the efficacy of US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies toward achieving their respective policy objectives, neither the Kennedy nor the Johnson administrations were
280 For more details, see “Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland, January 4, 1968, US Department of State, FRUS, 1964-1968, Vol. XXX, Doc. 294, 624-629,” available via the corresponding hyperlink in the bibliography. 139
ultimately successful at influencing de Gaulle’s independent foreign policy or antagonistic demeanor by supporting the French nuclear weapons program. Even so, through blocking all avenues of potential American aid to the force de frappe the US was able to clandestinely reprimand de Gaulle and signal that they would not enable the General’s antagonism and were content to simply wait him out of office. Similarly, Kennedy officials and Johnson officials were not successful at stopping the Chinese from successfully testing a nuclear device. However, as intelligence about the specifics of Chinese nuclear facilities remained scarce, the decision not to take direct unilateral military action or support ROC actions ensured that a great source of uncertainty was not introduced into the international system. This also allowed the Johnson administration to begin efforts at easing US-PRC tensions near the end of their tenure that Nixon officials would continue and, ultimately, develop into US-Sino rapprochement.
The Nixon and Ford Eras
The Nixon administration undertook additional estimation and made policy decisions on both US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies. Regarding France, Nixon indicated in the opening months of his first term that he did not view the force de frappe as problematic. Instead,
Nixon officials commissioned additional studies on potential US aid to the French nuclear weapons program and how NSAM 294 could be interpreted to facilitate this. The Nixon administration selected a policy of providing gradual aid and cooperation to the French nuclear weapons program following a February 1970 meeting with Pompidou. This began to be implemented through reopening dialogue channels for the French to seek limited American technical assistance on French weapons. Concurrently, Nixon officials continued to evaluate these discussions and the potential effects of expanding nuclear weapons cooperation with
France. This cycle repeated after Nixon officials decided to expand US aid to include dialogue 140
on nuclear weapons safety issues and the sale of lower-tier advanced computers for use in the
French missile program while simultaneously evaluating these choices and the effects of further cooperation. As Europe, led by France, became increasingly adversarial toward the US in 1973, a small group of Nixon officials, including Henry Kissinger and Secretary of Defense James
Schlesinger, decided to continue to aid the French nuclear weapons program while simultaneously handicapping aid to the British nuclear weapons program in order to prevent
Europe from coalescing into a bloc intent on espousing its identity through its opposition to US interests. Nixon officials explored options for additional cooperation with France and continued to evaluate current US aid to the French nuclear weapons program, but did not implement additional measures as US-Franco relations soured near the end of the Nixon era.
In contrast to their divergence in policy direction with Johnson officials on US-Franco nuclear policy, Nixon officials continued and accelerated Johnson administration efforts to increase communication and ease US-Sino tensions with the PRC. The Nixon administration sustained efforts to close the intelligence gap on the Chinese nuclear weapons program while simultaneously instituting additional studies to assess the state of US nuclear forces in Asia and the possibility of US-PRC rapprochement. Dialogue between the two increased, leading to
Kissinger’s secret trip to the PRC in July 1971 and Nixon’s own trip in February 1972.
Following this, Nixon officials selected a policy of unilaterally easing nuclear tensions between the US and PRC through withdrawing American nuclear weapons from Taiwan. Following implementation and evaluation of these measures, the Nixon administration augmented the policy in 1973 to also include sharing highly sensitive strategic information about Soviet intentions to attack the PRC’s nuclear facilities. Kissinger and Nixon also clandestinely augmented the policy to include working with Chinese leaders to form an international anti- 141
Soviet coalition intended to counter Soviet preemptive action against Chinese nuclear facilities for fear it would disrupt the international system and embolden further Soviet aggression abroad.
The Nixon administration continued to implement measures to ease US-Sino tensions and evaluate the policy through the end of their tenure.
The Ford administration selected and implemented a policy of increasing American aid to the French nuclear weapons program while maintaining, but not further augmenting, Nixon era measures fostering the easing of US-PRC nuclear tensions and protection of Chinese nuclear facilities from Soviet aggression. Following the restoration of nuclear dialogue between Ford and Giscard at Martinique in December 1974, Ford officials decided to expand both ongoing US-
Franco nuclear safety talks and American assistance to French ballistic missile development in
1975. While further acts of cooperation and support for the French nuclear weapons program did not occur through the end of their time in office, Ford officials continued to evaluate the policy.
Further actions investigated included transferring an advanced computer prohibited by NSAM
294 and altering the rate of US aid to the French nuclear weapons program to encourage further
French foreign policy movement toward US interests.
