Long Memories and Short Fuses Change and Instability in the Balkans

Long Memories and Short Fuses Change and Instability in the Balkans I The Balkans have traditionally been a region of instability and ferment, and with the end of the Cold War, long-standing conflicts are likely to re-emerge. During the nineteenth century the region was continually a site of great power rivalry, as Britain, Russia, and Austria sought to extend their influence in the area- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 or to block other powers from doing so. The volatile combination of great power ambition and assertive nationalism in the area contributed directly to the outbreak of World War I, and earned the region the reputation as "the powder keg of Europe." The collapse of the Ottoman and Hapsburg empires at the end of World War I left a host of ethnic and territorial conflicts unresolved and created a number of new ones. The Cold War, with its emphasis on "tight" bipolarity, tended to dampen many of these tensions and conflicts, though it did not entirely eliminate them. Polemics between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia over Macedonia periodically flared up; the Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minority was a source of disagreement between Romania and Hungary; discontent among the Turkish minority in Bulgaria led to several waves of emigration and poisoned Bulgarian-Turkish relations; and Yugoslav-Albanian relations were marred by differences over the Albanian minority in the Yu- goslav area of Kosovo. Still, as long as the bloc system existed, it acted as a residual, if diminishing, constraint on these tensions. The end of the Cold War, however, threatens to remove this constraint. As both superpowers are increasingly preoccupied with other pressing agendas and less inclined-or able-to act as hegemonic This article was written while the author was Distinguished Scholar in Residence at the Institute for East-West Security Studies in New York and was supported by a grant from the Ford Foundation, whose financial assistance is gratefully acknowledged. F. Stephen Larrabee is a Senior Staff Member at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, California. The views expressed here are the author's personal views and do not represent those of RAND or any of its sponsors. 1. For the purpose of this article, "Southeastern Europe" is defined as Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece and Turkey. The article, however, concentrates primarily on developments in the communist and former communist states of the Balkans. International Security, Winter 1990191 (Vol. 15, No. 3) 0 1990 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 58 Long Memories and Short Fuses I 59 powers, there is a danger that many long-submerged regional conflicts could intensify. Moreover, by allowing more open expression of ethnic grievances, the process of democratization in the post-communist countries of the Bal- kans may exacerbate rather than ameliorate some of these conflicts. Indeed, Europe may witness two diametrically opposed trends in the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 coming decade: while Western Europe moves toward greater integration and multilateral cooperation, Eastern Europe, particularly Southeastern Europe, may witness greater political fragmentation and a ”renationalization” of politics. In the 1990s the main threat to European security is likely to come not from Soviet military power but from ethnic conflict and political fragmentation in the Balkans. In short, the end of the Cold War may not mean the end of conflict in Europe. The source of conflict and instability may simply shift southward. Indeed, the Balkans could emerge as a major stumbling block to the creation of a stable security order in Europe in the coming decade. During the Cold War, most policy studies in the West focused on the Central Front, which was seen as the most likely arena of conflict in Europe. By contrast, Southeastern Europe has been largely neglected. Moreover, those studies that have focused on Southeastern Europe have concentrated heavily on problems on NATO’s southern flank.2 Few have systematically examined the area’s security problems in a broader regional ~ontext.~ With the end of the Cold War, however, the security context in South- eastern Europe is changing. Many old antagonisms and problems remain. At the same time new forces are at work which could have an important impact on the security of the area as well as European security more broadly. A reexamination of the security problems in the region therefore seems both timely and necessary. This article focuses on the security problems in the Balkans after the Cold War. The first section examines the problems of democratization and con- 2. See in particular John Chipman, ed., NATO’s Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges (London: Routledge, 1988); Monteagle Steams, Updating the Truman Doctrine, International Se- curity Studies Program, Working Paper No. 86 (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center, 1989); Richard Haass, ”Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean-Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part I,” in Prospects for Security in the Mediterranean, Adelphi Paper No. 229 (London:International Institute for Strategic Studies [IISS], 1988), pp. 61-71; Robert McDonald, “Alliance Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean-Greece, Turkey and Cyprus: Part 11,” ibid., pp. 72-85; and Jed C. Snyder, “Strategic Bias and Southern Flank Security,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Sum- mer 1985), pp. 123-142. 