RELATIONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

VOLUME 4

Expansion of Theory

EDITED BY LEWIS ARON • ADRIENNE HARRIS

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Beyond Doer and Done to An Intersubjective View of Thirdness*

Jessica Benjamin

The introduction of the idea of intersubjectivity into psychoanalysis has many important consequences and has been understood in a variety of ways. The position I will develop in this paper defines intersubjectivity in terms of a relationship of mutual recognition-a relation in which each per­ son experiences the other as a "like subject," another mind who can be "felt with" yet has a distinct, separate center of feeling and perception. The ante­ cedents of my perspective on intersubjectivity lie on one hand with Hegel (1807; KOjeve, 1969) and on the other with the developmentally oriented thinkers Winnicott (1971) and Stern (1985)-quite different in their own ways-who try to specify the process by which we become able to grasp the other as having a separate yet similar mind. In contrast to the notion of the intersubjective as a "system of reciprocal mutual influence"-referring to "any psychological field formed by interact­ ing worlds of experience" (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 3)-adumbrated by intersubjective systems theorists Orange, Atwood, and Stolorow

,. This paper originally appeared in Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 73(1), 2004, pp. 5-46. Reprinted with permission.

91 92 Ii jessica Benjamin

(1997),* I emphasize, both developmentally and clinically, how we actually a wide variety of come to the felt experience of the other as a separate yet connected being to the profession with whom we are acting reciprocally. How do we get a sense that "there one holds in minI are other minds out there" (Stern, 1985)? (Aron, 1999; Britl In highlighting this phenomenological experience of other minds, I-like "thing" we use bl other intersubjective critics of Freud's Cartesian ism-emphasize the recipro­ build relational S) cal, mutually influencing quality of interaction between subjects, the con­ for such cocreatic fusing traffic of two-way streets (Benjamin, 1977, 1988). But this theoretical ence of intersubje, recognition of intersubjective influence should not blind us to the power internal mental sp of actual psychic experience, which all too often is that of the one-way transitional space. street-in which we feel as if one person is the doer, the other done to. Pizer's (1998) ide, One person is subject, the other object-as our theory of object relations analyst and patier all too readily portrays. To recognize that the object of our feelings, needs, of their separate ( actions, and thoughts is actually another subject, an equivalent center of terms of static, prt being (Benjamin, 1988, 1995), is the real difficulty. you can't make thi Thus, I consider as a principle, func The Place of the Third as a "thing" in the is to distinguish it To the degree that we ever manage to grasp two-way directionality, we onto with her ego, do so only from the place of the third, a vantage point outside the two.t straw. For in the sp However, the intersubjective position that I refer to as thirdness consists of in Ghent's (1990) f, more than this vantage point of observation. The concept of the third means Elaborating this surrender, and thir or results from Sur * Stolorow and Atwood (1992) point out that they coined the term intersubjective inde­ certain letting go a pendently and do not think of it as presupposing a developmental attainment, as Stern other's point of vie (1985) docs. I (Benjamin, 1977, 1978) made use of the term as introduced into phi­ being able to sustai losophy by Habermas (1968), and then carried forward into psychology by Trevarthen separateness and di (1977, 1980), to focus on the exchange between different minds. Like Stern, I consider the recognition of other minds (the other's subjectivity) to be a crucial developmental control or COerce. attainment. Unlike Stern, however, I (Benjamin, 1988) have considered all aspects of Ghent's essay arl cocreating interaction with the other, fr0111 early mutual gazing to conflicts around ready look-alike, su: recognition, as part of the trajectory of intersubjective development. The major dif­ someone. From this ference between the theorizing of Orange et at. (1997) and my own is not, as they ouer to someone, a; believe (see Orange, 2002, 2010a), that I think the analyst should focus clinically on helping the patient to recognize the analyst's (or other's) subjectivity at the expense with them. I take thi of the patient's own. It is rather that I see such engagement in reciprocal recognition ,some principle or pI of the other as growing naturally out of the experience of being recognized by the Whereas in Gher. other, as a crucial component of attachment responses that require mutual regula­ as something the p tion and attunemen[. and, therefore, as ultimately a pleasure and not merely a chore the analyst'S surren( (Benjamin, 2010). t I am greatly indebted to Aron, with whom I formulated important portions of this paper and descriptions of the third in a jointly authored paper (Aron & Benjamin, 1999); Aron * Ghent's work on surrer emphasizes the observing function, but modified by identification, which he formulated thoughts, which were more recently in Aron (2006). University Postdoctora Beyond Doer and Oone to 93 ually a wide variety of things to different thinkers, and has been used to refer )eing to the profession, the community, the theory one works with-anything there one holds in mind that creates another point of reference outside the dyad (Aron, 1999; Britton, 1988; Crastnopol, 1999). My interest is not in which -like "thing" we use but in the process of creating thirdness-that is, in how we ::ipro- build relational systems and how we develop the intersubjective capacities

~ con­ for such cocreation. I think in terms of thirdness as a quality or experi­ .-etical ence of intersubjective relatedness that has as its correlate a certain kind of )owel' internal mental space; it is closely related to Winnicott's idea of potential or e-way transitional space. One of the first relational formulations of thirdness was ne to. Pizer's (1998) idea of negotiation, originally formulated in 1990, in which ations analyst and patient each build, as in a squiggle draWing, a construction needs, of their separate experiences together. Pizer analyzed transference not in ltCf of terms of static, projective contents, but as an intersubjective process: "No, you can't make this of me, but you can make that of me." Thus, I consider it crucial not to reify the third but to consider it primarily as a principle, function, or relationship (as in Ogden's 1994 view) rather than as a "thing" in the way that theory or rules of technique are things. My aim is to distinguish it from superego maxims or ideals that the analyst holds onto with her ego, often clutching them as a drowning person clutches a ity, we straw. For in the space of thirdness, we are not holding onto a third; we are, e two.'" in Ghent's (1990) felicitous usage, surrendering to it.* sists of Elahorating this idea, we might say that the third is that to which we means sllrrender, and thirdness is the intersubjective mental space that facilitates or results from surrender. In my thinking, the term surrender refers to a

h'e inde­ certain letting go of the self and thus also implies the ability to take in the as Stern other's point of view or reality. Thus, surrender refers us to recognition­ into phi­ being able to sustain connectedness to the other's mind while accepting his evarthen separateness and difference. Surrender implies freedom from any intent to consider control or coerce. Jpmental speets of Ghent's essay articulated a distinction between surrender and its ever­ s around rcady look-alike, submission. The crucial point was that surrender is not to najor dif­ someone. from this point follows a distinction between giving in or giving :, as they Ol'er to someone, an idealized person or thing, and letting go into being lically on ll'itb them. I take this to mean that surrender requires a third, that we follow . expense some principle or process that mediates between self and other. cognition ed by the Whereas in Ghent's seminal essay, surrender was considered primarily al regulu- as something the patient needs to do, my aim is to conSider, above all, ly a chore the analyst's surrender. I wish to see hov.l we facilitate our own and the

this paper )99); Aroll • Ghent's \vork on surrender was the inspiration for my first formulations of some of these ormulated thoughts, which were presented at a conference in his honor sponsored by New York t"niversity postdoctoral Program in May 2000. 94 i jessica Benjamin patient's surrender by consciously working to build a shared third-or, to point of view, it i put it differently, how our recognition of mutual influence allows us to than creating sp, create thirdness together. Thus, I expand Ghent's contrast between submis­ haps it could be sion and surrender to formulate a distinction between complementarity and in-bet ween-an i thirdness, an orientation to a third that lllediates "1 and thou." an unconscious s Symmetry is ;: ity, generating th Complementarity: Doer and Done to done-to relation ( of mirroring and Considering the causes and remedies for the breakdown of recognition and out of awareness the way breakdown and renewal alternate in the psychoanalytic process or interrupt in 1I (Benjamin, 1988) led me to formulate the contrast between the twoness of of interaction we complementarity and the potential space of thirdness. In the complementary izes the apparen structure, dependency becomes coercive, and, indeed, coercive dependence the other's recol? that draws each into the orbit of the other's escalating reactivity is a salient (2003; see also characteristic of the impasse (Mendelsohn). Conflict cannot be processed, feels the other tc observed, held, mediated, or played with. Instead, it emerges at the proce­ to me." dural level as an unresolved opposition between us, even tit for tat, based It is as if the e, on each partner's use of splitting. is that there app In my view, theories of splitting-for instance, the idea of the paranoid­ to the other's de schizoid position (Klein, 1946, 1952)-though crucial, do not address this mentary relatior intersubjective dynamic of the two-person relationship and its crucial mani­ happening is thl festations at the level of procedural interaction. The idea of complementary are irreconcilabJ relations (Benjamin, 1988, 1998) aims to describe those push-me/pull-you, true, I must be doer/done-to dynamics that we find in most impasses, which generally everyone can se appear to be one-way-that is, each person feels done to and not like an can't stop it" CRt agent helping to shape a cocreated reality. The question of how to get out As clinicians of complementary twoness, which is the formal or structural pattern of all ourselves that So impasses between two partners, is where intersubjective theory finds its ally be full of Sf real challenge. Racker (1968) was, I believe, the first to identify this phe­ sibility fails to 1 nomenon as complementarity, formulating it in contrast to concordance in person is Contre the countertransference. Symington (1983) first described this as an inter­ or impotent. At locking, dyadic pattern, a corporate entity based on the meeting of analyst'S being a respolli and patient's superegos. In the doer;, Ogden (1994) developed his own perspective on this structural pattern involuntary, a f in the notion of the subjugating third. He used the term analytic third dif­ sense of self as ferent]y than I do, to denote the relationship as one of an Other to both is also experier selves, an entity created the two participants in the dyad, a kind of by resolving impa~ cocreated subject-object. This pattern or relational dynamic, which appears Han of Our OWl to form outside our conscious will, can be experienced either as a vehicle of OUr resistance t recognition or something frOln which we cannot extricate ourselves. Taking When we as an on a life of its own, this negative of the third may be carefully attuned, dissociate bum like the chase-and-dodge pattern between mother and infant. From my up, and, of Cal Beyond Doer and Done to 95 third-or, to point of view, it is somewhat confusing to call this a third because, rather allows us to than creating space, it sucks it up. With this negative of the third (per­ veen submis­ haps it could be called "the negative third"), there is an erasure of the lentarity and in-between~an inverse mirror relation, a complementary dyad concealing an unconscious symmetry. Symmetry is a crucial part of what unites the pair in complementar­ ity, generating the takes-one-to-know-one recognition feature of the doer/ done-to relation (Benjamin, 1998). In effect, it builds on the deep structure ! of mi rroring and affective matching that operate-largely procedurally and I :ognition and out of awareness~in any dyad, a~ when both partners glare at each other llytic process or interrupt in unison. As we pay more attention to this procedural level le twoness of of interaction we come to discern the underlying symmetry that character­ )lnplementary izes the apparent opposition of power relations: each feels unable to gain e dependence the other's recognition, and each feels in the other's power. Or, as Davies ity is a salient (2003; see also Davies & Frawley, 1994) has powerfully illustrated, each be processed, feels the other to be the abuser-seducer; each perceives the other as "doing ; at the proce­ to nle." for tat, based It is as if the essence of complementary relations~the relation of twoness~ is that there appear to be only two choices: either submission or resistance the paranoid­ to the other's demand as Ogden (1994) put it. Characteristically, in comple­ )t address this mentary relations, each partner feels that her perspective on how this is 5 crucial mani­ happening is the only right one (Hoffman, 2002)~or at least that the two omplementary are irreconcilable, as in "Either I'm crazy or YOll are." "If what YOli say is h-me/pllll-YOll, true, I must be very wfong~pefhaps shamefully wrong, in the sense that hich generally everyone can see what is wrong with me, and I don't know what it is and nd not like an can't stop it" (Russell, 1998), how to get out As clinicians, when we are caught in such interactions, we may tell .1 pattern of all ourselves that some reciprocal dynamic is at work, although we may actu­ heory finds its ally be full of self-blame. In such cases, OUf apparent acceptance of respon­ ~ntify this phe­ sibility fails to truly help in extricating us from the feeling that the other concordance in person is controlling us, or leaving us no option except to be either reactive his as an intcr­ or impotent. Attributing blame to the self actually weakens one's sense of ting of analyst's being a responsible agent. In the doer/done-to mode, being the one who is actively hurtful feels 'uctural pattern involuntary, a position of helplessness. In any true sense of the word, our ,alytic third dif­ I>ense of self as subject is eviscerated when we are with our "Victim," who l Other to both is also experienced as a victimizing object. An important relational idea for Iyad, a kind of resolving impasses is that the recovery of subjectivity requires the recogni­ which appears tion of OUf own participation. Crucially, this usually involves surrendering :r as a vehicle of our resistance to responsibility, a resistance arising from reactivity to blame. urselves. Taking \X"hen we as analysts resist the inevitability of hurting the other-when we refully attuned. dissociate bumping into their bruises Of jabbing them while stitching them nfant. From my up, and, of course, when we deny locking into their projective processes 96 Jessica Benjamin with the unfailing accuracy of our own-we are bound to get stuck in twoness" complementary twoness. nal imagi. Once we have deeply accepted our own contribution-and its inevitability­ world of s the fact of two-way participation becomes a vivid experience, something I agree we can understand and use to feel less helpless and more effective. In this accepting sense, we surrender to the principle of reciprocal influence in interaction, has chose which makes possible both responsible action and freely given recognition. to the thi This action is what allows the outside, different other to come into view adaptatior (Winnicott, 1971). It opens the space of thirdness, enabling us to nego­ others (no tiate differences and to connect. The experience of surviving breakdown tion of on into complementarity, or twoness, and subsequently of communicating and there is al restoring dialogue-each person (not just the analyst) surviving for the connected other-is crucial to therapeutic action. This principle of rupture and repair persecuto] (Tronick, 1989) has beconle essential to our thinking. From it emerges a welI as a f more adyanced form of thirdness, based on a sense of shared communica­ love and s tion about reality that tolerates or embraces difference, one that is interper­ Theon sonally realized as both partners feel freer to think about and comment on that thirdl themselves and each other. person; it father apr Or primar The Idea of the Third her subjec about this Initially, the idea of the third passed into psychoanalysis through Lacan create a di (1975), whose view of intersubjectivity derived from Hegel's theory of rec­ ognition and its popularization by the French Hegelian writer Kojeve (1969). Lacan, as can best he seen in Book I of his seminars, saw the third as what keeps the relationship between two persons from collapSing. This col­ lapse can take the form of merger (oneness), eliminating difference, or of a The issue twoness that splits the differences-the polarized opposition of the power relevant t( struggle. Lacan thought that the intersubjective third was constituted by of onenes: recognition through speech, which allows a difference of viewpoints and of can be fOl interests, saving us from the kill-or-be-killed power struggle in which there Balint's iel, is only one right way. were not t In many analytic writings, theory or interpretation is seen as the sym­ a relation bolic father with whom the mother analyst has intercourse (Britton, 1988; fication w Feldman, 1997). Not only in Lacanian but also in Kleinian theory, this may ·was stan·i lead to a privileging of the analyst's relation to the third a.s theory and Thus, tl of the analyst's authority as knower (despite Lacan's warning against see­ aspects ot ing the analyst as the one supposed to know) as well as to an overem­ nt'ed in fa phasis on the oedipal content of the third. Unfortunately, Lacan's oedipal ence betw view equated the third with the father (Benjamin, 1995), contending that the father'S "no," his prohibition or "castration," constitutes the symbolic ~ Shuckingl' third (Lacan, 1977). Lacan equated the distinction between thirdness and nt's as doi Beyond Doer and Done to ~ 97