Ford officials, while not changing or expanding any US-Sino nuclear policy decisions made by Nixon officials, continued to implement and evaluate the policy that was in place. In contrast to the warming relations the US experienced with France and Europe during the Ford years, relations with the PRC cooled as Mao’s health declined and a power struggle among
Chinese leaders over Mao’s successorship gradually took place. This contributed to a stagnation in US-PRC relations and a freezing of US-Sino nuclear policy through the end of the Ford administration’s tenure. 142
Trachtenberg’s account of US-Franco relations during the Nixon era, which also included an account of nuclear cooperation and mention of Kissinger’s concerns about the formation of an antagonistic European bloc, is essentially continued through this study by examining documents from the Ford administration that were unavailable at the time of his article’s publication. While he too posits that US officials sought to use nuclear weapons support as a means to reorient
French foreign policy away from an anti-American line, his account stops at 1974 with US-
Franco relations “in tatters.”281 Documents from the Ford era indicate that this relationship was quickly mended and that nuclear cooperation and assistance to the force de frappe expanded even further. They also suggest that Kissinger’s clandestine policy of using nuclear support to move French foreign policy in line with American interests, which Trachtenberg addresses but was unable to follow through because of the unavailability of Ford documents, did begin to see success during the Ford years. US officials noted by November 1976 that American aid to the
French nuclear weapons program was likely responsible for increased military planning between the French and both NATO’s SACEUR and the US bilaterally, suggesting Kissinger’s policy was beginning to bear fruit. Ford officials apparently viewed it as successful as well, pondering at the time whether they could “have demanded and obtained more from the French.”282
R. Gerald Hughes and Thomas Robb’s account of Kissinger threatening to withhold nuclear sharing with the UK in order to coerce them into a more favorable foreign policy path is both substantiated and contextualized by the similar account of Kissinger and Schlesinger provided in this study. Roughly concurrent to the same period they describe US officials using these threats in mid-1973, Kissinger and Schlesinger are shown to work in a similarly close and
281 Trachtenberg, “The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 1969-1974,” 51. 282 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McAuliffe) to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, “French Connection,” November 1, 1976, Washington National Records Centers, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. E-15, Part 2, Doc. 341, 1041-1043. 143
collusive fashion to use aid toward, rather than threats against, the development of the French nuclear weapons program to achieve a change in French foreign policy. This is a particularly interesting contrast with Hughes and Robb’s study, as it demonstrates two examples of top US officials’ willingness to manipulate nuclear relations with allies, both constructively and coercively, in order to shift allied foreign policies more in line with US interests. While Hughes and Robb report that Kissinger did not follow through with his threats to withdraw American nuclear sharing with the UK, this study suggests that Kissinger did in fact withhold American nuclear weapons support to the UK, in the form of MIRV assistance, in favor of supporting
France in order to keep both roughly parallel in their weapons development pace and work toward the larger objective of keeping Europe from coalescing into a bloc united by its anti-
American disposition.283
Similar to the context provided to Lewis and Xue’s book by this study, it also does so for
Evan Feigenbaum’s book, China’s Techno-Warriors. As the book was published in 2003,
Feigenbaum was not able to review documents from the Nixon and Ford administrations that continued to be released for several years after the book’s publication. This study contextualizes the continued nuclear weapons progress the Chinese made in the 1970s by providing further evidence of the dangers the program faced from Soviet aggression. Rather than viewing sustained Chinese nuclear progress as a threat, as past administrations in the 1950s and 1960s had, this study provides evidence that as the Chinese progressed the Nixon and Ford administrations actively worked to both unilaterally ease nuclear tensions with the PRC through gradually withdrawing American nuclear weapons from Taiwan and deter Soviet efforts to gain support for destroying the PRC’s nuclear facilities.
283 See Figure 2 in the appendix for more details. 144
Additionally, the account provided by this study gives a parallel account of the formation of the tacit US-Sino alliance that is documented by Xin Zhan and other Chinese scholars.
Dong’s argument that Soviet threats against the PRC backfired by drawing the Americans to the
PRC’s defense rather than away from the Sino-Soviet border conflict is supported this study’s account, which indicates interest by Nixon officials throughout 1969 in stemming the outbreak of a Sino-Soviet conflict and demonstrates American support for the PRC through Nixon’s
September 1969 approval to explicitly inform the Soviets through diplomatic channels of
American disapproval of any Soviet preemptive action against Chinese nuclear facilities. While
Xin emphasizes that Mao apparently became distrustful of the US following the conclusion of the first round of SALT talks between the US and USSR, this study suggests that Kissinger and other top US officials were not aware of the beginnings of Mao’s apprehension by mid-1973 and only became conscientious of Mao’s change of heart by the time US-Sino relations began to noticeably cool by the beginning of the Ford era. Indeed, Xin describes the Chinese as viewing
Kissinger as “patronizing” and even “stoking Mao’s resentment” in a November 1973 meeting after the National Security Advisor continued to emphasize the threat of a Soviet strike on the
PRC that Mao did not view with the same urgency. In contrast to this seemingly confrontational description, this study provides evidence that Kissinger apparently reported to Nixon at the time that he thought the November 1973 meeting was “a positive success on all planes” and described the US-Sino relationship at that point in quite optimistic terms.284 A December 1973 NSC memo indicated that the US viewed resistance against US-PRC normalization as coming from within the Chinese bureaucracy against Mao and Zhou’s efforts than from a resentful Mao, as Xin’s
284 Xin, “Prelude to the Transformation,” 299-300; Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, “My Visit to China,” November 19, 1973, National Archives, FRUS, 1969-1976, Vol. XVIII, Doc. 62, 430-441. 145
description would suggest. While seemingly contradictory, this could represent an instance of two distinct perspectives of the same event. Mao indeed may have found Kissinger patronizing at the November 1973 meeting, but it seems unlikely he would let the Americans know this at the time. Simultaneously, Kissinger was likely unaware of the extent of SALT I in eroding
Mao’s trust in the US and so would have viewed the November 1973 meeting, which had a much less tense tone than the subsequent October 1975 meeting, as highly successful in spite of Mao’s private scorn.
Multiple aspects from Kissinger’s memoirs are given significant context by the documents reviewed in this study that were unavailable at the time of his memoirs’ publications.
