DOCSLIB.ORG

Communist and Post-Communist Studies

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Communist and Post-Communist Studies Communist and Post-Communist Studies Communist and Post-Communist Studies is an international journal covering all communist and post-communist states and communist movements, including both their domestic policies and international relations. It is focused on the analysis of historical as well as current develop- ments in the communist and post-communist world, including ideology, economy and society. It also aims to provide comparative foci on a given subject (e.g. education in China) by inviting comments of a comparative character from scholars specializing in the same sub- ject matter but in different countries (e.g. education in Poland or Romania). In addition to the traditional disciplines of history, political science, economics and international relations, the editors encourage the submission of articles in less developed fields of social sciences and humanities, such as cultural anthropology, education, geography, religon and sociology. JOINT EDITORS Andrzej Korbonski Luba Fajfer University of California, Los Angeles US Agency for International Development Center for European and Russian Studies Bureau for European and Eurasian Affairs 405 Hilgard Avenue RRB 5.10-042, 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Los Angeles, CA 90095-1446 Washington. DC 20523-2052 Lucy Kerner University of California, Los Angeles Center for European and Russian Studies 405 Hilgard Avenue Los Angeles, CA 90095–1446 EDITORS EMERITI Peter Berton University of Southern California, Los Angeles EDITORIAL BOARD Richard Anderson, Department of Political Science, Arnold Horelick, Carnegie Dowment for International UCLA Peace, 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington Richard Baum, Department of Political Science, Philip G Roeder, Department of Political Science, UCLA University of California, San Diego Ivan Berend, Department of History, UCLA Azade-Ayse Rorlich, Department of History, Ellen T Comisso, Department of Political Science, University of Southern California University of California, San Diego Susan L Shirk, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Gregory Grossman, Department of Economics, Affairs, US Department of State University of California, Berkeley Ivan Szelenyi, Department of Sociology, UCLA Dale R Herspring, Department of Political Science, James Tong, Department of Political Science, UCLA Kansas State University INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY BOARD Attil Agh, Department of Political Science, Budapest Boris Kapustin, Department of Political Science, The University of Economic Sciences Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences Rorlich Azade-Ayse, Department of History, University of Southern California Hisroshi Kimura, International Research Center for Japanese Studies, Kyoto Oleg T Bogomolov, Institute for International Economic and Political Studies, Russian Academy of Marie Lavigne, Department of Economics, Sciences Universite de Pau, France Archie Brown, St Antony’s College, Oxford Galia Golan, Department of Political Science, The Piotr Sztompka, Department of Sociology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jagiellonian University, Krakow Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 131e165 www.elsevier.com/locate/postcomstud Ukraine’s 1994 elections as an economic event Robert S. Kravchuk a,*, Victor Chudowsky b a School of Public & Environmental Affairs, Indiana University, 1315 East 10th St., Suite 433, Bloomington, IN 47405-1701, USA b Meridian International Center, 1630 Crescent Place, N.W., Washington, DC 20009, USA Abstract This article explores the political, economic, and social forces underlying the east/west cleavage in the 1994 Ukrainian presidential and parliamentary elections. We demonstrate that economic factorsdnotably, variations in regional economic strength and changes in employment in the period preceding the electionsdare stronger predictors of country-wide voting behavior and candidate support than ethnic and linguistic factors. The exceptions are the extreme eastern and western oblasts, where the analysis suggests the existence of significant differences in political culture. Ó 2005 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Ukraine; Elections; Former Soviet Union; Post-communism Introduction: prospects for democratic consolidation The literature on the political transformations in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union maintains that consolidation of democracy will be a lengthy process, * Corresponding author. Tel.: C1 812 855 5971. E-mail address: [email protected] (R.S. Kravchuk). 0967-067X/$ - see front matter Ó 2005 The Regents of the University of California. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.postcomstud.2005.03.001 132 R.S. Kravchuk, V. Chudowsky / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 131e165 marked by a prolonged stage of political instability which has been termed ‘‘postcommunism’’ (Bunce, 1995; Daedalus, 1994; Fish, 1993, 1995; McFaul, 1993a,b; Scho¨pflin, 1994; Tong, 1995). Scho¨pflin, for instance, asserts that the communist experience has atomized post-socialist populations, plunging them into a ‘‘semi-permanent’’ state of confusion and disappointment. Much of the literature holds that the legacies of communism (that is, mass alienation, ethnic nationalism, lack of democratic traditions, distrust of political parties, a fledgling civil society) pose serious difficulties for consolidating democracy. In this view, a highly chaotic political atmosphere will render it difficult for the masses to identify their interests. This will lead to ‘‘state-centered,’’ or as we call them, ‘‘statist’’ political systems, in which there are ideological divisions, widespread distrust of government, and rampant corruption. The state fills the void that civil society cannot fill. In the nascent post-communist political culture, elections will turn on personalities, rather than on social or material interests. Inordinate faith will therefore be placed in strong leaders, essentially benevolent dictators (Kubicek, 1994; Rose and Haerpfer, 1994; White et al., 1994). In interviews the authors conducted in 1993e1995, some prominent Ukrainian politicians described the people as ‘‘waiting for Pinochet.’’ The vestiges of communism thus include both cultural and institutional pathologies that tend to produce a highly volatile brand of politics, which militates against development of democratic traditions. To the casual observer, Ukraine exhibits symptoms of suffering from the ‘‘postcommunist condition.’’ It is commonplace to focus on the floundering party system, fledgling civic organizations, occasional rhetoric of ethnic intolerance, and nascent nationalism. Commentators especially dwell on the political divergencies between Ukraine’s eastern and western regions. In the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections, the east voted predominantly communist or socialist, while the west was a bastion of nationalist and democratic support. The common interpretation of the election result is that differences in language, ethnic heritage, and political culture constitute the major fault lines in Ukraine; the east having been more thoroughly ‘‘russified’’ than the west, and therefore less enthused with market reforms and links with Western Europe (Arel, 1994, 1995; Arel and Wilson, 1994; Bilous and Wilson, 1993). Much of the recent literature focuses on linguistic and ethno-regional factors as the key to understanding Ukraine’s future path of economic and political development. Andrew Wilson is, perhaps, the most vocal proponent of this view, writing that, ‘‘it needs to be restated that ethnolinguistic and geopolitical factors and not economic issues decided the 1994 presidential contest’’ (Wilson, 2000). Wilson bases his conclusions on a study of maps. But the study of Ukrainian political culture is in its infancy, and many potential explanatory factors have yet to be thoroughly explored. Consequently, this article explores the political, economic, and social forces underlying the east/west cleavage in Ukrainian politics through an examination of the 1994 presidential and parliamentary elections. Our main finding is that, contrary to the common view of Ukrainian politics, economic factorsdnotably, variations in regional economic strength and increases in state sector unemploymentdare stronger predictors of political activity and voting R.S. Kravchuk, V. Chudowsky / Communist and Post-Communist Studies 38 (2005) 131e165 133 behavior than ethnic or linguistic factors. The data support the conclusion that the strength of leftist forces in eastern Ukraine in 1994 was based on the relative economic decline there. Ethnicity appears to overlay Ukraine’s 1994 electoral outcome, but does not constitute the sole foundation for Ukraine’s 1994 political cleavage. Ethnicity was all but completely overshadowed by economic factors, except on a region-by-region basis, where ethnicity is a significant factor (albeit weaker than economic factors). These results will be seen to contradict the main contention of the ‘‘postcommunism’’ literature, that the voters are an amorphous mass, unable to identify their interests, and ultimately malleable by the demagoguery of the strong leaders that are certain to emerge. Events leading to the 1994 elections It has become commonplace to note the political divergencies between the eastern and western regions of Ukraine. Observers point out that the East votes predominantly communist or socialist, while the West is the traditional base of nationalism and democratic support. The common interpretation is that the main cleavage in Ukrainian politics
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Ukraine Ukraine at a Glance: 2002-03
