Long Memories and Short Fuses Change and Instability in the Balkans

I The Balkans have traditionally been a region of instability and ferment, and with the end of the Cold War, long-standing conflicts are likely to re-emerge. During the nineteenth century the region was continually a site of great power rivalry,

as Britain, Russia, and Austria sought to extend their influence in the area- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 or to block other powers from doing so. The volatile combination of great power ambition and assertive nationalism in the area contributed directly to the outbreak of World War I, and earned the region the reputation as "the powder keg of Europe." The collapse of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires at the end of World War I left a host of ethnic and territorial conflicts unresolved and created a number of new ones. The Cold War, with its emphasis on "tight" bipolarity, tended to dampen many of these tensions and conflicts, though it did not entirely eliminate them. Polemics between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia periodically flared up; the Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minority was a source of disagreement between Romania and Hungary; discontent among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria led to several waves of emigration and poisoned Bulgarian-Turkish relations; and Yugoslav-Albanian relations were marred by differences over the Albanian minority in the Yu- goslav area of Kosovo. Still, as long as the bloc system existed, it acted as a residual, if diminishing, constraint on these tensions. The end of the Cold War, however, threatens to remove this constraint. As both superpowers are increasingly preoccupied with other pressing agendas and less inclined-or able-to act as hegemonic

This article was written while the author was Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the Institute for East-West Security Studies in New York and was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, whose financial assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

F. Stephen Larrabee is a Senior Staff Member at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. The views expressed here are the author's personal views and do not represent those of RAND or any of its sponsors.

1. For the purpose of this article, "Southeastern Europe" is defined as Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Turkey. The article, however, concentrates primarily on developments in the communist and former communist states of the Balkans.

International Security, Winter 1990191 (Vol. 15, No. 3) 0 1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

58 Long Memories and Short Fuses I 59

powers, there is a danger that many long-submerged regional conflicts could intensify. Moreover, by allowing more open expression of ethnic grievances, the process of democratization in the post-communist countries of the Bal- kans may exacerbate rather than ameliorate some of these conflicts.

Indeed, Europe may witness two diametrically opposed trends in the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 coming decade: while Western Europe moves toward greater integration and multilateral cooperation, Eastern Europe, particularly Southeastern Europe, may witness greater political fragmentation and a ”renationalization” of politics. In the 1990s the main threat to European security is likely to come not from Soviet military power but from ethnic conflict and political fragmentation in the Balkans. In short, the end of the Cold War may not mean the end of conflict in Europe. The source of conflict and instability may simply shift southward. Indeed, the Balkans could emerge as a major stumbling block to the creation of a stable security order in Europe in the coming decade. During the Cold War, most policy studies in the West focused on the Central Front, which was seen as the most likely arena of conflict in Europe. By contrast, Southeastern Europe has been largely neglected. Moreover, those studies that have focused on Southeastern Europe have concentrated heavily on problems on NATO’s southern flank.2 Few have systematically examined the area’s security problems in a broader regional ~ontext.~ With the end of the Cold War, however, the security context in South- eastern Europe is changing. Many old antagonisms and problems remain. At the same time new forces are at work which could have an important impact on the security of the area as well as European security more broadly. A reexamination of the security problems in the region therefore seems both timely and necessary. This article focuses on the security problems in the Balkans after the Cold War. The first section examines the problems of democratization and con-

2. See in particular John Chipman, ed., NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1988); Monteagle Steams, Updating the Truman Doctrine, International Se- curity Studies Program, Working Paper No. 86 (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1989); Richard Haass, ”Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean-Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part I,” in Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1988), pp. 61-71; Robert McDonald, “Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean-Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part 11,” ibid., pp. 72-85; and Jed C. Snyder, “Strategic Bias and Southern Flank Security,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sum- mer 1985), pp. 123-142. 3. Two exceptions are F. Stephen Larrabee, Balkan Security, Adelphi Paper No. 135 (London: IISS, 1976); and Paul S. Shoup, ed., Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Press, 1990). lnternational Security 15:3 I 60

solidation in the "post-communist" states of the balk an^.^ The second section focuses on the crisis in Yugoslavia. The third section looks at a number of unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts in the area and their implications for regional security. The final section examines the potential role of Western policy, especially that of the United States, in enhancing security in South- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 eastern Europe.

Democratization and Change

In the 1990s the security dilemmas in the Balkans are likely to be exacerbated by several interconnected developments. The first stems from problems related to democratization in the post-communist states of the region. This process is likely to be bumpy and difficult for several reasons. First, unlike other countries in Europe that underwent transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems (such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal), the post-communist states in the Balkans and the rest of Eastern Europe will have to undergo a "dual transition": that is, they will have to change both their political systems and their economic systems at the same time. This dual transition will significantly complicate the transition process and will increase the possibility of political instability in many of these states. Second, none of the countries in the post-communist Balkans has any lengthy experience with democracy. For most of the interwar period Ro- mania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia were under authoritarian rule of one form or an~ther.~The few democratic institutions that did exist were largely destroyed under communist rule. Thus these countries will have to begin practically from scratch to build new democratic institutions. Third, nationalism has historically been a strong force in the Balkans6 The erosion of communist rule in Eastern Europe may, as Zbigniew Brzezinski

4. The term "post-communist" is used loosely here to refer to the process of democratization set in motion by the upheavals in the communist states of Europe in 1989. This process has been more far-reaching in some states than in others. Romania and Bulgaria are at the very beginning stages, while in parts of Yugoslavia the process is quite advanced. In Albania the process has not really begun at all. Despite the obvious distinctions among them, I include in the term "post-communist" Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. 5. For developments in the interwar periods see Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Paul Lendvai, Eagles in the Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans (New York: Doubleday, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 2928-2942 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967); and Robert L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Tim (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). 6. On the role of nationalism in the Balkans, see in particular the selections in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969). Long Memories and Short Fuses I 62

and others have argued, lead to the resurgence of nati~nalism,~particularly in the Balkans. The anti-Turkish demonstrations in Bulgaria in January 1990 and the clashes in Transylvania between the Romanian population and the Hungarian minority in March 1990 indicate that nationalism is far from dead

in both countries. Indeed, both could witness a re-nationalization of politics, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 in which weak semi-democratic regimes seek to bolster their popular support through appeals to nationalism.8 In Yugoslavia, as Tito’s legacy has begun to dissolve, nationalist tensions and historical antagonisms have reasserted themselves with increasing intensity. Moreover, these nationalist tensions have tended to be mutually re- inforcing. Albanian nationalism and separatism in Kosovo, discussed below, has sparked a strong reaction among the Serbs and Macedonians of Yugoslavia, which Serbian leader Slobodan MiloSevik has sought to exploit. The upsurge of Serbian nationalism has, in turn, reinforced separatist tendencies in Slovenia and Croatia, which view Serbia’s efforts to subjugate the Albanians as an attempt to reassert traditional Serbian dominance. Fourth, Bulgaria and Romania, unlike the post-communist countries of Central Europe, lack a strong “civil society.”9 Romanian leader Nicolae Ceau- sescu managed to stamp out all organized opposition in Romania through the brutal use of the secret police and a clever policy of ”rotation of cadres.”1° Only in the last few years did Bulgaria witness any significant expressions of political dissent. This was limited, however, to a relatively small group of intellectuals and environmentalists. l1

7. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, ”Post-Communist Nationalism,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 68, No. 5 (Winter 1989/90), pp. 1-25. 8. This pattern has traditionally been so prevalent in the Balkans that Myron Weiner has termed it the ”Macedonian Syndrome. ” See Weiner, ”The Macedonian Syndrome: An Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development,” World Politics, Vol. 23, No. 4 (July 1971), pp. 665-683. 9. By ”civil society” I mean the existence of autonomous political groups, institutions, and activities that are not entirely controlled by the established government. For a comprehensive treatment see John Keane, Democracy and Civil Society (London: Verso, 1988); and John Keane, ed., Civil Society and the State (London: Verso, 1988). 10. “Rotation of cadres” involved switching party and government officials from one post to another at regular intervals. While its ostensible purpose was to give officials wide experience in a number of areas, in fact it was used to prevent any particular official from obtaining a powerbase from which he might challenge Ceausescu’s rule. For a good discussion see James F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988), pp. 279-289. 11. See Richard Crampton, ”The Intelligentsia, Ecology and the Opposition in Bulgaria,” The World Today, February 1990, pp. 23-26. lnternational Security 15:3 I 62

This lack of a strong civil society has important implications for the process of democratization and consolidation. In Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hun- gary, there were organized political forces-Solidarity, Civic Forum, and Democratic Forum-to pick up the reins of power when the old order col-

lapsed or was voted out of office.I2 In Romania and Bulgaria, by contrast, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 the opposition was weak and fragmented and was unable to fill the power vacuum. Hence in these countries the former Communists have been able to cling to power by changing the name of their party and draping themselves in the mantle of reform. In Romania the process of democratization has been seriously impeded because society was so atomized and Ceausescu‘s power was more personal than institutional. It rested primarily on his control of the organs of coercion, especially the secret police (Securitate), who were better paid and better equipped than the army and who were loyal to Ceausescu personally. Hence Ceausescu’s removal created a power vacuum, which the National Salvation Front (NLF)-a coalition of former communists, technocrats, and military officers-has sought to fill. The Front has succeeded in doing so largely because there were no other organized institutions capable of providing effective authority and because it has maintained strong control over the media and other mass organizations. The Front’s authority remains contested, however, despite its strong showing in the elections in May (in which it gained 67 percent of the vote). Many Romanians do not trust the Front because the top leadership, especially President Ion Iliescu and Prime Minister Petre Roman, are former Commu- nists. The Front’s conduct while in office has done little to dispel this mis- trust. The elections in May 1990 were marred by widespread instances of corruption and intimidation. l3 On several occasions, moreover, the Front has resorted to mob rule. The most prominent instance was in June 1990 when it called in miners from the Jui valley to evict anti-government demonstrators forcefully from the center of Bucharest, a move that was regarded even by many Front supporters as ill-conceived and unnecessary.

