RELATIONAL PSYCHOANALYSIS VOLUME 4 Expansion of Theory EDITED BY LEWIS ARON • ADRIENNE HARRIS I~ ~~O~!~~~~:"P New York London LCCN,2007275272 If. Routledge Routledge Taylor & Francis Group Taylor & Francis Group 711 Third Avenue 27 Church Road New York, NY 10017 Hove, East Sussex BN3 2FA © 2012 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an lnforma business Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper Version Date: 20110726 International Standard Book Number: 978-0-415-88824-0 (Hardback) 978-0-415-88825-7 (Paperback) For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www. copyright.com (http://www.copyright.coml) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CeC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organiza­ tion that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. 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The ante­ cedents of my perspective on intersubjectivity lie on one hand with Hegel (1807; KOjeve, 1969) and on the other with the developmentally oriented thinkers Winnicott (1971) and Stern (1985)-quite different in their own ways-who try to specify the process by which we become able to grasp the other as having a separate yet similar mind. In contrast to the notion of the intersubjective as a "system of reciprocal mutual influence"-referring to "any psychological field formed by interact­ ing worlds of experience" (Stolorow & Atwood, 1992, p. 3)-adumbrated by intersubjective systems theorists Orange, Atwood, and Stolorow ,. This paper originally appeared in Psychoanalytic Quarterly, 73(1), 2004, pp. 5-46. Reprinted with permission. 91 92 Ii jessica Benjamin (1997),* I emphasize, both developmentally and clinically, how we actually a wide variety of come to the felt experience of the other as a separate yet connected being to the profession with whom we are acting reciprocally. How do we get a sense that "there one holds in minI are other minds out there" (Stern, 1985)? (Aron, 1999; Britl In highlighting this phenomenological experience of other minds, I-like "thing" we use bl other intersubjective critics of Freud's Cartesian ism-emphasize the recipro­ build relational S) cal, mutually influencing quality of interaction between subjects, the con­ for such cocreatic fusing traffic of two-way streets (Benjamin, 1977, 1988). But this theoretical ence of intersubje, recognition of intersubjective influence should not blind us to the power internal mental sp of actual psychic experience, which all too often is that of the one-way transitional space. street-in which we feel as if one person is the doer, the other done to. Pizer's (1998) ide, One person is subject, the other object-as our theory of object relations analyst and patier all too readily portrays. To recognize that the object of our feelings, needs, of their separate ( actions, and thoughts is actually another subject, an equivalent center of terms of static, prt being (Benjamin, 1988, 1995), is the real difficulty. you can't make thi Thus, I consider as a principle, func The Place of the Third as a "thing" in the is to distinguish it To the degree that we ever manage to grasp two-way directionality, we onto with her ego, do so only from the place of the third, a vantage point outside the two.t straw. For in the sp However, the intersubjective position that I refer to as thirdness consists of in Ghent's (1990) f, more than this vantage point of observation. The concept of the third means Elaborating this surrender, and thir or results from Sur * Stolorow and Atwood (1992) point out that they coined the term intersubjective inde­ certain letting go a pendently and do not think of it as presupposing a developmental attainment, as Stern other's point of vie (1985) docs. I (Benjamin, 1977, 1978) made use of the term as introduced into phi­ being able to sustai losophy by Habermas (1968), and then carried forward into psychology by Trevarthen separateness and di (1977, 1980), to focus on the exchange between different minds. Like Stern, I consider the recognition of other minds (the other's subjectivity) to be a crucial developmental control or COerce. attainment. Unlike Stern, however, I (Benjamin, 1988) have considered all aspects of Ghent's essay arl cocreating interaction with the other, fr0111 early mutual gazing to conflicts around ready look-alike, su: recognition, as part of the trajectory of intersubjective development. The major dif­ someone. From this ference between the theorizing of Orange et at. (1997) and my own is not, as they ouer to someone, a; believe (see Orange, 2002, 2010a), that I think the analyst should focus clinically on helping the patient to recognize the analyst's (or other's) subjectivity at the expense with them. I take thi of the patient's own. It is rather that I see such engagement in reciprocal recognition ,some principle or pI of the other as growing naturally out of the experience of being recognized by the Whereas in Gher. other, as a crucial component of attachment responses that require mutual regula­ as something the p tion and attunemen[. and, therefore, as ultimately a pleasure and not merely a chore the analyst'S surren( (Benjamin, 2010). t I am greatly indebted to Aron, with whom I formulated important portions of this paper and descriptions of the third in a jointly authored paper (Aron & Benjamin, 1999); Aron * Ghent's work on surrer emphasizes the observing function, but modified by identification, which he formulated thoughts, which were more recently in Aron (2006). University Postdoctora Beyond Doer and Oone to 93 ually a wide variety of things to different thinkers, and has been used to refer )eing to the profession, the community, the theory one works with-anything there one holds in mind that creates another point of reference outside the dyad (Aron, 1999; Britton, 1988; Crastnopol, 1999). My interest is not in which -like "thing" we use but in the process of creating thirdness-that is, in how we ::ipro- build relational systems and how we develop the intersubjective capacities ~ con­ for such cocreation. I think in terms of thirdness as a quality or experi­ .-etical ence of intersubjective relatedness that has as its correlate a certain kind of )owel' internal mental space; it is closely related to Winnicott's idea of potential or e-way transitional space. One of the first relational formulations of thirdness was ne to. Pizer's (1998) idea of negotiation, originally formulated in 1990, in which ations analyst and patient each build, as in a squiggle draWing, a construction needs, of their separate experiences together. Pizer analyzed transference not in ltCf of terms of static, projective contents, but as an intersubjective process: "No, you can't make this of me, but you can make that of me." Thus, I consider it crucial not to reify the third but to consider it primarily as a principle, function, or relationship (as in Ogden's 1994 view) rather than as a "thing" in the way that theory or rules of technique are things. My aim is to distinguish it from superego maxims or ideals that the analyst holds onto with her ego, often clutching them as a drowning person clutches a ity, we straw. For in the space of thirdness, we are not holding onto a third; we are, e two.'" in Ghent's (1990) felicitous usage, surrendering to it.* sists of Elahorating this idea, we might say that the third is that to which we means sllrrender, and thirdness is the intersubjective mental space that facilitates or results from surrender. In my thinking, the term surrender refers to a h'e inde­ certain letting go of the self and thus also implies the ability to take in the as Stern other's point of view or reality. Thus, surrender refers us to recognition­ into phi­ being able to sustain connectedness to the other's mind while accepting his evarthen separateness and difference. Surrender implies freedom from any intent to consider control or coerce. Jpmental speets of Ghent's essay articulated a distinction between surrender and its ever­ s around rcady look-alike, submission. The crucial point was that surrender is not to najor dif­ someone. from this point follows a distinction between giving in or giving :, as they Ol'er to someone, an idealized person or thing, and letting go into being lically on ll'itb them. I take this to mean that surrender requires a third, that we follow . expense some principle or process that mediates between self and other. cognition ed by the Whereas in Ghent's seminal essay, surrender was considered primarily al regulu- as something the patient needs to do, my aim is to conSider, above all, ly a chore the analyst's surrender.