    COUNTRY REPORT Ukraine Ukraine at a glance: 2002-03 OVERVIEW Efforts by both pro- and anti-presidential forces to gain the upper hand in the parliamentary election due by March 2002 will increasingly dominate the political scene. The president, Leonid Kuchma, and his parliamentary allies are likely to succeed in using their superior administrative and media resources to limit the gains of their opponents. The government will remain in power until the 2002 election and is unlikely to roll back its predecessor’s reform achievements, although electoral politics will preclude further significant reforms. The economy will grow at a more moderate pace in 2002-03, following buoyant growth in 2001. Year-end inflation will rise slightly to 12% in 2002, owing to further price liberalisation and election- related policy loosening, before falling again in 2003. Sustained export growth will ensure current-account surpluses in 2002-03, although these will narrow because of strengthening import demand and continued real currency appreciation. Key changes from last month Political outlook • The former prime minister Viktor Yushchenko looks increasingly likely to try to build an alliance for the 2002 election that is more centre- than reform-based. Economic policy outlook • Multilateral financing has resumed as expected, and should now permit completion of Ukraine’s Paris Club debts. The narrowing of the budget surplus in August underlines the Economist Intelligence Unit’s forecast that the government is likely to end the year with a slight budget deficit. Economic forecast • Preliminary trade data for the start of the third quarter has prompted a slight revision in our trade surplus forecast for this year.
    [Show full text]
  • Yes 2012 Report.Pdf
    CONFERENCE OPENING Dear Friends, Today, countries are in a global race that gets faster and faster. I am not a political scientist - as an art collector I like to use art when I speak about global challenges. Let me use the famous photographer Andreas Gursky’s “Boxenstopp” as an analogy. A pit stop in Formula 1. One team is blue and yellow. This is Ukraine; these are Ukraine’s colours. What is the Ukrainian team doing? I believe - reforms. In the global race, reforms are pit stops allowing you to change and speed up. Some countries which were slow before improve their position. Like cars that put on the right new tires and fill up with the right amount of gasoline, they can overtake others. Others put on the wrong equip- ment or lose too much time in the pit stop and fall behind. I hope Ukraine’s team will be successful. And I hope for all of us this conference will be an intellectual pit stop where we refuel and re-equip ourselves, take in new energy and ideas, to help all our respective countries become smarter, better, more productive, more just. For this, we have fantastic speakers with us in Yalta, political leaders, business leaders, social leaders, intellectuals. I look forward to our discussions. Victor Pinchuk, Founder and Member of the Board, Yalta European Strategy 1 AGENDA 9th YALTA ANNUAL MEETING Ukraine and the World: Addressing Tomorrow’s Challenges Together AGENDA Thursday, September 13 21:20 – 21:25 Welcoming Remarks Aleksander Kwasniewski, President of Poland (1995-2005); Chairman of the Board, Yalta European Strategy
    [Show full text]
  • EURASIA DAILY MONITOR Volume 5 , Issue 125 (July 01, 2008)
    EURASIA DAILY MONITOR Volume 5 , Issue 125 (July 01, 2008) OLIGARCHS WIELD POWER IN UKRAINIAN POLITICS By Taras Kuzio The leading Ukrainian magazine Korrespondent (June 12) published its annual list of wealthy Ukrainians. The most surprising new information was the estimate of Donetsk oligarch Renat Akhmetov’s wealth. Akhmetov, the head of Systems Capital Management, is worth $31.1 billion, making him the wealthiest person not only in the CIS but also in Europe. This revelation comes on top of the highest real estate purchase ever recorded in Britain to Olena Franchuk, the wife of Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Pinchuk and daughter of former President Leonid Kuchma (London Evening Standard, February 26). The purchase was for 80 million pounds ($160 million). London is fast becoming a refuge not only for Russian but also Ukrainian oligarchs. Russian political exiles, such as Boris Berezovskiy, flee to London while Ukrainian exiles (Ruslan Bodelan) flee to Russia. This is testimony to the different approaches to money laundering and due diligence undertaken by the United States and the EU. In the U.S. former Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko was convicted and jailed in 2004 for money laundering $120 million into the United States, $40 million less than Franchuk paid for her new London home. Four years of political instability in Ukraine have not damaged the ability of Ukraine’s oligarchs to increase their capitalization during President Viktor Yushchenko’s administration. Political instability has not affected the economy, which has continued robust growth; purchasing power is high and foreign direct investment is at record levels. According to Korrespondent editor Vitaliy Sych, Akhmetov’s estimated wealth has doubled in the past year because of three factors.