Kissinger does not discuss the eventual extent of US support to the force de frappe but does discuss at length US-Franco and US-European tensions during 1973 as well as his fears of an adversarial European bloc forming at that time. Documentation utilized by this study reveals how Kissinger sought to avoid the formation of such a bloc, providing evidence that Nixon officials sought to use nuclear weapons support to France as a carrot, and the simultaneous depravation of nuclear weapons support to the UK as a stick, to achieve this objective. That the document detailing Kissinger and Schlesinger’s conversation about providing MIRV technology to France, while withholding it from the UK, was personally classified by Kissinger and exempted from the general declassification schedule emphasizes the extreme sensitivity with which Kissinger apparently viewed clandestine US-Franco nuclear policy deliberations.285
Kissinger speaks in greater detail and, in some aspects, more openly about his dealings with the
PRC during the Nixon years in his memoirs. While he does not reveal secret actions such as the gradual removal of American nuclear weapons from Taiwan, this study reveals that the reasons
285 See the first page of Figure 2 in the appendix for details on this declassification exemption. 146
outlined in Kissinger’s memoirs for deterring a Soviet attack on the PRC are basically identical to the reasons he gave to Zhou Enlai for doing so in a November 1973 meeting. Additionally, while not directly confirming that Kissinger met with the Chinese Ambassador to the UN, Huang
Hua, numerous times clandestinely in New York between 1971 and 1973, as he describes in his memoirs, documentation of his highly secret meeting with Chinese Ambassador Han Hsu at the
White House in May 1973 demonstrates such meetings did in fact occur.
Kissinger does not describe any details of the expansion in American aid to the French nuclear weapons program or the continued removal of American nuclear forces from Taiwan that occurred during the Ford era. He does, however, describe both the vast improvement of US-
Franco relations as well as the cooling and subsequent stagnation of US-Sino relations that occurred simultaneous to the clandestine implementations of US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies. As with his recounting of his years serving in the Nixon administration, Kissinger provides in his memoirs about the Ford years his motivations for seeking to improve US-Franco and US-Sino relations while the documents reviewed by this study, and unavailable until decades after Kissinger’s own writings were published, provide insight into the means through which he and other Ford officials attempted to achieve these goals.
In reviewing the efficacy of US-Franco and US-Sino nuclear policies in achieving their respective objectives under the Nixon and Ford administrations, both appear to have been successful to some degree. Nixon officials laid the groundwork for a reorientation of French foreign policy away from Gaullism and back in line with US interests through reopening nuclear communication channels between the US and France and providing aid to the force de frappe that Ford officials continued. While providing aid to the French nuclear weapons program may not have been the sole factor in improving US-Franco relations and the bringing about a 147
friendlier, more cooperative French foreign policy, the US-Franco nuclear policy of the Nixon and Ford administrations was undoubtedly one of the primary factors. Both the Nixon and Ford administrations were also successful in using US-Sino nuclear policy to prevent the Soviets from attacking PRC nuclear facilities and, thereby, restraining further Soviet adventurism. The gradual easing of US-PRC nuclear tensions through the progressive US removal of American nuclear forces from Taiwan also allowed US-Sino rapprochement to occur during the Nixon years, while the continuation of Nixon era US-Sino nuclear policy decisions by Ford officials preserved progress in US-Sino relations that would ultimately reach full normalization under the subsequent Carter administration.
Final Summary
This study argues that US nuclear policy regarding the French and Chinese nuclear weapons programs underwent substantial changes between the Kennedy and Ford eras. Kennedy officials initially tolerated French proliferation and explored using aid to the French nuclear weapons program to influence de Gaulle’s foreign policy to move more in line with US interests, but soured on the force de frappe as de Gaulle became increasingly rhetorically hostile to US interests. Kennedy officials also viewed Chinese proliferation as untenable and explored numerous courses of action to stop or delay progress. Johnson officials eventually chose to block all American support to the French nuclear weapons program and not to preemptively deal with the Chinese nuclear problem, in part from a severe lack of intelligence on Chinese facilities and intentions. The Johnson administration eventually came to see rapprochement with the PRC as possible and began laying the groundwork for improved relations with the Chinese near the end of Johnson’s second term while continuing to refuse aid to the French nuclear weapons program owing to de Gaulle’s unending intransigence. Nixon officials reattempted using aid to 148
the force de frappe after de Gaulle left office to shape French foreign policy and used it as a means to avoid an adversarial European bloc opposed to US interests from forming. The Nixon administration also picked up where Johnson officials left off attempting to improve relations with the PRC, eventually using gradual US nuclear weapons removal from Taiwan to lower mutual nuclear tensions and shielding Chinese nuclear facilities from preemptive attack by the
Soviets in order to restrain further Soviet aggression abroad and maintain the integrity of the international system. Ford officials expanded upon aid to the French nuclear weapons program started under the Nixon administration which coincided with both improved relations with the
French and a reorientation of French foreign policy to a more friendly, less anti-American line.
The Ford administration continued the measures instituted by Nixon officials regarding the PRC without changing or expanding them, even as relations between the US and PRC languished during the Ford years, in order to preserve the gains made in improving US-Sino relations and working toward full normalization of relations with the PRC.
149
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary Sources
Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Foy Kohler. “Secretary McNamara’s Views on Nuclear Sharing." March 01, 1962. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives, Record Group 59, Bureau of European Affairs NATO and Atlantic Politico-Military Affairs, Records Relating to NATO, 1959-1966, box 7, Def 12 Nuclear France 1962. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110242.
Briefing Memorandum from the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger. “Missile Assistance at Martinique.” Undated. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 325, 998-1001. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d325.
Cable from William P. Rogers to American Embassy Paris. “Military Relations with France." November 15, 1971. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives, Record Group 59, Subject-Numeric Files, 1970-73 Top Secret Files, box 1, AE 1-1 70-71. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112258.
Circular Telegram from the Department of State to All NATO Missions. March 2, 1966. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964– 1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 55, 111-113. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d55.
Conversation between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). February 1, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 5, 18-21. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d5.
Department of State Cable 5245 to Embassy United Kingdom. “Message from President Kennedy to Prime Minister Macmillan." May 08, 1961. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, FOIA release. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111184.