12. There were, of course, important differences: Solidarity and Civic Forum were large, eclectic mass movements. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, by contrast, never attained such over- whelming political and moral status. Nevertheless, there were organized forces to pick up the reins of power when communist authority collapsed in each of the three countries. 13. See George Fodor, ”Romania: Why the Front Won,” The World Today, July 1990, pp. 125- 126. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 63

Thus, given the lack of strong democratic traditions, as well as the absence of a well-developed civil society, Romanian politics seem likely to be characterized by continued instability for some time. Indeed, the possibility of military rule or a ”civilian-military twilight’’-to use Dankwart Rustow’s

phrase-in which a weak civilian government rules with the support of the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 military, cannot be excluded. l4 In Bulgaria the prospects for a smooth transition to democracy are some- what better but hardly bright. What occurred in Bulgaria in November 1989 was, in effect, a ”palace coup.”’j Todor Zhivkov, who had been Communist Party secretary since 1954, was deposed by a coalition of his top lieutenants headed by Petur Mladenov, then the Foreign Minister. The party then re- named itself the ”Bulgarian Socialist Party” (BSP) and embarked upon a course of moderate reform. The lack of cohesive opposition, together with the party‘s strong support in the countryside, gave it a surprisingly large margin of victory in the elections in June 1990. (The BSP received 47.5 percent of the vote, for-211 of 400 seats in the National Assembly. The runner-up, the United Democratic Forces [UDF], a coalition of sixteen opposition groups, received 36 percent of the vote and 144 seats.) However, the forced resignation of President Mladenov in July (after video- tapes showed that he had urged using military force to crush the opposition months earlier) underscores the degree to which many of the ”born-again democrats” in the Socialist Party still retain habits carried over from forty years of communist rule. Moreover, the Socialists will face an uphill battle to maintain popular support. The economy is in disastrous shape, a problem exacerbated by Zhivkov’s attempt in May 1989 to encourage the emigration of the Turkish minority, many of whom labored in important tobacco growing areas. Bulgaria conducts over 55 percent of its trade with the Soviet Union and nearly 80 percent with COMECON, but it will not be able to rely as heavily on economic support from Moscow in the future, especially in the energy field. This will complicate Bulgaria’s economic problems and ability

14. See Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1965), p. 194. The Romanian military, however, is by no means a cohesive organization. There are significant divisions within the military between the older officers, who generally support the National Salvation Front, and many younger officers, who advocate more far-reaching democratic reforms. 15. For background see Wolfgang Hopken, ”Das Ende der Ara Zhivkovs,” Siidosteuropa, Heft 1 (1990), pp. 2-35. International Securify 25:3 I 64

to implement a successful reform program.16 Food shortages have become particularly critical and could lead to widespread outbreaks of domestic unrest. Indeed, if the economic situation continues to deteriorate, the present (BSP) government could fall and be replaced by a non-Communist govern-

ment. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Albania presents a special problem because it has not yet entered the post- communist age. It remains an anomaly in Eastern Europe, an isolated bastion of Stalinist orthodoxy in a region increasingly engulfed by pressure for democratization and decommunization. In recent years, however, Albania has come under pressure for reform. Since taking Enver Hoxha’s place as party leader in April 1985, Ramiz Alia has gradually sought to distance himself from some of Hoxha’s most rigid ideological positions. At the Ninth Party Plenum in January 1990 he outlined a modest list of economic and political reforms, including multi-candidate elections of enterprise managers by the work force, productivity incentives for industry and agriculture, and a modest decentralization of the e~onorny.’~These were supplemented by further reforms in May involving greater financial autonomy for enterprises and a relaxation of restrictions on travel.I8 In the past year there have been other signs that the unrest in Eastern Europe is beginning to have an impact on Albania. In January 1990 large- scale demonstrations reportedly took place in the town of Shkoder in northern Albania,19 and in May, 2000 workers in the town of Berat were reported to have gone on strike in protest against low wages-the first known strike in Albania’s postwar history.20The most dramatic unrest, however, occurred in July 1990 when some six thousand Albanians stormed several foreign embassies in Tirana seeking asylum in an effort to flee Albania.21

16. Bulgaria depends on the USSR for 93 percent of its oil needs. In July 1990 Moscow unilaterally cut its oil deliveries to Bulgaria by 16 percent, causing considerable disruption to Bulgarian industry. See Judy Dempsey and Nicholas Denton, ”Moscow Cuts Bulgaria’s Oil Supply,” Financial Times, July 20, 1990. 17. For details see Louis Zanga, ”A Progress Report on Changes in Albania,” Radio Free Europe (RFE), Report on Eastern Europe, April 20, 1990, pp. 1-3; David Binder, ”Hard-Line Albania Ushers in What It Calls ’Democratization’,” New York Times, March 22, 1990; and Economist, March 31, 1990, pp. 49-50. 18. Louis Zanga, “Albania’s New Path,” RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, June 15, 1990, pp. 1-5. 19. For details see New Yovk Times, “Tight Security Measures are Reported in Albania,” January 3, 1990; Louis Zanga, “Under Pressure for Change,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, February 9, 1990, pp. 1-4; and East European Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 6 (March 1990), p. 3 20. Laura Silber, ”Protests and Strikes Reported in Albania,” Financial Times, May 12, 1990. 21. These incidents appear to have been touched off by the relaxation of curbs on travel announced by Albania in May, and particularly by the decision of the Albanian government in Long Memories and Short Fuses I 65

Together with other recent developments, these incidents suggest that Albania may be heading for a period of increased domestic turmoil. The unrest, moreover, could accentuate strife within the Albanian leadership. Since 1988 there have been repeated reports of a power struggle between

Alia and a group of conservatives centered around Hoxha’s widow Nexhimije Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 and backed by the Sigurimi, the Albanian Secret Police, which since 1981 has increasingly acted as a state within the state.22After the wave of stormings of the embassies, Alia dismissed two reputed hardliners, Interior Minister Simon Stefani and Defense Minister Prokop Murra, and reshuffled the central committee secretariat in an effort to shore up his position and bring both the Sigurimi and the army under closer control. How successful this effort will be remains to be seen. The intellectuals and youth have become increasingly restive in recent years over the slow pace of change. Moreover, the army’s loyalty remains a major question. Given its reliance on conscripts, it might refuse to suppress a popular revolt. There is thus a possibility that serious unrest might lead to a split between the army and the security forces, similar to that which occurred in Romania after Ceausescu’s fall. The internal situation in Albania, moreover, is likely to be directly affected by developments in Kosovo, the Albanian-speaking part of Yugoslavia (discussed below). As the democratization process in Kosovo proceeds, it could have a spill-over effect on Albania, leading to calls for greater internal reform and an acceleration of popular unrest. Indeed, in the long run the situation in Kosovo may prove to be the most important catalyst for change in Albania.

The Crisis in Yugoslavia

The most important threat to Balkan regional security is posed by the trends toward disintegration in Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia borders on seven states and is the heart of the Balkans. Major political instability there could have rever- berations throughout the Balkans. Moreover, Yugoslavia has a number of conflicts with her Balkan neighbors (discussed below). These disputes

May to allow an Albanian family that had been living in the Italian Embassy in Tirana for five years to emigrate to Italy. See “Albanians Take Refuge in Embassies,” New York Times, July 4, 1990; and “Albania Said to Weigh Passports for the Restive,” ibid., July 5, 1990. 22. For details see East European Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 6 (March 19, 1990), p. 2. lnternational Security 15:3 1 66

could escalate if Yugoslavia disintegrates, posing new threats to regional security. Yugoslavia’s current difficulties have deep roots that predate the advent of communism and can be traced back to the creation of the country as a

unified state in the aftermath of World War I. The new Yugoslav state was Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 carved out of the remnants of the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. The major nationalities composing the new state had vastly different historical and cultural traditions and experience^.^^ The northern regimes of Croatia and Slovenia were largely Catholic and had been under Habsburg rule; the southern regions had been under Ottoman control. Serbia, the largest and most important area, gained its freedom in the nineteenth century, but Macedonia and what is now Kosovo did not achieve their independence until the early twentieth century. Bosnia, formerly under Turkish rule, was occupied by Austria after 1878. After 1918 all these territories became part of Serbia in the new Yugoslav state. The newly created Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes thus began as a deeply divided state. Politics during the interwar period were dominated by ethnic violence and a deep-seated conflict between the Serbs and Croats over governmental authority in the new state.24During World War 11, Croat- Serb animosity exploded into some of the most vicious violence the Balkan peninsula has known, leaving a strong residue of hostility and distrust that continues to mark Yugoslav politics today. When the communists, led by Josip Broz Tito, took power after the war, they sought to overcome the weaknesses of the interwar period by creating a truly federal system in which each of the six constituent republics (Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina) had equal rights. However, central authority largely remained in Belgrade, the capital of Serbia. This fact was highly resented by other nationalities, especially the Croats and Slovenes, and was seen as an effort to maintain traditional Serbian dominance.

