TRANSLATION ------[All translations of citations are unofficial]

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR’S OFFICE

ACCUSATION \

[Signature] Alberto Nisman General Prosecutor

Your Honour, Federal Judge Ariel O. Lijo:

I, ALBERTO NISMAN, General Prosecutor in charge of the Prosecutorial Investigation Unit for the bombings carried out on 18 July 1994 against the AMIA building [Case No. 3446/2012, “Velazco, Carlos Alfredo y otros por abuso de autoridad y violación de los deberes de funcionario público” (on abuse of authority and violation of the duties of public officials), Court No. 4 in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters for the City of Buenos Aires, Clerk’s Office No. 8] appear in this Court and respectfully state as follows:

I.‐ Purpose

In compliance with the legal mandate provided for in section 177 (I) of the Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure and in my capacity as representative of the Public Prosecutor‘s Office in charge of the Investigation Unit for the AMIA case, I hereby report the existence of a criminal plan designed to give impunity to the indicted Iranian nationals in that case, so that they may escape the investigation and be released from the measures taken by the Argentine courts with jurisdiction over the case. This plan has been orchestrated and set into motion by high authorities of the Argentine federal government, with the cooperation of third parties, which entails a criminal action that constitutes, a priori, the following offences: aggravated cover-up, prevention or hindrance of

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the performance of official duties, and breach of the duties incumbent upon public officials (Sections 277 (1) and (3), 241 (2) and 248 of the Criminal Code). This is extremely serious given that the event whose cover-up I hereby report —i.e. the terrorist attack against the AMIA headquarters— has been declared by the courts as a crime against humanity and has been classified by the Judge hearing the case as an act of genocide. The deliberate decision to cover up the Iranian nationals accused of having perpetrated the terrorist attacks of 18 July 1994, as shown by the evidence found, was made by the Head of the Argentine Federal Executive, Cristina Elisabet Fernandez de Kirchner, and implemented, mainly, by the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Mr. Hector Marcos Timerman. Furthermore, the evidence examined proves the active participation in the cover-up plan of a number of individuals with different degrees of involvement and responsibility to be determined during the investigation, including: Luis Angel D‘Elia, Fernando Luis Esteche, Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‘ Khalil, Argentine Congressman Andres Larroque, Mr. Hector Luis Yrimia and an individual identified as ―Allan‖, who has played a most prominent role in the events in question, who reports to the Intelligence Secretariat of the Argentine Presidency, and whose real name according to the evidence appears to be Mr. Ramón Allan Hector Bogado. Moreover, the investigation will also have to determine the actual role played by certain individuals with respect to whom there is prima facie evidence pointing to the fact that they were not unaware of the criminal action reported herein, including the Argentine Minister of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services, Mr. Julio De Vido. Finally, the investigation proposed herein must identify and determine the criminal responsibility for the reported offences that should be attributed to the persons —whether public officials or not— who took part in the drafting, negotiation, execution and implementation of the agreement signed with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as one of the means for achieving impunity. This includes both the persons whose roles were known to the public at large, and those who have taken part but whose involvement was not known to the public.

Introduction:

Throughout this accusation, we will refer to the pieces of evidence that show the existence of a sophisticated criminal plan, deliberately designed to cover up and give impunity to the Iranian

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nationals accused in the proceedings relating to the bombings of the AMIA building, so that they may escape Argentine justice once and for all and avoid its measures. As we may also see, at the time when the criminal plan was devised and implemented, the energy crisis that our country went through and still faces and the desire to re-establish full trade relations between the States, connected with a vision of geopolitical rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, were —as demonstrated by the evidence available— determining factors for the Argentine President, Cristina Elisabet Fernandez —with the participation and cooperation of Hector Timerman— to make the poor decision to go ahead with the impunity plan, thus sacrificing justice in the AMIA case. In effect, the fact that this criminal plot was decided by the Argentine President and set into motion, mainly, by her Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Hector Marcos Timerman will be proven. Furthermore, we will demonstrate the active criminal participation of third parties in the offence, including the following persons: Luis Angel D‘Elia; Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‘ Khalil; Argentine Congressman Andres Larroque; Fernando Esteche; the former Prosecutor appointed to act jointly, alternatively or successively in the AMIA case, Hector Luis Yrimia; and an individual who reports to the Intelligence Secretariat of the Argentine Presidency, who has been identified as ―Allan‖ and who, according to the evidence found, appears to be Ramón Allan Hector Bogado. In this respect, evidence will be produced showing that the plan reported herein included secret and public negotiations with the Iranians, during which an agreement was reached to remove the Interpol red notices, and that those negotiations resulted in the execution of a Memorandum of Understanding which, in essence, must be regarded as what it truly is: merely one of the tools chosen by the persons accused herein in order to guarantee what had been previously agreed upon; that is, the impunity of the Iranian fugitives and their disassociation from the proceedings for good. As will be explained in detail throughout this document and introduced briefly below, the execution and ratification of such memorandum plainly entails the destruction of the indictments against the accused Iranian nationals: First, because the conclusions of the so-called ―Truth Commission‖, as demonstrated by the evidence, had already been agreed upon by the signatories beforehand; second, because, as shown by the facts, the agreement was the excuse provided by the parties to request Interpol to remove the red notices; and, third, because its confusing and ambiguous phrasing, as well the countless successive stages established — without any duration having been provided for— in order for its provisions to be enforced,

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allow the parties to this impunity agreement to indefinitely refer to the existence of the Memorandum, even though in practice it produces no legal effect whatsoever. In addition, it will be proven that the impunity plan formulated by the Argentine President involved changing the hypothesis and redirecting the judicial investigation of the AMIA case to ―new indictees‖, on the basis of false evidence and with a view to fraudulently disassociating the accused Iranian nationals for good. As a matter of fact, some of the persons accused herein expressly engaged in the fabrication of this false hypothesis. They know that the ―Truth Commission‖ had not been created in order to conduct any investigation, but to legitimize the lie that they were concocting. It will be demonstrated that this criminal plan also involved secret agreements, which were outside the Memorandum of Understanding. In this regard, the removal of the red notices issued by Interpol for the Iranian officials was —secretly— agreed upon as it was Tehran‘s chief interest in order to sign the memorandum. In addition, it will be demonstrated that the parties had secretly agreed that, in practice, the former Minister of Defence of Iran, Ahmad Vahidi, who is currently a fugitive from Argentine justice, would never be interrogated, in spite of the provisions of the Memorandum, since this had already been agreed upon by the parties: ―it had already been discussed‖. Likewise, it will be shown that the public officials involved in this criminal plan, having either Argentine or Iranian nationality, had a common goal. They were not two parties negotiating an agreement, as they intended to appear before the public, but two partners seeking to erase —without anyone noticing— a criminal indictment for a crime against humanity. What is more, we will demonstrate here that the steps taken and the progress made in relation to the criminal plan were communicated in real time not only to Iranian authorities, but also to one of the fugitives in the AMIA case, Mohsen Rabbani, who participated in trade negotiations with the Argentine authorities involved in this plan, as well as in the negotiations mainly aimed at guaranteeing his own impunity. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated, there was a vicious campaign to discredit the investigation conducted in the case, for the purpose of undermining the judicial version of the facts, coupled with a campaign of deceit, composed of fallacies, misrepresentations, lies, denials, false promises and the manipulation of survivors and relatives of the victims of the bombings, in order to prevent the public opinion from learning the true concealment purpose that lay behind the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Iran.

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Moreover, we will refer to the evidence showing that the Argentine President and the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs contributed to the division of tasks that was required for this complex criminal scheme. From the concrete and specific contributions made by the President that could be proven on the basis of strong evidence, it became clear not only that she was the one who decided to structure this criminal plan for impunity and that, to that end, she used several actors to carry it out, but also that she was at all times in control of the operation, either by giving direct orders to her accomplices or by heading the necessary narrative and media campaign in order to camouflage the commission of the crime. Thus, she has chosen some of the individuals who participated in the criminal plot, thereby directly implicating —at least— one of her ministers and a national congressman; she has controlled the evolution of the plan at every step; she has negotiated, through intermediaries, with one of the fugitives; and she has become personally involved in some of the concealment actions required by this sophisticated plan. Along the same line, it will be amply demonstrated that the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Hector Timerman, has been —beyond any doubt— the main implementer the impunity plan devised and ordered by the President, Cristina Fernandez. Naturally, as it is a criminal plan involving a foreign country, the Minister of Foreign Affairs held and still holds a key position in personally dealing with many aspects of this cover-up. Using his office, he conveyed to Iran the decision made by the Argentine Government to abandon the demand for justice in the AMIA case; he agreed to remove the red notices; he signed secret agreements with Iran; and he participated in the negotiations, drafting and signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, which is the central piece of the impunity plan. Furthermore, he became personally involved in the campaign of discredit and deceit, intended to destroy the credibility of the court proceedings in order to deliberately present the agreement with Iran as the only suitable way to resolve the case. Both public officials acted with one criminal purpose: to ensure final impunity for the accused Iranian nationals and the end of any court activity against them, with a view to re-establishing full state trade and taking a step towards a geopolitical rapprochement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, without being subject to any criticism from the Argentine society. This arises from the evidence gathered but does not in any way rule out the existence of other motives in addition to the ones presented here, but which do not in any way modify or diminish the criminal responsibility of the accused.

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It is worth mentioning that there is nothing to criticize about the trade relations or geopolitical bonds between States. The objection here is due to the clear verification of the fact that in order to achieve such rapprochement the authorities of the Argentine Government accused herein sacrificed a pending judicial case, ignored the decisions made by the Argentine courts and devised a criminal plan to erase in an instant the serious accusations against the Iranian fugitives, in an attempt to give them impunity for good. This situation is both unheard of and unprecedented. This is not a dogmatic assertion, as multiple pieces of evidence are provided with this accusation which confirm that the yearning for Iranian oil was one of the driving forces behind the criminal actions reported herein. For illustration purposes, we could cite small pieces of the evidence described herein, such as when Fernando Esteche, in December 2012, claimed with respect to the Argentine Government: ―…they want to re-establish the relations between the two States…‖, or when Luis D‘Elia, in May 2013, stated that: ―...I just talked to Julio [in reference to Minister Julio De Vido] ... there is an energy crisis here ... they are willing to send the YPF people to do business over there [in reference to Iran] ... they are very interested in exchanging what they have for grain and meat...‖, or finally, when the Iranian agent in Buenos Aires, Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, confirmed that: ―…what Argentina needs is oil ... there is true interest in initiating and approaching trade relations from government to government, with officials from our government, a delegation from over there would travel to Caracas or to the Gulf or, better still, to Beirut … in order to start with direct links between officials…‖. What is more —and here is the important point— other pieces of evidence confirm that the commencement of trade exchange relations between Argentina and Iran was subject to the ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding, i.e., to moving forward with the impunity plan. The statements made by Jorge Khalil, one of the parties to such plan, are worth highlighting: ―We have green light for the operations... the thing is that they want to rush the memorandum... and they have talked with De Vido... Argentina has a great need for oil and Iran has a great need for grains... Moreover, De Vido believes that in order to take a step, i.e. an official step —from State to State— the Memorandum has to be signed‖. Furthermore, to the surprise and indignation of many, the evidence gathered shows that these negotiations were carried out with the participation of none other but Mohsen Rabbani, one of the Iranian fugitives, who was given periodic telephone reports on the progress made at the very heart of our government. Another one of the multiple examples included in this presentation is the transcript of one of telephone reports received by Rabbani: ―... today, we concluded a

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meeting with Minister of Planning De Vido, he said that he is willing to send the highest authorities of YPF to reach an agreement with the Islamic Republic and the transaction can be carried out in exchange for grains or other things...‖. Rabbani answered: ―send it to me so I can analyze it‖ and, after analyzing it, he said ―... here, there are some sectors of the government that told me that they are ready to sell oil to Argentina... and also buy weapons...‖. That is, while the Argentine courts accused —and accuses— on valid grounds certain Iranian officials of having decided, planned and carried out the terrorist attack against the AMIA building and while the Argentine President and the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs publicly affirmed that their acts were exclusively aimed at pursuing justice in relation to the AMIA case and that the Memorandum of Understanding was the only viable option for the case, one of the accused —Mohsen Rabbani— was secretly and clandestinely negotiating with one of our authorities, through hidden intermediaries and channels, an exchange of oil for grains, the sale of weapons and, what is worse, their impunity. Despite it being self-evident, we should highlight the extreme and unprecedented institutional gravity of the circumstances referred to in this accusation, not only due to the functional position of many of the persons involved in the criminal operation concerned but also due to the legal classification of the crime that was covered up, i.e., the ―previous crime‖ that the cover-up sought to hide, which is nothing less than the terrorist attack against the AMIA building, which has been declared by the courts as a crime against humanity and has been classified by the judge hearing the case, i.e. Mr. Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, as an act of genocide. With a view to duly setting in context the criminal acts referred to in this accusation, it should be noted that the Argentine courts found that the senior officials of Iran in 1994 were the ones who decided to launch the attack against the AMIA, planned the attack, and entrusted its execution to the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah. As a result, national and international arrest warrants were issued for the arrests of former President of the Islamic Republic of Iran Ali Akbar Hashemi Bahramaie Rafsanjani; former Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Velayati; former Minister of Intelligence Ali Fallahijan; former Commander of the Revolutionary Guard Mohsen Rezai; former Commander of the Al Quds Force and former Minister of Defence Ahmad Vahidi; former cultural attaché at the Iranian Embassy in Argentina Mohsen Rabbani; former Third Secretary of the Iranian Embassy in Argentina Ahmad Reza Asghari; and former Iranian Ambassador to Argentina Hadi Soleimpanpour. Since the year 2007, Red Notices —i.e., Interpol‘s highest arrest alerts— are

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pending in connection with five of those accused: Fallahijan, Rezai, Vahidi, Rabbani and Asghari. Relying upon those indictments, the Argentine Republic has requested for years the arrest of the Iranian accused, for extradition purposes, from the Islamic Republic of Iran, so far with no success. Indeed, under his presidency, Nestor Kirchner not only brought the case before the United Nations General Assembly but also rejected all offers made by Tehran, which were always aimed at agreeing on a politically negotiated way out of this matter, which is purely judicial in nature. This submission relies upon a wealth of documentary evidence and several unanimous declarations —from former Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fernandez; former Foreign Ministers Rafael Bielsa and Jorge Taiana; and Former Deputy Foreign Minister Roberto Garcia Moritan—describing the deals proposed by Iran and their outright rejection by the former Argentine President. The consistency that was shown for years in the Argentine official approach to the AMIA case underwent a radical change upon the current President‘s decision to move forward with a cover- up plan that would allow the Iranian accused to escape justice once and for all with a view to facilitating, inter alia, trade exchange at State level with the Islamic Republic of Iran. This circumstance became evident when former Minister of Foreign Affairs Bielsa emphasized the change in position of Ms. Fernandez‘s administration, stating that: ―[the government] tells the relatives that it is the companies and not the State that conduct trade. I believe that this is a stupid argument; it bothers me because this issue was sacred to Nestor... When I was the minister of foreign affairs, to talk about selling to or buying from Iran was casus belli‖. Within this context, the bilateral relation was marked, on the one hand, by the Iranian indifference towards the Argentine claims and, on the other, by our country‘s firm decision not to move forward with the relationship without first securing the cooperation of Tehran, that is, the surrender of the accused to be judged by the Argentine courts. We will demonstrate that, within this historical context and in the abovementioned scenario, between October 2010 and January 2011, the Argentine government led by Cristina Fernandez made a 180-degree turn in relation to its consideration of the AMIA case. Indeed, in January 2011, Hector Timerman travelled to the Syrian city of Alepo, secretly met with his Iranian counterpart, Ali Akbar Salehi, and told him that the Argentine political authorities were willing to abandon the investigation of the AMIA case as well as any demand for cooperation or justice

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with a view to establishing a geopolitical rapprochement as well as to re-establishing full trade relations between both countries. It will also be demonstrated that Minister of Foreign Affairs Salehi took notice of such offer and reported it to the then President Ahmadinejad: ―... Argentina is no longer interested in clarifying the two attacks... instead it prefers to improve its trade relations with Iran‖. This is the first time that a State that has suffered an act of aggression implores an aggressor State to sign an agreement under which the aggressors will be given impunity‖. Thus, a period of secret negotiation began between the Argentine government and the Iranian government which continued until September 2012 and during which both parties made gestures that, in light of the evidence gathered subsequently and when analyzed together, clearly reflect the agreement that was being worked out at that time. As an example, given the introductory nature of these paragraphs, we may refer to the fact that the Argentine government, in July 2011, described ―as very positive‖ a letter from the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs offering to cooperate with the investigation —curiously enough— regarding a new hypothesis different from that of the courts. Once progress was made with those secret negotiations where the cover-up and the plan for securing the impunity of the Iranian nationals were developed, in September 2012, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner made the meetings official, when she publicly stated before the United Nations General Assembly that the Islamic Republic of Iran had expressed its willingness to negotiate on the AMIA case. We may now understand why the Argentine President, at that moment and for the first time, did not invite the Jewish community institutions to become part of the commission at the opening of the General Debate of such international assembly. The announcement made had been previously agreed yet for a different purpose than that invoked. We will prove that the statement made by the Argentine President at that time was nothing but one of the many fronts used on the path of the impunity plan devised and orchestrated by the Argentine officials accused herein. That gesture was aimed at concealing the fact that the rapprochement had been initiated by Argentina, and not by Iran as was claimed, and sought to convince people that the negotiations would start at that moment, even though they had been ongoing for, at least, one year and a half. Evidence will be submitted of the fact that, while public diplomatic negotiations were taking place, the impunity plan secretly moved forward through parallel communication and negotiation channels established with Iran. At that time, a fundamental aspect of the criminal plan was conceived: redirecting the investigation to a new and false hypothesis incriminating

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innocent third parties but —mainly— disassociating the accused Iranian nationals, a task in which Jorge Khalil, Fernando Esteche, Hector Yrimia and a person known as ―Allan‖ actively participated. The visible result of the —secret and public— negotiations was the Memorandum of Understanding signed on 27 January 2013 in the Kingdom of Ethiopia. The Argentine official version indicated that it was a legal instrument that would make it possible for the fugitives to be subject to a preliminary interrogation. The truth is that it was merely one of the means chosen by the parties to make the criminal plan that was negotiated during two years viable, since its wording was —and still is— useful for this illegal operation. Let us be clear: The agreement between Iranian representatives and the Argentine authorities goes way beyond the letter of the memorandum. The criminal plan consisted in the destruction of the accusations made by the Argentine courts against the Iranian officials and the best way to get rid of those accusations, granting impunity and presenting the issue as orderly as possible to the mislead citizens, was the execution of the abovementioned bilateral agreement. This was so because its wording provides for mechanisms for achieving the removal of the Interpol red notices; because its enforcement entails so many successive stages without specifying their duration, thus allowing its term to be extended for an indefinite period of time without any real progress being made; because the conclusions of the ―Truth Commission‖ were already set in advance and its role makes it possible to introduce the new false hypothesis, relying upon false evidence. Indeed, as will be shown below, in practice, the only obstacles to the impunity that the accused Iranian nationals actually enjoy were the Interpol red notices, which have the ability to hinder their transnational mobility. Therefore, the parties agreed that they would be removed. This was the reason for the drafting of paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding. It was the only provision that was supposed to enter into force immediately, the only operative provision that would become effective without the need for the agreement to be ratified. Looking at its actual wording, one may see that there is no logical explanation for it. Thus, the removal of the red notices was the first fundamental step secretly agreed upon between Salehi and Timerman to disassociate the accused for good. It should be noted that, a month after the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, the intelligence agent of the Argentine Presidency known as ―Allan‖ told Iranian operator Khalil: ―I heard a piece of gossip... I was told there, at ―the house‖ [a reference to the Intelligence

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Secretariat]… Interpol is going to lift the arrest warrants against the friends [a reference to the Iranian fugitives], it is going to lift them now‖. Surprisingly and unexpectedly for those who orchestrated the cover-up, Interpol stated that there was an attempt to get it involved in an issue with which it had nothing to do and stepped in just in time to avoid the removal of the arrest alerts. It will be shown that such participation represented an unexpected obstacle for the perpetrators of the cover-up. Timerman was unable to honour what he had promised during the secret negotiations with Iran, which caused the Iranian nationals to complain. It should also be noted that, since Interpol declared that the red notices against the accused for the AMIA case would remain in effect, the Islamic Republic of Iran removed the agreement from its congressional agenda and, to this date, it has not officially announced its internal approval. The reason for such change of heart is clearly indicated in the evidence that will be submitted. A day after his return from Iran, Persian agent Khalil explained the reason for the delay to the Argentine authorities, in the face of local complaints about the delay in the internal approval of the Memorandum of Understanding in Tehran: ―... De Vido must be aware that Timerman hasn‘t done some of the things agreed. That is clear. He hasn‘t done some of the things agreed...‖ and, on another occasion, he stated that ―... I think this bloody Jew [a reference to Timerman] has screwed up... there was something signed, where the precautionary measures were mentioned [a reference to the Interpol red notices]...‖ Notwithstanding the abovementioned examples, we would like to clearly point out two revealing conclusions that arise from these statements as well as from other pieces of evidence that will be analyzed below. The first of those conclusions is that there is no doubt about that Minister of Foreign Affairs Timerman promised that the red notices would be removed. Timerman did not keep his promise, not because he did not want to but because Interpol prevented him from doing so. We may see in this submission that the Minister returned to the fray in September and November 2013, with the clear intention of convincing Ronald Noble to give in and authorize the removal of the notices, on the grounds that the agreement between the parties had continued to move forward, but —fortunately— he failed to do it once again. The second conclusion arising from that conversation clearly shows that, in addition to the Memorandum of Understanding that was signed, there have been other secret agreements between the parties. This statement is confirmed, among other pieces of evidence, by the declaration of Salehi himself, who acknowledged without hesitation that ―Interpol must remove the accusations against the Iranian authorities… The [contents] of the agreement between Iran

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and Argentina in relation to the AMIA case will be made public at the appropriate time and the issue [of the Iranian accused] is included and we are following up on it…‖. Bearing in mind that this statement was made in March 2013, it is evident that Salehi was not referring to the Memorandum of Understanding but to another agreement that was not made public by that time. And this background must be taken into account when considering the statements made by Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, who when referring to press news that former Iranian Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi would never be interrogated in spite of being included in the Memorandum, said that that rumour was true, that that particular matter ―had been previously discussed…was within the framework‖, and that the agreement ―is even more profound‖. That is, it will be shown that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic, Hector Timerman, not only signed a Memorandum of Understanding that was clearly unconstitutional and guaranteed the impunity of the accused Iranian nationals, but also entered into secret agreements that were even more advantageous to the fugitives. This shows that it is not, as publicly presented, about two parties negotiating a bilateral agreement but about two partners participating in a sophisticated criminal plan for impunity, to disassociate, once and for all, the AMIA case fugitives from any links to the bombing and close any investigation in connection with them. In fact, after the agreement was signed, Argentine intelligence agent ―Allan‖ admitted to his Iranian counterpart: ―Relax, we won, I mean, we won a game, I told you, you had no faith in me…‖, which reveals that both parties have had the same criminal objective. Now, the evidence presented in the accusation shows that the timely intervention of Interpol, which kept the red notices effective, neither frustrated nor prevented the future implementation of the cover-up operation. The perpetrators had taken the precaution of creating alternative mechanisms for achieving their goals, which were contained in the text of the Memorandum of Understanding. We will address the numerous mechanisms included in the intricate bilateral agreement. This was clearly not the result of the incompetence on the part of the drafters but, quite on the contrary, of their sagacity in providing the Memorandum with a complicated enforcement process, which—in order for an Iranian accused to hear the charges brought against him by the Argentine courts— requires that an endless list of procedures be conducted, some of which are impossible to follow, given the incompatibility with their respective legislations: (1) that both countries internally ratify the terms of the agreement; (2) that they mutually exchange notes

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notifying such ratification; (3) that each of the signatory countries appoint persons acknowledged for their legal expertise and personal probity to make up a ―Truth Commission‖; (4) that the individuals appointed accept their designation; (5) that a fifth member of the commission be appointed by mutual agreement between the parties; (6) that the members of the Commission draft the rules of procedure to which they will be subject; (7) that information on the case be requested; (8) that the requested information be sent and translated; (9) that each of the members of the commission analyze the evidence submitted; (10) that meetings be held to issue recommendations; (11) that those recommendations be notified to the signatory States; (12) that a date be set in order for hearings to be held; (13) that the accused be summoned; (14) that the accused appear for questioning, which —as will be shown below— does not meet the minimum conditions for it to be considered as a valid preliminary interrogation under Argentine law. There is no specific deadline for any of these steps to be taken. So much so that more than a year and a half has passed since the execution of the Memorandum and not even the first step was completed. Iran has not given notice of its ratification of the agreement yet. We may clearly see that the terms of this agreement, which is a reflection of an underlying criminal activity, are drafted in such a way that makes it possible for its implementation to be delayed for an indefinite period of time. Another key fact that leads to the final impunity of the accused is the actual participation of the ―Truth Commission‖, the purpose of which is to receive and assess —when the time comes— new evidence as well as to put forward a new hypothesis under which the Iranian nationals are not accused, thus legitimating the diversion of the investigation. The commission will analyze a new false version, a truth artificially formulated by the unscrupulous masterminds of this sinister plan. Once again, there is direct evidence that confirms these submissions. Iranian agent Jorge Khalil, on the same day when the Memorandum was signed, stated: ―someone‘s going to come out of this with egg on their face‖ and was clearly sure that that would not be the country he represented because ―… Obviously, that‘s fixed… How could it possibly go our way, man? If we‘re sitting at the table…‖ In this respect, we will show, through solid evidence, that once the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, a relationship was established which entailed the granting of support and protection from the Argentine government to Iran‘s contacts in Buenos Aires, who — knowing this— claimed that ―the government is now in favour‖, ―the government is backing us…‖ and —as stated by Khalil himself— ―we have an agreement with the national government… are in the context of a negotiation with the national government…‖.

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In another section of the accusation, we will demonstrate that perpetrators and accomplices, as an integral part of the criminal plan, had already planned and gone forward with the construction of a false accusatory hypothesis, with fabricated evidence, in order to divert the judicial investigation to innocent third parties, thus disassociating the Iranian nationals once and for all. With regard to such fraudulent disassociation, as early as December 2012, Esteche stated ―…they want to build a new AMIA enemy, someone new as the one responsible, they need to build this…‖ And from the conversation it emerges that this task was left in the hands of officials at the Intelligence Secretariat who were specifically appointed for this task. That is, at a time when neither the courts nor the relatives of the victims knew what was happening with the negotiation between Argentina and Iran, those who participated in the cover-up were perfectly aware that there would be a change in the hypothesis and that the investigation would be redirected to new accused persons. This was precisely because they were the ones in charge of formulating the false accusation. This is why ―Allan‖ said that ―…we are in a different country, in a different global situation, and we need to work in a different context…‖ and ―…another hypothesis will come up, with different evidence…‖ which would leave the Prosecutor in charge of the case high and dry ―because he never saw it, the evidence, what‘s going to come up now…‖ Notwithstanding the evidence, the facts or their actual responsibility in the bombings, the Iranian citizens would be disassociated from the case, Iran‘s image would be ―polished‖ and that was all ―agreed high up‖, i.e., it had the president‘s seal of approval. All that had been agreed, the AMIA case would be used as a chess piece to satisfy geopolitical interests on the new international board. Almost with a touch of irony, in signing the agreement, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Relations issued a press release stating: ―… the Argentine government ratifies that the only commitment is to the victims and the right of their relatives to find out the truth and to obtain appropriate reparation through the courts. The Argentine Republic reaffirms that such goal leaves no room for geopolitical interests, either of our own or of third parties‖. The evidence gathered here shows that this is not true and that commercial and geopolitical interests gave rise to a secret impunity plan, which has nothing to do with the pursuit of justice. Furthermore, emphasis should be placed on the serenity with which all of the parties to the impunity plan acted, in particular, the agent known as ―Allan‖, who has been acting freely without considering it necessary to cover up his actions, not even in light of the extremely sensitive nature of his task. This is simply because he has acted following instructions given by

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superior officers, express orders issued by the Argentine President, which is why he had no reason to worry about covering up his activities. ―Allan‖ himself recognized the existence of such maximum guarantee. The decision to redirect the investigation and to discredit the judicial authorities in charge of the investigation had the presidential seal of approval: ―relax, it is all agreed high up‖. Furthermore, as will be clearly shown in the following pages, both the Argentine President and the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs personally contributed to the implementation of the criminal plan. Both of them became involved in a political and media campaign to promote, among other false issues, the idea that the AMIA case was paralyzed since the very beginning. We will show in detail how Ms. Fernandez and Mr. Timerman manipulated the attack‘s survivors, the relatives of the victims, and the Jewish community institutions by setting up a true web of lies, fallacies and tricks, the most characteristic example of which is the presidential promise —clearly broken— to consult with relatives and victims before accepting any proposal made by Iran. Let us recall that, in September 2012, the President stated: ―… you can be confident that this President will not make any decision regarding any proposal made without FIRST consulting with the direct victims of the attack and, at the same time, political forces with representation in the congress of my country, because this decision cannot be made by a single political force…‖ The reality was harsh. The relatives and the victims of the attack were deceived since, contrary to what had been promised, there was no consultation with them. What is more, they had to hear about the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with the Islamic Republic of Iran through the media. And they were not heard when the majority of them expressed their rejection to the ratification of the agreement by the Argentine Congress. Therefore, it became clear that, no matter what the relatives of the victims said, the decision was taken. The Memorandum had been signed with a view to guaranteeing the achievement of a hidden goal: granting impunity to the accused Iranian nationals and allowing the Argentine government to justify to its citizens and the international community the restoration of commercial relations and the alignment with Tehran. Hence, the agreement had to be approved at any cost, because it removed the only obstacle to the relations with Iran. It was strictly necessary in order for the criminal plan that had been orchestrated to be implemented. What an irony. A President who has publicly burst with pride when telling survivors and the relatives of the victims about her commitment to seeking truth and justice, who has declared that her government would not let the AMIA case become a chess piece in global geopolitics,

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who stepped in because the case was paralyzed, was actually the main architect, together with Minister Timerman, of the fraudulent dismantling of the investigation and the cover-up of the accused. In her speech, she talked about justice and truth. In reality, impunity was agreed. It is thus terrifying to verify that it was all an act and manipulation of facts, individuals and —what is more— criminal activities. It will also be shown that the meeting held on 28 September 2012 between the foreign ministers of both countries was a mise en scène that had been previously agreed and, in fact, established at the request of Cristina Fernandez in order to delude public opinion. While a few days before, the Argentine President had strongly urged, before the United Nations General Assembly, that new Iranian President Hassan Rohani should move forward with the implementation of the agreement, Cristina Fernandez surreptitiously held talks with top Iranian officials and Mohsen Rabbani himself, through parallel negotiation channels that had been opened to carry out the criminal plan. Argentine interlocutor Luis D‘Elia specified the request: ―…I have an urgent message from the Argentine government to be transmitted urgently over there [a reference to Iran], before tomorrow… I‘m at Government House now… there is no matter of greater importance than this, trust me… I need for you to talk to the sheikh over there [a reference to Rabbani], I mean this is really big ok?‖ The president expected some public statements from Tehran that would further the impunity plan, always with a view to reaching her ultimate goal: to come geopolitically and commercially closer to Iran. The person who received the message and conveyed it to Iran, Jorge Khalil, revealed the information when stating: ―… They need that the Iranian government, together with the Argentine government, announce tomorrow the creation of the Truth Commission…‖ This already shows what will be demonstrated later on in this section: the strong interest of those responsible for the cover-up in making new contributions to the plan, the existence of communication and negotiation channels parallel to the official ones and hidden from the public opinion, the flagrant evidence that the details of the criminal plan were secretly worked out through those channels and that the public statements from the Argentine President and the Foreign Minister were nothing but a mise en scène in the media to mislead citizens about the reality of the AMIA case. Finally, it will be shown that this sophisticated plan, as stated at the beginning, was carried out by a series of accomplices. In the first place, reference should be made to Luis D‘Elia, who has always been a staunch defender of the Iranian regime and the Argentine government, to the point of defining himself as an unconditional ―soldier‖ of the President: ―…I have to play along

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with Government House… If the order is for me not to go, I‘m a soldier here…‖ D‘Elia was the hidden interlocutor on behalf of the Argentine government authorities and was in charge of the transmission and receipt of clandestine messages to and from Iran, for the purpose of overcoming the obstacles that were encountered as they moved forward with the cover-up. He has been the voice of the Argentine government. He had the necessary background to occupy such position. Ideologically supportive of both parties to the criminal deal, he went to Iran several times, invited by the regime. On one occasion, they offered him a deal similar to the one later signed by Timerman, which already included the end of the red notices. On all of his visits to Iran he met with senior officials, had his picture taken with –among others- the fugitive Mohsen Rabbani, with whom he has had contact for years. Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‖ Khalil is the most important contact of the authorities of the Iranian regime in Argentina, even more so that the former Chargé d‘Affaires in our country, over whom —as will be shown below— he had more power. A full-time champion of Persian interests, he is the ―voice and ears of Iran‖ in Argentina. In such capacity, he has acted as the central liaison in the relations between Iranian and Argentine officials within the framework of the events reported herein, thus operating as the main actor in the parallel diplomacy connecting Buenos Aires with Tehran, which was used for the implementation of the impunity plan. He participated both in the fabrication of the false lead, and in the negotiations with the Argentine government relating to the trade exchanges sought to be established with Iran at a State-to-State level. Furthermore, he kept the fugitive Mohsen Rabbani constantly informed about every progress made on the plan. Fernando Esteche is the leader of the Quebracho group, retains very close links with some officials of the Argentine federal government and, for years, he has maintained a position that is favourable to Iranian interests, so much so that he has been financially supported by the Iranian regime. His participation has been decisive as he is one of the individuals who made it possible for the cover-up plan to move forward, by putting the Iranian agent, Khalil, in contact with Argentine intelligence officers and, especially, with the former Prosecutor appointed to act in the AMIA case, Hector Yrimia, as well as by suggesting concrete ideas in order to build the new false hypothesis. Argentine Congressman Andres Larroque has also played a key role in the orchestration of the criminal plan because, given his close relationship with both the Argentine President and those who participated in the cover-up, he has acted as a liaison and intermediary with regard to the information exchanged between the perpetrators and accomplices of the cover-up. Evidence

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will be provided of various instances where Larroque communicated presidential orders both to Khalil and to D‘Elia, regarding how they were supposed to act. For instance, we may refer to the day, in November 2012, when Khalil recognized that: ―...I just came from La Matanza where I had a meeting with Luis D‘Elia and ‗Cuervo‘ Larroque, the one from ‗La Cámpora‘ ... they called me early because they wanted to talk to me. They said they had a message for the government ... Now, I am going to Martinez to convey that message, to the Ambassador‘s residence...‖. His participation has been essential in the criminal scheme as it made it possible to avoid direct contact between those who devised and those who implemented the impunity plan. Mr. Hector Yrimia, who then held the position of Trial Court Prosecutor in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters, was appointed on the day of the bombings together with other prosecutors to act jointly, alternatively or successively in the AMIA case. That is why he had detailed knowledge of the facts under investigation. As a consequence, he was in contact with the evidence, testimonies, expert opinions and reports relating to the case and —precisely— such intimate knowledge has made him a fundamental actor for the proper operation of the plan. His contribution was made where it proved most useful: in the fabrication of a false hypothesis through which —relying upon information obtained in the performance of his public duties— he cooperated at that stage of the plan. Special mention should be made of the individual known as ―Allan‖, who reports to the Intelligence Secretariat of the Argentine Presidency. He is a person with access to the presidential entourage, who has privileged information (including information about the President‘s health), who has voiced his sympathy for the Iranian regime, and who has repeatedly acted in favour of foreign interests to the detriment of Argentine interests. Furthermore, he has disclosed secret information protected under the intelligence law to agents of a foreign power and the President has entrusted him with the task of carrying out part of the impunity plan not only because of his dedication and obedience, but also —and above all other things— because he has no scruples when it comes to tampering with evidence and manipulating persons in order to fulfil the illegal task entrusted by his boss. In effect, it will be amply demonstrated that those who participated in the cover-up —especially the so-called ―Allan‖, together with the former Prosecutor appointed to act in the AMIA case and former Investigating Judge, Mr. Hector Yrimia— have worked on and negotiated the impunity of the fugitives of the AMIA case, for which purpose they disclosed confidential and classified information to the Iranian party, they contributed to the construction of a false lead by

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resorting to fabricated evidence, they conspired against the judicial investigation and they even used the resources of the Argentine State to surmount any obstacles arising during the implementation of the cover-up plan. In conclusion, the events briefly explained above led to the materialization of a sophisticated cover-up plan designed to give impunity to the accused Iranian nationals in the AMIA case, which was decided upon by President Cristina Fernandez, and —mainly— orchestrated by her Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, with the cooperation of individuals who, due to their skills and knowledge, turned out to be ideal agents to carry out the criminal scheme. A paradoxical —and rather irritating— circumstance in this criminal scheme was the fact that, in order to attain their criminal goals, the authors of the plan, while publicly claiming that they were seeking nothing but truth and justice, did not hesitate to attempt to destroy the indictment issued by the Argentine courts at the expense of 85 deaths. I. – Preliminary Comments on the Evidence: Some of the pieces of evidence on which this accusation is grounded are available to the public. However, other pieces of evidence have come to my attention in the performance of my duties and within the framework of the investigation of the bombings against the AMIA building. The latter are the product of wiretaps ordered by the courts in the AMIA case before the commencement of the illegal negotiations. At first, always within the framework of the investigation into the bombings, all evidence, leads and facts were found or discovered separately, independently from each other, so that they revealed nothing about the criminal basis that, as is evident now, they all share. Nonetheless, as time went by and —most importantly— new elements were found, such elements, which are unavoidable because of the sheer criminality revealed by them, caused the suspicions about the criminal plan demonstrated in this accusation to become clearer and stronger, since the evidence gathered, when considered as a whole, shows an extremely serious criminal activity. The serious irregularities and offences revealed by the wiretaps analyzed became increasingly evident. It became clear that what the indictees discussed in their conversations materialized in reality. The parties to the conversation would talk in advance about what would eventually come to pass. In this way, the criminal scheme reported herein began to be uncovered and many of the doubts regarding the actions taken by the Argentine Government (for example, the phrasing of the Memorandum of Understanding) were dispelled by the results of the court-ordered wiretaps.

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Just like a puzzle that is gradually pieced together, the cover-up plan began to come into focus, the stages of the ―iter criminis‖ gradually became clearer and it was possible to decipher, at least, part of this sophisticated plot. We should not give in to the simplicity or naivety inherent in believing that this submission comprises all the elements of the criminal plan for impunity. In truth, what we see, no matter how serious it may be, is merely the tip of the iceberg. In this respect, it should be noted that the most sensitive aspects of the criminal plan were not discussed over the phone, but agreed upon in person, which is why swift judicial action to make a historic reconstruction of the events is of the essence in this case. As a result, it bears noting that the crimes reported, which are of unprecedented institutional seriousness, are nothing but a small part of the scheme and the unlawful actions carried out. It will be up to the Judge in charge of the preliminary investigations to determine the true magnitude of this cover-up and impunity plan. Likewise, it is worth mentioning that certain circumstances and references discussed in the recorded conversations were verified, either because they became known to the public or because they are consistent with subsequent facts or statements that have also become known to everyone. In other words, references, circumstances, dates, episodes, political positions, that is to say, a heterogeneous set of facts mentioned in the telephone conversations cited herein, became true and this proves the credibility of the conversations recorded. There are numerous examples. Among many other references to events that became known to the public, there are allusions to and comments on the following:  The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (Communications of 27/1/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01 -27-112032-4, CD 266; File B- 1009-2013-01-27-112552-12, CD 266; File B-1009-2013-01-27-113208-14, CD 266; File B-1009-2013-01-27-122441-28, CD 266; File B-l 009-2013- 01-27-174637-12, CD 266);  The addresses delivered by national senators (Communications of 13/2/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-l009-2013-02-13- 123827-24, CD 283; Communication of 13/02/2013, Party to the Call No. - 3315-6908, File B-l009-2013-02-13-184206-28, CD 283) and by national congressmen (Communications of 26/2/13, Party to the Call No. 1 1-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-26-180341 - 24.wav, CD 296) during the parliamentary debate;

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 The trip made by Cristina Fernandez to attend the funeral of Hugo Chávez (Communication of 05/03/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013- 03-05-231220-24.wav, CD 303, File B-l009- 2013-03-05-231812-18, CD 303);  Mahmoud Ahmadinejad‘s alleged approval of the Memorandum of Understanding (Communications of 20/5/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013- 05-20- 122551-14, CD 31; File B-1009-2013-05-20-130258-12.txt, CD 31; File B-1009- 2013-05-20-130715-14, CD 31; File B-1009-2013-05-20-130940-28, CD 31; File B- l009-2013- 05-20-132253-6, CD 31; File B-1009-2013-05-20-133130-8, CD 31; File B- 1009-2013-05-20-140034-12, CD 31; File B-1009-2013-05-20-143508-24, CD 31; File B-1009-2013- 05-20-153449-10, CD 31; File B-l 009-2013-05-20-161759-6, CD 31; and of 21/5/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File 2542, CD 32);  The opinion submitted by this Prosecutorial Unit on 29 May 2013 (Communication of 31/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-05-31 -095657-14, CD 42);  An article written by journalist Roger Noriega, published in the newspaper Infobae on Edgardo Assad‘s links to terrorism (Communication of 1/6/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-06-01 -224726-18, CD 43);  The presidential elections in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Communication of 14/6/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-06-14-191219-18, CD 56);  The TV programme ―Periodismo para Todos‖ that presented a report on Luis D‘Elia (Communication of 7/7/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-l009-2013-07- 07-224045-18, CD 79);  The visit made by Emilio Persico to the AMIA building (Communication of 15/8/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-08-15-234225-2, CD 118);  An accusation made by National Congresswoman Elisa Carrio (Communication of 23/8/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-08-23-130443-6, CD 126);  An interview with the undersigned in Radio Jai (Communication of 14/11/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-l009-2013-11- 14-092352-14, CD 209);  The public statements made by the former Israeli ambassador to Argentina, Yitzhak Aviran (Communication of 4/1/14, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-l009- 2014-01-04-190349-16, CD 260; File B-l009-2014-01-04-235658-12, CD 260)

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 The meeting between the Governor of the Province of Corrientes and the Chargé d‘Affaires of Iran in Argentina (Communication of 4/2/14, Party to the Call No. 11- 3238-4699, File B- 1009-2014-02-04-093431-30, CD 291). These are only a few examples of the numerous and different references contained in the court- ordered wiretaps, which are consistent with the events that took place in reality. In other words, there is a correlation between reality and the circumstances mentioned in those conversations, which strengthens the probative value of this material and provides it with the necessary force, in view of the nature of the scheme reported. As a consequence, by virtue of the extreme importance of the events reported and notwithstanding the possibility that supplementary submissions may subsequently be filed, it is in order to submit this accusation, as well as to demand an immediate and urgent investigation into the facts, which, just like this accusation, are of unprecedented institutional seriousness.

II- Background information a) The judicial accusation against Iranian officials in the AMIA case On 18 July 1994, at around 9:53 a.m., a Renault Trafic van loaded with an approximate amount —equivalent in TNT— of between 300 and 400 kilos of a compound of ammonium nitrate, aluminium, a heavy hydrocarbon, TNT, and nitroglycerin, exploded opposite the building located in Pasteur street, No. 633, which housed, among other institutions, the Argentine Jewish Mutual Association (AMIA) and the Delegation of Argentine-Israeli Associations (DAIA). The attack killed eighty-five people, injured at least one hundred and fifty-one to varying degrees, and produced considerable material damages. Notwithstanding the early stages of the investigation, on 25 October 2006 the undersigned issued a report accusing one Lebanese citizen and seven Iranian citizens —all of whom were high officials of the then Persian government— of having participated in the bombing of 18 July 1994 (pp. 122.333/122.738 of the main file8). On 9 November 2006, the Judge of the case, Mr. Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, instructed the issuance of national and international arrest warrants for nine indictees (one Lebanese citizen and nine Iranian citizens) to seek their extradition in order to take their statement in the case (pp. 122.775/122.800).

8 From now on, unless otherwise stated, the pages referred to belong to the main file of the AMIA case.

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As a consequence, Interpol Buenos Aires prepared and sent the pertaining red notices to its counterparts. For its part, the Argentine Judiciary, upon verifying that the individuals sought had not appeared in court, declared them in default on 1 December 2006. The arrest orders issued by Judge Canicoba Corral at the request of this Prosecutor‘s Office were challenged by the National Central Bureau in Tehran (NCB Tehran). The Interpol General Secretariat summoned the parties to a meeting scheduled for January 2007. On 22 January, the Argentine delegation, headed by the undersigned, made a presentation before the General Secretariat, in which it explained in great detail the grounds and arguments that justified the new registration of the red notices related to the international arrest warrants issued in the case. In particular, it was explained that the new arrest orders were grounded on a judicial decision adopted by a sovereign State, based on new evidence, and in observance of the requirements established by Interpol for the registration of that kind of measures. The Argentine delegation urged the authorities of the organization to immediately order the search and arrest of those who were suspected of having been involved in the largest terrorist attack in the history of our country. After hearing the arguments of the Iranian delegation, the Interpol General Secretariat ordered that the matter be heard by the Executive Committee of the organization, and tasked the Office of Legal Affairs with the preparation of a report on the question being discussed. The Office made an appropriate distinction between the arrest warrants for Iranian citizens issued by former judge Galeano (which it called AMIA I) and the arrest warrants issued in November 2006 by Mr. Canicoba Corral (which it called AMIA II), and it recommended that the request for the publication of the red notices be granted in respect of 5 of the 8 accused individuals. The situation of those individuals who, at the time of the bombing, occupied the positions of President and Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran was considered similar to the situation analyzed by the International Court of Justice in the case ―Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium‖, and so the red notices were excluded. No red notice was issued in respect of the former Iranian Ambassador in Argentina, Hadi Soleimanpour. Furthermore, the Secretary General of Interpol, Mr. Ronald Noble, held the following in relation to the presentation made by the undersigned in the headquarters of the organization: ―… the highly professional explanation of your case, considering one accused at a time, provided by the Argentine prosecutors involved in the case was important for the Office of Legal Affairs to reach its conclusion, namely, that the case of the red notices request by the

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NCB Buenos Aires was not of a predominantly political nature so as to justify the application of the prohibition of article 3…‖ In March 2007, the Interpol Executive Committee meeting was held (South Africa, Chile, Singapore, Italy, Algeria, the United States, Korea, Spain, Morocco, Brazil, India, Russia, and Germany). The Committee had to adopt a decision on the matter. Once more, an Argentine delegation flew to Lyon, French Republic. On the 14th of that month, the undersigned explained his position before the members of the Executive Committee gathered for such purpose at the Interpol headquarters. Once the presentation ended, some members made consultations related to the case, which were answered. After that, the Iranian delegation presented its case. Finally, both delegations were summoned to the meeting room, where the President of the Executive Committee announced that, after a careful analysis of the written and oral presentations made by both delegations, a unanimous decision had been taken, namely the ratification and adoption of the recommendation made by the Secretary General of the Organization after the meeting of 22 January 2007. As a consequence, it ordered the publication of red notices in respect of Imad Fayez Moughnieh, Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rabbani, Ahmad Asghari, Ahmad Vahidi, and Mohsen Rezai, and rejected the request in respect of Ali Rafsanjani, Ali Velayati, and Hadi Soleimapour (in the case of the latter, the request had only been made by Judge Canicoba Corral). Likewise, it was informed that the registration of the red notices ordered by the Executive Committee would be valid as from 31 March 2007, unless any of the NCBs involved in the dispute filed an appeal, in which case the matter would be submitted to the General Assembly of the organization for its consideration. The General Assembly was scheduled to meet in the Kingdom of Morocco in November 2007. On 22 March 2007, this Prosecutorial Unit was informed that the NCB Tehran had formally appealed the decision of the Executive Committee requesting that the matter be submitted before the General Assembly, which was welcomed by the authorities of the international police organization. Hence, the matter was included in the agenda of the meeting of the abovementioned Assembly. As on previous occasions, it was deemed convenient for the head and the general coordinator of the Prosecutorial Unit, as well as for the members of the NCB Buenos Aires, to attend the 76th Annual Session of the Interpol General Assembly, held in the city of Marrakesh, Kingdom of Morocco, at which a decision would be adopted in relation to five new red notices ordered in this case.

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On 16 October 2007, a communication from the General Secretariat of the International Police Organization informing of the agenda to be dealt with at the annual session was received. Item 8 c) provided for the settlement of the lawsuit between Iran and Argentina on the publication of red notices on account of the legal recourse submitted by the Islamic Republic against the decision adopted by the Executive Committee in March 2007. However, prior to the commencement of the deliberations by the General Assembly, the Organization‘s Executive Committee held sessions on 3 and 4 November 2007 in view of the request made by the Iranian delegation for postponing the discussion on the matter for the following year. The Executive Committee rejected the postponement proposal and authorized the General Assembly to discuss the matter. On 7 November 2007, the question of the registration of the red notices was submitted for debate and subsequent voting by the Interpol General Assembly. On such occasion, after one of the delegates of the Iranian side had explained his position before the representations present, the undersigned, in representation of the Argentine delegation, rebutted such arguments and provided the grounds that justified the immediate registration of the red notices. Once such presentations had been completed, the missions present voted. Argentina‘s position was approved by 78 positive votes, with 14 votes against and 26 abstentions. In keeping with this, the governing body of the International Criminal Police Organization fully approved the position of the Argentine delegation, and consequently ordered the registration as red notices of the arrest warrants issued against Iranian citizens Ali Fallahijan, Mohsen Rezai, Ahmad Vahidi, Mohsen Rabbani and Ahmad RezaAsghari, which were added to the already existing arrest warrant for Lebanese national Imad Fayez Moughnieh. On 13 November 2007, the formal communication by Interpol informing of the effective registration of such arrest warrants was received in the proceedings. In this way, a lengthy and complex process had successfully come to an end, one which, due to the vicissitudes of the proceedings, meant substantial progress towards the clarification of the case. As a result, the Prosecutorial Unit headed by the undersigned obtained, with the support of a large majority, the definite publication of the red notices in respect of the suspects in the case, which —at the time— not only implied the confirmation of the straightening of, and progress in, the investigation, but also the renewal of trust of the international community of nations in the activity, probity, and efficiency of the Argentine Judiciary, which had been severely damaged by the conduct of the previous judge in relation to this case.

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As from that moment and over the subsequent years, the Argentine Republic complained against Iran, through various media and in different international fora, for its lack of cooperation in the investigation and for its reluctance to extradite the accused. For its part, Iran never yielded to these claims, nor did it accept any of the alternatives offered by Argentina to submit the indicted Iranian nationals to judicial proceedings. Until, at least publicly, in September 2012 the Argentine President, Ms. Cristina Fernandez, announced before the United Nations General Assembly that she had instructed the Argentine Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, to initiate a negotiation process with Iran in relation to the AMIA case. According to the official version, Minister Timerman met with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, to discuss the matter for the first time on 27 September 2012. Officially, a series of meetings between representatives of both countries were informed, of which no further details were provided (Press Releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship dated 27 September 2012, No. 313/12; 29/10/12 –No. 353/12-; 31/10/12 — No. 360/12-; 1/12/12 – No. 391/12; 7/1/13 – No. 002/13-). Exactly four months later, and after three meetings in Sweden held on 27 January 2013, both Foreign Ministers met in Ethiopia, where they signed a ―Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on matters related to the terrorist attack on the AMIA building in Buenos Aires on 18 July 1994‖ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Information No. 011/13, 27/01/2013). On 7 February 2013, the Argentine President sent the agreement to the Argentine Congress for its approval (File No. 296/12). For such purposes, extraordinary sessions had to be held as Congress was in recess. After considering the matter in committees, both houses approved the agreement, which was enacted as National Law No. 26843 on 27 February and published in the Official Gazette of 1 March, both for the year 2013 (Official Gazette No. 32591). For its part, on 10 March 2013, the then President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, sent the agreement to the Iranian Parliament (Majlis), which went into recess on 21 March on account of the New Year of the Persian calendar (Nouruz) and resumed its sessions on 8 April. However, at no time was the Memorandum discussed, and it was eventually removed from the parliamentary agenda (Pagni, Carlos, ―El kirchnerismo, en el peor de los mundos‖, La Nacion newspaper 30/5/13; ―El memorandum con Argentina llega al parlamento iraní‖, Europa Press news agency, 11/3/2013; Kollmann, Raúl ―Con novedades semana a semana‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 24/3/13).

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More than two months later, on 20 May 2013, Ali Pakdaman, then Iran‘s Chargé d‘Affaires in Buenos Aires, informed the press that, on 19 May, President Ahmadinejad had approved the agreement by signing it (―Teherán aprobó el memorándum por el atentado a la AMIA‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 20/05/2013; Kollmann, Raúl, ―Ahmadinejad eligió la vía expeditiva‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 21/05/2013). However, the truth is that no formal notice of such alleged approval has been received until now (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 110/13, 21/5/13). On 4 August, the new President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Hassan Rohani, took office and —as a consequence— some authorities in several governmental sectors in Tehran were changed. On 28 September 2013, one year after the official commencement of the negotiations, the new Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif, met with Minister Timerman in the United Nations headquarters in New York, United States. After the meeting, Timerman claimed in press releases that Javad Zarif had assured him that Iran had approved the memorandum with the backing of the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader (Miri, Ignacio, ―Timerman dijo que Irán aprobó el pacto por la AMIA, pero aún no rige‖, Clarin newspaper, 29/09/2013; Pisani, Silvia, ―Irán le confirmó a Timerman que ya aprobó el acuerdo‖, La Nacion newspaper, 29/09/2013; ―Timerman anunció nueva reunión con Irán en noviembre‖, Prensa Argentina, 28/09/2013; ―Timerman ratificó la aprobación del memorándum de entendimiento con Irán y un nuevo encuentro‖, Telam news agency, 28/09/2013; ―Irán aprobó el memorándum de entendimiento por la AMIA‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 28/09/2013). After another two months of silence on the part of Iran, officials of both Ministries of Foreign Affairs met again in Zurich on 20 and 21 November 2013, on which occasion Argentina submitted a written proposal on certain matters related to the implementation of the memorandum. Iran committed itself to giving a quick answer (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Information No. 279/13, 24 November 2013). However, to date, and although more than a year and a half has elapsed since its signature, notwithstanding the several statements made by the Persian officials, Iran has not formally communicated any kind of internal approval of the agreement. As a consequence, there has been no exchange of verbal notes, which marks the entry into force of the memorandum (item 6). On the other hand, several claims challenging the constitutionality of the abovementioned memorandum have been submitted with various Argentine courts.