Draft Memorandum from Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson. “Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces.” December 6, 1963. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon. Washington: 150
Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 151, 546-564. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d151.
Draft Paper Prepared by the Policy Planning Council. December 5, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 62, 222-224. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d62.
Draft Response to National Security Study Memorandum 63. “US Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences.” October 17, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 40, 108-112. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d40.
Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 297, 734-735. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d297.
Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 41, 125. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d41.
Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 81, 274. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d81.
Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 255, 551. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d255.
Editorial Note. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973- 1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 36, 271-272. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d36.
Letter from Gerard C. Smith to Henry A. Kissinger. June 30, 1970. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, FOIA Release. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113687.
Letter from President Nixon to Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. June 19, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 38, 278- 279. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d38.
151
Letter from President Nixon to the President of the Republic of China Chiang Kai-shek. March 27, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 74, 193-194. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d74.
Letter from Secretary of Defense McNamara to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). December 4, 1964. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 37, 61-64. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d37.
Letter from Secretary of State Rusk to the Ambassador to Poland (Gronouski). February 5, 1966. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 124, 254-255. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d124.
Letter from Secretary of State Rusk to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). December 1, 1964. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 36, 59-60. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d36.
Letter from the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). March 2, 1963. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 270, 762-769. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d270.
Letter from the Ambassador to France (Gavin) to President Kennedy. March 9, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 242, 687-688. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d242.
Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to the Ambassador to France (Gavin). February 2, 1962. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 238, 680-681. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d238.
Letter from the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (Cline) to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (Foster). October 1, 1962. Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. 152
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 234, 582-583. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d234.
Memorandum for Record of the Senior Review Group Meeting. “Senior Review Group Meeting of 12 March 1971, on NSSM 69, US Nuclear Policy in Asia and NSSM 106, US China Policy.” March 12, 1971. Washington National Records Center. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 108, 269-274. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d108.
Memorandum for the Record. September 15, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 49, 94-95. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d49.
Memorandum for the Record. “Meeting with the President.” July 24, 1964. Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 38, 69. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d38.
Memorandum for the Record. “President’s Meeting with Congressional Leadership.” October 19, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 60, 113-114. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d60.
Memorandum for the Record of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting. September 4, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 29, 76-77. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d29.
Memorandum from Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow). “Developments Behind the Reinforced Bamboo Curtain.” November 19, 1968. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 330, 720-721. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d330.
Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). “Follow-up on Military Cooperation with France.” April 8, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 155, 557- 560. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d155.
153
Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). “Status Report on Missile Cooperation with France.” August 4, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 157, 562-563. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v41/d157.
Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger. “Memo from Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense on Assistance to France on Ballistic Missiles." January 23, 1970. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Security Council Files (NSCF), Box 676, France Vol. IV 11/69-31 Jan 70. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110252.
Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry A. Kissinger. “Military Cooperation with the French." February 28, 1970. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Security Council Files (NSCF), box 676, France vol. V 01 Feb 70-Apr 70. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113681.
Memorandum from Helmut Sonnenfeldt to Henry Kissinger. “US-French Military Cooperation." July 04, 1974. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives, Record Group 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, box 5, Nodis Memcons 1974 folder 5. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110634.
Memorandum from Henry A. Kissinger to Melvin R. Laird and William P. Rogers. “Military Cooperation with France, NSDM’s 103 and 104." April 15, 1971. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Security Council Files (NSCF), box 678, France vol. VIII, Apr-Dec 1971. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112249.
Memorandum from Holsey G. Handyside. “Status Report on Proposed Nuclear Safety Talks with the French." May 03, 1972. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives, Record Group 59, Numeric-Subject Files, 1970-73 Top Secret Files, box 1, AE 1–1 FR–US 1973. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112403.
Memorandum from Horace Busby of the White House Staff to President Johnson. “Conversation, Ambassador Alphand.” June 10, 1965. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 49, 97-98. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d49.
154
Memorandum from James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). “The US and Communist China in the Months Ahead.” October 28, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 63, 117-120. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d63.
Memorandum from Jan Lodal of the National Security Council Staff and the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger. “Cooperation with France.” September 10, 1975. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 333, 1021-1025. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d333.
Memorandum from John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). “China and Arms Control.” March 18, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 109, 274-277. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d109.
Memorandum from President Ford to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. “Missile Cooperation with France.” June 23, 1975. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 331, 1017-1018. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d331.
Memorandum from Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. “The Current State of US-PRC Relations: Parallelism in International Affairs; Shaky Bilateral Ties.” December 31, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 65, 447-451. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d65.
Memorandum from Richard T. Kennedy to William G. Hyland. “Jobert Meeting: US-French Nuclear Cooperation." June 27, 1973. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library, National Security Council Files (NSCF), box 960, France Vol XI April 73-31 December 1973. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112431.
Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson. November 25, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 69, 132-133. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d69. 155
Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). February 26, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 14, 23-24. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d14.
Memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). September 18, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 51, 96-99. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d51.
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Laird to President Nixon. “US-French Relations: The Defense Dimension.” January 23, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973- 1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 304, 929-933. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve15p2/d304.
Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld to President Ford. “Cooperation with France.” May 13, 1976. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 336, 1029-1030. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d336.
Memorandum from Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford. “Control Data Corporation Request for Export License.” Undated. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973- 1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 337, 1031-1032. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve15p2/d337.
Memorandum from Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon. “Guidance for Sino-US Ambassadorial Meeting, January 20, 1970.” January 14, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 61, 165- 166. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d61.
Memorandum from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State Executive Secretary (Battle). October 7, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 80, 194. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d80.
156
Memorandum from the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Thompson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy). “Denials of US Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Vehicle Assistance to France.” December 29, 1964. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 41, 72-77. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d41.