23. For a detailed discussion of these various differencesand their impact on Yugoslav interwar politics see Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Grey Falcon (New York Viking, 1941); Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, pp. 217-241; M. George Zaninovich, The Development of Socialist Yugoslavia (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), pp. 11-39; Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, pp. 341-344. For a more general treatment see Dusko Doder, The Yugoslavs (London: Allen and Unwin, 1979). 24. For a concise discussion of interwar developments see in particular Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, pp. 217-241. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 67

This resentment led to growing pressures for decentralization of decision- making power. Over the past thirty years the locus of power has shifted dramatically from the federal center in Belgrade to the republics and provincial capitals.25 This has resulted in increasing fragmentation and regional

pluralization as the party leaderships in various republics increasingly pursue Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 local republic interests, often playing on ethnic nationalism. The fragmentation was kept under control while Tito was alive. Founder and architect of the Yugoslav system, he played a unique role in Yugoslav politics. It was the force of his personality that kept the system together and gave it cohesion, however fragile. In times of trouble he acted as the final arbiter of social conflict and ultimate guarantor of Yugoslav unity. Tito’s death therefore was deeply unsettling. It removed the main architect of Yugoslav unity. Rather than appointing a single successor, Tito sought to ensure the stability of the Yugoslav experiment by establishing a system of collective rule. However, the elaborate system of checks and balances that he set up, based on collective decision-making at all levels, has proven too unwieldy and cumbersome to deal with Yugoslavia’s mounting economic and social problems. At the same time as central power has weakened, many long-suppressed regional frustrations have surfaced, intensifying ethnic antagonisms and provoking new doubts about Yugoslavia’s long-term viability. The centrifugal tendencies have been reinforced by several other factors. The first has been the disastrous decline of the economy. At the end of 1989, the annual inflation rate had risen to 1500 percent. Unemployment was at 20 percent and the country’s hard currency debt was over $20 billion. As a result, the country’s standard of living has fallen dramatically and now is at the same level as in the 1960s. This economic deterioration has fueled a desire by some of the individual republics, particularly Slovenia and Croatia, to control more of their own income. While comprising only 8 percent of Yugoslavia’s population, Slo- venia produces nearly 20 percent of the country’s gross national product and 25 percent of its hard-currency exports. Much of this income is funneled through Belgrade and goes to support the backward regions in the south, through the Fund for Underdeveloped Regions. Thus the Slovenes and Croats have increasingly demanded to take greater charge of their wealth and their own political destinies.

25. For a detailed discussion see Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974 (London: Hurst, 1977). Rusinow’s book is the most complete and detailed study of this period. See also Duncan Wilson, Tifo’s Yugoslavia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). International Security 15:3 I 68

The decline of the Soviet threat has also played a role. Tito often used the fear of the Soviet threat to keep nationalist tensions under control. However, Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” particularly his repudiation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, has reduced the fear that internal disorder will be exploited by

Moscow to interfere in Yugoslav affairs.26 Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 The most immediate catalyst for the current crisis, however, has been the escalation of nationalist tensions in KOSOVO,the Albanian-speaking province, located within the republic of Serbia. Historically Kosovo has been dominated by Serbia. For the first two decades of the postwar period Kosovo was under a special police regime. As a result of the liberalization process initiated after the fall in 1966 of Alexander Rankovic, the powerful Serbian Secret Police Chief and Central Committee Secretary, Kosovo’s position improved. In 1974 it was granted the status of an autonomous province. In effect, this gave the province most of the same rights as other federal republics. This process has been accompanied by a growth of nationalist and separatist feeling among the Albanian inhabitants of Kosovo, who make up 90 percent of the province’s population, and by a rapid population growth, which has exacerbated the area’s economic problems (Kosovo is the poorest area in the Yugoslav federation). The increasing separatist feeling among the Albanians in Kosovo has sparked a backlash among the Serbian minority, who feel they are gradually being pushed out of their ancestral home.27Many Serbs also fear that the Albanian calls for republic status are a prelude to demands for full independence and possible unification with Albania. Slobodan MiloSeviC., the president of Serbia, has sought to exploit this rising tide of Serbian nationalism. In March 1989 he succeeded in pushing through changes in Serbia’s constitution that gave Serbia more direct control over Kosovo and Vojvodina, another autonomous province located within Serbia. He also tried to bring the Albanian provincial party leadership more directly under his control, arresting the former head of the Albanian party, Azem Vllasi, and replacing him with a leader, Rahman Morina, more sus- ceptible to Serbian control.28

26. During his visit to Yugoslavia in March 1989, for instance, Gorbachev went out of his way to praise the Yugoslav experiment and stress the Soviet commitment to non-interference in the affairs of other socialist states. For Gorbachev’s speech see Pruuda, March 19, 1989. 27. Since 1981 some 50,000 Serbs and Montenegrins have left Kosovo, many for economic reasons. However, the Serbian leadership has tended to downplay the economic reasons for the migration of the Serbs, blaming it on Albanian presence. 28. The charges against Vllasi were generally considered to have been trumped up. (He was accused of involvement in the organization of ethnic Albanian demonstrations and strikes in Long Memories and Short Fuses I 69

These efforts have sparked several outbreaks of large-scale violence since 1988, and the situation has remained tense since then. In February 1989 special measures were imposed, including the reinforcement of the federal militia and the partial mobilization of the army, to bring the unrest under control. The army was also partially mobilized in February 1990 to deal with Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 further outbreaks of unrest. While the deployment of the military has checked the spread of violence, it has not resolved the more fundamental causes of the crisis, which have much deeper political and economic roots. The significance of the Kosovo issue lies not only in its effect on relations with Serbia and the republic of Montenegro, but its larger impact on nationality relations within Yugoslavia as a whole. Kosovo has been the focal point for a wider disagreement between Serbia, on the one hand, and on the other Slovenia and, to a lesser extent, Croatia. Many Slovene and Croatian leaders have seen the crackdown against Kosovo largely as a pretext, and as a foretaste of MiloSevib’s intentions to strengthen federal control over the country’s economy and government. They have thus given moral support to the Kosovars’ cause and opposed the various restrictions imposed by the federal authorities on Kosovo since November 1988. Political organizations in Serbia and Montenegro, in turn, have accused the Slovenes and Croats of “colluding with Albanian separatists and terrorists” and encouraging Koso- vo’s secession from Serbia and Yug~slavia.~~ The nationality tensions in KOSOVO,moreover, have become linked with the wider issues of democratization and political reform within Yugoslavia. The ethnic unrest has sparked calls for the establishment of Western-style democracy in Kosovo; a number of alternative citizen groups have sprung up calling for the same types of democratic changes that are being sought by alternative political groups elsewhere in Yugoslavia, especially Slovenia and Croatia.30At the same time the communist party in Kosovo has steadily lost support and member~hip.~~

November 1988 and February 1989.) His arrest became a cause dlebre and touched off a series of bloody protests in Kosovo. In April 1990 Vllasi was released and the charges against him were dropped for lack of evidence. 29. On January 29, 1990, for instance, the Presidium of Serbia’s Central Committee concluded that “the sudden deterioration [in Kosovo] resulted from the overt support and encouragement of Slovene and Croatian party leaders who favor Kosovo’s secession from both Serbia and Yugoslavia,” accusing them of ”causing a civil war.” See Milan Andrejevich, “Some New Dimensions in the Kosovo Crisis,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, March 2, 1990, p. 43. 30. For a detailed discussion of these groups and their programs see ibid., pp. 44-45. 31. According to some accounts, the membership of the Kosovo Communist Party has dwindled International Security 153 I 70

In short the conflict in Kosovo is a symptom of-and to some extent has been a catalyst for-a larger political, economic, and social crisis in Yugo- slavia, the implications of which extend far beyond the borders of Kosovo. At issue is Yugoslavia’s future as an integrated state. While neither Slovenia

nor Croatia has any serious intention of seceding at the moment, both are Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 determined to expand their autonomy and to resist efforts by Serbia to strengthen federal control over the country’s economy and government. They want the present federation to be replaced by a looser confederation. MiloSeviC., in turn, has warned that if Yugoslavia becomes a confederation, Serbia will push to become an independent state. More ominously, in a speech to the Serbian National Assembly in June 1990, he raised the question of the fate of the nearly two million Serbs living outside of Serbia’s borders, most of them in Croatia and Herzegovina, noting that this proposed independent “unified Serbia” would be a guarantee of their protecti~n.~~This seemed to suggest that Serbia might seek to incorporate the Serbs into a ”Greater Serbia,” a move that would require a change of Serbia’s borders and could provoke civil war.33In July, moreover, the Serbian National As- sembly dissolved the Kosovo government and provincial assembly, after Kosovo declared its political independence from Serbia. The prospect of civil war or military intervention thus is becoming increasingly likely. The military is the only “unitarist” organization in Yugoslavia, and its leaders have expressed increasing concern over the disintegration of the country over the last couple of years. While to date the military leadership has tried to stay ”above politics” and encourage the republican political leaders to overcome their differences, there is a danger that the army will inevitably be drawn into the ensuing conflict if disintegrative trends continue. Indeed, many Croats and Slovenes think this is exactly what Milosevic wants and that his policy is consciously aimed at provoking such an intervention.x to 80,000, most of them Serbs. See Laura Silber, ”Serbia‘s Grip on Kosovo Begins to Weaken,” Financial Times, May 2, 1990. 32. For MiloSeviC‘s speech see Politika, June 26, 1990. For an English translation of the speech see Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) EEU-90-123, June 26, 1990, pp. 51-55. 33. MiloSeviC‘s warning had parallels with the ”amputation” of Yugoslavia with which King Alexander (of the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes) threatened Croatian leaders in the 1920s, when he said Croatia could have independence, only at the price of Serbian occupation of any territory settled by the Serbs. See Christopher Cviic, ”Calm Look at a Troubled Land,” Encounter, Vol. 74, No. 4 (May 1990), p. 22. 34. These fears are not entirely unjustified. During the referendum on local autonomy carried out by the Serbian population in Croatia in August 1990, there were signs of a potential coup by part of the military sympathetic to Milosevic. The Yugoslav news agency Tunjug-which is Long Memories and Short Fuses I 71

Military intervention, however, is unlikely to resolve Yugoslavia’s problems. Indeed, it could exacerbate them. The Yugoslav officer corps is dominated by Serbs.35Hence any military intervention would be widely perceived by many Yugoslavs, especially the Albanians, Croats and Slovenes, as an

effort to re-establish Serb dominance, and would thus be fiercely resisted. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Many recruits are other nationalities, especially Albanians. Many of these might simply refuse to fire on their fellow countrymen, or might even turn on their officers. In short, the potential for a real bloodbath would be great. Moreover, military intervention would do nothing to overcome Yugoslavia’s serious economic problems, which would continue to mount. Given Yugoslavia’s strategic position in the heart of the Balkans, any widespread civil unrest would inevitably spill over into neighboring countries, exacerbating other disputes and complicating the prospects for internal democratization in these regimes. Thus, the disintegration of Yugoslavia could prove to be the main threat to regional security in the Balkans-and to the security of Europe as a whole-in the 1990s.