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In short, on 15 May 2014, Division I of the Appellate Court in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters for the City of Buenos Aires decided to grant the action for the protection of constitutional rights (amparo) submitted by the representatives of AMIA and DAIA and, in keeping with the position held by the undersigned, declared both the Memorandum of Understanding and its enacting law unconstitutional. Likewise, such Court ordered, in a precautionary manner, that the decision be communicated to the Argentine Executive —in particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs— so that the Memorandum is not executed while the legal recourses submitted are being processed. Division I also instructed the case judge, Mr. Canicoba Corral, to reiterate, through diplomatic channels, the requests for extradition and judicial cooperation to the Islamic Republic of Iran, to request Interpol to deepen its efforts to enforce the arrest warrants, and to urge the police organization to review the possibility of issuing red notices in respect of Rafsanjani, Velayati, and Soleimanpour (CCCF, Division I, CFP 3184/2013/CA1 ―AMIA s/Amparo Ley 16.986‖ [AMIA on amparo action, Law 16986], 15/05/2014, Court No. 6- Clerk‘s Office No. l l ). Finally, it is worth recalling that, on 30 May this year, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights appealed the abovementioned resolution of the Appellate Court. Notwithstanding the vital importance of reaching a definite decision in this respect, the truth is that, for the purposes of this accusation, this judicial path is —in any case— a matter extraneous to the conducts that, in essence, have been reported herein. b) Iran‘s position in relation to the AMIA case

From the beginning of the investigation of the AMIA case and up to this day, the Islamic Republic of Iran has always denied, officially, the involvement of its nationals in the attack. Moreover, it has hindered the investigation in all manners possible; for instance, by attempting to discredit the judicial authorities involved in the case. It has even accused the Argentine government of financing terrorism and it has tried —on several occasions— to negotiate the acquittal of the accused politically. This position has remained unchanged throughout all these years, even after the signature of the agreement in January 2013. The Iranian rhetoric has reiterated countless times that none of its nationals participated in the attack, that the Argentine Judiciary is not trustworthy, that Iran condemns terrorism, and that it is willing to cooperate with Argentina to find the ―true culprits‖. By referring to the ―true culprits‖, Iran‘s position becomes clear: the Argentine accusation has been fabricated and

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orchestrated by judicial authorities who serve Zionism and foreign interests, with the participation of intelligence agencies from the United States and Israel. Numerous statements made throughout the years by various Persian officials evidence Iran‘s official position, namely: the letters sent by the Iranian Ambassador to the UN, Mohammad Khazaee, to the President of the General Assembly of said Organization — dated 28 September 2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010—; the formal accusations and the discrediting statements made by Iranian officials against different Argentine judicial authorities involved in the case, among others (cf.: Documents A/62/485, A/63/468, 4/64/481 and A/65/495, UN General Assembly, UN; ―Si los desagravian, Irán colaboraría con la causa AMIA‖, ADN Mundo, 4/12/2006; ―AMIA: Irán pidió ubicar al responsable real‖, Perfil newspaper, 29/11/2006; ―AMIA: Dura advertencia de Irán al gobierno de Kirchner‖, Diario de Cuyo newspaper, 11/12/2006; ―Irán reaccionó con agravios al pedido de Néstor Kirchner‖, Infobae newspaper, 27/09/2007; ―Ahmadinejad dice que quiere expandir las relaciones con la Argentina‖, Clarin newspaper, 26/09/2013; Dinatale, Martin, ―Negó Irán la denuncia del fiscal Nisman y lo acusó de sionista‖, La Nacion newspaper, 4/6/2013; ―Para Irán, la causa AMIA causó amargura en las relaciones entre Irán y Argentina‖, Jewish News Agency, 16/07/2013; Braslavsky, Guido, ―Irán pide a Interpol la captura del fiscal Nisman y de Galeano‖, Clarin newspaper, 13/11/2006; ―AMIA: dura respuesta iraní a los pedidos de capturas‖, Infobae newspaper, 13/11/2006; Gallo, Daniel, ―Irán amenaza con pedir el arresto de agentes de Interpol‖, La Nacion newspaper, 16/03/2007, ―Irán volvió a criticar al sionismo‖, La Nacion newspaper, 19/06/2013; Niebieskikwiat, Natasha, ―Irán rechazó, otra vez, su participación en la AMIA‖, Clarin newspaper, 19/06/2013; ―Irán ratificó su adhesión plena al memorándum con Argentina‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 12/02/2013; ―Kirchner ordenó expulsar a D'Elía del gobierno‖, La Nacion newspaper, 14/11/2006; ―Tensión diplomática y despido de D'Elía‖, La Voz newspaper, 14/11/2006; ―La Cancillería respondió a otra protesta de Irán‖, Clarin newspaper, 13/12/2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 528/06 of 13/11/2006; Press Release No. 000/07 ―Argentina rechaza pedido de exhorto de Irán‖, of 14/08/2007, Press Release No. 400/07 ―La cancillería argentina rechaza declaraciones difundidas por Irán‖, of 28/09/2007; ―Argentina expresó un categórico rechazo a dichos de Irán‖, El Dia newspaper, 28/09/2007; ―Que Irán respete la jurisdicción‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 29/09/2007). Specifically, in its 2007 and 2010 letters to the President of the United Nations General Assembly, the Iranian Ambassador to the Organization, Mohammad Khazaee, made

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affirmations along these lines: ―…the authors of the AMIA bombings went unpunished and, instead, several innocent Iranian nationals have been unfairly accused on no grounds…‖ and ―…All arguments against the Iranian nationals are nothing more than a lie…‖ (cf.: Documents A/62/485, A/63/468, 4/64/481 and A/65/495, UN General Assembly, UN). Now, this position is not exempt from practical consequences. The Islamic Republic has never cooperated with the Argentine judicial authorities, in spite of repeatedly making statements to the contrary. In fact, out of 17 letters rogatory issued9 to Iran within the framework of the case requesting information for the investigation of the attack, only one has been answered informing that the request would not be complied with, providing poor excuses, and rejecting all judicial cooperation in the case (pp. 126.761/126.779 and 127.614/127.657). Furthermore, Iran has also plainly rejected the arrest warrant against the indictees aimed at their extradition —which had been made through a letters rogatory via diplomatic channels in November 2006 (pp. 127.063/127.080 and 128.205/128.220). It is truly shameless to talk of cooperation in view of these records. On the other hand, as already mentioned, since 2005 several episodes have been recorded in the proceedings in which the Iranian authorities proposed, through diplomatic channels and in a completely indolent manner, the possibility of ―negotiating‖ in different ways the conclusion of the investigation, accusation and/or arrest warrant against its nationals (see pp. 116.381/116.383, 117.251/117.253, 118.680 and 118.952/118.953 bis). In effect, on more than one occasion, Iran sought to negotiate the impunity of its nationals. For instance, on 3 April 2005, the Argentine Republic‘s Chargé d‘Affaires in Iran delivered a new letters rogatory in relation to the case to the Head of the Department of International Law Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of that country. On such occasion, the Iranian official asked the following questions in relation to whether they should answer the letters rogatory or

9 The letters rogatory were the following: a) a letters rogatory of 27 June 2000 (pp. 550/551 of file 204); b) three letters rogatory of 5 March 2003 (pp. 106.475/76, 106.479/80 and 106.481/82); c) a letters rogatory issued on 16 May 2003 (pp. 108.201/02); d) a judicial request issued on 19 September 2003 (pp. 1235/1239 of file 402); e) a criminal summons of 4 May 2004 (pp. 3409/3413 of file 402); f) a letters rogatory of 9 April 2007 (pp. 124.239/124.242); g) a letters rogatory of 16 May 2007 (pp. 910/913 of file 391); h) another letters rogatory issued on 6 June 2007 (pp. 6832/6836 of file 201); i) a request entered on 9 October 2007 (pp. 3969/3974 of file 402); j) an attendance request of 3 October 2008 (pp. 6020/6023 of file 204); k) a letters rogatory of 29 October 2008 (ancillary civil action suit, pp. 79/88); I) a criminal summons of 30 April and 12 August 2009 (ancillary prejudgment attachment suit, pp. 118/121 and 134/138); m) a letters rogatory of 2 February 2012 (pp. 1170 of file 415) and n) a letters rogatory of 14 February 2012 (pp. 6416 of file 392).

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not: ―…If we provide our assistance to the Argentine Judiciary: a) Would not we be seen as the accused or the suspects? b) Suppose that we receive the letters rogatory and answer them […] Will the judge be ready to announce and categorically declare that there is no connection between Iran or its citizens and the AMIA bombings? c) Will the dossier remain open or not if we answer? d) How can we know whether the judge will close the dossier or not?‖ He added: ―the main issue is that, somehow, we need to be certain that, if we do cooperate, the judge hearing the case will reach the conclusion that Mr. X or Mr. Y are not, and were not, involved in the AMIA bombings. Remember that, since 19 July 1994, we have been stating that we are willing to cooperate with the Argentine Judiciary, and this position and offer are valid up to this day. If we had objective guarantees, tangible facts (tangible results), we would have no problem: a) receiving all letters rogatory; b) answering all such letters; c) even more: conducting some additional investigation in Iran…‖ (pp. 116.381/116.383). The same rhetoric was repeated by the Iranian officials who attended the meeting held in Tehran in July 2005 between diplomatic representatives of our country and the local Head of International Law Affairs, Mr. Mohsen Baharvand, in relation to the letters rogatory whose receipt and answer by the Iranian Judiciary were pending. On such occasion, the Iranian official said: ―We need that prospect to receive and answer the letters rogatory. Bear in mind that these are Iranian government officials and not ordinary citizens; in all, whenever one has something to give, one is expecting to receive something as well (…) The Iranian side is very flexible with the letters rogatory. We only complicate things when it is absolutely necessary (sic), and that is not the case of our relation with Argentina‖ (pp. 117.251/117.253). Another example of Iran‘s attitude in relation to its cooperation in the case is provided by a ―non paper‖ delivered by the abovementioned Baharvand to Argentine diplomats with an agreement proposal between both countries (pp. 118.680, 118.952/118.953 bis). The agreement then offered by Iran said the following: ―1. The parties agree that there have been no accusations against Iranian citizens in relation to the AMIA case. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the proceeding being conducted by the Argentine judge in charge of the investigation has been ordered, in respect of the Iranian citizens, for the sole purpose of gathering information.‖ ―2. The parties… shall abstain from making any kind of criminal implications, either directly or indirectly, or accusations against the other party and its officials.‖

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―3. The letters rogatory issued by the Argentine Judge shall be amended so that no affirmations or accusations are made, whether explicitly or impliedly, against the Iranian government and its citizens…‖ ―4. Once the provisions of the third paragraph have been observed, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran shall officially receive the letters rogatory…‖ ―5. The Argentine side… shall remove any arrest warrants issued by the Judge in charge of the investigation against citizens of the Islamic Republic of Iran…‖ The brief account made here reveals the unwonted position adopted by the Iranian government, which consists in subjecting their cooperation to a commitment by the Argentine judicial authorities not to accuse the officials and/or citizens of that country. On the other hand, on account of two requests aimed at obtaining information on holders of telephone lines, the Iranian authorities, through Interpol Tehran, answered the first request as follows: ―it is not possible for us to answer your request due to the importance of respecting human rights principles and rules, as well as the domestic laws of Iran concerning the respect for the private lives of its people‖ (p. 908 of file 391). With regard to the other request, far from providing the required information, they only answered the following: ―… please be so kind as to explain us the reasons and inform us where you obtained these telephone numbers…‖ (p. 6843 of file 201). This having been said, the excuses given by the Iranian regime to avoid answering the Argentine requests can be considered absurd and nonsensical at the very least, with the aggravating circumstance that there was no answer even though the required data was later sent to Tehran. Apart from the documentary evidence, these kinds of proposals were acknowledged by many then Argentine officials who, on account of occupying key positions, learnt about the different proposals made by Iran which were aimed at putting an end to the indictment in the AMIA case. In this regard, it is worth recalling an agreement rejected by Nestor Kirchner, which was verified by former Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fernandez and former Deputy Foreign Minister Roberto Garcia Moritan. For their part, former Foreign Ministers Rafael Bielsa and Jorge Taiana also confirmed the position adopted by Iran described herein, which was observed by them during their administrations in San Martin Palace. Rafael Bielsa mentioned the Iranian offer of four billion dollars in purchases of corn and wheat to resume bilateral trade subject to the condition of leaving the AMIA case aside. He stated: ―…it was an extortion-like attitude…‖ When making reference to the performance of the

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Iranian diplomacy in general, he said: ―They would always cheat us. We explained to them that here the Argentine Executive does not give orders to the Judiciary, let alone in a case of this nature. They pretended not to understand…‖ He added: ―… It is a conspicuously hostile country that has rejected to answer all letters rogatory… We would tell them: we are going to follow you under your beds, there is no arrangement here, answer the letters rogatory. One of their arguments was that we were missing 4 billion dollars… There was never the smallest concession… They wanted an item suggesting that there could be a mistake on the part of the Argentine Judiciary in respect of the summons of these Iranian officials…‖ (emphasis added, Dobry, Hernan, ―Cancilleres K: el acuerdo con Irán ya había sido rechazado‖, Perfil newspaper, 23/02/2013; ―Causa AMIA: Para D'Elía, los acusados iraníes van a ser sobreseídos‖, Infobae newspaper, 1/3/2013, ―Irán le ofreció un acuerdo igual a Néstor Kirchner, pero lo rechazó‖, Infobae newspaper, 14/02/2013; ―Duro cruce de acusaciones entre Timerman y García Moritán‖, La Nacion newspaper, 19/02/2013; ―Alberto Fernández: Néstor Kirchner siempre se negó a un acuerdo con Irán‖, Iprofesional, 20/02/2013). In the same vein, former Foreign Minister Jorge Taiana asserted that the Iranians had shown ―a lack of willingness‖ as ―they would not even receive the requests. I mean, they rejected them or discredited them. There was not the slightest hint that they were willing to help clarify the case…‖ (Dobry, Hernan, ―Cancilleres K: el acuerdo con Irán ya había sido rechazado‖, Perfil newspaper, 23/02/2013). What is more, the Persian authorities have used Argentine citizens who are well aware of the ideas of the regime and who, at the same time, have links with the Argentine government authorities, such as Luis D‘Elia, to make their proposals for a settlement that would be favourable to their interests in relation to the accusations made in the AMIA case. In effect, the Iranian regime took advantage of a trip made by Luis D‘Elia, Fernando Esteche and Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil in late February and early March 2010 to propose an agreement in relation to the attack (―Quejas de Israel por el viaje de D'Elía a Irán‖, La Nacion newspaper, 07/03/2010; ―D'Elía admitió un encuentro con un ex funcionario iraní prófugo en la causa AMIA‖, La Prensa newspaper, 07/03/2010; ―D‘Elía y Esteche vieron en Irán a un sospechoso de volar la AMIA‖, Perfil newspaper, 06/03/2010; ―D'Elía sigue defendiendo al prófugo de la AMIA: Es una buena persona‖, Clarin newspaper, 09/03/2010; ―Diputados repudió el viaje de D‘Elía a Irán y pidió informes a Cancillería‖, Infobae newspaper, 07/04/2010). Surprisingly, it has now been verified that such agreement was similar to the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Foreign Minister Timerman in January last year. D‘Elia remembered this when he

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said to Khalil: ―… It is similar to the one they proposed in our first trip to Tehran, remember?...‖ (Telephone conversation of 27/01/13, party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-27-174637-12, CD 266). This suggests, as will be analyzed and justified in detail in the relevant section, that the legal instrument signed by Argentina and Iran has nothing to do with the search for justice or the progress of the investigation. Rather, it is one of the means chosen to achieve a criminal and terrible goal: guaranteeing the definite impunity of the Iranian nationals accused in the case for the AMIA bombings through a seemingly legal safe pass. Finally, it is worth recalling —merely as an example, as there have been many similar attempts by Tehran— that, in September 2007, the then spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Mohammad Alí Hosseini, offered the following: ―As a humanitarian act, and in order to clarify the facts of this tragedy, the Islamic Republic announced in advance that it accepts the establishment of a bilateral committee on legal matters with Argentina, in spite of the absence of an arrangement and the disagreement between the Judiciaries of both countries‖ (―Irán reaccionó con agravios al pedido de Néstor Kirchner‖, Infobae newspaper, 27/09/2007). Obviously, this offer —which was not very different from the agreement signed— was rejected by Nestor Kirchner. In brief, Iran has always held and requested the same, which confirms that in that country there existed, and still exists, the political decision not to cooperate and not to acknowledge Argentina‘s jurisdictional sovereignty in the case, but to hinder and obstruct any progress that may be made. Now, it is clear that the evident lack of cooperation shown by the Iranian authorities in relation to this investigation is the reflection, or the consequence, of the strategy historically held by the regime of Tehran, which consisted and still consists in denying any relation of its citizens to the attack and never providing any type of information to the investigation in order to be released from any responsibility that may be attributed to it in relation to terrorist acts, thus rejecting the arrest warrants aimed at the extradition of the individuals that the Argentine Judiciary has indicted for the attack and seeking to discredit —in various ways— both the investigation and the authorities in charge of it. This demonstrates that there is a political decision to guarantee impunity, a decision that was adopted by the highest authorities of the regime, who also planned and ordered the attack that killed 85 people. Notwithstanding the firm denial of the regime, it was possible to obtain some revealing statements made by Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil, a representative of the interests and organic agent of

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Iran in Argentina who is actively involved in the cover-up reported herein. Such statements acknowledge the responsibility of Iranian officials in the attacks that took place in Argentina. When making reference to an individual, he pointed out: ―…the person who worked with Iran… when Iran killed here‖ (Telephone conversation of 19/11/12, party to the call No. 11-3315- 6908, File B- 1009-2012-11-19-083552-16, CD 197). On a different occasion, he confessed that the Argentine Deputy Secretary for Family Agriculture and the leader of the Evita Movement, Emilio Persico ―…always held that we were the ones… and it is okay… that is what he says. That is the fight‖ (Telephone conversation of 15/8/13, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-08-15-234919-2, CD 118). That is to say, the Iranians were responsible for the attack and, according to Persico, they were justified by their political fight. Likewise, according to D‘Elia, Persico ―…was the one who said that you were the AMIA issue…‖ when making reference to the responsibility of the Iranians in the attack (Telephone conversation of 15/8/13, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-08-15-234225-2, CD 118). These references should only be taken as mere examples and not as new evidence that provides the grounds for the accusation in relation to the attack, which —as it is known— has already been offered in previous prosecutorial reports and in the rulings of the case Judge, Mr. Canicoba Corral. These representations do not constitute evidence of the cover-up, but they make it possible to see that the strategy of repeated denial of the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran was successful. That is to say, in spite of actually being responsible for the attack, the circumstance of denying it for years and years ended up in this cover-up plan that intended to discredit the Argentine Judiciary and, mainly, was aimed at guaranteeing the complete and definite impunity of the accused Iranian nationals. In fact, according to the document that Mr. Jose Eliaschev sworn under oath to have read, the solidity of the Iranian position not to cooperate judicially and not to yield to the Argentine accusations was recognized by former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi as a successful strategy of the Supreme Leader. Salehi paid his compliments to this strategy when —as will be seen further on—, in January 2011, Hector Timerman gave up the Argentine claim for justice and offered him to make an arrangement to leave the bombing accusations aside and resume bilateral trade (pp. 131.189/131.194; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Argentina negocia con Irán dejar de lado la investigación de los atentados‖, Diario Perfil newspaper, 26/03/2011, pp. 130.911/130.913).

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In all, Iran never had the intention to cooperate and, in practice, it always hindered Argentine judicial proceedings, and the diplomatic, political, and judicial approaches it accepted had the sole purpose of putting an end to the accusations against its nationals and disassociating Iran of the case, although prohibited means had to be used to achieve such goal. It is worth highlighting that this strategy has been implemented by Tehran not only in relation to the AMIA case, but also in relation to other terrorist attacks committed in different parts of the world which also involved, essentially, the participation of Iranian officials as the parties responsible for terrorist acts. Iran never changed its position and did not even ameliorate its classis rhetoric after the official initiation of the negotiations and the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding, paying lip service to its readiness to engage in dialogue and negotiations while at the same time seeking to discredit, by any means, the rulings of the Argentine Judiciary and, consequently, of its officials. The following four episodes are examples of the above: 1) the then spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Ramin Mehmanparast, declared in October 2012 —when the negotiations were already public— that the accusations against the Iranian citizens were rejected and that his government was willing to cooperate to find the culprits of the bombings (―Irán volvió a rechazar todas las acusaciones por el atentado a la AMIA‖, La Nacion newspaper, 30/10/2012; Paraszczuk, Joanna, ―Irán ready to identify AMIA bombing perpetrators‖, Jerusalem Post, 30/10/12; Kollmann, Raul: ―Irán volvió a negar su culpabilidad‖, Pagina newspaper 12, 31/10/12); 2) according to a wire by the agency IRNA, Iran‘s official position —after the signature of the agreement with Argentina— was that the bombings may have been planned by Israel: ―… Iran claims that agents from Tel Aviv were involved in the attack… with the aim of increasing their influence on the government of Buenos Aires at the time…‖ (―Irán ratificó su adhesión plena al memorándum con Argentina‖, Pagina newspaper 12, 12/02/2013; ―FM: Irán, Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case‖, Iran Daily Brief, 14/2/13; ―El Canciller de Irán dice que negoció durante dos años el acuerdo con Argentina‖, Clarin newspaper, 12/02/2013; ―Salehi: Irán Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case‖, IRNA, 12/02/2013); 3) the statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, which sought to discredit the work of the Prosecutorial Unit headed by the undersigned and the report dated 29 May 2013 by holding that: ―…On account of the Zionist story and character of that prosecutor [Nisman], we do not give any importance to his affirmations…‖ (―Irán rechazó las acusaciones del fiscal Alberto Nisman al considerarlo sionista‖, La Nacion

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newspaper, 3/6/2013; ―El ministerio exteriores de Irán: No le damos importancia a las declaraciones de Nisman‖, IRNA, 5/6/2013); 4) in June 2013, after the signature of the agreement, another spokesperson of the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Abbas Araqchi— denied once more the participation of the Iranians in the bombings, declared that, for Tehran, the attack had been perpetrated by foreign Zionist agents, and added: ―Thanks God, with the cooperation of the Iranian and Argentine Foreign Ministers, work is being made towards finding a reasonable way to solve the AMIA question, and there is a better understanding that the foreign Zionist agents were the true culprits of this lamentable event…‖ (Niebieskikwiat, Natasha, ―Irán rechazó, otra vez, su participación en la AMIA‖, Clarin newspaper, 19/06/2013; ―Irán volvió a criticar al sionismo‖, La Nacion newspaper, 19/06/2013). The same spokesperson would later repeat these accusations in July 2013 (―Para Irán, la causa AMIA causó amargura en las relaciones entre Irán y Argentina‖, Jewish News Agency, 16/07/2013). The Argentine government had never remained silent in respect of this type of statements. But, since its approach to Iran, the Argentine authorities accused herein started to conduct themselves in conspiratorial silence when faced with these types of statements and/or attacks to the jurisdictional sovereign acts of several agencies of the Argentine Republic. This implied a change in respect of the position invariantly held by Nestor Kirchner during his administration, and constitutes a new hint of the existence of a previous agreement between both parties that — unfortunately— had the cover-up plan that is reported herein as a goal, a plan which the Argentine authorities showed more interest in developing than their Iranian counterparts. In this way, the unintelligible silence of the Argentine government, maintained in spite of the seriousness of the accusations and discrediting statements made by the authorities of the Iranian government, speaks for itself in this new context. Up to this day, the Iranian authorities insist on officially denying any cooperation by Iran in this case and —essentially— attacking and seeking to discredit, in different manners, the accusation made by the Argentine Judiciary by questioning the impartiality of the investigation and always suggesting the influence of foreign interests that skewed the investigation against Iran. More recently, on occasion of the ruling entered by the Appellate Court in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters declaring the unconstitutionality of the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Iran, as well as of its enacting law, the Iranian authorities reacted in a conspicuously provocative manner, in particular when considering their calm in respect of the approval of the agreement. On that occasion, the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign

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Affairs, Marziyeh Afkham, strongly condemned the ruling and stated: ―The Iranian government believes that the Memorandum of Understanding was a suitable solution and an opportunity to reveal the facts related to the AMIA tragedy and to settle our differences in this regard, but the decision of the Argentine court deprives both parties of this opportunity. Therefore, the Islamic Republic of Iran expresses its disagreement and discontent with the decision‖ (―Iran criticizes Argentine court decision to declare unconstitutional joint AMIA bombing probe with Irán‖, IRNA, 16/05/2014; ―Iran slams argentine court ruling on AMIA probe‖, Fars News Agency, 17/05/2014; ―Iran condemns argentine court ruling on AMIA probe‖, PressTV, 16/05/2014; Niebieskikwiat, Natasha, ―Irán lamenta la decisión de la Justicia argentina‖, Clarin newspaper, 16/05/2014; ―Irán expresó pesar y descontento por el fallo que invalidó el memorándum sobre el atentado a la AMIA‖, La Nacion newspaper, 16/05/2014). Double-discourse is not used exclusively by the Argentine authorities accused herein; the Iranian authorities knew perfectly well how to use it. This shows that, in spite of the time that has elapsed without there being any official communication of the internal approval of the agreement by Iran, the authorities of this country publicly expressed their interest in the agreement. Once more, this evidences the enormous gap between words and facts. Finally, it is worth highlighting that the Iranian rhetoric of denial and obstruction was widely known to the government of Cristina Fernandez and, as will be shown later, used by the Argentine authorities accused herein to cover up the accused and make progress in the impunity schemes. c) Nestor Carlos Kirchner‘s administration

During Nestor Kirchner‘s administration, the position of the Argentine Republic in relation to the AMIA bombings was clear and consistent: all political efforts were aimed at supporting the Argentine Judiciary. From the viewpoint of his powers, the then Argentine President attempted to obtain Iran‘s cooperation and the approval of the international community. Throughout his administration, the Argentine Executive invariably supported the conclusions reached by this Public Prosecutor‘s Office and the decisions of the Judiciary in relation to the case. The AMIA case was a governmental policy. Such support was evidenced in several specific actions, from the declassification of intelligence information (Executive Order No. 787 of 17 September 2003) and the creation of this Prosecutorial Investigation Unit in 2004 (Resolution MP 84/04) to the address given by the

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former President in 2007 before the United Nations General Assembly, on which occasion he denounced the lack of cooperation by Iran and requested that ―the Islamic Republic of Iran, within the framework of the applicable international law, accept and respect the jurisdiction of the Argentine Judiciary, and efficiently cooperate with the Argentine judges to prosecute the individuals indicted for such acts‖ (Nestor Kirchner‘s address at the 62nd United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 2007). Those individuals were Alí Akbar Hashemi Bahramaie Rafsanjani (then President of the Islamic Republic of Iran), Alí Fallahijan (then Iranian Information Minister), Alí Akbar Velayati (then Foreign Minister of the Persian nation), Mohsen Rezai (then in charge of the Revolutionary Guard Corps ―Pasdaran‖), Ahmad Vahidi (then in charge of the elite force ―Al Quds‖, which belonged to the Revolutionary Guard), Mohsen Rabbani (then Cultural Counselor of the Iranian Embassy in our country), Ahmad Reza Asghari or Mohsen Randjbaran (then Third Secretary of the Iranian diplomatic representation in our country), Hadi Soleimanpour (then Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Buenos Aires), and Imad Fayez Moughnieh (then in charge of the Hezbollah Foreign Service). Moughnieh was the only Lebanese in this list; the others were all Iranian citizens. The Prosecutorial Unit did not formulate any indictments against Hadi Soleimanpour; however, the Judge of the case provided the grounds for the accusation and ordered his arrest. In this way, Nestor Kirchner inaugurated this outstanding diplomatic recourse: to petition before the international community by using the fora and the international opinion in a legitimate and strategic manner to expose Iran‘s inadmissible position, thus transforming the international disapproval into a legitimate pressure factor aimed at achieving the goal established by the judicial bodies: the prosecution of the indicted Iranian nationals in order to make progress in the prosecution of the judicially responsible people for the bombings of the AMIA building. Furthermore, every time the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, through statements made by its officials and/or other channels, attempted to discredit the investigation of the AMIA case by undermining the officials involved in the investigation, especially when Iran submitted judicial accusations against such officials, Nestor Kirchner‘s administration rejected those discrediting statements and requested —through the appropriate diplomatic channels— any explanations deemed necessary as the adequate way of protecting and supporting the performance of the Argentine Judiciary.

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An example of this was the reaction of the Argentine Executive when, in 2006, certain information became known asserting that the Iranian Judiciary intended to request the arrest and extradition of the undersigned and of Mr. Juan Jose Galeano, who was no longer judge. On such occasion, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately requested explanations in this regard to the Iranian Chargé d‘Affaires in Buenos Aires, Mohsen Baharvand, who was the highest Persian diplomatic authority in the national territory (Press Release No. 528/06 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, 13/11/2006; Braslavsky, Guido, ―Irán pide a Interpol la captura del fiscal Nisman y de Galeano‖, Clarin newspaper, 13/11/2006, ―AMIA: dura respuesta iraní a los pedidos de capturas‖, Infobae newspaper, 13/11/2006; ―Tensión diplomática y despido de D'Elía‖, La Voz newspaper, 14/11/2006). This was not the only time the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to improper protests and unfortunate statements – gently put – by Tehran officials (see: ―La Cancilleria respondio a otra protesta de Iran‖, Clarin, 13/12/2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 000/07 ―Argentina rechaza pedido de exhorto de Iran‖, dated 14/08/2007; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 400/07, ―La cancilleria argentina rechaza declaraciones difundidas por Iran‖, dated 28/09/2007; ―Argentina expreso un categorico rechazo a dichos de Iran‖, El Dia newspaper, 28/09/2007; ―Que Iran respete la jurisdiccion‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 29/09/2007). The following statements by former Foreign Ministers Jorge Taiana and Rafael Bielsa are evidence of the strategic political position adopted through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by Nestor Kirchner with respect to the AMIA case. In this respect, former Minister Taiana stated: ―There has been no dialogue. We argued that there can be no dialogue until there is no judicial collaboration. We argue that, since 85 Argentines have died, we can make no concessions or grant any asistanse to a State that does not give out any signals that it is trying to find a solution in order to solve the case….‖ Iran had to surrender the accused iranians (Dobry, Hernan, ―Cancilleres K: el acuerdo con Iran ya habia sido rechazado‖, Perfil newspaper, 23/02/2013). In turn, Rafael Bielsa not only described the coercive attitude and the trade proposals of Iran in Exchange for the settlement of the AMIA case, but also confirmed that the case was considered by the Nestor Kirchner administration to be a ―State policy,‖ highlighting that Cristina Fernandez, on the contrary, “tells the relatives of the victims that business is made by companies and not the State. I think this is a stupid argument, which really annoys me because Nestor viewed this as a sacred issue…” He further explained that “when I was the

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Foreign Minister, talking about selling to or buying from Iran was casus belli” (emphasis added, Dobry, Hernan, ―Cancilleres K: el acuerdo con Iran ya habia sido rechazado‖, Perfil newspaper, 23/02/2013). With respect to the way in which contact was made with Tehran, Bielsa noted that, during his administration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had a transparency policy for the main persons envolved in the case: ―We were permanently in contact with relatives and the community, and we informed them about everything… Each step we took and each memorandum we sent were consluted with everyone, because it was a very sensitive issue and the ghost of Iranian offers was always haunting us…‖ (Dobry, Hernan, ―Cancilleres K: el acuerdo con Iran ya habia sido rechazado‖, Perfil newspaper, 23/02/2013). This summarizes the direction of the foreign policy implemented during those years in connection with the AMIA case. At the local level, Nestor Kirchner consistently demonstrated his support for the judicial case. He even removed a member of his own government, Luis D‘Elia, from his position. It is worth remembering that in November 2006, almost immediately alter the resolution issued by Rodolfo Canicota Corral ordering the arrest of Iranian officials who were suspected of participating in the bombing, the then Nacional Undersecretary for Lanas for Social Habitats, Mr. Luis D‘Elia, led a protest against the decision and stated the following: ―the judicial opinion accusing the Islamic REpublic of Iran of the AMIA case is deeply biased by world circumstances that are unrelated to the search for the truth‖ (Press release signed on 13/11/2006 by Luis D'Elia and Juan Jose Cantiello, and delivered to the then Charge d‘Affaires to Buenos Aires, Mohsen Baharvand). It was later known that the protest against the decision of the Argentine judiciary, which was carried out at the Iranian Embassy and led by D‘Elia – with the participation of Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, an Iranian figure in Argentina, had been encouraged by then Venezuelan Ambassador to Buenos Aires Roger Capella. This Venezuelan diplomat was closely linked with Tehran and, already during those years, supported the relationship between Iran, the Iranian nationals accused in the AMIA case, and certain local figures such as D‘Elia and Fernando Esteche (―Kirchner ordeno expulsar a D‘Elia del gobierno,‖ La Nacion newspaper, 14/11/2006; Gallo, Daniel, ―Controvertida agenda politica del Embajador de Venezuela,‖ La Nacion newspaper, 16/11/2006). This behavior caused former President Kirchner to immediately remove Luis D‘Elia from his position in the Argentine Executive Branch and call his Venezuelan counterpart, Hugo Chavez,

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who also brought an end to the diplomatic mission of Ambassador Capella to Argentina a few days later. In connection with the removal of D‘Elia, officials of Kirchner‘s government explained to the press that the President believed the former official had ―crossed an inviolable line. Never, ever should public officials express their opinion about pending cases, let alone about a case as sensitive as the AMIA bombing‖ (―Kirchner ordeno expulsar a D'Elia del gobierno‖, La Nacion newspaper, 14/11/2006). Also during those years, as has been stated above, Nestor Kirchner rejected several Iranian attempts to ―negotiate‖ an agreed solution that would put an end to the legal investigation against the Iranian nationals. This is evidenced not only by the case at hand (see pp. 116.381/116.383, 117.251/117.253, 118.680 and 118.952/118.953bis), but also by statements made by former Ministers of Foreign Affairs Rafael Bielsa and Jorge Taiana, former Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fernandez, and former Deputy Ministry of Foreign Affairs Roberto Garcia Moritan (Dobry, Hernan, ―Cancilleres K: el acuerdo con Iran ya habia sido rechazado,‖ Perfil, 23/02/213; ―Iran le ofrecio un acuerdo igual a Nestor Kirchner, pero lo rechazo,‖ Infobae online newspaper 14/02/03; ―Alberto Fernadez: Nestor Kirchner siempre se nego a un acuerdo con Iran,‖ Iprofesional newspaper, 20/02/2013). In addition to the events described in the paragraph above, as soon as the arrest warrants were issued, Kirchner rejected an agreement offered by Iran which, as stated by officials that have knowledge about the case, was very similar to the memorandum that Hector Timerman finally signed in Ethiopia (―Iran le ofrecio un acuerdo igual a Nestor Kirchner, pero lo rechazo‖, Infobae online newspaper, 14/02/2013; ―Duro cruce de acusaciones entre Timerman y Garcia Moritan‖, La Nacion newspaper, 19/02/2013; ―Alberto Fernandez: Nestor Kirchner siempre se nego a un acuerdo con Iran‖, Iprofesional newspaper, 20/02/2013). The existence of this precedent was confirmed by the former Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs between 2005 and 2008, Roberto Garcia Moritan, as well as by then Chief of Cabinet Alberto Fernandez – that is, two high-level officials of Nestor Kirchner‘s administration who were, given their respective positions in the Argentine Executive, directly involved in the negotiation of these matters. Garcia Moritan explained that Iran had offered an agreement that ―also had 9 points and was very similar to the current one,‖ which ―in spite of its nuances, had the same spirit‖ (―Iran le ofrecio un acuerdo igual a Nestor Kirchner, pero lo rechazo‖, Infobae newspaper, 14/2/03).

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Moreover, Alberto Fernandez asserted that there had been ―an Iranian offer to launch conversations in order to find a way out, with the participation of a third country or a commission. Kirchner, however, always refused these offers […] . Kirchner never agreed to any of these things…‖ (―Alberto Fernandez: Nestor Kirchner siempre se nego a un acuerdo con Iran‖, Iprofesiona newspaper, 20/2/2013). Faced with this statements and in order to conceal the reported events, Timerman decided to personally attack those who offered their testimony on the above situation, repeating what he had already done when journalist Jose Ricardo Eliaschev had revealed the true nature of the meetings in Syria (―Duro cruce de acusaciones entre Timerman y Garcia Moritan‖, La Nacion, 19/02/2013). Instead of refuting or answering the arguments on the events that had become of public knowledge, the Minister of Foreign Affairs went for the ad hominem fallacy – in an attempt to cover up the circumstances surrounding the criminal plan. Later, when offering a presentation before the Members of the Argentine Congress, Timerman had to acknowledge that Garcia Moritan‘s statements were true. Indeed, Nestor Kirchner had rejected an agreement with Iran which included a commission. However, in order to distort the facts, he argued that it was false that the proposal was similar to the Memorandum entered into, stating that: ―[…] we rejected the part which did not include the Judiciary, but we accepted the Memorandum that included the Argentine Judiciary […]‖ (Verbatim record of the plenary session of the Committees on Foreign Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Affairs of the House of Representatives of the Argentine Congress, dated 26 February 2013). Saying that the current agreement is different from the one rejected by Kirchner because the Memorandum of Understanding now includes the Argentine ―judiciary‖ is a fallacious argument, since the very text of the agreement establishes that the participation of the Argentine judiciary is subject to and mediated by the commission, which renders any procedural measure that may be taken potentially void. As will be seen below, this is not the only –nor the most serious– fallacy. All these false arguments were aimed at concealing an unavoidable truth: Cristina Fernandez authorized and Hector Timerman negotiated and signed an agreement that Nestor Kirchner would have never accepted or authorized for subscription. The assertions made by Roberto Garcia Moritan and Alberto Fernandez have been confirmed by recently obtained evidence, whereby the most important Iranian figure in Argentina, Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, expressly recognized that the agreement entered into with Iran is the same that had been around six years before and finally rejected.

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Indeed, on 27 January 2013, Khalil expressed the following in two communications with respect to the Memorandum of Understanding: ―…all I know is that the same document we drafted and submitted six years ago, both to the Iranian Embassy and to the Government…,‖ ―… we drafted this plan with Fernando Esteche six years ago…,‖ ―we drafted this agreement six years ago with Fernando Esteche and they said we were the crazy ones… When we presented it, the same one – it‘s in writing – about six or seven years ago, in 2006, they said ‗you are crazy, this is senseless.‘ Today, they approved it…,‖ ―…the very same one… they used the same one. What we said back then… everything just as we wrote it down with Fernando six years ago…‖ (Communications dated 27/01/2013, client No. 11-3315-6908, File No. B-l 009- 2013-01-27-112032-4, CD 266; File No. B-1009-2013-01-27-112552-12, CD 266; File No. B-l 009-2013-01-27-113208-14, CD 266). He further confessed to Luis D‘Elia: ―Do yo know who wrote that Memorandum for me? Do you? It was Fernando…,‖ referring to Esteche (Communication dated 27/01/13, client No. 11-3315- 6908, File Bl009-2013-01-27-174637-12, CD 266). The truth is that, in any case, the Nestor Kirchner administration – rightly – considered that these proposals implied an inappropriate intrusion by the Executive upon the Judiciary, and were basically undermining the legitimate claim for memory and justice in the AMIA case. In short, during all his time in office and – it could be said – as long as he lived, former President Nestor Kirchner was consistent with his position with respect to the AMIA case: he made a strong claim to Iran for its lack of cooperation with the case, he had the firm decision of rejecting Iranian proposals that involved dismissing the findings of the Argentine judiciary, and he invaluably contributed to the investigations of the Argentine judiciary into the case of the AMIA bombing. All of these were the pillars of his State policy. a) Presidency of Cristina Elisabet Fernandez

The spirit of Nestor Kirchner‘s policy with respect to the AMIA case continued unaltered during the first years of the presidency of his wife, Cristina Fernandez, who also protested against Iran at the United Nations for refusing to have the accused brought before the Argentine justice. The uncompromising refusal of Iran to comply with this legitimate claim somehow managed to erode the expectations of the Argentine Government during the last years and, as a consequence, the claims submitted thereafter include conditions that, to some extent, they were

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forced to undertake. In this respect, the offer to conduct the trial in a third country and/or under the supervision of international monitors evidences a certain degree of –legitimate– flexibility with respect to the initial claim. Nevertheless, even under these circumstances, the ultimate goal remained to have Iran bring the accused before the Argentine courts, that is, to have them judged by our laws and judges, and submitted to our investigations. It is precisely following this line that, on 24 September 2010, President Cristina Fernandez addressed the UN General Assembly and offer the possibility of choosing by mutual agreement a thir party where the accused Iranians could be tried for the bombing (Speech by Cristina Fernandez at the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly, 24 September 2010). The reply to this offer was issued through a letter from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee, who stated that the accusations of Argentina were unfounded and that the investigations were going in ―the wrong way,‖ which is why the ―real authors‖ of the attack would not be found. He further dismissed the accusation against the Iranian citizens as false, arbitrary and ungrounded, affirming that the Argentine judicial proceedings were riddled with irregularities, in violation of procedural guarantees and basic rights, and not aimed at finding truth and justice. He further expressed that: ―The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has verified that no Iranian citizen has been involved, either directly or indirectly, in the AMIA bombing.‖ He continued to accuse the Argentine authorities of collaborating with and financing terrorist groups such as the Mujahideen-e-khalq, and finally asserted that it was actually the Argentine Government that had been - up to that moment - systematically refusing to negotiate within a framework of cooperation in legal matters by insisting on imposing its unilateral decisions (Letter to the President of the UN General Assembly, dated 28 September 2010, sent by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, Mohammad Khazaee). In brief the last offer made by President Fernandez de Kirchner was frustrated by this reply of Tehran, which was as false as it was provocative. So far, we have demonstrated that the position of Argentina with respect to the AMIA case remained consistent throughout the years of Nestor Kirchner‘s government and part of Cristina Fernandez‘s – until , as will be explained below, a radical shift took place in the policy of the Argentine Federal Government. This shift, as is stated herein, is linked with the decision taken by the President –and implemented by Foreign Minister Hector Marcos Timerman jointly with third parties– to complete a cover-up plan that will allow the accused Iranians to avoid and/or escape judicial proceedings, with a view to facilitating a geo-political approach and trade

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exchange at the State level with the Islamic Republic of Iran. Based on the evidence gathered, these seem to be the main reasons for such plan – but not the only ones. It must be made clear that it is not the shift in foreign policy that is being questioned, since this is a tool available exclusively to the Federal Executive Branch, thus falling outside the scope of the jurisdiction of the courts. What is being reported in this accusation is the plain and simple decision to choose crime in order to do away with an accusation and an ongoing judicial investigation.

IV. - The plan to cover up the Iranian nationals accused in the AMIA case

The President of the Argentine Republic, Cristina Fernandez, decided to re-establish interstate relations with Iran. She knew that, in order to fully and unrestrictedly achieve her goal, she needed to settle the AMIA case somehow. The case had been pending for years, obstructing the bilateral agenda due to the ordered, ratified –and yet never executed– arrest warrants. In order to address and solve this issue, Fernandez and her Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, orchestrated and implemented a criminal scheme aimed at ensuring the definite impunity of the accused Iranians, fraudulently disassociating them from the investigations and diverting them towards other accused parties through a false lead. To this end, they held secret meetings with Iranian representatives during more than a year and a half, plus another four months of official negotiations. These negotiations led to the Memorandum of Understanding entered into in January 2013. This is a key component of the criminal scheme, since its provisions contain different means and mechanisms aimed at enabling the cover-up, under the guise of apparent legality required by the manoeuvre to be effective. As will be demonstrated below, Iran was lured to the scheme by the promise made by the Argentine Foreign Minister that Argentina would allow the removal of the red notices then and currently enforceable against five of its nationals. As pointed out by several pieces of evidence, this was secretly agreed between Timerman and Salehi, outside the text of the agreement. When this goal was frustrated by the intervention of third parties to the manoeuvre (Interpol), Iran lost its willingness to cooperate, which did not hinder the progress of the criminal scheme being executed by the accused Argentine authorities, which remained in force. This section will specifically and fully analyze the impunity plan implemented, which comprises the following: The decision to cover up, the willingness of certain authorities of the

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Argentine Executive to drop the claim for justice, the secret negotiations with Iran and the attempts to keep them secret, the public negotiation the content of which also remained a secret, the interest in Iranian oil, the geo-political reasons behind the realignment with Tehran, the acquiescence promised by Timerman with respect to the removal of the red notices, the existence of secret undertakings outside of the text of the Memorandum, and the fabrication of a false alternative hypothesis in order to divert the legal accusations against the Iranian nationals. Moreover, the text of the Memorandum of Understanding will be analyzed in detail in order to demonstrate how its provisions enable the implementation of certain aspects of the criminal scheme. a) The decision to cover up: It is clear that the decision of President Fernandez to re-establish bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran cannot be judicially challenged. This claim is not aimed at reporting or criticizing the shift in the political focus of the Government or its officials on a specific matter, or the change in the way in which said Government relates at the international level when faced with a conflict and/or with other States. Moreover, this claim is not aimed at reporting – let alone challenging – the fact that Argentina should engage in negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran in particular, whether of a business nature or in connection with the AMIA case. It is clear that all these issues and measures fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Executive Branch, which is the supreme chief of the Nation, the Head of Government and the head of the general administration of the country. As such, it is authorized by the Constitution to draft and enter into treaties, as well as to engage in negotiations to maintain good relations with foreign nations (Article 99(1) and (11) of the Argentine Constitution). None of the above is under discussion. The decision to launch negotiations with Iranian authorities, and even the fact of having reached an agreement with this government, are –in principle– the materialization of a strategy and a foreign policy measure which fall within the exclusive and discretionary scope of the Executive Branch, the control over which exceeds the Judiciary. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the content, timeliness and convenience of these acts are not under the supervision of the courts, the Judiciary does have the obligation to interfere with the implementation of acts that are within the powers recognized by the constitution when these acts imply the commission of crimes. In other words, if the negotiations had merely exceeded

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the constitutional limits by abusing powers granted to the State, it would be enough to dismiss them as unconstitutional. The situation, however, is more serious than this. The actions at issue are not only unconstitutional but also criminal, since the measures taken in order to cover up those accused of the bombing are identified and punishable as crimes under Argentine criminal law. Consequently, behind a goal that could be seen as legitimate –such as the full resumption of trade relations with Iran–, and despite the fact that the approach was made by the competent authorities, what is criminally punishable is the implementation of criminal manoeuvres aimed at hindering the search for justice in the case of the deadliest terrorist attack that ever happened on Argentine soil. The moment in which the Argentine President took the criminal decision to help the accused Iranians escape the action of the courts could be placed between late October 2010 and January 2011. Several reasons support this hypothesis. Two events, dated August and September 2010, demonstrate that, up to that moment, the policy of the Argentine Government with respect to the AMIA case had remained unaltered – that is, the decision to cover up the Iranians had not been taken. The first event took place on 11 August 2010, when Foreign Minister Timerman held a meeting with the United States Secretary of State. On this occasion, Ms. Hillary Clinton highlighted the mutual cooperation between the two countries in the fight against terrorism, noting that her country supported the claim for justice of Argentina in the cases of the regrettable and tragic terrorist attacks suffered by the latter country (Statements made by the United States Secretary of State, Hillary Rodham Clinton, to the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hector Timerman, 11/08/2010, United States Department of State). After the press conference offered jointly with Secretary Clinton, Timerman was asked about relations with Iran, and he answered the following: ―The situation is a very complex one. We have obtained evidence about the participation of certain Iranian officials in the attack against the Jewish Embassy to Buenos Aires10. Interpol accepted this evidence and we have requested their arrest. Argentina wants to obtain nothing more than justice. We want to find a solution to this very serious problem.‖ (―Timerman aseguro que el dialogo EEUU-UNASUR es posible y

10 Although he mistakenly mentioned to the ―Jewish Embassy,‖ he had intended to refer to the AMIA bombing.

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deseable,‖ Prensa Argentina, 11/08/2010; Baron, Ana. ―Timerman, con Hillary: apoyo por Iran y diferencias por Honduras‖, Clarin newspaper, 12/08/10).- In this respect, it was also reported that the US Secretary of State ―reiterated the support of her country for the claim of Argentina to have Iran surrender the suspects of a terrorist attack against the AMIA Jewish community centre,‖ and that she specifically supported ―…the arrest warrants against six Iranian nationals (including the current Iranian Minister of Defence, Almad Vahidi) and one Lebanese national…‖ (―Hillary apoyo el pedido argentino a Iran por atentado a la AMIA‖, Clarin newspaper, 11/08/2010; Baron, Ana. ―Timerman, con Hillary: apoyo por Iran y diferencias por Honduras‖, Clarin newspaper, 12/08/10).- Some time before commencing the direct and secret contacts with Iran, Foreign Minister Timerman made the following statements on this issue: ―… I could establish a link between a frustrated attack in JFK airport in the United States and Mohsen Rabbani, a former cultural attaché of the Iranian Embassy to Buenos Aires. Neither Hillary Clinton nor those investigating in Argentina were aware of this. We can now link a frustrated terrorist attack in the United States with the AMIA bombing…‖ (Cibeira, Fernando. ―Hay que relacionarse sin intermediarios‖ Interview with Hector Timerman, Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pagina 12 newspaper, 9/01/2011). This means that, until then, Hector Timerman appeared to be committed, in his position as Foreign Minister, to the legal accusation against the Iranian nationals, as well as to the task of mustering international support for the Argentine claim for justice. The second noteworthy event took place on 24 September 2010, when President Fernandez de Kirchner offered a speech –as she has been doing annually– before the UN General Assembly. During her speech, in connection with the AMIA case, she offered the Islamic Republic of Iran the opportunity to choose, by mutual agreement, a third country to conduct the trial against the Iranian nationals accused of the bombing, with the participation of international observers (Speech by Cristina Fernandez at the 65th Session of the UN General Assembly, 24 September 2010). Iran‘s answer to Argentina‘s proposal arrived four days later. In a letter addressed to the President of the UN General Assembly, the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, Ambassador Mohammad Khazaee, repeated once again the historical position of Iran with respect to this case (Letter to the President of the UN General Assembly, dated 28 September 2010, sent by the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations, Mohammad Khazaee, A/65/495, circulated on 6/10/10).

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In other words, while Argentine political authorities were attempting to make progress with their claim for justice by presenting an offer that was probably less ambitious, Iranian diplomacy literally shifted the focus on the issue, in line with its historical rhetoric, by accusing Argentina of refusing to cooperate and supporting terrorism. Until this moment, there are no relevant facts or clues to suspect that the impunity plan had been decided in secret and was already under way. On 27 October 2010, former President Nestor Kirchner died. Reference to this fact is not incidental. It has been made to note that, almost simultaneously with it, the AMIA case ceased from being a ―State policy‖ and turned into a regulating valve. Some sort of disposable part. The case is aggravated by the fact that high-level officials of the Argentine Government –as well as other parties– were involved in the commission of crimes. a. 1 ) The Aleppo Summit:

The first known and relevant clue about the decision to go through with the cover-up plan reported herein was observed barely three months after Nestor Kirchner died. It took place in January 2011, when Argentine Foreign Minister left the presidential delegation touring the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Turkey with President Fernandez, in order to attend some meetings at the Syrian Arab Republic (pp. 131189/131194; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Argentina negocia con Iran dejar de lado la investigacion de los atentados‖, Perfil newspaper, 26/03/2011, pp. 130911/130913). More specifically, on 23 January 2011, Timerman arrived in Damascus, where he met with the Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid al-Mohalem. After this he travelled to Aleppo, where he attended a meeting with President Bashar Al-Assad. It is curios that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic issued no press release informing about his meeting with Syrian President Al-Assad and his Foreign Minister, given the historical importance of this approach and the peculiarity of a meeting between two officials of different ranks, i.e., a President and a Foreign Minister. (―Argentina y Siria fortalecieron las relaciones‖, Telam news agency, 25/01/2011; ―Encuentro entre el Presidente de Siria Bashar Al-Assad y el canciller argentino Hector Timerman‖, Islamic Press, Source: SANA, 24/01/2011). However, a public cable of the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that on 23 January 2011, the Syrian Foreign Minister had met with his Argentine and Iranian counterparts, one

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after the other, and that on the following day both Foreign Ministers had travelled to the city of Aleppo, where they met President Al-Assad. According to the abovementioned news agency, Timerman and Al-Assad discussed issues related to the strengthening of the economic and scientific exchange between both courtiers, the peace process in the Middle East, and the relationships between Arab and Latin American countries (Encuentro entre el Presidente de Siria Bashar Al-Assad y el canciller argentino Hector Timerman‖, Islamic Press, Source: SANA, 24/01/2011). Similar information was published by Argentine official news agency TELAM (―Argentina y Siria fortalecieron las relaciones‖, Telam news agency, 25/1/2011). Today, it can be confirmed through different pieces of evidence that the then Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, secretly participated in the above summit (see pp. 131189/131194; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Argentina negocia con Iran dejar de lado la investigacion de los atentados‖, Perfil newspaper, 26/03/2011, pp. 130.911/130.913; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Polemica en torno a la negociacion secreta entre Argentina e Iran‖, Perfil newspaper, 2/4/2011). Journalist Gabriel Levinas, who claims to have accessed ―official sources of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs,‖ states the following: ―… That meeting was attended by the Argentine delegation that travelled with Timerman, which included Ambassador Ahuad and two Argentine intelligence officials. On the Syrian side, there were Minister of Foreign Affairs Mohalem and President Bashar Al Assad. However, in spite of what was reported by the media at that time, also p resent a the meeting were diplomat Walid Almohalem and Iranian Minister of Foreign Affairs Ali Akbar Salehi, in representation of Iran. After the introductory phase in which all attendees participated, the conversation, which lasted a little over an hour, evolved into a tête-à-tête conversation between Salehi and Timerman, in order for them to address the main issue… ‖ (Levinas, Gabriel, El Pequeño Timerman, Editorial B publishing house, Grupo Zeta, Buenos Aires, 2013, pp. 244 and 281). In addition, Levinas added that, based on the reconstruction of Israeli sources, Timerman had stated the following: ―… I am here by specific order of our President, for the purpose of trying to find a solution to the AMIA case. The times and mood in our country will be dealt with domestically…‖ (Levinas, Gabriel, cited above, pp. 246 and 281).

Two months after the meeting, the news about the Aleppo summit reached Argentine society through the press. An article published by journalist Jose Eliaschev informed about the secret meeting and described different aspects of it (Pepe Eliaschev, ―Argentina negocia con Iran dejar de lado la investigacion de los atentados‖, Perfil newspaper, 26/03/2011, pp. 130911/130913).

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The information of the first article was expanded by a second one, published days later by the same newspaper (Pepe Eliaschev, ―Polemica en torno a la negociacion secreta entre Argentina e Iran‖, Perfil newspaper, 2/4/2011). Mr. Jose Ricardo Eliaschev declared under oath that he had gained access to a copy of a confidential document drafted by Minster Salehi, addressed to the then President of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which contained details and conclusions about the meeting. Essentially, as will be analyzed below, Salehi reported to his President that the administration of Cristina Fernandez was willing to de facto suspend the investigations into the terrorist attacks of 1992 and 1994, in exchange for progress in the area of trade (pp. 131189/131194. See also: 131189/131194; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Argentina negocia con Iran dejar de lado la investigacion de los atentados‖, Perfil newspaper, 26/03/2011, pp. 130911/130913; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Polemica en torno a la negociacion secreta entre Argentina e Iran‖, Perfil newspaper, 2/4/2011). And if the ample evidence were not enough, Ali Akbar Salehi himself subsequently admitted that the negotiations with Timerman had started two years before the parties entered into the Memorandum of Understanding, which literally places the beginning of such negotiations in January 2011 – that is, around the date of the meeting in Aleppo. Therefore, the statement made by the Iranian Foreign Minister support the evidence mentioned herein, clearing any doubts about the time negotiations began (―Iran ratifico su adhesion plena al memorandum con Argentina‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 12/2/13; ―FM: Iran, Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case‖, Iran Daily Brief, 14/2/13; ―El Canciller de Iran dice que negocio durante dos años el acuerdo con Argentina‖, Clarin newspaper, 12/02/2013; ―Salehi: Iran Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case‖, IRNA, 12/02/2013). Indeed, the secret summit held in Aleppo was attended by the Argentine and Iranian Foreign Ministers, but also by the Syrian President and Foreign Minister, who acted not only as ―intermediaries‖ between the parties, but also as a ―front‖ to keep the contact confidential. Based on all of the foregoing and according to the abovementioned evidence, the Aleppo summit is the first concrete and verified proof that the highest ranking officials of the Argentine Government accused herein had taken the decision of abandoning the legitimate attempt to prosecute the Iranian nationals accused of the AMIA bombing, with a view to facilitating direct trading exchanges at the State level –among other goals–, even when this implied executing a plan to cover up for the indictees. According to the evidence gathered so far, this decision had been secretly informed to the Iranian authorities but none other than Argentine Foreign Minister Timerman, in January 2011, in Aleppo.

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a. 2) The willingness to drop the claim for justice in the AMIA case

All this secrecy evidences a need to hide something. Indeed, the willingness of President Fernandez de Kirchner to sacrifice the AMIA case in furtherance of a geo-political approach with Iran and progress in state-level trade with Tehran was to remain confidential, as was informed by Foreign Minister Timerman to his Iranian counterpart. This is evidenced by the document that Mr. Eliaschev has declared under oath to have read, whereby Mr. Salehi informed President Ahmadinejad about the details of the abovementioned summit. Witness Eliaschev declared that this secret document, drafted by Minister Salehi after the Aleppo summit, was circulated among the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of several countries. The report states that ―Argentina is no longer interested in solving these two bombing cases, but it would rather improve its economic ties with Iran.‖ In other words, the Argentine Government had given up its efforts to prosecute the accused Iranian officials and was presenting its intention to multiply trade exchanges between the two countries (pp. 131189/131194. See also: 131189/131194; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Argentina negocia con Iran dejar de lado la investigacion de los atentados‖, Perfil newspaper, 26/03/2011, pp. 130911/130913; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Polemica en torno a la negociacion secreta entre Argentina e Iran‖, Perfil newspaper, 2/4/2011). When giving his statement before the undersigned, the witness explained that ―the information about the meetings‖ had come to him in English and not in Farsi, and that he had personally verified that it was authentic. He also stated that the report contained recommendations by the Foreign Minister to the Iranian President (pp. 131189/131194).- In addition, he explained that the abovementioned report ―is not a cable, as defined by journalistic jargon,‖ but rather a ―report issued by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to President Ahmadinejad, a standard intergovernmental paper, in which the official in charge of the foreign affairs of the country suggests that, on the basis of the elements of judgement of said Ministry, the President should go forth with an important agreement with Argentina, since […] the conditions are favourable for the Argentine people to decide to turn the page…‖ (pp. 131189/131194). It is clear that no Minister of Foreign Affairs would be so reckless as to make such a statement to his President if he were not completely sure about the information he is delivering, which is further evidence that Foreign Minister Timerman actually conveyed to Tehran the willingness

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of the Argentine Government to drop the investigations in the AMIA case. This explains the Iranian conclusion –included in the report– about the success of the strategy of denying accusations against the country, which, considering the Aleppo summit, seemed to be yielding positive results. In this document, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs concluded that dropping the legal charges would allow both countries to start a new chapter in their relations, highlighting the convenience of this opportunity, given the time elapsed, the relatively low relevance of the cases to current public opinion and, most importantly, the favourable nature of the dramatic change in Argentina‘s position. Nevertheless, Iranian officials were aware that they had to act under the assumption that the Argentine Government could never publicly admit that this approach implied a step back, let alone demonstrate its willingness to drop its historical claim. All of the facts and subsequent confirmations further strengthen Mr. Eliaschev‘s statements. Circumstances from then on ratify the declaration of the witness with respect to the document he accessed. Indeed, the Memorandum of Understanding entered into by both countries is precisely the final outcome anticipated in Salehi‘s paper. The highest authorities of the Argentine Government were willing to drop their own claim for justice for the benefit of fugitive foreigners. This agreement leads to the impunity of the accused Iranians. On the one hand, the agreement expressly includes extremely complex mechanisms that render it inapplicable, as a way of guaranteeing impunity. On the other hand, in the event of its future implementation, it also provides for the intervention of the ―Truth Commission,‖ the conclusions of which had already been agreed and which, as has been demonstrated by the evidence, would be the means of introducing a new false –but plausible– hypothesis about the bombing, aimed at disassociating the accused Iranians from the case once and for all. In short, the evidence found demonstrates that there was a secret initiative by certain Argentine political authorities aimed at negotiating an agreement with Iran that could help ―forget‖ the terrorist attacks and reactivate state-level business trade. This also demonstrates that the matter could not be organized publicly, that is, Argentine officials could not acknowledge or uphold this decision before Argentine citizens. Tehran understood this, which is why it was necessary to find a secret way of coordinating the interests of both parties. This finally led to the unusual Memorandum of Agreement entered into in early 2013, which is one of the instruments designed to guarantee impunity.