Memorandum from the Ambassador to France (Bohlen) to Secretary of State Rusk. December 13, 1963. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 277, 790-793. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d277.
Memorandum from the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for National Estimates (Kent) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman). “What the Soviets Must be Thinking as They Perceive the Chinese Communists Working Towards an Initial Advanced Weapons Capability – Nuclear Weapons and Missiles.” July 8, 1963. Library of Congress. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 314, 771-772. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d314.
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (McAuliffe) to Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld. “French Connection.” November 1, 1976. Washington National Records Centers. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 341, 1041-1043. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d341.
Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Kohler) to Secretary of State Rusk. “Tripartitism.” January 24, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 223, 642-644. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961- 63v13/d223.
Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Office of Strategic and Space Systems, Department of Defense (Walsh) to Secretary of Defense Schlesinger. “Missile Cooperation with France.” March 6, 1974. Washington National Records Center. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 320, 984-987. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d320.
157
Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara. “Nuclear Arms Control Measures.” March 23, 1961. Washington National Records Center. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 9, 21-27. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961- 63v07/d9.
Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara. “Possible Responses to the ChiCom Nuclear Threat.” January 16, 1965. Washington National Records Center. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 76, 144-146. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d76.
Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara. “Review of Basic National Security Policy – Short Version.” December 7, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 119, 436-438. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d119.
Memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara. “Study of Chinese Communist Vulnerability.” April 29, 1963. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 283, 689-691. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961- 63v07/d283.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford. “Cooperation Programs with the French.” June 19, 1975. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 329, 1014-1016. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d329.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. “Follow-up Actions on Military Cooperation with the French.” March 10, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 142, 512-513. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d142.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. “Military Cooperation with France.” March 25, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 152, 550-554. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d152. 158
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. “My May 16 Meeting with the Chinese.” Undated. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 227, 899- 902. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d227.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. “My Visit to China.” November 19, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 62, 430-441. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d62.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. “Nuclear Sales to the PRC.” April 24, 1974. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 79, 499-500. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d79.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. “The US Role in Soviet Maneuvering Against China.” September 29, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 37, 101-103. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d37.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird. “Meeting with French Defense Minister Debré.” July 8, 1972. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 160, 579-580. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d160.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon. “Personal Letter to You from President Chiang Kai-shek Protesting Warsaw Talks.” March 7, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 71, 187-188. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d71.
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Richardson. “US Assistance to the French Missile Program.” March 9, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 305, 933-934. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d305. 159
Memorandum from the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird. “Redefinition of Advanced Computers.” April 21, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 156, 560- 561. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d156.
Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger). October 13, 1973. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 316, 975-978. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d316.
Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson. “Bob Anderson’s Call on General de Gaulle.” June 1, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 32, 53-54. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d32.
Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy. “Specific answers to your questions of May 29th (de Gaulle).” May 29, 1961. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 229, 660-662. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d229.
Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy. “Test Ban: Black Boxes, Khrushchev, and China.” November 8, 1962. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 243, 597-598. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d243.
Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Komer) to President Johnson. April 19, 1966. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 141, 285-286. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d141.
Memorandum from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson. “Comparison of Four Memoranda on China.” February 24, 1968. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 305, 662- 665. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d305. 160
Memorandum from Theodore L. Eliot Jr. to Henry A. Kissinger. “Joint Committee on Atomic Energy Hearings on Projected Nuclear Safety Talks with the French." November 16, 1971. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Security Council Files (NSCF), box 678, France Apr-Dec 1971 Vol VIII. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112259.
Memorandum of Conversation. March 1, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 118, 445-454. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v41/d118.
Memorandum of Conversation. February 24, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 141, 505-512. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v41/d141.
Memorandum of Conversation. October 21, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 162, 498-517. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d162.
Memorandum of Conversation. February 23, 1972. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 197, 719-752. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d197.
Memorandum of Conversation. April 12, 1972. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 220, 875-884. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d220.
Memorandum of Conversation. May 15, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 32, 254-262. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d32.
Memorandum of Conversation. July 6, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 41, 288-296. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d41.
161
Memorandum of Conversation. August 31, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973- 1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 313, 957-970. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76ve15p2/d313.
Memorandum of Conversation. November 10, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 55, 326-331. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d55.
Memorandum of Conversation. November 11, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 56, 331-359. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d56.
Memorandum of Conversation. January 29, 1975. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 327, 1009-1010. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d327.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Call on the Secretary of Defense by the Chinese Minister of Defense.” September 22, 1965. Washington National Records Center. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 104, 209-214. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d104.
Memorandum of Conversation. “China.” September 20, 1965. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 103, 207-209. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d103.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Conversation with French Ambassador.” January 9, 1967. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 71, 139-140. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d71.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Defense Cooperation; CSCE; F-104 Replacement; Monetary Issues.” December 15, 1974. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 326, 1001-1008. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d326.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Franco-American Relations.” September 10, 1964. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, 162
Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 34, 56-57. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d34.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Meeting of Chinese President C.K. Yen with the President: Review of Events on Mainland China; Sino-Soviet Relations; Viet-Nam.” May 9, 1967. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 259, 556-561. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d259.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Meeting on China Study.” August 27, 1965. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 99, 197-201. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d99.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Memorandum of Conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin.” September 25, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 54, 104-105. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d54.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Memorandum of Conversation with the President and the Congressional Leadership.” June 6, 1961. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 231, 668-669. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d231.
Memorandum of Conversation. “President’s Visit to de Gaulle.” June 2, 1961, US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 230, 663-667. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d230.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Review of French Foreign Policy.” May 25, 1963. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 271, 769-775. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d271.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Secretary Kissinger’s Briefing of Congressional Delegates Before Their Visit to the People’s Republic of China.” July 22, 1975. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 115, 706- 712. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d115.
