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Setanxmeba Zalis Argamoyenebis Sesaxeb: Tbilisi Gzagasayarze

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Setanxmeba Zalis Argamoyenebis Sesaxeb: Tbilisi Gzagasayarze SeTanxmeba Zalis argamoyenebis Sesaxeb: Tbilisi gzagasayarze ivane abramaSvili zviad avaliani 2017 Tqvens winaSea regionuli usafrTxoebis erT-erTi meqanizmis, Zalis argamoy- enebis sakiTxis Sesaxeb qarTul sazogadoebaSi arsebuli midgomebis analizisa da SesaZlo gzebis dasaxvis Sesaxeb Catarebuli kvleva. am masalaze dayrdno- biT Seqmnili moxseneba wakiTxuli iyo 2017w 10-12 Tebervals minskSi, belarusi, Catarebul saerTaSoriso konferenciaze. publikacia momzadebulia regionuli proeqtis „mSvidobis, usafrTxoebisa da stabilurobis axali arqiteqturis mSenebloba samxreT kavkasiaSi“ farglebSi, romelic xorcieldeba didi britaneTis mTavrobis „konfliqtis, stabiluro- bisa da usafrTxoebis fondis“ finansuri mxardaWeriT. publikaciaSi gamoTqmuli mosazrebebi ekuTvniT maT avtorebs da ar asaxavs gaer- Tianebuli samefos mTavrobis oficialur poziciebs. avtorebi: ivane abramaSvili, zviad avaliani redaqtori: nino kalandariSvili Targmani: guram dumbaZe dizaini: qeiT gabrisi tiraJi: 150 ISBN 978-9941-9510-2-2 sarCevi Sesavali .....................................................................................................................4 Zalis argamoyeneba saerTaSoriso samarTalSi ..................................... 5 Zalis argamoyenebis Sesaxeb SeTanxmebis saerTaSoriso konteqsti ..................................................................................5 dnestrispireTi – moldova ..............................................................................5 kosovo – serbeTi.................................................................................................6 CrdiloeT kviprosi – kviprosis respublika................................................. 8 saerTaSoriso gamocdilebis konteqstualizacia saqarTvelos konfliqtebTan mimarTebaSi .............................................. 9 saqarTvelo da Zalis argamoyenebis Sesaxeb xelSekruleba ............ 10 2008 wlis agvistos omi da axali realoba ...................................................... 11 2012 wlis arCevnebi: axali mTavroba, axali midgomebi? .............................. 14 daskvna ........................................................................................................................15 Sesavali muqara da Zalis gamoyeneba saerTaSoriso urTierTobebSi farTod gavrcele- buli praqtikaa, romelic yovelTvis did rols TamaSobda lokaluri, regionu- li Tu globaluri politikuri klimatis formirebaSi. konfliqtebis damangre- veli bunebidan gamomdinare, misi Sekaveba sakacobrio amocanadaa qceuli. Sede- gad, saerTaSoriso sazogadoeba cdilobs, maqsimalurad SezRudos dapirispi- reba da agresia msoflio politikur arenaze. mocemuli naSromi ori nawilisgan Sedgeba. pirvelis mizania, mimoixilos Za- lis argamoyenebis cneba saerTaSoriso samarTalSi da sami konfliqturi re- gionis – dnestrispireTis, kosovosa da CrdiloeT kviprosis magaliTze Seiswa- vlos, Tu ramdenad aqtualuri da mniSvnelovania Zalis argamoyenebis Sesaxeb SeTanxmeba maTi konfliqtebis transformaciis procesSi. mocemuli qeisebi SeirCa ramdenime garemoebis gaTvaliswinebiT: samive konfliqti mougvarebe- lia, dapirispirebul mxareebs Soris arsebobs eTnikuri gansxvavebuloba, samive konfliqtSi SeiniSneba secesionisturi miswrafebebi da samive maTgani geogra- fiulad evropis kontinentze viTardeba; naSromis meore nawili fokusirebuli iqneba uSualod saqarTvelos konfliqtebze da TbilisSi arsebul xedvebze, Tu ra roli akisria Zalis gamouyeneblobis Sesaxeb xelSekrulebis gaformebas misi konfliqtebis mogvarebis procesSi. 