,tuck in twoness with the division between a paternal symbolic, or law, and a mater­ nal imaginary. The paternal third in the mother's mind opens up the sane world of symbolic third ness (Lacan, 1977\ ability­ tnething I agree that in some cases we might speak of someone's letting go and . In this accepting the full blow of the reality that mother has her own desire and has chosen father, and this might indeed constitute one kind of surrender ~raction, to the third (Kristeva, 1987), I respect Britton's (1988, 1998) idea, and its >gnition. adaptation by Aron (1995), that the triangular relation of a child and two Ito view others (not necessarily father and mother) organizes the intersubjective posi­ ·0 nego- ·akdown tion of one subject who observes the other two in interaction. But unless ting and there is already space in the dyad, unless the third person is also dyadically for the connected to the child, he cannot function as a true third. He becomes a persecutory invader rather than a representative of symbolic functioning as ld repair well as a figure of identification and an other whom mother and child both nerges a Lll1unica­ love and share. interper­ The only usable third, by definition, is one that is shared. Thus, I contend ment on that thirdness is not literally instituted by a father (or other) as the third person; it cannot originate in the Freudian oedipal relation in which the father appears as prohibitor and castrator. And, most crucially, the mother or primary parent must create that space by being able to hold in tension her subjectivity/desire/awareness and the needs of the child. I will say more about this form of maternal awareness as a form of subjectivity that helps to create a different relation between two subjects with different needs. ~h Lacan y of rec­ 'e (1969\ third as The Problem of Oneness This col­ The issue of maternal subjectivity, as we have known for some time, is ::, or of a relevant to critiquing developmental theories that postulate an initial state le power of oneness between mother and baby (Benjamin, 1995), A faSCinating point tuted by <.:an be found in Lacan's (1975) critique of object relations theory. Regarding ts and of Balint's idea of primary love, Lacan objected that, if the intersubjective third ich there were not there from the beginning, if the mother-baby couple were simply a relation of oneness, then mother could nurse unstintingly in total identi­ the sym­ ,n, 1988; fication with baby, but there would then be nothing to stop her, when she ,vas starving, from turning the tables and eating the baby.* this may Thus, the child is actually safeguarded by the parental ability to maintain =ory and Linst see- aspects of subjectivity that are crucial, enabling her to suspend her own overem- need in favor of the child's immediate need without obliterating the differ­ ence between 1 and thou. In a related vein, Slochower (1996) argues that we 'i oedipal ding that symbolic * Shockingly for us today, Lacan (1975) alleged that Alice Balint portrayed certain aborigi­ nesS and nes as doing just that. 98 I Jessica Benjamin must consciously bear the knowledge of pain in giving over to the patient, is being hurt who cannot bear our subjectivity. need to safeI' This ability to maintain internal awareness, to sustain the tension of choose betwl difference between my needs and yours while still being attuned to you, when an anx forms the basis of the di;fferentiating third-the interactive principle that goes away. incarnates recognition and respect for the other's common humanity with­ out submission or control. This differentiating third is also the basis of the moral third-the principle whereby we create relationships in accord Rob with ethical values-and the symbolic thirdness that includes narration, self­ reflection, and observation of self and other. The differentiating third is Let me must analogous to the ability to project the child's future development (in other is organized words, her independence as a separate center of initiative), which Loewald ing" the otht: (1951) considers a parental function in his famous paper on therapeutic the one who action. The sustained tension of difference helps Create the explicit symbolic her unfulfill< level of thirdness in which we recognize others and ourselves as having woman who distinct intentions or feelings, separate centers of initiative and perception. who refuses This differentiating third is exemplified by the mother'S ability to maintain person, nor ( awareness that the distressed child's pain (e.g., over separation) will pass, attunement. alongside her empathy with that pain; that is, she is able to hold the tension Rob forms between her needs/wishes and her child's, identificatory oneness and the while consid, adult observational function. This mental space of thirdness in the caretaker demands thai must, I believe, in some way be palpable to the child. As a function, in both 6 weeks whil its symbolic and soothing aspects, it can be recognized and identified with him back. Rc and then made use of by the child or patient. does not knc The analyst is able to soothe-that is, help regulate the patient's arousal a power mov level-only to the extent that she is maintaining this position of thirdness Same time fri (not overwhelmed by identification with the patient'S state, in the sense Iyst he feels , understood by the theory of projective identification). In this sense, one­ At this juno ness needs to be modified by thirdness. However, this thirdness needs to terrible urger be close and accessible enough, conveying a sense of a shared potential But she is ab to the patient, so that the analyst is not giving empathy from a position self fearing tt of pure complementarity (the one who knows, heals, remains in charge). She feels divi Otherwise, the patient will feel that because of what the analyst has given afraid to lea, him, the analyst owns him; in other words, the analyst can "eat," that is to that feelin: shape, him in return. The patient will feel he must suppress his differences, wants to be t spare the analyst, participate in pseudomutuality or react with envious defi­ do this witho ance of the analyst's power. Lacking the sense of a shared differentiating alone only hI third, the patient has nothing to give back, no impact or insight that will by his wife. change the analyst. Patient an< The flip side of this absence of thirdness is that the analyst, like a mother, must submit t may feel that her separate aims, her being a person with her own needs, will the child. Th, "kill" the patient. She then cannot distinguish between when she is holding freely agreed the frame in a way that is conducive to the patient's growth and when she OUr marriage Beyond Doer and Done to 99

J the patient, is being hurtful to the patient. How can she then bear in mind the patient's need to safely depend on her yet extricate herself from feeling that she must le tension of choose between the patient's needs and her own? Such a conflict may occur uned to you, when an anxious patient repeatedly calls on weekends or when the analyst principle that goes away. lmanity with- the basis of ips in accord Rob Larration, self­ cUing third is Let me illustrate the dynamic that is instituted when the patient's world nent (in other is organized by the choice between submitting to being eaten by or "kill­ 'hich Loewald ing" the other. Rob, a patient in his 40s, grew up as his mother's favorite, ,n therapeutic the one who existed to fulfill her expectations, her perfectionist demands, )licit symbolic her unfulfilled ambition-in short, to live for her desire. Rob married a veS as having woman who is committed to being a perfect, self-sacrificing mother but ld perception. who refuses sex; thus, Rob can never fulfill his own desire as a separate ty to maintain person, nor can the couple come together as two bodies in the oneness of ion) will pass, attunement. )ld the tension Rob forms a deeply passionate attachment to a woman at his work and, eness and the while considering leaving his wife, takes his own apartment. But his wife 1 the caretaker demands that he swear on the Bible that he will not contact this woman for nction, in both 6 weeks while he is considering the situation; otherwise, she will never take identified with him back. Rob has submitted to this demand but is confused. In effect, he does not know a real third and cannot distinguish a moral principle from Itient's arousal a power move. He feels bound to his promise but also coerced and at the >n of thirdness same time frightened of losing either his wife or his lover. He tells his ana­ ~, in the sense lyst he feels suicidal. lis sense, onc­ At this juncture, Rob's analyst, a candidate in supervision, is gripped with jness needs to terrible urgency as well, feeling that she must protect and save her patient. lared potential But she is about to leave for a long-planned week's vacation and finds her­ rom a position self fearing that her leaving might kill the patient. Separation means murder. jns in charge). She feels divided: coerced, but bound to her patient, deeply concerned and _aIyst has given afraid to leave, but aware she is caught in an enactment. She cannot get ,n "eat," that is to that feeling of the mother who knows her baby's distress wiJI pass. She his differences, wants to be the good mother, available and healing, but can find no way to th envious deft­ do this without complying in some way with Rob's notion that he can stand I differentiating alone only by abjuring all dependency. She will be coerced by Rob as he is nsight that will by his wife. Patient and analyst are thus replaying the relationship in which the child t, like a mother, must submit to the mother who devours, yet the mother who leaves destroys own needs, will the child. The third here is perverted, turned from a commitment to truth or n she is holding freely agreed-upon shared principle (moral third) such as "We need to give :1 and when she OUr marriage a chance," into a promise extracted, "Give in to me or else." 100 ~ jessica Benjamin

The wife threatens the patient that he will go to hell for leaving her, thus For the observ giving expression to a moral world in which goodness/God is opposed to work as a true freedom, where freedom is possible only in a world of moral chaos ruled by demands, as we s the devil. The perversion of the moral third accompanies the kill-or-be-killed for accommodati( complementarity and marks the absence of recognition of the other's separ­ The primal form ateness, the space that permits desire, the acceptance of loss. with, and repair c In consultation, the analyst realizes she must bear her guilt for wanting resonance. Sande to be separate and to have her own life, just as the patient must bear his. resonance rhythr. She has to find a way to distinguish between her deep empathy with the principles of all II patient's fear of abandonment, on one hand, and submission to him in his name rbythmic tJ urgent, extracting behavior, his demand that she give her life, on the other. constitute the cal In the observational position provided by supervision, it becomes clearer metaphor for the how the interaction is informed by the belief that separating and having shared patterns. ) one's own independent subjectivity and desire are tantamount to killing, between persons, while staying means letting oneself be killed. organism. The analyst is inspired in the following hour to find a way to talk to Rob Sander (2002) . about how she has to bear the gUilt of leaving him, as he must bear his own modation by stu( guilt. This dispels the sense of do-or-die urgency in the session, the intense more rapidly to t twoness in which someone must do wrong or hurt or destroy the other. the Significant otl the baby, a COCre~ modates, so does The One in the Third probably the inbll ror; in effect, the t is One of the important questions I want to address here how we think letting go release~ about the way human beings actually develop this differentiating third. This might be Here I part company with Lacan (1975). The deeper problem with the oedi­ principle of mutu: pal view of the father as representative of the third (a concept both Lacanian wired pull to get t and Kleinian) is that it misses the early origins of the third in the maternal in sync. Sander's dyad. Lacan tells us that the thirdness of speech is an antidote to murder, gets going, it See to "your reality" versus "my reality," but his idea of speech misses the first deeper law of rea part of the conversation. This is the part that baby watchers have made an notion of lawfuln indelible part of our thinking. In my view of thirdness, recognition is not harmonic or musil first constituted by verbal speech; rather, it begins with the early nonverbal aspect (Knoblaud experience of sharing a pattern, a dance, with another person. I (Benjamin, Again, this asp 2002) have therefore proposed a nascent, energetic form of the third-as privileges law as distinct from the one in the mother'S mind. It is present in the earliest missing the eleme exchange of gestures between mother and child, in the relationship that has fails to grasp the c been called oneness. I consider this eady exchange to be a form of third­ that has been can. ness, and suggest that we use the term rhythmiC third for the principle of beings aligning tc affective attunement and accommodation to share patterning that informs play (Beebe & La such exchanges (previously called "the one in the third," which meant that a third, establishi part of the third that is constituted by our felt experience of being one with of action-reaction the other). and the other folJ Beyond Doer and Done to 101