    [Show full text]
  • Inside Ukraine 33
    Inside Ukraine October 16, 2014 №33 Content The Government Policy . 1 The President summed up the peace plan implementation . 1 A breakthrough in anti-corruption legislation . 3 Economic Situation . 5 Donbass losses from Russian aggression . 5 Separatists seek “energy autonomy” . 7 Political competition . 9 Diversification “Privat-style” . 9 Increasing role of Serhiy Lyovochkin . 10 Inside Ukraine 33 The Government Policy Experts’ criticism regarding presidential adminis- This issue can be resolved by identifying and punish- tration’s mistakes in information policy on Donbas ing those responsible for provocations and unrest. issues has brought positive results. Communication The Verkhovna Rada has adopted a package of between the President and citizens became more anti-corruption laws proposed by Petro Porosh- regular. Recently, he has summed up the first month enko and Arseniy Yatsenyuk. The package includes of his peace plan implementation. Stopping the en- laws on prosecutor’s office, determining final ben- emy along the frontline and decrease in the number eficiaries of legal entities, anti-corruption strategy, of casualties have become the key achievements of the National Anti-corruption Bureau and National the plan. Peaceful settlement of the conflict remains Commission for the Prevention of Corruption. On the only possible option for the President. the same day, the President established the National Nevertheless, the President took several regional Council for Anti-Corruption Policy with similar trips in order to inspect the level of defense capabil- functions as those of the National Commission. ity and made several appointments in security block. This testifies that the President and the Prime Min- Russia’s attempts to destabilize the situation in Kyiv ister will be trying to personally control the issue of using protests of radical groups and law enforcement combatting corruption.
    [Show full text]
  • The Oligarchic Democracy: the Influence of Business Groups On
    42 THE OLIGARCHIC DEMOCRACY THE INFLUENCE OF BUSINESS GROUPS ON UKRAINIAN POLITICS Sławomir Matuszak NUMBER 42 WARSAW September 2012 THE OLIGARCHIC DEMOCRACY THE INFLUENCE OF BUSINESS GROUPS ON UKRAINIAN POLITICS Sławomir Matuszak © Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies Content EDitors Adam Eberhardt, Wojciech Konończuk EDitorS Anna Łabuszewska Katarzyna Kazimierska Translation Ilona Duchnowicz CO-operation Nicholas Furnival Graphic Design Para-buch CHARTS Wojciech Mańkowski PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER Shutterstock DTP GroupMedia Publisher Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia Centre for Eastern Studies ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00 Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40 osw.waw.pl ISBN 978-83-62936-14-4 Contents THESES /5 MAIN SEctORS OF BUSINESS ActIVITY OF THE KEY UKRAINIAN OLIGARCHS /8 INTRODUctION /9 RESERVATIONS /11 I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE OLIGARCHIC SYSTEM AND ITS FORM IN 1991–2004 /13 1. The genesis of the oligarchic system /13 2. The formation of the clans /13 3. The beginnings of a system crisis /17 4. The Orange Revolution /20 II. THE OLIGARCHS IN 2005–2010 /23 1. The orange ‘oligarchic democracy’ /25 1.1. The business circles linked to the Party of Regions /26 1.2. ‘Orange’ business /27 1.3. The others /30 2. Tymoshenko’s conflict with the RUE Group /32 3. The attempt to form a grand coalition /32 4. The presidential election of 2010 /34 III. THE OLIGARCHS AFTER VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH’S VIctORY /37 1. The key groups of influence in the state administration/37 2. ‘The family’ – an attempt at a new quality /40 3.