4 Zalis argamoyeneba saerTaSoriso samarTalSi Tanamedrove saerTaSoriso samarTalSi Zalis gamoyenebaze uaris Tqma regu- lirdeba gaerTianebuli erebis organizaciis qartiiT, romlis 2(4) muxlis Tanax- mad – „gaerTianebuli erebis organizaciis yvela wevri saerTaSoriso urTier- TobebSi Tavs ikavebs Zalis, muqaris an misi gamoyenebisagan, rogorc nebismieri saxelmwifos teritoriuli xelSeuxeblobis an politikuri damoukideblobis winaaRmdeg, ise gaerTianebuli erebis miznebisaTvis Seuferebeli sxva nebismie- ri saxiT~.1 wesdeba ar ganmartavs, Tu konkretulad ra moiazreba „Zalis“ miRma, magram meore msoflio omis dasrulebis fonze, gaeros daarsebis istoriuli konteqstidan gamomdinare, farTod miiCneva, rom mocemuli cneba gulisxmobs SeiaraRebul Tavdasxmas. amasTan, imis gamo, rom xSirad xdeba „cecxlis Sewyve- tis“, „saomari moqmedebebis ganuaxleblobisa“ da „Zalis argamoyenebis“ cnebe- bis erTmaneTSi areva, aucilebelia maTi gamijvna, vinaidan pirveli ori viwro, droebiTi xasiaTisaa, morgebuli konkretul konfliqtur situacias, maSin ro- ca am ukanasknels farTo da zogadi datvirTva aqvs. gamomdinare iqidan, rom saerTaSoriso samarTlis mTavar subieqts warmoadge- nen suverenuli saxelmwifoebi, kvlevisTvis aqtualuria ganimartos, Tu ramde- nad vrceldeba zemoT mocemuli legaluri CarCo „de faqto“, „TviTaRiarebul“ da „araRiarebul“ saxelmwifoebsa Tu subieqtebze. am sakiTxze vrceli Teoriu- li debatebis miuxedavad, miiCneva, rom de faqto reJimebi nawilobriv warmoad- gens saerTaSoriso samarTlis subieqtebs da SezRuduli saxiT aqvT konkretuli uflebebi da valdebulebebi.2 maTze vrceldeba Zalis argamoyenebis principic3, rasac germaneli akademikosis, iohan froveinis mtkicebiT, safuZvlad udevs gaeros 1970 wlis deklaracia megobruli urTierTobebis Sesaxeb, generaluri asambleis 3314-e rezolucia da saxelmwifoTa praqtika.4 Zalis argamoyenebis Sesaxeb SeTanxmebis saerTaSoriso konteqsti dnestrispireTi – moldova 1990-1992 wlebis dnestrispireTis omis postkonfliqtur fazaSi gadasvlis Semdeg or dapirispirebul mxares Soris araerTi xelSekruleba gaformda. am pe- riodis erT-erTi yvelaze mniSvnelovani SeTanxmeba Sedga1997 wels, moskovSi, romelsac euTosa da ruseTis mxridan win uswrebda sakmaod intensiuri media- ciis procesi.5 1995 wlis 5 ivliss moldovis prezidentma mirCa snegurma da dnestrispire- Tis liderma igor smirnovma xeli moaweres SeTanxmebas ormxriv urTierTobebSi 1 gaerTianebuli erebis organizaciis wesdeba da saerTaSoriso sasamarTlos statuti. ix. http://un- georgia.ge/uploads/UNCharter.pdf 2 Essen, von Jonte. De-Facto Regimes in International Law, Merkourios – International and European Security Law – Vol. 28/74, gv. 49 3 Stürchler, Nikolas. The Threat of Force in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2007. gv. 124 4 Essen, von Jonte... gv. 37 5 Moldova/Trans-Dniester (1990-present), University of Central Arkansas. ix. http://uca.edu/politicalscience/dadm-project/eu- roperussiacentral-asia-region/moldovatrans-dniester-1990-present/ 