~ her, thus For the observing, critical functions of the differentiating third to actually )pposed to \vork as a true third-rather than as a set of perverse or persecutory )s ruled by demands, as we saw in the case of Rob-requires integration of the capacity ,r-be-killed for accommodation/attunement to a mutually created set of expectations. ler's separ- The primal form this accommodation assumes is the creation of, alignment \vith, and repair of patterns, the participation in connections based on affect ~or wanting resonance. Sander (2002), in his discussion of infancy research, calls this st bear his. resonance rhythmicity, which he considers one of the two fundamental 1)' with the principles of all human interaction (the other being specificity). Hence, the ,him in his name rhythmic third is inspired by his work. Rhythmic experiences help n the other. constitute the capacity for thirdness, and rhythmicity may be seen as a mes clearer metaphor for the model principle of lawfulness underlying the creation of and having shared patterns. Rhythm constitutes the basis for coherence in interaction t to killing, between persons, as well as coordination between the internal parts of the organism. ,talk to Rob Sander (2002) illustrated the value of specific recognition and of accom­ )ear his own modation by studying how neonates who were fed on demand adapted , the intense more rapidly to the circadian rhythm than those fed on schedule. \Vhen he other. the significant other is a recognizing one who surrenders to the rhythm of the baby, a cocreated rhythm can begin to evolve. As the caregiver accom­ modates, so does the baby. The basis for this mutual accommodation is probably the inbuilt tendency to respond symmetrically, to match and mir­ rori in effect, the baby matches the mother's matching, much as one person's )w we think letting go releases the other. tiating third, This might be seen as the beginning of interaction in accord with the lith the oedi­ principle of mutual accommodation, which entails not imitation but a hard­ ,oth Lacanian "vi red pull to get the two organisms into alignment, to mirror, match, or be the maternal in sync. Sander's study showed that once such a coherent, dyadic system te to murder, gets gOing, it seems to move naturally in the direction of orienting to a isses the first ch:eper law of reality-in this case, the law of night and day. In using this lave tn,lde an notion of lawfulness, I am trying to capture, at least metaphorically, the gnition is not harmonic or musical dimension of the third in its transpersonal or energetic .rly nonverbal aspect (Knoblauch, 2000). I have also referred to it as the energetic third . . I (Benjamin, Again, this aspect of lawfulness was missed by oedipal theory, which the third-as privileges law as boundary, prohibition, and separation, thus frequently n the earliest missing the element of symmetry or harmony in lawfulness. Such theorizing nship that has t~dls to grasp the origins of the third in the nascent or primordial experience form of third­ that has been called onene:-:;s, union, resonance-but really consists of two le principle of beings aligning to a th ird pattern. Research on mother-infant face-to-face s that informs play (Beebe & Lachmann, 199'1) shows how adult and infant align with ich meant that a third. establishing a cocreated rhythm that is not reducible to a model )eing one with of action-reaction, with one active and the other passive or one leading and the other following. Action-reaction characterizes our experience of 102 21 jessica Benjamin complementary twoness, the one-way direction; by contrast, a shared third In discussing B is experienced as a cooperative endeavor. out that his descri As I have stated previously (Benjamin, 1999, 2002), the thirdness of tion of responses. attuned play resembles musical improvisation, in which both partners follow the identificatory . a structure or pattern that both of them simultaneously create and surrender (1998) thinks the to, a structure enhanced by our capacity to receive and transmit at the analyst's different same time in nonverbal interaction. The cocreated third has the transitional side the dyad. Bu quality of being both invented and discovered. To the question of "Who cre­ asymmetry of the ated this pattern, you or I?" the paradoxical answer is "Both and neither." baby, a point Ish, I suggest that, as with early rhythms of sleeping and nursing, it is initially related. For now r the adult's accommodation that permits the creation of an organized system patient into a shaJ with a rhythm of its own, marked by a quality of lawfulness and attunement attunement and n: to some deeper structure-"the groove." In "intersubjectivity proper," that In seeing the th is, by the age of 10 months, the partners' alignment-as Stern (985) pro­ offers an alternati posed-becomes a "direct subject in its own right" (Beebe et al., 2003). In known, giver and other words the quality of our mutual recognition, our thirdness, becomes something the an: the source of pleasure or despair. The basis for appreciating this intention the one the patie1 to align and to accommodate seems to lie in our "mirror-neurons" (citation). patient build toge Beebe and Lachmann (1994, 2002) described how, in performing the actions the view of the t of the other, we replicate their intentions within ourselves-thus, in the excluded. It inhen deepest sense, we learn to accommodate to accommodation itself (we fall although I take BJ in love with love). container, the ana like, a threat to th But I think that The Shared Third verSing may be an of the patient in 0 If we grasp the creation of thirdness as an intersubjective process that is has often collabor constituted in early, presymbolic experiences of accommodation, mutual­ traumatized, aban ity, and the intention to recognize and be recognized by the other, we can experienced by th understand how important it is to think in terms of building a shared third. false self, who mu In shifting to an intersubjective concept of the third, we ground a very dif­ the patient loves. ferent view of the clinical process from the one espoused by those who use to the multiplicity the concept of the third to refer to observing capacities and the analyst'S relation to his own theory or thinking. Contemporary Kleinians view the third as an oedipal construct, an observing function, conceiving the analyst'S third as a relation to theory rather than a shared, cocreated experience with the patient. Britton (1988, The effects of the 1998) theorized the third in terms of the oedipal link between the parents, the patient feels c.: explaining that the patient has difficulty tolerating the third as an observa­ trated in a descrif tional stance taken by the analyst because theory represents the father in the in which the patic.: analyst's mind. The father, with whom the analyst is mentally conversing­ he had bought hi actually having intercourse-intrudes on an already shaky mother-child his own favorite f dyad. Indeed, one patient yelled at Britton, "Stop that fucking thinking!" he expected her t Beyond Doer and Done to 103 ared third In discussing Britton's approach, Aron (Aron & Benjamin, 1999) pointed Qut that his description of how he worked with the patient shows a modula­ irdness of tion of responses, an attunement that accords with the notion of creating :lers follow the identificatory aspect of the rhythmic third. The safe shelter that Britton l surrender (1998) thinks the patient must find in the analyst's mind may rely on the ;mit at the analyst's differentiating third, the connection to an observing position out­ :ransitional side the dyad. But it is experienced by the patient as the accommodating f"Who cre­ asymmetry of the mother (who also has a differentiating third) with her l neither." baby, a point I shall return to when I consider how the two thirds are inter­ related. For now my point is that this accommodation allows or invites the ,t is initially ized system patient into a shared rhythmic third based primarily on his need for affect attunement attunement and recognition. ,[oper," that In seeing the third as essentially an intersubjective cocreation, the analyst (1985) pro­ offers an alternative to the asymmetrical complementarity of knower and Ll., 2003). In known, giver and given to. By contrast, when the analyst sees the third as something the analyst relates to internally, the central couple may become 55, becomes lis intention the one the patient is excluded from rather than the one that analyst and patient build together. I suggest that there is an iatrogenic component to lS" (citation). g the actions the view of the third as something the patient attacks because she feels -thus, in the excluded. It inheres in the view of the third as the otbe1' person or theory­ tself (we fall although I take Britton's point that because of the lack of a good maternal container, the analyst'S relation to an other may symbolize, or may even feel like, a threat to the patient's connection. But I think that, most frequently, the other with whom the analyst is con­ versing may be another part of the patient, the coparent or developed aspect of the patient in contrast to the child part (Pizer, 2002)-the adult part that has often collaborated and joined the analyst and his thinking. As the more rocess that is ttion, mutual­ traumatized, abandoned, or hated parts of the self arise, this collaborator is experienced by the betrayed child as a sellout, a "good-girJ" or "good-boy" other, we can false self, who must be repudiated along with the part of the analyst whom l shared third. md a very dif­ the patient loves. Thus, creating a shared third requires constant attention chose who use to the multiplicity of our part selves. :\ the analyst's

construct, an An Example from the Literature lion to theory Britton (1988, The effects of the usage of the third as an observing function from which the patient feels excluded, and therefore attacks, are especially well illus­ en the parents, as an observa­ trated in a description of impasse by Feldman (1993). He described a case he father in the in which the patient was speaking of an incident from childhood in which ly conversing­ he had bought his mother a tub of ice cream for her birthday, choosing y mother-child his own favorite flavor: "When he offered it to her, she said she supposed l.g thinking!" he expected her to give him some of it. He saw it as an example of the 104 ~ Jessica Benjamin way she never wholeheartedly welcomed what he did for her and always observation, as th< distrusted his motives" (p. 321). breakdown of the i Feldman (1993) apparently did not investigate what in that moment might My way of analy have caused the patient to repeat a story that implied his mother "habitually by which I do not [ responded ... without thinking, and without giving any space to what he like the preSSllre ~ himself was thinking or feeling" (p. 323, italics in original). Feldman argued the situation differ that the patient's motive was to regain reassurance, to reestablish his psychic response to Feldm: equilibrium-seen as nonanalytic needs-and that, when the patient failed that the analyst wa to receive reassurance, he needed to emphasize how hurtful the episode read Feldman'S refu had been. Feldman noted that the patient withdrew, feeling hurt and angry. give space to what I I would speculate that the patient was trying to communicate something (for the intersubjective instance, the shame produced by the rejection of his need for soothing) that what he wanted il the analyst had missed in assuming that he already understood. most likely his pen What the analyst understood and proposed to the patient was that the unable to see the patient could not tolerate the mother's having her own independent observa­ everything was eitl tions (much as he, the analyst, felt not allowed to have them; note the mirror shared but was so I effect here). The mother was instead thinking about her son in her own way How might this by using her connection to an internal third. Feldman (1993) maintained that depletion each tin­ he neither "fit in with" nor criticized the patient but rather showed that he enjoyed sharing an had been able to maintain, under pressure, his own capacity for observing without a space of and his way of thinking, and this, he helieved, was primarily what disturbed including especiaU the patient. The patient had "sometimes been able to acknowledge he hates one person can be being aware that I am thinking for myself" (p. 324). As is symptomatic of The analytic tas complementary breakdown, Feldman found himself unable to maintain his system of sharing ;: own thinking except by resisting "the pressure to enact a benign tolerant one, as when you c relationship" (p. 325) or to otherwise fit in-in other words, to soothe and insist at times on ' regulate the patient. or letting her preh It is notable that Feldman (1993) ,vas insightful in recognizing that insist­ is often an even gl ing on "the version of his own role that the analyst find... reassuring may put that in their cocre; pressure on the patient to accept a view of himself that he finds intolerable" intersubjective thil (p. 326). Feldman accurately described the impasse in which the patient was interpretations of ' "then driven to redress the situation" (p. 326) and assert counterpressure.* sllch as Feldman ( What he did not recognize was how his view of the third-in my terms, a their perceptions a third u'ithout the oneness of rhythmicity-contributed to this enactment. In my understaJ His case narrative demonstrates that thirdness cannot reside simply in the feels compelled to analyst's independent observation, nor can it be maintained in a posture of reality, this genera resisting the patient's pressure rather than responding to it-that is, without tem of collaborati" recognizing and soothing distress related to shame, rejection, and so on. In differentiating asp' effect, this is an illustration of the complementary situation, in which the by, in effect, "refu analyst's resistance-his effort to maintain internal, theoretically informed patient's intention a way to fit, to acc( * In a later work Feldman (997) discussed how the analyst may unconsciously foster his ability to retlei impasse by becoming involved in projection and enactments_ The clinical emph; Beyond Doer and Done to 105 rand ahvays observation, as though that were sufficient to make a third-led to the breakdo\vn of the intersubjective thirdness between analyst and patient. lament might My way of analyzing this case would be rather different than Feldman's, er "habitually by which I do not mean that in the live moment I might not feel something ce to what he like the pressure and resistance that he felt but rather that I would see ldman argued the situation differently in retrospective self-supervision. The patient, in sh his psychic response to Feldman's prioritization of "absenTing" or "thinking," insisted patient failed that the analyst was behaving like his mother; in other words, he correctly 11 the episode read Feldman's refusal to mold, to accommodate, to show understanding and urt and angry. give space to \vhat he himself was feeling. The ice cream was a metaphor for "omething (for the intersubjective third, part of the patient's effort to communicate about soothing) that what he wanted in treatment-and had wanted in childhood-to share, ad. most likely his perception of emotional reality. The mother (or analyst) was It was that the unable to see the ice cream as a shareable entity-in her mental world, ndent observa­ everything was either for her child or for herself; it was not a gift if it was [lote the mirror shared but was so only if it were relinquished. n her own way How might this dynamic have affected the mother's envy and sense of naintained that depletion each time she gave to the patient? How much could she have ;;howed that he enjoyed sharing anything with her child? In a world without shared thirds, V for observing without a space of collaboration and sharing, everything is mine or yours, ·what disturbed including especially the perception of reality. Only one person can eat; only \'ledge he hates one person can be right. symptomatic of The analytic task in such a ca.se is to help the patient create (or repair) a to maintain his system of sharing and mutuality~ in which now you have a bite, now] have benign tolerant one, as when YOll eat a cracker with your toddler. The toddler may have to " to soothe and insist at times on "all mine," but the delight of letting Mommy take a bite, or letting her pretend to. as \vell as of playfully pulling the cracker away, izing that insist­ is often an even greater pleasure. feldman's patient was trying to tell him .ssuring may put chat in their cocreated system, the third was a negative one; there was no inds intolerable" intersubjective thirdness in which they could both eat, taste, and spit out 1 the patient was .;.nterpretations of what is going on as a shared project. To repair ruptures ounterpressure.·:: ~uch as Feldman described, the analyst and patient must be able to share -in t11Y terms, a (heir perceptions and observation rather than simply opposing each other. this enactment. In my understanding of such complementary oppositions, if the analyst de simply in the ["ecls compelled to protect his internal, observing third from the patient's cI in a posture of i";::,ality, this generally is a sign of a breakdown already occuning in the sys­ _that is, without t'.:m of collaborative understanding and attunement. The analyst needs the on, and so on. In differentiating aspect, but this "independent thinking" cannot be achieved on, in wh tch the i !y, in effect, "refusing to ht in," refusing accommodation. To receive the etk-ally informed ~:)jjent's intention and to reestablish shared reality, the analyst needs to find ·L vvay to fit, to accommodate, thaL does not feel coerced-bringing together j;]s ability to reflect with the identificatory impulse of the rhythmic third. l1nconSCi0Usl~· foster ~ ne clinical ernphasis on building the shared third is. in my view, a useful 106 1. jessica Benjamin antidote to earlier, often persecutory idealizations of interpretation-even "marker"-eX:2 those modified ones, such as in Steiner's (993) position, which recognizes propose that r the necessity of the analyst's accommodation to the patient's need to feel plays to differ< understood yet considers it less contributory to psychic change than acquir­ soothed by th, ing understanding. understandiof! Rather than viewing understanding-that is, the third-as a thing to be gesture and h acquired, a relational view sees it as an interactive process that creates suggest that t a dialogic structure: a shared third, an opportunity to experience mutual communicatio recognition. This shared third, the dialogue, creates mental space for think­ cation about c ing as an internal conversation with the other (Spezzano, 1996). think it will tl The study ing/communi< Integration: Differentiation With Oneness or the Moral Third tion between a shared syml To construct the idea of the shared, intersubjective third, 1 have brought ing third-he, together two experiences of thirdness: the difterentiating aspect that needs and thus as a to inform even the oneness of accommodation, empathy, and resonance; urgency in hel and the rhythmic aspect that informs shared reflection, negotiating, and tion meet, en'ond Doer and Done £0 107

tation-even "marker"-exaggerated mirroring-make clear to the baby Fonagy et al. h recognizes propose that mothers are driven to saliently mark their affect-mirroring dis­ need to feel plays to differentiate them from realistic emotional expressions. The baby is ~ than acquir- soothed by the fact that mother is not herself distressed but is reflecting and understanding his feeling. This behavior, the contrast between the mother's a thing to be gesture and her affective tension level, is perceived by the child. I would , that creates suggest that this kind of interaction constitutes a form of protosymbolic ·ience mutual communication and thus is an important basis for later symbolic communi­ ace for think­ cation about one another's minds (e.g., "I know you are upset by this, but I i). think it will turn out okay"). The study of marking shows how the feeling about behavior and shar­ ing/communicating about it are not identical. Such an incipient differentia­ Irai Third tion between the gestural representation and the thing/feeling helps build a shared symbolic third. It relies on the mother's relation to a differentiat­ have brought ing third-her ability to represent her distress as distinct from her child's ect that needs and thus as a necessary part of the relationship rather than a disregulating nd resonance; urgency in her mind. It is the place where self-regulation and mutual regula­ gotiating, and tion meet, enabling differentiation with empathy rather than projective con­ an understand fusion. Thus, we see the synergy of the attunement function, the rhythmic in the parent- third, with the containing function of the differentiating third. I emphasize that this is not only a matter of differentiation because the mother needs 11 the one, the nind, which is the identification of the rhythmic third and not merely an abstract idea of what is right. The third degenerates into mere duty if there is no identifica­ o identify with tory oneness of feeling the child's urgency and relief, pleasure, and joy in 11-there is the connection. )ther's need for Let me give an exarnple written by someone who was himself a parent { a mother, this and was writing about a parental experience, which is an important point; dll-or-be-killed even more important to me personally, it was written by Stephen Mitchell, whose subsequent death was a great loss. It represents a statement by a his threatening , are one or by founding relational theorist about the importance of the principle of accom­ netrical aCC01l1- modation to the other's rhythm in creating a shared third. Mitchell (1993) ,ity. The mother underscored the distinction between submission to duty and surrender to :Jt a submission the third, what I am calling the third in the one:

\Vhcn my older daughter was about two or so, I remember my excitement at nd self-denying the prospect of taking walks with her, given her new ambulatory skills and lei the ability to her intense interest in being outdoors. However, I soon found these walks ago­ ise, the mother nizingly slow. My idea of a walk entailed brisk movement along a road or path. :;;tress is natural Her idea was quite diffel·ent. The implications of this difference hit me one day ess without dis- when we encountered a fallen tree on the side of the road .... The rest of the "walk" was spent exploring the fungal and insect life on, under, and around , Gergely, Jurist, the tree. 1 remember my sudden realization that these walks would be no fun the mother can for me, merely a parental duty, if I held onto my idea of walks. As I was able to give that up and surrender to my daughter·s rhythm and focus, a different type 1, and yet by a

,, 108 * Jessica Benjamin

of experience opened up to me .... If I had simply restrained myself out of duty, Orange (Orange: I would have experienced the walk as a compliance. But I was able to become dec entering frol my daughter's version of a good companion and to find in that another way for distinguish true me to be that took on great personal meaning for me. (p. 147) analyst suffers ., observation. Th The parent thus accepts the principle of necessary asymmetry, accommo­ and hurtfulness dating to the other as a way of generating thirdness, and is transformed by As a superviE the experience of opening to mutual pleasure. Mitchell asked how we distin­ which it is pass guish inauthentic submission to another's demand from authentic change, being "bad," wi another way of questioning how we distinguish the compliance of twoness of the dyad he, from the transformational learning of thirdness. To me, it seems clear that be the bad one, in this case, the internal parental third, which takes the form of reflections side the analyst on what will create connection in this relationship, allows surrender and complementary transformation. This intention to connect and the resulting self· observation The concept ( and acceptance of what is lawful, in accordance with "how it is," produce a ing the different sense of the moral third: the orientation to a larger principle of lawfulness, empathy third. J necessity, rightness, or goodness. the acceptance a It would be simple (and not untrue) to say that the space of thirdness sary asymmetry opens up through surrender, the acceptance of simply being, stopping to only one-way re watch the fungi grow. But I have been trying to show how important it view is incompal is to distinguish this from submission-to clear up a common confusion recognizes the j' between surrender and an ideal of pure empathy, whereby merger or one­ with the other. ness can tend toward inauthenticity and the denial of self, leading ultimately tion by which ar to the complementary alternative of "eat or be eaten." For instance, some being understoo. authors have warned against the idea of the analyst's authenticity as if it other misses the meant imposing the analyst's view in a reversal of the old reluctance to understanding. disclose and impose (see Bromberg's 2006 critique) and a consequent fail­ My contention ure of empathy. This opposition of empathy and authenticity splits oneness We aim for onenl and thirdness, identification and differentiation, and constitutes the analytic but it does not w dyad as a complementarity in which there is room for only one subject a shared third. W (Aron, 2006). a deep identificat I have found that analysts who have worked deeply with patients in oping the positiv a style that emphasizes empathic attunement frequently come for help tory underpinnin with stalemates based on the exclusion of the observing third, which now the more elabora appears as a destructive outside force, a killer that threatens the treatment. become mere sin This issue is crucial because submission to the ideal of being an all-giving, not feel safely tal all-understanding mother can gradually shift into a persecutory experience third is experienc of being depleted, losing empathy, being devoured. As one supervisee put less dejection, or it, she began to feel so immobilized that she imagined herself cocooned in this in terms of t a condom-like sheath, "shrink-wrapped." brain contact witt The relational perspective is not that the analyst should demand that the patient's pain. the patient recognize the analyst's subjectivity-a misunderstanding of vation and judgmc the relational position on intersubjectivity by those like Stolorow and ing "resistance" (5 Beyond Doer and Done to 109 y, Orange (Orange, 2002, 2010) who emphasize the important part played by Ie decentering from one's own subjectivity. It is rather that the analyst learn to ". distinguish true thirdness from the self-immolating ideal of oneness that the analyst suffers as a persecutory simulacrum of the third, blocking real self­ observation. The analyst needs to work through her fear of blame, badness, and hurtfulness, which is tying both the patient and herself in knots. Imo­ ct by As a supervisor, I often find myself helping the analyst create a space in which it is possible to accept the ineVitability of causing or suffering pain, stin­ being "bad," without destroying the third. I observe how both members Lnge, Iness of the dyad become involved in a symmetrical dance, each trying not to be the bad one, the one who eats rather than being eaten. Yct whichever that side the analyst takes in this dance, taking sides itself simply perpetuates tions complementary relations. and The concept of thirdness formulates an alternative to this dance by add­ ation ing the differentiating third to the rhythmic aspects of accommodation and .Ice a ness, empathy third. It aims to distinguish compliance to a needed other from the acceptance of necessary asymmetry (Aron, 1996). However, such neces­ sary asymmetry does not imply a view of the maternal bond as involving Iness only one-way recognition of the child's subjectivity by the parent. Such a .1g to view is incompatible with an intersubjective theory of development, which lot it recognizes the joys and the necessity of reaching mutual understanding Llsion with the other. One-way recognition misses the mutuality of identifica­ one­ tion by which an other's intention is known to us. To separate or oppose lately being understood from self-reflective understanding or understanding the some other misses the process of creating a shared third as a vehicle of mutual i if it understanding. ce to My contention is, then, that we need the diHerentiating third even when t fail- we aim for oneness, that is, that oneness is dangerous without the third­ eness but it does not work properly without the flip side, the rhythmic joining in alytic a shared third. We (Aron & Benjamin, 1999) have talked about the need for lbject a deep identificatory sense of joining the other as a prereqUisite for devel­ oping the positive aspects of the observing third. Without this identifica­ lt5 in tory underpinning, without the nascent thirdness of emotional attunement, help the more elaborate forms of self-observation based on triangular relations 1 no\\' become mere simulacrum of the third. In other words, if the patient does ment. not feel safely taken into the analyst'S mind, the observing position of the ;iving, third is experienced as a barrier to getting in, leading to compliance, hope­ rience less dejection, or hurt anger. As Schore (2003) proposed, we might think of :!e put this in terms of brain hemispheres: The analyst'S shutting down the right­ led in brain contact with her own pain also cuts off affective communication with the patient's pain. Moving dissociatively into a left-brain modality of obser­ d that vation and judgment, the analyst "switches off" and is reduced to interpret­ ng of v and ing "resistance" (Spezzano, 1993). 110 ~ Jessica Benjamin

Typically, observing thirds that lack the music of the rhythmic third, of reciprocal identification, cannot create enough symmetry or equality to ~hat holding onto interp prevent idealization from deteriorating into submission to a person or ideal Interpretation is designee (Benjamin, 1995). Such submission may be countered by defiance and self­ prets a power struggle, ; destructive acts. Analysts in the past were particularly prone to conflating move. compliant submission on the patient's part with self-observation or achieve­ Relational analysts ha­ ment of insight and defiance with resistance. One of the most common the patient in exploring 0 difficulties in all psychotherapeutic encounters is that the patient can feel might call for the patient "done to" by the therapist's observation or interpretation; such interventions the space of thirdness rat trigger self-blame and shame, which used to be called by the misnomer tation of what has just go "resistance" (although they may indeed reflect intersubjective resistance to to be a defensive insisten the analyst's projection of her shame or guilt at hurting the patient). In other of reality. words, without compassionate acceptance, which the patient may have sel­ Britton (1988, 1998) dom experienced and never have internalized (as opposed to what ought to opposition of my reality be), observation becomes judgment. relationship when the pI Analysts, of course, turn this same beam of critical scrutiny on themselves, able or persecutory. It fe. and what should be a self-reflexive function turns into the self-flagellating, only one psychic reality. "bad-analyst" feeling. They fantasize, in effect, being shamed and blamed in tion of effects in this con front of their colleagues; the community and its ideals become persecutory partners experience the rather than supportive. without abandoning one how destructive the pati! instance, when the patit: Breakdown and Repair me ill, mad, and unable t impossible to take that if There may be no tenet more important to overcoming this shame and blame I believe that the anal in analytic work than the idea that recognition continually breaks down, nant emotional reality mi that thirdness always collapses into twoness, that we are always losing and his Own feelings denied ~ recovering the intersubjective view. We have to keep reminding ourselves response that the child's that breakdown and repair are part of a larger process, a concomitant of the not only invalidates nee( imperatives of participating in a two-way interaction. This is because, as mind; equally important Mitchell (1997) said, becoming part of the problem is how we become part of subjecting the child to an the solution. In this sense, the analyst's surrender means a deep acceptance also endangers the child of the necessity of becoming involved in enactments and impasses. This Where this kind of rna acceptance becomes the basis for a new version of thirdness that encour­ of projective identificati< ages us to honestly confront our feelings of shame, inadequacy, and guilt, to halt or even to observe. tolerate the symmetrical relation we may enter into with our patients, with­ attunement to the patier out giving up negative capability-in short, a different kind of moral third. partly through this involt Until the relational turn, it seems, many analysts were content to think dissociated self-experier of interpretation as the primary means of instituting the third. The notion ~nalyst can have a grip ( of resolving difficulties remained some version of the analyst's holding onto the crunch," often sigm the observing position, supported by theory, and hence formulating and I crazy or is it you?" interpreting in the face of impasse. Relational analysts are inclined to see The analyst caught in interpretation as action and to recognize, as Mitchell (1997) pointed out, and, against her own will to defend herself against Beyond Doer and Done lo 111 = third, that holding onto interpretation could perpetuate the very problems the ality to interpretation is designed to address. An example is when an analyst inter­ or ideal prets a power struggle, and the patient experiences this, too, as a power nd self­ move. nflating Relational analysts have explored a variety of ways to collaborate with lchieve­ the patient in exploring or exchanging perceptions. Foi· instance, the analyst ammon might call for the patient's help in figuring out what is going on to open up can feel the space of thirdness rather than simply putting forward his own interpre­ rentions tation of what has just gone wrong (Ehrenberg, 1992). The latter can appear isnomer to be a defensive insistence on one's own thinking as the necessary version tance to of reality. In other Britton (1988, 1998) explicitly considers the way the complementary lave sel­ opposition of my reality and your reality gets activated within the analytic ought to relationship when the presence of an observing third is felt to be intoler­ able or persecutory. It feels, Britton remarked, as though there is rOom for mseives, only one psychic reality. I have been trying to highlight the two-way direc­ ~ellating, tion of effects in this complementary dynamic, the symmetry wherein both lamed in partners experience the impossibility of acknowledging the other's reality ·secutory without abandoning one's own. The analyst may also be overwhelmed by how destructive the patient's image of her is to her own sense of self. For instance, when the patient's reality is that "You are toxic and have made me ill, mad, and unable to function," the analyst will typically find it nearly impossible to take that in without losing her own reality. I believe that the analyst'S feeling of being invaded by the other'S malig­ nd blame nant emotional reality might mirror the patient's early experiences of having ks down, his own feelings denied and supplanted by the parent's reality. The parental Jsing and response that the child's needs for independence or nurturance are ·'bad" ourselves not only invalidates needs and not only repels the child from the parent's ant of the mind; equally important, as Davies (2004) has shown, the parent is also ~cause, as subjecting the child to an invasion of the parent's shame and badness, which me part of also endangers the child's mind. cceptance Where this kind of malignant complementarity takes hold, the ping-pong sses. This of projective identification-the exchange of blame-is often too rapid to at encour­ halt or even to observe. The analyst cannot function empathically, because ld guilt, to attunement to the patient now feels like submission to extortion, and it is ~nts, with­ partly through this involuntary response on the analyst'S part to the patient's Jral third. dissociated self-experience that trauma is reenacted. Neither patient nor 1t to think analyst can have a grip on reality at this point-what Russell (1998) called rhe notion "the crunch," often signaled by the feeling expressed in the question, "Am ,lding onto I crazy or is it you?" lating and The analyst caught in the crunch feels unable to respond authentically, ned to see and, against her own will, she feels compelled, unconSCiously or consciously, )inted out, to defend herself against the patient's reality. When the analyst feels, implies, 112 ~_ jessica Benjamin or says, "You are doing something to me," she involuntarily mirrors the you Perhaps mOSI who feels that the other is bad and doing something to you. Therefore, the an intersubjecti more each I insists that it is you, the more each I becomes you, and the more aCknowledgmer our boundaries are blurred. My effort to save my sanity mirrors your effort can acknowled~ to save your sanity. Sometimes, this self-protective reaction shows itself in create a system subtle ways: the analyst's refusal to accommodate; the occurrence of a pain­ in the past and ful silence; a disjunctive comment, conveying the analyst's withdrawal from tation and the a the rhythm of mutual emotional exchange, from the one in the third. This cupation, roisat reaction is registered in turn by the patient, who thinks, "The analyst has point Uacobs, : chosen her own sanity over mine. She would rather that I feel crazy than patient may nee that she be the one who is in the wrong." her willingness This deterioration of the interaction cannot yet be represented or con­ responsibility f( tained in dialogue. The symbolic third-interpretation-simply appears as able piece of en the analyst's effort to be the sane one, so talking about it does not seem to acknowledgmer help. Certain kinds of observation seem to amplify the patient's shame at ment in which being desperate and guilt over raging at the analyst. As Bromberg (2000) tion, suspected pointed out, the effort to represent verbally what is going on, to engage the respect and ide symbolic, can further the analyst's dissociative avoidance of the abyss the ing third. patient is threatened by. In reviewing such sessions in supervision, we find As analysts, ' that it is precisely by "catching" a moment of the analyst's dissociation­ out of the sym! visible, perhaps, in a subtly disjunctive focus that shifts the tone or direction need for self-ju of the session-that the character of the enactment comes into relief and can done that has ! be productively unraveled. horribly shamel Britton (2000) has described the restoration of thirdness in terms of the patient's reality analyst's recovery of self-observation, such that "we stop doing something patient's accusa that we are probably not aware of doing in our interaction with the patient." the grip of help I would characterize this, in accord with Schore (2003), as the analyst's right, healthy, k regaining self-regulation and becoming able to move out of dissociation edge the patien and back into affectively resonant containment. Another way to describe it then the intersu is that the ana(yst needs to change, as Slavin and Kriegman (1998) put it, this step out of and in many cases this is what first leads the patient to believe that change it involves dire is possible. While there is no recipe for this change, I suggest that the about one's ow idea of surrendering rather than submitting is a way of evoking and sanc­ ing a claim on . tioning this process of letting go of Ollr determination to make our reality it into being. operative. To do this-and I think this has been clarified only recently and This amelior insufficiently remarked upon prior to recent relational and intersubjectively the differentiat informed literature*-is to find a different way to regulate ourselves, one in rhythmic third which we accept loss, failure, mistakes, our own vulnerability. And, if not can contain cat always (as Renik, 1998a, contends), we must certainly often feel free to com­ is. I also think ( municate about this to the patient, rience of takin! responsibility, t has always exp * See Bromberg (2000), Davies (2003), Renik (1998a, 1998b), Ringstrom (1998), Slavin and member of the Kriegman (1998), Schore (2003), and Slochower (1996), Beyond Doer and Done to 113