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a. 3) Evidence about the secret negotiations

From early 2011 until late September 2012, Argentine and Iranian officials secretly negotiated an agreement that would bring down the accusations in the AMIA case and provide impunity to the fugitive Iranian nationals. In spite of the determined efforts to keep these criminal manoeuvres secret, the information was finally disclosed and certain events took place which evidenced the creation and growth of the criminal scheme during that year and by means of secret meetings. These are publicly known situations, the true meaning of which cannot be discovered in isolation but rather by analyzing them as a whole, in coordination, and under the light of the cover-up plan reported herein, which helps unveil their true proportions, since they are proof of both the progress in the accomplishment of the crime and the manner in which the way was paved to publicly announce the bilateral approach at the right time. It should be noted that the actions referred to are not crimes in and by themselves, but rather circumstances which are currently clear evidence of the criminal scheme that was being surreptitiously implemented. This is the only legal and criminal relevance of the circumstances described below. The first clue came with the reaction to the article released by Jose ―Pepe‖ Eliaschev in the Perfil newspaper. In March 2011, the journalist released a report on the meeting held in Aleppo and the decision to drop the legal charges in order to resume business exchanges, which caused great commotion in the public opinion and even within the Cristina Fernandez‘ administration. The reply came swiftly and consisted of a direct personal attack against the provider of the information, in a twisted attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the published article. Instead of offering explanations to help alleviate the serious consequences of the disclosed information, Foreign Minister Timerman personally questioned Mr. Eliaschev, arguing that the information he had published was false and aimed at discrediting his almost contemporary visit to Israel. Timerman stated the following: ―… the information was false and part of a campaign against my foreign relations policy, that is, my visit to Israel… It was part of the opportunism of a pseudo-journalist who did not hesitate to say just anything in order to offend me…‖ (―Brutal cruce entre Hector Timerman and Pepe Eliaschev por el pacto con Iran,‖ Mañana Sylvestre, Radio La Red and Perfil Newspaper, 20/4/11; emphasis added). This is clearly a maladroit ad hominem fallacy, since no reference was made to the meeting.

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However, it was Timerman‘s Iranian counterpart that finally categorically refuted the statement of the Argentine Foreign Minister. Indeed, Minister Salehi, who had personally participated in the negotiations, publicly acknowledged in 2013 that negotiations had lasted two years. He specifically stated the following: ―…we have been meeting with Argentine Foreign Minister Hector Timerman during two years‖(―Iran ratifico su adhesion plena al memorandum con Argentina‖, Pagina 12 newspaper, 12/2/13; ―FM: Iran, Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case‖, Iran Daily Brief, 14/2/13; ―El Canciller de Iran dice que negocio durante dos años el acuerdo con Argentina‖, Clarin newspaper, 12/02/2013; ―Salehi: Iran Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case‖, IRNA, 12/02/2013). This confession forced the mendacious Argentine Foreign Minister to soften his first statement by saying that ―for two years Iran has been interested‖ in addressing the case. He added that he had not recalled this before because ―they had never wanted to involve the Argentine judiciary, which is why no dialogue was possible,‖ and, finally, he had to acknowledge that ―there had been conversations, and messages had been sent.‖ (Pique, Martin. ―Si se lleva adelante el memorandum, se activa la causa y comienza el juicio‖, Tiempo Argentino newspaper, 17/2/2013). In other words, the true reasons behind the meeting were denied and the negotiations that began during said meeting were concealed and, when these facts were made public by the press, the measure adopted was to personally attack the journalist who published the news, as a way of undermining the credibility of the information in question. It should be noted that witness Eliaschev declared under oath that he had personally seen a copy of the abovementioned document, also explaining the circumstances under which he gained access to it. These attacks to the press revealed the interest in preserving the confidentiality of the negotiations. This was not, however, the only time the Foreign Minister attempted to undermine the credibility of information sources as part of the criminal scheme. Instead of refuting the facts published, he questioned those who reported on the circumstances that the Minister wanted to keep secret, as was the case of the statements made by former Deputy Foreign Minister Roberto Garcia Moritan. It is evident that the Argentine official could not publicly admit that the claim for justice in the AMIA case had been abandoned in order to facilitate a trade with the Islamic Republic of Iran. The second clue came the day before the 17th anniversary of the AMIA bombing, when the Iranian press released a communiqué by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, dated 16 July 2011, which communicated its ―willingness to engage in constructive dialogue‖ and ―to

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cooperate with the Argentine Government in order to make all efforts possible within the framework of the law and mutual respect, with a view to preventing the legal investigations from going in the wrong way.‖ It was also reported that the Iranian Government had expressed its outrage in connection with ―the fact that the search for the truth about the criminal attack had become the target of political plots and conspiracies‖ aimed at involving Iran, ―in order to divert the legal proceedings from its path and prevent those who are truly responsible for the crime from being brought before the courts.‖ He added that ―the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also expresses its discomfort for the continuation of these actions by those who have been acting within the Argentine judiciary since those times.‖ (―Iran, dispuesto a cooperar con Argentina por atentado contra AMIA de 1994‖, El Comunal newspaper, 16/07/2011; ―Iran to cooperate over Argentina Jewish Centre bomb‖, BBC News, 17/07/11; ―Argentina welcomes Iran offer in AMIA bombing probe‖, Tehran Times, 18/07/2011; ―Argentina welcomes Iran offer in 1994 bombing inquiry‖, BBC News, 18/7/11; ―Iran promete ayuda para esclarecer el caso AMIA‖, La Nacion newspaper, 17/07/11; Eliaschev, Pepe. ―Las condiciones que pone Iran para dialogar‖, Perfil newspaper, 23/7/11).- It should be noted that, at that time, Argentina‘s cooperation offer came out, at least for Argentina‘s society, as completely out of context. Indeed, Iran had taken the overnight decision to cooperate, with no apparent reason or motive to do so. It is clear today that this was a gesture of good will made within the framework of the secret negotiations being carried out. On 17 July, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued its reply through a communiqué informing that it had learned, through the press, of the announcement made by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and that it was waiting "to receive the official communiqué from its Iranian counterpart" in connection with the cooperation offer. The Argentine message added that ―the confirmation of the Iranian release would imply unprecedented and very positive progress by the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran with respect to the AMIA case.‖ The message concluded by stating that ―Argentina ratifies that law and justice are the only path to be followed by societies and their governments in the fight against international terrorism‖(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 336/l 1 ―Answer by the Argentine Government to the cooperation announcement in the AMIA case made by the Iranian Government‖, 17/7/11; ―Argentina welcomes Iran offer in AMIA bombing probe‖, Tehran Times, 18/07/2011; ―Argentina welcomes Iran offer in 1994 bombing inquiry‖, BBC News,

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18/7/11; ―AMIA: Iranian promise for the anniversary‖, Ambito Financiero newspaper, 18/7/11). Thus, although the Argentine authorities maintained a somewhat ambiguous official support for its national courts as the only means to find a solution to this matter, no reply was issued – contrary to its approach so far– to the Iranian suggestions that Argentine judicial conclusions were biased by political interests and were going down the wrong way, as well as that the assistance promised by Iran was aimed at modifying their path, leading the investigations towards a different hypothesis involving different indictees, leaving Iran out of the case. In other words, Iran was repeating its old speech. It was not offering to abide by the cooperation requests issued by Argentine courts, let alone to arrest the fugitives that had remained protected in its territory – it was only offering to cooperate in the redirecting of investigations towards a different hypothesis which obviously did not involve Iran. The reply issued by the Argentine Government did not make reference to these circumstances, nor did it address or object to the discrediting lines against the Argentine Judiciary. On the contrary, it seemed to demonstrate unprecedented support therefor. Indeed, in spite of the eloquent attack against the Argentine Judiciary and far from demanding the rectification of the statements due to their consequences – as had been previously done by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs on other similar occasions –, Foreign Minister Timerman stated that the proposal ―would mean unprecedented and very positive progress‖ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release no. 336/11, 17/07/2011). Today, it is evident that these were steps taken to pave the way for the cover-up of a crime against humanity. A question should be made at this point: What happened to the cooperation offer of Iran? As was to be expected, nothing. It was nothing more than empty words, as has always been the case with Iran regarding this case. It should be also noted that, with respect o the abovementioned Iranian offer, the Prosecutorial Unit of the undersigned forwarded two rogatory letters to the Islamic Republic of Iran making reference to the cooperation offer made by the Iranian authorities, in order for their alleged willingness to cooperate to inure to the benefit of the investigations of the case. No answer was ever issued. (p. 1179 of File No. 415 and p. 6416 of File No. 392). Unfortunately, it has been discovered that all of this was nothing more than a staging mounted to continue with the execution of the impunity plan being elaborated at the time.

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The third clue came to light two months later during the opening of the 66th session of the UN General Assembly, on 22 September 2011. For the first time since 2009, President Fernandez de Kirchner requested the then Argentine Ambassador to said organization, Jorge Arguello, to remain seated while the then President of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, offered his speech. This contrasted with the decision taken and upheld by the President in previous years to have the Argentine delegation leave the floor in order not to listen to the speeches given by Ahmadinejad (―La AMIA reclamo que la delegacion argentina abandone la ONU cuando hable el presidente de Iran‖, La Prensa newspaper, 11/09/2012; Mindez, Leonardo, ―AMIA: Con otro gesto oficial se confirmo el giro ante Iran‖, Clarin newspaper, 23/09/2011; Levinas, Gabriel, cited above, pp. 173, 189, 208, 20 and 279). A communication signal of this sort is less mysterious when analyzed under the light of the negotiations being secretly held by the two countries. As has been stated above, this claim is not about the political decision of the Argentine President to order the Argentine Ambassador to the UN to remain in his place in order to listen to the speech of the Iranian President. This decision is mentioned in this section simply because it constitutes an important clue to the existence of negotiations which, at the time, were kept secret. The fourth clue took place in September 2012, when, for the first time in years, the Argentine Executive decided not to invite any of the leaders of institutions of the local Jewish community to take part in the Argentine delegation that travelled to the 67th session of the UN General Assembly. One of said leaders stated the following: ―… unfortunately, last year we were not invited. Coincidentally, it was at that time that the Argentine President submitted this proposal at the dialogue table.‖ (Borger, Guillermo. Verbatim report of the plenary meeting of the committees of the Argentine Senate, 13 February 2013). This is even more curious when taking into account the official announcement made President Fernandez de Kirchner about her decision to ―start‖ a dialogue on the AMIA case, which was made precisely at that time. The existence of previous negotiations and agreements with Iran and the prior knowledge of the announcement that was going to be made must have motivated the decision to exclude Jewish community leaders from her delegation. This is further proof that, jointly with the rest of the evidence, demonstrates that President Fernandez de Kirchner was lying when she announced that it was then that negotiations were commencing. This, however, was neither the only nor the worst lie.

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During the course of the secret negotiations (from January 2011 to September 2012), there were signals that pointed at a shift that today we know was grounded on the approach of officials of the two countries and, most importantly, on the criminal scheme designed, the ultimate goal of which was to guarantee impunity for the fugitives and remove all relevance from the accusation made by both the undersigned and the Judge who obtained strong and decisive international support at subsequent Interpol votes. In brief, the Argentine authorities involved in the cover-up of the accused Iranians logically attempted to keep negotiations with Iranian officials under strict confidentiality, but clues started emerging and constituted clear signals that finally revealed the existence of these negotiations. Indeed, when the press made public the secret meeting held by Hector Timerman in Aleppo, the Argentine Foreign Minister harshly criticized the journalist who spread the news. In July 2011, Iran declared that it was willing to negotiate in connection with the bombing – overnight and with no apparent reason. After two years, the Argentine Government finally attended, through its Ambassador, the speech offered by President Ahmadinejad to the General Assembly of the United Nations. President Fernandez de Kirchner did not invite institutions of the Jewish community –contrary to her usual practice– to take part in the delegation that travelled with her to the following annual meeting of the United Nations, which coincidentally was the occasion on which she announced the commencement of negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran over the terrorist attack of 18 July 1994. Could all these events be merely coincidental? Common sense says that the answer is no. Nevertheless, it is verified evidence that confirms that all of these gestures were based on the secret approach between the parties, the final goal of which was to guarantee the impunity of the accused Iranian fugitives. a.4) Public negotiation.

On 25 September 2012, the President of the Argentine Republic, Cristina Fernández, announced before the General Assembly of the United Nations that she had instructed her Foreign Minister, Mr. Héctor Timerman, to initiate a negotiation process with Iran in connection with the AMIA case.

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It was officially informed that this decision arose from a request made by Iran seven days before the opening of the General Debate of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of Argentina, Press Release No. 302, 18/09/2012). However, as proven, the elements obtained in this case show that it was just an act since the parties had been negotiating for over a year. This results from the issues discussed above. Thus, "...Cristina and her Foreign Minister were making official an event which had already taken place... ― (See: Levinas, Gabriel, op. cit, p. 237). The foregoing is also grounded on both the testimony of Mr. Eliaschev and on the public statements by Foreign Minister Salehi, proving that the ―commencement‖ of the negotiations announced by Ms. Fernández and her Foreign Minister in September 2012 was simply untrue (―Irán ratificó su adhesión plena al memorándum con Argentina‖, Pagina 12, 12/2/13; ―FM: Irán, Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case‖, Iran Daily Brief, 14/2/13; ―El Canciller de Irán dice que negoció durante dos años el acuerdo con Argentina‖, Clarin, 12/02/2013;

―Salehi: Iran Argentina adhere to agreement on AMIA case", IRNA, 12/02/2013; p. 131.189/131.194; Pepe Eliaschev, ―Argentina negocia con Irán dejar de lado la investigación de los atentados‖, Perfil Newspaper, 26/03/2011, p. 130.911/130.913; Pepe Eliaschev, ―Polémica en torno a la negociación secreta entre Argentina e Irán‖, Perfil newpaper, 2/4/2011; Eliaschev, Pepe. ―Las condiciones que pone Irán para dialogar‖, Perfil, 23/7/11). On the other hand, according to The Tehran Times, the negotiation between Argentina and Iran had started even before the summit held in Aleppo in mid 2010 after a series of secret meetings held by officials from both countries ―to prepare the ground to sign the memorandum of understanding…‖ (Soroush, M. ―Iran and Argentina deal a serious blow to Zionists‖, Tehran Times, 23/02/2013; Levinas, Gabriel, op cit, p. 238; ―La prensa iraní afirma que la negociación con Argentina empezó en 2010‖, La Nacion, 24/02/2013); an issue that was also mentioned by Mr. Eliaschev in his articles (Pepe Eliaschev, ―Argentina negocia con Irán dejar de lado la investigación de los atentados‖, Perfil Newspaper, 26/03/2011). Thus, the truth is that on 25 September 2012, Ms. Fernández decided to make the negotiations with the Islamic Republic of Iran official at the United Nations. Of course, she did not mention

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the secret discussions that had been taking place for a year and a half from January 2011 to September 2012. What she did say to the victims and their relatives was: ―rest assured that this President will not take any decision on any proposal presented without PREVIOUSLY consulting with the direct victims of this event, as well as with the political forces represented in the Argentine Congress because this may not be decided by a single political force…‖ (Address by Cristina

Fernández before the 67th General Assembly of the United Nations on 25 September 2012, emphasis added). However, even though she publicly undertook to consult with them before taking any decision, that never happened, and after three meetings with Iranian officials the signing of the ―Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Argentine Republic and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran on issues related to the terrorist attack of the AMIA building occurred in Buenos Aires on 18 July 1994‖ was made public in Addis Ababa,

Kingdom of Ethiopia, on 27 January (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 011/13, 27/01/2013). The execution of the agreement showed that the President did not keep her word. We will show below that this unfulfilled promise is not only morally reproachable —which is not legally pertinent— but it is also an action especially designed to contribute to the structuring of the criminal plot reported –and this is what actually matters. The President notified about this agreement through her official Twitter account on a Sunday that commemorated the International Holocaust Remembrance Day. In such communication, she described the event as ―historical‖ (tweets of Cristina Fernández of 27 January 2013 from 10:26 am to 10:32 am). In this respect, AMIA authorities spoke about an ―undebated memorandum‖ and asserted that: "the proposal was signed, a fact about which we were not informed‖, " his memorandum took us all by surprise on 27 January; it was never discussed with us, not even mentioned‖ (Borger, Guillermo in: "La AMIA advirtió un momento difícil, tras el acuerdo entre Argentina e Irán‖,

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La Nacion, 3/2/2013; ―Presidente de la AMIA prometió no bajar los brazos y se comprometió a evitar que la causa por el atentado causa en la nulidad‖, Agencia Judía de Noticias, 4/3/2013).

In addition, DAIA representatives stated that they learnt about the agreement together with the rest of the citizens and that the entity neither received prior notification of it nor participated in its drafting (Schlosser, Julio in: ―LA DAIA reconoció que hay un resquemor en la comunidad judía por el acuerdo que la Argentina firmó con Irán‖, Itongadol, 4/2/2013).

Going back to September 2012 and after the President‘s announcement before the United Nations, the Argentine Foreign Ministry and the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a joint communiqué which, as evidenced below, helped to amplify the presidential lie. In the report, both ministries claimed to have undertaken to explore legal mechanisms that would not be contrary to the legal systems of Argentina or Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 313/12, 27/09/2012). At this point, it bears noting that the outcome of the diplomatic meetings was not precisely consistent with the Argentine legal system. On the contrary, as stated in the opinion issued by the Prosecutorial Unit of which I am in charge, the Memorandum of Understanding violated the Argentine Constitution and the international human rights rules having constitutional status. This was also held by the Court of Appeals in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters for this City, which declared the unconstitutionality of the agreement and the law approving it (CCCF, Division I, CFP 3184/2013/CA1 ―AMIA s/Amparo Ley 16.986‖, 15/05/2014, Court No. 6 – Clerk‘s Office No. l l ) . In other words, contrary to the announcements made, Mr.

Timerman signed a legal instrument which flagrantly contradicted the local legal system. This matter having been clarified, we should now stress that such press release was followed by others, where the Foreign Ministry referred to brief meetings held between both parties but said nothing about the issues discussed therein or about the scope of the negotiations (Press Releases of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship dated 27/9/12 – No. 313/12; 29/10/12 – No. 353/12-; 31/10/12 – No. 360/12; 1/12/12 – No. 391/12; 7/1/13 – No. 002/13).

To date, the Argentine authorities have provided no information whatsoever on the negotiations conducted in those meetings.

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Moreover, in response to the request filed by the undersigned at the petition of the accusing entities AMIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina) and DAIA (Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentina) requiring information on the meetings held in Tehran, Timerman‘s Ministry asserted that " since it is a diplomatic negotiation process between States, the parties have agreed to maintain the contents confidential while the meetings are being held" (official letter of 5 November 2012 included on p. 132.805 and Note No. 2194 dated 8

November 2012 of DIAJU Folder No. 7102/11, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship). As a matter of fact, by using the confidentiality prerogatives of diplomatic activity and hiding behind the confidentiality allowed in certain meetings, Mr. Timerman kept his discussions secret because he was not in a position to make them public. A cover-up was being negotiated and, hence, publicity and citizen control were the worst enemy. It is yet another case of double use of diplomatic functions to conceal criminal activities for the purpose of covering up terrorism. This tactic is not new to Tehran or, clearly, to those covering up this criminal scheme. In sum, as proven by the events reported here, the negotiations on this issue were shrouded in absolute secrecy, hidden behind intermediaries and ―mock‖ meetings, and they remained that way for the subsequent year and a half, until the public announcement of the ―commencement‖ of the dialogue —the contents and scope of which have been kept confidential. In order to prevent the disclosure of the meeting and their contents, facts were denied and distorted and the sources providing information on the issue were questioned and discredited as a strategy to avoid —by whatever means necessary— the verification of these circumstances, but without providing any explanations for the challenges made. This was the beginning of the criminal plan. All formalities were gradually dropped and the parties became immersed in a criminal activity and a set of criminal acts that has no precedents in Argentine history. As will be proven, this clearly evidences an unparalleled level of impunity, as well as a rarely-seen arbitrary and criminal use of the power of the state. a) The motives for the cover-up.

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Even though for there to be a cover-up it is not legally necessary to prove the existence of interests leading the perpetrator to take the actions that constitute the abovementioned offence, given the complexity of the case, it is extremely useful to further discuss —based on the leads and other evidence gathered— certain aspects of this issue since, in my opinion, they help to fully understand the criminal plan reported herein. It has already been proven that Argentine authorities decided that it was convenient to re- establish full bilateral relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. There is nothing to discuss in this respect because —regardless of whether we agree with it or not— such decision is incumbent upon the Executive Branch exclusively and may not be objected to by the courts. Furthermore, it should be noted that the trade-related reasons which prompted Argentine authorities and the other parties involved to act, strengthened by the severe energy crisis, are clear from the evidence available and, consequently, are deemed as determining factors for the actions reported. However, they are not the only reasons.

There is also evidence showing that there were geopolitical reasons leading to the rapprochement with Tehran. According to this evidence, the present global scenario was considered to favour closer relations with Iran and required the destruction of the AMIA case. As for the rest, we cannot dismiss the possibility that there were other alternative and supplementary motives apart from those mentioned herein, which contributed to the adoption of the decision and cover-up schemes described herein. In this case, the determination of these concurrent reasons may be addressed in the investigation requested herein.

It is clear that Ms. Cristina Fernández was wise enough to know beforehand that this decision would never be peacefully tolerated by Argentine public opinion owing to the ruling of the Argentine court on the responsibility of Iranian officials for the AMIA bombing. That is to say, getting closer to and negotiating with the government of a country whose officials and former officials were accused of participating in the most serious attack on Argentine soil was bound to give rise to strong criticism, if the unfinished business relating to the AMIA case was not addressed before the beginning of the trade negotiations.

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In view of the foregoing, the path chosen by the President to resolve this difficult matter is truly inexplicable and, what is worse, criminal. She simply decided to ignore the problem. She then chose to disregard the court ruling and ordered the imprementation of a cover-up plan which entailed dispelling all suspsicions against the Iranian fugitives, releasing them from criminal responsibility and guaranteeing their impunity for the future. Without any accusation that could obstruct the relations, there would be no obstacles hindering progress on the state trade agenda.

At the time there was a need to ―clean up‖ Iran‘s image. With this idea in mind, an impunity agreement was secretly negotiated whereby the removal of the Interpol red notices placed on the five Iranian indictees was accepted and –as will be seen– an alternative hypothesis was secretly built pointing to new and false accused parties to disassociate the truly guilty parties from the case. Following this path, secret —and, subsequently, public— negotiations were held; the Memorandum of Understanding was signed; its approval by Congress was swiftly obtained; the victims of the bombings and their relatives were lied to with promises that they would be consulted about any proposals arising from the negotiations; agents of the intelligence service of the Argentine Presidency were used to ―fabricate‖ a false but plausible hypothesis other than the one obtained in court and based on the evidence available in the case, which involved resorting to a former prosecutor appointed to the case in order for him to provide his knowledge; a parallel communication channel with Tehran was established; a political and media campaign was launched to discredit the court indictments; and the mise-en-scene to conceal the criminal plan. In sum, many actions were taken which, if analysed as a whole, show both the deliberate intention of the parties involved in this criminal plot and the thoroughness with which the cover-up was developed and impelemented. a. 1) A peculiar cover-up

The accumulated evidence leads to the conclusion that the rapprochement that led to the execution of the Memorandum of Understanding as a means to achieve impunity, as well as its constant promotion, were not prompted by Iran but by the Argentine authorities, which have

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been the chief implementators of this criminal plan. As stated, this shows the peculiarity of the perpetration of the crime, since, although it may seem irrational, this cover-up was driven by the interests of the party covering up the crime, rather than by the individuals whose crime was covered up. It was not the Iranian fugitives or authorities who crossed oceans and deserts to get to Aleppo in Syria, in order to secretly negotiate a pact offering impunity, as will be proven below.

Furthermore, the facts show that Iranian authorities were only interested in the removal of Interpol‘s red notices on five Iranian nationals, who play very important roles in Iranian political life. They were stung by the affront caused when the former Defense Minister, Ahmad Vahidi, was forced to leave Bolivian territory in the light of the pressure generated by the red alert in force against him (―Bolivia echó a Ministro de Defensa iraní acusado por atentado en la Argentina‖, Infobae.com, 31/5/2011; ―Evo expulsó a un funcionario iraní‖, Pagina 12, 1/6/2011; ―Bolivia pide disculpas a la Argentina y expulsa a Ministro de Defensa iraní‖, El mundo, 1/6/2011). These situations have caused the regime to grant diplomatic immunity to each of the fugitives every time they travel abroad. In fact, in May 2014, representatives of the Republic of Korea inquired about the implications of inviting indictee Mohsen Rezai to visit that country, which resulted in a request to Interpol requiring that, if the visit took place, the international arrest warrant or red notice on the abovementioned official be enforced (Official Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship of 9/05/2014, Note No. 5572/14; Official Letter to the Head of the Interpol

Department of the Argentine Federal Police dated 12/5/2014). This proves that, as stated, although the red notices have not been enough to arrest the indictees so far, they clearly affect them since they still constitute an obstacle to their transnational mobility. However, the Iranian interest in the ratification of the agreement vanished into thin air when the red notices were not removed, as agreed upon. It should be noted that on 10 March 2013, the Memorandum of Understanding was submitted to the Iranian Parliament for its validation. One week later, on 15 March, Interpol guaranteed the effectiveness of the red notices. On the

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following day, Foreign Minister Salehi publicly expressed his dissatisfaction with the decision of the International Criminal Police Organization and claimed that, pursuant to the agreement, Interpol was supposed to remove the red notices. The consequence of this discouraging blow to Iran was that the treaty was never discussed in Parliament and seemed to be left out of the Iranian legislative agenda. (Pagni, Carlos, ―El kirchnerismo, en el peor de los mundos‖, La Nacion 30/5/13; ―El memorandúm con Argentina llega al parlamento iraní‖, Europa Press,

11/3/2013; Kollmann, Raúl ―Con novedades semana a semana‖, Pagina 12, 24/3/13; Note No. LA/35678-47- 3.1 EGI/tsa, Legal Council, General Secretariat, International Criminal Police Organization, 15/3/2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Communiqué No. 044/13 of 15/03/2013; IRNA, ―Salehi, Irán y Argentina trabajan conjuntamente para resolver las acusaciones sobre la AMIA‖, 18/3/2013; ―Irán asegura que el acuerdo con Argentina incluye retirar las ‗notas rojas‘ de Interpol‖, La Nacion, 18/3/2013). This shows the importance given by Iran to the red notices, which was also evidenced by the words of Minister Salehi, the negotiator of the agreement, who referred to the existence of secret arrangements between both countries on this issue, which arrangements were hidden and denied by Argentine authorities and could not be complied with –as proven by the evidence– due to the actions of Interpol. Going back to the peculiarity of this cover-up, it should be noted that the evidence shows a strong disparity of interests between the Argentine and Iranian authorities which was also demonstrated by the following circumstances:

1) The trip made by Foreign Minister Héctor Timerman to Aleppo to secretly initiate the negotiations where he offered what Tehran has always wanted; i.e, that the charges against its citizens for the worst terrorist act perpetrated on Argentine soil be dropped (p. 131.189/131.194; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Argentina negocia con Irán dejar de lado la investigación de los atentados‖, Perfil Newspaper, 26/03/2011, p. 130.911/130.913; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Polémica en torno a la negociación secreta entre Argentina e Irán‖, Perfil Newspaper, 2/4/2011; Levinas, Gabriel, op. cit., p. 244, 246 and 281).

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2) The complete silence on the part of the Argentine government during the public negotiations period and even after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding in the light of the offensive statements made by Iranian officials aimed at discrediting the Argentine judicial investigation and/or the Argentine court authorities participating in it (―Irán volvió a rechazar todas las acusaciones por el atentado a la AMIA‖, La Nacion, 30/10/2012; Paraszczuk, Joanna, ―Irán ready to identify AMIA bombing perpetrators‖, Jerusalem Post,

30/10/12; Kollmann, Raúl: ―Irán volvió a negar su culpabilidad‖, Pagina 12, 31/10/12; ―Irán ratificó su adhesión plena al memorándum con Argentina‖, Pagina 12, 12/02/2013; ―Irán rechazó las acusaciones del fiscal Alberto Nisman al considerarlo sionista‖, La Nacion, 3/6/20113; ―El ministerio exteriores de Irán: No le damos importancia a las declaraciones de Nisman‖, IRNA, 5/6/2013; Niebieskikwiat, Natasha, ―Irán rechazó, otra vez, su participación en la AMIA‖, Clarin, 19/06/2013; ―Irán volvió a criticar al sionismo‖, La Nacion, 19/06/2013; ―Para Irán, la causa AMIA causó amargura en las relaciones entre Irán y Argentina‖, Agencia

Judía de Noticias, 16/07/2013). 3) The Argentine Foreign Minister‘s overacted response to a proposal made by the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to ―cooperate‖ in the investigation in July 2011 which, as has always been the case with Iran in these proceedings, was never materialized (―Irán, dispuesto a cooperar con Argentina por atentado contra AMIA de 1994‖, El Comunal, 16/07/2011; ―Iran to cooperate over Argentina Jewish Centre bomb‖, BBC News, 17/07/11; ―Argentina welcomes Iran offer in AMIA bombing probe‖, Tehran Times, 18/07/2011;

―Argentina welcomes Iran offer in 1994 bombing inquiry‖, BBC News, 18/7/11; ―Irán promete ayuda para esclarecer el caso AMIA‖, La Nacion, 17/07/11; Eliaschev, Pepe. ―Las condiciones que pone Irán para dialogar‖, Perfil, 23/7/11; Ministry of Foreign Affais and Worship, Press Release No. 336/l 1 ―Respuesta del gobierno argentino ante el anuncio de cooperación del gobierno iraní en la causa AMIA‖, 17/7/11; ―AMIA: promesa iraní para el aniversario‖, Ambito Financiero, 18/7/11).

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4) The presence of the Argentine legation at the General Assembly of the United Nations during the speeches delivered by the Persian head of state in September 2011 and 2012 (―La AMIA reclamó que la delegación argentina abandone la ONU cuando hable el presidente de Irán‖, La Prensa, 11/09/2012; Mindez, Leonardo, ―AMIA: Con otro gesto oficial se confirmó el giro ante Irán‖, Clarin, 23/09/2011; Levinas, Gabriel, op. cit., p. 173, 189, 208, 20 and 279).

5) The swift ratification of the agreement by the Argentine Congress as opposed to the still pending approval in Iran (Sofía Guterman, ―They are doing everyhing they can in order for Iran to emerge victorious from this situation‖), Radio JAI, 14/02/2013; ―Sobre el cruce en el debate por el memorándum: Lo de ayer fue miserable‖, La Razon, 14/02/2013; "Familiares de las víctimas del atentado a la AMIA piden participar en el plenario de Diputados", Agencia Judía de Noticias, 22/02/2013; Pagni, Carlos, "El kirchnerismo, en el peor de los mundos", La Nacion 30/5/13; "El memorandún con Argentina llega al parlamento iraní",

Europa Press, 11/3/2013; Kollmann, Raúl "Con novedades semana a semana", Pagina 12, 24/3/13). 6) The subsequent demands and proposals made by the Argentine President and the Foreign Minister in the light of the lack of sufficient notification of the ratification of the agreement by Iran, coupled with the public requests to speed up the creation of the commission provided for in the agreement and the setting of the dates for the hearings set forth therein. ("Timerman estimó que en el próximo mes y medio el parlamento iraní aprobará el acuerdo por la AMIA", Télam, 18/4/13; "Cuánto más tarde Irán en aprobar el memorando, más dudas va a generar", Ambito Financiero, 18/4/13; "Ultimátum oficial a Irán: Espero que en un mes aprueben el memorándum", Infobae, 18/04/2013; "Reclaman a Irán el aval al acuerdo", Clarin, 19/04/2013; "Timerman confía en que Irán firmará el pacto en un mes", La Gaceta, 19/04/2013; Address by Cristina Fernández, 68th General Assembly of the United Nations, 24 September 2013; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 279/13, Press statement read by Foreign Minister Timerman at Casa Rosada, 24 November 2013; Dinatale,

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Martín, "La negociación con Irán, empantanada por la lista de Interpol", La Nacion, 08/12/2013).

7) The preparations made at ministerial level in order to commence the ―oil for grain‖ trade exchange —longed for and promoted by the Argentine authorities— as soon as Iran approved the agreement (Communications of 20/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238- 4699, File B-l 009-2013-05-20- 133130-8, CD 31; File B-1009-2013-05-20-111124-8, CD 31;

File B-1009-2013-05-20- 114842-2, CD 31; File B-l009-2013-05-20- 140034-12, CD 31; File B-1009-2013-05-20-143508-24, CD 31; File B-l009-2013-05-20-161759-6, CD 31; communications of 21/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File 2542, CD 32 and communications of 28/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-l009-2013-05-28- 155549-2, CD 39). 8) The mise-en-scene of the Argentine diplomacy in September 2013 in an attempt to show concrete progress with Iran (see point V.b.2).

9) The fabrication of a false hypothesis with new perpetrators and fraudulent evidence in order to eliminate the present court indictment and disasssociate the Iranian indictees from the case for good (Communication of 27/1/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009- 2013-01-27-113208-14, CD 266; Communication of 01/06/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-l 009-2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43; Communication of 18/12/2012, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226; Communication of 14/2/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-14-

164341-10, CD 284). Finally, the facts proven throughout this accusation and briefly mentioned in this section clearly demonstrate that, in this case, the parties that perpetrated the cover-up were much more interested than those benefiting from the cover-up in moving forward to the final stages of the plan. This, as is presently known, is directly related to the fact that the motive behind the rapprochement and the design and implementation of the cover-up plan was the desire to re- establish trade between states and to adopt a geopolitical position that was closer to Tehran, as

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decided by the Argentine authorities involved in this case. This is proven by the wiretaps recording the conversations between the actual negotiators of both states. a.2) Evidence of the desire to re-establish trade relations between the States

There is a body of evidence showing that the proven criminal actions aimed at guaranteeing impunity were driven by the desire to re-establish the trade relations between the States as a way of overcoming the serious energy crisis in Argentina. In fact, the court-ordered wiretaps have made it possible to learn about and prove these circumstances, as they were discussed through parallel communication and negotiation channels established with Tehran to move forward with the cover-up plan. ONE. Before the signing of the agreement, when the negotiations underway in Switzerland were unkown, Fernando Esteche, one of the parties to this plot who is a leader of the ―Quebracho‖ group and a notorious advocate of the Iranian regime and has close ties with national government officials, asserted that: ―…they wish to re-establish relations… they are going to do it… multi-dimensionally. At a government level, I mean, at a State level… it has to do with establishing relations between the two States…‖ (Communication of 18/12/12, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18-183332, CD 226). The parties to the plan were aware of the interests underlying the agreement. In addition, there is evidence that local individuals who have historical and strong ties with the Islamic Republic of Iran and who are also closely related to national government officials were already aware of the interests underlying the agreement that ensured impunity for the Iranian fugitives. TWO. A contact of Jorge Khalil, the Iranian businessman Heshmatollah Rehnema, was also aware of the interest of the Argentine Government in trading with Iran. As a result, he contacted Khalil to inform him about his negotiations at the Chamber of Commerce of Tehran to meet in Iran with Argentine diplomats so as to pave the way for all Iranian companies to start negotiating in Argentina. This rapprochement and meeting request from Iranian groups of companies would have been impossible before the agreement concerning AMIA. There is nothing wrong with trade; quite on the contrary. However, it is a crime to illegally destroy the

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court indictments and give impunity to the Iranian fugitives in order to make such trade possible. As to this particular issue, Rahnema stated that: "...what I need now is to check whether I can get leverage through D‘Elia... the Foreign Office...Persico11...Fernando*‘... because I want to call the Argentine Embassy in Tehran...because the Chamber of Commerce of Tehran wishes to hold a meeting to pave the way for all private companies directly… to take him to the Chamber of Commerce of Tehran, the Argentine business attaché in Tehran... I wanted to take him there to speak at the Chamber and the Chamber is very interested in having the private companies… start doing business with Argentina...‖ (Communication of 14/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-14-125442-12, CD 0025). Regardless of the fact that Rahnema referred to an interest in trade relations between private persons, Khalil explained to him that he had conveyed these concerns to Luis D‘Elia who, in turn, had communicated them to Andrés ―Cuervo‖ Larroque, who was to talk to the President

(Communication of 14/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B B-1009-2013-05- 14-131007-12.wav, CD 0025). Khalil explained: ―I went to D‘Elia and I told him… about all the proposals and about the Foreign Ministry, about the Foreign Ministry too… what they had proposed… And he then took it to ―Cuervo‖ Larroque… the guy of ―La Cámpora‖, the head of ―La Cámpora‖… and they were going to talk to Cristina…‖ (Communication of 14/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-14-131007-12.wav, CD 0025). THREE. A few days after Jorge Khalil, the local contact of the regime, came back from Iran and after several communications in which he advised Luis D‘Elia of the messages from Tehran, a series of events took place as from 15 May 2013, when Khalil was instructed to get immediately in touch with D‘Elia, who was ―at the President‘s office.‖ D‘Elia put the telephone speaker on and explained that there was an public official listening: "...I am with a friend who is listening to you, but I will not say the name..." Then, they talked about the possibility that the delegations of both countries might meet in Caracas, Beirut or any other area in the Gulf –as proposed by the Iranians– to re-establish trade relations between the

11 Referring to the Under-Secretary of Family Agriculture, Emilio Pérsico.

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governments. Khalil said: ―… Great… there is true interest in initiating and approaching trade relations from government to government, with officials from our government, a delegation from over there would travel to Caracas or to the Gulf or, better still, to Beirut … or some place in the Gulf… in order to start with direct links between officials …‖. D‘Elia answered as follows, since the person that was with him remained silent:―Great. OK. It would include what we want… right?". They ended up reaching an agreement (Communications of 15/05/2013,

Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-15-100907-10, CD 26; File B-1009- 2013-05-15-101055-4, CD 26). These contacts evidence that, as far as D‘Elia is concerned, ―we‖ means certain Argentine governmental authorities for whom he operates and that, with regard to Khalil, in the same context, ―we‖ means Iran. It is fundamentally clear that the local senior authorities were interested in re-establishing trade between both States. Thus, it may be inferred that Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil is conveying Iran‘s response to Argentina‘s request to negotiate.

FOUR. The manifest commercial interest that inspired this impunity scheme was clearly proven by the telephone communications of 19 and 20 May 2013 referring to the meeting between Luis D‘Elia and the Minister of Federal Planning, Public Investment and Services, Mr. Julio De Vido, which was held on the instructions of Cristina Fernández. In addition, as will be seen below, the proposals conveyed by Minister De Vido at the President‘s request were subsequently submitted to the consideration of the Iranian fugitive Mohsen Rabbani, who, given his political power, indirectly participated in the negotiations with the persons in charge of covering him up, thus participating in the cover-up plan that benefitted him. It is as astonishing as unacceptable. On 19 May, Luis D‘Elia got in touch with Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil and told him: ―I talked to Julio… I‘m meeting him tomorrow at 10.00…‖ in reference to Minister De Vido —who, to D‘Elia, is simply ―Julio‖—. The he stated: "... ―…there is an energy crisis here, do you get what I‘m saying?...‖ (Communication of 19/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3964-0799, File 51.78404.20130519.225357, CD 80). The meeting between D‘Elia and Minister De Vido took place on the following day. The communication is transcribed below.

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D‘Elia: I‘m at the door of the Ministry of Planning, I‘m about to go in and see Julio, ok? Khalil: Great, ok, call me later. D‘Elia: I‘ll tell him about that, OK? Khalil: Right, yes, yes, no worries. (Communication of 20/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699. File 3815, CD 31). After the meeting, D‘Elia called Khalil again:

D‘Elia: Look, I talked to him. Khalil: Right. D‘Elia: They are willing to send YPF people with the two of us... Khalil: OK. D‘Elia: To do business there. Khalil: Good. D‘Elia: He is very interested in exchanging what they've got for grain and meat.

Khalil: OK. D‘Elia: And... you know He has a political issue; they need the Memorandum approved, OK? Khalil: Yes, that point is very clear, Luis... I told you that the other day. Did you tell him what I said? D‘Elia: Yes, I told them 10 days ago and they said it would be approved in 30 days. Khalil: No, no, I told you the Memorandum would be approved...I told you that, but that they were delaying it because of that issue.*

D‘Elia: No...no, there was something there... I said what you told me, about the incident. Khalil: Yes. D‘Elia: And... the meeting happened because the boss requested it, OK? Khalil: OK. D‘Elia: We are at the highest level. Khalil: This means we're good, then. D‘Elia: Oh, yeah, very good. Now, if the memo is not approved, you see, we will look as morons there.

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Khalil: If they don't approve it? They will approve it, they will... D‘Elia: Well, but they have to do it fast, you know. Khalil: They will approve it, Luis, you know what times in Persia are like and, also some logical things did not take place, OK?, you know ...De Vido must know that "Timerman hasn‘t fulfilled some of the promises made‖. It‘s as clear as that. He hasn‘t delivered". (Communication dated 20/5/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05-

20-111124-8, CD31). * This refers to the fact that Interpol‘s red notices had not been removed. These conversations reveal five fundamental issues: 1) The close relations with De Vido, with whom they were on a first-name basis: "Julio". 2) The interest in sending YPF people to negotiate with Iran in order to exchange ―grain for oil‖, which led senior national officials to design and implement a cover-up plot. 3) The need for Iran to approve the Memorandum of Understanding as a pre-requisite to engage in trade activities —this is one of the reasons why such document was signed and evidence of the fact that the agreement served as a means for enabling trade activities. 4) The meeting between Minister De Vido and D‘Elia, which happened because "the boss requested it", as she was especially interested in movig forward with the cover-up scheme because this was the key to unlock trade. 5) The secret agreement entered by Foreign Minister Timerman to remove Interpol red notices, his failed efforts to achieve such purpose and the subsequent Iranian frustration as police search priorities persisted. Later that day, Jorge Khalil informed Iran of the progress in the negotiations. He warned Abdul

Karim Paz, sheikh of the "At Tauhid" mosque, religious leader of the Shiite Muslim community and right-hand man of Mohsen Rabbani, who was in Iran, that: "...what Argentina needs is oil, it is all about oil, and that‘s all they are buying... They can give grain to Iran, that oil in exchange for grain... ". Then, he added that: "...Argentina is in desperate need of oil and Iran is in desperate need of grain and all that. Exchange should begin...'" (Communication dated 20/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-133130-8, CD 31). He went to say: " ...look, everything is about to come to fruition here; tell them to stop messing around..." and highlighted that: "...I am telling you now, the thing is... that the Foreign Ministry

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is asking me for it now and De Vido said ‗If I have to send the YPF people to make the deal... they need crude oil...and start the exchange...‘‖ (Communication dated 20/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-133130-8, CD 31). Then, he summarized everything as follows: "...There is green light here to do the transactions and send the people; the thing is that they want to speed up the Memorandum... Well, tell them that what Argentina needs is oil, it is all about oil, and that‘s all they are buying... They can give grain to Iran, that oil in exchange for grain... Do you understand? ...and it was discussed with De Vido... all of this was discussed with De Vido... Argentina is in desperate need of oil and Iran is in desperate need of grain and all that. Exchange should begin. That's on the one hand. On the other hand, De Vido believes that to move forward with this..., you know, officially, from government to government, the Memorandum must be signed; if not, there will only be deals between private parties, just that... like now... In other words, the Memorandum must be signed to start dealing from government to government, because for the time being the only ones doing business are the private companies..." (Communication dated 20/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-133130-8, CD 31). He also said that "...there is a more important message from today: they are willing to send the YPF bosses to Caracas straight away to meet with whoever is responsible there..." and explained that both he -Khalil- and Luis D‘Elia would travel (Communication dated 20/5/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-32384699, File B-l009-2013-05-20-132253-6, CD 31). After all these reports by Khalil, Abdul Karim Paz, who was in Iran, consulted with the local officials and conveyed the reply: "...they have always been ready here; the problem is mostly over there... but they said that they will set a date and there is no problem here: a delegation will go to Venezuela and arrange everything, no problem...tell them to set the date for whenever they want to go..." (Communication dated 20/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-140034-12, CD 31) Afterwards, Khalil conveyed Tehran‘s message to one of Luis D‘Elia's collaborators: "...I spoke with Baharvand...Tell Luis this: Baharvand tells me that they are interested, tell them to set a date and they will send a delegation to wherever they think fit to start negotiations; in other

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words, there is no problem whatsoever...the one travelling is Baha, I think...he is going, they are not sending low-rank officials... he is the one in charge of the negotiations...‖ (Communication dated 20/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 113238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05- 20-143508-24, CD 31). As if this were not enought, this entire negotiation ended up in the hands of indictee Mohsen Rabbani. This is how Khalil informed about this: "...we had a meeting today with Minister De

Vido, in which he stated he is willing to send YPF top executives to close a deal with the Islamic Republic and the transaction can be made in exchange for grain...", to which Rabbani replied: "Send it over so that I can analyze it...", which clearly shows that Rabbani is still empowered by the regime to make decisions regarding all matters relating to the Argentine Republic (Communication dated 20/5/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05-20-114842-2, CD 31). This is inconceivable: high officials of the Argentine government have secretly negotiated with an indictee in the AMIA case, who they also benefited by illegally disassociating him from the case through a sophisticated cover-up plot. Some days later, Rabbani resumed participation in the negotiations and said: "I told you that we...uhm...had discussed with Argentina, the truth about... we suffered a lot so that Iran, all the purchases... Iran was the first one to buy from Argentina and now it hardly buys anything at all‖. He added that: "but this may change...there is something that is very important here, I was told there are some sectors of the government that are ready to sell oil to Argentina, sell tractors ....and buy weapons..." (Communication dated 28/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11- 3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-155549-2, CD 39). This is hard to understand, let alone to accept: high officials of the Argentine government started secret negotiations with an indictee in the AMIA case, who is also planning to ―buy weapons‖. Please note the sequence. On 18 July 1994 there was a terrorist attack in Buenos Aires. The Judiciary investigated and held certain Iranian nationals liable for devising and planning the bombings. These people have been so far protected by their regime, which rules over the

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Islamic Republic of Iran. The Argentine government negotiated an agreement with that country and, ignoring the Judiciary and the National Constitution, provided the necessary legal framework for those who had been accused to be illegally disassociated from the case for good and be given impunity. It is in that context that Mohsen Rabbani, one of the fugitives from Argentine justice who benefits from this illegal agreement, upset by the position adopted by the Argentine government, negotiates his impunity, decides which steps are to be taken, controls the progress of the criminal plot and intends to ―buy weapons‖ instead of responding to the serious accusations against him. In other words, within the framework of the rapprochement between the parties, which guarantees impunity for the accused, one of the main fugitives decides and actually negotiates to buy weapons from our country. These conversations are important as they reveal, on the one hand, that the perpetrators of the cover-up were a group of Argentine officials and their accomplices and, on the other, that Iran did not need to approve the Memorandum of Understanding to negotiate. They were willing to engage in trade anyway and this was expressed by one of their most prominent officials, the former Chargé d‘Affairs in Argentina, Mohsen Baharvand, when he said that they ―have always been ready‖. This is of paramount importance. From the very beginning, the highest officials in the Iranian regime knew that it was crucial for the Argentine authorities participating in this plot to get the Memorandum of Understanding approved before moving forward with the trade exchanges. That was perfectly clear to Tehran.

Moreover, Iranian authorities had expressed a long-standing desire to trade. They did not mind whether the Memorandum of Understanding was approved or not. There is no evidence showing that the AMIA case could prevent Tehran from restoring commercial bonds with Buenos Aires. They only signed the Memorandum of Understanding as it had been agreed that that would suffice to remove the red notices. They were not concerned about the accusations by Argentina, but merely about the ability of their officials to travel around the world with no restrictions.

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As a matter of fact, some historical signs prior to these criminal actions evidence Tehran‘s permanent willingness to trade with Buenos Aires. For example, in 2007, after a meeting with the then Iranian Foreign Minister, Manuchehr Nottaki, D'Elia —who was already playing an active role in this web of contacts— announced that Iran wished to restore trade relations with Argentina (Obarrio, Mariano, ―D‘Elia prometió acercarse más a Irán‖, La Nacion, 28/02/2007; ―Causa AMIA: Para D‘Elia, los acusados iraníes van a ser sobreseídos‖, Infobae, 1/3/2013).

Moreover, once the negotiations between both countries in relation to the AMIA case were made official, the then Iranian President publicly declared that: "I am sure that when investigations take place in an accurate and impartial manner, then the grounds will be prepared for the expansion of ties between Iran and Argentina." ("Ahmadinejad: Iran- Argentina transparent talks over AMIA leads to expansion of ties", Fars News, 2/10/2012). A few days earlier, at a press round, he had asserted that he was hoping "to hold talks to find the truth‖ in connection with the case. In this regard, he stated that: ―Fortunately, Argentina has accepted the proposal. I hope that the conversations between both Foreign Ministers can serve to lay the foundations and help set an agenda to reach this goal … We want to expand our relations‖ (―Ahmadinejad dice que quiere 'expandir las relaciones' con la Argentina‖, Clarin, 26/09/2012). These statements by the then Iranian President, within the framework of the negotiations that were under way, take us once again to the campaign to discredit the actions taken by the Argentine courts, to the need to re-direct the investigation and, mainly, to the constant interest in trading. These are examples that prove that the Islamic Republic of Iran was willing to negotiate without having to ratify the Memorandum of Understanding because, unlike the Argentine government, they did not need to explain themselves to their citizens. Thus, their interest in signing the document, as will be shown later, did not revolve around trade between the States but around the removal of Interpol‘s red notices relating to their officials.

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Once again, it is worth mentioning that having trade relations with Iran or any other State is, in itself, perfectly legal. It is not legal, though, to agree to ensure impunity for a crime against humanity, regardless of the reason. In sum, the evidence shows that Argentina‘s top government officials had an express interest in restoring trade relations with Iran —in view of the serious national energy crisis— and that there was an urgent need to destroy all the accusations in connection with the AMIA case at one stroke in order to achieve that goal. According to the evidence gathered, this is one of the reasons —perhaps even the main reason— why the President promoted the cover-up scheme, into which an investigation is requested herein so that all the parties involved may be tried and punished. It bears noting once again that the aim of this accusation is not to question the establishment of commercial relations with other foreign countries. It is a well-known fact that those decisions are not a matter to be discussed by the courts. Moreover, those relations are, in essence, lawful.

What we do challenge and report here are the circumstances that have turned this situation into a criminal plot, i.e., the decision to aid a group of fugitives from Argentine justice in a case of international terrorism as an illegal means to settle a bilateral conflict which stemmed from a judicial investigation and, thus, enable trade between both countries, among other things. The Argentine authorities did not just take into their heads to make the restoration of the longed-for commercial relations with Iran conditional upon certain steps in the implementation of the cover-up scheme. Cristina Fernandez was convinced that if the Memorandum of

Understanding —and, therefore, the cover-up— was not approved, it would be very hard to make any progress in the commercial arena. Hence, as it has already been asserted and proved, a path of lies, deceit, manipulation and crime was followed. A cover-up scheme was devised and subsequently camouflaged as diplomatic and bilateral treaty negotiations. All of this has led to this accusation. b. 3) Evidence of the geopolitical interest in an aligment with Iran Apart from the interest of Ms. Fernandez and her Foreign Minister in restoring trade exchanges with Iran at State level in order to mitigate the serious energy crisis, the evidence gathered also

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shows a geopolitical interest, which —according to that evidence— influenced the decision to adopt and implement the impunity scheme reported herein. In this regard, emphasis is to be placed on the statements made by "Allan", who played a key role in the criminal scheme due to his connection with the Intelligence Secretariat of the Argentin Presidency, his close ties with the presidential entourage, and his active relationship with Tehran‘s local contact, Jorge Khalil. This man, who served as a liaison between the parties participating in the scheme and actively contributed to fabricating the false lead intended to re- direct the investigation, said: "...we are in a different country, in a different global situation, and we need to work in a different context..." (Communication dated 01/06/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). These words referred to the existence of a new geopolitical scenario in which it was no longer convenient to be enemies with Iran; thus, these operators, just like "Allan" said, found themselves in a situation where they needed ―to work in a different context‖, which led to the creation of "...another hypothesis, with different evidence...‖ to deceive the undersigned and "...leave him high and dry, because he never saw it, the evidence...what's going to come up now..." (Communication dated 01/06/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). In the same telephone conversation, "Allan" explained the close link between the new global situation and the need to redirect the accusation to fraudulently disassociate Iran from the case for good. In November 2012, before the agreement was signed, the parties involved were already talking about the need to "...build a new AMIA enemy, someone new as the one responsible…‖, and about the role of the intelligence services in this task (Communication dated 18/12/2012, Party to the Call No. 11-3315- 6908, File B-l 009-201212-18-183332-8, CD 226). ―Allan‖‘s statements explain that this stemmed from Argentina‘s new geopolitical position. Once again, it is worth mentioning that the political decisions made to run Argentina's foreign relations are not being analysed or questioned here. It is just stated that, by virtue of the evidence, the impunity scheme reveals itself as being pursued by geopolitical reasons. As it has already been stated in respect of the commercial interest, it is the decision to give impunity to

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the Iranian fugitives, and not any international alignment in particular, that is important from a judicial-criminal standpoint. It is also worth mentioning that, beyond the commercial and geopolitical interests proved by the evidence gathered so far, there may have been other alternative and supplementary reasons that led to the adoption of the decision and the cover-up plot described here, which will be established over the course of this investigation. b) Memorandum of Understanding Having explained the decisions and the motives of the participants in the plot to place criminal and spurious interests over justice and law, we will now explain here another aspect of the cover-up plot. The Memorandum of Understanding has been conceived as an instrument that contributes most effectively to executing the plot to disassociate a group of individuals who had been accused of participating in the AMIA bombing and to give them impunity. This criminal scheme stands out for its sophistication. This is not about someone helping a fugitive by hiding them temporarily in their home so that they can dodge the security agencies. In this case, a decision was made and it was agreed that the accused would be given impunity. Then, a plan to carry this out in apparent legality was devised so that it seemed a legitimate act in the eyes of the Argentine society first and of the world, insisting that dialogue was the best way to solve conflict. The agreement had to appear as an instrument that would bring justice when, in fact, it had been designed for the contrary: to hinder and hamper justice. Hence the sophistication of the reported crime.