Regional and Ethnic Conflicts

The problems of political development in the Balkans are compounded by the existence of a number of unresolved regional and ethnic conflicts with deep historical roots. While communist rule did not eliminate these conflicts, it did often act as a constraint on them. However, with the collapse of communist rule and the re-nationalization of politics in a number of states in the region, many of these disputes could re-emerge with increased intensity. To be sure, these conflicts are not likely to spark a world war, as the assassination of Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand did in 1914. At that time the Balkans were the seat of intense great-power rivalry. Today none of controlled by Milosevic-initially reported that an emergency situation had been declared in areas of Croatia inhabited by Serbs, and that Serbs living in those areas had called on the army for help. Several hours later these reports were denied. The Croatian President Franjo Tudjman claimed the reports were part of a plan to destabilize Croatia and overthrow the Croatian government by provoking military intervention. For details, see ”Anzeichen eines misgliickten Interventionsversuch der Armee in Kroatien,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 20, 1990; and “Kroatien fiihlt sich nach dem misgliickten Aufstand in Knin gestarkt,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 23, 1990. 35. Close to 70 percent of the officer corps and non-commissioned officers are Serbs. See A. Ross Johnson, The Role of the Military in Yugoslavia (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, April 1980). International Security 25:3 I 72

the major powers, including the Soviet Union, has a strong interest in trying to exploit these conflicts for its own purposes. This does not mean, however, that such conflicts can be ignored. In many instances their intensification could seriously complicate the process of dem-

ocratic consolidation in the region, in the same way as Basque separatism Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 hindered the consolidation of democracy in Spain in the late 1970s. Moreover, some of the disputes, like the Macedonian issue, involve more than one country. Thus there is a danger that an intensification of the disputes could have a “ripple effect” throughout the region, exacerbating other conflicts. Finally, the possibility of an actual shooting war, such as that which occurred between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in 1974, while remote cannot entirely be excluded. Thus these conflicts could seriously hinder the construction of a stable security order in the “new Europe.” With these considerations in mind it may be useful to take a more detailed look at some of these disputes and their potential impact on regional and European security.

THE KOSOVO PROBLEM Yugoslavia’s disintegration could exacerbate Belgrade’s dispute with Albania over the fate of the nearly two million Albanians living in Yugoslavia, most of whom live in Kosovo. The roots of the dispute can be traced back to the defeat of Turkey in the Balkan wars of 1912-13, which led to the creation of Albania as an independent state. At the London Conference (1913), the great powers decided to create a ”rump Albania,” which included only about half of the Albanian population in the area.36More than 50 percent of the Albanian population was left outside the boundaries of the newly created Albanian state. Serbia acquired most of what is now Kosovo, while Montenegro and Macedonia received small parts. The national conflict re-emerged during the course of World War 11. The Albanian Communist Party, which spearheaded the resistance against the Germans, was controlled by the Yugoslav Communist Party (YCP) under Tito and was little more than an extension of the Yugoslav Party. During the war the Albanian Communist Party (ACP) had initially supported the Mukaj agreement, which called for the inclusion of Kosovo into a “Greater Albania.” Under pressure from Yugoslavia, however, the Albanian Party was forced to

36. For a detailed discussion of the London Conference and the creation of Albania, see R.J. Crampton, The Hollow Detente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans 1911-1924 (London: George Prior, 1977). Long Memories and Short Fuses I 73

repudiate its support for the Mukaj agreement and accept the incorporation of Kosovo into Yugoslavia, a move which undercut popular support for the Party in Albania and was resented by many members in the Albanian Party. After the Yugoslav-Soviet break in 1948, Albania quickly joined the cavalcade

of criticism of Yugoslavia. The break led not only to a purge of alleged Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 ”Yugoslav agents” in the Albanian party,37 but to a strong upsurge of anti- Yugoslav (or more accurately anti-Serb) feeling within Albania. Under Enver Hoxha, who emerged as the undisputed leader of the Albanian party after 1949, the struggle against “Titoism” became the cornerstone of Albania’s policy and the litmus test of Albania’s relations with other communist parties. In particular, Hoxha tirelessly attacked the repression and ”exploitation” of the Albanian minority by Belgrade. Although Hoxha never expressis verbis demanded the return of Kosovo, the Albanian charges were regarded in Belgrade as little more than undisguised territorial claims against Yugoslavia. Hoxha’s successor, Ramiz Alia, has continued more or less unchanged the policy he inherited from Hoxha regarding Kos~vo.~~Like Hoxha he has persistently accused Yugoslavia of conducting an ”anti-Albanian policy” and of repressing the Albanian minority in Yugoslavia, though like Hoxha, he has stopped short of actually demanding the return of Kosovo. Belgrade, in turn, has continued to accuse Albania of spreading ”anti-Yugoslav propa- ganda” and stirring up unrest among the Albanian population of Kosovo. Relations deteriorated after popular unrest in Kosovo in 1968, which led to a virtual cessation of all cultural and tourist exchanges. Since 1988, however, there have been signs that Tirana is interested in improving relations with Yugoslavia. In February 1988 a cultural agreement was signed between the two countries. And in a speech in May 1990 Foreign Minister Reis Malile, one of the chief architects of Albania’s new foreign policy, suggested that Albania might relax its restrictions and allow families to visit relatives in neighboring countries.39 A liberalization of travel restrictions could have an important impact on the internal situation in both countries. On the one hand, greater contact

37. The chief victim was Koci Xoxe, the Interior Minister, who had headed the ”Yugoslav faction” in the party. Xoxe was arrested and executed in 1949 as part of the wave of purge trials that swept Eastern Europe in the aftermath of the Stalin-Tito break. 38. See Jens Reuter, “Das Kosovo-Problem in Kontext der jugoslawisch-albanischen Beziehun- gen,” Sudosteuropa, Heft 11/12 (1987), pp. 718-727. Also by the same author, “Die jugoslawisch- albanischen Beziehungen nach Enver Hoxha,” Siidosteuropa, Heft 1 (1987), pp. 10-18. 39. Zeri i Popullit (Tirana), May 16, 1990. For a fuller discussion see Louis Zanga, ”Albania’s New Path,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, June 15, 1990, pp. 1-5. International Security 15:3 I 74

with the process of democratization in Kosovo could whet the appetite of the Albanian population for more sweeping reforms at home, thus acceler- ating the process of change in Albania. On the other, it could create a growing feeling of ”togetherness” between the two Albanian communities and lead

to increased pressures for unification, especially if Serb repression of Alban- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 ian political rights continues and centrifugal forces within Yugoslavia as a whole intensify.

THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION The Macedonian problem has been a long-standing source of conflict in the Balkans.40The ”Greater Bulgaria” established by the Treaty of San Stefan0 in March 1878 included most of Macedonia, but this was quickly lost at the Congress of Berlin three months later, greatly reducing Bulgaria’s size. At the end of World War I Macedonia was divided among four states: Greece, which got the largest portion, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Albania, which received a small part on its eastern border. During the interwar period the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), operating from Bulgarian soil, conducted a campaign of terror against both Bulgarian officials and Yugoslavia in support of an independent Ma~edonia.~’ In 1944 a completely new dimension was given to the problem with the establishment of the People’s Republic of Macedonia as one of the federal units of Yugoslavia. In Yugoslavia the Macedonians were recognized as a separate Slavic nation, with their own separate language. Neither Greece nor Bulgaria, however, recognizes a separate Macedonian nation or nationality. The focus of the postwar conflict between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria has been over the disputed ethnic identity of the Slavic majority in Macedonia. Yugoslavia asserts that this majority constitutes a Macedonian nation and insists that Bulgaria recognize the basis of Yugoslavia’s ethnic claim to Mac- edonia and grant special minority rights to the Macedonian minority in southwestern Bulgaria, known as Pirin Macedonia. Bulgaria, on the other hand, claims that the Slavic population of Macedonia is ethnically and his-