3. Two exceptions are F. Stephen Larrabee, Balkan Security, Adelphi Paper No. 135 (London: IISS, 1976); and Paul S. Shoup, ed., Problems of Balkan Security: Southeastern Europe in the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: The Wilson Center Press, 1990). lnternational Security 15:3 I 60 solidation in the "post-communist" states of the balk an^.^ The second section focuses on the crisis in Yugoslavia. The third section looks at a number of unresolved ethnic and territorial conflicts in the area and their implications for regional security. The final section examines the potential role of Western policy, especially that of the United States, in enhancing security in South- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 eastern Europe. Democratization and Change In the 1990s the security dilemmas in the Balkans are likely to be exacerbated by several interconnected developments. The first stems from problems re- lated to democratization in the post-communist states of the region. This process is likely to be bumpy and difficult for several reasons. First, unlike other countries in Europe that underwent transitions from authoritarian to democratic systems (such as Spain, Greece, and Portugal), the post-communist states in the Balkans and the rest of Eastern Europe will have to undergo a "dual transition": that is, they will have to change both their political systems and their economic systems at the same time. This dual transition will significantly complicate the transition process and will increase the possibility of political instability in many of these states. Second, none of the countries in the post-communist Balkans has any lengthy experience with democracy. For most of the interwar period Ro- mania, Bulgaria, Albania, and Yugoslavia were under authoritarian rule of one form or an~ther.~The few democratic institutions that did exist were largely destroyed under communist rule. Thus these countries will have to begin practically from scratch to build new democratic institutions. Third, nationalism has historically been a strong force in the Balkans6 The erosion of communist rule in Eastern Europe may, as Zbigniew Brzezinski 4. The term "post-communist" is used loosely here to refer to the process of democratization set in motion by the upheavals in the communist states of Europe in 1989. This process has been more far-reaching in some states than in others. Romania and Bulgaria are at the very beginning stages, while in parts of Yugoslavia the process is quite advanced. In Albania the process has not really begun at all. Despite the obvious distinctions among them, I include in the term "post-communist" Bulgaria, Romania and Yugoslavia. 5. For developments in the interwar periods see Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Paul Lendvai, Eagles in the Cobwebs: Nationalism and Communism in the Balkans (New York: Doubleday, 1969); Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars 2928-2942 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1967); and Robert L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Tim (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956). 6. On the role of nationalism in the Balkans, see in particular the selections in Peter F. Sugar and Ivo J. Lederer, eds., Nationalism in Eastern Europe (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969). Long Memories and Short Fuses I 62 and others have argued, lead to the resurgence of nati~nalism,~particularly in the Balkans. The anti-Turkish demonstrations in Bulgaria in January 1990 and the clashes in Transylvania between the Romanian population and the Hungarian minority in March 1990 indicate that nationalism is far from dead in both countries. Indeed, both could witness a re-nationalization of politics, Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/isec/article-pdf/15/3/58/691468/isec.15.3.58.pdf by guest on 30 September 2021 in which weak semi-democratic regimes seek to bolster their popular support through appeals to nationalism.8 In Yugoslavia, as Tito’s legacy has begun to dissolve, nationalist tensions and historical antagonisms have reasserted themselves with increasing inten- sity. Moreover, these nationalist tensions have tended to be mutually re- inforcing. Albanian nationalism and separatism in Kosovo, discussed below, has sparked a strong reaction among the Serbs and Macedonians of Yugoslavia, which Serbian leader Slobodan MiloSevik has sought to exploit.

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