It was announced that Argentina and Iran would sign the Memorandum of Understanding on 27 January 2013 en Adis Abeba, Kingdom of Ethiopia. Both the President and Foreign Minister Timerman presented it as a "historical achievement'' and, as they would repeatedly declare, it was a tool to enable international cooperation, especially designed to collaborate with the Argentine Judiciary in the AMIA case. On that same day, Jorge Khalil, an agent of the Iranian regime based in Buenos Aires and a personal contact of fugitive Mohsen Rabbani, said: "...this agreement...this new

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relationship...this new phase..." (telephone conversation dated 27/01/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-27-112032-4, CD 266). But if the agreement had, in theory, been created to help respond to the claims made by the Argentine Judiciary, if —as was later stated— Tehran had finally given in, and if —as was also said— this would help bring the fugitives before the Judge hearing the case: what was Jorge Khalil, one the men whom Mohsen Rabbani trusted the most in Buenos Aires, celebrating? His boss' questioning? The fact that the Judiciary had finally found a way to oblige him to appear when he had avoided it for almost a decade by sheltering in diplomatic immunity and the territory of Iran? If the agreement was solely aimed at making the indictees appear before the judge, as it was declared, why were trade exchanges for oil secretly negotiated? Why was it denied that there had been negotiations in this respect? Why did Minister De Vido meet and talk with Luis D'Elia about that exchange, upon the request of President Cristina Fernandez, if the only thing that mattered was to provide assistance to the Judiciary? While it was asserted that they intended to contribute to the progress of the case, they were in fact, without the survivors and the victims' families knowing, without anybody knowing, secretly negotiating over oil and weapons with indictee Mohsen Rabbani! The day following the signature of the agreement, the individual identified as "Allan", a participant in this cover-up, who is loyal to a sector in the Intelligence Secretariat and has access to the presidential entourage, called Jorge Khalil and said in excitement: "Relax, we won,

I mean, we won a game, I told you, you had no faith in me" clearly referring to the signature of the agreement (telephone conversation dated 28/01/13, Party to the Call No. 11-315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-28-135732-18.wav, CD 267). Once again the question arises: Why would signing an agreement that in theory would bring his boss, Mohsen Rabbani, to the Judiciary —something he had been avoiding— calm down and/or make Khalil happy? What part of such a scenario could be considered a victory by Khalil? Why does an Argentine intelligence agent, such as "Allan", share interests with an agent operating for the Iranian regime in Argentina? The circumstances to be analysed in this section reveal that

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Khalil did have obvious reasons to cheer up, celebrate and relax after the "Memorandum of Understanding" was signed because it meant that the plan to cover up Rabbiani and the other accused Iranians was materializing. Khalil knew it, he knew perfectly well that the document that had been signed was just camouflage hiding, behind an appearanbce of legality, a much broader, prior agreement that favoured his bosses, because it could disassociate them for good from the accusations of liability in the AMIA bombing.

This considerations are relevant because this section will analyze the role that this agreement played in a much broader criminal scheme of which it is not the only or ultimate piece, but undoubtedly the most visible one. In fact, the vagueness, ambiguity and inaccuracy of its text have given the plan certain flexibility, thus providing different paths towards covering up and granting impunity to the accused Iranians. All these provisions included in just one document are versatile enough to be used alternatively or combined to fit the political needs of those who are involved in the plot.

Therefore, a priori, there are provisions in the document that make it possible to cover up the accused in different ways: a) by favouring the removal of Interpol red notices (paragraph 7); b) by guaranteeing impunity through the establishment of an intricate, endless procedure leading nowhere, which only dilutes accusations and makes it feasible to drop the charges against them, an option that is remarkably favoured by the total lack of deadlines for enforcing the agreement; and c) by arranging, through the ―Truth Commission‖ created in the agreement, the disassociation for good of the accused in the AMIA attack, thus redirecting the investigation to other perpetrators and hypotheses. In a few words, the document contains many resources and options to make progress in the criminal plot as requested by its masterminds and executors, thanks to the large amount of variables operating such a sophisticated scheme. c. 1) Removal of Interpol red notices. Iran‘s interest As it has already been explained in the introduction, five out of the eight accused Iranian nationals with national and international arrest requests in connection with the AMIA case are

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top search priority for Interpol (red notices); it is worth remembering that these individuals have great importance in the Iranian political arena. The evidence gathered indicates that there have been negotiations and previous agreements between the parties concerning the removal of Interpol red notices. As a matter of fact, the elements gathered so far lead to the conclusion that removing the red notices was the main interest of the Iranian authorities in this agreement and Foreign Minister Timerman accepted and contributed to it. He did his best to get Interpol to contribute to achieving this goal. He obviously did this beyond his public statements to the contrary, because telling the truth would have been incompatible with the claims for justice in this case, and he would have been confessing to participating in the criminal plot. Interpol's diligent and, at the same time, unexpected —for the perpetrators— attitude, more specifically the Secretary General‘s, Ronald Noble, prevented it. The first piece of supporting evidence is the existence of the document that Mr. Jose Ricardo

"Pepe" Eliaschev referred to in his testimony. This document states that Minister Salehi proposed that he be granted authorization to request the removal of the international arrest requests backed by Interpol to President Ahmadinejad, thus expressing special interest in improving the situation of the then Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, one of the indictees with a red notice in force (p. 131.189/131.194; Eliaschev, Pepe, "Argentina negocia con Irán dejar de lado la investigación de los atentados", Perfil newspaper, 26/03/2011, p. 130.911/130.913; Eliaschev, Pepe, "Polémica en torno a la negociación secreta entre

Argentina e Irán", Perfil newspaper, 2/4/2011). It should also be recalled that, between 31 May and 1 June 2011, Bolivia was visited by the then Iran Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, one of the fugitives in the AMIA case, thus disobeying the international arrest order issued by Argentina and Interpol red notices. The widespread repudiation to this visit obliged the Bolivian government to expel the Iranian official ("Bolivia echó a Ministro de Defensa iraní acusado por atentado en la Argentina", Infobae.com, 31/5/2011; "Evo expulsó a un funcionario iraní", Pagina 12 newspaper, 1/6/2011;

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"Bolivia pide disculpas a la Argentina y expulsa a Ministro de Defensa iraní", El mundo newspaper, 1/6/2011). Witness Eliaschev stated under oath that the document he had the chance to read consisted in "a report from the Iranian Foreign Ministry to President Ahmadinejad, a typical inter- governmental paper, in which the official responsible for the foreign affairs of the country's regime informs the President that, in view of the evidence available to the Iranian Foreign

Ministry, it would be advisable to take steps towards a significant agreement with Argentina as... all the conditions are given for Argentina to decide to turn over the page... " (pp. 131.189/131.194). As it has been mentioned in connection with the offers rejected by Nestor Kirchner, there had been a previous agreement with Iran in 2006, which was drafted by Fernando Esteche, who delivered it to both governments together with Jorge Khalil. This was accounted for by several telephone communications that have been judicially recorded: "...all I know is that it is the same document we drafted six years ago and submitted to the Iranian Embassy and to people in the government... ", "...the same one, the very same one... just as we said ...the same we drafted with Fernando six years ago... ", "...the agreement we drafted six years ago with Fernando Esteche, and we were called crazy... when we said it, the same, it was written, six, seven years ago, in 2006...they told us 'you guys are crazy, this makes no sense'...they released it today... ", "...they said this was impossible, that it couldn‘t be done... ", "... Do you know who drafted it for me, that day, that memorandum, do you who drafted it?...Fernando... ", making reference to Esteche (telephone conversations dated 27/01/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2013-01 -27-174637-12, CD 266; File B-1009- 2013-01-27112032-4, CD 266; File B-1009-2013-01-27-112552-12, CD 266; File B-1009-2013-01-27-113208-14, CD 266). On that occasion, Khalil had made it clear that: "...we came up with this plan with Fernando Esteche six years ago... when I took it to Baharvand, he said no..." (telephone conversation dated 27/01/2013, Party to the Call No. 113315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-27-113208-14, CD

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266). In other words, although Kirchner had not accepted it, the agreement had not been welcomed in Iran either. It can now be concluded that Iran may have rejected it then because Interpol had not issued the red notices against the Persian officials yet and, therefore, the reason that later raised Tehran‘s interest in reaching an agreement on the issue did not exist then, as it has been shown in this document. As there were no red notices to remove, Iran had no interest in signing an agreement with Argentina.

This implies that, from the beginning of these negotiations, the Iranian party was especially interested in removing Interpol‘s red notices, and the purpose of that was to favour the five affected parties, particularly the then Minister Vahidi. In fact, the evidence does not reveal any other interests from Tehran as specific as these ones. The seventh provision of the Memorandum of Understanding was the starting point to enable the removal of Interpol‘s red notices, i.e. it was the first step to guarantee the impunity of the indictees. b. l.a) The seventh paragraph, the validity of red notices, and Iran‘s subsequent lack of interest

The plot to remove Interpol‘s red notices was subtly included in the text of the agreement, specifically in point 7, as follows: "Following its signature, this agreement shall be sent jointly by both foreign ministers to Interpol Secretary General, in compliance with Interpol‘s requirements regarding this case". The lack of accuracy in the text regarding the implications of the communication to be sent under this provision, which is the only one in the whole agreement that operates with a mere signature and does not require any internal ratification — features that distinguish it from the rest of the agreement—, has made it possible to use arguments to relativize the immediate reasonable suspicion raised by this paragraph. When the memorandum became known, both the local Jewish community leaders and groups of victims and relatives of victims of the attack, among others, expressed their deep concern

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regarding the true implications of this communication and its potential negative consequences concerning the priority searches ordered by Interpol. In this regard, it was alleged that this communication was used to meet commitments assumed before Interpol that do not exist. Nothing had been agreed upon and there were no commitments at all. In fact, associations of victims and family and community agencies tried to cause the Argentine Foreign Ministry to propose an annex to the memorandum of understanding specifying — among other items— that its execution would not affect the validity of red notices at all. As will be seen further on in this document, although at the beginning it has been informed that this had been agreed upon with Timerman, the Foreign Minister later denied having commited to arranging an annex to the agreement with relatives and community leaders. It was clear that several Argentine social sectors, guided by hermeneutical conclusions drawn from this paragraph 7, warned that its application could lead to the removal of the red notices. The news is that evidence confirming this suspicion has been found. It has now been proved that one of the items agreed upon secretly by Foreign Minister Timerman was, precisely, the removal of such notices, as this was the main interest of the Iranian counterpart to sign the agreement. The evidence which reveals that the initial expectations of the parties signing the agreement were for Interpol to lift the arrest orders is provided by the statements made by those participating actively in the negotiations between the Argentine and Iranian authorities through parallel channels and secretly, who naturally knew of the existence of Timerman‘s secret agreement for the removal of Interpol red notices. In February 2013, only one month after the agreement, while speaking with Iran‘s local referent Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil, "Allan" admitted that there were rumours at the Intelligence Agency that Interpol would remove the red notices over the Iranian indictees. Specifically, he said: "I have a gossip... I was told at the house12...Interpol will lift the arrest warrant against our friends... They will lift it now." Khalil was excited: "I can‘t believe it! At last!" (telephone conversation

12 Making reference to the Intelligence Agency.

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dated 25/2/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-25-151137-12, CD 295). The then Iranian Business Attaché, Alí Pakdaman, had already told Khalil, on the same date that the agreement with Iran was signed, that he would have even better news. This is how Khalil explained it: "...I called Pakdaman... he was already aware, he told me. This is good news, he told me, and you will receive even better news, he said. Just a little while ago..."

(telephone conversation dated 27/01/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009- 2013-01-27-122441-28, CD 266). This helps confirm that the removal of red notices was part of the secret negotiation. In other words, that was the information that circulated at the time and, as agreed upon by the Argentine and Iranian parties when signign the impunity plan and as stated in paragraph 7 of the memorandum, the removal of the red notices was a true possibility. In addition, the interpretation made by Iran regarding paragraph seven of the agreement is a key element to understand its true meaning. In this sense, the first hint appeared when the official Iranian news agency (IRNA) published, under the heading "Memorandum of Understanding signed between Iran and Argentina: Great diplomatic success", the legal analysis of the content of the agreement by Iranian international law expert Mohammad Hossein Mahdavi. In this document, the law expert stated that: "Actually, the goal of this article [paragraph 7 of the memorandum] is for both countries to show Interpol that bilateral differences over the AMIA case, which had caused some individuals to be included in the red notice list of that organization, had been settled through mutual cooperation, and that, therefore, Interpol could annul that list..." (Mahdavi, Mohammad Hossein, "Memorandum of Understanding signed between Iran and Argentina: Great diplomatic success", IRNA, 7/2/2013). This interpretation was undoubtedly supported by the statements made by Minister Salehi himself —who co-signed the treaty— when he stated, as informed by IRNA news agency, that: "according to the agreement signed by both countries, Interpol (International Police) should remove the accusations against Iranian authorities", and criticized Interpol for having affirmed that they remained in force (IRNA, "Salehi: Iran and Argentina working jointly to solve

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accusations over AMIA", 18/03/2013; "Irán asegura que el acuerdo con Argentina incluye retirar las "notas rojas" de Interpol", La Nacion newspaper, 18 March 2013; "Tehran insists accord with Argentina includes Interpol lifting red notices against Iranian suspects", Mercopress, 19/03/2013). As clarified by the Iranian Foreign Minister, the agreement was expected —even without becoming effective— to help remove Interpol red notices. If they were removed, nothing would cause the suspected parties to be actually brought before the Argentine Judiciary. Although red notices have not been sufficient to oblige the accused Iranian nationals to appear before the Argentine judge, they were clearly the only element that prevented several of the indictees from moving around the world, thus impairing the complete impunity with which they have proceeded so far. In this regard, it should be noted that, on many occasions, this Prosecutorial Investigation Unit has learned of trips made by the accused parties abroad, thus running the risk of being arrested by virtue of the international arrest orders and red notices in force. In fact, in May 2014, representatives of the Republic of Korea inquired about the implications of a potential invitation to indictee Mohsen Rezai for him to visit that country. The undersigned immediately advised Interpol that, should the visit take place, the international arrest warrant with a red notice in respect of the abovementioned official should be acted upon (Official Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship of 9/05/2014, Note No. 5572/14; Official Letter to the Head of the Interpol Department of the Argentine Federal Police dated 12/5/2014).

Evidence obtained shows that Salehi had agreed with Timerman that the red notices would be removed after the mere signature of the Memorandum of Understanding. Therefore, paragraph 7 —concerning the communication to Interpol— was the only one drafted with an operational nature; the only one that could and should have immediate application. The rest of the paragraphs under the agreement required ratification by both parties, the exchange of diplomatic notes, and that the agreement be in force to be fulfilled. Communicating the signature of the agreement to an agency involved exclusively in police matters and having no participation or interest in the treaties or agreements between its member

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states, as is the case of Interpol, had the sole purpose of having the red notices of Iranian fugitives removed. The truth is that the criminal intention to guarantee the impunity of the top five accused parties searched by the police in relation to the AMIA case met an unexpected obstacle. On 15 March 2013, the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) sent a letter to Foreign Minister Timerman, which was signed by Joel Sollier, General Counsel at the agency, stating the following in relation to the Memorandum of Understanding: The Office of Legal Affairs of the INTERPOL General Secretariat states that such agreement does not imply any changes in the status of the red notices published in relation to the crimes investigated in the AMIA case..." (Note No. LA/35678-47/3.1/EGI/tsa, Office of Legal Affairs, General Secretariat, International Criminal Police Organization, 15/03/2013). Then, in May 2013, the Argentine Foreign Minister met Interpol Secretary General, Mr. Ronald Noble, in Lyon, France. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship issued a communication stating that: "...During the meeting, Secretary General Noble reaffirmed the statements made by the General Counsel of Interpol in a letter of 15 March, according to which the Memorandum signed with Iran does not affect in any way the red notices issued by Interpol at the request of Argentina..." (Press Release No. 122/13 dated 30/05/2013). Interpol repeated this information through an official communication (Interpol, "Visit by Argentina‘s Foreign Minister to INTERPOL focuses on global security issues", 30/05/2013). In effect, the delay in ratifying the Memorandum by the Iranian government, and its reluctance to do so, can be explained by the fact that Foreign Minister Timerman was unable to fulfil the secret commitment undertaken in relation to the the removal of the red notices by Interpol, which were not removed. This accounts for an obvious fact: Iran‘s withdrawal. Ever since Interpol communicated that the notices would not be removed, Iran suspended the internal procedure for agreement ratification by withdrawing it from Parliament, where it had been included in the agenda for discussion, thus deferring its implementation indefinitely (Pagni, Carlos, "El kirchnerismo en el peor de los mundos", La Nacion newspaper, 30/05/2013; "Timerman estimó que en el próximo mes y medio

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el parlamento iraní aprobará el acuerdo por la AMIA", TELAM news agency, 18/4/13; "Ultimátum oficial a Irán: Espero que en un mes aprueben el memorándum", Infobae newspaper, 18/04/2013; "Reclaman a Irán el aval al acuerdo", Clarin newspaper, 19/04/2013). However, to date the Argentine authorities involved in this issue have tried to address this setback and persuade Iran to speed up its internal procedures in order to contribute to the ongoing cover-up scheme.

Within this context, in April 2013, Timerman declared: "I hope it is approved within the next month, or month and a half... the longer they take, the more doubts will arise as to their intentions. We did our part and we are expecting Iran to do its part" ("Timerman estimó que en el próximo mes y medio el parlamento iraní aprobará el acuerdo por la AMIA", Telam news agency, 18/4/13; "Cuánto más tarde Irán en aprobar el memorando, más dudas va a generar", Ambito Financiero newspaper, 18/4/13; "Ultimátum oficial a Irán: Espero que en un mes aprueben el memorándum", Infobae newspaper, 18/04/2013; "Reclaman a Irán el aval al acuerdo", Clarin newspaper, 19/04/2013). At that time, the foreign minister explained that the Iranian Parliament was expected to resume its activities after the legislative recess and that its priority was to discuss the annual budget and "then the treaty with Argentina" ("Timerman confía en que Irán firmará el pacto en un mes", La Gaceta newspaper, 19/04/2013). More than a year has elapsed since that month or month and a half. As months went by and, especially, after a communication by Interpol stating that red notices would continue to be effective, Tehran realized that the Argentine Foreign Minister had been prevented from fulfilling his promises due to reasons beyond his control, and expressed its unease in this regard. The day after returning from the Islamic Republic of Iran and meeting "with the highest levels... with the bosses... with the Foreign Ministry...." (Telephone conversation dated 11/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-11 - 173407-12, CD 0022), Jorge "Yussuf‘ Khalil clearly conveyed to the speaker on the side of the Argentine officials, Luis D'Elia, that the Iranians were disappointed at the unfulfilled commitment. He stated as follows:

Khalil: Let‘s meet. We have some homework to do.

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D'Elia: Oh, ok, sure, no problem... hey, why is this taking so long? Khalil: Well... there is certain… between you and me, disappointment over there, over there, I don‘t know why, they are disappointed.. D'Elia: Disappointed?

Khalil: Disappointed, yes.. I think that some of the words used were not welcome... D'Elia: I see… Khalil: I think this bloody Jew13 screwed it up. D'Elia: Really? Khalil: Yeah.

D'Elia: What did he say? Khalil: He was signing something… also in the part of the preliminary measures, I think, but we‘ll talk about it personally. D'Elia: Ok, sure, no problem..

(Telephone conversation dated 11/5/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-1 l-083146-8.wav, CD 0022). Khalil‘s words give a glimpse of the fact that another document had been signed apart from the Memorandum of Understanding, which was private and reserved in this case, and which included the issue of Interpol‘s red notices. This can be further demonstrated when analyzed under the light of the statements made by Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi, who stated as follows in March 2013: "...The [content] of the agreement between Iran and Argentina regarding the AMIA issue will be made public at the right time and the matter [of Iranian indictees] has been included. We are making a follow- up...‖ ("Tehran insists accord with Argentina includes lifting red notices against Iranian suspects, Mercopress, 19/03/2013). As this declaration was made in March 2013, two months after the Memorandum of Understanding was entered into, it is evident that Salehi refers to another agreement, a deal that had not been made known to the public in general in March 2013

13 Referring to Hector Timerman.

" Making reference to red notices

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and which included the issue of red notices over Iranian accused parties which, as previously stated, should have been removed. In other words, as the possibility of advancing with the commitment assumed by Timerman was frustrated, Salehi acknowledged the existence of a secret agreement on this matter. He did not hesitate to show Timerman up because he felt betrayed. Four days after the conversation in which Khalil informed D'Elia about Tehran‘s

"disappointment" at Timerman for his having "screwed up", Khalil was requested to contact D'Elia immediately, who was "at the offices of the President". D'Elia put the telephone speaker on and clarified that an official was listening: "...I am here with a friend who is listening to you, but I will not say their name..." In that conversation, Khalil stated: "...Yes, it is important that you disclose that too. Those two messages that caused discomfort and that are jeopardizing the relationship in one way or another...‖ (Telephone conversation dated 15/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-15-100907-10, CD 26; File B-1009-2013-05-15-

101055-4, CD 26). Then on 20 May, as a result of the meeting held between D'Elia and Minister Julio De Vido, Khalil returned to the matter when he told D'Elia once more: "...De Vido has to know that Timerman did not fulfil certain things. This is very clear; he did not fulfil certain things..." (Telephone conversation dated 20/5/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05-20-111124-8, CD 31). On the next day, with respect to the same issue, D'Elia repeated the same statement: "...he said he would speak to Ms. Number One and then call me...", making an obvious reference to Mrs. Fernandez (Telephone conversation dated 21/05/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File 2542, CD 32). The message of "disappointment" at the noncompliance with the red notices had travelled from Tehran to the Argentine Government House. This issue continued for several months afterwards, when Khalil pointed out once more that Irak was not being ―neglectful‖ with respect to the internal ratification of the agreement (Telephone conversation dated 24/02/2014, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-

2014-02-24-171304-2, CD 311).

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Now, in view of the importance of the unfulfilled commitment, Iran‘s reaction was deceitful because they said they had approved the agreement through an alternative channel, with no official communication and generating no legal effects. However, Iranians acted as if it had been ratified. In fact, on 20 May 2013, the then Iranian Charge d‘affaires in Argentina, Ali Pakdaman, informed during a radio interview that his country had ratified the memorandum of understanding. The agreement had been approved by the then President of Iran, Mahmoud

Ahmadinejad, on the previous day, subject to no parliamentary analysis ("Teheran aprobo el memorandum por el atentado a la AMIA", Pagina 12 newspaper, 20/05/2013; Kollmann, Raul, "Ahmadinejad eligio la via expeditiva", Pagina 12 newspaper,21/05/2013). Within this context, Khalil told D'Elia: "...I told you it was going to be approved, dude, I told you to stay calm..." He also claimed that : "...this government should show some gestures, Luis; we are growing tired of showing gestures; this government should start making gestures..." (Telephone conversation dated 05/20/13, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-

2013-05-20-122551-14, CD 31). The gesture referred to by Khalil was the removal of red notices, Iran‘s main goal, which had been promised by Timerman and had never been fulfilled due to the intervention of Interpol. In response, the ―spokesperson‖ of the Argentine Government, Luis D'Elia, made the following statement: "...but there is a detail here that will complicate things... it was approved by Ahmadinejad, but not by the Iranian Congress..." (Telephone conversation dated 20/5/13, Party to the Call No. 11-32384699, File B- 1009-2013- 05-20-130940-28, CD 31)

In June of that year, it emerged that on the following days Iran‘s notification as to the approval of the agreement would become known, and that a joint presentation by both countries would take place in order to communicate the steps to be followed (Dinatale, Martin, "Nego Iran la denuncia del fiscal Nisman y lo acuso de sionista"; La Nacion newspaper, 4/06/2013). Notwithstanding Iran‘s reluctance, Argentine authorities continued to make efforts to achieve the ratification of the agreement, in view of the interest of many of its highest officers to continue with the criminal scheme. It is in this context that the speech of the President at the opening the 68th UN General Assembly on 24 September 2013 should be interpreted. On this

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occasion, she stated that a reasonable term had elapsed, that Argentina had already approved the agreement, and that now it was Iran‘s turn. In her words, she stated that: "...We are now waiting for them to tell us whether the agreement has been approved, and when it will be approved if it still has not been approved. In addition,we would like to have a date for the creation of the commission, as well as a date for the Argentine judge to visit Tehran... so that our patience should not be confused with naivety or stupidity" (Speech by Cristina Fernandez, 68th Session of the UN General Assembly, 24 September 2013). This strong claim gave rise to a meeting between Foreign Ministers on 28 September 2013, at the headquarters of the UN in New York, which was nothing more than an unacceptable mise- en-scene —as was subsequently determined and will be analyzed below—, orchestrated by the President and her Foreign Minister. With no news as to the abovementioned ratification, on 20 and 21 November 2013, during meetings held in Zurich, Foreign Minister Timerman stated that he had provided Iranian representatives with a new proposal, which was part of the cover-up plan, aimed at making progress in connection with the statements to be made by the accused (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 279/13, Press statement read by Foreign Minister Timerman at the House of Government on 24 November 2013). As reported by the Foreign Minister, Argentine official had met "...in order to negotiate the terms required to comply with each paragraph under the Memorandum of Understanding between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Argentine Republic to pave the way for justice and solve the case of the AMIA bombing. At that meeting, "...the Argentine Republic provided the Iranian delegation with a proposal to conclude the term of the Memorandum in 12 months after the creation of the Experts‘ Commission, which included guarantees and immunities to allow the Argentine court hearing the AMIA case to carry out investigations at the city of Tehran. Iranian officials undertook tooffer a quick response to the Argentine proposal..,." although nothing else was said on the matter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 279/13, Press statement read by Foreign Minister Timerman at Casa Rosada, 24 November 2013).

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It was also informed that: "...Timerman would have repeated to Zarif that the interpretation of the validity of arrest warrants against the accused was not made by Argentina, but by Interpol itself..." (Dinatale, Martin, "La negociacion con Iran, empantanada por la lista de Interpol", La Nacion newspaper, 08/12/2013). This was some kind of apology that gives a glimpse of what has already been demonstrated: the continued validity of red notices was a contradiction, since there was a commitment to remove them.

Simultaneously, also during November of that year, Timerman continued trying to solve the problem of the unexpected subsistence of red notices. He met with Noble again, to whom he informed about the continued negotiations between both countries over the Memorandum (Interpol, Press Release: "Visit by Argentina‘s Foreign Minister to INTERPOL focuses on global security issues", Lyon, France, 26/11/2013). The intention was clear: with his visit, Timerman was trying to convince Ronald Noble of the fact that the conflict with Iran over the AMIA case was already being channelled through the Memorandum of Understanding, in order for him to agree to remove the red notices. In January 2014, a few days before the first anniversary of the signature of the agreement with Iran, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a communique on the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Argentine Republic to pave the way for Justice to solve the AMIA bombing case. At that meeting, "...the Argentine Republic provided the Iranian delegation with a proposal to conclude the term of the Memorandum in 12 months after the creation of the Experts‘ Commission, which included guarantees and immunities aimed at allowing the Argentine court hearing the AMIA case to obtain statements at the city of Tehran. Iranian officials undertook to provide a quick response to the Argentine proposal...", although nothing else was said on the matter (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 279/13, Press statement read by Foreign Minister Timerman at the House of Government, 24 November 2013). It was also informed that: "...Timerman repeated to Zarif that the interpretation of the validity of arrest warrants against the accused was not made by Argentina, but by Interpol itself..." (Dinatale, Martin, "La negociacion con Iran, empantanada por la lista de Interpol", La Nacion,

08/12/2013). This was some kind of apology that gives a glimpse of what has already been

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demonstrated: the continued validity of red notices was a contradiction, since there was a commitment to remove them. Simultaneously, also during November of that year, Timerman continued trying to solve the problem of the unexpected subsistence of red notices. He met with Noble again, to whom he informed about the continued negotiations between both countries over the Memorandum (Interpol, Press Release: "Visit by Argentina‘s Foreign Minister to INTERPOL focuses on global security issues", Lyon, France, 26/11/2013). The intention was clear: with his visit, Timerman was trying to convince Ronald Noble of the fact that the conflict with Iran over the AMIA case was already being channelled through the Memorandum of Understanding, in order for him to agree to remove the red notices. In January 2014, a few days before the first anniversary of the subscription of the agreement with Iran, the Foreign Ministry issued a communique with respect to the agreement entered into by third parties regarding Iran‘s nuclear development and affirmed that: "It has been 19 years since the AMIA case began. Nothing has been clarified and those responsible have not been condemned; that is why, with the same spirit present in the Iranian nuclear program negotiation, the Argentine Government expects to solve with the Islamic Republic of Iran all pending issues in order to allow local judicial authorities to make progress in the essential procedural steps required to find the truth and achieve justice in the AMIA case'' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 006/14, "La Argentina celebra nuevo acuerdo diplomatico entre los P5+1 e Iran", 13 January 2014).

In fact, Iran never granted its approval. Once again, the validity of red notices —when the contrary had been agreed upon— was fundamental upon making a decision. Specifically, to date there has been no exchange of diplomatic notes and, consequently, the treaty has not entered into force (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 110/13, dated 21/05/2013). It is evident that Timerman‘s commitment, ordered by the President, was to arrange the removal of Interpol‘s red notices, which was one of the main reasons of Iran to sign the agreement. The determination of the international police agency to abide by the law hindered this first goal of

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the criminal plot carried out by the authors of this terrible impunity scheme. After some time, being aware of the impossibility to remove red notices, Timerman informed his counterpart that he was not to blame for his failure to fulfil this commitment, since despite all the efforts he made, the red notices could not been lifted. This, however, did not thwart the impunity plan. Beyond any doubts, Tehran‘s main interest was to have the red notices of Interpol removed. However, three issues should be clearly borne in mind. First, this setback does not imply that

Iran‘s interest in the agreement disappeared completely. Second, for the cover-up crime reported hereby, it is irrelevant whether Iran had an interest or inclination to take part in the manoeuvre of the Argentine parties and their accomplices. This is so because this type of crime does not require consent by the other party to be committed – nor is awareness of the covered- up party required. Third, this setback does not thwart the cover-up operation carried out by the high-level officials of the Argentine Government and the other parties involved, which is activated by the agreement and will be described in detail in the next section.

Summing up, it is only through the existence of this secret commitment and its unfulfillment that it can be understood why Iran shied away from the first goal of the scheme reported herein, as well as the distrust generated among the authors and beneficiaries of the cover-up plan. c. l.b) Fifth paragraph of the Memorandum of Understanding

One last issue should be analyzed with respect to Interpol‘s red notices. As already mentioned, the Memorandum of Understanding includes several mechanisms and measures to carry out the different steps agreed upon as part of the cover-up plan. As previously stated, this helped the plan to be flexible and adaptable to different scenarios, considering the huge number of variables, which cannot be absolutely controlled by the authors and parties involved. Thanks to this characteristic of the text, the removal of Interpol‘s red notices, which represented Iran‘s main reason to enter into the agreement, can still be implemented by following the content of the memorandum, though not in the direct and simple manner set forth in paragraph 7.

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In this sense, it is still possible to attain that goal through paragraph 5 of the agreement, i.e. within the framework of the hearings to be held in Tehran, in which the "Truth Commission" created by the treaty will interview the five Iranian indictees having Interpol‘s red notices, before Iranian and Argentine judicial authorities and representatives of both states. It should be noted that, out of the eight Iranian indictees whose testimonies have been ordered in the case, paragraph 5 of the agreement governing "Tehran hearings" only includeds those with an Interpol red notice, the removal of which —as demonstrated by the evidence gathered— was essential for Iran, as had been agreed. There is no reasonable explanation for the Argentine authorities to accept the hearings of only those whose red notices could be removed, while excluding the Iranian indictees with effective arrest warrants issued against them by Federal Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral. Thus, the text of paragraph 5 of the memorandum shows gives the indictees having no Interpol red notices (Rafsanjani, Velayati and Soleimanpour) no incentive to appear before the

Judiciary. The agreement preserves the de facto impunity that they currently enjoy, and the intervention of the commission could guarantee it for ever. In addition, indictees having red notices (Fallahijan, Vahidi, Rezai, Rabbani and Asghari) could appear before an Iranian court, Commission members and the Argentine judge, without being submitted to the national criminal process. If the intention had been to submit all accused Iranians to the Argentine courts, as has been argued to justify the agreement before public opinion, then all of the accused should have been included and true examinations should have been requested pursuant to Argentine law for all indictees, and not mere interviews only for those having Interpol red notices. Bearing this in mind, the true nature of these "hearings" and their potential implications should be pointed out. First of all, during the parliamentary debate for approval of the agreement, Foreign Minister Timerman stated that the appearance of indictees before this heterogeneous group of political and judicial parties can be assimilated to appearing before judicial authorities for legal purposes as part of an ongoing criminal process. In his words: "According to the memorandum, Argentine judicial authorities shall question those parties against which Interpol

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has issued a red notice for arrest. This provision follows national criminal procedure regulations on a strict basis, which govern the appropriateness of the examinations of indictees..." (Verbatim record of the Full Meeting of Commissions at the Argentine Senate, 13 February 2013). This had already been stated to the media a few days earlier, as follows: "The fact is that Iranian suspectswill sit on the bench and be subject to an examination under the terms of Argentine law, before an Argentine judge and an Argentine prosecutor" (Kollmann,

Raul, "Los iranies se someteran a la ley argentina", Pagina 12 newspaper, 30/01/2013). It should be noted that, even though it is redundant, the agreement makes no stipulation as to whether the questioning will be in charge of Argentine judicial authorities, and it includes no express references to the application of Argentine procedural regulations thereto; neither does it allow the judge to arrest the indictees, if deemed appropriate, pursuant to Argentine law. First of all, the accusation should be supported by an Iranian judge in compliance with Iranian law, which is contrary to the public statement made by Tehran‘s system, which affirmed that all its citizens were innocent. In addition, not all "Iranian suspects" would sit on the bench, as stated by the Foreign Minister. As has already been noted, the agreement stipulates that only five out of the eight Iranian indictees should be questioned. Moreover, reference is made to a strictly judicial activity, which the agreement unlawfully delegates to the "Truth Commission", the conclusions of which —as shown by evidence— had been agreed upon in advance.

Returning to the analysis, once the abovementioned indictees appear before the Iranian judge, the "Truth Commission" members and the Argentine judge, it could be argued that there would be no legal reasons —in principle— for Argentina to continue requiring maximum priority to Interpol to search for these indictees since, following this criterion, they would be deemed to have already appeared in the proceedings against them. This would lead to the removal of red notices without giving the the judge a specific chance to question or arrest the indictees, if deemed appropriate. This is just another twist in the plot to achieve the impunity of the accused parties.

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Indeed, the agreement provides no guarantee for the judge to have the possibility to arrest the indictees. Should the former decide to hold them for trial through pre-trial detention after the alleged "examination", the plot is activated: as they have already appeared before the "Truth Commission", Interpol‘s red notices are removed, but it is not possible to hold the indictees for the purpose of the proceeding, thus rendering them even freer, with no restriction as to their movements, justice being bound hand and foot.

It is also worth noting that the Tehran hearings set forth in the memorandum are significantly far from what is deemed an examination pursuant to current procedural regulations (section 294 and related sections of the Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure). They can only be understood —in accordance with the text of the agreement— as a mere interview before commission members, judicial authorities and representatives from both countries. As already stated, within the scenario described by the treaty, the legal powers granted to Argentine justice are fully restricted. The agreement does not allow the Argentine judge to order indictees to appear through police force or to proceed with the abovementioned examination as it safeguards the rights guaranteed by Iranian law, which also prevents appearance through the use of police force, especially before a foreign judge (see section 8). Furthermore, the judge cannot order their arrest —if deemed appropriate— and/or their transfer to our country. The document does not guarantee the application of Argentine law in implementing this act; on the contrary, everything seems to indicate that the applicable law — based on territoriality reasons— would be Iranian law.

Consequently, it is completely false to affirm that the indictees would conform to law by merely appearing at the interview before the commission, as stipulated in paragraph 5.The broadness and vagueness of the instrument and the numerous possible interpretations would necessarily give rise to a debate, with the strong risk that this discussion could take place with red notices having already been removed, i.e. within a cover-up process that is still further consolidated. As it may be observed, everything has been built to favour impunity, with various possible alternatives to attain that goal. c.2) Impunity due to the impossibility to apply treaty provisions

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As previously stated, the mechanisms stipulated in the agreement to guarantee the impunity of

Iranian fugitives include the impossibility to apply its provisions due to restrictions arising from an intricate proceeding that leads to nothing and only serves to dilute accusations and promote non-incrimination, which is favoured by an endless succession of steps to be defined and the total lack of deadlines for their implementation. Specifically, the memorandum has not stipulated any term. No term has been established to create the commission, issue procedural rules, send evidence and information, prepare the report, or carry out hearings in Tehran. Nothing. No term has been established in this agreement. Why? Because its sole purpose is to favour and cover-up the indictees, thus guaranteeing their impunity. The agreement does not guarantee any law or proceeding – it only serves to guarantee impunity. In fact, in the proposal dated November 2013, Foreign Minister Timerman stated that he intended to fix one year as the term "...to conclude the mandate of the memorandum...".

However, in reality, he stipulated that that term would run only after the creation of the commission, which subordinates a specific term to an uncertain condition or circumstance, to which no time limits apply. This is equal to nothing. It was a new attempt to conceal the impunity mechanisms of the plan. Moreover, Iran has not answered the alleged proposal (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Information Document No. 279/13, "Declaracion de prensa leida por el canciller Timerman en Casa Rosada el domingo 24 de noviembre a las 21 horas", 24/11/2013).

In short, this omission in terms of deadlines and the intricate nature of the stipulated proceedings, also constitute safe conducts of impunity, given that they permit the allegation that an agreement was made between the parties, while making it politically viable to re-establish full relations between both states, without really solving the AMIA question. c.3) The ―Truth Commission‖ and the fabrication of an alternative hypothesis to disassociate the Iranian Nationals from the AMIA case.

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The criminal plan deployed has as its purpose to cover up for the Iranian Nationals indicted in the AMIA case, thus removing them from the reaches of the Argentine Judiciary, disassociating them from the judicial indictment hanging over them and, hence, guaranteeing their impunity and closing once and for all any investigation concerning them. This criminal plot was motivated by the interest of certain Argentine officials in approaching Iran on the geopolitical plane and re-establishing State-to-State trade relations. To do so, it was agreed, by way of conducts that were clearly criminal, to remove the impediments that have obstructed the bilateral relationship for years; in other words, the pending judicial question in the AMIA case. On this point, we will reveal the probatory elements that prove that the ―Truth Commission‖, as established in the memorandum of understanding signed with Iran, constitutes one of the principal paths in securing the exoneration of the Iranian indictees in connection with the AMIA attack, without regard to their real responsibility in the event, thus allowing the cover-up scheme denounced herein to be completed. Likewise, a list will be drawn up of the evidence that proves that the perpetrators and their accomplices, as integral parties to the plan, planned and made progress in fabricating an alternative, false but plausible, accusatory hypothesis with ―new‖ fraudulent evidence to illegally redirect the enquiry towards other indictees, and so permanently disassociate the Iranian nationals from any involvement in the attack, thus deceiving family members, victims, the Judiciary and the whole of society. c.3.a) The ―Truth Commission‖ and its true role in the plan.

The scheme devised in the agreement provides the tools to make progress towards that objective which, as can be appreciated, is much broader and more important than the simple removal of Interpol‘s red notices. Thus, the Memorandum of Understanding, and fundamentally the points that provide for the creation, formation, powers and obligations of the ―Truth Commission‖ (1 to 5 and 8) are drafted in such a way as to allow: 1) the legitimacy of the investigation pursued by the national justice system to be questioned, 2) the public officials who intervened in it to be discredited, 3) items of evidence and conclusions to be distorted, 4) the accusation against the current indictees to be discredited, and 5) the investigation to be redirected towards new culprits, as has permanently been requested by Iran and, now, has been criminally granted by certain Argentine

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authorities, in a U-turn on the position maintained by the government of Nestor Carlos Kirchner, and part of that of Cristina Fernandez. These actions, regardless of whether they are carried out individually or jointly, have as their purpose to generate a safe conduct designed to permanently cover up for the indictees, allowing them to evade the action of the judiciary with the aim of guaranteeing their impunity and ensuring that they are never again investigated. As stated above, in its wording the pact reveals a certain degree of subtlety to ensure that the underlying criminal objectives do not appear to be too grotesque in the eyes of the world. With that goal in mind, it was decided that the conclusions of the commission should not actually be binding, since that would have been too obvious. But in fact, it is as if they were, since both governments pledged to tie ―their future actions‖ to the discoveries and recommendations of the commission created which, as its name suggests, would unravel ―the truth.‖ This forces the Argentine State and its various bodies to take heed of the mentioned ruling. The commission could, as authorized in the agreement, fraudulently discredit the evidence obtained in the judicial case, and/or incorporate information or evidence that may turn out to be false or illegitimate and, thus redirect the investigation or create suspicions and mistrust that mean that ―new hypotheses‖ on the AMIA bombing could be introduced with ―new indictees‖ as protagonists who, in light of the ruling of the commission, are finally seen as the ―true perpetrators‖ of the attack. In this role of granting-questioning legitimacy, the commission has the power to disregard the actions taken by the Judiciary, and thus disarticulate the indictments, without there being a review mechanism on its ruling which, once notified and despite the fact that it could be refuted at a later stage in other areas, would irreversibly call legitimacy into question. It should be noted that its mere creation has already flagrantly discredited the Argentine Judiciary which, in the light of the agreement, seems to need foreign endorsements in order to advance with its requests and proceedings. In short, the text of the agreement contains an instrument with the institutional capacity to perpetrate the cover-up denounced herein: the ―Truth Commission.‖ After a thorough analysis of the letter and the spirit, as well as the scope, of the Memorandum of Understanding, the following questions arise: Why was it not foreseen that the Argentine judge might take statements in accordance with the law, as established in Argentine legislation? If it was claimed that the Iranians had agreed to accept Argentine jurisdiction and to declare before our judge, why was this not included in the written agreement? Why were the judicial

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powers to order the appearance by public force of reluctant indictees and/or, if necessary, their subsequent arrest not protected? Why was it agreed that the hearings should take place in Tehran, under Iranian law, and where the prosecutor in the case is the subject of an arrest warrant, precisely for having accused Iranian officials? Why is the agreement said to be compatible with Argentine law when its enforcement involves ignoring the regulations in force, which are the sole guarantee that protects the criminal proceedings from being declared null and void in the future? Why was no deadline agreed upon, although communication with Interpol was authorized without the treaty being ratified and in force? If Iran maintains it has evidence concerning the case, why does the agreement not request that it should be presented to the Argentine Judiciary? Why was a commission going by the name of ―Truth Commission‖ set up with the power to challenge the actions of the Argentine Judiciary? Why was it accepted that the Argentine Judiciary should be scrutinized and tried by an extrajudicial body with illegal judicial powers? Why did the Executive encroach upon the investigation of a criminal case under way, and not hesitate to infringe the republican principle of government and the clear prohibition contained in Art. 109 of the National Constitution? Why did the lies and the claim that negotiations started in September 2012 continue, even though the Iranian authorities had no legal restrictions or state secrets that might prevent them from acknowledging that they had begun long before? Why was the promise to notify the victims and the family members as to the progress of the negotiations, prior to striking any agreement, not honoured? Why was the overwhelming rejection caused by the memorandum in the institutions affected by the attack and, fundamentally, in various groups of family members and victims who had voiced their disagreement, overlooked? Many more similar questions could also be posed. All these questions have just one simple and institutionally terrible answer: behind this pact there lies a criminal plan designed to secure the impunity of all the Iranian accused, creating a body that could completely challenge the legitimacy of the accusations of the Argentine Judiciary in that regard. In its text, the memorandum has the potential to challenge the conclusions drawn by the Argentine Judiciary on the basis of the evidence obtained and in accordance with the law. In its text, it was agreed to call ―truth‖ that which emanates from a body created by political powers and illegally endowed with judicial powers. That is, in itself, extremely serious, but it takes on scandalous proportions when the details of the negotiations are known, which the participants openly put forward in the conversations that will be described in the following point:

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c.3.b) New hypothesis, new indictees and new evidence: the path to impunity The criminal plan ordered by Cristina Fernandez, and mainly orchestrated by Hector Timerman to free the Iranian indictees from the accusations made and endorsed by the Argentine Judiciary not only provided for the disassociation from the case of the fugitives, but also established that other fabricated culprits should occupy their place in order to close the circle of impunity at any price. Hence, the creation of a new criminal hypothesis that explains the attack from another standpoint and which redirects the investigation towards ―new culprits‖ was a fundamental and very useful piece in the cover-up. It should be noted that redirecting the enquiry to new culprits has always been the solution suggested and requested by the Islamic Republic of Iran. They wanted the accusations against their citizens to be dropped and the investigation to be redirected in order to discover, on their terms, the ―true perpetrators‖. Now, the Argentine officials and accomplices involved in the cover-up plot were prepared to accept such an approach but, secretly, they acknowledged the truth: that it was not a question of finding the ―true‖ perpetrators but of fabricating a new hypothesis, obtaining sufficient evidence to make it credible, and accusing innocent third parties, even though the ones responsible, as the judicial evidence suggests, are those who are actually indicted. That is exactly how it was. The accused accepted and helped to fulfil this scandalous goal, seeking to invalidate the judicial accusations made in the worst terrorist attack carried out in our country, by accusing individuals who were already known to be innocent. Consequently, in November 2012 —that is, before the signing of the memorandum— those involved in the cover-up were already working on fabricating ―new indictees‖ for the attack who, of course, had to be alien to Iran. In that line of action, Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil had already had a meeting with Dr. Hector Luis Yrimia, the former prosecutor in the case and former investigating judge, currently linked to a sector of the Intelligence Secretariat and a participant in the plot denounced. In his words: ―…I have a few things to tell you… I had a chat with the prosecutor… The prosecutor in the case… the previous prosecutor, not the one who‘s there now… The one who knows all about it is the one I‘m telling you… the prosecutor in the case…‖. He then went on to point out that Yrimia had contacted him through Fernando Esteche: ―…And the one who introduced me to him is Fernando‖ (Communication dated 4/11/12, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012- 11-04-130024-6, CD 182).

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With respect to the construction of the new hypothesis, which was false but necessary to remove the accusation made against the indicted Iranian Nationals, Fernado Esteche concluded: ―…they want to create a new enemy of the AMIA, a new culprit for the AMIA [attack], for example. The need to build it. They‘ll need to start building consensus on this…‖, and, from the conversation it is apparent that the task was assigned to the Intelligence Secretariat or, at least, to a sector of such agency. In constructing this ―new enemy,‖ since ―they won‘t be able to say that the Israelis did it‖ because clearly that would not be credible, they had to create a false hypothesis, and they even spoke of involving ―a connection with local fascists‖. (Communication dated 18/12/12, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18- 183332-8, CD 226). At a time at which neither the judiciary nor the family members or victims of the bombing knew what was happening with the negotiations between Argentina and Iran, these ―operators‖ knew perfectly well that a change of hypothesis was coming which involved redirecting the enquiry towards ―new indictees‖ who would replace the accused Iranian nationals, all based on false evidence. That is how it was, since they were precisely some of those entrusted with putting together the new false hypothesis to divert the investigation from its true course. The objective of generating this forged hypothesis and redirecting the enquiry was: ―the essence of the plot, the core of the plot… is Iran‘s innocence‖. It was also said that: ―…it‘s Iran‘s innocence along with the innocence of the community as the local connection…‖ (Communication dated 14/02/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02- 14-164341- 10, CD 284). For that reason, they were planning: ―…to build a new enemy of the AMIA, a new culprit for the AMIA attack…‖, and they acknowledged that the accessories in the cover-up ―…are going to offer you all a whitewash…‖ in reference to the Iranians (Communication dated 18/12/2012, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908. File B-1009-2012-12- 18-18332-8, CD 226). In the same vein: ―I reckon we‘re going to clear things up…‖ (Conversation of 1/6/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3964-0799, File 224753, CD 0086). They also knew that the ―Truth Commission‖ had not been created to investigate anything at all, but to legitimize the lie that was being fabricated. In fact, in conversations on the same day on which the pact with Iran was signed, it was concluded that one of the two parties, either Argentina or Iran, had to appear as wronged by the actions of the ―Truth Commission‖ as foreseen in the agreement. Literally: ―…someone is going to leave here with mud on his face…‖ to which Khalil, the voice of Iran on this issue, agreed: ―…Obviously, it‘s all been taken care of…‖, but he clarified that it would not be the Iranians and concluded: ―…how on

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earth can it be someone on our side, idiot? If we‘re the ones sitting at the table…‖. (Communication dated 27/1/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01- 27-113208-14, CD 266). It was particularly revealing to note that a contact of the stature of Khalil knew, at the same time as the signing of the agreement, that everything had been taken care of, that the Iranian fugitives were going to be disassociated from the case by the commission and that those who would be wronged were the ones on the Argentine side who had made the accusations against the Iranian Nationals. Moreover, on the day following the signing of the agreement the intelligence agent identified as ―Allan‖ contacted Khalil and said: ―Take it easy, we‘ve won. Well, we‘ve won a match, as I told you, but you didn‘t believe in me…‖ (Communication dated 28/01/13, Party to the Call No. 11- 315-6908. File B-1009-2013-01-28-135732-18.wav, CD 267). This kind of communication between an Argentine official and the contact person for Iran, Jorge Khalil, is particularly striking. Obviously, the questions concerning the memorandum and, fundamentally, the cover- up, had been agreed beforehand and hence the expressions of clarification, such as ―I told you, but you didn‘t believe in me‖ and ―we‘ve already won‖ which reveal that a certain sector of Argentine intelligence, by presidential decision, was operating jointly and in line with the interests of Tehran. Likewise, they talked about the fears Khalil had expressed concerning the role of Timerman in the negotiations ―… let‘s see whether he can disguise it… besides, he doesn‘t understand…‖. But these fears were of no importance because it was: ―order and order and more orders‖ in allusion to the fact that the Foreign Minister merely obeyed the orders received from Ms. Fernandez (Communication dated 28/01/13, Party to the Call No. 11-315-6908. File B-1009- 2013-01-28-135732-18.wav, CD 267). This conversation also serves to prove that the parties to the plot knew perfectly well that it was ―a cover-up‖, that is to say, that an agreement had to be to drawn up very skilfully so that its wording would not crudely expose the sophisticated underlying plan. On another occasion, ―Allan‖ estimated ―... that in a year and a half we‘ll have good news ...‖ covertly referring to the full acquittal of the accused Iranian nationals in the case. And he said: ―... this is perfect for us, perfect at international level ...‖ and concluded: ―... relax, it WAS ALL AGREED HIGH UP...‖ (Communication of 6/2/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-06-203822-26, CD 276). It should be mentioned that ―us‖ included Khalil, that is, the interests of Iran.

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Regardless of the evidence, the facts or their actual role in the bombings, the Iranian nationals were to be disassociated from the case, Iran would have ―its name cleared‖, and all had been ―decided at the highest level‖, i.e., the plan had the presidential seal. This is of extreme institutional gravity. The order to commit the crime was issued directly and personally from the President of the Argentine Republic, and her Foreign Minister, other lower officials and third parties were entrusted with its implementation. The actual scope and extent of their responsibility will be determined by the Court‘s investigation. It is worth reiterating that the Memorandum of Understanding signed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Argentine Republic is the device specially designed to present to the world a legal camouflage concealing a sophisticated impunity plan benefiting international terrorists that are fugitives from the Argentine justice. The evidence proving that the mastermind behind the cover-up plan to provide impunity to the Iranian nationals accused by the Argentine Judiciary of bombing the AMIA building was the very President of the Argentine Republic, Cristina Fernandez, is conclusive. Now, the masterminds and participants of this cover-up had come to the conclusion that there is now a new global scenario where Iran‘s position has changed. And this ―new world‖ would favour -in a way- the realization of this criminal plan, since there are interests and situations that require a rapprochement with Iran, that need to have Iran‘s ―name cleared‖ and that demand the emergence of ―new enemies‖. This new scenario could contribute to the credibility of the version invented to disassociate the indicted Iranian nationals from the AMIA case. While Cristina Fernandez openly asserted that she would not allow ―... this terrible tragedy that happened to us, Argentinians, to be used as a chess piece on the international board ...‖ or ―... for international geopolitics purposes...‖, one of her accomplices, ―Allan‖, recognized through parallel channels that ―…we are in a different country, in a different global situation, and we need to work in a different context ...‖ (Communication of 06/01/2013, Party to the Call No. 11- 3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). There is a new global context, ―we are in a different country‖ and hence the need to build a new AMIA enemy. It was no longer useful to accuse the Iranian nationals, even though they were truly responsible for the attack; it was necessary to restore the ties with Iran and the local Iranian community. The evidence proves it. It has been revealed that ―... another hypothesis will come up, with different evidence...‖ (Communication of 01/06/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43).

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In other words, the responsibilities were to be determined by the international political and geopolitical needs of the masterminds. The evidence presented was of little importance. It had been arranged that the AMIA case would be used as a piece to satisfy geopolitical interests in the new global scenario. Ms. Fernandez‘s words are indeed ironic. It was said that, once the new hypothesis and its false evidence came up, the undersigned would be left high and dry ―... because he never saw it, the evidence, what‘s going to come up now ... it is conclusive evidence...‖ (Communication of 01/06/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). In fact, they knew that in order to discredit the undersigned and the investigation conducted according to law, and to develop the cover-up with a view to disassociating the Iranian nationals from the case, it was necessary to create a new -and false- hypothesis, including ―unseen evidence‖, never presented in the case. That is, the participants in the cover-up knew that a new hypothesis for the attack would be presented, but with ―different evidence‖, evidence never seen by the undersigned. There was talk of fabricating evidence to discredit the current and thorough investigation and thus taking away legitimacy from the accusation involving the indicted Iranian nationals. Now, it is a truism to say that the new hypothesis had to seem plausible. Consequently, it was decided to resort to certain individuals who had had access to the investigation of the AMIA case, such as former Federal Prosecutor and former investigating judge, Hector Luis Yrimia. This contact was aimed at obtaining objective data of the case which would turn false evidence credible. Mr. Yrimia acted as prosecutor in the first moments of the investigation14 which were quite transcendental. He has had access to the records of the case and was able to contribute information to formulate a hypothesis supported by elements that were already in the case, which would entail a greater degree of credibility to the fabricated version of the facts. It should be noted that in November 2012, long before the signing of a treaty with Iran, Jorge ‗Yussuf‘ Khalil had already met with Mr. Yrimia. He stated: ―... I have a few things to tell you

14 The same day of the attack, Mr. Hector Luis Yrimia, the then Trial Prosecutor in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters, was appointed by the Attorney General‘s Office, together with other prosecutors, to participate in the investigation of the AMIA bombings (Resolution No. 37/94 of 18/07/1994). According to that provision, these officials could act jointly, alternatively or successively to reconstruct the material facts of the bombings and proceed to arrest the instigators and perpetrators of, and accomplices and accessories to these crimes. This decision was adopted by express instruction of the Minister of Justice, Mr. Rodolfo Carlos Barra (Resolution No. 83 of the Ministry of Justice, 18/07/1994). Later, on November 23 of that year, he became investigating judge, thus abandoning his position in the Public Prosecutor‘s Office (see pp. 508/511 and 2054 of the main file).

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... I talked to the prosecutor ... The prosecutor in the case ... the former prosecutor, not the current one... The prosecutor who has the knowledge is this one I‘m talking about ... the prosecutor in the case‖. He then said that the contact with Yrimia has allegedly come through Fernando Esteche: ―... And the one who introduced me to him is Fernando‖ (Communication of 4/11/12, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-04-130024-6, CD 182). These contacts were confirmed in a subsequent conversation, held in December 2012, in which Esteche told Khalil that ―the prosecutor in the AMIA case is one of them, Yrimia‖ (Communication of 18/12/2012, Party to the Call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18- 183332-8, CD 226). ―Them‖ refers to a sector of the Intelligence Secretariat. These references indicate that Mr. Yrimia would respond to the same sector of the Intelligence Secretariat as ―Allan‖, who claims: ―... Yrimia is my employee… he is involved in every matter, didn‘t you realize?‖ (Communication of 10/07/2013, Party to the Call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-10-07-141519-20, CD 171). It was precisely Fernando Esteche who suggested Yrimia as a source of information to formulate the new hypothesis ―this is very specific and can be used for any particular thesis other than.... third country or whatever, any of the things that are to be resolved, it will be useful because it is information‖ (Communication 18/12/2012, Party to the Call No. 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226). It is clear that there are several hypotheses to destruct the accusation. They have to choose the best one, the most credible one, and so they need accurate information. In this respect, Mr. Yrimia has been one of the sources willing to provide such information precisely because he was in a privileged position of direct contact with the records of the case due to his role as prosecutor in the AMIA case. In sum, for the formulation of the ―new hypothesis‖, the participants contacted Mr. Hector Yrimia who, for the purposes of the plan, has the following ―credentials‖: 1) he has specific personal knowledge of the AMIA bombings, for he has been, among others, one of the first prosecutors in the case; 2) he has ties with the sector of the Intelligence Secretariat responsible for the construction of the new false hypothesis; 3) he has direct links with the Iranian agent Jorge ‗Yussuf‘ Khalil, due to the relationship of the latter with Fernando Esteche; and 4) he talks about it in his conversations with Jorge Khalil. There is no doubt that Yrimia was able to provide first-hand information on the case. And as the decision to have a ―new enemy‖ had already been made, it was vital to have information

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supported by data in the records of the case, and which would allow fabricating the most credible of all false versions.