40. For a comprehensive treatment see Elisabeth Barker, Macedonia: Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1950); Stephen Palmer and Robert King, Yugoslav Communism and the Macedonian Question (Hamden, Conn.: Shoestring Press, 1971); Patrick Moore, ”Macedonia: Perennial Balkan Apple of Discord,” The World Today, October 1979, pp. 427-428; and Wolf Oschlies, “Zur Mazedonian-Frage: Am Anfang war das Wort,” Europuische Rundschau, No. 2 (Spring 1983), pp. 91-102. 41. For a good discussion of IMROs terrorist activities during the interwar period, see Seton- Watson, Europe Between the Wars, pp. 243-253. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 75

torically Bulgarian, while denying that Bulgaria has any territorial aspirations against Yugoslavia-a position that the Yugoslavs find threateningly ambig- uous.42 Moscow has often seen the dispute as a useful means of indirectly putting

pressure on Yugoslavia. Indeed, the dispute was often a fairly accurate Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 barometer of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The problem, however, also developed an important Bulgarian domestic dimension. After 1967 it was increasingly linked to the Zhivkov regime's emphasis on nationalism and patriotism. In this capacity it served as a form of "surrogate nationalism" or "safety valve" for national aspirations that were otherwise largely subordinated to the dictates of Soviet foreign policy. Since Zhivkov's removal in 1989 there has been a general re-nationalization of Bulgarian political life, and a number of independent political groups concerned with the Macedonian issue have emerged.43 Some, such as the Ilinden Society, call for the recognition of the Macedonian minority. The majority, however, such as the Vardar Discussion Club and the Macedonian Cultural-Educational Society, promote the Bulgarian identity of the Mace- donians. The Macedonian issue, moreover, has re-emerged as an issue in the internal Bulgarian debate. Some elements in the non-communist opposition have accused the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) of "selling out" Bulgarian national interests regarding Macedonia in the early postwar period.44 In early 1990 polemics between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia again flared up, prompted, it appears, by the passage of a resolution by the Yugoslav parliament on February 16 deploring the "forced assimilation" of the Macedonians in the Pirin region of Bulgaria.45To be sure, such polemics

42. Initially Bulgaria recognized a Macedonian minority-a legacy of the early postwar cooperation between Dimitrov and Tito. However, since 1965 the Bulgarian census has not included a category for Macedonians. 43. One of the most interesting examples of the re-emergence of the Macedonian theme was the broadcast in late June 1990 of an hour-long interview-the first ever-with Vance Mikhaylov, the leader of IMRO, the Macedonian nationalist terrorist organization. Mikhaylov, now 94, was forced to go underground in 1934 and had been living in Rome since 1959. In the interview Mikhaylov, apparently now less fervent a Macedonian nationalist than in his younger years, blamed the revival of Macedonian separatism on Yugoslavia. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), EEU-90-123, June 26, 1990, p. 7. 44. For details see Wolf Oschlies, "Die 'unbulgarische Positionen' verlassen--endlich!" Aktuellen Analyses, Bundesinstitut fur ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, No. 24, April 4, 1990, pp. 1-8. 45. See Patrick Moore, "The Macedonian Question Resurfaces," WE, Report on Easfern Europe, April 6, 1990, pp. 46-49. International Security 15:3 [ 76

are hardly new. They take on added significance in the current context, however, because of the re-emergence of nationalist trends in both countries. There is thus a danger that one or the other government-or both-may seek to exploit the dispute to bolster popular support and compensate for its own

domestic weakness. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 The Macedonian issue has also more recently led to increased friction between Greece and Yugoslavia. Since late 1988 the Macedonians in Yugo- slavia have begun to raise the issue of the rights of the Macedonian minority in Greece more aggressively. Greece has vigorously rejected these complaints. Greece contends that there is no separate Macedonian nationality and that those people living in the Macedonian part of Greece are "Slavo- phone Greeks," that is, Greeks who speak a Slavic language.46 The dispute took an important new turn in 1989-90. In the past it was mainly the authorities in Skopje, the capital of the Yugoslav Macedonian Republic, that raised the issue of the rights of the Macedonian minority most vigorously. The central government in Belgrade, by contrast, remained largely aloof from the dispute or gave it only lukewarm backing. Since the end of 1989, however, the government in Belgrade has begun to back the Macedonian claims more vigorously and has sought to internationalize the dispute, formally raising it at international fora such as the United Nations General Assembly and the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva. Border incidents between Greece and Yugoslavian Macedonia have also increased.47 In May 1990, for instance, more than 50,000 Macedonians blocked several border crossings between Yugoslavia and Greece to demand that the Greek government recognize the Macedonian minority in Greece, and that it lift visa requirements for Greek citizens who wish to travel to Yugoslavia, and visa restrictions on those Yugoslav citizens who fought (or whose parents fought) in the Greek Civil War on the side of the Greek communists. Relations have also been strained by increased problems over truck permits and currency rules.48

46. For a good discussion of the Greek point of view and the role of the Macedonian question in postwar Greek-Yugoslav relations, see Evangelos Kofos, The Macedonian Question: The Politics of Mutation (Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1987, pp. 1-16. 47. See Milan Andrejevich, "Yugoslav Macedonians Demand Greece's Recognition of Aegean Macedonians," RFE, Report on Eastern Europe, June 1, 1990, pp. 45-49. Kerin Hope, "Greek- Yugoslav Row Blows Over Macedonian Issue," Financial Times, June 22, 1990; and Viktor Meier, "Wieder die mazedonische Frage," Frankfurter Allgenzeine Zeitung, June 22, 1990. 48. From the Greek point of view, the escalation of the Macedonian issue is particularly worrying Long Memories and Short Fuses I 77

The escalation of the Macedonian issue should be seen against the background of the larger problem of the growth of nationality tensions within Yugoslavia as a whole in recent years. As noted earlier, the devolution of political power in Yugoslavia in the last decade has given greater autonomy

to the individual republics and provided them with greater leeway to pursue Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 their own “national” interests. This has resulted in attempts by the Mace- donian leadership to press more forcefully the issue of the rights of Mace- donians outside Yugoslavian borders and to demand greater support for this position from the federal government in Belgrade. At the same time traditional rivalries and grievances have reasserted themselves more fiercely. On the one hand, the rising militancy of the Albanian population in Yugoslavia has contributed to a growth of national self-asser- tion in Macedonia because the more militant Albanians have called for the creation of an Albanian republic carved out of the current republic of Kosovo and the western part of the Macedonian republic.49 On the other hand, traditional hostility between Serbia and Macedonia has intensified, fueled in particular by Serbia’s claims that a ”forced emigration” of the Serbs from Macedonia after World War I1 was illegal.50Indeed, only shared fear of the militancy of the Albanian minority appears to have prevented an open break between the two republics. It is this domestic context which is crucial. To date, the Macedonian issue has largely been a peripheral problem. However, if the centrifugal tendencies in Yugoslavia intensify, this could change. Squeezed between rising Albanian nationalism, on the one hand, and Serbian nationalism, on the other, some forces in Macedonia might conclude that their destiny would be better served outside the Yugoslav federation than inside and begin to agitate for the creation of an independent Macedonian state, especially if Slovenia and Croatia press for greater independence. If this were to happen, the Mace- donian problem could pose a more serious threat to regional security. because of its potential impact on Greek-Turkish relations: Greek officials fear that it will encourage Turkish complaints about Greek treatment of the Turkish minority in Western Thrace. 49. There are some 300,000 Albanians among Macedonia’s total population of close to 2 million. 50. A law passed in late 1945 by the Yugoslav Federal Assembly had called for the resettlement of Serbs from Macedonia to other parts of Yugoslavia, mainly Serbia. Serbia’s National Assembly recently declared the law illegal and is seeking final approval from the Assembly. Serbia has also demanded that Macedonia compensate those Serbs who were forced to leave. For details see Andrejevich, ”Yugoslav Macedonians Demand Greece’s Recognition of Aegean Macedo- nians,” p. 47. lnternational Security 15:3 I 78

THE TURKISH MINORITY IN BULGARIA Regional stability has also been disrupted in recent years by conflicts between Turkey and Bulgaria over the Bulgarian government’s treatment of the Turk- ish minority in Bulgaria. There are about 800,000 ethnic Turks in Bulgaria;

remnants of centuries of Turkish occupation, they comprise about ten percent Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 of the population. They are mostly located in the economically important tobacco-growing regions of Bulgaria. The Turkish minority was treated relatively well during the interwar years, but they have fared less well under the communist regime, which has sought to restrict their rights and curtail their religious and cultural opp~rtunities.~~ These restrictions have led to discontent and periodic pressures for emigra- ti~n.~~In 1950-51 some 150,000 Bulgarian Turks left for Turkey in a series of mass expulsions. Another 120,000-130,000 were allowed to leave as a result of an agreement signed with Ankara in February 1968. The agreement expired in 1978 and thereafter emigration was reduced to a trickle until 1989 when a new round of expulsions occurred (discussed below). Recent difficulties should be seen against the background of Bulgaria’s general attempt to pursue a policy of national assimilation designed to break down the exclusiveness of the Turkish minority. This campaign gained intensity during the 1960s and especially the 1970s as a result of Zhivkov’s efforts to create “a unified Bulgarian Socialist nation.” The effort reached new heights in 1984-85, when the Bulgarian government began to compel all ethnic Turks to adopt Bulgarian names.53 The speaking of Turkish was also forbidden in public places. The government justified the moves on the grounds that the Turks were actually ethnic Bulgarians who had been com- pelled to adopt Islam during the Ottoman occupation; now they were simply being “re-Bulgarianized .‘’FA