5 samxedro Zalisa da ekonomikuri sanqciebis argamoyenebis Sesaxeb.6 imdenad aR- niSnuli dokumenti ar gamxdara mxareebisTvis mniSvnelovani datvirTvis mqo- ne, ramdenadac momdevno vrceli xelSekruleba, romlis erTgvar preludiasac igi warmoadgenda. swored axal xelSekrulebas unda daeregulirebina urTier- Tobebi konfliqtis mxareTa Soris, romelsac mogvianebiT ewoda „memorandumi moldovis respublikasa da dnestrispireTs Soris urTierTobebis normaliza- ciis safuZlebis Sesaxeb“ (igi aseve cnobilia „moskovis“ an „primakovis memoran- dumis“ saxeliT).7 moskovis memorandums xeli 1997 wlis 8 maiss moaweres moldovis prezident- ma luCinskim da dnestrispireTis prezidentma smirnovma, garantor mxareebs ki ukraina da ruseTi warmoadgendnen.8 memorandumis mixedviT moldovis respu- blikisa da dnestrispireTis urTierTobebi erTi saxelmwifos SigniT, yofili moldovis ssr-is sazRvrebSi, unda ganviTarebuliyo. mxareebi adasturebdnen erTgulebas gaeros, euTosa da saerTaSoriso samarTlis zogadi normebis mi- marT da iRebdnen pasuxismgeblobas samoqalaqo mSvidobis, stabilurobisa da usafrTxoebis damyarebaze. moldovam da dnestrispireTma gamoxates mzaoba, „uari Tqvan Zalis gamoyenebaze an muqaraze Zalis gamoyenebis Sesaxeb maT or- mxriv urTierTobebSi. nebismieri uTanxmoeba unda mogvardes mxolod da mxo- lod mSvidobiani gziT molaparakebiTa da konsultaciebiT, ruseTis federaci- isa da ukrainis, rogorc miRweuli SeTanxmebebis Sesrulebis garantori qveyne- bis daxmarebiT; aseve euTosa da dsT-is mxardaWeriT~.9 sainteresoa, rom moskovis memorandumiT kiSiniovsa da tiraspols Soris ya- libdeboda saxelmwifoebriv-samarTlebrivi urTierTobebi da am ukanasknelis statusi unda gansazRvruliyo ormxrivi SeTanxmebis safuZvelze. dnestrispi- reTi aseve monawileobda moldovis respublikis sagareo politikis warmarTva- Si da mas eniWeboda ufleba, calmxrivad daemyarebina saerTaSoriso kontaqtebi ekonomikur, samecniero-teqnikur, kulturul da sxva ormxrivad SeTanxmebul sferoebSi.10 miuxedavad imisa, rom 1997 wlis memorandumi gansxvavebulad iqna interepre- tirebuli kiSiniovsa da tiraspolSi, is mainc fundamentur SeTanxmebad rCeba konfliqtis or mxares Soris, vinaidan man Seqmna myari bazisi samomavlo inicia- tivebisa da TanamSromlobisTvis. kosovo – serbeTi kosovos statusi, serbeTis araRiarebis politika da eTnikurad serbebiT da- saxlebuli municipalitetebis statusi priStinasa da belgrads Soris arsebu- li urTierTobebis mTavari ganmsazRvreli faqtorebia. 2008 wels kosovos mier 6 Галин, Александр. Доверия не заслуживающие. ix. http://materik.ru/problem/detail.php?ID=8433 7 Kosienkowski,M. & Schreiber, W. Moldova: Arena of International Influences, Lexington Books, 2012. gv. 223 8 Memorandum On the Bases for Normalization of Relations Between the Republic of Moldova and Transdneistria, OSCE. ix. http://www.osce.org/moldova/42309?download=true 9 iqve 10 iqve 6 damoukideblobis gamocxadebis Semdeg balkaneTis naxevarkunZulze axali po- litikuri dRis wesrigi Camoyalibda. Sedegad, kosovoelebsa da serbebs Soris dialogma ormagi mniSvneloba SeiZina. 2011 wlis gazafxulze evrokavSirma safuZveli Cauyara belgradsa da priS- tinas Soris oficialur dialogs, romelic e.w „gadaRvris“ (spill-over) principze iyo dafuZnebuli.11 sawyis etapze mas hqonda teqnikuri datvirTva, romelic
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