So, in the conversations recorded, different ideas were considered regarding possible alternative versions, like: ―they will not be able to say it was the Israelis‖; a ―connection of local fascists‖ could be blamed; or ―...they are reporting that they themselves were the ones of the self-attack. So, straight out and we start weaving another variable ―...If the Traffic falls down, forget it, everything falls down, not only did it fall down, but it also turned over…‖(Communication of 12/18/2012, client 11¬3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18- 183332-8, CD 226, Communication of 02/13/2013, client -3315-6908, File B-1009- 2013-02- 13-184206-28, CD 283 and Communication of 2/14/2013, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009- 2013- 02-14-164341 -10, CD 284). And that conversation shows again that everything had been agreed in advance. When the alternative of a ―new hypothesis‖ was suggested: ―…If the Traffic falls down, forget it, everything falls down…, not only did it fall down, but it also turned over…, Khalil pointed out: ―It‘s done... Are you kidding me?... it‘s done, I can‘t talk or say anything, but IT‘S ALL DONE‖ (Communication of 2/14/13, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-14-164341-10, CD 284; the highlighted text is for emphasis). Impunity had already been agreed outside the text of the agreement. In summary, from the evidence obtained it can be deduced that the Intelligence Sector reporting to the Presidency, to which ―Allan‖ reports, focused on the construction of a new enemy, a new hypothesis that could explain the attack so that it disassociates the accused Iranian nationals from the cover-up plan herein reported. So, from the steps that were taken by the cover-up participants, it can be deduced that the construction of the false lead that would move away the investigation of Tehran implied the fabrication of evidence incriminating innocent third parties, and converted them into new accused and, according to the whole tale, the ―true guilty persons‖. Everything remained on stand-by due to the Iranian denial to sign the Memorandum of Understanding, because the red notices were in effect.

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As was said at the beginning, the cover-up plot conveys not only the disassociation from the accusation through fraudulent means, of those who have been legally indicted with grounds for a crime, but it also implies falsely accusing third parties. The purpose of building this false alternative theory has been to contribute to the non- incrimination of the accused Iranian nationals and to end the nightmare that began for them in 2007, when the undersigned was able to have Interpol accept the detention with red notices for the accused. The participants in the cover-up understood it this way. Proof of this is what they said in this regard: ―...the essence, the core … is Iran‘s innocence…/the rest is secondary….‖, and also ―...it‘s Iran‘s innocence with innocence of the community as the local connection,...'‘'' (Communication of 14/02/2013, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-14-164341 -10, CD 284). The gravity of these actions is enormous, especially if it is considered that the first decision was taken by the highest national public authority and involves the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a

National Congressman, certain sectors of Argentine intelligence and local contacts linked to government officers, among others. Finally, while the participants in this fact -some very close to the presidential entourage, as in the case of ―Allan‖, for example-, acknowledged, in private, that the changes in the world scenario demanded a new positioning in respect of Iran, that would result in the invention of new culprits for the AMIA case, with the consequent removal of the obstacle that, according to the Argentine authorities, has hampered the bilateral relationship; on the other side, the

President constructed an official discourse that was very different from the reality managed by the participants in her plan. In effect, Cristina Fernandez publicly expressed: ―...we will never allow the use of the AMIA tragedy as a chess piece in the chessboard of foreign geopolitical interests‖" (Twitter message from Cristina Fernandez‘s account on 27 January 2013, 10:32). And she added: ―I will not allow this terrible tragedy that happened to the Argentinians to be used as a chess piece in the international chessboard‖, and insisted:

I will not let anyone use the Argentinians‘ tragedy for international geopolitical

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purposes (Cristina Kirchner‘s Twitter account― 04/03/2013 5:08 PM; Message from President Cristina Fernandez to the Legislative Assembly on the occasion of the opening of the 131st period of ordinary sessions of the Argentine National Congress on 1/03/2013). In this long chain of lies, the head of State was followed –precisely- by her Minister of Foreign Affairs, who, months ago, had issued an announcement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs which, while announcing a recess in the official negotiations, said: ―...The National

Government ratifies that their only commitment is to the victims and their families‘ right to find due reparation in truth and justice. Argentina states again that within such objective, there is no room for own or foreign geopolitical interests...'''' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release Nº 360/12 of 31/10/2012, the underlined text is for emphasis). Neither the President‘s speech nor the Foreign Minister‘s announcement was true. They themselves were the principal actors of a plan that sacrificed the case related to the AMIA bombing in the search of interests unrelated to the search for justice.

A President who publicly loves to tell the survivors and families of the victims that she‘s seeking truth and justice; who states that she will not let the AMIA case be used in the worldwide geopolitical game of chess; who has taken this issue in her hands because the case was paralyzed, when in fact, she has ordered the destruction of the case out and cover-up of the accused. It‘s thus frightening, to verify that it is all about acting and manipulating facts and persons, since the truth is that this same President has ordered the Foreign Minister, officers from her intelligence service, and other persons supporting her administration to execute a criminal plan, decided by herself, and to construct a false hypothesis to put an end to the accusation against the Iranian nationals in the AMIA case. d) Signs of a secret agreement entered into with Iran outside the Memoradum of Understanding. At the time of announcing the signature of the agreement from Adis Abeba, Ethiopia, Minister Timerman found himself compelled to clarify: This agreement was reached in a direct dialogue with Iran and there are no secret clauses or any other issue with the government of

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that country... ‖ (Timerman‘s statements after signing the agreement with his Iranian counterpart to investigate the AMIA bombing, Pink House, Presidency, 27/01/2013). The reason for such clarification could not be understood. This agreement is supposed not to have any secret or hidden clauses. As months passed, that preventive statement of the Minister would gain true sense. In May 2013, when Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil reported the disappointment he had found in Tehran due to the red notices issue, he simply said what had happened: ―...there‘s a little… between you and me…there is a little disappointment over there… Disappointment, yes, yes, yes… it looks like… It looks like this bloody Jew has screwed up… there was something signed, where the precautionary measures were also mentioned I think...‖ (Communication 8 A clear reference to Interpol‘s red notices of 11/5/2013, client 11-3238-4699, FileB-1009-2013-05-1 l-083146-8.wav, CD 0022). Khalil‘s words show the existence of another document signed where the removal of Interpol‘s red notices was included. That is, a broader document than the wording included in the memorandum of understanding of 27 January 2013. This is verified with the statements of the Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi who, in March 2013, said: ―...―The [contents] of the agreement between Iran and Argentina in relation to the AMIA case will be made public at the appropriate time and the question [of the Iranian indictees]…is included and we are following it up…‖, in clear allusion to an agreement different from the memorandum (―Tehran insists accord with Argentina includes Interpol lifting red notices against Iranian suspects‖, Mercopress, 19/03/2013). Another episode that reveals the existence of secret pacts between both parties should be added to this. There were accurate signs that led to doubtas to whether the hearings in Tehran were going to take place, even when they do not even constitute true interrogatories for Argentine law. In fact, the spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ramin Mehmanparast, stated: ―...The subject of the interrogation of an Iranian responsible person [in reference to Vahidi] is completely false… It looks like those who are worried about this agreement spread this kind of information…‖ (―Irán ratificó su adhesion plena al memorándum con Argentina― [Iran

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ratified its full endorsement of the memorandum with Argentina], Página 12, 12/02/2013). The media informed that: ―...The spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Ramin Mehmanparast, said that the request for interrogation of some officers of the Islamic Republic of Iran within the framework of the review of the AMIA case is not true…‖ (―Mehmanparast: solicitud para interrogar a funcionarios iraníes sobre el caso AMIA, es falsa‖, IR1B, 11/02/2013. [Mehmanparast: the request to interrogate Iranian officers regarding the AMIA case is false‖, IRIB, 11/12/2013]). The next day, Foreign Minister Salehi stated: ―...We have signed an agreement with Argentina about the solution of the AMIA case and both parties have committed to it…‖ (―El canciller de Irán dice que negoció durante dos años el acuerdo con Argentina‖, Clarín, 12/02/2013 [―Iranian Foreign Minister says he negotiated during two years the agreement with Argentina‖, Clarin 12/02/2013]). So, in order to calm down the new ongoing controversy, in the middle of the Parliamentary consideration of the agreement, Minister Timerman gave the following explanation about the Iranians‘ statements, addressing a National Senator: ―You said yesterday that the Iranian government denied that the suspects were going to be interrogated. Who said so? A spokesman. Do your spokesmen speak for you or do you speak for yourself? Because the Iranian Foreign Minister, Dr Salehi, an hour later said that Iran will honour all the items of the Memorandum. Do you believe the spokesmen more than the Foreign Minister himself?...‖ (Hector Timerman‘s words, shorthand version of the Plenary Session of Commissions, Upper Chamber, Honourable

Congress of the Nation, on 13 February 2013). But it was a fallacy. Another one. Salehi had not denied the statements of his own spokesman. That would be strange. His spokesman had transmitted an important and accurate message. Salehi had only confirmed his commitment to comply with the pact, and that in no way meant that the then Minister of Defence had to appear in the hearings foreseen in the agreement. With his failed attempt to interpret the intimate will of the Iranian regime better than the Iranian officers, Foreign Minister Timerman concealed what was really taking place: the execution of a cover-up plot herein detailed.

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In fact, the true evidence of the existence of a secret pact between Salehi and Timerman under which it was agreed that Ahmad Vahidi would never appear in those hearings arises from the communication between Jorge Khalil and Luis D‘Elia, transcribed as follows: D‘Elia: Infobae is saying that the interrogatory of Vahidi was rejected. What do you know?? Khalil: No, I don‘t know anything, Luis. D‘Elia: Huh?

Khalil: I don‘t know anything. D‘Elia: Because you see, this goes… just one day before the parliamentary debate… Khalil: But....erm.. D‘Elia: What if it is a red herring? Khalil: Yes, a red herring. We‘ll talk later in person and I‘ll tell you. D‘Elia: But don‘t leave me … Why is it a red herring? Khalil: Man, I cannot tell you over the phone what is happening, but … it‘s within the framework, Luis. D‘Elia: Oh, oh....ok, ok. Was it previously discussed? Khalil: Sure, sure. I cannot speak over the phone. This bloody phone is more tapped than mine and yours is yet more tapped than mine. D‘Elia: But was it known in advance??... isn‘t it a surprise? Khalil: No. D‘Elia: Ok

Khalil: It was… both parties, it was known. D‘Elia: Uh Khalil: It‘s even deeper, Luis, I have to explain it to you. (Communication of 12/2/2013, client 11-3315-6908, FileB-1009- 2013-02-12-100525-14, CD 282). That is to say, it was not only the fall of the red notices. It was also agreed that, in practice, the then Iranian Minister of Defence and current fugitive from Argentine justice, Ahmad Vahidi, would never sit for the interrogatories, no matter what the wording of the Memorandum said. It

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was agreed between the parties, it had been ―previously discussed‖ and, as suggested by the conversation, the agreement was ―still deeper‖. This evidence reveals, in a conclusive way, the existence of secret agreements outside the wording of the Memorandum, some of them written and signed, which include questions that cannot be known by the public opinion. This contributes to the certification of the plan herein reported, since everything openly concerning such plan has been –in principle- hidden from public examination. e) Mohsen Rabbani and the impunity plan During this criminal plan, the different advances were immediately communicated to one of the fugitives from Argentine Justice, accused of participating in the AMIA bombing, and direct beneficiary of the cover-up herein reported: Mohsen Rabbani. Every step of the plot and every message known by Tehran‘s agent in Buenos Aires, Jorge Khalil, was communicated to the indictee Mohsen Rabbani.

Phone calls that constitute clear examples: ―...today we have finished a meeting with the Ministry of Planning, De Vido, and he is determined to send YPF‘s highest authorities to make arrangements with the Islamic Republic and the transaction may be carried out with grais or other things…‖, to which Rabbani replied: ―...Send it to me for an assessment...‖ (Communication of 20/5/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05¬20-114842-2, CD 31). So, the Argentine government proposals were sent to be assessed and decided upon by one of the accused of the terrorist attack, who, after an evaluation, answered: ―...there are some sectors of the government here that told me they are ready to sell oil to Argentina...and to buy weapons as well...‖ (Communication of 28/5/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05- 28-155549-2, CD39). This shows several things. First, Rabbani has huge decision-making power and political weight within the regime, which has enabled him to participate in person in the negotiations with the accessories after the fact.

This fugitive indictee has capacity to decide over commercial questions between both States

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that, as reported, constituted a central motor to advance with this cover-up. All this indicates that Rabbani himself has indirectly participated –through intermediaries like Jorge Khalil- in the commercial negotiations that encouraged precisely his own cover-up. And all this unbeknownst to the public. Second, and taking into account that the meeting with Minister De Vido was carried out ―because the boss requested it‖ (Communication of 20/5/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-

1009-2013-05-20- 111124-8, CD 31), one of the ways in which the messages and proposals submitted by Cristina Fernandez, through her Minister of Federal Planning, Julio De Vido, the operator Luis D‘Elia and the link with Tehran, Jorge Khalil, got to the indictee Mohsen Rabbani is hereby proved. In other words, the President of Argentina, Dr. Cristina Fernandez negotiated, through third persons, with fugitive Mohsen Rabbani, over different questions regarding the cover-up that united them in a criminal duet of cover-up person and ―covered up‖ person.

Third. The case herein recorded shows that while Dr. Fernandez publicly assured that the agreement was going to contribute to the judicial case, secretly and in a clandestine way, she negotiated for oil with one of the suspects of the largest terrorist attack suffered by our country. And Rabbani, instead of being worried about his procedural situation, was organizing the negotiation for oil encouraged by the President, related to his own cover-up, and including the possibility of buying weapons from Argentina. Fourth. This possibility of buying weapons from Argentina was informed by Mohsen Rabbani to a person of his entourage, Adalberto Assad, who that same day was coming to meet with an officer of the Argentine government, who was going to act as an intermediary to arrange a personal meeting with the President for him (Communication of 28/5/13, client 11- 3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05-28-155549-2, CD 39). Fifth. These phone calls also show that Mohsen Rabbani followed and follows up closely the meetings and negotiations relating to the agreement that, as reported herein, serve the purpose –among other issues- of his personal cover-up. Thanks to Khalil, Rabbani was better informed than the families and victims of the attack, than the local Jewish leaders and also than the

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Argentine judicial authorities, none of whom, as of May 2013, were aware of these negotiations. There are other examples of Mohsen Rabbani negotiating, sending messages to his intermediaries, for them to eventually reache President‘s Office: '''‗...Iran wants good relationships, we…, it‘s the truth that Iran wants good relationships… And now Iran is growing, so they have to make the most of it as soon as possible, now that they are willing. He also received messages in reply: ―...They also… the government also wants to have a good relationship...‖ with reference to the Argentine government (Communication of 28/5/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05- 28-155549-2, CD 39). There are other examples of communications with Rabbani that prove that he was informed of every aspect regarding his procedural situation, the AMIA case, the rapprochement between Tehran and Buenos Aires and, naturally, the Memorandum of Understanding, a path to his impunity (Communication of 27/2/13, client 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2013-02¬27-125331-

24, CD 297, Communication of 20/5/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20- 114842-2, CD 31, Communication of 28/5/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013- 05-28- 155549-2, CD 39; Communication of 24/11/13, client 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-11 - 24-103813-4, CD 219 and Communication of 4/2/14, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014- 02-04-093431-30, CD 291). Within the framework of this criminal plot, Jorge Khalil has been Rabbani‘s person of confidence, who has informed him constantly from Buenos Aires: ―...Sheikh, be sure that tonight, when I get home, I will send you a report of everything, everything I am doing… ‖, showing –once again- his subordination to Mohsen Rabbani (Communication of 20/01/2014, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-20-160302-28, CD 276). Rabbani has recognized this bond in different times: ―I mistreat you in confidence because you are responsible for everything‖ (Communication of 13/2/13, client 11- 3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-13- 184206-28, CD 283 and in Communication of 14/2/13, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013- 02-14¬164341-10, CD 284), or ―...do not mess things up. You work with me...‖

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(Communication of 24/11/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-11- 24-103813-4, CD 219). Moreover, these telephone communications conclusively evidence that Mohsen Rabbani in Iran continues operating and making decisions for Tehran‘s regime and providing funds to support the structure devised by him in Argentine territory during the decade that preceded the attack against the AMIA premises, a structure supported by him until now with the aid of his entourage (Communication made on 20 May 2013, line No. 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013- 05- 20-114842-2, CD 31, Communication made on 28 May 2013, line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-28-155549-2, CD 39; Communication made on 19 January 2014, line No. 11¬3964-0799, File IN- 12177-20140119-003044, CD 49; Communication made on 1 January 2014, line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-20-160302-28, CD 276, Communication made on 4 February 2014, line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-2-04-093431-30, CD 291).

But above all, the events recorded in the communications obtained by judicial order, are a blatant example of how certain Argentine government authorities –through intermediaries- have been negotiating and agreeing joint strategies with one of the individuals accused of involvement in the terrorist attack against AMIA. Item V below details all the actions carried out by the President, the Foreign Minister and other individuals involved in the cover-up plan to thoroughly execute their criminal scheme. V.- Actions aimed at promoting the criminal scheme: a) Discredit campaign The cover-up plan included a media and discourse-based strategy aimed at destroying the credibility of the Argentine Judiciary and of those in charge of the investigation into the attack blaming them for the deadlock in the proceedings, in addition to accusing them of bias and essentially of being influenced by interests alien to the search for truth and justice. Indeed, it was an actual and –let it be said- nefarious campaign to discredit the current judicial investigation into the AMIA bombing, which indeed was another means to carry out the cover- up plan, since by discrediting the accusation, ―new hypotheses‖ and ―new‖ authors of the attack

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can be presented and be made to look plausible and, in doing so, the accused Iranian nationals and mainly Tehran can be completely disassociated from any terrorist involvement in the attack. Discredit is not harmless and contributes to the cover-up scheme herein denounced. a. 1) The case is a ―fabricated case‖ This stereotypical expression has been the spearhead in the attempt to challenge the focused Argentine judicial investigation which has been able to establish, to a great extent, who were the individuals involved in the terrorist attack carried out in Buenos Aires on July 18, 1994. On the other hand, the ―fabricated case‖ has always been the official version of Tehran‘s regime. It is merely a communicational strategy for its defence that the Islamic Republic of Iran has successfully implemented. According to this false assumption, there are foreign interests promoted by members of political factions from Israel and/or the United States of America who were able to influence and manipulate the Argentine judiciary to make up an accusation involving Iranian nationals in the

AMIA bombing, for the purpose of discrediting and destroying the reputation of the Islamic Republic of Iran by claiming that it was responsible for a terrorist attack carried out in South America. There is no evidence whatsoever of these accusations lightly made. There could not be any evidence either simply because the alleged manipulation by foreign powers never occurred and the conclusions reached by the investigation into the attack are nothing but the result of the analysis of the evidence produced in the proceedings. The fact that a specified sector or country likes the evidence produced or not, is something completely unrelated to the undersigned. Since the introduction of the cover-up plan by certain authorities of the Argentine Government, the discredit campaign - which up to then had been solely orchestrated from Tehran- showed subtle shift to a different direction. The highest authorities of the Argentine Republic -including the President and the Foreign Minister- far from objecting to the Iranian rhetoric, seemed to subscribe to it and helped to bolster the discrediting narrative. Previously, Luis D‘Elia had acted as a local mouthpiece for this version, but this cost him his position during the presidency of Nestor Kirchner, who did not allow his officers to

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groundlessly call into question any conclusions drawn by the Judiciary and the Public Prosecution. D‘Elia never stopped giving this false and discrediting account. Within that context, while D‘Elia worked on asserting that foreign interests had managed to influence and manipulate the Argentine Judiciary to fabricate the accusation against Iran, the President reinforced the rhetoric through her Twitter account by saying: ...―we shall never lett the AMIA tragedy be used as a chess piece on the chessboard of foreign geopolitical interests…‖ (Message on Cristina Fernandez‘s Twitter account on 27 January 2013 at 10:32 am). This sentence was praised by D‘Elia himself, who underlined that the President had made reference to the use of the AMIA topic in connection with geopolitical issues of other countries (―Causa AMIA: Para D‘Elia, los acusados iraníes van a ser sobreseídos,‖ [―AMIA case: D‘Elia says the accused Iranian Nationals will be acquitted‖] Infobae, March 1, 2013, ). It is disturbing to confirm that, contrary to what has been stated by President Fernandez, the AMIA case was used as a pivotal argument to re-establish bilateral trade relationss with the

Islamic Republic of Iran, as a result of a change in the geopolitical vision. a. 2) The case is in a deadlock To gain the support of the public opinion and parliamentary approval, it was strategically sought to present the Memorandum of Understanding – an important piece in the cover-up scheme- as the sole alternative for progress in the case, as the right path to take, not because it was the ideal means, for nobody could believe that- but because there were no other alternatives left and there was nothing to lose.

Thus, they sought to plant the idea that the legal proceedings for the investigation of the attack had come to a complete standstill years ago. Through this entirely false claim, it was strategically intended to make the public believe that the memorandum provided the only possibility for progress in the case, and that, although the Memorandum was not ideal and certain aspects offered room for improvement, it was better than the standstill of the case. To sum up, it was false but it was said that nothing could be lost by trying this option. To support this argument, Timerman said: ―...―For the first time, there is a written commitment on the part of Iran… so that the AMIA case can overcome its current complete standstill… I

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repeat, its current complete standstill‖ and then he clarified that he referred to ―....the pending legal proceedings which have shown no progress whatsoever in recent years‖ and he warned the legislators: ――It is up to you to decide whether the case progresses or remains at a standstill‖ and he then added: ―The case has been at a standstill since 2006‖, and ―I remind you that 19 years have passed and no significant progress has been achieved.‖ (Stenographic Version of the Plenary Session of the Senators‘ Committees of Foreign Affairs, Judicial and

Constitutional Issues and Criminal Matters held on 13 February 2013). Similar statements were repeated before the Plenary Sessions of the Deputies‘ Committees (according to shorthand version of Plenary Session of Deputies‘ Committees of Foreign Affairs, Judicial and Constitutional Issues, Federal Congress, held on 26 February 2013). On the other hand, in her speech addressed to the General Assembly, President Fernandez asserted: ―...the case is stagnant; there has been no progress for 19 years‖ (Cristina Fernandez‘s Speech, 68th United Nations General Assembly, 24 September 2013). And some months earlier, upon submitting the agreement to Congress for approval, she asserted in a National Simultaneous TV Broadcast: ―This Memorandum agreed by us is a step forward to unblock a case that has been at a standstill for 19 years... (Cristina Fernandez‘s Speech, National Simultaneous TV Broadcast on 8 February 2013). In March 2013, the President wrote in her Twitter account: ―We had to untie this‖, referring to the AMIA case (see Twitter 4 March 2013 5:05 PM) and before the Legislative Assembly:―... my commitment is to untie this…‖ (Message delivered by President Cristina Fernandez to the

Legislative Assembly at the opening of the 131st Annual Session of the Argentine Congress, 1 March 2013). In line with the President and the Foreign Minister, other officials and representatives close to the President made similar statements. Daniel Filmus, at the time a Senator, held that the agreement ―untied the AMIA case‖ which ―has shown no progress since 2006‖, and he added that: ―although 100% success of the memorandum cannot be guaranteed, we know that the case frozen as it now is destined to failure‖ (―Duro cruce de acusaciones entre Timerman y García

Moritán‖, La Nación, 19 February 2013).

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When National Senator Miguel Angel Pichetto took the floor, he also asserted that ―the case has been at a standstill since 2006…‖ (Stenographic Version of the Plenary Session of the Senators‘ Committees held on 13 February 2013). Therefore, in view of so many untruths it is worth referring –at least briefly – to the significant progress achieved in this case since 2006, the year in which the international arrest warrants were issued and approved by an ample majority at the Interpol General Assembly held in

November 2007. The following year -2008- the tasks that resulted in the denunciation of another cover-up plan verified in this case to benefit the indictee Alberto Jacinto Kanoore Edul were concluded. The case has now reached the oral trial stage. Late in 2008, preliminary attachment against the property of the accused was ordered, with the relevant disqualification from disposing of and encumbering certain real property owned by Mohsen Rabbani in Argentina being recorded in the land register.

In 2009, the General Prosecutor‘s Office under my charge issued a new Opinion on the attack. It contained the work related to the identification of the car bomb; furthermore, the operation of the terrorist cell of Hezbollah involved in the material execution of the attack was explained in detail. We could even establish the identity and involvement of the head of the operatives, the Lebanese Samuel Salman El Reda who is accused of having coordinated the arrival and departure of the operatives in charge of the execution of the final stage of the terrorist attack. A national and international arrest warrant under Interpol maximum search priority (red notice) was ordered against him. In the abovementioned Opinion it was established that El Reda was an active member of the Lebanese terrorist organization Hezbollah, with proven relationships with prominent individuals established in the Tri-Border Area, who are members of Hezbollah. As a result of the tasks performed by this General Prosecutor‘s Office, we could prove that at least since 1987, El Reda knew the City of Buenos Aires and was acquainted with the indictee Mohsen Rabbani, and that his integration into the local environment was strengthened by his marriage to an Argentine woman, Silvina Sain, in 1989. This link with Buenos Aires and specifically with

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Mohsen Rabbani, added to the fact that El Reda was a member of Hezbollah, enabled the effective connection between the organization at regional level and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran then in office, whose highest political authorities were indicted for the bombing. Evidence gathered confirmed that, in the year in which the terrorist attack took place, Samuel Salman El Reda resided in the city of Foz do Iguazu, but alternated between the cities of Foz do

Iguazu and Buenos Aires, where he stayed with his parents-in-law. He took advantage of his trips to and from Brazil and Argentina to perform his terrorist tasks because he raised no suspicion due to his family ties. Also, we confirmed that El Reda came to the city of Buenos Aires at different times, and more precisely, on a date close to the execution of the terrorist attack; it was also proven that El Reda wilfully omitted migration records, only to hinder potential investigations and the tracking of his movements, and as regards the attack against the AMIA premises, his wilful omission to have migration records of his travels to and from both countries can only be understood as an activity within the scope of that carried out by him in connection with the attack. Also proven by this General Prosecutor‘s Office, especially with regard to the essential role played by El Reda in the execution of the terrorist attack against the Jewish Community Center, are the phone calls he made and received. Considering the recipients, the place and time of the phone calls, it could be concluded that El Reda transmitted information required for the execution of the attack and that he played a significant role in the coordination of the arrival and departure, planning and operations and other activities deployed by the operatives, either with respect to the remaining agents involved in the operation who, like him, acted locally or those who acted from the Tri-Border Area through a cellular phone registered to the name of André Marques. Those communications were strictly necessary and essential for the operation to conclude as it did, to the extent that the sequence could not have reached its final stage without El Reda‘s involvement at the appropriate times and places.

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As regards these telephone communications, we first took into consideration that with a view to the attack, they were made from strategic places (airport terminals used for the arrival and departure of at least, some of the operatives who executed the attack, as well as public phone centres located in the vicinity of the target). Second, in some cases, phone calls were made to line numbers registered as Hezbollah communication centres in Beirut (Lebanon), and also to lines registered to the name of André Marques, who was an active member of Hezbollah, and who was in charge of coordinating actions and agents from the Tri-Border Area. Lastly, we took into consideration that the phone calls were made from 1 July 1994 to 18 July 1994. Previously, it had been found that the line registered to the name of Marques had only received calls from Argentina between these dates, neither before nor after, which means that the telephone was enabled during a specified term and for a specific purpose: to coordinate the tasks performed for the execution of the terrorist attack against the AMIA premises. In the abovementioned Opinion it was shown that the first two calls made to the telephone line registered to the name of André Marques –Tri-Border Area- were made on 1 July, from public call centres located at Ezeiza International Airport and the last call was made on 18 July, from another call centre located at Jorge Newbery Metropolitan Domestic Airport, just two hours before the explosive device detonated and destroyed the AMIA building. The fact that both the first and the last call were made from airports, led us to conclude that the active member of Hezbollah operating the line registered to the name of André Marques, received information about the arrival and departure of operatives who executed the final stage of the attack. In conclusion, the work carried out by the Prosecutorial Unit could clearly and conclusively show that Samuel Salman El Reda played a determining role within the framework of the local support for the AMIA bombing. Also, in that judgement there was a long report, of over one hundred pages, which made reference to the tasks carried out by the Prosecutorial Unit for the purpose of identifying the bodywork that was used for the assembling of the car bomb that exploded in the AMIA building. After the use of adequate filters to clarify the long lists studied and a rigorous

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subsequent analysis, it was possible to shortlist the number of vans to four units, among which, and it was so concluded, is the van used for the assembling of the car bomb. In 2010 and as a consequence of the declarations of the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and the National Chamber of Criminal Appeals in Cassation of the previous year, in connection with Carlos Telleldin‘s procedural status, a review of the evidence against him began and as a consequence a new motion to take the case to trial with respect to Telleldin was made in the month of August, 2012. In 2013, by virtue of the investigation activity carried out by the prosecutor‘s office, which included the taking of testimonies in foreign countries, and the evidence obtained in the two previous years, precisely related to illegal activities of agents for the Tehran regime, there was a new declaration of over than 500 pages that explained the modality of the Iranian regime to infiltrate into several countries in South America and install intelligence stations to perpetrate, incite and sponsor terrorist activity in line with their principle of exporting the revolution.

This information has been central to contextualize, both regionally and strategically, the AMIA bombing, as well as to present in greater detail the role of the indicted Mohsen Rabbani in such attack. In such ruling, it was proved that the context in which the bombing of the Jewish community centre took place was not in the nature of an isolated event but the structure of a much bigger scheme, dominated by the Iranian penetration policy in the region. Concurrently with all these lines of investigation and the related declarations, the Prosecutorial Unit is working on a daily basis to intensifying the investigation into the bombing and this is evidenced in the principal body of the case and at present in 27 separate files that are still pending. It is worth remembering that shortly after taking office, that is, in mid-2010, the Foreign Minister knew that among the different lines of the investigation, progress was being made into a new line related to the indicted Mohsen Rabbani, his role, and contacts at a regional level that would later lead to the declaration of May 2013. The Minister said he had given information to the Prosecutorial Unit concerning this line of investigation. He was making reference to a

―google‖ server alert that he had received through electronic mail. Quoting his words,

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Timerman declared: ―… I could connect that a bombing that had been prevented against JFK United States Airport involved Mohsen Rabbani, the person who was a cultural attachè in the Iranian embassy in Buenos Aires. Neither Hillary Clinton nor the people investigating here knew it. Now there is a connection between a bombing that was prevented in the United States and the AMIA bombing…‖ (Cibeira, Fernando. ―Hay que relacionarse sin intermediarios‖ Interview with Hector Timerman Foreign Minister, Página 12, 9 January 2011).

Actually, at his appearances before the parliamentary commissions of the National Congress during the debates for the approval of the memorandum of understanding, Hector Timerman recalled: ―(…) the prosecutor will tell you who provided him with the main evidence available at present against the Islamic Republic of Iran. And you will be surprised because that person was me. I did cooperate with the investigation (…) Specifically, that evidence led him to a lot of enquiries that I hope we will one day be able to submit in court … ―n (shorthand transcripts at the Plenary Session of the Commissions of Foreign Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Affairs of the Lower House of the Argentine Congress, held on 26 February 2013). In other words, Mr. Timerman was well aware of the concrete advances in the case and he admitted this fact at the National Congress. However, three months later, he was crossing the Syrian deserts to contact Iran and negotiate the suspension of the investigations and to resume trade exchanges between the two States, with no hesitation when justifying this course of action by saying on several occasions that the case was ―paralyzed‖. This fallacy was exposed even more clearly on 29 May 2013, when the prosecutor‘s office under my charge, as mentioned some paragraphs earlier, made a long declaration, precisely in relation to the line of investigation known to Foreign Minister Timerman, in which facts and evidence were mentioned that illustrated more clearly the political and regional context in which the AMIA bombing took place 14 Reference is being made to the connection between AMIA indictee Mohsen Rabbani and Abdul Kadir, currently sentenced to life imprisonment (pp. 133.113/133.416 of the main proceedings).

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and in particular the role of Mohsen Rabbani in such case (pages 133.113/133.416). When news of the document transpired , the Foreign Minister changed his previous stance and stated: ―I haven`t seen much in the way of new information‖, in an attempt to belittle the enquiries made by the Public Prosecutor‘s Office, not realising that his contempt was discrediting the contribution he had so much boasted about before the national congressmen and which, in view of its significance, he had communicated to US Secretary of State Ms. Hillary Clinton (Pisani,

Silvia, ―El Congreso de EEUU invitó al fiscal Nisman por su informe de Irán‖, La Nación, 14 June 2013). Last, affirming that ―there is nothing to lose‖ is a new argumentative ploy with the purpose of justifying the course of the memorandum of understanding that, as is known today, is the road to impunity for the Iranians accused of the AMIA bombing. It is worth recalling that the case may be bombarded with challenges if procedural steps not provided for in the law or contrary to the Argentine Consitution and its public law principles are taken. It is not true that there are no risks. In fact, as will be seen, damage has already been done, because third countries have stopped sending information from the date of the agreement. In conclusion, the only thing that needs to be unblicked is the firm Iranian refusal to extradite its nationals so as to make them available to the Argentine Judiciary. The memorandum of understanding is far from solving this problem. The judicial case does not need to be unblocked and, less till can it be irresponsibly and fallaciously stated that the case has been paralyzed since 2006, as has been stated. Such affirmations can only be motivated by an interest in bringing discredit to the Argentine Judiciary, validating the memorandum and, as has now been determined, in moving ahead with the cover-up plan in progress. b) The campaign of deceit The media manipulation of the reality of the proceedings in connection with the AMIA bombing that the President and the Foreign Minister carried out in the context of the process of the negotiation with the Islamic Republic of Iran was necessary but not enough. A web of lies, of promises that the officials in question knew they would never fulfil, of dramatizations and other false communicational strategies had to be used for the sole purpose of favourably

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manipulating public opinion in relation to the negotiation with Iran and in particular with respect to the Memorandum of Understanding for the ultimate purpose of covering up for the accused and dissociating them from the legitimate accusation against them. Thus, those accused of the cover-up have lied with respect to the exact moment when the negotiations began, with respect to the scope of the matters that were negotiated and with respect to which of the parties had promoted and encouraged the rapprochement. For the same reasons, the evident willingness on the part of the Argentine representatives to leave justice aside in the AMIA case for the sake of the commercial agenda, as well as for geopolitical reasons was concealed, thus making false statements with regard to the true motives of the agreement, that is, the interests underlying this decision. For this reason, it was also necessary to resort to clandestine intermediaries and to ―screen‖ meetings so as to make progress with the secret negotiation. Thus, the press was refuted and questioned when it publicized details of the negotiation that had been meant to be kept secret.

For this reason, former government officials that confirmed the existence of the antecedents of the agreement were attacked, such antecedents no thaving succeeded precisely due to their illegal implications. Therefore, it was intentionally falsely affirmed that the judicial case was paralyzed, that there was no other way out and nothing to lose if the memorandum was supported. In general terms, these were some of the positive actions that Cristina Fernandez, Hector Timerman and other parties of this cover-up plan, carried out as part of the discredit campaign.

The ways in which the President and the Foreign Minister have tried to justify the negotiation with Iran by saying that the case was paralyzed even though they knew very well that that was not the case, have already been detailed. Now, details concerning their following contributions to the criminal plan will be given. Knowing that the Memorandum of Understanding was simply a legal disguise for the purpose of camouflaging the covering up of the Iranian fugitives, the President presented it as a ―historical achievement‖. On the day it was signed, in her official ―Twitter‖ account, she announced: ―Historical: Nearly 19 years after the AMIA bombing, for the first time this legal

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document under INTERNATIONAL LAW has been signed between Argentina and Iran… Historical: Because the right to due process,a fundamental principle of international criminal law is guaranteed … by creating a true commission of five international jurists of renowned prestige … None of them may be a national of either country. Essential STANDARD of INDEPENDENCE … Historical: Because for the first time Argentine judicial authorities may question those in respect of whom Interpol has issued a red notice … Historical: Because the agreement between Argentina and Iran will be considered and ratified by the parliaments of both countries. High institutional standard. Historical: Because Iran was not obliged by virtue of any resolution or instrument of international law … or multilateral body, such as the. UN, to talk to Argentina, let alone to sign an agreement. Historical, because we will never let the AMIA tragedy be used as a chess piece in the board of other people‘s geopolitical interests…‖ (Twitter messages in the account of Cristina Fernandez of 27 January 2013. 10:26 to 10:32). With these words, she tried to install the news in the media from the enthusiasm of a ―historical victory‖, hiding the cover up plan devised to make politically viable a geopolitical rapprochement and trade exchange of State to State with Iran. She continued playing her role in the criminal plan by denying the speculations that began circulating, as soon as there was news of the agreement, that accused the authorities of the national government of having acted for the sake of trade interests. The President said in her message when submitting the bill for approval of the memorandum to the National Congress that: ―… attempts are being made to present the agreement as a sort of scheme to ―initiate‖ trade with Iran. The truth is that trade has existed since 1990 and, except for the years 2004 and 2005, has resulted in a surplus…‖ (Presidential message Nº 173 upon referring to the National Congress the draft law concerning the Memorandum of Understanding between Argentina and Iran). It is true that the flow between privates of both countries had been increasing, but the true interest lay in restoring trade relations on a State to State level. There are very many registered telephone communications that reflect this at the highest government levels. Trade between

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privates and agreements between States are two very different things. So arguing the case for one situation never justifies the other one. On the other hand, it is worth recalling the words of a former Foreign Minister for Nestor Kirchner, Rafael Bielsa, when he affirmed that Cristina Fernandez “… she says to the relatives of the victims that those who do business are companies and not the State. I believe it is a lame argument, it irritates me a lot because this was sacred to Nestor…” and he added:

“When I was Foreign Minister, talking about selling to or buying from Iran was casus belli”) (the highlighted text is for emphasis, Dobry, Hernan, ―Cancilleres K: el acuerdo con Iran ya había sido rechazado‖, Perfil, 23 February 2013) In this lie, Cristina Fernandez was seconded with emphasis by Foreign Minister Timerman, who on several occasions claimed that the agreement was not economically motivated and to prove that, he stated: ―I feel offended when you make up this thing about economic interests...How could I do something that is forbidden by the United Nations?... because if you had read the sanctions of the United Nations you would realize that what you are saying is impossible, but as you have not read the sanctions, you are simply repeating what you hear ... there cannot be economic interests ... because there are economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, of which Argentina is a member, which prevent trade with Iran beyond that being carried out at present, in grain, and that is not being carried out by the Argentine government... it is carried out by private companies.. I have already asked them not to do it ...‖ (Tenembaum, Ernesto, Tierra de Locos, interview with Hector Timerman 18 February 2013).

On another occasion he affirmed: ―... Why can‘t I sell oil to Iran? Sanctions. Then, how is Argentina going to buy? ... There are sanctions. Today, it is not permitted to buy oil...‖ (Piqué, Martín. ―Si se lleva adelante el memorándum, se activa la causa y comienza el juicio‖, Tiempo Argentino, 17 February 2013). The truth is that with the exception of the group of inputs related to the Iranian nuclear program, there is no legal obstacle that can prevent trade exchange on a State to State level between Argentina and Iran. All the resolutions that the UN Security Council has issued preventing UN member countries from trading with the Islamic Republic of Iran have referred

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to items, materials, equipment, goods and technologies related to the enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear minerals or heavy water, or to the development of nuclear weapon vector systems. A new lie by Mr Timerman that adds to the long list of lies to which he resorted –certainly with little success- to hide the crime to which he was a party. In fact, on 16 December 2010, within the framework of the 40th Summit of Mercosur held in Foz de Iguazú, the execution of a free trade agreement with Iran was announced (Levinas,

Gabriel, op. cit., page. 238). This was later denied by the Foreign Minister, who explained: ― it is false, a lie, an infamy to suggest that Mercosur is even considering signing a Free Trade Agreement with Iran … What we signed is a General Agreement of Preference, where any country member may decide ―I sign‖. Iran said: I sign), but it did not sign…‖ 15 Resolutions of the UN Security Council, Nº 1385, 1686, 1737, 1747, 1803 and 1929 on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. (―El fantasma de Irán y el reconocimiento a los palestinos se metió en el escenario político argentino‖, Agencia Judía de Noticias, 16 December 2010; ―Timerman calificó como infamia la información sobre un acuerdo entre el Mercosur e Irán‖, Agencia Judía de Noticias, 16 December 2010). Besides, and this is fundamental, when asked about the trade relations with Iran, the Foreign Minister explained: ―...Iran is in the Group of the 77 of which Argentina is a member as well as the 10 countries that signed this agreement of tariff preferences. Therefore, there is no type of restriction...‖ to trade with Iran. (Gosman, Eleonora, ―Mercosur: anuncian un acuerdo de libre comercio con Palestina‖, Clarín, 16 December 2010; Levinas, Gabriel, op cit, pag. 238; Eliaschev, José ―Pepe‖, ―Desinteligencias‖, Perfil, 18 December 2010). In other words, shortly before the secret Aleppo summit, Hector Timerman himself had already stated that there were no restrictions to trade with Iran, a country with which it was even possible to establish preferential treatment in the exchanges. Even after the Aleppo meeting in April 2011 and when he visited Israel, at a joint press conference with his Israeli counterpart Avigdor Lieberman, Timerman stated: ―…there is no problem in trade with Iran. Argentina has no attachment against Iran. Iran has no attachment

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against Argentina …‖) (Levinas, Gabriel, op. cit. pages 247/248, 269, 282; ―Joint press conference with FM Lieberman and Argentine FM Timerman‖, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 4 April 2011). After the signing of the agreement, as arises from the above paragraphs, the Foreign Minister had no problem stating the exact opposite of what he had been saying until then. Another example of this type of false statements by the Foreign Minister was when the agreement was being discussed in Congress and, to justify the agreement and the ―Truth Commission‖ provided for in it, he made completely incorrect affirmations concerning the vicissitudes of the extradition proceedings before the authorities of the United Kingdom in connection with the former Iranian Ambassador posted to Argentina during the time of the bombing, Hadi Soleimanpour. Before the plenary of commissions in the Argentine Senate, on 13 February 2013, the Foreign Minister stated: ―… the extradition request made by Argentina in connection with former

Iranian ambassador Hadi Soleimanpour was rejected by the British Judiciary due to the nonexistence of evidence … Interpol denied refused to issue a red notice because it was considered that he had already been arrested, dismissed and released due to lack of evidence … that the evidence produced by the judge of the case at the time, Dr. Galeano, to request the extradition of the Iranian ambassador at the time of the bombing was rejected because according to the authorities of a third country, in this case, the United Kingdom, it was not enough even to initiate the extradition process.. ―‖(Shorthand version of the Plenary Session of the Commissions of Foreign Affairs, Constitutional Affairs and Justice and Criminal Cases of the Senate, held on 13 February 2013). In brief, Timerman stated that the ―lack of evidence‖, that the ―nonexistence of evidence‖, had led the ―legal authorities of a third country‖, specifically the ―British judiciary‖ to dismiss and release the Iranian diplomat, and further that this had made Interpol refuse to issue a new red notice regarding this individual when, indicted once again by Dr. Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, a new international arrest warrant was issued against him.

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However, once again, facts differed from words. In the year 2003, when the case was still pending before former Judge Juan Jose Galeano, Soleimanpour was temporarily arrested in the United Kingdom with a view to his extradition, by virtue of an arrest warrant that was current at the time. The Iranian diplomat requested a release on bail, which was granted, in order to wait out of prison for the extradition procedure. At that time, the British judge made some considerations regarding the issue of evidence, but made it clear that it was too early to decide on the matter, because the Argentine Judiciary had two months to formally request the extradition and present the evidence in relation to the case. In other words, it was he stage of temporary arrest and the extradition process had not yet been initiated. And even though the Argentine Judiciary fulfilled its obligation, when the time came, it was the Undersecretary of State of the United Kingdom who decided not to carry out the process for Soleimanpour‘s extradition, which did not take place for political reasons not stated in the decision and by virtue of a legal exclusive right provided for in the extradition treaty that governed the case. In brief, if the extradition of Soleimanpour could not be achieved at that time, it was due to a political decision and not a judicial one, and the reason for this was not the lack of evidence in support of the charge, as was maliciously suggested to public opinion, but political reasons not expressed, which led to such decision. Soleimanpour was never acquitted by the British Judiciary, as has been said. The Federal Court of Appeal also took note of and referred to in the decision that declared unconstitutional the Memorandum of Understanding with Iran and its enacting law (Vote of Dr. Eduardo G. Farah, CCCF, Chamber I, CFP 3184/2013/CA1 ―AMIA s/Amparo Ley 16.986, 15/05/2014, Juzgado N°6- Secretaría N°11). All these argumentative fallacies constitute the campaign of deceit, an important element of the impunity plan. Thus, lies and double talk have been the rule in this case. All the parties involved deliberately lie and, on top of that, on issues that may be easily proved. We may conclude that the seriousness of the actions to be concealed - the cover-up of fugitive foreigners, of the worst

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terrorist attack in Argentine history - overshadows the methods used. In other words, it is so terrible, what has to be concealed, that we do not pay attention to the means used for such purpose. A change in a statement, a lie, any premeditated deceit cannot be compared to the possibility of discovering the concealment plan. b. l) Manipulation of the victims and of the relatives of the victims of the bombing. Apart from falsifying reality, by lying with respect to the true procedural status of the AMIA case, the initiation of the negotiation with Iran, the contents of the subsequent public meetings and the actual meaning and scope of the Memorandum of Understanding entered into; the authors of this concealment did not hesitate to unjustly manipulate the Jewish institutions negatively affected by the bombing as well as the survivors and relatives of the victims who died in the explosion. The objective of this atrocious attitude was the same as usual: to gain the support of these actors in particular and of public opinion in general in order to implement the impunity plan without anybody knowing.

Indeed, as soon as the signing of the memorandum with Iran was made public, the Jewish institutions as well as the groups of victims and relatives of victims of the bombing agreed in pointing out that they had not been previously informed or even consulted about the fact that an agreement with Iran would effectively be signed, let alone being informed or consulted regarding its contents (―El acuerdo con Iran sorprendió a los familiares de victimas del ataque a la AMIA‖, (The agreement with Iran surprised the relatives of victims of the AMIA bombing ") Infobae, 27 January 2013).

Therefore, the AMIA authorities talked about a ―nonconsulted memorandum‖ and stated that: ―la propuesta aparece firmada, un hecho del que no hemos sido informados‖ (the proposal is signed, a fact which has not been informed to us). They said: ―este memorando nos sorprende a toda la ciudadania el pasado 27 de enero, jamas fue consultado, ni siquiera comentado‖ (this memorandum was a surprise for all the citizens last 27 January. It had never been consulted, not even mentioned) (Borger, Guillermo in: ―La AMIA advirtió un momento difícil, tras el acuerdo entre Argentina e Iran‖,( The AMIA warned about a hard time to come after the agreement between Argentina and Iran) La Nacion, 3 February 2013; ―Presidente de la AMIA

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prometió no bajar los brazos y se comprometió a evitar que la causa por el atentado causa en la nulidad‖, (AMIA´s President promised not to give up and undertook to prevent invalidity of proceedings in the bombing case) Agencia Judia de Noticias, 4 March 2013). On their part, the representatives of DAIA asserted they learnt about the agreement at the same time as public opinion and made it clear that the institution was not previously consulted and that it did not participate in the drafting of the document (Schlosser, Julio in: ―LA DAIA reconoció que hay un resquemor en la comunidad judía por el acuerdo que la Argentina firmó con Iran‖ (DAIA recognized that there is unease in the Jewish community on the agreement that Argentina signed with Iran) Itongadol,4 February 2013). In fact, they got the news through the official twitter account of President Cristina Fernandez and, immediately, through the mass media (Cristina Fernandez tweets dated 27 January 2013 from 10:26 to 10:32, transcribed in previous paragraphs; ―Through her Twitter account: La Presidenta sorprendió al anunciar un acuerdo con Iran por la AMIA‖, (The President surprised by announcing an agreement with Iran on the AMIA case) El Cronista Comercial, 28 January 2013). This caused immediate unease, since the President had publicly committed herself, in her speech in September 2012 at the United Nations, to previously consult any proposal made by Iran. Let's recall her words: "you can be sure that this President shall not make any decision regarding any proposal made to her, without PREVIOUSLY consulting those who have been direct victims of this bombing .And, at the same time, with the political spectrum with parliamentary representation in my country, because this cannot be decided by only one political force.‖ (Cristina Fernandez' speech before the 67th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, on 25 September 2012, the capital letters are mine).This promise was never fulfilled and strictly speaking, it was part of one of many acts of manipulation made by Ms. Cristina Fernandez in her criminal path. Likewise this exposed the huge difference in the way in which in the past this issue had been handled with the community leadership and –principally- with the relatives and victims of the bombing. Rafael Bielsa stated: ―Estábamos en permanente contacto con los familiares y la

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comunidad, informándolos de todo....Cada paso que dábamos, cada memorandum que enviábamos, lo consultábamos con todos, porque era una cuestión muy sensible y estaba siempre el fantasma de las ofertas...‖ (We were constantly in contact with relatives and the community, providing all the information... Each step we took, each memorandum we sent, we consulted everything with everybody, because it was a sensitive issue and the shadow of the offers was always there...) (Dobry, Hernan, ―K Foreign Minister: the agreement with Iran was rejected‖, Perfil, 23/02/2013). In that context, it was evident that the purpose of the breached presidential promise was to keep the support that the administration of Ms. Fernandez had until that moment, in relation to the AMIA issue, within the communities and the group of relatives and victims of the bombing. The parliamentary mechanism for the approval of the memorandum should be considered in the same light. The stated parliamentary action has nothing to do with ―prior to any resolution‖ nor ―consultation regarding the proposal‖ but it is the means to legally validate a previously accepted and signed proposal. Moreover, the approval of the memorandum took place in the Legislative Branch, which is not the space where the Executive Branch acts, liaises and/or makes consultations with the relatives of the victims, even though some of them attended sessions and/or spoke in commissions. In addition to all these obvious facts that confirm the breach of the promise, no place was given to the opinions contrary to the agreement, when representatives of the opposing political parties, community institutions and several groups that include relatives and victims that spoke against the approval of the agreement, expressed many objections. To support this statement, we can resort to the words of several relatives of the victims of the bombing. Sofia Guterman stated: ―Nobody informed us to tell us that we should register. Nobody said anything. I was surprised... I did not think they would rush the process, but the race was almost over and they had to reach the proposed end... It was sickening when Pichetto said 'let's hurry that the President said this should be over (Sofia Guterman, ―Se está haciendo todo lo posible para que Iran salga triunfante de esto‖, (everything possible is done for Iran to result successful on this issue) Radio JAI, 14/2/013;

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6Referring to Fernando Esteche. 7Referring to Minister Julio De Vido. On her part, Laura Ginsberg stated: ―...Uno esperaría que el Congreso fuera un ámbito de reflexión, Timerman imprimió, como también los senadores del oficialismo, las características de un ambiente pobre, chicanero y vulgar...‖ (One would think the Congress to be a scope for reflection, Timerman as well as the senators for the government, gave it the characteristic of a poor, tricky and vulgar environment ...) and regarding the debate she added: ―...estuvo en manos de Timerman y del gobierno, porque la intención de ellos era apurar rapidito la ley...‖ (it was in Timermans' hands and in those of the government because their intention was to speed up the passing of the law...‖. Finally, she stated:―...Lo unico que el gobierno quiere es sancionar lo antes posible esta ley, que significa un punto final para el tema de la AMIA...‖ (The only thing the government wants is to pass the law as soon as possible, which means an end to the discussion over the AMIA issue...‖ and summarized: ―....Lo de ayer fue miserable...‖(…What happened yesterday was mean...) (Laura Ginsberg, ――Sobre el cruce en el debate por el memorandum: Lo de ayer fue miserable‖, La Razon, 14 February 2013). Finally, a group of relatives formed by Luis Czyzewski and Mario Averbuch, among others, denounced that they could not express their opinion in the plenary of the committee carried out in the Argentine National Senate (―Familiares de las víctimas del atentado a la AMIA piden participar en el plenario de Diputados‖, (Relatives of the AMIA bombing´s victims ask to take part at the Congress members plenary ) Agencia Judia de Noticias, 22 February 2013).

In addition, no one was previously consulted. The victims and their relatives heard about the agreement and its contents through the media. They did not take part during the negotiation process which – as has been proved – was secret. In the word of the Jewish community leaders: ―...No hemos recibido ni siquiera una llamada telefónica anticipando esta posibilidad. Nos hemos sorprendido, pleno domingo, Dia Internacional del Holocausto, plenas vacaciones, plena feria judicial. Nos enteramos por los medios... Concretamente fuimos absolutamente sorprendidos por este memorandum...‖(We haven't received a single phone call that could anticipate this possibility. We were surprised, on

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a Sunday, International Holocaust Day, during the holidays, in the judicial recess. We heard about it through the media... We were absolutely surprised by this memorandum...‖ (Borger, Guillermo. Shorthand version of the committee plenary, 13 February 2013). It was clear that whatever the relatives and victims of the bombing could say, the decision was taken. The memorandum had been signed without prior consultation and had to be approved at any cost. That was strictly necessary to execute the criminal plan contrived.

It should be added that the presidential lie regarding the prior consultation was coupled with an outright withholding of information from the relatives of the victims of the bombing, even though the information sent, as an annex, forming an integral part of the Memorandum of Understanding which shall be presented for parliamentary approval...‖(―AMIA informa a la opinión pública sobre las conclusiones de la reunion mantenida con el canciller Timerman en el dóa de ayer‖, (AMIA informed public opinion on the conclusions of the meeting held with Foreign Minister Timerman yesterday) Prensa Judia, 30 January 2013; ―La AMIA pide que las promesas de Timerman sean anexadas por escrito al acuerdo original‖, (The AMIA asks that Timerman´s promises be annexed in writing to the original agreement) Clarin, 30 January 2013). Moreover, the association ―Memoria Activa‖ also issued a communication that stated the following: ―...Memoria Activa concurrió el martes 29/1 a una reunión convocada por el canciller Hector Timerman en la sede de la AMIA. En la misma el canciller aclaro los términos del acuerdo en relación a los siguientes puntos, que pasan a ser las bases innegociables del mismo y que seran ratificadas por el gobierno argentino por escrito: 1-Los imputados serán indagados en Teherán bajo el código penal procesal de la República Argentina por el juez y el fiscal de la causa AMIA. 2- Las alertas rojas y pedidos de captura de Interpol delos imputados se mantendrán vigentes...‖ (Memoria Activa attended a meeting on Tuesday 29 January called by the Foreign Minister Hector Timerman at the office of AMIA. In the meeting the Foreign Minister explained the terms of the agreement regarding the following items, which are the non-negotiable basis of the agreement, and that will be acknowledged by the Argentine government in writing.: 1-Indictees shall be interrogated in Tehran under the Code of Criminal

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Procedure of the Argentine Republic by the judge and the prosecutor of the AMIA case.) 2- The red notices and Interpol detention of the indicted shall remain in force...‖ (Communication of Memoria Activa to public opinion, 31 January 2013). In press statements, Adriana Reisfeld from "Memoria Activa" added: ―Se habló de esto y Timerman dijo que así iba a ser. Se comprometió a estos puntos‖ (This was discussed and Timerman said that it was going to be like this. He committed to these items) (Cappiello, Hernan, ―Timerman was annoyed with the

AMIA due to its requests‖, La Nacion, 1 February 2013). The Jewish communities from all over the country expressed, among their concerns and demands regarding the memorandum, that ―en ninguna instancia de este proceso habrá riesgo de que pierdan vigencia las circulares rojas emitidas por Interpol‖ (in no instance of the process will there be the risk that the red notices issued by Interpol may be removed‖ (―La AMIA pide al gobierno que rehaga el memorandum con Iran‖, (AMIA asks the Government to redo the memorandum with Iran) La Nacion, 1 February 2013).