Perhaps most crucial to replacing our ideal of the knowing analyst with eyou an intersubjective view of the analyst as responsible participant, is the C, the acknowledgment of our own struggles (Mitchell, 1997). The analyst who more can acknowledge missing or failing, who can feel and express regret, helps effort create a system based on acknowledgment of what has been missed, both .elf in in the past and the present. There are cases in which the patient's confron­ pain­ tation and the analyst's subsequent acknowledgment of a mistake, a preoc­ I from cupation, misattunement or an emotion of his own is the crucial turning . This point (Jacobs, 2001; Renik, 1998a). For, as Davies (2004) illustrated, the st has patient may need the analyst to assume the burden of badness, to show r than her willingness to tolerate it to protect the patient. The analyst shoulders responsibility for hurting, even though her action represented an unavoid­ r con­ able piece of enactment. A dyadic system that creates a safe space for such 'ars as acknowledgment of responsibility provides the basis for a secure attach­ :em to ment in which understanding is no longer persecutory, outside observa­ tOle at tion, suspected of being in the service of blame. This sense of mutual (2000) respect and identification contributes to the development of a differentiat­ ge the ing third. ISS the As analysts, we strive to create a dyad that enables both partners to step {e find out of the symmetrical exchange of blame, thus relieving ourselves of the ltion­ need for self-justification. In effect, we tell ourselves, whatever we have rection done that has gotten us into the position of being in the wrong is not so ndcan horribly shameful that we cannot own it. It stops being submission to the patienfs reality because, as we free ourselves fro111 shame and blame, the of the patient's accusation no longer persecutes us, and hence, we are no longer in lething the grip of helplessness. If it is no longer a matter of which person is sane, atient." right. healthy, kno\\is best, or the like, and if the analyst is able to ad{nowl­ tlalyst's edge the patient's suffering without stepping into the position of badness, .ciation then the intersubjective space of thirdness may be restored. My point is that cribe it this step out of helplessness usually involves more than an internal process; put it, it involves direct or transitionally framed (Mitrani, 2001) communication change about one's own reactivity, misaltunement, or misunderstanding. By mak­ hat the ing a claim on the potential space of thirdness, we call upon it and so call d sanc­ it into being . . reality This ameliorative action may be thought of as a practice that strengthens ltly and the differentiating third-not only the simple, affective resonance of the ectively rhythmic third but also the maternal third in the one, wherein the parent ,one in can contain catastrophic feelings because she knows they are not all there i, if not is. I also think of this as the moral third-reachable only through this expe­ to com- rience of taking responsibility for bearing pain and shame. In taking such responsibility, the analyst is putting an end to the buck passing the patient has always experienced-that is, to the game of ping-pong wherein each lavin and member of the dyad tries to put the bad into the other. The analyst says, 114 Jessica Benjamin in effect, "I'll go ftrst."* In orienting to the moral third of responsibility, the analyst is also demonstrating the route out of helplessness. without the one, rath In calling this the moral third, I am suggesting that clinical practice containment (Cooper, may ultimately be founded in certain values, such as the acceptance of the possibility of a sh uncertainty, humility, and compassion that form the basis of a democratic by virtue of mutual r or egalitarian view of psychoanalytic process. I am also hoping to correct the intersubjective fie] our understanding of self-disclosure, a concept that developed reactively to a shared third, an obj counter ideas about anonymity. In my view, much of what is misunderstood acknowledging his ov as disclosure is more properly considered in terms of its function, which is will take such opeonl to acknowledge the analyst's contribution (generally sensed by the patient) analyst must engage n to the intersubjective process, thus fostering a dyadic system based on tak­ anxious, nor a denial, ing responsibility rather than disowning it or evading it under the guise of 1993, p. 145). neutrality. But what is the t Let me briefly illustrate with an example presented by Steiner (1993), anxious or perceive tt which touches on the analyst's difficulties with feeling blamed. Steiner cites Why would it not reI an interaction in which he "went too far" in his interpretation, adding a knOWledge of his OW[ comment with a "somewhat critical tone to it which I suspected arose from recognize his respons my difficulty in containing feelings ... anxiety about her and possibly my analytic community t annoyance that she made me feel responSible, guilty, and helpless" (p. 137, inevitable participati( italics added). In supervising and reading, I have seen numerous examples implies the need for I of this kind of going too far, when the analyst thinks he has managed the can be the basis of ini discomfort of suppressing his own reality and reacts by dissociatively try­ tion to the moral thir ing to insert it after all (Ringstrom, 1998). Despite this aside to us, his col­ ("I'll take the hit if yc leagues, in the actual event, Steiner (1993) dismissed the patient's response to him as projection, because he felt that "I was being made responsible for the patient's problems as well as my own" (p. 144). He does not seem AccOl to consider the symmetry between his reaction and her reaction, in which she tended to feel persecuted because she felt that Steiner "inlplied that she I will illustrate tills C1 [that is, she alone] was responsible for what happened between us" (p. 144). into complementarit) So, rather than "disclosing" that indeed he was feeling responSible and that destroy the life-givin: he had gone too far, he rejects the possibility of confirming her observa­ tion that "over the question of responsibility, she felt I sornetinles adopted a righteous tone which made her feel I was refusing to examine my own Aliza contribution ... to accept responsibility myself" (p. 144). While Steiner accepts the tendency to be caught in enactment and the A patient whose ear necessity for the analyst to be open minded and inquiring to be helped by understood and safel the patient's feedback, he insists that the analyst must cope by relying on ing that any misunc his own understanding, just as he insists that the patient is ultimately helped malignant that it we only by understanding rather than by being understood. Both analyst and Aliza, a successful 111 patient are held to a standard of relying on individual insight, the third suffered a series of unable to cope; arum strange relatives wh( .. Drucilla Cornell (2003) has explicated the principle of ubuntu, crucial in the South couch during which African reconciliation process, as meaning "I'll go first." attuning, a series of ------~

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Beyond Doer and Done to 115 nsibility, the without the one, rather than making use of mutual, albeit asymmetrical, containment (Cooper, 2000). Steiner's definition of containment excludes ical practice the possibility of a shared third, of creating a dyadic system that contains :ceptance of by virtue of mutual reflection on the interaction. Thus, he rejects use of 3. democratic the intersubjective field to transform the conflict around responsibility into 19 to correct a shared third, an object of joint reflection. And he dismisses the value of reactively to acknowledging his own responsibility because he assumes that the patient isunderstood will take such openness as a sign of the analyst's inability to contain; the ion, which is analyst must engage neither in "a confession which simply makes the patient I the patient) anxiolls, nor a denial, which the patient sees as defensive and false" (Steiner, )ased on tak­ 1993, p. 145). , the guise of But what is the basis for assuming that the patient would be made anxious or perceive this as weakness rather than as strength (Renik, 1998a)? :einer (1993), Why would it not relieve her to know that the analyst is able to contain . Steiner cites knowledge of his Own weaknesses and thus strong enough to apologize and on, adding a recognize his responsibility for her feeling hurt? It seems to me that it is the :d arose from analytic community that must change its attitude: Accepting the analyst's t possibly my inevitable participation in such enactments, as Steiner seems to do, also >less" (p. 137, implies the need for participatory solutions. The surrender to the inevitable )us examples can be the basis of initiating mutual accommodation and a symmetrical rela­ managed the tion to the moral third-in this case, the principle of bearing responsibility )ciative1y try­ (,'I'll take the hit if you'll take the hit"). :0 us, his col­ ~nt's response e responsible Accommodation, Cocreation, and Repair oes not seem ion, in which I will illustrate this creation of shared responsibility in a Cdse of breakdown plied that she into complementarity, a prolonged impasse in which any third seemed to nus" (p. 144). destroy the life-giving oneness. sible and that , her observa­ :imes adopted Aliza mine my own A patient whose early years in analysis provided an experience of being ment and the understood and safely held, began to shift into trauma-related states of fear­ be helped by ing that any misunderstanding-that is, any interpretation-would be so by relying on malignant that it would catapult her into illness, despair, and desolation. mately helped Aliza, a successful musicologist, had fled Eastern Europe as a child and had th analyst and suffered a series of catastrophes with which her family had been nearly 19ht, the third unable to cope; among them was Aliza's having been left by her mother with strange relatives who barely spoke her language. After several years on the :ial in the South couch during which AUza experienced me as deeply holding and musical1y attuning, a series of misfortunes catalyzed the appearance of catastrophic 116 ~ Jessica Benjamin anxieties, and my presence began to seem unreliable, dangerous, and even recapitulate a long histor toxic. Of course any analysis as it deepens will expose areas of shame colleague, I concluded th that are dealt with projectively, dramatize failures by and traumas with her was not wrong or de early others that must be enacted to be addressed, and thus disrupt the her. In the event, I surpri: attunement of the rhythmic third. But in this case, external events added to to accept the loss of Ali;. the frightening quality of these ruptures and posed a greater threat to our as an analyst. I thought 1 jOintly constructed container. Aliza needed me more but thus also feared me a deeply attuned dyad, more-her disorganized attachment experiences were reenacted such that knew we both felt love fa misattunements on my part destabilized both of us. It was as if I had simply she was experiencing-a lost the score, our third, which once guided me. failure. My efforts to reflect on this turn appeared to Aliza as "thinking," as As planned, I began b denial of her desperation, as dangerous self-protection, evasion of blame might be unable to fulfil (in effect, repelling rather than containing her projections). My adherence elsewhere if she wished. to the traditional third, the rules of analytic encounter, began to seem (even that no matter what she to me) a misuse of the professional role to distance myself from her agonies that she could not break and to withdraw as a person, in effect dissociatively shutting the patient out reassertion of the indest of my mind. Any effort to explain this awful turn, often when Aliza urgently responsibility dramatical asked it of me, could turn into a means of shifting the blame onto her, or receptivity to her becaus clumsy intellectualization that broke the symphonic attunernent of OUf early find a solution alleviated relationship (an example of the right-to-Ieft brain shift described by Schore, to the analytic commitm 2003). This problem was exacerbated because Aliza often countered her deep connection to her. shame by trying to prove she could be an intact adult in talking competently nection and feeling, with to me about her traumatized child self, but that self then felt angry and her. This shift allowed U~ excluded. What had been a subjectively helpful third now seemed to be a and aloneness that the r dynamic built on a dissociative or blaming form of observation rather than recovered memories and on emotional resonance and inclusion. Yet we were still hauntcc I began to be overcome by classic feelings of complementary breakdown: a period of this heightel feeling helpless, feeling the pull to defend my reality, my own integrity of regain her trust in me. 51 feeling and thinking to protect myself from shame; in turn, I felt the cor­ she could not imagine w responding fear that this shame would lead me to blame and so destroy my Shortly after the terre patient. When Aliza objected to my formulations as too intellectual, I was for a number of sessions reminded of Britton's (1988, 1998) descriptions of how the shaky maternal pist. She reported that s container is threatened by thinking. But it did not seem to me to be the being surrounded by oth "father" who broke into the previously soothing maternal dyad but rather to the disaster, Believinl a sanity-robbing and terrifying denial that represented the diSSOciated, dis­ and linking this to the w owned, "violent innocence" of Aliza's mother (Bollas, 1992, p. 165), who follOWing: "Everything I responded to any crisis or need with chaos and impermeability. It was this experience of the blan k mother whom neither of uS could tolerate having to be. Our complementary acted as though nothinJ twoness was a dance in which each of us tried to avoid being her-each anything I saw, it wasn't feeling done to, each refusing to be the one to blame for hurting the other. teT as YOU-it was my Sl At the same time, from Aliza's point of view, the feeling of blame was reaction." my issue; her concern was that she literally felt as if she were dying and Aliza then spoke of that I did not care. I began to fear that she would leave and we would thus she was troubled by thi: Beyond Doer and Done to 117 and even recapitulate a long history of breaking attachments. In consultation with a of shame colleague, I concluded that I would tell her that what she wanted me to give mas with her was not wrong or demanding but that I might not be able to give it to lsrupt the her. In the event, I surprised myself. I had prepared for the session by trying ; added to to accept the loss of Aliza as a person I cared about as well as my failure eat to our as an analyst. I thought that our hopeful beginning, when we had created feared me a deeply attuned dyad, would be at best overshadowed by our ending. I such that knew we both felt love for each other and that I could identify with the pain lad simply she was experiencing-alongside my feelings of frustration, impotence, and failure. lking," as As planned, I began by telling AIiza that her needs were not wrong yet I of blame might be unable to fulfill them and that I would assist her in seeking help Idherence elsewhere if she wished. But I also found myself telling her spontaneously eem (even that no matter what she did she would always have a place in my heart, er agonies that she could not break our attachment or destroy my loving feelings. This )atient out reassertion of the indestructibility of my love and my willingness to bear a urgently responsibility dramatically shifted Aliza's view of me. But it also shifted my 110 her, or receptivity to her because, paradoxically, my acceptance of my inability to four early find a solution alleviated my sense of helplessness. It enabled me to return by Schore, to the analytic commitment not to "do" anything, but rather to contact my :ltered her deep connection to her. She responded by recovering her side of the con­ lmpetently nection and feeling, with me, the meaning of the shared loss of my value for angry and her. This shift allowed us to open the door to the dissociated states of terror edtobea and aloneness that the patient had felt I could not bear with her, and she 'ather than recovered memories and scenes of childhood we had never reached before. Yet we were still haunted by the specter of the destroying mother, and after reakdown: a period of this heightened reliving Aliza said that she would never fully ntegrity of regain her trust in me. She chose to leave to protect our relationship, a third ~It the (or­ she could not imagine would survive. destroy my Shortly after the terrorist attacks of Septemher 11, 2001, Aliza returned tnal, I was for a number of sessions, having ,,-'orked in the interim with another thera~ y maternal pist. She reported that she had become aware of anger and the feeling of , to be the being surrounded by others who refused to acknowledge their own relation but rather to the disaster. Believing that she was commenting on my relation to her dated, dis- and linking this to the way she had experienced me in the past, I noted the 165)' who following: "Everything I said seemed to be my distancing myself, another It was this experience of the blank faces in your family. \Xrhen disaster struck, they plementary acted as though nothing bad had happened at all. Whenever I told you her-each anything I saw, it wasn't my having a subjective reaction to the same disas­ ~ the other. ter as you-it was my seeing something shameful in the intensity of your blame was reaction .. , dying and Aliza then spoke of guilt at having "battered" me, and I replied that would thus she ,vas troubled by this at the time hut could not help doing it. She said 118 I Jessica Benjamin that she had "tricked" me by eliciting formulations and explanations from had to marvel at herse me that felt distancing and had so angered her. Likewise, she had often had the experience tha demanded that I ten her what I felt but had been angry if I did so because tion, my mistakes and then it was "about you." As the process of s and I recreated an e::: I acknowledged that in being drawn into these interactions, I often did feel very bad and as though I was failing. I said that in my view what was play our previous expt grate experiences of r€ important was that, even though she knew this was happening, it felt to her that she had to accept the onus, an the blame, if she let herself acknowledge childhood love of her her sense of my and b any responsibility-a "loser-takes-all" situation. This seemed to me related thirdness, a symmetri to why she had left when she did. I raised the question of whether she felt position of forgivenest that I, too, could not bear the onus, that whatever I would have to admit to in each of our minds for us to continue would be more than I could bear-that I was not willing shared third had allm to take that on for her not to be crazy. I suggested, "You couldn't rely on me disillusion, and to acel to care enough about your sanity to bear blame for you." I hope this vignett AHza replied, "Yes, I saw you as being like the parent who won't do process of shared trat that, would rather sacrifice the child." We considered how every effort I possibilities of this w< had made to acknowledge my role in our interaction was tainted by Aliza's panacea, that the anal sense that she was required to reassure the other. She was sure she had only by working thro to bear the unbearable for her mother (or other), while reassuring her that and loss. she was "good" for her. It seemed there had been no way for me to assume The notion of the responsibility without demanding exoneration-thus, the limits of any form table breakdown and of disclosure or acknowledgment became clear to both of us. to our patients and tt In later sessions, we explicated this impossibility as we arrived at a dra­ This notion seems to 1 matic picture of Aliza's mother's way of behaving during the horrifying the relational imperat events of the patient's early childhood. I was able to say what could not be ment in the interactic said earlier: how impossibly painful it was for Aliza to feel that she, with her that we be oriented own daughter in the present, in some way replicated her mother's actions. mean by the moral tl But it was likewise impossible for me to bear the burden of being that certain principles as ; mother because then I would pose a terrifying threat to her. interaction in which, Aliza responded to this description of her dilemma with shocked recog­ equacy, and gu ilt th, nition of how true it felt and also how it foreclosed any action on my part, analyst's surrender IT any move toward understanding. She was amazed that I had been able to a process that is ofte tolerate being in such a frightening situation with her. Again, I was able to is an intrinsic necess reiterate my sadness about having been unable to avoid evoking the feeling or requirement pose( of being with a dangerous mother who denies what she is doing. Aliza's third in a process th::: response was to spontaneously reach an intense conviction that she must, ful" forms, to the ex at all costs, assume the burden of having a sanity-destroying mother inside the Other. her. She was aware of a sense of deep sorrow for how difficult it had been In recent decades for me to stay with her through that time. toward overthrowing Indeed, her response was so intense that I felt a moment of concern­ subjectivity with the was I forcing something into my patient? However, when she returned after now necessary to fo( a 2-month summer break and throughout the following year, Aliza spoke of subjectivity by provi how transformed she felt, so much stronger after that session that she often Beyond Doer and Done to 119