    [Show full text]
  • The Impact of Changes in Electoral Systems: a Comparative Analysis of the Local Election in Ukraine in 2006 and 2010
    STUDIA VOL. 36 POLITOLOGICZNE STUDIA I ANALIZY Olena Yatsunska The impact of changes in electoral systems: a comparative analysis of the local election in Ukraine in 2006 and 2010 KEY WORDS: local government, local elections, proportional electoral system, majoritarian electoral system, mixed majoritarian-proportional electoral system, Ukraine STUDIA I ANALIZY Having gained independence in 1991 Ukraine, like most Central and East- ern European countries, faced the need for radical Constitutional reforms, with reorganization of local government figuring high in the agenda. Like other post-soviet countries, Ukraine had to decide on the starting point and like in the neighboring countries, democratic euphoria of the early 1990s got the upper hand: local authorities were elected on March 18, 1990, while the Law On Local People’s Deputies of Ukrainian SSR and Local Self-government was adopted by Verkhovna Rada of Ukrainian SSR on December 7, 1990. Ukrain- ian Researchers in the field of local government and its reforms concur with the opinion that the present dissatisfactory state of that institution was con- ditioned by the first steps made by Ukrainian Politicians at the beginning of the ‘transition’ period. Without clear perspective of reform, during more than 20 years of Independence, Ukrainian local government has abided dozens of laws, sometimes rather contradictory and has survived more than 10 stages of restructuring. Evolution of election legislation in Ukraine is demonstrated by Table 1. The table shows that since 1994 three electoral systems have been tested in Ukraine: 1, Majoritarian, 2, Proportional except elections to village and settlement councils and 3, ‘Mixed’ system (50% Majoritarian+50% Proportional).
    [Show full text]
  • The Negative Consequences of Proportional Representation in Ukraine
    THE NEGATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION IN UKRAINE SERHIJ VASYLCHENKO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHER Abstract: Ukraine has changed its electoral law numerous times. The first two elections to the parliament in 1990 and 1994 employed a single-member district majoritarian system. The Verkhovna Rada elections in 1998 and 2002 used a mixed system with single- member districts and proportional representation. The parliamentary elections in 2006 and 2007 were purely proportional representation. Finally, the elections in 2012 went back to the mixed system. This article argues that the use of proportional representation has facilitated extensive manipulation in the Ukrainian political system through the creation of “party projects” and by severing the link between parliamentarians and their constituents. fter Ukraine gained its independence in 1991, it faced an urgent need Ato reform its electoral legislation to address new political realities – most importantly, the development of a multiparty system in place of the previous one-party system that had ruled the Soviet Union. According to the existing law adopted during the Soviet era, parties other than the Communist Party of the Soviet Union had no legal basis. That law laid out a first past the post majoritarian system in which the winner had to win an absolute majority of the votes.1 The opposition national-democrat deputies in the People’s Rada group in the first years of independence supported electoral law reform Serhij Vasylchenko is an independent political geographer in Ukraine, [email protected]. 1 Law “On elections of the people’s deputies of the Ukrainian SSR” from October 27, 1987, Vedomosti Verkhnoi Rady USSR, 1989 addendum to N 45, article 626 <http://zakon4.rada.