51. J.F. Brown, Bulgaria Under Communist Rule (New York: Praeger, 1970), pp. 293-295; Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule, pp. 427-429. 52. For detailed discussion of the causes of the emigration and its impact on Bulgarian-Turkish relations in the postwar period, see Wolfgang Hopken, “Im Schatten der nationalen Frage: die bulgarisch-turkischen Beziehungen,” Siidosteuropa, Heft 213 (1987), pp. 75-95; and by the same author, “Im Schatten der nationalen Frage: die bulgarisch-tiirkischen Beziehungen (II),” Siidost- europa, Heft 4 (1987), pp. 178-194. 53. The drive seems to have been the final stage of a five-year campaign to issue Bulgarian citizens new identity cards before the next census, scheduled to be held at the end of 1985. 54. The Turkish minority, who are ethnic Turks, are distinct from the Pomaks, Slavic-speaking ethnic Bulgarians who adopted Turkish names and converted to Islam during the Ottoman reign. There are about 150-200,000 Pomaks living in Bulgaria today. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 79

The campaign provoked widespread resistance among the Turkish population in Bulgaria, and led to bloody clashes with the authorities that resulted in hundreds of deaths.55Turkey’s reaction was initially relatively restrained, probably because Ankara did not want to jeopardize a growing economic

relationship with Sofia, but also out of fear that a sharp deterioration of Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 bilateral relations would lead to a renewed emigration of the Turkish minority, which would exacerbate Turkey’s internal social and economic problems. Pressure from public opinion, however, gradually forced the Turkish government to take stronger action, including an effort to internationalize the issue, which led to a sharp deterioration of relations. Relations between the two countries improved for a short while after the signing of a “Protocol on the Promotion of Good Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation” on the eve of the Belgrade meeting of Balkan foreign ministers in February 1988. Thereafter several working groups were set up to deal with outstanding bilateral problems, including the Turkish minority. However, the decision by the Bulgarian government at the end of May 1989 to force thousands of ethnic Turks to emigrate created new tensions in relations and caused severe domestic problems for Turkey, which was forced to absorb more than 300,000 refugees on short notice.56 The decision by the Zhivkov government to force the Turks to emigrate proved to be a strategic blunder. Not only did it damage Bulgaria’s image internationally, but it also had disastrous economic consequences, causing a severe labor shortage in the tobacco-growing areas where many of the Turks live. Domestically, moreover, it contributed to the discontent, both within the party and among the intellectuals, which had been visibly growing since 1987. In the summer of 1989, for instance, 121 leading intellectuals signed a petition to the National Assembly condemning the expulsions and calling for their halt. Several opposition groups also emerged within the Turkish minority, the most important of which was the Democratic League for the Defense of Human fights.57

55. Reliable figures on the actual number of deaths are hard to come by. Turkish sources put them as high as 1,000. The real number, however, is probably closer to several hundred. 56. The reasons for the Zhivkov government’s decision remain unclear. Ethnic unrest among the Turkish community in Bulgaria had been growing and the government may well have thought that it could defuse the pressure by allowing some of the Turks to emigrate. It did not expect, however, the flood of emigration that actually occurred. 57. On the role of the intellectuals in support of the Turkish minority, see Crampton, “The Intelligentsia, the Ecology, and the Opposition in Bulgaria,” p. 25. International Security 15:3 I 80

Zhivkov’s ouster in November 1989 led to a reversal of the policy of Bulgarianization. At the end of December, the Bulgarian State Council and Council of Ministers condemned Zhivkov’s policy depriving the Turks of their rights and promised that these rights would be fully restored.j8 In March

1990 the Bulgarian Parliament passed a law restoring the names of the Turkish Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 minority. Turks returning to Bulgaria have also been allowed to reclaim property and jobs. The decision at the end of December 1989 to restore rights and property to the Turkish minority provoked widespread violent protests by Bulgarians in Sofia, Plovdiv, and several other cities in Bulgaria in early January 1990. The protests owed their strength as much to the way the decision was presented as to its contents.59 The decision was taken in secret with little prior public discussion, and this caught many Bulgarians off-guard. Some of the protests also appear to have been organized by local party officials opposed to the changes instituted after Zhivkov’s ouster, and intended to inhibit the reform process. Whatever the mix of causes, the strong backlash underscored the deep-seated sensitivities surrounding the Turkish minority issue and the degree to which nationalism remains a powerful force that could shape Bulgarian politics in the future. At the same time, the deepening of the process of democratization is likely to provide greater opportunities for the Turkish minority to articulate its interests politically. In the elections in June, for instance, the newly formed Movement for Rights and Freedoms (MRF), which unofficially represents the interests of the Turkish minority, won 23 seats in the National Assembly. Thus for the first time there will be a “Muslim bloc” in the parliament. In the future the Turkish minority seems likely to press its demands for separate schools and language instruction more vigorously, primarily through the MRF. This could intensify ethnic tensions within Bulgaria as well as exacerbate relations with Turkey. A weak and fragmented Bulgarian government could be tempted to play the ”national card” in order to bolster its domestic support. In addition, the growth of Muslim fundamentalism and Pan-Turkism could have a spill-over effect on Bulgaria, exacerbating the minority problem.

58. Thomas Goltz, “Bulgaria Ends Campaign to Assimilate Turks,” Washington Post, December 30, 1989; also ”Turks Win Right to Use the Muslim Names They Were Forced to Change,” New York Times, December 30, 1989. 59. For a detailed discussion of the background and reasons for the unrest see Stephen Ashley, “Ethnic Unrest During January,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, February 9, 1990, pp. 4-11. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 81

Over the long term these developments could have an impact on align- ments within the Balkans, particularly on relations between Bulgaria and Greece. Both countries share a fear of Turkey, and in recent years ties between the two have warmed visibly. In 1986 they signed a “Declaration on Good

Neighborliness, Friendship, and Cooperation,” and more recently they have Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 sought to develop common strategies toward Turkey, including limited military cooperation.60 It is too early, however, to speak of a new ”Athens-Sofia axis.” The process of democratization in Bulgaria is far from complete and it is still unclear what direction Bulgarian policy will ultimately take. Some Greek officials fear that the collapse of the Zhivkov regime could lead to a ”national renaissance’’ in Bulgaria with strongly nationalistic overtones. Together with the strong pro- Western policy adopted by Greek Prime Minister Constantin Mitsotakis, this is likely to place limits on Greek rapprochement with Sofia. Nonetheless, the growing cooperation between Sofia and Athens in recent years underscores the degree to which the two countries share common concerns, not only regarding Turkey but also Yugoslavia.

THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA The Hungarian-Romanian dispute over the Hungarian minority in Romania is another source of tension in the Balkans.61The dispute had its origins in the aftermath of World War I. Following the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, governmental authority in Hungary collapsed and Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Romania occupied areas inhabited by their various nationalities. The Hungarian communist, Bela Kun, seized power in Budapest and launched attacks on the Romanians in Transylvania, but Hungary‘s armies were soundly defeated. As a result of the Treaty of Trianon (1920), Hungary was forced to cede nearly two-thirds of its territory: Transylvania, the age-old home of Hungarian culture, was given to Romania, parts of Slovakia inhabited by Hungarians were also ceded to Czechoslovakia, while Croatia and the Vojvodina were given to Yugoslavia. As a result nearly three million Hungarians found themselves living outside their former borders.

60. Paul Anastasi, “Greece and Bulgaria Plan Anti-Turkey Strategies,” New York Times, February 7, 1990. 61. There are nearly 2 million ethnic Hungarians living in Romania. They comprise about 9-10 percent of the country’s population. International Security 15:3 I 82

During the interwar period the Romanians did not deprive the Hungarians of their schools or language, though they did require all civil servants to pass a Romanian language examination, which was often used to discriminate against Hungarians. Ironically, in the Stalinist period the situation of the

Hungarian minority considerably improved. In 1952 the Hungarian Auton- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 omous Region was established, which gave its 600,000 Hungarians-about one third of the Hungarian population in Romania at the time-considerable administrative freedom. In 1960, however, the Hungarian Autonomous Re- gion was partially dismantled, and in 1968 it was abolished altogether, leading to a fragmentation of the Hungarian community. The number of Hun- garian language schools declined, as did the number of institutions of advanced learning where subjects were taught in Hungarian.62Moreover, as a result of demographic changes and Ceausescu’s policy of forced assimilation or “Romanization,” many Transylvanian cities, the historical focal points of Hungarian culture, gradually lost their Hungarian character. The Hungarian minority reacted to these developments, especially the closing of Hungarian language schools, with increasing alarm because it is upon them that not only Hungarian culture but a distinct Hungarian identity in Romania depends. Beginning in the 1970s the Hungarian minority began to speak out more vocally against repression and discrimination, and sought to call international attention to their plight. The number of Hungarian dissident journals and samizdat publications in Transylvania, many of them sharply critical of Ceausescu and his policy toward the minority, also increased visibly.63 Initially the government of Jinos Kadar in Hungary sought to obtain an improvement of the minority‘s situation through quiet diplomacy. However, this policy failed to achieve any visible results and during the 1980s the situation of the minority continued to decline. As it did, intellectuals and dissident groups in Hungary began to take up the issue, pressing the Kadar government to speak out more forcefully about the plight of the minority in Romania.&lPressure from these groups forced the government to confront