However, the Foreign Minister denied having made a commitment to the victims, relatives and leaders of the communities to take steps with a view to an annex to the agreement (―La AMIA pide al gobierno que rehaga el memorandum con Iran‖, (AMIA asks the Government to redo the memorandum with Iran) La Nacion, 1 February 2013); Cappiello, Hernan, ―Timerman se molestó con la AMIA por sus exigencias‖ (Timerman upset with AMIA because of their demands), La Nacion, 1 February 2013). Now, in both cases the presidential promise to consult the relatives, victims and political spectrum with parliamentary representation, BEFORE entering into an agreement with Iran, as well as the commitment denied by the Foreign Minister in relation to the preparation of an Annex to the agreement, are public and obvious examples of acts of manipulation performed by public officers involved in the cover-up herein denounced, essentially oriented to support an agreement with Iran. The actions by the President and the Foreign Minister described in this item are schemes that deliberately seek to deceive. All with one criminal purpose: to ensure final impunity for the accused and the end of any court activity against them, to achieve the ultimate goal: to freely

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engage in state trade and coming geopolitically closer to the Islamic Republic of Iran without admitting any reproach from the Argentine public opinion. In short, to bring the agreement with Iran to a successful conclusion and achieve impunity for the accused, the promise made of a consultation prior to any agreement and the commitment assumed to negotiate an Annex to the agreement was breached. They pretended they sought an agreement with the entire political spectrum to advance in the treaty but, in fact, all the multiple and extended opinions against the memorandum were ignored. And as will be seen in the following paragraph, mises en scène were included to display false diplomatic progress before Argentine public opinion. b. 2) Mises en scène. After the presidential speech on the occasion of the opening of the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, President. Fernandez strongly requested the Iranian authorities to answer the Argentine request made in relation to the agreement entered into several months earlier, (President Cristina Fernandez´s speech, 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 24 September 2013). No Iranian representative was present to listen to Mrs, Fernandez and, on the contrary, President Hassan Rohani did not even mention the issue in his speech. Clear signs, at that time, of the lack of interest on the part of Tehran in the agreement entered into with our country, once the possibility of removing red notices was ended. The demands mentioned in the previous paragraph were made on the night of Tuesday 24 September 2013. According to Timerman, two days later, on Thursday 26, Argentine diplomats received a call from the Iranian Foreign Minister to arrange a meeting on Saturday 28 (Miri, Ignacio, ―Timerman dijo que Iran aprobó el pacto por la AMIA, pero aun no rige‖, (Timerman said Iran approved the agreement for the AMIA, but it is not in force yet‖, Clarin, 29 September 2013; ―Timerman se reunirá con su par de Iran en la ONU‖, (Timerman will meet with his Iranian counterpart in the UN‖), Prensa Argentina, 26 September 2013). ―Acabo de recibir un llamado del canciller Javad Zarif para reunimos el sábado por el tema AMIA‖, (I have just received a call from the Foreign Minister Javad Zarif to meet on Saturday in relation to the AMIA issue), announced Timerman to journalists in New York (―Argentina e Iran

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reactivan el dialogo para avanzar en la causa‖, (Argentina and Iran revive dialogue to move forward in the case) La Capital, 27 September 2013). Other media transcribed the following words of the Foreign Minister: ―Hace unos minutos hemos recibido una llamada de las autoridades de la Republica Islamica de Iran solicitando tener una reunión en el marco de las Naciones Unidas entre los dos cancilleres para tratar el tema del memorandum...‖(Some minutes ago we received a call from the authorities of the

Islamic Republic of Iran requesting a meeting within the framework of the United Nations, between the two Foreign Ministers, to deal with the memorandum issue...‖ (Cibeira, Femando ―Cara a cara para dialogar sobre el memorandum‖, Pagina 12, 27/2013 [sic]) (Face to face to dialogue on the memorandum). In addition, the Foreign Minister stated that the purpose of the meeting was: ―...conocer el estado actual del memorandum de acuerdo a la legislación iraní, es decir, si fue aprobado por el Congreso o no. Si fue aprobado por el Congreso, entonces, establecer el marco con el cual vamos a formalizar la fecha de conformación de la Comisión y al mismo tiempo el viaje de las autoridades judiciales a Teheran...Y si no fue aprobado, cuando se aprobara...‖(…to know the current status of the memorandum according to the Iranian law, that is to say, if it was approved by Congress. If approved by Congress, then to set the framework in which we can fix the date for the formation of the Committee and at the same time the trip of the judicial authorities to Tehran... and if it was not approved, when it will be approved...‖ (―Timerman se reunirá con su par de Iran en la ONU‖, Prensa Argentina, 26 September 2013; Cibeira,

Femando ―Cara a cara para dialogar sobre el memorandum‖, Pagina 12, 27 September 2013) (Face to face for dialogue on the memorandum). This was how the Argentine citizenship was notified of the concern and expectation to know what the Iranians would say after the public and strong demand made by the President. From her speech it was understood that Iran should confirm if the agreement was approved, when the ―Truth Committee‖ would be formed according to the agreement and when the Argentine judicial authorities would travel to Tehran for the hearings.

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Some of the contacts that participated in those negotiations understood, a day before the Foreign Ministers‘ Summit and without knowing Tehran‘s answer yet, that the Iranian authorities would not accept what President Fernandez was secretly requesting and, besides, that the Argentine public attitude in ―pressing‖ the Iranians was ―pour la galerie‖ or ―for the sake of appearances only‖ (Communication dated 27 September 2013, client 11-3238-4966, File B-1009-2013-09-27- 115448-6, CD 161).

Secondly, it has been made evident that there are several things that are things discussed and agreed in advance that are not communicated to the public opinion, which is targeted by deception in the form of mise-en-scènes, fake negotiations, hidden agreements, etc. It can be understood that such a delicate matter must be treated with discretion. But the discretion, in this case, is only aimed at deceiving and concealing unlawful activities. It is meant to keep up appearances and not be discovered. Thirdly, these pieces of evidence have shown that, behind the scenes, without anyone knowing, everything was arranged and, in fact, there were no secrets or expectations whatsoever, because the Argentine authorities already knew what would happen at the summit. The previous agreement with Tehran would be performed ―pour la galerie‖, although it was not exactly what had been requested from the president´s office in the Pink House, as shown by the communications herein transcribed. Through the parallel communication channel by means of which this cover-up was also devised, Luis D‘Elia called his friend Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, an organic reference of Iran in the country, to give him a message that he should send to Teheran about what the President needed the Iranians to announce at the meeting, in order to deceive the citizens in relation to the status of the actual situation. The meeting on Saturday 28 September 2013, between Timerman and the newly-appointed Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif Khonsari, at the offices of the United Nations in New York, was a real mise-en-scene, i.e., a show to make people believe that they were actually negotiating and/or that the Argentine diplomats were obtaining some results thanks to the recent public demand made by the President.

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As already stated, the truth is that the Argentine authorities had already requested –through unofficial channels – a joint announcement by both Foreign Ministers, as well as some definitions about several topics, something that was, apparently, too ambitious. But the Iranians, in an attitude that could be taken as ―…a gesture… towards the Argentine government on the eve of elections…‖ (Communication dated 27 September 2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-09-27- 135214-22, CD 161), merely agreed to publicly, but not jointly, announce that Iran had approved the memorandum with the endorsement of the Supreme National Security Council and the Supreme Leader, although this was not true. Again, it was done ―pour la galerie‖. That Saturday 28 September, the Foreign Ministers held two meetings, with intermediate consultations with their respective presidents. The diplomatic notes were never exchanged. The agreement did not become effective. No schedule was established for the ―Truth Commission‖ or the Teheran meetings. There was no joint announcement at all. The Iranian authorities did not declare anything officially. After the meetings, Foreign Minister Timerman talked to the media and explained that his counterpart had assured him that the memorandum was internally approved by the Supreme National Security Council, with the Iranian President as the head, and the endorsement of the Supreme Leader. He also stated that some technical teams would meet in Switzerland in the first half of November to start discussing the implementation of the agreement (Ignacio Miri, ―Timerman dijo que Iran aprobo el pacto por la AMIA, pero aun no rige‖, (Timerman said that

Iran passed the agreement on the AMIA, but it is not in force yet) Clarin, 29 September 2013; Silvia Pisani, ―Iran le confirmo a Timerman que ya aprobo el acuerdo‖, (Iran confirmed to timerman that the agreement has already been passed) La Nacion, 29 September 2013; ―Timerman anuncio nueva reunion con Iran en noviembre‖, (Timerman announced a new meeting with Iran in November) Prensa Argentina, 28 September 2013; ―Timerman ratifico la aprobacion del memorandum de entendimiento con Iran y un nuevo encuentro‖, (Timerman ratified the approval of the memorandum of understanding with Iran and a new meeting)

Telam, 28 September 2013; ―Iran aprobo el memorandum de entendimiento por la AMIA‖

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(Iran approved the memorandum of understanding on the AMIA), Pagina 12, 28 September 2013). IRNA, the official news agency of the Islamic Republic, informed about the meeting held by both Foreign Ministers, but said nothing in relation to the approval of the memorandum; it only reported that a new meeting had been proposed to be held in November in Geneva, Switzerland (IRNA, ―Zarif continues talks with counterparts in New York‖, 29 September 2013). That is to say, Iran admitted having met and did not contradict Timerman‘s statements, but did not go much further. In fact, in Iran, the alleged approval of the agreement was merely informed by the ―Tehran Times‖, which took the Argentine official news agency TELAM as the only source for this information. Unprecedented. The Persian newspaper ―Tehran Times‖, one of the most important papers in the Iranian nation, in an effort to inform about a decision adopted by the government of its own country, referred to the official news agency of another country,

Argentina, as the source (―Argentina says Iran committed to probing 1994 bombing‖, Tehran Times, 29 September 2013; ―Timerman ratifico la aprobacion del memorandum de entendimiento con Iran y un nuevo encuentro‖, (Timerman ratified the approval of the memorandum of understanding with Iran and a new meeting) Telam, 28 September 2013). How come the source is not Iranian? How come the Tehran Times, to report an act of government decided and approved in Tehran, used TELAM as its source? In this case, as in many others, the actions of the Foreign Minister had been staged for the media, since everything was known beforehand. Everything had been devised, negotiated and distorted beforehand. Secretly. Through the parallel and unofficial channels which, as will be proved below, were really important for the cover-up operation denounced here. While the Argentine Republic was expecting the results of the meeting of the Foreign Minister in New York, the Pink House already knew what would happen and that everything was a staging. That did not matter; the important part consisted of what was then communicated to public opinion and, obviously, the deception.

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Now, all that has been described in this section should be construed in an integral way and in relation to a key issue: the cover-up officials always needed to resort to the highest support possible from th public opinion in order to facilitate the implementation of their criminal plan. Owing to the special characteristics of the cover-up described herein and the institutional role of many of its authors and perpetrators, the weight of the public opinion in support of the Memorandum of Understanding and the need to keep the public unaware of the real objectives pursued by means of that instrument, have guided actions and public reactions by the parties involved.. In short, it is worth mentioning the lies and other stratagems used by the President and her Foreign Minister in order to conceal their criminal plan: 1) the case is paralyzed; 2) the AMIA case will not be allowed to become a chess piece in global geopolitics; 3) with the application of the Memorandum of Understanding, there is nothing to lose; 4) the agreement does not contain any hidden clauses; 5) the instrument makes it possible to receive the unsworn testimony of the indicted Iranian nationals; 6) there is no commercial interest whatsoever in this agreement; 7) no trade operations can be performed with Iran because that is prohibited by the UN; 8) the relatives and victims will be consulted before making any decision about the Iranian proposals; 9) an Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding will be executed in order to ensure the effectiveness of the red notices; 10) the negotiations with Iran were initiated at the request of Tehran; 11) the process of negotiations started in September 2012.

c) Other ways to foster the impunity plan The campaign to motorize the cover-up operation was not just a media circus; there is evidence of the intention of the perpetrators of this cover-up to remove the undersigned from his office as the head of the Prosecutorial Investigation Unit that investigates the AMIA bombings, as another way to prepare the ground for the achievement of their criminal objectives. One of the paths chosen in this case was the use of a false hypothesis made up by a certain area of the Intelligence Secretariat to attribute the bombings to new fabricated criminals as a way to undermine the tasks of the undersigned. That is, if this false theory was finally imposed as true,

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it would mean that the work of the Prosecutorial Investigation Unit had been mistaken or even worse, malicious. In such way, it can be stated that the removal of the signatory of this accusation would have been much easier. Precisely, the evidence has revealed that: ―… another hypothesis will come up, with different evidence‖. Within this setting, it was stated that the undersigned would be left totally unsettled by the new hypothesis grounded on false pieces of evidence which, obviously, were not added to the case. It was affirmed that: ―…he is going to be high and dry, because he never saw it, the evidence, what‘s going to come up now… is conclusive evidence…‖ (Communication dated 1 June 2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). Effectively, it was known that in order to undermine the work of the undersigned and the investigation carried out in a legal way, in order to advance with the cover-up of the Iranian indictees, they needed to invent a new –and false- hypothesis, with ―evidence‖ that had never been seen, never filed in the case.

From these statements by ―Allan‖, it can be understood that for those who were behind the cover-up, a key objective was the removal of the undersigned, by means of the personal discredit and/or undermining the credibility of the investigations,, based on –as arises from their plot- fabricated hypotheses with false evidence. There are other signs that also reflect the interest in removing the undersigned. As stated above, discrediing the investigation consisted of a necessary step for the plan, the execution of which would be amply facilitated –without doubt- by the absence of the person in charge of the investigation into this case of international terrorism. Khalil knew why ―Allan‖, his contact at the Intelligence Secretariat, with access to the presidential entourage, had told him that they were planning to create ―another hypothesis with different evidence‖ and therefore the undersigned would be bewildered (Communication dated 1 June 2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). Then, in relation to the declaration issued by the ―AMIA‖ Prosecutorial Investigation Unit on 29 May 2013 which, precisely, deepens the evidence and provides for new elements relating to the participation of Iranian officials in the attack, Khalil affirmed that: ―…these are the last-ditch

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efforts this guy can make…‖ (Communication dated 1 June 2013, client 11-3964-0799, File 61.30373.20130601.225511, CD 86). On 16 July 2013, two days before the anniversary of the attack, the undersigned presented this statement at the Intercontinental Hotel in the City of Buenos Aires, before a wide audience that included national legislators and congressmen from Buenos Aires, as well as experts in International Law, within the framework of a conference organized by the Latin American

Jewish Congress. With reference to such speech, Jorge Khalil, who was talking to Alejandro Jose Salomon, said: ―…I am listening to Nisman… the way he killed us!... yes, yes, he really killed us, eh… as usual, yes, yes, as usual, he really killed us…‖, and Salomon answered: ―…well, he is not trustworthy at all… and let‘s move on with the intervention in this guy´s area…‖ (Communication dated 17 July 2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-07-17- 134828-28, CD 89). These words are coherent with certain news that appeared at that time that referred the possibility of the intervention of this Prosecutorial Unit (―Estudian intervenir la fiscalia del caso ―AMIA‖, (They study control change at the Prosecutorship for the AMIA case) (Perfil, 14 July 2013). See Ignacio Ortelli, ―Nisman ratifico sus sospechas sobre Iran‖, Clarin, 17 July 2013; ―Nisman: no hay forma de detener la investigacion‖, Pagina 12, 16 July 2013; ―Informe del fiscal del caso AMIA‖, La Nacion, 17 July 2013; ―No hay forma de detener la investigacion por la AMIA‖, Ambito Financiero, 17 July 2013.

The purpose of removing the undersigned from his present office and, consequently from the AMIA case, is clearly there. This is consistent with the terms referred to in the previous paragraph and would certainly benefit the cover-up plan detailed and denounced here. From the facts listed in this section it is evident that a fierce campaign to discredit the investigation into the case was launched, planned to undermine the judicial version of the facts, and which was combined with a campaign of trickery including fallacies, stagings, lies, denials and false promises. Victims and relatives of the bombing were manipulated, they also tried to remove the undersigned from his position as the head of the Prosecutorial Unit which

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investigates the bombing, in order to prevent public opinion from knowing the significance of the real concealment intention that underlies the agreement with Iran. Gestures and other favours: components to facilitate the impunity plan. It was always quite clear to the authors of this cover-up that a substantial part of it was to secure the willingness of the authorities of the Iranian regime and of their local contacts, because the approval, or even better, the support of these actors, would contribute to facilitate the evolution of the criminal plan, due to its peculiar characteristics. The question related to the cessation of the Red Notices, as has already be shown, was obviously of crucial interest to Tehran and created frictions between the concealers and those concealed. Moreover, the setting up of communication and negotiation channels parallel to the official ones, was also a central resource to favor getting closer to and a good understanding with Tehran, in pursuit of the progress of the criminal plan. Nevertheless, the actions aimed at achieving the willingness of Iranian citizen, and thus to facilitate the criminal plan to move on, were not limited to these two items, but it has been able to confirm the grant of a series of specific favors, such as: the facilitation of negotiations, promises of jobs and access to important contacts; all of which made available to the regime´s local referrals, as gestures of proximity and goodwill intended to favor –ultimately- the plan of impunity. These "favors" basically demonstrate the interest of Ms. President to keep her relationship with Iranian contacts on good terms, in order to move ahead with her criminal plan. And they should be interpreted in that line. On May 28, 2013, Adalberto Assad had a meeting at the Ministry of Justice, which he immediately reported to his referral Jorge "Yussuf" Khalil: "...I just left the Ministry of Justice a while ago ... I have some nice news ... I need to see you ... I need to have a talk as part of a series of formal visits which several representatives responding to Iran made to government agencies, among which is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Communication dated 05.28.2013, Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-28- 141635-26.txt, CD 39).

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This approach and the novelty of having "open doors" to the country´s most important offices was immediately known by the fugitive Mohsen Rabbani, who - as has already been proven- was actively involved in the negotiations with their concealers . On that occasion, Assad reported to Rabbani on his meeting with a national minister: "... many nice things we're seeing ... meeting with the Minister, surprised me today, because it´s a very important opening-up to the community ... this is politics, sheik ... We are working for ... the

Government, we are now working because the Minister will talk to the President, he told me today, to ask her to receive me ... I´d love to see the President..‖ Rabbani understood that " ... we ... had talked to Argentina ... Iran was the first buyer for Argentina and now buys almost anything ... but ... this situation can change with you and with the government referring to current Iran´s referrals in Argentina, as Khalil, and the authorities of this Argentine government (Communication dated 28/05/13, Line No. 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-05- 28-155549-2, CD 39).

In fact, days before this meeting at the department of justice, the accused Rabbani had received the message sent by Cristina Fernandez, through the Minister De Vido and the intermediaries Jorge Luis D'Elia and Khalil, which expressed the interest in obtaining Oil (20/05/2013 Communications, Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05-20-111124-8, CD 31, File B- 1009-2013-05-20-114842-2, CD 31; File B-1009-2013-05-20-122551-14, CD 31, File B-1009- 2013-05-20-132253-6, CD 31, File B-1009-2013- 05-20- 133130-8, CD 31, File B-1009-2013- 05-20-143508-24, CD 31).

Powered by blind necessity of the Argentine authorities involved in this plan of moving on with the concealing plot, the local referrals of the Iranian regime began to have access to the offices of various officers of Cristina Fernandez. Through the agent known as "Allan" close to Ms. President, Tehran´s representatives in Argentina had access to favors and to a preferential treatment in the most varied negotiations. Thus, they have used the influences and have used their brand new contacts with the local political power. For instance: "Allan" promised Khalil positions at the National Customs and the Ministry of the Interior and Transportation for people of the Shiite community, "... there must be changes in

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transportation and customs and they will try to put ... ten guys in each place " (04/07/13 Communications dated 4/7/13, Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-07-04-112603-6.txt, CD 76 and dated 7/7/13 Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-07-07-152130-22, CD 79). Khalil has also asked favors for his contacts at Customs (Communication dated 24.05.2013, Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-5 24-175330- 20.txt, CD 35).

Fernando Esteche once advised Khalil that for the "whitewashing" with the local Iranian community to have a greater public visibility, he should ask for some gestures from the Government, such as "... to invite them or to start inviting them to the events at the Pink House (Government House) as exponents of the community‖ ... or . .that the President one day goes for breakfast on Ramadan and added … the President should go. ..that´s easier for "Allan" ... " (Communication dated 18.12.2012, Line No. 11- 3315-6908, File B-1009- 12-18-183332-8, CD 226). They wanted to give more publicity to the approach.

On another occasion, facing tax problems with the AFIP, community members turned to Jorge Khalil who, through Luis D'Elia, guaranteed a direct contact with the Federal Administrator of Public Revenues, Ricardo Echegaray, to solve the problem (Communication fsyrf 21/11/13, Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-1121-210631-26, CD 216). A similar result was obtained, ie, contact Ricardo Echegaray, through the negotiations of "Allan" who, upon a request of Khalil told him: "... no problem ... you come along with me ..." (Communication dated 13/06/2013, Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-l009-2013-06-13-213124-

24, CD 55). It is to be pointed out that, on more than one occasion, these "favors" found the wanted correlation, i.e. they resulted in the engagement of the regime´s local referrals, such as Jorge Khalil, who on more than one occasion expressed the support for the Argentine Government and acted in a way to strengthen ties between Tehran and Buenos Aires, contributing to the advancement of the concealing plan. Expressions such as: "... we have to fight here, I say, with people from government, to support the government ... '‖ must be understood in this sense

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(Communication dated 14/02/13, Line No. 11- 3315- 6908, File B-l009-2013-02- 14-164341- 10, CD 284). Also in that same line must be construed, for instance, the episode that took place in November 2012, before signing the agreement, when Luis D'Elia and Andres Larroque asked Jorge "Khalil Yussuf not to join an organized march of the leftist parties in defense of the "Palestinian cause" because such actions could affect the new bilateral relationship. Khalil agreed to the request and explained the reasons for accepting: "... I guess the Trots will start with messages against the government, which I do not want ... I do not want to do something that irritates ... we do not want irritate the Argentine government ... I will not do anything to irritate the Argentine government ... we're fixing a major problem for us ... ", in clear reference to the indictments of the Iranian citizen for the bombing against the AMIA (Communication dated 16/11/2012 Line No. 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-11-16-225815-2, CD 194). On the same subject, he explained: "... This morning I met with government people, they asked me please not to go to the meeting ..." and he was told: "... stop that fuss because the issue of ... can affect the relationships they are maintaining, the conversations we are having in Geneva clearly referring to the diplomatic rounds of negotiations which would culminate in the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (Communication dated 17/11/2012, Line No. 11 -3315- 6908, File B-1009-2012-11-17-183444-8, CD195). Finally, on the same episode, Khalil said: "... we are in the middle of negotiations with the government ... based on the present negotiations between Iran and Argentina, we do not want to see ourselves mixed up. Besides itt was a request from the government. I was talking to D'Elia and the ―Cuervo‖ Larroque and they asked me that and I conveyed it to Safir and the Safir told me the same thing ... 'let´s not do something that could disturb' ...." (Communication dated 18/11/2012, Line No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-18-095153-16, CD 196). Now, these orders and favors from Tehran´s local referrals would have been unthinkable in the absence of the evident political turn and later approach by the Argentine authorities, as already proven in these presents.

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In fact, plenty material evidence was obtained, precisely, giving account of this new political positioning of the "Argentine government". Again, it must be made clear, that no political decisions are analyzed or assessed here. The value recognized to the statements transcribed below lie in the fact that they reveal once again that the truth was far away from that which was publicly communicated. While they told us Argentineans, that they had achieved to vanquish, somehow, the historic Iranian reluctance to cooperate with the judicial case and that Tehran – somehow – accepted the Argentine requirements; the truth is that the message received in Tehran was another one. Ms. Dr. Fernandez had decided to guarantee the impunity of the Iranian citizen accused of the terrorist attack, as a prelude trading Persian oil. And she was willing to ingratiate herself with the regime. That was the message received in Tehran, and their referrals expressed it this way: "... because the government is now in favor of ..." Iran (Communication dated 06.06.2013, Line No. 11- 3238-4699, File B -1009- 2013-06-06-092046-14, CD 48), "... the government puts up with it ...

'" 1 (Communication dated 30.05.2013, Line No. 113238-4699, File B-1009-2013 -05-30- 225622-30, CD41), "...we are fine. They came out to defend us, directly ... " it was said on occasion of the debate for parliamentary approval of the agreement with Iran (14.02.13 Communication, Line No. 11-3315-6908, FileB-1009-2013-02-14-164341 - 10, CD 284). The same day the agreement with Iran was signed, Jorge Khalil celebrated "... this agreement ... this new relationship ... this new stage ...", clearly referring to this new context of rapprochement with the Argentine government (Communication dated 27/01/13, Line No. 11- 3315-6908, File 1009-2013-01 B-112032-4, CD 266). A few days later, Khalil highlighted again this substantial change of position: "... look with whom the government is working it out," referring to the rapprochement between Iran and Argentina (Communication dated 03.02.2013, Line No. 11-3315-6908 , File B-1009- 2013-02- 03-141619-26, CD 273). In July of that same year the expressions of joy for the new position related to Iran continued. The day of the last anniversary of AMIA´s bombing Khalil said: "... we are ... facing

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an agreement with the national government ... pursuing a negotiation with the national government ...", and from the whole conversation it clearly arises that he is not referring only to the Memorandum of Understanding, but to an underlying and much ample agreement (Communication dated 18/07/13, 11-3238-4699 Line No., File B-1009-2013-07-18-155916-12, CD 90). At the act of Al Quds Day, Abdul Karim Paz said, about the AMIA case and with reference to the Memorandum of Understanding signed with Iran, that:‖ ("... Argentina has understood how things are, they want to turn the page and become independent of what the United States and Israel say..‖(Dinatale, Martin, (Dinatale, Martin, ―D'Elia y Esteche reivindicaron a la agrupacion terrorista Hezbollah‖, (" D'Elia and EstechevindicatedtheHezbollahterroristgroup "), La Nacion, 13/08/2013). More recently, in February 2014, he Kahlil continued informing Rabbani: "... we are working well in politics here ..." (comunication dated 04/02/14, Line No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009 -

2014- 02-04-093431-30, CD 291). The local referrals of the Islamic Republic had understood the actions of the "Argentine government" as favorable to the position and interests of Tehran: the "Argentine government" now supported their interests, i.e. the desincrimination of Iranian citizens in the court case and consequently, the disassociation of Iran and the local Iranian community of the suspicion of being involved in the bombing. Even those involved in the cover-up took the desincrimination of Iranian citizen and the subsequent ―whitewashing‖ of the community, and began planning future projects. In that sense, "Allan" sustained: "... there are lots of issues that we have to go start putting together ..with intelligence ... we are doing fine and we have to work quietly, we have to work for 10 years from now ... you understand me? In a year and a half we must have good news, but here there is a job to do for a good while ... "(Communication dated 06.02.2013, Line No. 11- 3315- 6908, File B- 1009-2013-02- 06-203822-26, CD 276). Later on, the Iranian agents continued to operate with the same idea: "... It is a long term issue, to work it out well ... We will have to set up some four, five strong "truths ", you have to set

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them up ..." (Communication dated 03.10.2014, Line No. 11-6224-0263, File B-1009-2014-10- 03-223900- 28). Note that "Allan" and Khalil were sure that the Iranian citizen would be released from the court´s indictment, " In a year and a half we must have good news " is the unequivocal expression that reflects this thought. They had already deemed that obstacle removed and placed themselves on another horizon, a step above, strategically thinking from now to several years ahead. In short, these were not two parties negotiating an agreement, as they wanted to present it publicly, these are two partners looking to delete a criminal indictment for a crime against humanity in the most credible way possible. vi.- Parallel channels of communication and negotiation The criminal plan here evidenced and accused must in no way be mistaken with a diplomatic negotiation, although its implementation has included formal diplomatic contacts. The truth is that the plan´s criminal quality is also evident in the need for counting on these parallel unofficial channels as concrete, efficient and reliable paths to move on with the purpose the approach and the formal diplomatic negotiations truly have had: the impunity of the Iranian citizen accused of the AMIA case. As mentioned previously, there is multiple evidence supporting the existence of communication and negotiation channels parallel to the official ones, though interlinked therewith, which facilitated contacts between Tehran and Buenos Aires for the purposes of the criminal objective. Making reference to a concrete message, Khalil illustrated it saying: ― …they gave me data on which we have to work, they told me that I have to transmit it … well, guys, forward this to the interlocutors from there so they talk to the interlocutors from here…‖ (Communication dated Nov. 4 2012, telephone 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-04-130024-6. CD 182). In other words the parallel channels had ―interlocutors from here‖ and ―interlocutors from there‖. These evidences uncovered a group of individuals strongly linked to officers and former officers from both governments who, from the shadows, have strategically and substantially contributed

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to the actions required to progress with the planned criminal objective. Among them, the active participations of the following persons may be underlined: Luis Angel D‘Elia, Fernando Luis Esteche, Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf Khalil, the National Deputy Andres Larroque, Hector Luis Yrimia and the person identified as ―Allan‖ belonging to the Intelligence Secretariat, organic and inorganically, who could be Ramon HectorBogado, which may be his real name or the name he uses in his intelligence activity.

These subjects, implied in the cover-up, are related among each other. Please note that Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil has repeatedly communicated with D‘Elia, with Esteche, with ―Allan‖, with Yrimia and has met Larroque in several opportunities. Also, ―Allan‖ and Yrimia responded to the same sector of the Intelligence Secretariat. The two latter characters have been introduced to Khalil through Fernando Esteche, implying that he knew them beforehand. The relationships between D‘Elia and Larroque, D‘Elia and Esteche and Larroque and Esteche are of public knowledge.

What appears to be a cumbersome tongue twister to read, in reality is the concrete demonstration that these subjects not only know each other but that they have also had joint activities and, according to the evidence shown in this presentation, they have all participated in the execution of the cover-up plan. Thereby, the close and promiscuous relationship between the participants of the cover-up plan is exposed. There is profuse evidence that shows the existence of concrete messages relative to the object of this accusation that have been communicated between authorities of both countries through these unofficial channels. There is no doubt whatsoever, that the activity of the communication and negotiation channels represents a de facto parallel diplomacy. Even before signing the ―Memorandum of Understanding‖, already in November 2012, negotiations were carried out beyond the diplomatic channels, that is, paths that were beyond the meetings held in Switzerland. In other words, while formal diplomacy was meeting in the Swiss Confederation, the hidden messages between Teheran and Buenos Aires covered other parallel paths. Jorge ―Yussuf‖

Khalil explained ―…I come from La Matanza, I have just had a meeting with Luis D‘Elia and

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―Cuervo‖ Larroque, the one for La Campora … they called me early and wanted to speak to me, that they had a message for the government … and now I‘m going to Martinez to give the message, to the home of the Ambassador..‖ making reference to the Iranian Charge d‘affaires in Argentina, highest official authority in the national territory (Communication dated November 17, 2012, telephone 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-17-104846-10.wav, CD 195).

He described this same sequence in another telephone communication: ― …I returned at eleven pm from Martinez. I went to La Matanza, talked with CuervoLarroque and with D‘Elia … from there I had to go to the home of the ambassador and talk with the ambassador to send a message they sent me…‖ and he added: ― Larroque … sat with me and gave me a message I have to transmit to the embassy. I went to the embassy and transmitted what I had, but I did not go to the embassy, I had to go to Martinez...‖. With respect to his relationship with the Argentine authorities he explained: ― I am not operating for them, I am operating for our people, for the embassy … they told me to do one thing, and as I am the link...‖ (Communication dated November 18, 2012, telephone 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-18- 100116-6, CD 196). The day after Jorge ―Yussuf Khalil returned from a trip to the Islamic Republic of Iran, where he interviewed ―the highest spheres … with the responsible heads … with the chancellery…‖ (Communication dated May 11, 2013, telephone 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2012-05-11- 173407-12, CD 0022), he communicated with Luis D‘Elia and they agreed to meet, however, he told him there was uneasiness in Iran, apparently by the noncompliance by Timmerman, and that – also – they had not liked some public declarations by argentine officials. ―They disliked some words that have been said … the comment that mentioned: ―I hope you don‘t think that I like to negotiate with so and so, with the Iranians!‖… that made a very bad impressiond, but anyway I‘ll transmit it correctly to you, so you can transmit it the way down … as if you did not know…‖ Communication dated May 11, 2013, telephone 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-05 – 11-083146-8.wav, CD 0022, underlined). The messages, in this tone, arrived directly from Teheran to the Casa Rosada (Government House).

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These are clear examples as evidence that certain argentine authorities used these parallel communication channels, unofficial and totally secret to make progress on the cover-up plan. The role of each one of these actors is also perfectly proven: Larroque, D‘Elia and Khalil, fulfill the criminal maneuver. They perform as links between the highest argentine and Iranian political authorities. And, Larroque is the one that in general receives the order from the President, which are then forwarded to D‘Elia. So clear as unheard of.

These channels have also been used to send updated information to Mohsen Rabbani, one of the accused for the AMIA bombing, on different configurative aspects of the plan destined to cover it up. We must recall the decision power this accused Iranian national still has, allowing him to intervene directly and personally in the negotiations between Iranians and argentines. Please note that the attitude of Rabbani is not the attitude of a worried fugitive due to his procedural situation or due to the evolution of the accusation against him. On the contrary, having a high degree of security that will maintain him unpunished thanks to the protection of the regime of his country, he has time and energy to continue giving orders at distance and organizing the actions of the Shia community in Argentina. If this is not enough, lately he has even shown more confidence when he noticed the favorable disposition of the argentine government towards him. This is reflected in his dialogues: ― I told them that we … had talked with Argentina… Iran was the main purchaser from Argentina, and now they buy almost nothing ... but … this situation may change with you and with the government‖ making reference to the present referrals of

Iran in Argentina, like Khalil, and the authorities of the present argentine government (Communication dated May 28, 2013, telephone 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-28- 155549-2. CD 39). Another example is the report by Jorge Khalil when he communicated: ― … today we concluded a meeting with the Planning Minister De Vido, he agrees to send the highest YPF authorities to agree with the Islamic Republic and the transaction may be by means of grains and by means of other things…‖ and Rabbani replied: ― send it to me for evaluation …‖

(Communication dated May 20, 2013, telephone 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-

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114842-2, CD 31). And, after analyzing it, he replied. ―… here some sectors of the government told me that they are ready to sell oil to Argentina … and also to buy arms…‖ (Communication dated May 28, 2013, telephone 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-28-155549-2. CD 39). Reference should also be made to the fact that these parallel channels have been used to organize actions and behaviors that allowed – in different manners – the progress of impunity. For example, in November 2012, Luis D‘Elia as well as Andres Larroque requested Khalil that he should not participate in a demonstration organized by the leftist parties in defense of the ―Palestinian cause‖ and, that they should also cease with the claims and reproaches, because this type of actions could have repercussions on the new bilateral relations. Khalil explained like this: ― we don‘t want to do something that may irritate … we don‘t want to irritate the argentine government … I‘ll do nothing to irritate the argentine government …‖ and he added ― … we are repairing a greater problem for us …‖ making reference to the accusations for the AMIA bombing, and that required caution. Khalil understood the risk of the participations in these demonstrations: ― … I imagine that the trosks are going to start with messages against the government, something I don‘t want …‖ (Communication dated November 16, 2012, telephone 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-16-225815-2. CD 194). The cover-up plan required all possible precautions. With respect to this issue, Khalil added: ―This morning I had a meeting with the people of the government, they asked me that I should not go to the meeting please …‖ and they said: ― stop being angry because the issue of … may have repercussion on the relations they are maintaining, the conversations we are having in Geneva …‖ Communication dated November 17, 2012, telephone 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-17-183444-8. CD 195). In relation to a message in particular, Khalil exemplified the following: ―...I‘ve been given a datum that needs to be worked on; I‘ve been told I need to pass it on… well guys, throw this to your spokespersons over there so that they can talk to thespokespersons here... ‖ (Communicationdated 4/11/12, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-04-130024- 6, CD 182). In other words, side channels had their ―spokespersons here‖ and ―spokespersons there.‖

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Such evidence unveiled a group of individuals who were closely related to current and former officials from both governments, who from the shadows, who strategically and materially contributed with the necessary steps to effect the masterminded. Among them, it is worth remarking the involvement of Luis Angel D'EIia, Fernando Luis Esteche, Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf Khalil, the National Congressman Andres Larroque, Hector Luis Yrimia, and the individual identified as ―Allan‖ belonging to the Intelligence Secretariat both in an organic and inorganic fashion, who could be Ramon Hector AllanBogado, whether this is his real name or the one he is named while rendering his intelligence services. These individuals, who are involved in the cover-up, are related among one and other. Note that Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil held talks with D‘Elia,Esteche,―Allan‖,Yrimia on a frequent basis, and met Larroque several times. At the same time, ―Allan‖ and Yrimia answer the orders from the same sector of the Intelligence Secretariat. These latter individuals were introduced to Khalil by Fernando Esteche, which implies he had met them before. The relations held among

D‘Elia and Larroque, D‘Elia and Esteche and Larroque and Esteche, are publicly known. What seems to be a troublesome tongue-twister to read is actually the concrete proof about the fact that such individuals not only know one and other, but also that they have carried out joint activities, and as per the evidence shown throughout this filing, they have all taken part in the execution of the cover-up plan. In this way, the close and promiscuous connection among the members of the cover-up plan is evidenced. There is lavish evidence about the existence of concrete messages in relation to the subject matter of this accusation, which have been exchanged between authorities of both countries through these non-official channels. Undoubtedly, the activity of such communications and negotiation channels embodies a the facto side diplomacy action. Even before the execution of the ―Memorandum of Understanding,‖ already on November 2012, negotiations were being held outside diplomatic channels, namely, through means other than the meetings which were held in Switzerland at the same time.

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In other words, while formal diplomatic officials were gathered in the Helvetic Confederation, hidden messages between Tehran and Buenos Aires were being exchanged at the same time through other channels. Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil explained: ―...I ‗ve just come from La Matanza. I‘ve had a meeting withLuis D'Elia and― elCuervo‖ Larroque, the one fromla Campora...they called me early in the morning and said they wanted to talk to me. They said they had a message for the government... And now, I‘m off to Martinez to pass that message to the Ambassador‘s residence...,‖ in relation to the person Responsible for the businesses of Iran in Argentina, the top official authority in the national territory (Communicationdated 17/11/2012, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-17- 104846- 10.wav, CD 195). This same routine was mentioned by him in another telephone communication: ―...I returned at eleven o‘clock from Martinez. I went to La Matanza, I‘d been talking to el CuervoLarroque and D'Elia...from there I had to go the ambassador‘s residence to talk to the ambassador to send a message I‘d been told...‖ and he added: ―...Larroque...he sat down with me and gave me a message I had to pass onto the embassy. I went to the embassy and told what I had to say, but I didn´t go to the embassy, I had to go to Martinez...‖ And he explained the following in relation to the Argentine authorities: ―...I am not operating for them; I am operating for our own people, for the embassy...they sent me to do a certain thing, because I am the nexus... ‖ (Communicationdated 18/11/2012, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11- 18-100116- 6, CD 196).

The day after Jorge ―Yussuf Khalil returned from a trip to the Islamic Republic of Iran, where he held a meeting with the ―top authorities...with the maximum responsible individuals...with the foreign ministry...‖ (Communicationdated 11/05/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-l009- 2013-05-11- 173407-12, CD 0022), he got in touch with Luis D'Elia and they arranged a meeting. However, he made him know in advance that Iran was experiencing discomfort apparently due to Timerman‘s breach, and that -furthermore- some statements made by some Argentine public officials had been displeasing:

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―...some words were considered unpleasant....such as that comment made: ‖So what? Do you think I like negotiating with such and such, with the Iranians!‖....he fucked it up so bad, but I will tell it as it is so that you can pass it on under the table...and let it slip off...unnoticeably...‖ (Communication dated 11/5/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-05- ll-083146- 8.wav, CD 0022, underlined by myself). Such messages, with all of their shades, came right from Tehran to the Pink House.

These are overt examples which evidence that certain Argentine authorities made use of such parallel unofficial and totally secret channels to move forwards with the cover-up plan. It is also perfectly proven the role of each of these participants: Larroque, D'Elia and Khalil, are part of the criminal plot. They perform as links among the top Argentine and Iranian authorities. Moreover, it is Larroque who takes orders from the President, in general, and then they are passed onto Luis D'Elia. This is both clear and inadmissible. These channels were also used to furnish updated information to Mohsen Rabbani, one of the indictees in relation to the bombings against the AMIA, about different aspects of the parts of the plan intended to cover it up. It is worth noting the power of decision that such indictee still has, which has allowed him to act in a direct and personal way in the negotiations between Iranian and Argentine people. Be it noted that Rabbani does not behave like a fugitive concerned about his legal procedural status or the progress of the accusation against him. On the contrary, since he feels very confident in the fact that he will come clean thanks to the protection of the system of his country, he has both time and energy to keep on imparting orders from a distance and masterminding the actions of the Shiite community in Argentina. On top of that, he has lately gained much more confidence taking into account the good predisposition of the authorities of the Argentine government towards him. This can be shown in his conversations. ―...I told them that we...had talked to Argentina...Iran was the first buyer from Argentina and now it‘s buying almost nothing....but....this situation can change with you and the government,‖ in relation to the current referents of Iran in Argentina,

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such as Khalil, and the authorities of this Argentine government (Communication dated 28/5/13, client 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-05-28- 155549-2, CD 39). Another example of the above-mentioned is the report by Jorge Khalil when he communicated: ―...today we rounded off a meeting with the Minister of Planning De Vido, where he showed his intention to send the top authorities of YPF to settle matters with the Islamic Republic, and operations can be done in exchange of grains and other things...‖, to which Rabbani answered:

―...Send it to me so I can study it... ‖ (Communicationdated 20/5/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20- 114842-2, CD 31). And, after having a look at it, he answered: ―...here some sectors from the government told me they are ready to sell oil to Argentina...and also to buy weapons... ‖ (Communication dated 28/5/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05-28-155549-2, CD 39). It should also be remarked that such parallel channels have been used to organize actions and ways of acting that made it easy –in different modalities- for the impunity plan to go further with. For instance, by November 2012, both Luis D'Elia and Andres Larroque requested Khalil that he did not take part in a demonstration organized by left-wing parties showing their support to the ―Palestinian cause‖ and, also, that he stopped his reproaches and complaints, because such type of actions could impact on the new bilateral relations. In Khalil‘s words: ―...we do not want to cause political turmoil...we do not want to irritate the Argentine government...I won‘t do anything to irritate the Argentine government... ‖ and he added ―...we are fixing a significant issue for us...‖, in relation to the charges for the bombings against the AMIA, and that deserved to be cautious. Khalil understood how risky it was to get involved in such demonstrations: ―...I can figure out the trosks will start with their messages against the government, which I don‘t want...‖ (Communication dated 16/11/2012, client 11- 3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11 -16-225815-2, CD 194).The cover-up plan needed to take all possible precautions. In relation to the same issue, Khalil added: ―...This morning I had a meeting with people from the government. They asked me not to go to the meeting... ‖ and they told him: ―...drop your

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anger cause the issue about...can impact on the relations they are holding, the talks we are having in Geneva... ‖ (Communication dated 17/11/2012, client 11¬3315-6908, File B-1009- 2012- 11-17-183444-8,CD195). And he decided: ―...So I don‘t want that anyone of us, who represents the Islamic Republic in one way or the other, like you do, like Ghaleb, like I do, like anyone from Flores or our community, goes there, to no place, no one is taking part, as long as Israel doesn‘t invade....Now, if Israel invades....we will organize a front, not with the trosks or the left-winged, with Kirchner‘s followers, La Campora and all those are going to support us. I have already discussed this with Larroque and D'Elia... ‖ (Communication dated 17/11/2012, client 11- 3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-11-17-183444-8, CD 195). And he repeated: ―...we are not making any statement here, cause negotiations with the government are in full swing... I called up that meeting...but then I cancelled it, because based on the negotiations underway between Iran and Argentina, we don‘t want to see ourselves involved. Besides, it was a request from the government. I have been talking with D'Elia and the ―Cuervo‖ Larroque and they asked me that, so I told that to Safir...andSafir told me the same thing... 'let‘s not do anything that might cause irritation '....‖ (Communication dated 18/11/2012, client 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-11-18- 095153-16, CD 196). In a conversation held with Fernando Esteche he stated ―...On Saturday I went to el Gordo ‗s (the fat guy), I talk to the ―gordo‖, and he phoned the ‖cuervo‖ before me, he put him on the speaker...‖Cuervo‖, I‘m here with Yussef blablabla...I‘m telling him what you told me to say. Oh, really?...‖. At this point, it goes without saying that when reference is made to ―the gordo‖

(the fat guy) and ―the cuervo‖ (the crow), reference is being made to Luis D'Elia and Andres Larroque, respectively (Communication dated 19/11/2012, client 11¬3315-6908, File B-1009- 2012-11-19-121034-16, CD197). From this series of communications, it can be concluded that Khalil was not willing to become involved in an attack against the government, as a referent for Iran on behalf of ―the trosks‖ and/or any political association, so as not to endanger the negotiations with Tehran. D'Elia and Larroque shared this concern and worked it out so that Khalil and his followers remained far

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from any demonstrations and/or open criticism against the government due to the position adopted in the light of international events related to the Palestine-Israeli conflict. Both Larroque and D‘Elia made their contributions to ensure and keep the best possible atmosphere between the parties, while the cover-up plan ordered by Cristina Fernandez and carried out by Hector Timerman was being executed. Another example which evidences the intent to protect the cover-up plan arises from the event on 29 May 2013, when the decision by the Prosecutor‘s Unit about going deeper into some aspects related to the AMIA bombings became known to the public, among which the infiltration of Iranian intelligence structures in the region was under analysis. On that occasion, Jorge Khalil and other members of the local community were planning to make a public deposition, but they received instructions from Iran to refrain from doing that, in order not to endanger relations with Argentina, and obviously, the cover-up actions. In this sense, he held: ―...they are asking you to stay put...I‘ve already been told by the guy here not to do anything, anything, anything, but let‘s not do anything cause he doesn‘t want to screw up their relation... ‖ (Communication dated 04/06/2013, client 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009- 2013--04-082254-20, CD 46). In this case, instructions from Tehran were received by Khalil through Abdul Karim Paz, who is the one ―being asked that we don‘t do anything and by ―the guy here‖, he means the one Responsible for the businesses of Iran in Argentina. To sum up, the cover-up was the most important thing and had not to be affected by structural matters.

Finally, such parallel channels contributed to developing actions intended to the creation of an alternative and false version about the bombings, which was believable for the public opinion, and which allowed to redirect the investigations to ―new indictees,‖ covering up the Iranian accused nationals for good, who are very clearly involved by several pieces of evidence and different judicial resolutions. This item is illustrated by several communications held between the Iranian referent Jorge Khalil and other participants, basically, Fernando Esteche, Hector Yrimia and the intelligence agent ―Allan.‖ For further development, please refer to the arguments on item IV.c.3.b hereof.

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In short, on the above-mentioned items episodes have been exemplified which show the way in which messages, requests, concerns, and information, etc. were communicated from one side to the other of all the individuals involved in the cover-up plan herein stated. What has been described in this item allows to see the way in which the authors of the plot managed to established an indirect connection, through a set of intermediaries, not only with Iranian referents in Tehran but also with one of the indictees in the AMIA bombings, Mohsen Rabbani, whose detention for extradition purposes has been requested through a letter rogatory by the Argentine justice, and is at the top priority of Interpol searches. As follows, the role and the contributions of each of these above-mentioned individualswho took part in the criminal plot herein reported. a) Cristina Elisabet Fernandez To understand the role of Cristina Fernandez, Esq., in this impunity plan, it must be set clear that the crime reported would not have been committed without her decision and consequent actions. In effect, The President of the Argentine Nation issued an express instruction so that a cover-up plot was designed and executed, with the aim of disassociating the Iranian nationals accused in the case for the bombings against the AMIA building, in order to ensure them their final impunity. Such decision was founded on the grounds of seeking a geographic and political approach, as well as re-establishing full state-level trade relations with the Islamic Republic, since she considered that the national power crisis could be substantially weathered through business exchanges of ―oil for grains.‖ The circumstance that it has been the top authority of the Argentine Republic who ordered the execution of such criminal actions implies that what is hereby reported bears a huge institutional seriousness. After analyzing the evidence to the most rigorous extent, it arises unequivocally that the president was involved in the criminal plot herein reported. On several occasions, the parties involved in the criminal plot had made reference to his issue, ensuring that: ―everything is

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arranged high up,‖ everything had been decided ―at the highest level because ―the boss had requested it‖ and her Foreign Minister, in an obedient way, implemented such plot because it was―order, order and order‖ (Communication dated 6/2/2013, client 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009- 2013-02-06-203822-26, CD 276, Communication dated 20/5/2013, client11- 3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-111124-8, CD 31; Communication dated 28/01/13, client 11-315- 6908, File B-1009-2013- 01 -28-135732-18.wav, CD 267).

The dismay caused cannot be avoided when proving that Mrs President is involved in a evil master plan intended to leave aside the search of justice in the case that investigates the greatest terrorist bombings suffered in the Argentine history. Unfortunately, as it is publicly known, it is not the first time that the leader of the future of the Nation is involved in criminal actions to divert the investigation of the AMIA case. Dr. Fernandez‘s commitment to such criminal plot of impunity was such that she chose really carefully some of her collaborators, or to be more precise, her accomplices, making use of different people to execute such plot. This has been one of her essential contributions to instrument the plan. When the credentials of each of the participants are observed and analyzed, it can be noticed that her selection was right, since they all have criminal records and the necessary qualifications to faithfully obey the President‘s commands. To begin with, she made use of an individual called ―Allan‖, a man of her entourage, consubstantiated with the Iranian government, a direct contact of the top referent of such country in Argentina and a member of the Intelligence Secretariat of the Nation; so that he could assist the Foreign Minister in all of the steps related to the implementation of a cover-up plot which, due to their notoriously criminal nature, would not be convenient to be effected by a top national minister. The fact that ―Allan‖ performs –organic or inorganic-functions for the national intelligence body is not an insignificant datum. On the contrary, such status allowed him to take advantage of the resources of such state secretariat, which made him particularly fit to comply with his duty.

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She also instructed the leader Luis D‘Elia to take care of sending and receiving all the messages exchanged through side communication and negotiation channels developed to fulfil the cover-up actions. In this case, the decision of the President was also appropriate because D‘Elia has been not only a fervent protector of the Iranian regime but also, in his own words, an unconditional ―soldier‖ of Cristina Fernandez. Furthermore, she chose the National Congressman Andres Larroque, another relentless follower of the President, who acted as a link, as a bridge between her and the clandestine members of the impunity plan. The need to have an intermediary is obvious. Since we are dealing with the execution of a crime, the President has cunningly preferred to stay away from the individuals executing criminal acts. Since the accomplices had to act following her orders, it became essential to rely on an extremely loyal person who could justify his personal relation to Dr. Cristina Fernandez and Luis D‘Elia, and such person ended up being the above-referred Larroque.

And mainly, she delegated a great part of the instrumentation of the criminal plot onto her Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, who she initially instructed to get in contact with the Iranian representatives for the purposes of letting them know how willing the Argentine government was to leave aside any legal compliant for justice in relation to the AMIA case, in exchange of a closer commercial relation between both countries, which started in 2011, in the city of Alepo. Specifically, by a presidential order, Timerman separated from the official committee who visited different countries in the Middle East, to head to the Syrian city of Alepo, where he held secretly a meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Salehi. There he communicated the following message: ―...Argentina is no longer interested in clarifying the two attacks…instead it prefers to improve economic relations with Iran…‖(Ys. 131.189/131.194; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Argentina negocia con Iran dejar de lado la investigacion de los atentados‖, (Argentina negotiates with Iren to leave the investigation of the bombings aside) Perfil Newspaper, 26/03/2011, pp. 130.911/130.913; Eliaschev, Pepe, ―Polemica en torno a la negociacion

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secreta entre Argentina e Iran‖, (Controversy about the secret negotiation between Argentina and Iran) Perfil Newspaper, 2/4/2011). His instructions involved the authorization so that Minister Timerman negotiated and instrumented in a secret way, the impunity plan which would remove the obstacle that meant the Argentine judicial accusation against Iranian nationals. Such plan, included the presidential decision to instrument a mechanism in the Memorandum of Understanding which allowed to provide for the cease of red notices, due to the fact that that was the only actual interest of the Iranian government. And such issue was shown on the seventh item of such agreement. The impunity plan masterminded by Dr. Fernandez went far beyond the removal of such priorities of searching by Interpol and included the final disassociation of the Iranian nationals. Therefore, its instrumentation led to the creation of a ―Truth Committee‖, as agreed upon in the Memorandum, the conclusions of which had been arranged beforehand, and would guarantee such agreed impunity. Being aware of such circumstances, it was said: ―...―someone‘s going to come out of this with egg on their face...‖, to which Jorge Khalil, referent from Iran, acknowledged: ―...Of course, that‘s fixed...,‖ but he stressed that the Iranian nationals would not be the ones who suffered the damages, and concluded: ―... how on earth is going to be thrown at our side asshole?! If we are sat at the table...and (Communication dated 27/1/2013, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-27-113208-14, CD 266).

Furthermore, as it was shown, she authorized her Foreign Minister to close secret agreements with the Iranian representatives who, according to the evidence introduced to the case, ensured the removal of Interpol red notices and the granting of protection to the former Iranian Minister of Defence, Ahmad Vahidi, guaranteeing him he would never been examined. The existence of secret agreements was shown by the at-that-time Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, when he said: ―...The [contents] of the agreement between Iran and Argentina in relation to the AMIA issue shall become public at the right time and the issue [of the Iranian indictees] is included and we are after it...'‘‘‘ (―Tehran insists accord with

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Argentina includes Interpol lifting red notices against Iranian suspects,‖ Mercopress, 19/03/2013) and by the participants of the cover-up who stated: ―...there was something signed, where the precautionary measures were mentioned... ‖ (Communication dated 11/5/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-05-11-083146- 8.wav, CD 0022); and ―...is rotten fish, then we‘ll talk in person, it‘s within the framework, it was already known, it is more profound... ‖(Communication dated 12/2/2013, client 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-12-100525-14,

CD 282). Another express directive of the President, this time channelled through the agent ―Allan,‖ was the order of preparing a false hypothesis, backed up by fabricated evidence to incriminate ―new authors of the bombings,‖ which would be accused with the aim of disassociating for good from the event those Iranian indictees. Precisely, ―Allan‖ recognized such an order, when acknowledgingthat the subscriber―...is going to get high and dry, cause he has never seen them, he, the evidence....what comes now is definite evidence...‖ (Communication dated 01/06/2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). This issue has been already mentioned by Fernando Esteche, another participant of the plot, who even before subscribing the memorandum said: ―...they want to build a new AMIA enemy, someone new as the one responsible, they need to build this…‖, a task intended for the intelligence services. According to Esteche, how ―are they going to do to say the Israel people were not to blame‖, cause -clearly- it would not be believable, they had to make up a false hypothesis, and they even talked about getting a ―local fascist connection‖ involved (Communication dated 18/12/2012, client 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-12- 18-183332-8, CD 226). Another remarkable contribution to the plot has been her announcement at the General Meeting of the United Nations on 25 September 2012, where she informed that, in response to a request by the Islamic Republic of Iran one week before, she had ordered her Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman, to start a negotiation process with such country. This contribution to the plot became essential, because the official speech of the President was intended to- and achieved- hide the fact that secret negotiations had been being held for one

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and a half years and that their approach had been the result of an Argentine initiative, not Iran‘s, as it had been announced. She could not publicly acknowledge that she had ordered her Foreign Minister that he offered Iranian authorities impunity for their nationals in exchange of a closer geo-political and commercial relation. As it was already said, this criminal plot demanded to have the greatest possible support by the public opinion and- essentially-by the victims, in relation to the accord that it would be executed and was finally executed with Iran, as a way to facilitate its execution. For that end, previous negotiations and the Argentine initiative were concealed, and for the same purpose, on September 2012, the President promised, consciously knowing that she would fail to that promise, that she would consult relatives and victims before adopting any kind of decisions about the dealings with Tehran. She was only after inspiring some phony confidence on the victims of the bombings, promising them that they would be consulted on. But they were later on shocked by the new and executed accord, on Sunday 27 January 2013 (Cristina Fernandez‘s speech before the 67th General Meeting of the United Nations, dated 25 September 2012; Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Information for the Mass Media No. 011/13). In the same line, and abusing of her office and duties, she continued showing an official version with false facts in order to hide the criminality of the actual plan. Thus, she submitted the Memorandum of Understanding as a "historic achievement" (Twitter messages from Cristina Fernandez' account dated January 27th, at 10: 26 to 10:32 AM). On the same day of the approval she wrote in her official Twitter account a series of messages which intended to place the news as a "success", all these in order to conceal the actual purpose of the Memorandum of Understanding: to give a truthful legal frame for sneakily execute the impunity of the Iranian Nationals accused and therefore to make the geopolitical and trading rapprochement with Teheran possible. She continued in that obstinate position when in her message upon the submission of the memorandum's approval bill before the National Congress, she said: …"They intend to show the agreement as a kind of scheme for "starting" trading with Iran. In fact such trading has existed since 1990 and except for the years 2004 and 2005 it was in surplus…" (President's

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Speech no. 173 upon the submission before the National Congress of the Memorandum of Understanding between Argentine and Iran approval's bill). Maliciously, the President was referring to the trading with the private sector. She could not admit that she had decided to abandon the demand of justice on the AMIA case in exchange of establishing trading at a State level which did not exist and which she was trying to reestablish. Although she publicly denied that the trade was an interest for engaging Iran, in secret, the

President tried to put in practice her decision of trading with Teheran, giving instructions to her Minister of Planning, the architect Julio De Vido. For that end, he was ordered to go on with the negotiations for exchanging oil for seeds through parallel communication channels with the system. In such sense Luis D'Ellia recognized: …"the meeting took place as it was ordered by the boss…", in reference to their meeting with De Vido and he affirmed: "…I was talking to the "quia" (in reference to the Minister De Vido) … they are willing to send people to YPF with the two of us, to make business there…he is really interested in exchanging their product for seeds and meat there…" (Communication dated May 20 2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013.05-20-111124-8, CD31). The commitment with the bombing's victims was null, since by the month of May 2013, the National Executive Branch, under instructions of Ms. Crisitina Fernandez, was carrying secret negotiations with Iran in order to exchange oil for seeds and meat. And, as it was already proved, Mohsen Rabbani, one of the indictees in the AMIA case, had participated of these same trade negotiations. An example of these is the fact that Khalil informed Rabbani: …"today we concluded a meeting with the Minister of Planning, De Vido, where he said he was ready to send executive officers of YPF to negotiate with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the transaction may be through seeds and through other things…", to what Rabbani answered: "send it to me in order to evaluate it" and after his assessment he answered: …"there are some sectors of the government who said to me they are ready to sell oil to Argentina…and also to buy some arms…" Communication dated 20 May 2013, client 11-3238-4699, File B-10009- 2013-05-28-155549-2, CD39.)