had to marvel at herself and wonder if she were the same person. Now she IS from had the experience that her love survived the destructiveness of our interac­ i often tion, my mistakes and limitations. )ecause As the process of shared retrospection and reparation continued, Aliza and I recreated an earlier mode of accommodation, which brought into -ten did play our previous experiences of being in harmony. She was able to reinte­ hat was grate experiences of reverence and beauty in which my presence evoked her It to her childhood love of her mother's face, the ecstasy and joy that had confirmed lwledge her sense of my and her own inner goodness (Mitrani, 2001). We created a , related thirdness, a symmetrical dialogue, in which each of us responded from a she felt position of forgiveness and generosity, making a safe place between us and ldmit to in each of our minds for taking responsibility. The transformation of our twilling shared third had allowed both of us to transcend shame, to walk through yonme disillusion, and to accept the limits of my analytic subjectivity. I hope this vignette is suggestive enough of the complexity of such a von't do process of shared transformation as to make plain the risks as well as the effort I possibilities of this work. I have tried to make clear that disclosure is not a .y Aliza's panacea, that the analyst's acknowledgment of responsibility can take place she had only by working through deep anguish around feelings of destructiveness her that and loss. ) assume The notion of the moral third is thus linked to the acceptance of inevi­ any form table breakdown and repair, which allows us to situate our responsibility to our patients and the process in the context of a witnessing compassion. at a dra­ This notion seems to me intrinsic to embracing the intersubjective necessity, lorrifying the re1ational imperative to participate in a two-way interaction. If involve­ lid not be ment in the interaction cannot be avoided, then it is all the more necessary , with her that we be oriented to certain principles of responsibility. This is what I 's actions. mean by the moral third: acceptance (hopefully within our community) of leing that certain principles as a foundation for analytic thirdness-an attitude toward interaction in which analysts honestly confront the feelings of shame, inad­ ~ed recog- equacy, and guilt that enactments and impasses arouse. In this sense, the 1 my part, analyst's surrender means accepting the necessity of becoming involved in en able to a process that is often outside our control and understanding-thus, there Tas able to is an intrinsic necessity for this surrender; it does not come from a demand :he feeling or requirement posed by the other. This principle of necessity becomes our ng. Aliza's third in a process that we can actively shape only according to certain "law­ she must, ful" forms, to the extent that we also align and accommodate ourselves to ther inside the Other. t had been In recent decades, the relational or intersubjective approach has moved toward overthrowing the old orthodoxy that opposed efforts to use our own concern­ subjectivity with theories of one-way action and encapsulated minds. It is Jrned after now necessary to focus more on protecting and refining the use of analytic ~a spoke of subjectivity by providing outlines in the context of a viable discipline. As It she often

,, 120 I Jessica Benjamin

Mitchell (1997) contended, transformation occurs when the analyst stops trying to live up to a generic, uncontaminated solution, and finds instead toward res! the custom-fitted solution for a particular patient. This is the approach that psychoanal' works because, as Goldner (2003) put it, it reveals "the transparency of the and inventi analyst's Own working process ... his genuine struggle between the neces­ ourselves. sity for analytic discipline and need for authenticity" (p. 143). Thus, the patient sees in the analyst a vision of what it means to struggle internally in a therapeutic way. The patient needs to see his own efforts reflected in the analyst's similar but different subjectivity, which, like the cross-modal response to the infant, constitutes a translation or metabolizing digestion. Aron, L. (1995 The patient checks out whether the analyst is truly metabolizing or just rest­ Aron, L (199 ing on internalized thirds, superego contents, analytic dictums. Press, Aran, L. (199S I experienced a particularly dramatic instance of this need to contact Aran, l. (2001 and be mirrored by the authentic subjective responses of the analyst with 344-36 a patient whose highly dissociated experiences of her parents' homicidal Aran, L., & Bel attacks materialized as a death threat toward me. After I told her that there at Sprin were certain things she absolutely could not do for both of us to safely con­ Beebe, B., & tinue the process, she left me a phone message saying that she had actually principl wanted me to confront her with limits, as she never had been before. In Beebe, 6., & l effect, she was searching for the symbolic third, what Lacan (1975) saw as Press. the speech that keeps us from killing. This third had to be backed up by Beebe, B., SOT a demonstration that I could participate emotionally, that is, could identify and Stel Benjamin, J. (1 ~·ith her feeling of sheer terror and survive it. Benjamin, J. (1 The patient added in her message that she needed me to do this from sis and my own instincts, not out of adherence to therapeutic rules. I came to real­ Benjamin, J. ( ize that she meant that I had acted as a real person, with my own subjec­ tion. Nt tive relationship to rules and limits. And that this had to be demonstrably Benjamin, J. ( based on a personal confrontation of the reality of terror and abuse, not New 1-1. on dissociative denial of it. She needed to feel the third not as emanating Benjamin, J. from an impersonal, professional identity or a reliance on authority, such London as she had felt from the church in which she had been raised, but from Benjamin, J. ( my personal relation to the third, my faith in what is lawful. At the time, I Rclatiol felt how precarious the analyst's endeavor is, the risk of the trust placed in Analyti, Benjamin, J. me: could I indeed reach into myself and be truthful enough to be equal Psycho, to this trust? Benjamin! J. ( All patients, in individual ways, place their hopes for the therapeutic Journal process in us, and for each one, we must use our own subjectivity in a dif­ Ballas, C. (l~ ferent way to struggle through to a specific solution. But this specificity and Strauss the authenticity on which it is based cannot be created in free fall. Analytic Britton, R. (1 ~ work conducted according to the intersubjective view of two participating lEd.), T. subjectivities requires a discipline based on orientation to the structural Univer~ conditions of thirdness. It is my hope that this clinical and developmen­ Britton, R. (19 tal perspective on cocreated, intersubjective thirdness can help orient us Britton, R. (2C by Psyt Beyond Dol;:';{ and Done to ] 21 stops lstead toward responsibility and more rigorolls thinking, even as our practice of h that psychoanalysis becomes more emotionally authentic, more spontaneous of the and inventive, morc compassionate and liberating to both our patients and ourselves. 1eces­ S, the rnally ted in References modal ~stion. Aron, L (199S). The internalized primal scene. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 5(2), )95-237. ;t rest- !\ron, L. (1996J, A meeting of minds: A4ulUaiity in psychoanZllvsis. Hillsdale, NJ; Analytic Press. ontact Aran, L. (1999). Clinical choices and the relational matrix. Psychoanalytic Dialogues. 9, '1-30. I Aron, L. (2006). Analytic impasse and the third. Inrf!rnational Journal o( Psychoanalysis, 87, t with 344-368. licidal Aron, L., & Benjamin, J. {"I 999, April}. Intersubjectivity and tile struggle to think. Pilper presented : there at Spring Meeting, Division 39 of the American Psychologic, 3.!. 442--464. Benjamin, /. (1978). Internalization dnd instrumental culture: A reinterpretation 01 psychoanaly­ 5 from sis and socia! theory. Dissertation, New York University. o real­ Benjamin, J. (1988). The bonds oilOl'e: P>'I -choan:.dl/sl\. fernini:.rn. and the probfelJJ oj" domina­ ;ubjec­ lion. New York: Pantheon.