    [Show full text]
  • FY 2000 Country Commercial Guide: Ukraine
    U.S. Department of State FY 2000 Country Commercial Guide: Ukraine The Country Commercial Guides for Ukraine was prepared by U.S. Embassy Kiev and released by the Bureau of Economic and Business in July 1999 for Fiscal Year 2000. International Copyright, U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service and the U.S. Department of State, 1999. All rights reserved outside the United States. Note: This information has been compiled as a source of information for American business representatives working in Ukraine. A company listing should not in any way be perceived as an official endorsement of a company or its services. Individuals requiring business services in Ukraine are urged to shop around before selecting the company best suited to meet their individual needs. TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CHATPER II ECONOMIC TRENDS AND OUTLOOK A. Major Trends and Outlook B. Principal Growth Sectors C. Government Role in the Economy D. Balance of Payments Situation E. Infrastructure CHAPTER III POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT A. Nature of Bilateral Relationship with the United States B. Major Political Issues Affecting Business Climate Change C. Political System, Election Schedule, Orientation of Major Parties CHAPTER IV MARKETING U.S. PRODUCTS AND SERVICES A. Distribution and Sales Channels B. Use of Agents and Distributors; Finding a Partner C. Franchising D. Direct Marketing E. Join Ventures/Licensing F. Steps to Establishing an Office G. Selling Factors/Techniques H. Advertising and Trade Promotion I. Product Pricing J. Sales Service/Customer Support K. Selling to the Government L. Need for a Local Attorney M. Performing Due Diligence/Checking Bona Fides of Banks/Agents/Customers CHAPTER V LEADING SECTORS FOR U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • For Free Distribution
    AN OVERVIEW OF PARTIES AND CANDIDATES WILL KHARKIV BECOME STORY OF A MAN WHO SPENT RUNNING FOR SEATS IN PARLIAMENT THE NEXT SEPARATIST HOTSPOT A MONTH IN CAPTIVITY IN DONBAS № 13 (79) OCTOBER 2014 WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM Featuring selected content from The Economist FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION |CONTENTS BRIEFING Where Are Estonia’sF riends? A New World Order: The NATO does not know how to deal with small, confusing new rules imposed on challenges, so Russia unleashes them. If they go unpunished, the world by the Russian they set a precedent dictator create a cruel no- holds-barred game. When 27 it is in full swing, the soft Nuclear Whimper: Edward Lucas on trust and the West comfort of Western life may easily disappear forever 28 4 ECONOMICS On the Edge of Recession: The West’s sanctions are hitting POLITICS Russia’s contracting economy Back to Black: The Ukrainian Week looks at party lists and independent candidates to see how many “new faces” the 29 upcoming parliament will have A Plea for Change: Transition from oligarch economy to EU membership for Ukraine 6 The Next People’s Republic? Without “tourists” from Russia, 30 the separatist movement in Kharkiv has quickly marginalized. If Nobel-winning economistR oger Myerson: not for pro-Russian sympathies of the local authorities, it would “Many arguments against decentralisation are based hardly pose any threat at all on a misconception of what it means” 10 34 Separatism From Top Offices of Kyiv: SECURITY Separatism in Ukraine is Ex-Defence MinisterM ykhailo Koval talks about the army, predominantly
    [Show full text]
  • Nationalism and Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Thought: the Ontology of Resistance
    Nationalism and Orthodoxy in Ukrainian Political Thought: The Ontology of Resistance Matthew Raphael Johnson Introduction: Ukraine and “the Nation” The Hetmanate as the Central Element in Ukrainian Political Ideas: The Background to Ukrainian Social Thought From Pereslav to Andrusovo: The Horror of the 17th Century Ivan Vyshenskii (d. 1620) and Gregory Skovoroda (d. 1794) Taras Shevchenko (d. 1861) Drahomanov (d. 1895) and Kostamarov (d. 1885) Ivan Franko (d. 1916) The UAOC under Patriarchs Dmitri and Volodymyr The Autocephalous Orthodox Church in the 20th Century under Vasyl Lypkivsky and the Poltava Movement An Overview of Ukrainian Nationalism in the Second Half of the 20th Century From the Second World to the Void, Ukraine's Second Ruin: 1990 to 2015 Conclusions (c) Hromada Books, 2017 ISBN: 978-1-387-11207-4 Acknowledgments The typical book on Ukrainian history is written in well funded universities by alienated, urban and cultureless professors. These privileged dons have an army of research assistants (sometimes called “students”) whose uncopyrighted research is no doubt valuable as raw material. High salaries, total job security, secretaries, graduate assistants, grant money and a host of other privileges make their job much easier. How much of their books is really their work is something that is not likely to be solved. Given that so much of this is written by others, with the assistance of so many others, and on university time generously funded by taxpayers (among other people), the claim to copyright is a sick joke. While their privileges are many, it does come at a price: their total lack of freedom.