163
Memorandum of Conversation. “Tripartite Consultation between France, the United States and the United Kingdom.” March 10, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 225, 649-653. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d225.
Memorandum of Conversation. “US and GRC Policies in East Asia.” April 16, 1964. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 26, 41-49. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d26.
Memorandum of Conversation. “US-France Divergencies: Berlin, The Nuclear Question and NATO.” February 28, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 240, 683-685. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d240.
Memorandum of Conversation. “US-French Exploratory Talks; First Session.” May 28, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 253, 708-713. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d253.
Memorandum of Conversation. “Visit of French Defense Minister Galley; Strategic Problems.” August 17, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 312, 955-957. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d312.
Memorandum of Conversation between Secretary of State Rusk and the French Ambassador (Alphand). January 19, 1963. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 265, 750-753. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d265.
Memorandum of Conversation—Kissinger and Schlesinger. September 05, 1973. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Ford Presidential Library, Gerald R. Ford Papers, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, box 2, September 5, 1973 – Kissinger, Schlesinger. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113232.
Memorandum of Meeting. May 11, 1962. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 249, 695-701. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d249.
164
Memorandum of Telephone Message from Foy D. Kohler to Paul H. Nitze and Roswell L. Gilpatric. March 09, 1962. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives, Record Group 59, Bureau of European Affairs NATO and Atlantic Politico- Military Affairs, Records Relating to NATO, 1959-1966, box 7, Def 12 Nuclear France 1962. Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #2. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/110243.
Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting. “Minutes of Meeting on Post-de Gaulle France.” February 23, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 140, 499- 504. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d140.
Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting. “US Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France; US Policy Toward Peru.” May 22, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969- 1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 128, 471-474. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d128.
Minutes of a National Security Council Review Group Meeting. “US Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France (NSSM 60).” December 11, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 134, 488-489. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v41/d134.
Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting. “Military Cooperation with France.” March 3, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 150, 535-547. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d150.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-2-61. “Attitudes of Key World Powers on Disarmament Issues.” April 6, 1961. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961- 1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 13, 35-38. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d13.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-3-72. “China’s Military Policy and General Purpose Forces.” July 20, 1972. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 240, 1017-1023. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d240.
165
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-2-65. “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Programs Conclusions.” February 10, 1965. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998, Document 77, 146-148. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d77.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-3-65. “Communist China’s Military Establishment.” March 10, 1965. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964- 1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 80, 152-154. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d80.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-8-67. “Communist China’s Strategic Weapons Program.” August 3, 1967. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964- 1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 277, 593-594. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d277.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-8-69. “Communist China’s Strategic Weapons Program.” February 27, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 7, 16-17. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d7.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-8-71. “Communist China’s Weapons Program for Strategic Attack.” October 28, 1971. Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 168, 574-578. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d168.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 22-68. “French Nuclear Weapons and Delivery Capabilities." December 31, 1968. History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Obtained and contributed by William Burr and included in NPIHP Research Update #11. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116888.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-63. “Likelihood and Consequences of a Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Systems.” June 28, 1963. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 301, 747-749. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961- 63v07/d301.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 4-61. “Probable Short-Term Reactions to US Resumption of Nuclear Tests.” January 17, 1961. Central Intelligence Agency Files. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David 166
W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 1, 1-7. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d1.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-3-61. “Sino-Soviet Air Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1966.” July 11, 1961. Central Intelligence Agency Files. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 36, 115-118. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d36.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 13-2-60. “The Communist Chinese Atomic Energy Program.” December 13, 1960. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, China, Volume XIX, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 364, 744-747. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1958-60v19/d364.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11-12-66. “The Outlook for Sino-Soviet Relations.” December 1, 1966. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 223, 479-489. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d223.
National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 11/13-69. “The USSR and China.” August 12, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 24, 65-66. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v17/d24.
National Security Action Memorandum No. 294. “US Nuclear and Strategic Delivery System Assistance to France.” April 20, 1964. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 30, 50-51. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d30.
National Security Action Memorandum No. 336. “Potentially Embarrassing Activities in France or in Areas Outside France which are Controlled by France.” August 6, 1965. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964– 1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 51, 106-107. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d51.
National Security Decision Memorandum 230. “US Strategy and Forces for Asia.” August 9, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 48, 315-316. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d48.
167
National Security Decision Memorandum 261. “Nuclear Sales to the PRC.” July 22, 1974. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973- 1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 83, 513-514. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d83.
National Security Decision Memorandum 299. “Cooperation with France.” June 23, 1975. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 330, 1016-1017. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d330.
National Security Study Memorandum 47. “Military Relations with France.” April 21, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 123, 463-464. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d123.
National Security Study Memorandum 60. “United States Policy Toward Post-de Gaulle France.” May 29, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 130, 475-477. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d130.
National Security Study Memorandum 100. “Military Cooperation with France.” September 1, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 144, 515-516. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d144.
National Security Study Memorandum 106. “China Policy.” November 19, 1970. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the Unites States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969- 1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 97, 246-247. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d97.
National Security Study Memorandum 166. “Review of US-French Bilateral Issues.” December 26, 1972. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 163, 589-590. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d163.
National Security Study Memorandum 175. “US Nuclear Defense Policy Toward France.” March 13, 1973. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 306, 934-935. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d306.
168
National Security Study Memorandum 63. “US Policy on Current Sino-Soviet Differences.” July 3, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 15, 41-42. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d15.
National Security Study Memorandum 69. “US Nuclear Policy in Asia.” July 14, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969- 1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 18, 48-49. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d18.
