Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D’HISTOIRE DES IDÉES
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Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES D’HISTOIRE DES IDÉES INTERNATIONAL ARCHIVES OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 210 SCEPTICISM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: ENLIGHTENMENT, LUMIÈRES, AUFKLÄRUNG Edited by Sébastien Charles • Plínio J. Smith Board of Directors: Founding Editors: Paul Dibon†, Richard H. Popkin† Director: Sarah Hutton, University of Aberystwyth, UK Associate Directors: J.E. Force, University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA; J.C. Laursen, University of California, Riverside, USA Editorial Board: M.J.B. Allen, Los Angeles; J.-R. Armogathe, Paris; S. Clucas, London; G. Giglioni, London; P. Harrison, Oxford; J. Henry, Edinburgh; M. Mulsow, Erfurt; G. Paganini, Vercelli; J. Popkin, Lexington; J. Robertson, Cambridge; G.A.J. Rogers, Keele; J.F. Sebastian, Bilbao; A. Sutcliffe, London; A. Thomson, Paris; Th. Verbeek, Utrecht For further volumes: http://www.springer.com/series/5640 Sébastien Charles • Plínio J. Smith Editors Scepticism in the Eighteenth Century: Enlightenment, Lumières, Aufklärung Editors Sébastien Charles Plínio J. Smith Université de Sherbrooke Departamento de Filoso fi a Sherbrooke Universidade Federal de São Paulo Québec, Canada Guarulhos, Brazil ISSN 0066-6610 ISBN 978-94-007-4809-5 ISBN 978-94-007-4810-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-007-4810-1 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg New York London Library of Congress Control Number: 2013937200 © Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2013 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, speci fi cally the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on micro fi lms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. Exempted from this legal reservation are brief excerpts in connection with reviews or scholarly analysis or material supplied speci fi cally for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Duplication of this publication or parts thereof is permitted only under the provisions of the Copyright Law of the Publisher’s location, in its current version, and permission for use must always be obtained from Springer. Permissions for use may be obtained through RightsLink at the Copyright Clearance Center. Violations are liable to prosecution under the respective Copyright Law. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a speci fi c statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. While the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication, neither the authors nor the editors nor the publisher can accept any legal responsibility for any errors or omissions that may be made. The publisher makes no warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein. Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com) Preface The Age of Enlightenment has often been portrayed as a dogmatic period on account of the veritable worship of reason and progress that characterized eighteenth century thinkers. Even today the philosophes are considered to have been com- pletely dominated in their thinking by an optimism that leads to dogmatism and ultimately rationalism. On this view scepticism is no more than an epiphenomenon that offers some nuance to dogmatic assertions, but which has nothing positive to propose in response. How, on such a view, are we to reconcile the rationalist trium- phalism attributed to Enlightenment thinkers with the corrosive critique of reason allegedly developed by the sceptics? Therein must lie contradiction, and the con- junction of scepticism and Enlightenment in the title of this volume might well seem surprising in as much as it con fl icts with the image of the eighteenth century to which we continue to hold. One indication of this state of affairs can be found in Richard Popkin’s judgment concerning scepticism in the Enlightenment. According to Popkin, scepticism had no major in fl uence on the philosophical debates of the eighteenth century.1 At bottom, Popkin portrays scepticism—at least in his earliest articles on the topic—as reducible to three great philosophical currents, namely, the survival of Montainian and Baylean Pyrrhonism, an irrationalist fi deism that would remerge a century later in Kierkegaard, and an epistemological scepticism characteristic of the earliest opponents of Kant’s critical philosophy in the heart of the Berlin Academy. However, for Popkin, these currents did not achieve a wider scope for which reason we might well speak of a ‘subterranean scepticism’ whose in fl uence on the intellectual scene of the Enlightenment