62. In 1947 there were some 1800 Hungarian schools in Romania. By 1980 there were only 12, though 108 other schools still offered some courses in Hungarian. See Judith Pataki, “Free Hungarians in a Free Romania: Dream or Reality?” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, February 23, 1990, p. 22. 63. For background see F. Stephen Larrabee, The Challenge to Soviet Interests in Eastern Europe, R-3190-AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, December 1984), pp. 38-40. 64. One of the most ardent champions of the cause of the Hungarian minority abroad was Gyula Illyes, one of Hungary’s best-known authors (Children of the Puszta). On a number of Long Memories and Short Fuses I 83

the issue more openly, including a reference to it for the first time in the Central Committee report approved at the Party Congress in March 1986. The issue moved more directly into the open in 1988 as a result of two events. The first was Kadar’s ouster as party leader in May 1988 and his

replacement by Karoly Gr6sz. Kadar had always been a reluctant nationalist, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 especially on the minority issue. His departure removed an important constraint on public debate and Hungarian diplomacy. The second event was Ceausescu’s decision to raze some 6000-7000 villages, many of them located in Transylvania, as part of his industrialization campaign. This caused an outcry in Hungary and led to a serious deterioration of relations between the two c~untries.~~Hungary also sought to internationalize the issue by raising it directly at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) meeting in Vienna. The overthrow of Ceausescu in December 1989 initially led to an improvement in Hungarian-Romanian relations. The National Salvation Front in Romania promised to guarantee the rights of minorities and in the first few months took a number of steps to improve their conditions, including a decision to reintroduce Hungarian language instruction in some high schools in Transylvania. This move, however, provoked strong criticism from parts of the Romanian population, and as a result, the implementation of the decision was postponed.66 Tensions reached a climax in mid-March when ethnic unrest broke out in the Transylvanian city of Tirgu Mures, which had been the capital of the Hungarian Autonomous Region. The unrest led to at least eight deaths and nearly 300 injuries. It appears to have been provoked by attacks on Hungar- ians by supporters of Vatra Romaneasca (Romanian Hearth), an ultra-nationalist group, which seeks the continuation of the Ceausescu regime’s policies of forced assimilation of the ethnic minority and of creating a homogenous Romanian occasions he used his great prestige to put pressure on the Hungarian leadership, including Kadar himself, to take a stronger public stand on the minority issue. 65. Only a small number of these villages were ever actually razed. Nevertheless, the decision caused a major outcry not just in Hungary but also in Romania because many historic Romanian monuments and buildings were to be destroyed. 66. On the role of the education issue in the outbreak of violence in Tirgu Mures, see Pataki, “Free Hungarians in a Free Romania: Dream or Reality?” pp. 18-26. 67. For a detailed discussion of the causes of the unrest and the role of Vatra in it, see Vladimir Socor, ”Forces of Old Resurface in Romania: The Ethnic Clashes in Tirgu Mures,” WE, Report 017 Eastern Europe, April 13, 1990, pp. 36-42. See also Celestine Bohlen, ”The Romanian Revo- lution Over: It’s Back to Old Hatreds in Transylvania,” New Yovk Times, March 21, 1990; Judith International Security 15:3 I 84

The emergence of Vatru and its role in the Tirgu Mures disturbances underscores the fact that the forces of nationalism are by no means dead despite Ceausescu‘s departure. Vatru has strong support among the nomenklatura under Ceausescu as well as among former members of the Securitate. The

problem is compounded by the fact that in the countryside, particularly in Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Transylvania, many of the key political and administrative posts are still occupied by holdovers from the Ceausescu period. The process of democratization, however, has strengthened the hand of the Hungarian minority, giving it an official forum for articulating its interests. In the May 1990 elections the Hungarian Democratic Federation (UDF), which represents the interests of the Hungarian minority, won 7.5 percent of the vote-more than any other party except the National Salvation Front. The UDF’s strong showing ensures that the question of minority rights will remain an important domestic issue in Romanian political life. Changes within Hungary, moreover, seem likely to ensure that the issue of the Hungarian minority remains on the front burner. The Hungarian Democratic Forum, the major winner in the parliamentary elections in March and April 1990, has put a strong emphasis on Hungarian national pride and traditions. In a speech shortly after winning the election, Jozsef Antall, the leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum, made clear that the party intended to be a spokesman for ”all Hungarians,” suggesting that it would concern itself more forcefully with the situation of Hungarians abroad, particularly those in Romania.6s The party has a strong “populist” wing, for whom the issue of the Hungarian minority abroad is a strong emotional concern. Thus, while there is little likelihood that Hungary will raise irre- dentist territorial claims against Romania, the treatment of the Hungarian minority is likely to remain a major issue in Romanian-Hungarian relation^.^^

Dempsey, “Hungarian Protest Against Ethnic Violence in Romania,” Financial Times, March 21, 1990; and Michael Shafer, ”The Romanian Authorities’ Reactions to the Violence in Tirgu Mures,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, April 13, 1990, pp. 43-47. 68. See Blaine Harden, “National Pride Back in Style,” Washington Post, April 11, 1990; Carol J. Williams, ”Hungarian Patriotism Carried Conservatives to Victory,” Los Angeles Times, April 11, 1990. 69. In June 1990, on the seventieth anniversary of the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty, the six parties represented in Hungary’s parliament issued a statement specifically reaffirming Hungary’s commitment to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, which prohibits changing existing borders by force. At the same time they said that they expected the rights of ethnic Hungarians living outside Hungary’s borders to be guaranteed. See Alfred Reisch, “Hungarian Parties Seek to Reassure Romania on Border Issue,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, June 15, 1990, pp. 28-33. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 85

BESSARABIA The Bessarabian issue could also re-emerge more forcefully in the 1990s. Bessarabia, currently a part of the Moldavian Republic of the USSR, has been a bone of contention between Russia and Romania for several hundred

years.70 For centuries the area was part of the Romanian principality of Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 Moldavia. In 1812 it was annexed by the Russians. After World War I Bes- sarabia and Bukovina chose to join Romania. The Soviet Union, however, refused to recognize Romanian sovereignty over Bessarabia. The Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, signed in August 1939, implicitly ceded Bessarabia to the Soviet Union, and in June 1940 Moscow formally annexed both Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Romania recaptured the territories in 1941, only to lose them again in 1944 when both provinces were overrun by the Soviet Army. After World War I1 Bessarabia was incorporated into the newly established Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, northern Bukovina, three historical counties of Bessarabia, and eight raions (small districts) of the Moldavian republic were ceded on Stalin’s orders to the Ukraine-a decision regarded with considerable resentment by the Moldavians. In order to justify the annexation, Stalin sought to emphasize the “separateness” of the Mol- davians from the Romanians. Soviet authors were directed to stress the distinctiveness of the Moldavian language-which is in fact a dialect of Romanian-and Moldavia was forced to adopt the Cyrillic alphabet. After 1945 Romania did not seek to reclaim the territories or challenge the Soviet borders. Although the issue continued to be a subject of historical controversy and academic debate, it never attained the political intensity or significance that characterized the dispute between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria over Macedonia. Indeed, Ceausescu was relatively cautious about Bessarabia, perhaps out of a desire not to give Moscow a ready-made excuse for increasing pressure on Romania at a time when relations were already strained. The escalation of nationality tensions in the Soviet Union in the last several years, however, has cast the issue in a new light. The Moldavian National Front, which has spearheaded the nationalist revival in the Moldavian Re- public and which is today the strongest political force there, has begun to raise the issue as part of its long list of grievances against the Soviet leadership. In June 1989 it organized a large rally in Kishinev to mourn the annex-

70. On the historical background of the dispute see Michael Sturdza, “Changes in the Inter- national Status of Bessarabia,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, May 25, 1990. lnternational Security 15:3 I 86

ation of Bessarabia and the partition of the Moldavian lands. The rally approved several resolutions condemning the annexation of Bessarabia in 1940 and proclaiming June 28, the day the Soviet army entered Bessarabia in 1940, a “day of national mourning.” One of the resolutions also demanded “the

return to the Moldavian SSR of ancient territories of the Moldavian people Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 that were unjustly incorporated into the Ukrainian SSR in 1940.”71 While the Front has called for closer contacts with Romania, including an open border like the one between East Germany and West Germany after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, it has stopped short of demanding full independence or reunification. In the short term, any calls for territorial revisions are more likely to be aimed at recovering northern Bukovina and the other territories given to the Ukraine after the 1940 annexation than at seeking reunification with Romania. As Moldavia emancipates itself from Soviet tu- telage, however, the sense of cultural and spiritual unity with Romania could intensify and possibly lead to calls for some form of closer association, possibly even ~nification.~~ To date there has been little inclination by the Iliescu government in Romania to reopen the Bessarabian issue. On the contrary, while the National Salvation Front has advocated an intensification of contacts with Moldavia, Front spokesman have consciously sought to play down the Bessarabian issue. In May, for instance, President Iliescu, while acknowledging that the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia was a ”historic injustice,” stated that it could not be in Romania’s interest to raise the issue of redrawing the border^.'^ Cultural and governmental contacts between Romania and Moldavia have also significantly increased since the beginning of 1990.74Several cultural societies have been formed in Romania dedicated to promoting cultural ties and professional exchanges with Moldavia. The Romanian press, particularly the opposition newspapers, now also regularly covers Moldavia. Tourist contacts across the once impenetrable border have also increased.

71. See Vladimir Socor, “Rallies in Kishinev Mourn Soviet Annexation, Escalate National De- mands,” RFE, Report OH the USSR, July 21, 1989, pp. 21-24. 72. The strength of this feeling of “spiritual unity” was underscored in June, 1990, when thousands of Moldavians and Romanians converged for a symbolic linking of hands at the Moldavian-Romanian border. Chanting “One nation!” and “United we cannot be conquered!” many demonstrators clearly saw the event as a manifestation of national unity. See Quentin Peel, “Border Spirit Fires Moldavia’s Defiance,” Financial Times, June 25, 1990. 73. Mihai Carp, “Cultural Ties Between Romania and Soviet Moldavia,” WE, Report on Eastern Europe, July 27, 1990, pp. 41-44. 74. For details see Carp, ”Cultural Ties Between Romania and Soviet Moldavia,” pp. 42-44. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 87

As long as the Iliescu government remains in power, there is unlikely to be any official attempt to reopen the Bessarabian issue. Iliescu is a strong Gorbachev supporter and he has no desire to antagonize the Soviet leader or create additional problems for him. Many members of the opposition,

however, feel more strongly about the issue and are inclined to raise it more Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 vigorously. Moreover, the increase in cultural and human contacts between Romania and Moldavia is likely to strengthen the feeling of national unity over time. Thus, while at the moment the Bessarabian issue is relatively quiescent, it could take on a more acute dimension in the future, especially if the opposition comes to power in Romania.