Paper Prepared by Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council Staff. “Further Thoughts on China.” October 9, 1968. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964- 1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 328, 709-718. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d328.
Paper Prepared by the Ambassador to France (Bohlen). “Reflections on current French foreign policy and attitudes toward the United States and recommendations.” Undated. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 27, 44- 47. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d27.
Paper Prepared by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord). “Analysis/Highlights of Secretary Kissinger’s Meeting with Chairman Mao, October 21, 1975.” Undated. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973- 1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 128, 828-831. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d128.
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. “China in 1980-85 and in the Year 2000.” July 1974. Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969- 1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 84, 514-517. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d84.
Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency. “The Foreign Policies of China’s Successor Leadership.” June 1976. Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 148, 931-935. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d148.
Paper Prepared in the Department of State. “Issues Paper for the Secretary’s Briefing of the President.” Undated. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-15, Part 2, Documents on Western Europe, 1973-1976, ed. Kathleen B. Rasmussen. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2014. Document 323, 990-996. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve15p2/d323. 169
Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council. “An Exploration of the Possible Bases for Action Against the Chinese Communist Nuclear Facilities.” April 14, 1964. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Doc. 25, 39-40. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d25.
Paper Prepared in the Policy Planning Council. “The Implications of a Chinese Communist Nuclear Capability.” Undated. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Doc. 30, 57-58. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d30.
Response to National Security Study Memorandum 47. October 20, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 132, 479-481. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d132.
Response to National Security Study Memorandum 100. January 15, 1971. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969-1972, eds. James E. Miller and Laurie Van Hook. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2012. Document 148, 524-530. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v41/d148.
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-9-70. “Chinese Reactions to Possible Developments in Indochina.” May 28, 1970. Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 82, 214-217. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d82.
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-69. “Communist China and Asia.” March 6, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 9, 22-24. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969- 76v17/d9.
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-3-63. “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program.” July 24, 1963. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VIII, National Security Policy, ed. David W. Mabon. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1996. Document 138, 492-494. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v08/d138.
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-8-66. “Communist China’s Advanced Weapons Program.” November 3, 1966. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: 170
Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 198, 415-416. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d198.
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 43-1-72. “Taipei’s Capabilities and Intentions Regarding Nuclear Weapons Development.” November 16, 1972. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 266, 1114- 1118. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d266.
Special National Intelligence Estimate, SNIE 13-4-64. “The Chances of an Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion.” August 26, 1964. Central Intelligence Agency. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 43, 78-81. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d43.
Study Prepared by the Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Regional Group for East Asia and the Pacific. “US Security Assistance to the Republic of China.” November 12, 1974. Ford Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVIII, China, 1973-1976, ed. David P. Nickles. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2007. Document 90, 545- 558. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v18/d90.
Talking Points. “President’s Visit to de Gaulle.” May 27, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 228, 657-659. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961- 63v13/d228.
Telegram from Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State. May 15, 1957. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, China, Volume III, eds. Harriet D. Schwar and Louis J. Smith. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1986. Document 251, 522-523. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955- 57v03/d251.
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to Department of State. May 4, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 245, 690-691. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d245.
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State. June 20, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 255, 719-724. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d255.
171
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State. June 21, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 256, 725-727. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d256.
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State. December 13, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 261, 740-742. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d261.
Telegram from Secretary of State Rusk to the Department of State. December 10, 1966. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 224, 489-490. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d224.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France. July 2, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 232, 670-671. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d232.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France. July 2, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 233, 672. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d233.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France. November 29, 1961. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 237, 679. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d237.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in France. July 22, 1967. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 75, 144-145. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d75.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Poland. January 4, 1968. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. 172
Document 294, 624-629. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d294.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China. December 21, 1964. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 74, 142-143. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d74.
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China. November 2, 1968. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 329, 718-720. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d329.
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. February 21, 1962. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 239, 681-682. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d239.
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. July 6, 1962. Kennedy Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 257, 727-730. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d257.
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. January 4, 1963. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume XIII, Western Europe and Canada, eds. Charles S. Sampson and James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1994. Document 263, 745-748. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v13/d263.
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. January 5, 1965. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 42, 77-81. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d42.
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. March 11, 1965. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 45, 89-92. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d45.
173
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. July 12, 1967. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 74, 143- 144. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d74.
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. July 27, 1967. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 76, 145-147. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d76.
Telegram from the Embassy in France to the Department of State. “Possible Effects of Present Crisis on French Foreign Policy.” May 28, 1968. National Archives and Records Administration. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XII, Western Europe, ed. James E. Miller. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2001. Document 79, 151-153. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v12/d79.
Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State. March 23, 1965. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 81, 155-157. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d81.
Telegram from the Embassy in the Republic of China to the Department of State. November 3, 1966. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 196, 410-411. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964-68v30/d196.
Telegram from the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State. July 27, 1963. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Volume VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, eds. David W. Mabon and David S. Patterson. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1995. Document 354, 856-863. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v07/d354.
Telegram from the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson in Texas. May 5, 1967. Johnson Library. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXX, China, ed. Harriet Dashiell Schwar. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1998. Document 257, 553-555. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1964- 68v30/d257.
Washington Special Actions Group Report. “Immediate US Policy Problems in Event of Major Sino-Soviet Hostilities.” November 10, 1969. National Archives. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969-1972, ed. Steven E. Phillips. Washington: Government Printing Office, 2006. Document 43, 118-121. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v17/d43. 174
Secondary Sources
Atkin, Nicholas. The Fifth French Republic. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005.
Bell, David S. and John Gaffney. The Presidents of the French Fifth Republic. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.
Brewer, Garry D. and Peter deLeon. The Foundations of Policy Analysis. Homewood, IL: The Dorsey Press, 1983.