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That is to say, whilst the President publicly assured that her actions were exclusively motivated by the search of justice for the AMIA case and that the Memorandum of Understanding was the only possible solution for the case, one of the indictees, Mohsen Rabbani, secretly and clandestinely was negotiating with our authorities through intermediaries and hidden channels to exchange oil for grains, the arms sale, and what is worst, their own impunity. The next contribution for the performance of the impunity plan was to install, from the highest levels of power, the version that the proceedings of the AMIA bombing was paralyzed, with the intention of confusing the public opinion and thus being allowed to submit before the Argentine people the Memorandum of Understanding –remember that the instrument drawn up to make the Iranian Nationals impunity feasible- was the only possible solution. Such intervention was divided in several episodes and remained over time. In fact, in her speech through a nationwide broadcast held on 8 February 2013, whilst she was informing the submission of the Memorandum of Understanding's ratification bill to the National Congress, she said: "…This agreed upon Memorandum is a step forward in order to sort out a case which has been in standby for 19 years now …" (Cristina Fernandez speech on 2/8/13). In March 2013, she wrote on the social networks "…we had to sort this thing out…" (Speech of the President on the opening of the 131st period of the Legislature's regular sessions, 3/1/2013). On her speech before the 68th General Meeting of the United Nations, she insisted with the same lie when she affirmed: "…the case is stagnant, it haven't moved for more than 19 years…"

(Speech before the United Nations on 24 September 2013). The paradoxical thing is that the President knows, with no doubt, that the proceedings have moved along, especially considering the wide promotion the subsequent ruling of the Prosecutorial Investigation Unit and different judicial pronouncements have had, for her expressions on the contrary can only be considered as an effective expression of the malice with which she has acted trying to discredit the Argentine justice as an indirect way of legitimating a bilateral agreement – be it read Memorandum of Understanding- which is the basis for a criminal plan created by her.

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Another of her contributions took place on 27 September 2013, a day before the meeting of the Argentine and Iranian Foreign Affairs Ministers, when she instructed the accomplice Luis D'Elia to read a message to the Persian agent Jorge Khalil. In this way it was acknowledged by D'Elia: "…I have an urgent message from the Argentine government, to go there urgently, before tomorrow…I am at the Government's House now, there is no other issue more important than his one, believe me…"(Communication dated 9/27/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-

2013-09-27-103753-14, CD161). Furthermore, Luis D'Elia asked Khalil "…I need you to talk to the sheik there [in reference to Mohsen Rabbani] …w/ra that is very important what I have, uh … he/she asked me…" (Communications dated 9/27/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-09-27-114113-28, CD 161; File B-1009-2013-09-27-104245-8.txt, CD161). Khalil, above mentioned, specified the request made by Cristina Fernandez, … She needs that the Iranian government together with the Argentine government announces tomorrow the formation of the "Truth Commission" … that they please announce it together tomorrow at the meeting …that the day for the meeting for the Truth Commission be defined and that the day, on January, when the Argentine judge may travel to Teheran be also set…" (Communications dated 9/27/13, client 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-09-27-115448-6, CD 161). It was further clarified: "…the meeting is held in a hurry asked by Cristina…note that Rohani (Iran's President) hasn't spoken about the AMIA issue in his speech…" (Communications dated 9/27/13, client 11-3238-4966, File B-1009-2013-09-27-115448-6, CD 161).

From the concrete and specific contributions by the President, it became clear not only that she was the one who decided to structure this criminal plan for impunity and that she used several actors to carry it out but also that she was at all times in control of the operation, either by giving direct orders to her accomplices or heading the necessary narrative campaign to camouflage the commission of the crime. We are in presence of the person holding the most important public office in the Argentine Republic. Thus, her responsibility is enormous. Unfortunately, she had decided to commit a crime in order to ensure impunity for the Iranian fugitives of the AMIA case; she had chosen

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some accomplices for her criminal plan, directly involving –at least- one of her ministers and a congressman; she had controlled the evolution of the plan; she had negotiated through intermediaries with one of the fugitives, and she had become personally involved in some concealing actions required by this sophisticated plan. The incidents narrated in this chapter evidenced this. b) Hector Marcos Timerman

The Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Hector Timerman, has no doubt been the main implementer of the impunity plan devised and ordered by the President of the Argentine Republic, Cristina Fernandez. Since it is a criminal plan involving a foreign country, the Foreign Minister held the key position to personally see to many aspects of this cover-up structure. Using his office, he conveyed to Iran the decision of the Argentine Government to abandon the claim for justice in the AMIA case; he agreed to have the red notices removed; he signed secret agreements with the Iranian side; he participated in the negotiation, drafting and signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, a central piece of the impunity plan. He became personally involved in the campaign of discredit and deceit, which was aimed at destroying the credibility of the court case in order to deliberately present the agreement with Iran as the only suitable way to resolve the case. A specific review of each of his interventions and contributions to the criminal plan herein reported provides clear and sound evidence that Hector Timerman was an essential actor in the criminal plot to achieve the impunity envisaged for the accused Iranian nationals. Evidence against him is overwhelming. Indeed, the beginning of his criminal actions coincided with the initial steps in the commission of the crime. Following the President‘s instructions, he parted from the official delegation that was visiting different countries in the Middle East to travel to the Syrian city of Aleppo, where he held a secret meeting with Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Salehi. There he conveyed the following message: ―… Argentina is no longer interested in resolving the two bombings but instead prefers to improve its economic relations with Iran…‖, pp. 131.189/131.194; Eliaschev, Pepe ―Argentina negocia con Iran dejar de lado la investigación de los atentados‖, Diario Perfil newspaper, 26 March 2011, pp. 130.911/130.913; Eliaschev, Pepe ―Polémica en torno a la negociación secreta entre Argentina e Iran‖, Diario Perfil newspaper, 2 April 2011. 179

Within this plan, Hector Timerman led negotiations with the Iranian representatives, both in secret and public meetings. That is to say, Timerman played a central role in negotiating an agreement with the Iranian counterpart on the definite impunity of the fugitives and the removal of the red notices. The main contribution of Minister Timerman to the impunity plan was no doubt the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding on behalf of the Argentine Republic, since this was a key action in the execution of the criminal plan. By signing this agreement, Timerman provided the necessary legal instrument for the criminal plan, since it makes it possible to cover up the accused in different manners: a) by favouring the removal of Interpol red notices (paragraph 7); b) by guaranteeing impunity through the establishment of an intricate, endless procedure leading nowhere, which only dilutes accusations and makes it feasible to drop the charges against them, an option that is remarkably favoured by the total lack of deadlines for enforcing the agreement; and c) by arranging, through the ―Truth Commission‖ created in the agreement, the disassociation for good of the prima facie accused in the AMIA attack, thus redirecting the investigation to other perpetrators and hypotheses. Indeed, as has been held and proven, the Memorandum of Understanding did not intend to have the accused Iranian nationals testify before the judge and prosecutor of the AMIA case. Conversely, it was one of the means chosen by the parties to the criminal plan to eliminate all charges against them in the Argentine Judiciary and to ultimately guarantee the definite impunity of the accused in the case. Besides the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, another contribution to the criminal plan by Minister Timerman was the closing of other secret deals, which include the removal of the red notices and also grant greater benefits —for instance, ensuring that the former Minister of Defense, Ahmad Vahidi, even with the agreement being in force, would never have to appear before the judge hearing in the case. There are telephone conversations obtained from telephone tapping ordered by the court which account for these secret agreements. For instance, when the parties talk about the fact that ―there was something signed, where the precautionary measures were mentioned‖ (Telephone conversation of 11 May 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-11- 083146-8.wav, CD 0022). Or when, with regard to a news article informing that Vahidi would not be interrogated despite the provisions of the Memorandum, the local Iranian contact, who evidently had first-hand information, said ―…this is fishy, let‘s talk about this later face to face

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… it is within the framework… it is, or it was known it is, even more profound…‖ (Telephone conversation of 12 February 2013, party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02- 12-100525-14, CD 282). As if all these hints were not sufficient, Foreign Minister Salehi himself referred to the existence of other secret agreements with Timerman (―Tehran insists accord with Argentina includes Interpol lifting red notices against Iranian suspects‖, Mercopress, 19 March 2013). It is evident that Timerman‘s task, following instructions of the President, was to negotiate the removal of Interpol‘s red notices, since this was of utmost interest for Iran to sign the agreement. The International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) respect for legality frustrated this first criminal goal of the perpetrators of the impunity plan. When, fortunately, Interpol timely intervened to prevent the removal of the priority red notices by informing that ―….The Office of Legal Affairs of the Interpol General Secretariat states that the Agreement [in reference to the Memorandum of Understanding between Argentina and Iran] does not entail any change in the status of the red notices published with regard to the crimes investigated in the AMIA case…‖ (Note No. LA/35678/47/3.1/EGI/tsa. Office of Legal Affairs, International Criminal Police Organization, 15 March 2013), Foreign Minister Timerman carried out new actions to favour the criminal plan and, in May 2013, met with Interpol Secretary General, Ronald Noble, in Lyon, France, in order to get Interpol to take into consideration the bilateral agreement and, consequently, to accept to remove the above- mentioned red notices, although he publicly informed otherwise (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Release No. 122/13 of 30 May 2013; Interpol ―Visit of Argentine Foreign Minister to Interpol focused on international police collaboration‖, 30 May 2013). Within this context, Iranian representatives pointed out their discontent with the failure to remove the red notices: ―…there is a little unease there … Unease…. I think this bloody Jew [a reference to Hector Timerman] has screwed up…there was something signed, where the precautionary measures were mentioned [a reference to the Interpol red notices]…‖; ―…Timerman hasn‘t complied with some of the things agreed. That is clear. He hasn‘t done some of the things agreed…‖ (Telephone conversation of 11 May 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-11-083146-8.wav, CD 0022 and telephone conversation of 20 May 2013, party to the call No. 11-3228-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-20-111124-8, CD 31). The Minister made additional contributions to the plan and, in November 2012, he met with Noble again, whom he informed about the continuation of negotiations between both countries with regard to the Memorandum (Interpol, Press Release: Visit by Argentina's Foreign Minister

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to INTERPOL focuses on global security issues, Lyon, France, 26 November 2013). The intention was clear: to inform Noble that the Memorandum of Understanding between both countries was making progress, which was a subtle and indirect way of asking Interpol to review their stance and accept to remove the red notices affecting the Iranian nationals. Without having obtained the desired and promised result, the Argentine Minister changed his strategy and tried to convince Iranians that the red notices would be removed after the hearings. In this regard, it was reported that ―…In conversations with his Iranian peer, Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister Timerman considered the red notices would be automatically removed once the five accused had testified before the judge investigating the bombing, Mr. Rodolfo Canicoba Corral, in Iran…‖ (Di Natale, Martin ―La negociación con Irán, empantanada por la lista de Interpol‖, La Nacion newspaper, 8 December 2013). As clearly stated in this accusation, the impunity plan needed not only legal camouflage but also a narrative and media strategy to avoid bringing to light its concealed criminal purpose. In this necessary concealment, Hector Timerman also played a fundamental role. When negotiations had already been made public, extreme care was taken so nothing would halt the implementation of the criminal plan. Among the steps taken to favour the perpetration of the cover-up reported herein, Hector Timerman abused of the secrecy inherent in diplomatic negotiations to conceal the progress made in the criminal plan, and issued communiqués from the Argentine Foreign Ministry to deceive public opinion about the contents of the negotiations, so as to guarantee the continuation of the criminal plan, which was about to be completed. At the beginning of the process, both ministries issued a joint communiqué in which they stated they had committed to explore legal mechanisms which do not go against the legal systems in Argentina and Iran (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Information 313/12, of 27 September 2012). The outcome of these negotiations was precisely the Memorandum of Understanding, which was later declared unconstitutional by Division I of the Appellate Court in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters (CCCF, Division I, CFP 3184/2013/CA1 ―AMIA on Amparo Law 16,986, 15 May 2014, Court No. 6, Clerk‘s Office No. 11). This evidenced the contradiction of the announcement made by Foreign Minister Timerman, since the legal instrument had flagrantly violated the Argentine legal system. In another press communiqué, before signing the agreement, Timerman‘s office asserted that ―….The National Government ratifies that the only commitment is towards the victims and the right of the relatives of the victims to find redress in justice and truth. Argentina reaffirms there is no room for geopolitical interests, of the country or of others, in the quest for this goal….‖

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(Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Press Communiqué No. 360/12, 31 October 2012, underlining was added -sic). Precisely, as has been broadly proven at this point, one of the main interests of the criminal plot was the willingness to come closer to Tehran in geopolital terms, as decided by the President of Argentina. It is thus clear that Foreign Minister Timerman acted in bad faith to pin down the impunity plan and had no problem in carrying out subsequent actions to favour it. The criminal intent shown by him throughout the criminal plot was evidenced, for instance, only two days after signing the Memorandum, i.e., on 29 January 2013, when the Minister attempted a rapprochement by meeting the Jewish community organizations who had voiced their rejection of the agreement. On that occasion, as stated at the time by AMIA‘s President, Mr. Guillermo Borger: ―…the Foreign Minister is willing to draft a note of clarification, a note attached to the agreement with all these questions, that he will sign himself….‖ (Borger‘s statement to the Jewish News Agency, ―Borger después de la visita de Timerman a la AMIA‖, 29 January 2013). In an official communiqué, AMIA gave an account of the commitment undertaken by Foreign Minister Timerman to draft an annex to the memorandum to ensure that the hearings in Tehran were preliminary interrogations pursuant to Argentine law, that they were conducted by Argentine authorities, and that the proceedings foreseen in the agreement did not imply the removal of the Interpol red notices. In this regard, Memoria Activa issued a communiqué with regard to Timerman‘s commitment. (―AMIA informa a la opinión pública sobre la conclusiones de la reunión mantenida con el canceller Timerman en el día de ayer‖, Jewish News Agency, 30 January 2013; ―La AMIA pide que las promesas de Timerman sean anexadas por escrito al acuerdo original‖, Clarn newspaper, 30 January 2013, Memora Activa communiqué to the public at large, 31 Janauary 2013). Despite the above, and after all these communiqués, the Foreign Minister denied having promised the victims, their relatives and community leaders that he would negotiate an annex to the agreement (―La AMIA pide al gobienro que rehaga el memorandum con Iran‖, La Nacion newspaper, 1 February 2013; Capiello, Hernan ―Timerman se molestó con al AMIA por sus exigencias‖, La Nacion newspaper, 1 February 2013). In other words, and despite how shocking this unfulfilled and denied promise was, Hector Timerman was operating to facilitate and conceal a criminal scheme, even at the expense of his own public reputation. In the task of discrediting court investigations, Hector Timerman again played a decisive role in this specific phase of the criminal plan by making ongoing contributions. For instance, when Congress discussed the agreement, he pointed out that ―…For the first time there is a written

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commitment with Iran….for the AMIA case to exit its complete stagnation‖, and then added ―….ongoing legal proceedings experiencing no progress whatsoever in the last few years‖ (taken form the shorthand version of the Plenary of the Senate‘s Committees on Foreign Affairs, Constitutional and Justice Matters, and Criminal Matters, held on 13 February 2013, and shorthand version of the Plenary of the House of Representatives‘ Committees on Foreign Affairs, Justice and Constitutional Matters, National Congress, held on 26 February 2013). On that occasion he stated ―… You offend me by inventing the issue of economic interests… How am I going to do something that is banned by the United Nations? There are economic sanctions imposed by the United Nations, which Argentina supports, and that ban trade with Iran beyond the trade currently taking place —which mainly consists in commercializing grains. This is not conducted by the Argentine Government…. It is the private companies that trade…‖ (Tenembaum, Ernesto. Tierra de Locos, interview with Hector Timerman, 18 February 2013). Beyond the fact that such assertions are false and contradict other public statements made by Timerman himself, these statements clash against the direct evidence herein submitted, which verified that the Executive Branch, represented by Foreign Minister Timerman, secretly negotiated with Iran the purchase of oil and the sale of beef and grain. Furthermore, it is worth pointing out that one of the Iranian fugitives participated in these negotiations: Mohsen Rabbani. An example of the above is a telephone communication that was tapped in May 2013, of which Rabbani was a party, in which he was informed that: ―…. today we participated in a meeting with Minister for Planning De Vido in which he said he was willing to send YPF senior authorities to arrange matters with the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that the transaction can involve grains and other things … it‘s a question of looking into the matter‖, to which Rabbani answered ―send me [the proposal] so I can evaluate it‖. After its evaluation, Rabbani answered ―…―…there are some sectors of the government here who told me they are willing to sell oil to Argentina, sell tractors…and also to buy weapons…‖ (Telephone conversation of 20 May 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-05-20-1148421-2, CD 31 and of 28 May 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-28-155549-2, CD 39). While the Argentine Judiciary was struggling to arrest the accused of the bombings to subject them to a fair trial, and while relatives and survivors were hoping for that time to come, Foreign Minister Timerman and President Fernandez held secret negotiations with one of the sought fugitives and, at the same time, publicly boasted that they were collaborating to help the case move forward.

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Another contribution to the criminal plot reported herein can be noted in the role played by Timerman with regard to the mise-en-scène to cheat public opinion on the different aspects of the agreement. It was Timerman who stated that the meeting with his Iranian peer emerged from a request from Teheran, in response to the presidential address at the United Nations General Assembly, when it was proven that ―… the meeting was hurried at the request of Cristina…‖ (Telephone conversation of 27 September 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B 1009-2013-09-27-115448-6, CD 161). And it was Timerman who, unaccompanied by his peer, informed the internal approval of the agreement by Iranian authorities, that is to say, an act of government of the Iranian regime. In brief, he who should see to the interests of all Argentineans as regards the country‘s foreign affairs is involved in the implementation of an awful concealment plan devised, planned and implemented to provide impunity to the accused Iranians in the AMIA case and definitely disassociate them from the attack. In doing so, he has breached his duty as a public official, as required by the high ministerial position he holds and by the Argentine Ministerial Law; he has violated the criminal law, incurring in criminal conduct; he has overrun the Argentine judiciary‘s proceedings in the last eight years, making concessions that wrecked all the achievements within a very complex case; he has cheated and lied to community leaders, associations of relatives of the victims of the bombings, survivors, national legislators, the media and society at large, not hesitating to alter reality with a view to concealing the criminal plan in which he participated. This conduct deserves the greatest reproach and a rigorous enforcement of the breached laws.

a) Luis Angel D‘Elia

Luis D‘Elia has been the valid interlocutor used by the President and the Foreign Minister to keep the secret and clandestine negotiations going with Iran with regard to the cover-up plan. This cannot surprise anyone because for many years he has been and still is nowadays, a firm advocate of the Iranian regime, who has reproduced in the local media, the version historically supported by the Iranian authorities, questioning the court accusation on Iranian nationals for the attacks on the AMIA building, and who has publicly defended them on several occasions. He has proven and close relationships with the authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, whom he contacts and with whom he has shared radio interviews, trips, conferences, political rallies, etc. This set the foundations for him having been invited to Iran more than once, and

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having made other trips thanks to the sponsorship and support of his Persian friends as, for instance, during his visit to Lebanon in 2012 (Obarrio, Mariano, ―D‘Elia prometió acercarse más a Iran‖ – D‘Elia promised to come closer to Iran, La Nación newspaper, 28 February 2007; ―D‘Elia, más lejos: Iran no tiene nada que ver con el atentado a la AMIA‖ – D‘Elia goes a step further: Iran has nothing to do with the AMIA bombings, Perfil newspaper, 7 March 2010; Oz, Fernando, ―D‘Elia lleva negocios a Irán y ya sueña con enriquecerle uranio‖ – D‘Elia takes business to Iran and already dreams of enriching uranium for them, Perfil, 3 Paril 2010; ―D‘Elia gestiona negocios para Irán y busca que la Argentina colabore en su polémico programa nuclear‖ – D‘Elia negotiates business for Iran and seeks Argentina‘s collaboration in the country‘s controversial nuclear programme‖, Infobae newspaper, 4 April 2010; ―Desde el Líbano, D‘Elia volvió a agredir a la comunidad judía‖ – From Lebanon, D‘Elia once again attacked the Jewish community, Radio JAI, 29 March 2012; ―D‘Elia marchó por Palestina y desató polémica en Twitter‖ – D‘Elia marched in favour of Palestine and triggered controversy on Twitter, Perfil, 29 March 2012). In fact, at the end of February and beginning of March 2007, D‘Elia traveled to the Islamic Republic of Iran and met at least with two of the prima facie accused for the AMIA bombings: Mohsen Rabbani and Ahmad Asghari, something he himself recognized under oath when testifying before the undersigned. On that occasion, he also admitted the trip had not been paid from his pocket but was an invitation to participate in a seminar on Latin America and ―just like in any international seminar expenses were borne by the host country‖ (Luis Angel D‘Elias deposition on 8 May 2007, pp. 124.367/124.373 of the main body of the case, pp. 17/23 of Case File No. 416). Upon his return from the Asian country, D‘Elia stated they had provided him with evidence and documentation showing that Iran had nothing to do with the AMIA bombings and that the accusation of this Prosecutorial Unit was based on false evidence (Obarrio, Mariano, ―D‘Elia prometió acercarse más a Iran‖ – D‘Elia promised to come closer to Iran, La Nación newspaper, 28 February 2007; Galak, Oliver, ―Escándalo en la Feria del Libro‖ – Scandal at the Book Fair, La Nación, 30 April 2007; ―De regreso, D‘Elia ratificó su respaldo a Iran‖ – Upon his return, D‘Elia ratified his support to Iran, La Nación, 2 March 2007). Consequently, a comprehensive investigation was carried out, following information, elements and witnesses provided by D‘Elia. Initially, D‘Elia played down the press information by explaining that his statements were not emphatic but instead a mere hypothesis outlined according to elements provided by Iran and the advice of his lawyer.

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The weakness of this arguments appeared clearly when D‘Elia was unable to corroborate or provide any element in support of his speculations when summoned to testify. He even admitted not having ever read the file and recognized his assertions were only mere speculations. In fact they were even disregarded by the witnesses he presented. After all, it was clearly evidenced that the version provided by D‘Elia was not even supported by the elements and measures he himself had proposed. And, consequently, that line of investigation was closed, and the conclusion was reached that ―the version outlined by D‘Elia had no foundation and boiled down to a crazy, on the spur-of-the-moment theory, is self-evident and does not deserve any further analysis‖ (pp.379/381 of Case File 416). Specifically, on that occasion, what could be interpreted as a clumsy attempt –in which Luis D‘Elia was involved- to drop charges against the prima facie accused Iranians in the AMIA bombings was distorted. Thus it must come as no surprise that new plots to disassociate the accused Iranians from the indictments in the case of the attacks involve D‘Elia. Furthermore, his closeness to Cristina Fernandez‘ government and this bonds with Iran have turned him into an almost essential character in this criminal plot. It must be recalled that D‘Elia called himself an unconditional ―soldier‖ of the President. In the months of February and March 2010, Luis D‘Elia again visited Iran. This time he was accompanied by Alicia Sanchez, Fernando Esteche, Jorge Rachid, Mario Codarin and Abdul Karim Paz (Santiago Paz Bullrich). The purpose of the visit was to participate in the 31st anniversary of the Islamic Revolution and was an invitation of the Iranian government, who lodged the whole of the delegation at the Guest House of the Persian Foreign Ministry (―Quejas de Israel por el viaje de D‘Elia a Irán‖ - Israel complains about D‘Elia‘s trip to Iran, La Nación, 7 March 2010; ―D‘Elia admitió un encuentro con un ex funcionario iraní prófugo en la causa AMIA‖ – D‘Elia admits meeting with a former Iranian official, a fugitive in the AMIA case, La Prensa newspaper, 7 March 2010; ―D‘Elia y Esteche vieron en Irán a un sospechoso de volar la AMIA‖ – D‘Elia and Esteche met in Iran with a suspect of the AMIA bombings, Perfil newspaper, 6 March 2010). On that occasion, the Iranians offered an agreement of similar characteristics to the one ultimately signed by Hector Timerman. ―…It is similar to the one proposed on the first trip to Teheran, remember?‖ (Telephone conversation of 27 January 2013, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-27-174637-12, CD 266. On that occasion, D‘Elia met again with Mohsen Rabbani. This time, with the participation of Fernando Esteche and Abdul Karim paz, among others. (―D‘Elia admitió un encuentro con un ex funcionario iraní prófugo en la causa AMIA‖ – D‘Elia admitted having met with a former

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Iranian official, a fugitive in the AMIA case, La Prensa newspaper, 7 March 2010; ―D‘Elia y Esteche vieron en Irán a un sospechoso de volar la AMIA‖ – D‘Elia and Esteche met in Iran with a suspect of the AMIA bombings, Perfil newspaper, 6 March 2010; ―D‘Elia sigue defendiendo al prófugo de la AMIA: es una buena persona‖ – D‘Elia defends AMIA fugitive: he is a good person, Clarin newspaper, 9 March 2010; ―Diputados repudió el viaje de D‘Elia a Irán y pidió informes a Cancillería‖ – The House of Representatives repudiated D‘Elia‘s trip to Iran and asked Foreign Ministry to report, Infobae newspaper, 7 April 2010). For years, as stated by D‘Elia, he has been in close contact with Mohsen Rabbani, with whom he met every time he was invited to the Islamic Republic of Iran, and whom he interviewed more than once on his radio programme when Rabbani was already a fugitive (Luis D‘Elia interviews Mohsen Rabbani in radio programme on 9 March 2010 and 6 April 2011, on Radio Cooperativa AM 770; ―D‘Elia y Esteche vieron en Irán a un sospechoso del atentado de la AMIA‖ – D‘Elia and Esteche met in Iran with AMIA bombing suspect, Perfil newspaper, 7 March 2010; ―D‘Elia no cometió delito al reunirse con los iraníes‖ – D‘Elia committed no crime in meeting with Iranians, Crítica newspaper, 8 March 2010; ―Rabbani le confirmó a D‘Elia que no declarará en la causa AMIA‖ – Rabbani confirmed to D‘Elia he would not testify in the AMIA case‖, Ambito Financiero newspaper, 9 March 2010; Niebieskikwiat, Natasha ―D‘Elia sigue defendiendo al prófugo de la AMIA: es una buena persona‖ – D‘Elia continues to defend AMIA fugitive: he is a good person, Clarín newspaper, 9 March 2010; ―Rabbani advirtió que hay muchos negocios atrás de la causa AMIA‖ – Rabbani warned there are many deals underlying the AMIA case, Página 12 newspaper, 9 March 2010; Oz, Fernando, ―D‘Elia lleva negocios a Irán y ya sueña con enriquecerle uranio‖ – D‘Elia takes business to Iran and already dreams of enriching uranium for them, Perfil newspaper, 3 April 2010: ―D‘Elia gestiona negocios para Irán y busca que la Argentina colabore en su polémico programa nuclear‖ - D‘Elia manages deals for Iran and seeks Argentina‘s collaboration in the country‘s controversial nuclear programme, Infobae newspaper, 4 April 2010). This invitation to the Islamic Republic of Iran was not just by chance. He was invited to learn about the political solution and the disassociation from the AMIA case, thus leaving aside the accusations of the Argentine Judiciary and –basically- removing the red notices, in line with Teheran´s historical claim. The people around him included the former Venezuelan ambassador to Argentina, Roger Capella. During his stay in Argentina, Ambassador Roger Capella used to get on very well with different Argentine social organizations and funded certain figures such as Luis D‘Elía and

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Fernando Esteche by making trips, scholarships and other resources available to them (Gallo, Daniel ―Controvertida agenda política del Embajador de Venezuela‖, La Nación, 16/11/2006). Precisely, it was Capella who, in November, 2006 urged Luis D‘Elía to protest against the Argentine Judiciary in connection with the AMIA case, which cost him his place in the Kirchner administration (―Kirchner ordenó expulsar a D'Elía del gobierno‖ (Kirchner ordered D‘Elía to be expelled from the Government), La Nación, 14/11/2006; Gallo, Daniel, ―Controvertida agenda política del Embajador de Venezuela‖, La Nación, 16/11/2006). D‘Elía saw eye to eye with the Iranian Administration and thus followed the communications guidelines set up by Teheran and strongly criticized the investigation carried out by the Argentine Judicial Authorities and their officials, questioning their integrity and claiming that the accusation against the Iranian nationals was false and had been concocted because of interests, pressure and interference from American and Israeli sectors and agencies (see Report of November 13, 2006, signed by Luis D‘Elía and Juan José Cantiello, and handed over to the Iranian Charge d‘affaires in Buenos Aires, Mohsen Baharvand; Wiñazki, Verónica, ―Desde Irán, D'Elía aseguró que apoyaría la pena de muerte a los responsables de la AMIA‖ (In Iran, D'Elía maintained he would support the death penalty for those responsible for the AMIA case), Perfil, 4/3/2010; ―D'Elía, más lejos: Irán no tiene nada que ver con el atentado a la AMIA‖ (D'Elía, further away; Iran has nothing to do with the AMIA bombings), Perfil, 7/3/2010; ―D'Elía no cometió delito al reunirse con los iraníes‖ (D'Elía did not commit any crime when he met with the Iranian Nationals), Crítica, 8/3/2010; interview during Rodolfo Barili´s program ―Data‖, Metro channel, 27/03/2010; ―Causa AMIA: Para D'Elía, los acusados iraníes van a ser sobreseídos‖ (AMIA Case: According to D'Elía, Iranian Nationals will be acquitted), Infobae, 1/3/2013; Speech by Luis D'Elía at the Act commemorating International Quds Day or the day initiated by Iran to express solidarity with the Palestinian people, At-Tauhid Mosque, 2/8/2013; ―D'Elía satisfecho tras el giro de Cristina con Irán, insiste con defender a los acusados por AMIA‖ (D'Elía, satisfied by Cristina´s turn in favour of Iran, insists on defending the accused in the AMIA case), La Nación, 26/09/2012; Dinatale, Martín. ―D'Elía y Esteche reivindicaron a la agrupación terrorista Hezbollah‖ (D'Elía y Esteche alleged in favor of the terrorist group Hezbollah‖, La Nación, 13/08/2013). The fact that he took this stand publicly cost him, as has already been said, his position as National Lands Under Secretary for Social Habitat. In this respect, D‘Elía himself said ―...fue un momento muy duro para mí... ‖ (…those were very tough times for me…), but he pointed out: ―...nunca me fui del kirchnerismo, seguí militando y acompañando como lo hice

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siempre....'‖ (…I never left the Kirchnerist movement, I was always affiliated to the movement and kept on supporting it as I had always done…) (―Causa AMIA: Para D'Elía, los acusados iraníes van a ser sobreseídos‖ (AMIA Case: According to D'Elía, Iranian Nationals will be acquitted), Infobae, 1/3/2013‖). Despite the fact that he no longer had a public position, D‘Elía kept on closely connected to the government and held a position in Federación de Tierras y Viviendas. He retained his share of power in the national government and hung on to his contacts, this allowed him to keep on operating. His activities seemed to intensify and/or gain more visibility during Cristina Fernández‘s last term of office. His influence on land and housing issues was confirmed, for instance, by Jorge Khalil‘s words who told another member of the local Iranian community ―Recién salgo de donde Luis...le pedí hectáreas para nosotros, me las va a dar ahora...para hacer un predio para nosotros....” (I‘ve just been to see Luis… I asked him for some hectares of land for us, he will give them to us ….to build some facilities for ourselves…) Communication of 13/02/2013, subscriber 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013- 02-13-124515-18, CD 283). On another occasion he told D‘Elía: ―…..yo ya te había dicho que yo fui ahí a Corrientes, a la subsecretaría, a que avances con esos...” (I already told you that I had been to Corrientes, to the Under Secretary‘s Office, so that you could make progress with….), in reference to business between them (Communication of 5/3/2013, subscriber 11- 3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-03-05-231220-24.wav, CD 303). That is to say that even when not holding an official position, D‘Elía kept on pulling the strings at the Office of the National Under Secretary for Lands, assigning and disposing of state-owned properties as if holding a public position de facto. In this respect, may we point out that in 2008 the former Office of the National Lands Under Secretary for Social Habitat which had reported to Luis D‘Elia in 2006 changed its name to National Lands Commission for Social Habitat (Comision Nacional de Tierras para el Habitat Social) ―Padre Carlos Mujica‖ and reported to the Chief of Cabinet Ministers (Office of the President of the Argentine Republic) (Executive Orders No. 172/2006 of 20/02/2006 and 341/2008 of 3/3/2008). The Commission‘s Headquarters are at Av. Corrientes 1302, 2nd. Floor of the City of Buenos Aires and for years were presided over by Architect Rubén Pascolini who, in turn, together with most of the Board Members of such Commission, is a member of the non profit organization ―Federación de Tierra, Vivienda y Hábitat‖ chaired by, precisely, Luis D'Elía (official websites: www.tierras.gob.ar and www.ftv.org.ar).

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In short, few people may claim so many honours as Luis D'Elía to play this role. He has been a staunch advocate of the Iranian Government and of the Argentine Government, to the extent of calling himself ―a soldier‖. D'Elía himself recognized this when he was speaking to Khalil, at the time he travelled to Venezuela with Cristina Fernandez when President Hugo Chavez died. On that occasion he said: ―Yo me estoy yendo a Caracas temprano...Me voy con la Presidenta, Yuse...‖ (I‘m off to Caracas very early in the morning… I‘m travelling with the President, Yuse…) And after that, when he mentioned the fact he had not attended the ceremony in commemoration of Chavez‘s death at the Venezuelan Embassy in Buenos Aires: ―Yo tengo que hacer el juego de la Rosada, papá. Si tengo orden de no ir, soy un soldado acá, ¿entendés?‖ (I have to play along with the Government House, big boy. If the order is for me not to go, I‘m a soldier here, get it?) (Communication of 05/03/2013, subscriber 11- 3315-6908, File B-1009- 2013-03-05-231220-24.wav, CD 303). Indeed: a soldier travelling as part of the presidential entourage, accompanying the President to pay a visit of condolence on account of the death of a foreign Head of State. With these credentials, it is no surprise that when the Government decided to establish a closer relationship with Teheran (vis-à-vis the criminal plan outlined herein), D‘Elía played a fundamental role as liaison, receiving and sending secret messages from the Argentine authorities to Teheran, at the different stages of such a sophisticated plan. This was evident when the Agreement was still under negotiation, after the memorandum had been executed, when things did not progress because Iran had lost interest and when an alleged negotiated solution was staged in connection with the disagreements. He even partook of the business negotiations in connection with the plan involving Congressman Mohsen Rabbani. This is the only possible interpretation of the fact that he was all the time in touch, personally and over the phone, with Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, a pillar of the Iranian community in Buenos Aires and Iran‘s principal spokesperson in Argentina where AMIA was concerned; the meetings he held with Iran‘s Chargé d‘affaires in Argentina, his involvement with local groups supporting Iran; the fact that he used to appear in public and make statements when and if the presidential entourage instructed him to do so and the frequent contact with Congressman Andrés Larroque, who is the main channel (though not the only one) to access the President. The fact that Larroque was Cristina‘s and D‘Elía‘s go-between was clear to the general public when the media published the following message conveyed to D‘Elía by that Congressman: “Dice Cristina que no hables más hasta las elecciones” (Cristina says you are not to say anything until the elections) (―Cristina furiosa con D'Elía: No hables más hasta las elecciones‖

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(Cristina is furious at D‘Elía: Don‘t say anything else until the elections), La Politica On Line, 26/09?2013). The information disclosed by the media is completely in line with the data obtained from the telephone conversations registered, in that they confirm that Larroque is Ms. Fernandez‘s and D‘Elía‘s go between, and that the information was received at and sent by the Office of the President through him, at least on occasion of several episodes denounced herein. In this respect, we should state once again that Luis D‘Elía is not just somebody who sympathizes with Cristina Fernandez merely because he shares her feelings in the AMIA case, but rather that he is one of her operators, somebody who works for her, who gets instructions and does not question them. No Tom, Dick or Harry was chosen as a go-between to further negotiations, a ―soldier‖ was chosen. Several episodes have been outlined as follows in order to throw light on Luis D‘Elía‘s role in this network. In the first place, we should quote again Jorge Khalil‘s words in November, 2012: ―vengo de La Matanza recién he tenido una reunión con Luis D‘Elía y el ―Cuervo‖ Larroque, el de la Cámpora...que me llamaron temprano que querían hablar conmigo, que tenían un mensaje para el gobierno para dar... Y ahora me voy para Martínez a dar el mensaje, a la casa del Embajador...‖ (I‘ve been to La Matanza, I just met with Luis D‘Elia and ―Cuervo‖ Larroque, the guy from the La Campora group…they called me early today to say they wanted to talk to me because they had a message for the government to be conveyed…And now I‘m off to Martinez to pass on the message, to the Ambassador‘s residence…). The reference is to Iran‘s Charge d‘affaires in Argentina, the top official authority in our territory (Communication of 17/11/2012, subscriber 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-17-104846-10.wav, CD 195). And on the next day: ―...Me fui a La Matanza, estuve hablando con el Cuerno Larroque y con D'Elía...de ahí me tuve que ir a la casa del embajador a hablar con el embajador para mandar un mensaje que me mandaron...‖ (...I‘ve been to La Matanza, I got together with Cuervo Larroque and with D'Elía...from there I had to go to the Ambassador‘s, to talk to the Ambassador and convey the message I received...) (Communication of 18/11/2012, subscriber 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-18- 100116-6, CD 196). Second. On 27 January 2013, after Minister Timerman signed the agreement with Iran, the then Secretary General to the President, Oscar Parrilli, got in touch with Luis D‘Elía to report these circumstances and also asked him to keep a low profile for ten days approximately and not to make public statements (Communication of 27/01/13, subscriber N°11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2013-01-27-174637-12, CD 266 and Communication of 28/01/2013, subscriber 11-3315-

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6908, File B- 1009-2013-01-28-135905-20, CD 267). Had Luis D‘Elía not been part of the cover-up group, this information would be meaningless. Indeed, had he not been a government official, why would he have been informed on the spot that the agreement had been signed and why would he have been asked to keep silent? ―Allan‖ was also asked to ―keep strategically quiet‖, though this time it was Jorge Khalil who made the request: ―...lo que le tenés que decir al negro...que esté tranquilo, 'por diez días no comentés nada'... ‖ (…what you must tell Negro …to keep quiet, ‗for ten days don‘t say anything‘…) And Khalil passed the message on to D‘Elía: ―...por las dudas que te llamen hoy los medios o alguno, tené perfil bajo, por diez días por lo menos... ‖ (just in case, …should the media or anybody call you today, keep a low profile, for ten days at least…). And D‘Elía answered: ―...bárbaro....me dijo Parrilli recién también. Dale...‖ (…perfect …Parrilli has just told me so. OK…‖) (Communication of 28/01/2013, subscriber 11-3315-6908, File B-1009- 2013-01-28-135732- 18.wav, CD 267; File B-1009-2013-01-28- 135905-20, CD 267). We must necessarily conclude that Ms. Fernandez instructed D‘Elía to keep ―strategically quiet‖, and that she did so both through the Secretary General and through ―Allan‖. What a paradox indeed, for the national authorities to take upon them to inform Luis D‘Elía personally about the Memorandum that had been signed while both the relatives and the victims of the bombings learnt the news through the media. Third. In February, 2013, Ali Pakdaman, Iran‘s former Charge d‘affaires, was able to publish an article through the official news agency through D‘Elía: ―...en Télam, yo se la conseguí...él me llamó a mí para decirme que quería salir en Télam...y me llamó Baharvand para decirme lo mismo...” (…I got it for him, in Telam …he called me to tell me he wanted to publish it in Telam …and Baharvan also called me to tell me the same thing…) making reference to the Iranian diplomat and the former Charge d‘affaires based in Buenos Aires (Communication of 12/02/2013, subscriber 1 1- 3315-6908, File B-1009- 2013-02-12-185834-30, CD 282). Actually, to articulate this request for the Iranian diplomat D‘Elía resorted to his contacts in the government: ―...yo se la conseguí, yo hablé con Rodra y el Cuervo...”, (…I got it for him, I spoke to Rodra and Cuervo…), meaning the then Media Under Secretary, Rodrigo Rodriguez, and National Congressman Andres Larroque (Communication of 12/02/2013, subscriber 11- 3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-02-12-185834-30, CD 282). Episodes of this type show, once again, that Luis D‘Elía‘s actions serve Iran‘s interests, in furtherance of the instructions given by the President of the Argentine Republic.

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Fourth. During the International Quds Day celebrations, Luis D‘Elía defended Hezbollah and prided himself of his contacts with the terrorist organization accused of carrying out the AMIA bombings (Dinatale, Martín, ―D'Elía y Esteche reivindicaron a la agrupación terrorista Hezbollah‖ (D'Elía and Esteche defended the terrorist organization Hezbollah, La Nación, 13/08/2013). When D‘Elía praised the Lebanese terrorist organization he made reference to his recent trip to the Republic of Lebanon in March, 2012, during which he visited the premises of the organization and got in touch with its leaders (Speech by Luis D‘Elía during the International Quds Day celebrations, At-Tauhid Mosque, 02/08/13). According to the information available, this trip was funded by the organization ―Free Palestine‖(―Luis D'Elía desde Beirut, acompaña la Marcha Mundial a Jerusalén por Palestina. En Buenos Aires, se marchará desde el Obelisco, en www.luisdelia.org , 30/03/2012. (Luis D'Elía from Beirut, joins in in the Global March to Jerusalem for Palestine. In Buenos Aires the march will start at the Obelisk, at www.luisdelia.org , 30/03/2012). Besides, D'Elía thanked the Iranian spokespersons in Argentina for ―la posibilidad de conocer el Líbano...de estar en contacto con los dirigentes de Hezbollah...‖ (the possibility of visiting Lebanon ..of being in touch with the Hezbollah leaders…) (Speech by Luis D'Elía during the International Quds Day celebrations, At-Tauhid Mosque, 02/08/13). His statements throw light on the intentions of his Iranian contacts who funded his trip. His affiliation with such terrorist organization went as far as asking Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil to introduce him to Hamas and Hezbollah leaders for journalistic reasons. His words were ―...que le habilites contactos allá con Hezbollah y Hamas...‖ (get him contacts over there, with Hezbollah and Hamas), making reference, precisely, to Hezbollah, the organization involved in the AMIA bombings, as was disclosed in several pieces of evidence produced in the case. (Communication of 24/11/2012, subscriber 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11 -24-134118- 12, CD 202). Fifth. D‘Elía was asked to convey how ―upset‖ the Islamic Republic of Iran was about the Argentine failure at removing the Interpol red notices. This is very clear in the evidence obtained and detailed herein. Khalil: ―Yyyyy...hay un poquito de....esto entre nosotros, hay un poquito de desazón de allá, de allá, no sé porque, hay desazón.‖ (You see ………we are ……rather upset, the people over there, over there, are rather upset, I don‘t know why, they are upset). D‘Elía: Desazón?! (Upset?!)

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Khalil: ―Desazón, sí, sí, sí. No gustó algunas palabras que se dijeron eh, me parece... ‖ (Upset, yes, yes, yes. Some words did not go down well, I think…) D‘Elía: Ajá (mh) Khalil: Me parece que el ruso este de mierda'9 se mandó alguna. (I think this bloody Jew has screwed up…) D‘Elía: Ah ¿sil (Oh, did he? ) Khalil: Si, sí (yes, yes). D‘Elía: ¿Qué dijo?(What did he say?) Khalil: No... estaba firmado algo, donde estaba el tema de las cautelares15 también parece, pero bueno lo hablamos personalmente. (No …there was something signed, where the precautionary measures were mentioned I think, but we‘ll talk it over personally.) D‘Elía: Bueno, dale, dale, dale. (OK, let‘s do so.) (Comunication of 11/5/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013- 05-11-083146- 8.wav, CD 0022). Sixth. Luis D‘Elía was perfectly aware that one of the interests of the Argentine authorities which had triggered the execution of the cover-up plan in which he was involved was mainly commercial. A note should be made of the sequence of communications with Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil on 20 May 2013. D‘Elía: Estoy acá en la puerta de Planificación y entro a ver a Julio eh! (I‘m at the door of the Planning (Ministry), I‘ll be seeing Julio, OK, Khalil?) Khalil: Bueno, bueno, 11ámame después. (OK, OK, call me later.) D‘Elía: Le voy a tirar eso, eh, ¿dale? (I‘m going to bring that up, OK?) Khalil: Dale, si, si tranquilo. (OK, OK. No problem.)

After the meeting between Luis D‘Elia and Minister Julio De Vido ended, Luis D‘Elia called

Khalil again: D‘Elia: Look here, I have just been talking to the ―quía‖ Khalil: Yes D‘Elia: They are willing to send YPF‘s people with us two, Khalil. Khalil: Yes D‘Elia: To do business there

15 The Interpol red notices

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Khalil: Good D‘Elia: He is very interested in exchanging what is theirs for grain and meat there, right Khalil: OK D‘Elia: And … what‘s the deal? He has a political problem; the memorandum needs to be approved, huh? Khalil: Yes, that is quite clear, Luis, I told you the other day. Did you state what I said to you?

D‘Elia: Yes, I told them 10 days ago, and they said that it would be approved in 30 days Khalil: No, no, I told you that the memorandum would be approved…. I told you, but that it was being delayed because of that matter… D‘Elia: No… no, there was something …I shared what you told me, the incident that happened Khalil: Yes D‘Elia: And the meeting was because the boss requested it, eh? Khalil: Right

D‘Elia: We are at the highest level Khalil: It means that we are fine D‘Elia: Yes, yes, more than fine… Now, if that memorandum is not approved, we‘ll be considered as dumb-asses there, see? Khalil: If they don‘t approve it? They will approve it, they are going to approve it D‘Elia: OK, but they have to approve it asap, see. Khalil: They will approve it, Luis, you know what times are like in Persia and, besides, the logics that are not followed, you know… eehh. De Vido has to know that ―Timerman failed to deliver in certain areas‖, this is clear as crystal, he failed to deliver in certain areas… (Phone conversation of 5/20/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 05-20- 111124-8, CD31). The details of the meeting that D‘Elia passed on to Jorge Khalil arrived on the same day to Teheran, when Iran‘s local leader summarized it as follows: ―…Here we have been given green light to the operations and to sending people, the issue is that they want to speed up the memorandum.. In principle, tell them that what Argentina needs is oil, only oil, and everything

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that it is buying… Iran can exchange that for grains, that oil in exchange for grains…Do you understand what I‘m saying?... and it was discussed with De Vido… all this was discussed with De Vido.. Argentina badly needs oil and Iran badly needs grains and all of that, to begin the exchange. That, on the one hand. On the other hand, De Video understands that, to take steps, that is to say, official steps, from State to State, the memorandum must be signed, otherwise only the private companies will stay … as they are now, working… That is to say, the memorandum should be signed to start things from State to State, because for the time being the only people that are working are the private companies…‖ (Phone conversation of 5/20/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 05-20-133130-8, CD31). Seven. D‘Elia played a key role in the ―mise-en-scene‖ prepared by the Argentine Government authorities in late September 2013, when they were supposedly waiting for the Islamic Republic of Iran to answer whether or not the Memorandum had been signed by the Iranian regime. What was in actual fact happening may be gathered from telephone conversations between

D‘Elia and Khalil. September 27, 2013 D‘Elia: …I have an urgent message from the Argentine Government to transmit, but urgently, before tomorrow Khalil: Before tomorrow? Where are you? D‘Elia: I am at the Government House now Khalil: Well, I‘m on my way

(Phone conversation of 09/27/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 09-27- 103753-14, CD161). Consequently, Khalil tried to contact the Iranian Commercial Attaché in Argentina to pass on the message. Khalil: Listen, Mohsen, is that man going to be there? Mohsen Ali: The man will be there, but he has two meetings… Khalil: No, I need to take him out of the meeting for 15 minutes, I need to give him a message, pal

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Mohsen Ali: And for that, but when? Khalil: It is from the Argentine Government, they sent a message for him (Phone conversation of 09/27/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 09-27-104209-26, CD161). The following was said during the next conversation: Mohsen Ali: Listen to me, the Ambassador says he would rather see you alone because he wants to talk to you, do not come with him, he should come later

Khalil: No, I can go before, he has the message Mohsen Ali: Before… Khalil: He just called, there was a call from the Government House, he has it, the message Mohsen Ali: Yes, of course, but he says he wants to see you to speak with you privately (Phone conversation of 09/27/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 09-27- 104852-14.wav, CD161). In short, D‘Elia went to the Iranian Embassy and asked Khalil to also pass on the message directly to Iran: he wanted it to reach Mohsen Rabbani personally D‘Elia: I am going to the Embassy Yussef. Khalil: All right, don‘t worry, I have just arrived at the Government House, be happy. D‘Elia: Listen, come here because I need you to talk to Sheik alia ehl Khalil: Yes, yes, yes, I am with Rubén, we have called the other one. D‘Elia: Ahh, you are with Rubén? I feel better then. Khalil: I am with Rubén here, I am aware of everything, be happy

D‘Elia: Tell him that … explain that we are here [unintelligible] and we need that, you know? Khalil: Ok, ok, ok. D‘Elia: tomorrow both should announce it, right? Khalil: Ok, ok, hugs D‘Elia: Ok, ok, hugs (Phone conversation of 09/27/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 09-27- 114113-28, CD161).

During a later telephone conversation, Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil disclosed the message.

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Khalil: Shall I tell you what it is? Karim Paz: Yes Khalil: He needs that the Iranian Government and the Argentine Government together announce the creation of the ―Truth Commission‖ tomorrow Karim Paz: Aha… Khalil: And … and that. That they should please make a joint announcement tomorrow at the meeting Karim Paz: We‘ll have to see if the Iranians are ready so fast, we‘ll see Khalil: No… what do I know, that is another matter, I am just telling you what they want. Karim Paz: I don‘t know, it seems to me they messed things up a bit but in any case the Iranians have the patience of an elephant, so they will put up with it Khalil: Yes, precisely Karim Paz: … want to settle

Khalil: Quietly Karim Paz: But it seems messy, Argentina sucks up, you see, to the United States, throw problems to the United States but it puts up… they are, anyway, going to put up with it all but I do not think that tomorrow they announce an agreement. I do not believe that the Iranians are coming so sharp to the meeting, because the meeting is held in a hurry, at Cristina‘s request… (Phone conversation of 09/27/2013, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 09-27- 115448-6, CD161).

At this point, it is necessary to underline the key role played by D‘Elia, the person that the President and other parties to the criminal plan used to exchange messages for the purpose of covering up and granting immunity to the accused Iranian nationals. To sum up, the background of Luis D‘Elia as staunch advocate and activist of both the Iranian regime and the Argentine government positioned him as the ideal person to implement the cover-up plan. He had already participated in the plan when the agreement was being negotiated, when the

Memorandum of Understanding was signed, when it was debated at Congress, when it got stuck

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due to Iran‘s lack of interest, and when an act was staged by the parties to simulate they were trying to agree on a diplomatic way out of their disagreements. At different stages of this sophisticated crime he made key contributions to its development. He received instructions from Andrés Larroque. He spoke many times with Jorge Khalil, the representative of the Iranian regime, he contacted Iran‘s diplomatic representative, and he publicly advocated for the sound progress of the plan. That is to say, he constantly contributed from his position to advance the crime. d) Jorge Alejando ―Yussuf‖ Khalil Jorge Alejando ―Yussuf‖ Khalil is the most important source of the Iranian regime authorities in Argentina. In that capacity, he was the main link between Iranian and Argentine authorities within the framework of the crime herein reported. In fact, in all matters connected with the cover-up plan, Khalil had much more weight than the Persian diplomats posted to Argentina. That is to say, Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil reported to the regime and acted at all times in accordance with Teheran‘s instructions. He was the voice and ears of Iran in Argentina, he transmitted the messages of Iran authorities, and he defended Iranian interests against local operators, at the same time relaying the concerns and demands of the Argentine authorities to his superiors in Iran. Khalil was always aware of his position and explained it as follows: ―I am organic, I told him… I was given the order from there, I do not have to move a finger… I do not move a finger‖, regarding the fact that he gave unquestioned obedience to the instructions and indications received from Teheran (Phone conversation of 6/6/13, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 06-06-092046-14, CD48). Khalil is considered in the community as ―… the contact person with the Embassy…‖ and he thus described himself (Phone conversation of 02/14/13, subscriber 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013 – 02-14-164341-10, CD 284). At another time he defined himself as the link between Argentine officials and the Iranian Embassy by saying: ―I am not operating for them, I am operating for our side, for the Embassy… They send me to do one thing, I am like a link…‖, clearly referring to Iran (Phone conversation of

11/18/12, subscriber 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012 – 11-18-100116-6, CD 196).

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If any doubt remains on Khalil‘s importance as point of contact and local link for Teheran, particularly for this plan of impunity, he showed that he managed it and clarified that he did not care what Ali Pakdaman said. Ali Pakdaman was the then commercial attaché of Iran in Argentina, the highest Iranian diplomatic authority here. In his own words: ―I don‘t give a f*** what Pakdaman says…‖ (Phone conversation of 08/12/13, subscriber 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013 – 08-12-120458-26, CD 115).

However, it should be noted that Khalil shows a remarkable change of method to relate to Iranian diplomatic activity according to the matter at hand. Sometimes he acts submissively, sometimes independently and challenging, which proves the significant degree of independence of his contact channels and, essentially, of his support in Teheran. Among others, he is supported by Mohsen Baharvand, the former Commercial Attaché of Iran in Argentina and currently a high official at the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this connection, he said the following: ―Baha knows what I do and everything… what places I go to, he knows everything, I tell him, I always told him everything‖, contrary to the position taken as regards one of his successors, Ali Pakdaman, about whom he said: ―… I shall not tell this to Safir, because Safir will sell him…‖ (Phone conversation of 11/04/12, subscriber 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2012 – 11-04-130024-26, CD 182). A few days before the agreement with Iran was to be signed, Pakdaman called him to say: ―…you have to go to Iran because Baharvand wants to tell you how things are progressing, how they are going to go on… and also the sheik [Mohsen Rabbani] will say in front of everyone that all of them should follow you…,‖ which evidences his close relationship with the Iranian diplomats and, particularly, the trust that the indicted, Mohsen Rabbani, had in him (Phone conversation of 02/14/2013, party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, File No. B-1009-2012 – 02-14-164341-26, CD 284). But beyond certain tensions, it is clear that Khalil is self-sufficient, having power of his own to stand against the formal Iranian diplomacy, which he circumvents according to the instructions received, ―… I passed him over because I was told that I have to do things and, well… I do them. Besides, I talked to his boss, if he has any problem he should take it up with his boss‖

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(Phone conversation of 05/20/2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013 – 05-20-133130-9, CD 31). Also, it is well worth adding that the current Commercial Attache of Iran in Argentina got his position thanks to the steps taken and the approval granted by Khalil himself, who said the following: ―…the Ambassador was very happy, he is an ambassador that…huh, I consider him very acceptable in comparison with all other ambassadors who came here, I work best with him… he is my ambassador of choice. When I was asked, Tom, Dick, or Harry? I said Tom and I told this ambassador, do you know that I voted for you? He said yes, yes, yes, I would like to thank you because you spoke for me, and this and that. Because his boss was a close friend of mine, he is a close friend of mine, and the truth is that he is handling the negotiations with Argentina‖ (Phone conversation of 11/29/13, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013 – 11-29-131946-2, CD 224).