Western Policy

The foregoing analysis highlights the changing security environment in Southeastern Europe and the dangers of growing instability there. These dangers are likely to be accentuated by several other factors: (1) the impact of East-West detente, which could intensify centrifugal forces in the area; (2) the growth of nationalism within the region; (3) the preoccupation of the United States and its West European allies with developments in Western Europe such as German unification, political and monetary union, etc.; and (4) the decline of the Soviet threat and the withdrawal of Soviet military forces from Eastern Europe. These factors could deflect U.S. and West Eu- ropean attention away from Southeastern Europe, thereby enhancing the prospects of instability there. The decline of the Soviet threat and the growing preoccupation with other pressing foreign and domestic concerns, however, should not blind the United States and its West European allies to the security threats posed by developments in the Balkans. While the danger of another major European war starting there is remote, this does not mean that the West should simply ignore the potential for unrest and violence in the Balkans. In the long run it will be impossible to create a stable new security order in Europe if one part of the continent is in constant turmoil and is the seat of mounting ethnic and civil strife. Indeed, in the coming decade the real threat to European security is likely to come not from the military confrontation in Central Europe-as in the past-but from political instability in Southeastern Europe. Thus it behooves the United States and its West European allies to pay greater attention to the area as they seek to construct a new security order in Europe. lnternational Security 15:3 I 88

What can and should the United States do? First, the United States should support the process of democratization in post-communist Southeastern Eu- rope. More democratic regimes in Southeastern Europe are likely, on the whole, to be more tolerant and less antagonistic.

Second, the United States and its West European allies should make polit- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 ical and economic reform a condition of any economic assistance to the countries of post-communist Southeastern Europe. Given their manifold economic problems, all the countries of Southeastern Europe will need substan- tial Western assistance. This gives the West some influence over the process of democratization. Economic assistance should be used as a lever to nudge the post-communist countries of Southeastern Europe in a more democratic direction.75 Third, the United States should avoid being drawn into ethnic disputes. Most of these disputes are complex and have deep-seated historical roots. Usually both sides have legitimate grievances and it is often impossible to make clear policy judgments. Instead the United States should use its good offices to get third parties such as the UN or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to act as mediators in these disputes. Fourth, the United States should closely coordinate its policy toward the region with its West European allies. Many of the West Europeans have long- standing ties and closer relations to countries in the region than the United States does. France, for instance, has strong traditional ties to Romania, and has played an important role in providing assistance to Romania since Ceau- sescu's fall, while the Federal Republic of Germany has strong economic and political links to Bulgaria. Italy has special ties to Albania, which derive from both geography and history. In many cases, therefore, it may be best to encourage these countries to take the lead in supporting the process of democratization and helping resolve regional conflicts. Fifth, the United States should encourage the "Europeanization" of South- eastern Europe. While to some extent the countries of Southeastern Europe

75. The approach taken by the "G-24" group of Western industrialized nations at its July 1990 meeting in Brussels provides an instructive example in this regard. The G-24 agreed to expand economic assistance to Eastern Europe, to include Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and East Germany. Romania was excluded because of the violent repression of the demonstrations in June by the Iliescu government. However, the prospect of assistance to Romania at a later date was left open if Romania can meet the democratization criteria set forth by the G-24. The G-24 thus sent a strong political signal to Romania without slamming the door entirely. See Thomas Friedman, "24-Nation Group Expands Aid Plan to Eastern Europe," New York Times, July 4, 1990. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 89

present different and more difficult problems in terms of their integration into Europe, they should not be excluded from the process. This would simply reinforce many of the adverse trends already present in the area. Rather, as they democratize, these countries should be drawn into all-Euro-

pean institutions such as the Council of Europe and the European Parliament. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 At the same time, such membership should be made conditional on the implementation of democratic reforms. This linkage can serve as both lever and incentive to encourage such reforms and ensure their implementation. Sixth, the United States should support closer regional cooperation among the countries of the area. Despite the re-emergence of old antagonisms and ethnic conflicts, there has been a general trend toward greater multilateral cooperation in the Balkans in recent years, especially in the economic area. This cooperation can have a positive impact on the political climate of the area and over time may make the resolution of controversial issues easier. Seventh, the United States should actively support a broadening and strengthening of the CSCE process. This ensures a continuing U.S. role in European affairs and also provides a useful mechanism for dealing with many of the ethnic and regional conflicts in the area. For instance, it might be useful to establish a permanent commission within the CSCE framework to deal with the problem of minority rights.76 A European peace-keeping force, which could mediate and establish order in case of an escalation of regional or ethnic conflicts, also deserves consideration.n Beyond these general principles, a number of more specific country-related policy considerations are worth mentioning. As far as Romania and Bulgaria are concerned, the prime U.S. aim should be to support and help stabilize the process of democratization. Here economic assistance, especially the prospect of Most Favored Nation (MFN) trade status, may prove to be a useful lever. For Bulgaria and Romania, MFN is not particularly important in economic terms-U.S. trade with both countries is minimal and not likely to grow substantially, with or without MFN. However, MFN status is important politically. It is a symbol of “political respectability,” and very much desired by both countries for that reason.

76. Jonathan Eyal, for instance, has suggested the establishment of a “minorities protection system” to guarantee minority rights under international law. See Eyal, ”Eastern Europe: What About the Minorities?” The World Today, December 1989, pp. 205-208. 77. This force would, of course, suffer many of the same limitations of UN peace-keeping forces. In particular, it could only be sent in if the parties involved agreed to its use. International Security 15:3 I 90

Romania was granted MFN in 1975 when the United States wished to reward Ceausescu for his independent foreign policy uis-u-uis the Soviet Union. It was withdrawn, however, in February 1988 by the Reagan admin- istration as a sign of its disapproval of Ceausescu’s poor human rights rec-

~rd.~*Restoration of MFN status should be made contingent upon the insti- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 tutionalization of a program of comprehensive reform. In order to have maximum impact, however, any move in this direction, and any decision to award MFN to Bulgaria, should be coordinated with America’s West Euro- pean allies and should be part of a general Western effort to encourage the democratization process. Albania presents a different case since it still maintains a rigid totalitarian system and has only just begun to embark upon a modest reform course. The United States has made intermittent overtures to normalize relations with Albania since 1974. In the past these have been coldly rebuffed by Albania. Recently, however, Albania has shown an interest in normalizing relations with the United States, as well as participating in the CSCE process, which it had previously refused to do.79Given the potential for instability in the Balkans in the coming decade, the United States should explore Tirana’s recent overtures. If diplomatic relations could be established, this would at least give the United States a presence in Albania, which could be important if the process of change in Albania accelerates in the future. Finally, the United States needs to pay more attention to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia’s disintegration poses the greatest threat to security in the Bal- kans, perhaps to security in all of Europe. As noted earlier, any outbreak of civil war there would be hard to contain and would most likely spill over into the rest of the Balkans, exacerbating other disputes and encouraging some nations or groups to settle old scores. Moreover, it cannot be excluded that some non-European power such as Iraq or Libya might surreptitiously seek to exploit any conflict for its own purposes. Thus a more concerted effort to help stabilize Yugoslavia is in the Western interest. This effort should involve a Western aid package coordinated

78. The withdrawal of MFN was a formality, however, since Romania, in order to show that it could not be pressured into liberalizing, had informed the U.S. earlier in the year that it would not seek a renewal of its MFN status. 79. In a speech in mid-April, Albanian party leader Ramiz Alia expressed his readiness to normalize relations with both the United States and the Soviet Union. See David Binder, ”Hardline Albanians Signal Desire to Resume Ties with U.S. and Soviets,” New York Times, April 20, 1990. Long Memories and Short Fuses I 91

through the European Community. Such a package, however, should be conditioned on the continuation of the process of economic reform, democratization, and respect for human rights in the individual republics as well as the country as a whole. Any attempt by the Serbs to reimpose their

dominance under the guise of strengthening central control is likely to ex- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 acerbate current nationality tensions and damage relations with Europe and the United States. Given the current pressures for greater autonomy in Yugoslavia, the only viable solution in the long run is a loose confederation that allows the individual republics greater control over their own affairs. Given the internal difficulties Yugoslavia faces, steering such a balanced course will not be easy. The reform process in Yugoslavia is likely to be uneven and marred by occasional excesses and setbacks. The basic problem, as one Yugoslav commentator has pointed out, is that it is getting increasingly harder to draw the line between reformist and disintegrative tendencies.80 Yet the decline of the Cold War may also expand the U.S. room for maneuver. Yugoslavia may now become less of a strategic pawn in the superpower rivalry. This may make it easier for the United States, in consultation with its West European allies, to use its influence more effectively. In short, the end of the Cold War does not mean that the United States can simply disengage from the problems of Europe, leaving these problems to fester and grow. Washington needs to work closely with its West European allies to create a stable new security order in Europe to replace the old bipolar order that has collapsed. If this new order is to be durable, however, it cannot be limited to Northern and Central Europe; it must include South- eastern Europe as well. Over the long run this may prove the greatest challenge to its construction.

80. Ranko Petkovic, “The United States and Yugoslavia,” Review of International Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 960, p. 8.