Bundy, McGeorge. Danger and Survival: Choices about the Bomb in the First Fifty Years. New York: Random House, 1988.
Burr, William and Jeffrey T. Richelson. “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64.” International Security 25, no. 3 (Winter 2000/01): 54-99.
Cannon, James. Gerald R. Ford: An Honorable Life. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013.
Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday. Mao: The Unknown Story. New York: Anchor Books, 2006.
Clark, Paul. The Chinese Cultural Revolution: A History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Dalleck, Robert. An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963. Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 2003.
Dalleck, Robert. Lyndon B. Johnson: Portrait of a President. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
Danhui, Li and Yafeng Xia. Mao and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1973: A New History. Lanham: Lexington Books, 2018.
Dikötter, Frank. Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-1962. London: Bloombury Publishing, 2010.
Dikötter, Frank. The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962-1976. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016.
Dikötter, Frank. The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945-1957. New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2013.
Dillon, Michael. Deng Xiaoping: The Man who Made Modern China. New York: I. B. Tauris & Co., 2015.
175
Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War. New York: Random House, 2008.
Dong, Wang. “Grand Strategy, Power Politics, and China’s Policy toward the United States in the 1960s.” Diplomatic History 41, no. 2 (2017): 265-287.
Farrell, John A. Richard Nixon: The Life. New York: Vintage Books, 2017.
Feigenbaum, Evan A. China’s Techno-Warriors: National Security and Strategic Competition from the Nuclear to the Information Age. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003.
Fenby, Jonathan. The General: Charles de Gaulle and the France He Saved. New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2012.
Gao, Wenqian. Zhou Enlai: The Last Perfect Revolutionary. New York: PublicAffairs, 2007.
Gavin, Francis. Nuclear Statecraft: History and Strategy in America’s Atomic Age. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2012.
Goldstein, Lyle J. “Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why It Matters.” The China Quarterly, no. 168 (2001): 985-997.
Han, Suyin. Eldest Son: Zhou Enlai and the Making of Modern China, 1989-1976. New York: Kodansha America, 1994.
Hastings, Max. Vietnam: An Epic Tragedy, 1945-1975. New York: HarperCollins, 2018.
Hess, Gary R. Vietnam: Explaining America’s Lost War. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008.
Hogwood, Brian W. and Lewis A. Gunn. Policy Analysis for the Real World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Hughes, R. Gerald and Thomas Robb. “Kissinger and the Diplomacy of Coercive Linkage in the ‘Special Relationship’ between the United States and Great Britain, 1969-1977.” Diplomatic History 37, no. 4 (2013): 861-906.
Jackson, Julian. De Gaulle. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2018.
Kampen, Thomas. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the Evolution of the Chinese Communist Leadership. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 1999.
Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1971.
Kissinger, Henry. White House Years. New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1979.
176
Kissinger, Henry. Years of Renewal. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.
Kissinger, Henry. Years of Upheaval. New York: Little, Brown and Co., 1982.
Korab-Karpowicz, W. Julian. “Political Realism in International Relations.” In Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018. https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl- relations/#TwenCentClasReal.
Lewis, John Wilson and Xue Litai. China Builds the Bomb. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988.
Lüthi, Lorenz M. The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Maddock, Shane. Nuclear Apartheid: The Quest for American Atomic Supremacy from World War II to the Present. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2010.
McNamara, Robert S. Blundering into Disaster: Surviving the First Century of the Nuclear Age. New York: Pantheon, 1986.
Pantsov, Alexander V. and Steven I. Levine. Mao: The Real Story. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2012.
Polmar, Norman and John D. Gresham. DEFCON-2: Standing on the Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2006.
Schoenhals, Michael, ed. China’s Cultural Revolution, 1966-1969: Not a Dinner Party. Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1996.
Seaborg, Glenn T. A Chemist in the White House: From the Manhattan Project to the end of the Cold War. Washington: American Chemical Society, 1998.
Seaborg, Glenn T. and Eric Seaborg. Adventures in the Atomic Age: From Watts to Washington. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2001.
Spence, Jonathan D. Mao Zedong: A Life. New York: Penguin Books, 1999.
Stern, Sheldon M. The Cuban Missile Crisis in American Memory: Myths versus Reality. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012.
Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009.
Taylor, Jay. The Generalissimo’s Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000. 177
Thody, Philip. The Fifth French Republic: President, Politics, and Personalities. New York: Routledge, 1998.
Trachtenberg, Marc. A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement 1945-1963. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999.
Trachtenberg, Marc. “The de Gaulle Problem.” Journal of Cold War Studies 14, no. 1 (2012): 81- 92.
Trachtenberg, Marc. “The French Factor in US Foreign Policy during the Nixon-Pompidou Period, 1969-1974.” Journal of Cold War Studies 13, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 4-59.
VanDeMark, Brian. Road to Disaster: A New History of America’s Descent into Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 2018.
Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping and the Transformation of China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011.
Williams, Charles. The Last Great Frenchman: A Life of General de Gaulle. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 1993.
Xin, Zhan. “Prelude to the Transformation: China’s Nuclear Arms Control Policy during the US- China Rapprochement, 1969-1976.” Diplomatic History 41, no. 2 (2017): 288-305.
Yafeng, Xia and Zhi Liang. “China’s Diplomacy toward the United States in the Twentieth Century: A Survey of the Literature.” Diplomatic History 41, no. 2 (2017): 241-264.
Yang, Jisheng. Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2012.
Yang, Kuisong. “The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement.” Cold War History 1, no. 1 (2000): 21-32.
178
APPENDIX A. FIGURES
Figure 1
179
180
Figure 2
181
182
183
184
185
Figure 3
186
187
Figure 4
188
189
190
191
Figure 5
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199