was meager, if not non-existent. Scepticism, then, would be reducible to the emblematic fi gure of Hume—a reduction that could be justi fi ed only if his scepticism had been fully appreciated. However, as is well known, Hume’s reputation among the philosophes was based more on his work as a 1 Cf. Richard Popkin, “Scepticism in the Enlightenment”, 1963, reprinted in Richard Popkin et al. (eds.), Scepticism in the Enlightenment , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1997, pp. 1–16, and “Scepticism and Anti-Scepticism in the Latter Part of the Eighteenth century”, 1976, reprinted in Richard Popkin et al., op. cit. , pp. 17–34. v vi Preface historian than as a philosopher. If scepticism was present, it was limited to France at the dawn of eighteenth century, during which time appeared the writings of Pierre Bayle, the Latin and then French translations of Sextus Empiricus’ Hypotyposes , and the posthumous Traité de la faiblesse de l’entendement humain of Pierre-Daniel Huet. Because none of these works exerted signi fi cant in fl uence over future generations, Popkin concluded that scepticism could not have been one of the major features of a century marked by the progress of knowledge and technical inno- vation—an evolution whose quintessential expression can be found in the Encyclopedia of Diderot and d’Alembert. The numerous studies of modern scepticism that have subsequently appeared, including those of recent years, have largely followed in Popkin’s footsteps in emphasizing the importance of scepticism for the seventeenth century while dismissing its in fl uence on the following century 2 (with the exception of the fi rst half of the eighteenth century). 3 Authors have chosen to focus on sceptical anteced- ents in the Renaissance rather than the continuation of scepticism into the following century. 4 The republication of Popkin’s foundational work is a clear proof of this tendency, in so far as he ends his study of modern scepticism with Bayle. 5 As a general rule, if eighteenth century scepticism is studied at all, it is in its British and German manifestations. Hume continues to appear as the sole Enlightenment sceptic, and Berkeley and Kant as the rare thinkers who were able to make use of scepticism the better to refute it. 6 Thus, it is no surprise that commentators have followed 2 José Raimundo Maia Neto and Richard Popkin (eds.), Scepticism in Renaissance and Post-Renaissance Thought. New Interpretations , New York, Humanity Books, 2004. 3 Richard Popkin and Charles B. Schmitt (eds.), Scepticism from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment , Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1987; Gianni Paganini, Scepsi Moderna. Interpretazioni dello scetti- cismo da Charron a Hume , Cosenza, Edizioni Busento, 1991 ; Richard Popkin and Arjo Vanderjagt (eds.), Scepticism and Irreligion in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries , Leiden, Brill, 1993; Julián Marades Millet and Nicolas Sánchez Durá (eds.), Mirar con cuidado. Filosofía y escepti- cismo , Valencia, Artes Grá fi cas Soler, 1994 ; Lother Kreimendahl, (ed.), Aufklärung und Skepsis. Studien zur Philosophie und Geistesgeschichte des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts (Festschrift G. Gawlick), Stuttgart, Fromman-Holzboog, 1995; Richard Glauser, Berkeley et les philosophes du XVII e siècle : perception et scepticisme , Sprimont, Mardaga, 1999; Frédéric Brahami, Le travail du scepticisme : Montaigne, Bayle, Hume , Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2001; Gianni Paganini (ed.), The Return of Scepticism from Hobbes and Descartes to Bayle , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2003; Gianni Paganini, Skepsis. Le débat des modernes sur le scepticisme , Paris, Vrin, 2008. 4 Pierre-François Moreau (dir.), Le scepticisme au XVI e et au XVII e siècle , Paris, Albin Michel, 2001. 5 Richard Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Savonarola to Bayle , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003. The same holds true for Sylvia Giocanti, Penser l’irrésolution : Montaigne, Pascal, La Mothe le Vayer, trois itinéraires sceptiques , Paris, Honoré Champion, 2001. 6 Richard Popkin, The High Road to Pyrrhonism , Indianapolis, Hackett, 1980; Richard Watson and James E. Force (eds.), The Sceptical Mode in Modern Philosophy. Essays in Honor of Richard H. Popkin , Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1988. A noteworthy exception is Sébastien Charles, Berkeley au siècle des Lumières. Immatérialisme et scepticisme au XVIII e siècle , Paris, Vrin, 2003, although it is primarily concerned with an extreme form of scepticism, namely solipsism. With regard to Kant in particular, see Michael