    [Show full text]
  • Ukraine's Party System Evolution: 1990-2017
    RAZUMKOV CENTRE UKRAINE’S PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION: 1990-2017 The publication is supported by the Ukrainian Office of Konrad Adenauer Foundation 2017 UKRAINE`S PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION: 1990-2017 / Edited by Yu.Yakymenko. – Kyiv: Razumkov Сentre, 2017. – p.62 This publication presents an abridged version of the Analytical Report by the Razumkov Centre that examines the emergence and further transformation of Ukraine’s party system in 1990-2017. We have examined key drivers of change at each evolution stage, such as legislation on political parties and elections; political regime; most significant societal cleavages, nature and consequences of their influence; analysed current trends in Ukraine’s party system development. The publication will be useful for everyone interested in post-independence nation-building processes in Ukraine, development of political parties and the party system, experience of political transformations in post-Soviet countries. © Razumkov Centre, 2017 © “Zapovit Publishing House”, 2017 UKRAINE’S PARTY SYSTEM EVOLUTION: 1990-2017 olitical parties are an important institution of a democratic society, P which ensures aggregation and articulation of the interests of various social groups. Interaction among parties in their struggle for power and the exercise of political power by them form a party system. The process of party system formation in Ukraine has been going on for more than 25 years. This publication represents a shortened version of the Razumkov Centre’s report, which examines the fundamental stages of the party system formation in 1990-2017, including intra-party processes, institutional legal and socio-political conditions for their activities and inter-party relations.1 1. STUDY METHODOLOGY The Razumkov Centre’s study uses an approach that combines elements of quantitative and qualitative approaches to the analysis of party system dynamics and takes into account changes of the three following components that define party system and/or affect it.
    [Show full text]
  • Secret Archives from Soviet Era Presented to Kyiv-Mohyla Academy
    InsIde: • Binghamton remembers victims of 2009 shooting – page 4. • Theater review: “Scythian Stones” at La MaMa – page 8. • Archeological field research continues at Baturyn – centerfold. THEPublished U by theKRA Ukrainian NationalIN AssociationIAN Inc., a fraternal Wnon-profit associationEEKLY Vol. LXXVIII No.17 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, APRIL 25, 2010 $1/$2 in Ukraine Secret archives from Soviet era Russia grants Ukraine gas discount presented to Kyiv-Mohyla Academy in return for extension of fleet’s lease by Larysa Syvolozhska RFE/RL of Ukrainian-Russian relations, are a clear signal of the warming ties between the KYIV – The National University of Kyiv KYIV – Ukraine has agreed to a two countries after years of hostility. Mohyla Academy has received a digital lengthy extension for the Russian Black Moscow had been unable to win a copy of historic declassified documents of Sea Fleet’s base in Crimea in exchange lease extension from President the Soviet era (1918-1991) from the for a major discount on Kyiv’s imports of Yanukovych’s predecessor, Western- Archives of the Security Service of Ukraine. Russian gas. leaning Viktor Yushchenko, who per- The transfer of previously secret NKVD- The lease on the base will be extended ceived the Russian fleet as a hostile pres- KGB (People’s Commissariat for Internal for another 25 years beyond the current ence on Ukrainian soil. Affairs – Committee for State Security) files term, which was due to expire in 2017. In Ukraine’s new government, in turn, is regarded as a remarkable event and illus- return, Russia has pledged to cut the price badly needed a Russian gas discount to trates the need for transparency and the Ukraine pays for Russian natural gas.
    [Show full text]