,trably 8enjamin, /. (1995). Likf' subjects, /0\,E" nbjects: [55<3)., OJ) n.:':.."ognilion and sf'.,ual differencE'. ,e, not New Haven, CT: Yale Univerc,ity rl·t'ss. nating 8enj Or'lIlgc. lnlt'mational lpeutic Journal or Psychoanalytic Selt Ps}'choJog;:, :)"()!, 2 ..1-1.-256. :1 dif­ a noll as, C. 11992). fJeing a characler: PS) choanalviis ilnd self experienc2. ('!el,\ YOlk Farrar, ityand Strauss & Giroux. naly£ic I)rittoll, R. (1988). The missing link: parenlal sexuality in the Oedipu..; comple". In R. Shafer ipating (Ed.), The contemporary Kleinians o( London (pp. 2-j·2~258). {'vlaciisort,. (T: Intemational uctural Universities Press, 1997. )pmen­ !~t"itton, R. (199B). Br=lief and imagination. London: Routiedge. ient us :''\!"iUon, R. (2000). Internet discussion of Britton's vvork. P

\ 122 I Jessica Benjamin Mitrani, J. (2001). Ordinary Bromberg, P. M. (2000). Potholes on the royal road-or is it an abyss? Contemporary the treatment of prim Psychoanalysis, 36, 5-28. Ogden,1. (1994). Subjects ( Cooper, S. (2000). Mutual containment in the analytic situation. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, Orange, O. M. (2002). ThE 10(2), 169-194. process. Psychoana/~ Crastnopol, M. (1999). The analyst's professional self as a "third" influence on the dyad: When Orange, D. M. (2010). RE the analyst writes about the treatment. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 9,445-470. dialogue. Internation Davies, ]. M. (2003). Falling in love with love: oedipal and postoedipal manifestations of Orange, D. M., Atwood, G idealization, mourning, and erotic masochism. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 13, 1-28. NJ: AnalytiC Press. Davies, J. M. (2004). Whose bad objects are we anyway? Repetition and our elusive love affair Pizer, S. (1998). BUilding with evil. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 14,711-732. AnalytiC Press. Davies, J. & Frawley, M. (1994). Treating the adult survivor of childhood sexual abuse: Pizer, S. (2002, October). ' A psychoanalytic perspective. New York: Basic Books. postoedipal manifes Ehrenberg, D. (1992). The intimate edge. New York: Norton. online symposium. Feldman, M. (1993). The dynamics of reassurance. In R. Schafer (Ed.), The contemporary Racker, H. (1968). Transfer Kleinians of London (pp. 321-344). Madison, CT: International Universities Press, 1997. Renik, O. (1998a). The an;: Feldman, M. (1997). Projective identification: The analyst's involvement. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 7' of Psychoanalysis, 78, 227-241. Renik, O. (1998b). Getting Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, mentalization and the Ringstrom, P. (1998). Thera1 development of the self. New York: Other Press. the double bind hyp Ghent, E. (1990). Masochism, submission, surrender. Contemporary Psychoanalysis, 26, Russell, P. (1998). Crises 0 169-211. the Paul Russell Cor Goldner, V. (2003). Gender and trauma: Commentary on Michael Clifford's case presenta­ Sander, l. (2002). Thinking tion. Self Psychology: European Journal for Psychoanalytic Therapy and Research, 11, of being known. PS) 13&-144. Schore, A. N. (2003). Affe. Habermas, J. (1968). Know/edge and human interests. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1971. Slavin, M. & Kriegman, D. Hegel, G. W. F. (1807). Phenomenologie des Ceistes. Hamburg, Germany: Felix Meiner, 8,247-285. 1952. Slochower, J. A. (1996). H Hoffman, l. (2002, January). Forging difference out of similarity. Paper presented at the Spezzano, C. (1993). Aftf,>( Stephen Mitchell Memorial Conference of the International Association for Relational Spezzano, C. (1996). The Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy, New York. epistemology. Psycl Jacobs, T. (2001). On misleading and misreading patients: Some reflections on communica­ Steiner, J. (1993). Problem tions, miscommunications and countertransference enactments. International Journal of interpretations. In F Psychoanalysis, 82, 653-669. Stern, O. N. (1985). The il Klein, M. (1946). Notes on some schizoid mechanisms. In Envy and gratitude and other works, Stolorow, R. & Atwood, 1946-1963. New York: Oelacorte, 1975. psychological life. f Klein, M. (1952). Some theoretical conclusions regarding the emotional life of the infant. Symington, N. (1983). Th{ In Envy and gratitude and other works, 1946-1963. New York: Delacorte, 1975. Review of Psychoa. Knoblauch, S. H. (2000). The musical edge of therapeutic dialogue. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Trevarthen, C. (1977). De Press. (Ed.), Studies in me Kojeve, A. (1969). Introduction to the reading of Hegel. New York: Basic Books. Trevarthen, C. (1980). ( Kristeva, J. (1987). Freud and love. In Tales of love. New York: Columbia University Press. primary intersubjer Lacan, ). (1975). The seminars of Jacques Lacan, book /: 1953-19540. Forrester, Trans.). sona! communicat. New York: Norton, 1991. Tronick, E. (1989). Emoti Lacan, J. (1977). Ecrits: A selection (A. Sheridan, Trans.). New York: Norton. 44,112-119. Loewald, H. (1951). Papers on psychoanalysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Winnicott, D. W. (1971) Mitchell, S. (1993). Hope and dread in psychoanalysis. New York: Basic Books. and reality. Londo Mitchell, S. (1997). Influence and autonomy in psychoanalysis. Hillsdale, NJ: AnalytiC Press. Beyond Doer ane! Done to 123

Mitrani, J. (2001). Ordinary people and extra-ordinal)! proteclions: /\ post-Kleinian approach to emporary the treatment of primitive mental states. London: Routledge. Ogden, 1. (1994). Subjects of analysis. Northvale, N): Jason Aronson. )ia/ogues, Orange, D. M. (20m). There is no outside: Empathy and authenticity in the psychoanalytic process. Psychoanalytic Psychology, 19, 686-700. 'ad: When Orange, D. M. (2010). Recognition as: Intersubjective vulnerability in the psychoanalytic dialogue. International joumal of Ps),choanal,/tic SeH Psychology, 5(3J, 227-243. ;tations of Orange, D. M., Al'wood, G. E. & Stolorow, R. D. (1997). Working intersubjectively. Hilbdale, 1-28. NJ: Analytic Press. love afiair Pizer, S. (1998). Building bridges: Negotiation of paradox in psychoanalysis. Hillsdale, NJ: Analytic Press. Jal abuse: Pi;;:er, S. (2002, October). COlllmentary on J. Davies's "Falling in love with love: oedipal and postoeclipal manil'estCltiolls 01 idealization, Illouming, and erotic masochism." IARPP onlinc symposiulll. Itemporary Racker, H. (1968). Transference ane! countertransference. London: Kamac, 1981. -ess, 1997. Renik, O. (1998a). The analyst's subjectivity and the analyst'S objectivity. Inlernational journal Inal Journal of Psychoanalysis, 7~, ..J-87-497. Rcnik. O. (1 998b). Getting real in analysiS. Ps),cho3nalyiic QUclrterfy, 6/, 566-593. 'on and the Ringstrom, P. (1998). Ther apclltic impasses in contemporary j1sychoanalytic treatment: Revisiting the double bind hypothesis. Psychodnal),tic Dialogues, 8, 197-316. lalysis, 26, Russell, P. (1998). Crises of emotional growth (<1.IC3. iheory of the crunch), Paper presented at the Paul Russell Confercnce, Roston, 1v\A. ,e presenta­ Sa.ncler, l. (2002). Thinking differently: Principles of process in living sysiems and the specificity ~search, II, of being known. Psychoanal'llic Dialogues, 12(1), -11-42. Schore, A. N. (2003), AHect regulation and the repair of the self. New York: Norton. 1971. Slavin, M. & Kriegm<:lIl, D. ("I 998}. Why the analyst needs to change. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 21ix Meiner, 8,147-285. Siochower, 1. A, (1996). I-/olcling ancl psychoclnalysis. Hi Iisdale, NJ: AnalytiC Press. ~nted at the Spezzelno, C. (1993). /\f{ecl in psychQanaly~i~:;\ clinical s\"Ilthcsi:;.. Hiliscble, N1: ;\nalylie Press. )r Relational SPCZZClIlO, C. (1996). The three faces of two-person psychology: Development, ontology, and epistemology. Psycho

'. 124 I jessica Benjamin

AFTERWORD A key purpOse of my I In considering how the ideas put forth in this paper fit into my work as a differs from the claSsical whole, I want to add a few reflections on the third, especially the moral cific knowledge in the third, a term that has elicited many questions. I hope to untangle some insight for the patient, or "misrecognitions" regarding the thorny issue of mutuality in the thera­ For relational analysis, t peutic dyad and show how a developmental viewpoint that integrates the able as a one-person pre rhythmic with the symbolic-differentiating aspects of thirdness avoids patient to change herself many pitfalls. In addition, I will point to further developments in the the intersubjective relatic idea of acknowledgment as an action that builds and restores the third. elaborated this point (Bi Acknowledging the violation of procedural or symbolic patterns is cru­ ing insight is an action, cial to the process of rupture and repair, breakdown and recognition. other, as in "I have acte( The sense of a lawful world begins with these intersubjective cocre­ felt in our interaction" a! ated patterns. Ironically this sense of the term moral tbird was lost on this view, agreement ac some analysts, especially traditional ones, who imagined a superego restoring felt connection driven analyst imposing a moral judgment on the patient (see Sedlak, tion of intent to underst:: 2009). In fact, the concept of thirdness is the antithesis of coercive impo­ As relational thinkers. sition of one subjective reality or set of ideals over the other insofar as it but our sensibility for v denotes the creation of space for recognizing and negotiating difference ognition-eschews the ; (Benjamin, 2009). My use of the word moral is meant to invoke a sense constant accommodatioJ of lawfulness based on respect for the other's reality and subjectivity, emotional, procedural Ii thus countering the "my way versus your way" of complementary power of the third as a princi relations. The theory of the moral third relates to understanding how in this case a position t recognition of the other's equal dignity and value but different perspec­ know, between two kin tive and subjectivity develops as an emotional experience with others effort is to show how th not simply as an abstract idea. and differentiating aspc The idea of the third is that we can maintain a representation of the recognizing the relativit lawful in the face of failures and disappointments-unlawfulness-with symbolic third); on the i others upon whose fragile psyches we depend. This is why historically (the rhythmic third). the idea of the third has been connected to surrender or faith-in love What has always bee or goodness or lawfulness. The third is that which we turn to as an to evade or split off the alternative to coercion (including moral righteousness) or submission accepting, even embrac in response to feelings of helplessness. This idea was elaborated by sonance, rupture not as Kierkegaard, whose ideas I was not previously aware of: "The third, Bonds of Love conclude( which thinkers would call the idea, is the true, the good, or more between breakdown an< accurately the God relationship," and the lover, as in Ghent's view of one-time triumphant en surrender, "humbles himself not before the lover but before the good" reso Iu tion was often at (Hoffman, 2010. p. 204). Thus without a third, one person can break just as in many cases th, a relationship, but when there is a third, which "is love itself," the one tion has been reduced t who suffers can hold onto to the third "and then the break has no power It was my hope that in i over him" (p. 204). The essence of the third is that we use it to step out clarify the way that in o' of a complementary power relation in which we might feel "done-to" by we are forever striving t keeping faith with the intention of love, the meaning of connection. table failure and limitat Beyond Doer and Done to 125

A key purpose of my paper was to show how an intersubjective third rk as a differs from the classical viewpoint in which the third expresses a spe­ moral cific knowledge in the analyst'S mind, which is then translated into

~ some insight for the patient, or even ego ideals of analytic conduct (goodness). thera­ For relational analysis, the inSights we formulate are not simply valu­ .tes the able as a one-person process, fulfilling an analytic ideal of helping the avoids patient to change herself, but form part of creating, changing and using in the the intersubjective relation which is then represented. I have elsewhere :; third. elaborated this point (Benjamin, 2006) that in therapy dyads express­ is cru­ ing insight is an action, representing a form of acknowledgment to the itiol1. other, as in "1 have acted this way toward you because of something I

~ cocre­ felt in our interaction" as opposed to "you made me feel this way." On lost on this vie,,-.', agreement about causality is not the goal-the process of Iperego restoring felt connection can occur ,vithont agreement, but with recogni­ Sedlak, tion of intent to understand or empathize. e impo­ As relational thinkers, we may not ,dways agree on "",,hat is the good, )far as it but our sensibility for what constitutes therapeutic goodness-or rec­ ffercnce ognition-eschews the appeal to the analyst'S authority in favor of a a sense constant accommodation and negotiation of different realities: at the iectivity, emotional, procedural level as well as of symbolic content. The idea y po"ver of the third as a principle is thus modified by the idea of thirdness, ing how in this case a position between what we don't know and what we do perspec­ know, between two kinds of goodness, between faith and doubt. My h others effort is to show how the 1110ral third is the integration of the rhythmic and differentiating aspects. On the one side, accepting difference and

)l1 of the recognizing the relativity of ollr subjective perspective (the moral and ss-'.vith symbolic third); on the other, the faith we hold in restoring connection 5torically (the rhythmic third). --in love \Vhat has always been problematic in the restoration is the tendency to ;]s ail to evade or split off the disruptive moment of disconnection rather than bmission accepting, even embracing. moments of disregu \;ltion, emotional dis­ )rated by sonance, rupture not as uJtimate failure but part of how things are. The 'he third, Bonds of LOl'e concluded by \varning that there is a const~lnt movement or more between breakdown and restoration of recognition. that there can be no 5 "'jew of "me-time triumphant end of history. Unfortunately, this idea of a final he good" i'esolution was often attributed to me (Butler, 2000; Benjamin, 2000), :£1n break JUSt as in many cases the idea of recognition, especially mutual recogni­ ," the one don has been reduced to a panacea. a demand, a formulaic obligation. no power .If 'was my hope that in developing the notion of the moral third I could :) step om darify the way that in overcoming breakdown through acknowledgment Jne-to" by" :\Ce are forever stfiving to embrace the negative and so convert our inevi­ ~C(ion. wble failure and limitations into renewed possibility of connection. 126 ~ Jessica Benjamin

The most clinically and developmentally acute embodiment of this to show why differentiatic notion, the underlying principle sustaining lawfulness, may be rupture rhythmicity or oneness; tl and repair. Most of what I have written about breakdown and recogni­ be sustained by a parent" tion fits in with the vital work done by Tronick (1989; later also Beebe of expectancy and painfu & Lachmann, 2002) on rupture and repair in the infant-caregiver rela­ experience. The oneness tionship, the gist of which is that rupture with repair is better than an ment to the mother, is c( apparently seamless accommodation. perceive the difference be In therapeutic work as well as child development I translate this own discomfort, and embl notion of repair as acknowledgment. When a caregiver acknowledges not the humbling or aggn an important violation of expectancy, "marks" it, interpersonal safety The lawfulness of the is restored, and there is a concomitant relaxation that brings the ability of accommodation and n to feel and think back on line. In response to acknowledgment pro­ around the adult (or ther found physiological, kinetic, facial shifts may occur that are felt by both ingly shared process of rel partners even without or betore words (Bucci, 2008). I have come to Through the repair of dis emphasize this idea of overcoming violations of the "law," which begins agency, their conviction ( with the level of the rhythmic third, the implicit procedural level, the Being able to acknowledg expected pattern of attunement. In other words, when the mother inevi­ including "I can (but do tably disrupts, violates some expectancy (taking off the warm wet dia­ part of believing in a law per and exposing the infant's skin to cold air), her appropriate marking essential to our work as r behavior shows her acknowledgment that "the law" has been broken. The idea that recognir This understanding of repair and acknowledgment may illuminate an that the analyst'S indeper ongoing controversy, in which some psychoanalysts focus solely on the patient (Reis, 2010b; Oral side of mutual recognition relating to the differentiating aspect of the ing. Mutual recognition i third (Reis, 1999, 2010a; Orange, 2008*; Benjamin, 1999, 2010). My use simply an inevitable outcc of the Hegelian paradigm in which one has to struggle with the realiza­ (2010) argues. To say tha tion that one depends on the other for recognition is seen as denying or contradiction in terms-; trumping "primary intersubjectivity" (Trevarthen, 1980), our beginnings in favor of child or patil in feeling at one with the other. This critique is bound up with the idea hardly be mutual, indec( that I expect children to recognize parents, patients to recognize ana­ tainly would be an eraSl lysts, and thus risk retraumatizing patients who have been insuffiCiently simplistic clinical applie<: recognized in childhood. Orange, 201Oa), this may The idea of the rhythmic third encapsulates a part of my theory that vital in making use of the always conceptualized early experiences of attunement to be the cellu­ mentary thinking. lar level of recognition and made clear that it is the parents' recognition It is helpful to ask, if, that paves the way for the child. In this paper, however, my aim was opmentai achievement n sense do we yet see it a5 ,. Orange (2010) altered this criticism after a more careful consideration of my work and needs? Properly underst( offered a much appreCiated recognition of my therapeutic views on the need for rec­ does not require the pati ognition of the patient as primary as well as what it means for the analyst to be expe­ Rather, as in Winnicott's rienced as a subject. a position exemplified clearly by Slavin (2010). She amplified this with her Own parallel version of how the analyst's use of subjectivity helps therapeutic or patient recognizes th<: relationship survive the crunch and utilize enactments. which leads me to conclude that does not need to be pror similar thinking regarding the uses of enactment and the role played by the analysfs apeutic response to onc use of subjectivity in repairing ruptures are greater than our differences. than as reactive compli Beyond Doer and Done to 127

of this to show why differentiation cannot be divorced from the experience of rupture rhythmicity or oneness; that accommodation and attunement can only 'ecogni­ be sustained by a parent who can contain, and thus mark, the violations ) Beebe of expectancy and painfu I disruptions that infants and small children fer rela­ experience. The oneness experienced by the infant, the secure attach­ than an ment to the mother, is constructed and staged by a mother who can perceive the difference between herself and the infant, can tolerate her late this own discomfort, and embrace the necessities of care in the third of love, wledges not the humbling or aggrandizing of self. ,1 safety The lawfulness of the 1110ral third is original1y rooted in patterns le ability of accommodation and recognition that are asymmetrically organized ent pro- around the adult (or therapist's) capacities, but the goal is an increas~ . by both ingly shared process of repairing the inevitable troubles large and small. come to Through the repair of dbruptions both partners develop their sense of h begins agency, their conviction of impact on and responsibility for the other. .eve} , the Being able to acknowledge rupture and also to perform acts of repair­ ler inevi­ including "I can (but don't always have to) make mother happy"-is wet dia­ part of believing in a lawful world, the moral intersubjective third. It is marking essential to our work as relational analysts as well. Jraken. The idea that recognition is always mutual, or that mutuality means ninate an that the analyst's independent subjectivity "must" be recognized by the ,lyon the patient (Reis, 2010h; Orange, 2008), is thus a profound misunderstand­ ,ct of the ing. Mutual recognition is neither a goal nor a therapeutic agenda but I). My use simply an inevitable outcome of relational repair of rupture. as Ringstrom le realiza­ (2010) argues. To say that a patient "must" recognize the therapist is a lenying or contradiction in terms-a mere reversal of complementary interaction eginnings in favor of child or patient complying with parent or therapist could h the idea hardly be mutual, indeed hardly constitute recognition, and most cer­ snize ana­ tainly would be an erasure of the third. If students fall prey to such iufficiently simplistic clinical applications of the idea of recognition (Reis, 2010b; Orange, 2010a), this may suggest why the understanding of the third is heary that vital in making use of the concept and extricating oneself from comple~ ~ the cellu­ 1llentary thinking. ·ecognition It is helpful to ask, if we consider recognition of the other as a devel­ Iy aim waS opmental achievement many patients ha ve been deprived of, in what sense do we yet see it as a condition for the patient receiving what she .f my work ;Jnd needs? Properly understood, the recognition the patient needs to have e need for rec­ does not require the patient to meet the analyst's needs for recognition. ivst to be e.xpe­ Rather, as in \VinnicoU's (1971) theory of surviving destruction, the child ; amplified thi" (Jr patient recognizes that the other person is outside one's control and ~lps therapeutic does not need to be propped up or palliated or complied with. The ther~ ,0 conclude that by the analyst's apeutic response to one's need, the recognition, is given freely rather ,. than as reactive compliance to coercive demand or created by one's

\ 128 ~ Jessica Benjamin

own self-sacrificing exertion (Benjamin, 2010). What a relief! The thera­ sense of lawfulne pist who survives noncompliance, dysregulation, despair, and demand we are responsib without retaliation or collapse now appears, mercifully, as outside and law of responsiv( independent although not so far outside as to give no consolation or all rupture_sep<: empathy. This experience of differentiating thirdness, so unlike the bur­ son feel more re den of shoring up or defending against the other, is what it means to analyst becomes recognize the analyst's independent subjectivity. embraces the can The developmental principle of rupture and repair corresponds with bystander. In this an essential relational clinical principle, namely the great therapeutic psychoanalytic tt inlportance we assign to surviving enactments. Enactments, in other through the imp< words, consist of recreating past experiences of rupture with a differ­ fering and the co ent outcome that repairs. Here I have come increasingly to value the have come to sec bravely prescient contributions of Ferenczi, which emphasized how pro­ the broader visio~ ductively we can (and must) use repetitions of trauma caused by our socially responsil failures as well as difficulties tolerating our own feelings and reactions recognize the pai (Benjamin, 2008). This view of enactment and acknowledgment, rupture and repair, prefigured the crudal work on dissociation, trauma, multiple selves and self-states that is central to our relational perspective (see espe­ cially Bromberg, Davies, Stern). The recognition of failure, that is to say Aron, l. (1996). A mel: the unavoidable reenactment meshes with our current appreciation that Press. patients present unlinked parts such that we are apt to fail in address­ Aron, l. (2006). Ani'!lyti 344--368. ing one part we and they dissociate as we speak to an other. Yet it is Aran, l. & Benjamin, only in this way that we can reassociate the past with a reliable witness presented at Sp in the present, so we create a third that survives rupture and has the NewYark. moral component of acknowledging the truth of injury. Through this Beebe, B. & Lachmann. Press process we are sustained by an acquired faith in the process of rupture Benjamin, J. (1988). Th, and repair. Especially giving the acknowledgment Ferenczi 0933; Aron, nation. NewYc 1996) describes of having repeated the original trauma becomes a way Benjamin, 1. (1995). Uk New Haven, C of creating a new experience of thirdness that is sturdy and flexible. Benjamin, J. (1999l. ! The therapeutic value of enactments correlates with the developmen­ Psychoanalytic tal creation of the third through acknowledging violations ill the pat­ Benjamin, J. (2004), f tern of accommodation. The idea that the lawful third develops through Psychoana/rtic Benjamin, J. (2006, Jiln acknowledging violations expands the Winnicottian (971) idea of sur­ ures and injuri· vival of destruction: On one side it emphasizes the empathic recognition Relational PSV( crucial to survival and on the other the fact that the relationship, the Benjamin, J. (2008, Mi'! Sigmund Freuc third, and not merely the analyst survive (Benjamin, 2006). As parents Benjamin, J. (2009a). A

or therapists, we can acknowledge and affirm the subjectivity of the edging failure I other who suffers the painful separation, and it is through this affirma­ subjective rela tion that attachment becomes more secure. 90, 441-445. Benjamin, J. (200gb). p~ From this experience of the other who disappoints or injures as ulti­ of Psychoanal\ mately responsive and self-correcting, not froln satisfying the impossible Benjamin, J. (201 0). C~I demand for a completely predictable, controllable universe, arises the Journal of Ps.\'( Beyond Doer and Done to 129

[he thera­ sense of lawfulness and faith in a moral third. The acknowledgment that =!. demand we are responsible for causing pain or injury actually emphasizes the .ltside and law of responsiveness more strongly than would Our attempt to avoid alation or all rupture-separation. Being able to COunt on that law makes a per­ :e the bur­ son feel more regulated, recognized, agentic, and safe. In effect, the means to analyst becomes not only the agent of repetition but also a witness who embraces the compassionate position of the resonating and responsible onds with bystander. In this sense I think we can begin to see how the outline of a 11erapeutic psychoanalytic third allows us to bring the ethical into our practice not , in other through the imposition of morality but through the recognition of suf­ h a differ­ fering and the: complexity of attending to it. Through this formulation I value the have come to see the link bet"reen our acting in the consulting room and 1 hOl\' pro­ the broader vision of becoming an active bystander that makes humans ,ed by our socially respon.sible, empowered to \vitness if not to change and thus to t reactions recognize the pain and affirm the dignity of those 'who suffer. mel repair, iple selves References (see espe­ at is to say ,"hOIl, L. ("I g~()). /\ meeting of minds: Mutualily in psychoanalYSIS. Hillsdalc, NJ: Analytic :iation that Press. .n address­ ,ron. L. COO()\. Analytic impassp ,lncl the third. International fuurnal of Ps},clioanalysis, 87, 3-+-l--3(,)0. ~r. Yet it is /don, L. & P,clljamin, J. 0999, April). Jntersubjectivity and the struggle La Lhink. Pdpel )Ie witness presenlecl aL Spring 1\1eeting, Division 39 of the American Psychological Association, ncl has the NewYor"k. ~r.'he, 8. S, L1Chl1l3nn, F. (1002)./Il'~lllt research awl adult lieatml:lIl. Hillsd~lle, NJ: Allctiytic lrough this Pres':>. of rupture r;.!njdJl1in! J. (] 98(1). The bunels ot" lo\"c: Ps),chuanah··sis. feminism, dnel thc prohlern of domi­ 1933; Awn, nation. New YOIL Pantheon. Hlles a way L-:"nj,lnlin, J. (1905). Like sul.Jjects/ love o!JjPcts: Essays on I"t'cogniliull dod 50\1lal C/itl'erenrc. New HZlven, CT: Vide University Press. flexible. Sr:nj,)l1lin, J. (1999). A note on the dialectic: COl1lll1ent:',lj,lmin, J. (1004). Geyond doel" and done 10: An intel"subjective vie\<\, oJ thirdness. Psychodnalylic Quarterly, 63, 5-46. IpS through 8'O'!1jdrnin, J. (2006. January). OUf appointment in Thebes: acknOwledgment or fail­ idea of sur­ An~llytic ures and injuries. Paper presented at the Meeting or the Inlerllcltional Association 01 recognition Relaiioll

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Bromberg, P. M. (2006). Awakening the dreamer: Clinical journeys. Mahwah, NJ:TheAnalytic Press. Bucci, W. (2008). The role of bodily experience in emotional organization: New perspectives on the multiple code theory. In F. S. Anderson (Ed.), Bodies in treatment: The unspo­ ken dimension (pp. 51-76). New York: Analytic Press. Butler, J. (2000). Longing for recognition: Commentary on the work of Jessica Benjamin. Studies in Gender and Sexuality, 1,271-290. Davies, J. M. (1998). Multiple perspectives on multiplicity. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 8, 747-766. Ferenczi, S. (1933). Confusion of tongues between adults and the child. In Final contributions John Bowll to the problems and methods of psychoanalysis (pp. 156-167). London: Karnac, 1980. Fonagy, P., Gergely, G., Jurist, E. & Target, M. (2002). Affect regulation, mentalization and the Thei development of the self. New York: Other Press. Hoffman, M. (201 0). Toward mutual recognition: Relational psychoanalysis and the Christian narrative. New York: Routledge. Orange, D. M. (20103). Recognition as: Intersubjective vulnerability in the psychoanalytic dialogue. International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self' Psychology, 5(3), 227-243. Orange, D. M. (201Ob). Revisiting mutual recognition: Responding to Ringstrom, Benjamin and Slavin. International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psychology, 5{3), 293-306. Reis, B. (1999). Thomas Ogden's phenomenological turn. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 9, 371-395. Reis, B. (2010a). A human family: Commentary on paper by Elisabeth Fivaz-Depeursinge, At this historical mom. Chloe Lavanchy-Scaiola, and Nicolas Favez. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 20, the attachment theory 151-158. Reis, B. (201 Ob). All roads do not lead to Rome. psychoanalytic Dialogues, 20, 231-236. of Margaret Mahler is Ringstrom, P. (201 0). Meeting Mitchell's challenge: A comparison of relational psychoanaly­ cal positions occurred sis and intersubjective systems theory. Psychoanalytic Dialogues, 20, 196-218. and different academi. Sedlak, v. (2009). psychoanalytic controversies: Discussion. International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 90, 451-455. thought to have repla( Slavin, M. (2010). On recognizing the psychoanalytic perspective of the other: A discussion of both for a compreh' of "Recognition as: lntersubjective vulnerability in the psychoanalytic dialogue." and that the two had International Journal of Psychoanalytic Self Psychology, 5(3), 274-292. Stern, D. 8. (2009). Partners in thought: Working with unformulated experience, dissociation tally than has been pr< and enactment. New York: Routledge. up in the context of p Trevarthen, C. (1980). Communication and cooperation in early infancy: A description of trauma of war. Both I' primary intersubjectivity. In M. Bullowa (Ed.), Before speech: The beginning of inter­ tized child that reflect, personal communication. New York: Cambridge University Press. Tronick, E. (1989). Emotions and emotional communication in infants. American Psychologist, know from the most J 44,112-119. Winnicott, D. W. (1971). The use of an object and relating through identifications. In Playing and reality. London: Tavistock. * I am very grateful to Vi for sharing her knowled Memoirs ofMargaret S ..l by Nancy Chodorow, Ma Marshall Clark for provi by Dr. Bluma Swerdloff University. I am very a Adrienne Harris, Patrici Steinberg, and Elisabeth originally appeared infO pp. 571-601. Reprinted ..