Further still, Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil considers the current Iran‘s business representative in Argentina to be a ―friend‖ (Communication dated 4 July 2013, telephone number 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-07-04-004323-8, CD 76), as evidenced by certain gestures, for instance, when the diplomat lent him his car to travel to La Pampa (Telephone conversation dated 24 January 2014, party to the call No.11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01 – 24-184418- 16, CD 280). Another important clue to understand Khalil‘s weight in this criminal plan lies in his relation with accused Mohsen Rabbani, who he contacts often either through telephone or email and who has been his acquaintance ever since the terrorist attack on AMIA: ―...I am speaking about 1993, 1994 when the bomb exploded...‖ (Telephone conversation dated 6 June 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-06-06-092046-14, CD 48). Khalil continues to receive orders from the Iranian business representative and report periodically to him on the news about the AMIA case. The following conversation shows Khalil‘s absolute faithfulness to Rabbani. On 27 February 2013, while the Memorandum of Understanding was being discussed by Congress, Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil spoke with Rabbani and stated: Khalil: Congressmen are debating whether you go to prison or not, and [unintelligible] will pay the least attention today... Rabbani: Defend us [unintelligible]

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Khalil: ...we will defend you in Congress, in prison, outside prison, everywhere, God willing, because we are the same thing, you, this community, we are the same... if they accuse an Iranian, if they accuse an Iranian they are accusing the whole Islamic community in Argentina, to make it short. Rabbani: This matter is hot, isn‘t it? Khalil: Uh.. yes... very hot, absolutely hot… I am forwarding you the emails, didn‘t you get the news? Rabbani: Yes, yes, Yussef thank you. Khalil: I am sending you emails everyday with news on every newspaper. (Telephone conversation dated 27 February 2013, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013- 02- 27-125331-24, CD 297). There are many examples of these telephone conversations between Khalil and Rabbani, which basically prove Khalil‘s dedicated efforts to keep indicted Mohsen Rabbani informed of each aspect regarding his position in the case, the AMIA case in general, the rapprochement between Tehran and Buenos Aires and, naturally, the Memorandum of Understanding, which opened the road to impunity for the already mentioned Rabbani (telephone conversation dated 27 February 2013, party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2013-02-27- 125331-24, CD 297; telephone conversation dated 20 May 2013, party to the call N o . 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-05-20-114842-2, CD 31; telephone conversation dated 28 May 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013- 05-28-155549- 2, CD 39; telephone conversation dated 24 November 2013, party to the call No. 11- 3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-11-24-103813-4, CD 219 and telephone conversation dated 4 February 2014, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014- 02-04- 093431-30, CD 291). In other words, Khalil has reported directly and continuously to Mohsen Rabbani, indicted for the AMIA bombings, with both national and international arrest warrants and Interpol red notices in place, and who directly benefited from the cover-up criminal scheme denounced herein. Furthermore, he has sent all kinds of information of interest to Rabbani and, further still, he has reported on –public and non-public– data gathered from local sources, whether from operators with access to the President‘s office, such as Deputy Larroque, relevant parties who work for domestic intelligence services, such as ―Allan‖ and Yrimia; and/or nationals who have been historically allied to Tehran, such as D'Elia and Esteche.

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By way of example, on 20 May 2013, soon after a meeting held by Luis D‘Elia and Julio De Vido on the intended business with Iran, Khalil called Mohsen Rabbani to report on the developments of the meeting: Khalil: ...we have just ended a meeting with the Minister of Federal Planning, Julio De Vido, who is willing to send the top executives of YPF to make an agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran and the consideration may be grains or other goods... it may be discussed. Rabbani: Send me the information for me to evaluate it. Khalil: ...I‘ll send you an email on what was discussed in the meeting and you make your own evaluation. Rabbani: Then, do you think these operations are a sure thing? Khalil: Yes, of course, we are on the safe side, Agha, rest assured, we are working well. (Telephone conversation dated 20 May 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013- 05-20-114842-2, CD31). As previously stated, while the Argentine judiciary was accusing certain Iranian officials –on well-founded grounds– of having decided, planned and carried out the AMIA bombings in the heart of the capital city, one of the indictees, Mohsen Rabbani, was negotiating with Argentine authorities through intermediaries and hidden channels trade exchanges of grains and weapons. It should be added that, not only did Khalil keep Rabbani informed under Rabbani‘s direct instructions, but there is also evidence that Khalil has many times tried to convey a sense of tranquility to him during several stages of the cover-up scheme, for example, when he said the following: ―...everything will be all right, rest assured that everything will go well...‖ (telephone conversation dated 20 May 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009- 2013-05-20-114842-2, CD 31). In this way, he has conveyed tranquility to one of the persons indicted for the bombings: ―...Sheik, don‘t you worry, when I get back home I will send you a report on all, everything that I am working on‖, thus showing –once again– his subordination to Mohsen Rabbani (telephone conversation dated 20 January 2014, party to the call No. telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-20-160302-28, CD 276). Rabbani‘s trust in Khalil was also shown, for instance, when – after having an argument with Khalil and in view of Khalil‘s anger, Rabbani apologized and stated: ―I am mean to you because I trust you, you are responsible for everything‖ (telephone conversation dated 13 February 2013, party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-l 009-2013-02-13-184206- 28, CD 283 and telephone conversation dated February 14, 2013, party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-l 009-2013-02-14-164341-10, CD 284). Or when Rabbani told him: ―...do not mix

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things up. You work with me...‖ (telephone conversation dated November 24, 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-11- 24-103813-4, CD 219) and when he decided ―...tell them that you coordinated the trip with me...‖ (telephone conversation dated 4 February 2014, party to the call No. 11-3238- 4699, File B-l009-2014-02-04-093431-30, CD 291). In addition, these contacts clearly prove that Mohsen Rabbani, from Iran, continues to decide and operate at the highest level of Tehran‘s government, through contacts of his highest confidence, such as Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil, who receives financing remitted by Rabbani to sustain the structure the indictee once built in Argentina during the decade preceding the AMIA bombing and which he continues to sustain with the help of those surrounding him (telephone conversation dated 28 May 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013- 05-28-155549-2, CD 39; Telephone conversation dated 19 January 2014, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-19-002737-2, CD 275; telephone conversation dated 20 January 2014, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01- 20-160302- 28, CD 276; telephone conversation dated 4 February 2014, party to the call No.11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2014-02-04-093431 -30, CD 291). Jorge Khalil‘s involvement in the dealings, contacts and communications that facilitated the cover-up plan is recognized by him just five days before the Memorandum of Understanding was signed: ―...look who the Argentine government is getting to an agreement with‖, in reference to the rapprochement between Argentina and Iran: ―...I am behind it...‖ (telephone conversation dated 3 February 2013, party to the call No. 1 1-3315-6908, File B- l009-2013-02-03-141619-26, CD 273). All the cited excerpts confirm that Khalil has participated, represented and operated in the name of Mohsen Rabbani during the negotiations, but mainly as a referent of Tehran‘s administration. On the other hand, Jorge Khalil has played a key role in planting a false clue to deviate the judicial investigation on the AMIA case and definitely disassociate the Iranian indictees from the terrorist attack. In this sense, he was the person who maintained constant telephone contact with ―Allan‖, the agent of the Intelligence Secretariat in charge of developing the new hypothesis. And long before the agreement was signed, Khalil had already been working with Fernando Esteche, who also contributed ideas to develop an alternative version that could explain the terrorist attack. In the last months of 2012, Esteche had suggested that the former prosecutor appointed in the AMIA case, Hector Yrimia, were involved in the plan; following this recommendation, Hector Yrimia started to meet with Jorge Khalil in November 2012. The

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reason to include Yrimia was to make the alternative version appear more plausible and render the disassociation of the Iranians more effective. He was perfectly aware—that is what he had worked for— that ―another hypothesis, with other evidence‖ would evolve, that the intention was to mislead the undersigned and ridicule the current investigation by using evidence then unknown in the judicial record of proceedings; and that the ―Truth Commission‖ had not been created to investigate, but rather was intended to disassociate the Iranians: ―...someone will be to blame for this... Obviously, this has been fixed... How come the blame will be on us? If we are sitting at the table...‖ (telephone conversation dated 27 January 2013, party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-27-113208-14, CD 266; and telephone conversation dated 1 June 2013, party to the call N o . 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-06-01-224726-18, CD 43). As a matter of fact, a major part of the evidence cited here which has made it possible to find out and denounce this criminal scheme, are the telephone conversations held by Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil and intercepted by judicial orders in the AMIA case. This means that Khalil‘s participation and awareness of facts not only support the indictment against him but also have allowed the undersigned to gather enough information to discover and demonstrate the impunity scheme. In summary, Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil has played a key role in implementing the criminal cover- up scheme devised by the highest authorities of the Argentine government. He is the political referent of the Iranian government in Argentina; he is fully committed to the ideas and the politics of the Iranian regime. As a full-time militant of Persian interests, he has been the clandestine negotiator of the Iranian regime in Buenos Aires in order to comply with the iter criminis of impunity. Given the absence of an official position, he has fit in perfectly for the task of serving as a communication channel to send and receive secret and clandestine messages between the masterminds and those being covered-up. In addition, he powered the direct purpose of the cover-up scheme, that is, the trade exchange between Argentina and Iran. In this respect, he has built bridges between government agents and Iranian operators, the most important of which may be summarized as the interest in exchanging ―oil for grains‖, as communicated by Minister Julio De Vido, following orders issued by Cristina Fernandez. Furthermore, and as has already pointed out, he took part in the development of an alternative hypothesis and his contribution was fundamental to the success of the cover-up scheme.

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e) "Allan‖, member of the Intelligence Secretariat, whose real name –based on strong indications – could be Ramon Allan Hector Bogado. In implementing the criminal scheme, the person identified as ―Allan‖ played an indispensable role. As officer of the Intelligence Secretariat, with direct access to the people surrounding the President, he has been a key player in interacting among the highest government authorities involved in the facts of the case. In other words, he has been especially chosen to implement, materialize and carry out the criminal scheme devised by the President and the Foreign Minister. In the first place, it should be noted that ―Allan‖ may be Mr. Ramon Allan Hector Bogado. Even though no intrusive evidentiary measures were conducted to unveil this issue, in the belief that such measures should be ordered by the judicial authorities in charge of the accusation that is made here, the following information was gathered: 1) ―Allan‖ sent Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil a text message with his personal email address: ―[email protected] (text message dated 19 December 2012, 3.59 p.m., party to the call No. 11-3315-6908, CD 227). 2) In the ―Sonico‖ social networking site we found an account whose owner registered with the e-mail address ―allanbogad‖, the same address that ―Allan‖ sent to Khalil (printouts of the ―allanbogad‖ account in the ―Sonico‖ social networking site are attached hereto). 3) As it appears from a telephone communication, ―Allan‖ comes from the province of Misiones. As a matter of fact, in reference to the National Senator for Misiones, Juan Manuel Irrazabal, Khalil told ―Allan‖: ―you will get along well with him because he is a native of your province‖ (telephone conversation dated 5 December 2013, party to the call N o . 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-12-05-192539-18, CD 230). 4) In the obituary publications of a newspaper from the Province of Misiones, informing the disease of ―Allan Hector Bogado‖ —who reportedly died at 78 years old—, various relatives and friends are identified. His name – almost homonymous to the person of interest in this investigation —may lead –, a prior, to presume certain family ties between them, thus reinforcing the theory that Khalil‘s contact – ―Allan‖ from Misiones, may well be ―Ramon Hector Allan Bogado‖ (printouts of the obituaries of the El Territorio newspaper for 29 and 30 August 2013 are attached hereto). 5) In that same newspaper from Misiones, there are pictures of a middle-aged man identified as ―Allan Bogado‖. In the picture, he appears with other people whose names match the names of the contacts of ―allanbogad‖ account in the ―Sonico‖ social networking site and with many

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relatives of the diseased ―Allan Hector Bogado‖ (―Mirando el rio‖, El Territorio, digital version, dated 2 June 2006). Based on all these indications, it is possible to suspect that the identity of Khalil‘s contact identified in telephone communications as ―Allan‖ could be ―Ramon Allan Hector Bogado‖; nevertheless, this should be naturally confirmed by the judge who will hear this case. In addition to the correct identification of this person, the fact is that it is a member of the Intelligence Secretariat who has defended and acted, many times, in favor of foreign interests and to the detriment of national interests. This person has transmitted secret information protected by the intelligence Act to agents of foreign countries. He has worked for and negotiated the impunity of fugitives in the AMIA case. As such, he did not hesitate to convey sensitive and classified information to the Iranian counterpart. Neither did he hesitate to help devise a ―false clue‖ based on false evidence, or conspire against judicial authorities in charge of the investigation, less still use the national state structure to establish good relations with Iran, facilitate favors and remove any barrier that may arise during the implementation of the cover-up plan. The fact that he did on orders from his superiors does not release him from responsibility. Further elaborating on our assertions, it should first be mentioned that the elements gathered show that ―Allan‖ works for the Intelligence Secretariat, which membership is outside any doubt given its own confession and the information managed by him. Attention should be paid to the following conversation between ―Allan‖ and Khalil, held on 2 June 2013. Khalil: Two minor things... how do you see the change in the government? The idea of the woman2'. ―Allan‖: There were no changes. Khalil: How come? No minister was removed? ―Allan‖: The names have changed, but the circumstances have not. Khalil: No, no, but the change of name, mainly the women‘s name, ... how do you see it? ―Allan‖: Well...to us, it is complex where I work. To them, wherever they are, it is the same thing, the one who was working was Loco11... Khalil: ―Ah ok....tomorrow I would like to have a chat with you any time? Allan: Yes yes, I tell you clearly. Our Interior Director was there because he dates the daughter of the woman... Khalil: Yes, but do you think the women that left was in fact removed? I am asking you

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specifically this... Allan: Ah, there is a whole internal issue. She was with her friend Milani, who has a parallel intelligence... eh... (Telephone conversation dated June 2, 2013, party to the call No. number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-06- 02-221245-20, CD 44). In another conversation, ―Allan‖ said: ―...I have news...I was told at ―the house‖ ...Interpol are going to remove the arrest warrants...They are going to lift them now... ‖, the Intelligence Secretariat being ―the house‖ (telephone conversation dated 25 February 2013, p a r t y t o the call No. 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2013-02- 25-151137-12, CD 295). His own partners are aware that he works for the national intelligence unit. For example, Esteche commented: ― ...‘Allan‘ could solve it, if an intelligence interest is involved... ‖ (telephone conversation dated 18 December 2012, party to the call No.11- 3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226) and Khalil stated: ―...they went to complain with this

―Allan‖ and all the gang, ... they went to protest to 25 de mayo24... ‖ (Telephone conversation dated 17 July 2013, party to the call No. 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-07-17-134828-28, CD 89) and referred to ―Allan‖ as ―the head of the SIDE‖, further highlighting that Allan had mentioned there were ―serious internal problems among them‖, ―them‖ being the intelligence services (telephone conversation dated 1 June 2013 paryto to the call No. 11-3964-0799, File 224753, CD 0086; File 61.30373.20130601.22551 1, CD 0086).

24 ―In reference to the National Security Secretary, Sergio Alejandro Berni.

In addition to all of these strong indications, ―Allan‖ himself mentioned that he would travel to the Triple Frontier in the final stage of the negotiations with Iran, a situation that is really striking and should not be overlooked in this analysis (Telephone conversation dated 22 November 2012, party to the call No. 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2012-11 -22-121757-24, CD 200). On the other hand, some references have been recorded according to which Dr. Hector Yrimia reports to the same sector of the Intelligence Secretary as ―Allan‖, who describes it as follows...‖ (Telephone conversation dated 7 October 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009- 2013-10-07-141519-20, CD 171).

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He further has close ties with ―La Campora‖ – a group that supports the incumbent government —, as shown by several pieces of evidence. For instance, the conversation held with Khalil where he affirmed: ― ...some guys from La Campora came to see me....want to approach you‖ (telephone conversation dated 6 February 2013, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009- 2013-02-06-203822-26, CD 276). On another occasion, namely on 24 May 2013, on the eve of a demonstration for the May Revolution, he explained: ―...I have to make sure that La Campora supporters get well to the front; so, at 11 am we meet in Piedras and Chile. There I take them out and we all move inside; once it is over, I leave...‖‘ (Telephone conversation dated 24 May 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013- 05-24-175330- 20.txt, CD 35). He is also involved with the persons surrounding the President. In this respect, it should be recalled when Fernando Esteche suggested that Khalil should demand certain actions by the government directly involving Dra. Fernandez, and further clarified: ―...having the President go... that is more difficult for Allan...... ‖, thus showing again Allan‘s strategic access to those surrounding Dra. Fernandez (telephone conversation dated 18 December 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226). The close ties that ―Allan‖ has with people surrounding the President is demonstrated by the information he manages. On May 24, 2013 he told Khalil: ―The President is with the flu, and has very high fever. Thus, she has a big problem; let‘s see whether tomorrow she is in conditions to speak; if she decides to speak... she will speak later in the day, after 4 or 5 pm‖ (telephone communication dated 24 May 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009- 2013-05-24-175330-20.txt, CD 35).

On 7 October 2013, Khalil and ―Allan‖ spoke about the President‘s health. ―Allan‖: and...she has a blood clot, she will likely be operated. She realized on Saturday when she started to make gym. Khalil: was she leaning to one side? ―Allan‖: Everything started with her foot... like when the hand goes to sleep,...it itches. They thought it was due to her heart and went out very fast. Then they carried out some studies as part of the medical system of the quinta, she was administered anti-coagulant – which is very good – that prevented any damage, do you understand? Khalil: It now seems they are taking her to Favaloro ―Allan‖: She has already been in hospital for one and a half hour.

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(Telephone conversation dated 7 October 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009- 2013- 10-07-141519-20, CD 171). As a matter of fact, based on the information communicated to the press, the official medical report signed by the President‘s Medical Unit and released by the Communications Secretary, Alfredo Scoccimarro, Mrs. Fernandez had attended the Fundacion Favaloro for a cardiovascular study due to arritmia during a serious headache event. Scoccimarro explained that Mrs. President has suffered a head trauma on August 12 that had shown no symptom whatsoever (―Silencio y misterio alrededor del golpe que sufrio Cristina Fernandez‖, Perfil, 10/7/2013; ―El misterio de un golpe del que no se informo‖, La Nacion, 10/7/2013). As it can be seen, neither the official information nor the information gathered and released by news media until October 7, 2013 was as detail as the information that ―Allan‖ had on Mrs. President, the circumstances in which the condition was detected, and initial symptoms and the medical treatment received by Cristina Fernandez before being transferred to the medical center. In other words, ―Allan‖ possessed privileged and accurate information on the President‘s health, which by then was not public. And he possessed detailed as well as updated information. Therefore, as already stated and proved, he is close to the persons surrounding the President. Such closeness makes sense when his part in the criminal scheme is analyzed. Otherwise, he would have never been entrusted with such a sensitive task: carry out a crime directly ordered by the President. In fact, his actions covered various aspects of the cover-up scheme. First, we served as the link between the Argentine government authorities involved in the cover-up plan and the parallel communication channels. In this respect, it is not surprising that, immediately after signing the treaty with Iran, ―Allan‖ contacted Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil asking him to convey a direct message from Cristina Fernandez to Luis D'Elia: Do not speak for ten days. ―Allan‖: ...tell the negro....to stay quiet, for ten days, do not make any comment. Khalil: I‘ll call him right away (Telephone conversation dated 28 January 2013, telephone number 11-315-6908, File B-1009- 2013-1 -28-135732-18.wav, CD 267). Immediately, Khalil called Luis D‘Elia and gave him the message.

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Khalil: Listen to me, just in case you get any call from the media or any other person, keep a low profile, at least for ten days. D‘Elia: Ok. Khalil: I know why I am telling you this... D‘Elia: Perfect....Parrilli has just told me the same thing. (Telephone conversation dated 28 January 2013, telephone number 1 1-3315-6908, File B- 1009- 2013-01-28-135905-20, CD 267) The request in itself is not important. What matters is to prove that ―Allan‖ was following orders directly issued from the President. This is evidenced by the fact that his message was exactly the same as the former General Secretary of the President, Oscar Parrilli, but through other channels. Therefore, the order was that D‘Elia should not speak, and it was conveyed both by Parrilli and by ―Allan‖. The fact that the same strategic order is conveyed speaks of the same source and everything here suggests it was Mrs. Fernandez. This does confirm the position that ―Allan‖ held among those surrounding the President. In another telephone conversation with Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, on 6 February 2013, in relation to the then recent signature of the Memorandum of Understanding, ―Allan‖ said: ―...we are very well and we have to work with pease... we have to work for the next 10 years, am I clear? We can have good news in 18 months, but here we should work for the long term‖. Khalil: Follow it up closely. ―Allan‖: Yes, but do not worry, this is closed at very high levels of government; do not worry. Khalil: yes, yes, follow it up anyway...I know why I am telling you this....because I also here the noise on the other side; you hear the noise on one side, I hear it on the other side. ―Allan‖: good, but here, once the law is passed, there is no turning back. Khalil: Sure, I know. There everything is ok, but what happens... I tell you later when we meet... because I was sent a couple of things that I did not quite convince me, then I tell you later. (Telephone conversation dated 6 February 2013, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009- 2013-02-06-203822-26, CD 276). Furthermore, it should be noted that the relation between ―Allan‖ and Khalil became stronger. In order to ingratiate himself with the Iranians, ―Allan‖ has been opening doors of many important government offices. As part of this ―favours‖ to Iranians, we coordinated a meeting between Khalil and Ricardo Echegaray, head of the Administracion Federal de Ingresos Publicos (Argentine Revenue Administration, known as AFIP) on a matter related to some

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bond insurance. As a matter of fact, when Khalil asked ―Allan‖ to get this contact, the answer was: ―...no prob...you come with me...‖ (Telephone conversation dated 13 June 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-06-13-213124- 24, CD 55). Khalil has also asked favours to his contacts at Customs (Telephone conversation dated 24 May 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B- 1009-2013-05-24-175330-20.txt, CD 35). In fact, on another occasion, ―Allan‖ promised to get them positions at the Argentine Customs Administration and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Transportation for people of the Shia community, 19 In reference to Hector Timerman

21 In reference to Nilda Garre, who had been removed from the Security Minister.

23 In reference to Fernando Pocino, Director of Internal Affairs at the Intelligence Secretariat.

24 Location of one of the buildings of the Intelligence Secretariat. ―...changes should be made in the transportation and customs administration and there they will try to get ten positions in each of them‖ (telephone conversation dated 4 July 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-07-04-112603-6.txt, CD 76 and 7 July 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-07-07- 152130-22, CD 79). These events suggest that there was an order, issued by the highest level of government, which had authorized certain access, contacts and advantages to Iranian operators in Argentina, as part of the broader context of the impunity plan. ―Allan‖ has been a key player in ―opening doors‖ to local contacts for the indicted fugitives. Further evidence of the close ties between those who carried out the cover-up scheme. In addition, when the agreement was then signed, ―Allan‖ told Khalil: ― ...Keep calm, we already won, that is, we won one battle, I told you, you did not believe in me...‖, thus identifying himself and the speaker as members of the same side of the agreement, as having the same interest, which – as it is known know – was more than that, it was a criminal plan to provide impunity (telephone conversation dated 28 January 2013, telephone number 11-315- 6908, File B-1009- 2013-01-28-135732-18.wav, CD 267). The alignment with Iranian indictees is also evidenced by his own words, as he has even referred to them as ―friends‖ (Telephone conversation dated 25 February 2013, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2013- 02- 25-151137-12, CD 295). On countless documented occasions, ―Allan has provided an operator of the Iranian regime

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(Jorge Khalil) – who has direct and fluent relation with the indicted Mohsen Rabbani, political information of Cristina Fernandez‘s government that has not been made public. This also reveals the high level trust between ―Allan‖ and Jorge Khalil. Once, Khalil asked him that certain information be checked; for instance, he told him ―...I have a meeting with a person... who says he is a friend and, to be honest, I need to check some things...'‘'‘ (Telephone conversation dated 22 November 2012, telephone number 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2012- 11-22-121757-24, CD 200). This type of request provide further evidence of the ties between ―Allan‖ and intelligent services .When Khalil asks ―Allan‖ to check some information on any person or issue, it is as if he were Mohsen Rabbani himself —who Khalil receives orders from and who periodically talks to him— using the Argentine intelligence service of the State for his needs and interests. Furthermore, Allan told Iran‘s agent – Jorge Khalil—that he had been to Switzerland one month before the agreement was signed in Africa, to work on the agreement: ―...all we have worked on this...you know I was in Geneval last month...‖ (Telephone conversation dated 28 January 2013, telephone number 11-315-6908, File B-1009-2013-01-28-135732- 18.wav, CD 267). ―Allan‘s‖ intervention thus becomes evident. Another main contribution by ―Allan‖ to the performance of the criminal scheme has to do with the development of a new criminal hypothesis for the AMIA case that removes the accusations made by the judiciary against the Iranians. In this respect, ―Allan‖ stated: ―...we are already in another country, the world environment has changed and work takes place in a different context... ‖, and the phrase ―work in a different context‖ implied that the priority was a geopolitical repproachment with Iran; for such purpose, accusations against Iranian officials in the country had to be removed (telephone conversation dated 1 June 2013, telephone number 11- 3238-4699, File B-1009-2013- 06-01-224726-18, CD43). To such end, he told the Iranian agent: ―...he knows what it is coming, that a new hypothesis, with new evidence is coming, and will be terribly busy because he never saw the evidence, do you understand brother?... ‖, in referring to the undersigned (telephone conversation dated 1 June 2013, telephone number 11- 3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-06-01 -224726-18, CD 43). In other words, this person with a strategic position in the national government, told an agent operating for a foreign government that false evidence will be submitted to illegally change the course of the case, delegitimize those who conducted the investigation and to cover up the indictees, and all that information was sent to an indictee that is fugitive from justice in

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Argentina. The seriousness of the actions carried out by ―Allan‖ in this criminal scheme is to be highlighted, because from this position in the national government provided non-public data, including information on the case, the undersigned and the agreement, to an organic representative of Iran - Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil-, who in turn conveyed the information to many persons, including Mohsen Rabbani, one of the persons charged with terrorism acts by the Argentine judiciary with red light issued by Interpol At the same time, the President and the Foreign Minister, showing their ability to misrepresent truth stated that the agreement was only intended to move the case forward, and they were only seeking justice and truth. What a paradox! Finally, a striking fact is that ―Allan‖ did not deem it necessary to act under cover. This may be due to the fact that, as already demonstrated, he was following higher orders. His contacts with Iran were perfectly aware of who we was reporting to and where he worked; he himself has admitted that the information he managed was sourced from his place of work, the Intelligence Secretariat, and he has thus conveyed reserved information without the need to act under cover, knowing that he was following orders and not violating secrets that could endanger his source of work. Besides providing secret and reserved information to Iranian contacts in the country, ―Allan‖ has conveyed a sense of tranquility in different stages of the cover-up scheme. Thus, when the new legal opinion issued by the Prosecutorial Investigation Unit was released on 29 May 2013, where new evidence was presented that supported the involvement of Iranian indictees in the bombings, Alias told Khalil in referring to such legal opinion: ―...It says there...when it reaches the just, how will he move it forward?‖(telephone conversation dated 31 May 2013, telephone number 11-3238- 4699, File B-1009-2013-05-31-095657-14, CD 42), thus suggesting that everything was under control, that the prosecutor‘s opinion would not prosper, because the ultimate decision depended upon various stages of the judiciary and not on what is demonstrated or argued by the Public Prosecution Office. He thus maintained close ties with Tehran‘s referents in Buenos Aires, who he assisted and supported with the ultimate goal of sustaining the ―prosperous‖ relation with the Iranian regime and hence facilitate the criminal scheme. To conclude, there are sound arguments to affirm that the masterminds of this criminal plan have designated a person close to the power of the Intelligence Secretariat, trusted by the President, to cooperate with the Iranians while implementing a cover-up scheme. And,

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through this designated person –who is ―Allan‖- they have opened up the doors of the State structures so that Tehran‘s representatives in Buenos Aires may take advantage of contacts and aspects. This is one of the persons used by the masterminds to carry out the criminal scheme. It is evident that ―Allan‖ has been carefully selected given that he had access to the persons surrounding the President, we reported to the Intelligence Secretariat, he had overt empathy with the Iranian regime, he was a direct and habitual contact of Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil, he was dedicated, obedient and – above all – we had no scruples about manipulating evidence, persons and inventing fake hypothesis for purposes of achieving the cover-up scheme. d) Femando Luis Esteche

Fernando Esteche is a leader of the ―Quebracho‖ organization and he has long stated his position against the accusation of Iranians in the AMIA case. In addition, the close ties between members of the ―Quebracho‖ group and incumbent and former officials of Cristina Fernandez‘s administration, have been known to the public. As a matter of fact, ―Quebracho‖ has been considered ―adhering to the government‖ (Morales Sola, Joaquin, ―Las dos miradas de EEUU‖, La Nacion, 2/23/2014). And it was told that, despite Esteche‘s arrest, this group had maintained ―...informal relations with the K...‖ (Van Der Kooy, Eduardo, ―El activismo de Quebracho ocupa el vacio callejero que dejaron los K‖, Clarin, 2/20/2014). In July 2011, information was disclosed which indicated that Luis D'Elia and the Quebracho Group, among others, were receiving political and financial support from the Iranian government (Dinatale, Martin, ―Preocupan vinculos con D'Elia y Quebracho‖, La Nacion, 7/18/11).

To understand Femando Esteche‘s involvement in the cover-up scheme, it should be noted that he is also related to the indictee Mohsen Rabbani, the Deputy Andres Larroque and has permanent contact with Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil. As a matter of fact, he travelled to the Islamic Republic of Iran at the en February and early March 2010, together with indictees Luis D‘Elia and Jorge Khalil, to take part in the XXXI anniversary of the Islamic Revolution, where he had personal contact with Mohsen Rabbani (―D‘Elia y Esteche vieron en Iran a un sospechoso de volar la AMIA‖, Perfil, 6/3/2010). On the other hand, his relation with National Deputy Andres Larroque is a matter of fact.

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Esteche himself has recognized: ―...today I have to meet him, yes, today I am coming to Capital to meet him...‖, in reference to Deputy Larroque (telephone conversation dated 19 November 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012- 11-19-121034-16, CD 197). So much so that based on the relation existing between Esteche and Larroque, Khalil has asked him to help him build a direct relation with the Deputy (telephone conversation dated 20 November 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-11 -20-131705- 12, CD 198). Thus, it is the person who has facilitated the cover up plan or made it possible, at least, through two concrete actions. First of all, he facilitated the relation of the Iranian agent in Buenos Aires, Jorge Khalil, with officers of the Argentine government.

Namely, he has contacted Khalil with operators of the Intelligence Secretariat, the person known as ―Allan‖ and Dr. Hector Luis Yrimia, who have taken part in the development of a false hypothesis intended to replace the hypothesis where Iranians under cover are involved. In fact, Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil expressly manifested that he has met with officials of the Intelligence Secretariat to work on promoting a cover-plan thanks to the efforts of Esteche (telephone conversation dated 4 November 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-11 -04-130024-6, CD 182).

Secondly. Esteche has personally contributed with specific ideas in developing the new and false hypothesis raised by Cristina Fernandez government for the bombings that took place on 18 July 1994. Note his opinion back in December 2012 on the steps that should be followed in relation to the cover-up scheme: ―...the new head of AMIA, for instance, is a need they have to build it, they will have to build consensus gradually ...they won‘t be able to blame the Israelis... ‖, suggesting that the bombing could be attributed to ―...a connection of local fascists...‖ (telephone conversation dated 18 December 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226). And he further contributed with a specific idea: ―...The Prosecutor of the AMIA case belongs to them, Yrimia; he was removed from the case, he can give you information; I need information on the AMIA case, is it possible or not? What are you willing to contribute?..?'‘ (telephone conversation dated 18 December 2012, telephone number 11-3315- 6908, File B- 1009-2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226).

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It was Esteche who contacted Dr. Hector Luis Yrimia and connected him with Jorge Khalil, the Iranian referent, and asked the former for information on the judicial proceedings for purposes of fabricating together with the indictees a new hypothesis for the bombings with a high degree of credibility based on the information provided to him. As a matter of fact, in a conversation Khalil mentioned that he had met for two hours with the ―former judge and former prosecutor of the AMIA case, Yrimia‖ and that the contact had been possible through people known to Esteche (telephone conversation dated 19 January 2014, telephone number 11-3964-0799, File IN-12177-20140119-003044, CD 49). It should be remembered that, at the time of the bombings, Yrimia was prosecutor of first instance in federal criminal matters, in charge of Prosecution Office number 6, and was designated on the very same of date of the attacks to take part in the investigations, together with, alternatively to or subsequently to other prosecutors also appointed to the same effects, thus having access to the record of proceedings from the very beginning. This was a central contribution made by Mr. Esteche to the development of the cover-up plan implemented and occurred months before signature of the agreement with Iran, which further shows these people acted with knowledge and planning even when nobody, not even the family members, knew that an agreement would be signed, let alone its content. It was logical: as part of the criminal scheme, the operation being devised affected them directly. Furthermore, other elements confirmed Esteche‘s relations with the Iranians as it has been proved that he received economic resources from Iran. In this respect, Khalil said: ―...« Fernando, people who work with Heshmat ...are providing you resources ...every month ...fixed resources every month...per employee... ‖ (telephone conversation dated 30 November 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-30-163313-28, CD 208). Given his network of contacts, he became another important pillar of negociation and communication channels, which bolstered and facilitated the cover-up plan being implemented. e)Hectr LuisYrimia

Another person who had a relevant participation, cooperated and provided information to Iranian agents in Argentina, who contributed to the development of a new fabricated hypothesis and promoted the cover-up plan was the former National Criminal Investigating Judge and former Federal Prosecutor, Dr. Hector Luis Yrimia. The first record of contact between Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil and Hector Yrimia dates back to

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early November 2012: ―I had a conversation with the prosecutor...the prosecutor of the case....the one who was, not the incumbent one, the former prosecutor...'‘'1 (telephone conversation dated 4 November 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012- 11-04-130024-6, CD 182). This was taking place more than a month after the public announcement of negotiations with Iran and before execution of the Memorandum of Understanding. In view of subsequent developments, it made sense that at that time they were already working on the alternative hypothesis, fabricated evidence that would disassociate the Iranian indictees from the case. Yrimia took part in the plan and maintained permanent contact with Tehran referents in Argentina, thanks to Esteche‘s intermediation planAnd Khalil explained it this way: ―...And I like Fernando‖. (Telephone conversation dated 4November 2012, telephone number 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2012- 11-04-130024-6, CD 182), who refers to him as a source of information ―that may be useful for any of the theories ...whatever is resolved, this will help because it is information‖ (telephone conversation dated 18 December 2012, telephone number 11-3315-6908, File B-1009- 2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226). And there are important elements that connect him with the Intelligence Secretariat: ―the AMIA prosecutor, Yrimia is with them‖ (telephone conversation dated 18 December 2012, telephone number 1 1-3315-6908, File B- 1009-2012-12-18-183332-8, CD 226). These references indicate that Dr. Yrimia would report to the same sector in the Intelligence Secretariat as ―Allan‖, who argues: ― ...Yrimia. ..he is my employee...‖ (telephone conversation dated 7 October 2013, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-10-07-141519-20, CD 171). Contacts between Jorge ―Yussuf‘ Khalil and Dr. Hector Luis Yrimia continued month after month and became stronger. In January 2014, Khalil told Abdul Karim Paz: ―...Today I spoke with the former judge and former prosecutor of the AMIA case, Yrimia...I had a two-hour meeting...‖ (telephone conversation dated 19 November 2014, telephone number 11-3964- 0799, File IN-12177- 20140119-003044, CD 49). In fact, by around the same time, conversations were recorded between Khalil and Hector Luis Yrimia, which demonstrate his participation in the criminal scheme (telephone conversation dated 1 January 2014, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-20-205332-26 CD 276 and telephone conversation dated 24 January 2014, telephone number 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01 -24-153750- 18, CD 280).

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The high degree of confidence revealed by the communications between Khalil and Yrimia not only is consistent with the serious matters linking them but also shows the progress of their tasks. There is evidence confirming that Jorge Khalil brought together Mr. Yrimia and the Iranian Charge d‘Affaires in Argentina on more than one occasion, a fact of which only the intelligence agent ―Allan‖ was aware (Communications of 23/01/2014, party to the call 11- 3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-23-212332-26, CD 279; Communication of 24/01/2014, party to the call 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-24-153750-18, CD 280; Communication of 11/02/2014, party to the call 11-3238-4699, File B-l009-2014-02-11-114448- 6, CD 298). In addition, there is evidence showing that the issues addressed by both of them diversified and they discussed the possibility of a religious rapprochement (Communication of 19/01/2014, party to the call 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-01-19-002737-2, CD 275). This was recognized by Khalil himself when he stated: ―... I‘ll meet with the number one of those politically operating for the Vatican ... they are the ones adapting the whole story...‖ referring to the fabrication of the false lead to redirect the investigation of the ―AMIA‖ case towards another hypothesis and new indictees. He added: ―... we are talking about working, about the church and the Shiism making a joint effort... those are the excuses. But, later, these guys got the matter overexposed ... one was... the former judge in the AMIA case... Yrimia... Yrimia... I‘m meeting with him today...‖ (Communication of 22/01/2014, party to the call 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-1-22-102353-16, CD 278). The meeting for religious reasons, completely unconnected to the subject-matter of the accusation, is an excuse, as recognized by Khalil, since the link with Yrimia always revolved around the cover-up of those accused in the AMIA case. In fact, when speaking of ―Allan‖, both Khalil and Yrimia refer to him as their ―mutual friend‖, with whom they have to meet for ―the other matter‖, i.e. the issue ―other than the religious work‖, clearly making reference to the AMIA case and the construction of the hypothesis to distract the investigation and dismantle the accusation against the Iranian nationals (Communication of 03/02/2014, party to the call 11-3238-4699, File B-1009-2014-02-03- 144,547 -22, CD 290). A reference to the cover-up used by these characters to conceal their criminal activities cannot be ignored. As they meet for lawful and legitimate matters, such as the rapprochement between two religions, they devised at the same time and the same meetings the criminal plan masterminded by the President and her Foreign Minister.

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This Investigation Unit is, unfortunately, aware of this plot as it is nothing less than the dual mode that Iranian agents have used to conceal surreptitious and even criminal activities. They conceal their criminal aims behind religious or cultural fronts. Therefore, it is really disturbing to see that the same scheme has been used in this new cover-up or, at least, in a part thereof. In conclusion, the fact is that the plan to provide the accused Iranian nationals with final impunity is still in force. Its participants continue working, as has been presented in the paragraphs above. Mr. Yrimia‘s contribution to the criminal plan has been substantial. He has provided his knowledge of the AMIA case to help shape the cover-up. It is specific knowledge because he obtained it in the exercise of his former position as Federal Prosecutor specially appointed by the Attorney General‘s Office to participate in the investigation of the attack on the AMIA building (Resolution No. 37/94 of 18/07/1994), by the express instruction of the Ministry of Justice (Resolution No. 83 of the same date). In that capacity he has got to know the facts in detail, has seen the evidence, witness statements, expert opinions, technical reports, the result of the raids, and has heard the versions of the events as given by the first indictees. This detailed level of knowledge has become essential for the proper development of the plan. And he made his contribution precisely where it is more useful: in the formulation of the false hypothesis. He was and is able to state with certainty whether this or that theory is plausible or not, if it is consistent with the evidence available in the case, if any item should be modified, etc. This means that, using information gathered in the exercise of his public office, he has participated in this criminal activity. Furthermore, the fact that he has served as a judge for several years cannot be overlooked either. Hence he also has the technical knowledge necessary to make the false hypothesis feasible. Clearly, then, his contribution has been extremely valuable to the criminal plan denounced herein. d) Andres Larroque

It has been demonstrated that both Jorge Luis D‘Elia and Jorge ‗Yussuf‘ Khalil have been carefully selected to act as clandestine links in the cover-up plan. One of the qualities they share is that despite the close identification with the governments they represent and the confidence they inspire in its principals, they are not public officials. They do not hold public office or have visible political responsibilities in the government for which they act. But as common

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denominator, they operate very close to the political power, the political power trusts them, and they are very powerful in their respective areas. To mediate between the masterminds of the criminal plan and several of its implementers, they turned to a person who could easily use his contacts with both sides: Congressman Andres Larroque, who has acted as a link between the President of the Argentine Republic, Mrs. Cristina Fernandez, and Luis D‘Elia, for the purpose of making progress in relation to the crime exposed herein. This statement is neither mere conjecture nor an inference or deduction. Direct evidence proving it is reproduced herein. Khalil has bluntly admitted having received messages directly from Larroque: ―... I talked to D‘Elia and ‗Cuervo‘ Larroque and they asked that and I passed on the message to the Safir and the Safir16 said the same thing... ‗let‘s not do anything that can cause trouble‘‖ (Communication of 18/11/2012, party to the call 11-3315-6908, File B-1009- 2012-11-18- 095153-16, CD 196). In regard to the same meeting he said: ―... I just had a meeting with Luis D‘Elia and ‗Cuervo‘ Larroque, the guy from the La Campora group... they wanted to talk to me because they had a message for the government to be conveyed... And now I'm off to Martinez to pass on the message, to the Ambassador‘s residence‖ (Communication of 17/11/2012, party to the call 11- 3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-17-104846-10.wav, CD 195). The interaction is evident. Larroque relayed messages from the national government authorities involved in cover-up and Khalil passed them on to the Iranian counterpart. The messages related to the criminal plan and were conveyed through parallel channels. Larroque‘s mediation between Cristina Fernandez and D‘Elia became evident to the general public when it was announced that the Congressman had relayed the following message to D‘Elia: ―Cristina says that you must stop talking until the elections‖ (―Cristina furiosa con D‘Elia: No hables mas hasta las elecciones‖, La Politica On Line, 26/9/2013). This news reporting is fully consistent with the data arising from the telephone conversations transcribed and/or referenced herein, as the information entered and exited the presidential office through him, at least in several episodes related to the facts established here. This intermediary role was also necessary for the trade issues underlying the cover-up. Thus, Khalil admitted having conveyed messages on trade issues with Iran: ―... I went to talk to D‘Elia and I told him... about all proposals and about the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and also

16 He is the Iranian Charge d‘Affaires in Argentina.

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about what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had proposed to me… and he transmitted this to ‗Cuervo‘ Larroque, the guy from the ‗La Campora‘ group, the head of the ‗La Campora‘ group... And they would talk to Cristina...‖ (Communication of 14/05/2013, party to the call 11- 3238-4699, File B-1009-2013-05-14-131007-12.wav, CD 0025). The agreement had not been signed yet and Larroque mediated to avoid complications that could damage the rapprochement with Tehran. Thus, in November 2012, along with Luis D‘Elia, he asked Khalil not to include the groups led by the local Iranian community in a march organized by leftist parties defending the ―Palestinian cause‖ and also to stop reproaching and complaining, because such actions could affect the burgeoning bilateral relations. In this regard, Khalil stated: ―... This morning I met with people from the government, they asked me not to go to the meeting...‖ and he was told, ―... Control your anger, because the issue of... can affect the relationships they are maintaining, the talks we are having in Geneva...‖, clearly referring to the diplomatic rounds that gave rise to the agreement with Iran. He added: ―... Then I do not want any of us who represent the Islamic Republic in one way or another ... or our community ... to go to any of these meetings... I already talked to Larroque and D‘Elia...‖ (Communication of 17/11/2012, party to the call 11-3315-6908, File Bl009-2012-11-17- 183444-8, CD 195). The next day, he stated: ―... we are not making any representation here, because we are in the middle of negotiations with the government... I called that meeting... but I cancelled it later... because we do not want to get involved in the negotiations being carried out between Iran and Argentina. In addition, it was a request from the government. I talked to D‘Elia and ‗Cuervo‘ Larroque and they asked me this and I passed on the message to the Safir and the Safir said the same thing... ‗let‘s not do anything that can cause trouble‘‖ (Communication 18/11/2012, party to the call 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012-11-18-095153- 16, CD 196). And he told Esteche: ―... on Saturday I went to ‗Gordo‘‘s house, talked to him, and he called ‗Cuervo‘, put the speaker on... ‗‗Cuervo‘, I‘m with Yussef blah blah blah ... I‘m telling him what you asked me to. So, eh?‘‖ referring respectively to Luis D‘Elia and Andres Larroque (Communication of 19/11/2012, party to the call 11-3315-6908, File B-1009-2012- 11-19-121034- 16, CD 197). This reveals Congressman Larroque‘s intervention, as necessary for the cover-up plan devised by Mrs. Fernandez, to protect the negotiations with Tehran from any unnecessary tension. This notwithstanding other direct contributions that have been already mentioned aimed at achieving the criminal objective exposed herein.

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Moreover, as already mentioned in previous sections, Larroque has also been in contact with Fernando Esteche, who said: ―... I have to see him today, today I come to Buenos Aires to see him…‖ referring to the congressman (Communication of 19/11/2012, party to the call 11-3315- 6908, File B-1009-2012-11-19-121034-16, CD 197). So much so that based on the relationship between Esteche and Larroque, Khalil asked him to help build a direct relationship with the congressman (Communication of 20/11/2012, party to the call 11-3315-6908, File B-1009- 2012-11-20-131705-12, CD 198). In sum, Congressman Larroque has acted, as part of this plan, as a link between the President and Luis D‘Elia, has transmitted messages and instructions to the representative of Tehran, Jorge Khalil, and has communicated with Fernando Esteche in relation to the cover-up plan. A key player in the coordination of communications and negotiations that made the plot denounced herein feasible.

VII. Conclusions:

Over the course of this accusation, the facts have been explained in detail and wide-ranging evidence has been presented which demonstrates that the President of the Argentine Republic, Cristina Elisabet Fernandez, expressly instructed that a plan be devised and executed to disassociate the accused Iranian nationals from the case in connection with the AMIA bombing, in order to ensure their impunity once and for all. It has also been proved that the instruction was motivated by the President‘s decision to establish a geopolitical rapprochement as well as to reestablish full trade relations at the State level with the Islamic Republic Iran, on the understanding that this would substantially alleviate Argentina‘s energy crisis. The evidence has shown that the plan devised by the President was mainly executed by her Foreign Minister, Hector Timerman. That it took two years of secret and public negotiations with authorities of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in the context of which the Argentine authorities left aside the demand for justice in the AMIA case and agreed to remove the Interpol red notices as a first step to disassociate all the accused Iranians. One of the methods of choice -perhaps the most visible one but not the only one- to achieve this previously agreed goal was the ―Memorandum of Understanding‖ presented as a result of negotiations between the parties, although in fact, according to the evidence gathered, it was the instrument to enable the destruction of the accusations against the accused Iranians.

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It has been proved that the Memorandum of Understanding has played a central role in the cover-up operation. It was the path taken by the parties to the criminal plan to press for the removal of the Interpol red notices. In addition, the document was intended to guarantee the impunity of the Iranian fugitives through the work of the ―Truth Commission‖, the conclusions of which, as has been seen, had been agreed upon beforehand. This Commission would lead to the new false hypothesis which, based on fabricated evidence, had been invented to replace the accusations maintained by the judicial investigation. It was also demonstrated that the masterminds of this criminal conspiracy –Cristina Fernandez and Hector Timerman- were aided by a group of fellow conspirators chosen on account of their history and close identification with the criminal plan exposed here. The participation of Luis Angel, D‘Elia, Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, Fernando Esteche, (congressman) Andres Larroque, the former prosecutor appointed to act in the AMIA case, Hector Luis Yrimia, and the intelligence agent known as ―Allan‖, whose real name according to the evidence appears to be Ramon Allan Hector Bogado, became clear. The evidence proving that both the President and the Foreign Minister personally contributed to the implementation of the criminal operation has also been presented. From the concrete and specific contributions by the President, it became clear not only that she was the one who decided to structure this criminal plan for impunity and that she used several actors to carry it out but also that she was at all times in control of the operation, either by giving direct orders to her accomplices or heading the necessary narrative campaign to camouflage the commission of the crime. Thus, she has chosen some of the parties to the cover-up, directly implicating –at least- one of her ministers and a national legislator; she has controlled the evolution of the plan at every step; she has negotiated with one of the fugitives through intermediaries; and she has become personally involved in some concealment actions required by this sophisticated plan. As for the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship of the Argentine Republic, it has been amply demonstrated that Hector Timerman has –without doubt- been the main implementer of the impunity plan devised and ordered by the President, Cristina Fernandez. Using his office, he conveyed to Iran the Argentine government‘s decision to abandon the demand for justice in the AMIA case; he agreed to remove the red notices; he signed secret agreements with the Iranian side; he participated in the negotiations, drafting and signing of the Memorandum of Understanding, the central piece of the impunity plan. And he became personally involved in the campaign of discredit and deceit, intended to destroy the credibility

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of the court case in order to deliberately present the agreement with Iran as the only way to resolve the case. Both officials acted with one purpose: to ensure final impunity for the accused and the end of any court activity against them, so as to achieve their ultimate goal of engaging freely in state trade with Iran and coming geopolitically closer to Tehran without admitting any reproach from Argentine and global public opinion. This arises from the evidence gathered but does not in any way rule out the existence of other motives in addition to the ones presented here, but which do not in any way modify or diminish the criminal responsibility of the accused. The execution of this criminal scheme has involved a succession of truly alarming situations. While the Judiciary has devoted and continues to devote a great deal of effort to ensuring the arrest and subsequent trial of those prima facie accused as being responsible for participating in the 18 July 1994 bombing, the National Executive Branch has secretly negotiated, precisely with one of the accused, Mohsen Rabbani, for the purchase and sale of oil for grain and, fundamentally, for the impunity of the accused. These actions have led to justified warnings with regard to the unprecedented institutional gravity of the plot denounced, as the criminal plan seeks not only to destroy the judicial investigation into the worst terrorist attack suffered in our country, but also, in the design, planning and commission of the crime, some of the highest authorities of the national government have participated, including the chief of the Executive. Due to the unusual length of this accusation, it is in order to briefly recapitulate the key points that have been proved in this presentation and have been taken into account to inform the conviction that several offences prosecutable by the state are present, namely:  That the decision by President Cristina Fernandez to give impunity to the accused Iranians and disassociate them from the investigation into the bombing of the AMIA building was motivated –at least- by geopolitical and commercial reasons. The President was of the view that Iranian oil would serve the purpose of alleviating the severe energy crisis that has afflicted the country. Exchanges, for example, of ―grain for oil‖ (sic) were seen as a way out of the emergency, aside from the interest in coming closer to Tehran as part of a new geopolitical positioning in the current global scenario.  That these geopolitical and commercial interests were admitted by the parties themselves: ―…we are in a different country, in a different global situation, and we need to work in a different context…‖ and ―…what Argentina needs is oil...there is true interest in initiating and approaching trade relations from government to government,

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with officials from our government, a delegation from over there would travel to Caracas or to the Gulf or, better still, to Beirut…in order to start with direct links between officials…‖  That the presidential decision aimed at coming closer to and/or engaging in trade at the government level with the Islamic Republic of Iran is not judicially challengeable as this involves functions incumbent upon the National Executive Branch, which is responsible for the conduct of the country‘s external relations.  That the option chosen by the President and by the Foreign Minister to enable the geopolitical rapprochement and the trade channel was the foundation for this accusation, for the simple reason that they opted for an illegal and criminal path and engaged in conduct falling under the Argentine Criminal Code, by ordering the planning and execution of a plan to disassociate the accused Iranians from the AMIA case for good.  Contrary to this decision and to these criminal actions, under President Nestor Kirchner all offers made by Tehran to agree on a politically negotiated way out of this matter, which is purely judicial in nature, were firmly rejected. This was reflected by several unanimous declarations –by the former Chief of Cabinet, Alberto Fernandez; the former Foreign Ministers, Rafael Bielsa and Jorge Taiana, and the former Deputy Foreign Minister, Roberto Garcia Moritan- describing the deals proposed by Iran and their rejection by the former Argentine President.  That the plan contrived by Cristina Fernandez included the end of the Interpol red notices –unexpectedly frustrated by the firm action on the part of Secretary General Ronald K. Noble-, the signing of a bilateral legal document that could bring about impunity for the accused Iranians, the fraudulent redirecting of the judicial investigation towards a new false lead with fabricated evidence, the deployment of a media and discourse campaign to undermine the credibility of the Argentine Judiciary‘s conclusions and the manipulation of the relatives of the victims, the bombing survivors and the Jewish community institutions affected by the 1994 terrorist attack.  That the impunity plan began in January 2011 in the Syrian city of Aleppo, at which time Foreign Minister Timerman told his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Salehi that ―Argentina is no longer interested in clarifying the two attacks…instead it prefers to improve economic relations with Iran…‖ This is the first time a State that has suffered an act of aggression has implored an aggressor State to sign an agreement under which the aggressors will be given impunity.

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 That the negotiations with the representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran were kept secret until September 2012, when the President publicly announced the ―beginning‖ of a negotiation process with Iran.  That once the meetings were officially announced and, making use of the secrecy inherent in formal diplomatic activity, the contents of the discussions was kept secret, as a logical necessity on the part of those involved to cover up the criminal activities they were conducting.  That on 27 January 2013 the Memorandum of Understanding was signed in the Kingdom of Ethiopia, which confirmed that the negotiations had not sought to create a tool to facilitate judicial cooperation for the AMIA case and/or the extradition of the accused, but rather that a legal instrument with an appearance of legality had been drafter in order to serve, in addition to concealing, the previously agreed decision: final impunity for the accused Iranians.  After the agreement was signed, Argentine intelligence agent ―Allan‖ admitted to his Iranian counterpart: ―Relax, we won, I mean, we won a game, I told you, you had no faith in me…‖, which reveals that both parties have had the same criminal objective. Therefore, this shows that it is not, as publicly presented, about two parties negotiating a bilateral agreement but about two partners participating in a sophisticated criminal plan for impunity, to disassociate, once and for all, the AMIA case fugitives from any links to the bombing and close any investigation in connection with them.  That the ambiguity, vagueness and omissions in the text of the Memorandum of Understanding have been significant ingredients in the cover-up structure denounced here, as they have provided the criminal plan with the necessary juridical and semantic flexibility in order for those who masterminded this cover-up to be able to adapt the implementation of its provisions to the randomness of external and unrelated factors that might come up during the implementation of the plan.  That the intricate drafting of the memorandum confirmed the existence of thorough and painstakingly planned work to bring about impunity. This highlighted the direct intent on the part of the protagonists of the plan, who fully cognizant of the purpose of their actions, sought to disassociate the Iranians from the accusations in relation to the bombing.  To this end, Foreign Minister Hector Timerman pledged to remove the red notices at the time and still existing in respect of five accused Iranians. This was the reason for the

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drafting of paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Understanding, the only operative one. Upon the agreement being signed, the communication to Interpol was enabled, in order for the red notices to be immediately removed, as openly admitted by Iranian diplomats.  That the International Criminal Police Organization (Interpol) duly intervened in the case, ensuring the validity of the red notices and frustrating, at least up to now, the promise made by Mr Timerman.  That this situation not only led to a public complaint by the Iranian Foreign Minister, who demanded that ―…under the agreement signed by both countries, Interpol must remove the accusations against the Iranian authorities…‖, but this was also recorded in the parallel communication channels with Tehran: ―Timerman hasn‘t done some of the things agreed. That is clear. He hasn‘t done some of the things agreed…‖ In Iran, this led to the agreement being withdrawn from the parliamentary approval process that had begun and, to this date, ratification has not been officially notified nor has the exchange of notes taken place.  That Foreign Minister Timerman not only signed the Memorandum of Understanding but also closed at least two secret and illegal deals. This was explained by Khalil, on the day following his return from Tehran: ―…I think this bloody Jew [a reference to Hector Timerman] has screwed up…there was something signed, where the precautionary measures were mentioned [a reference to the Interpol red notices]…‖ and ratified, in March 2013, by the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi: ―The [contents] of the agreement between Iran and Argentina in relation to the AMIA case will be made public at the appropriate time…‖. This was not a reference to the Memorandum of Understanding but to another agreement that, two months after the signing and publicizing of the memorandum, was still being kept secret. And this background must be taken into account when considering other statements by Jorge ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, who when referring to press news that former Iranian Defence Minister Ahmad Vahidi would never be interrogated in spite of being included in the Memorandum, said that that particular matter ―had been previously discussed…was within the framework‖ and that the agreement ―is even more profound‖.  That the Memorandum of Understanding provides for other mechanisms in order to ensure impunity for the accused. The ―Truth Commission‖ provided for in the agreement has been created to discredit the investigation carried out by the Judiciary and legitimize a new and false version of the facts, created to disassociate the Iranians

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from the chase. This has been recognized by those responsible for the cover-up: ―someone‘s going to come out of this with egg on their face…that‘s fixed…How could it possibly go our way, man? If we‘re sitting at the table…‖  That impunity was agreed before the Memorandum was signed and included the formulation of an alternative hypothesis with false evidence in order to fraudulently divert the judicial investigation to third parties, freeing the Iranians from the accusations. In this regard, as early as December 2012, Esteche stated ―…they want to build a new AMIA enemy, someone new as the one responsible, they need to build this…‖ And from the conversation it emerges that this task was left in the hands of officials at the Intelligence Secretariat who were specifically appointed for this purpose. In this regard, it was also said that ―…another hypothesis will come up, with different evidence…‖ and the idea was to leave the undersigned, the prosecutor in charge of the AMIA bombing case, ―high and dry, because he never saw it, the evidence, what‘s going to come up now…‖  That the steps and progress of the plan locally were communicated in real time both to the Iranian authorities in Tehran and to one of the AMIA case fugitives, Mohsen Rabbani, who still has enormous decision-making power within the Iranian regime and has at all times been informed of the developments relating to his own cover-up.  That the fact that the Iranian authorities were aware of the resolutions and decisions by the Argentine government again showed that the agreement, far from having contributed to the case, as falsely proclaimed, was a juridical disguise for an illegal and much more comprehensive previous agreement.  That the influence of the accused Rabbani has led to a pitiful situation. Active negotiation between the government officials accused here and one of the fugitives that they were at the same time covering up. In other words, while the Judiciary made efforts aimed at the arrest and subsequent trial of those accused of being responsible for the bombing, Cristina Fernandez and her Foreign Minister negotiated through intermediaries with one of the principal accused persons, Mohsen Rabbani, for the purchase of oil and for his impunity. As the latter himself said: ―…there are some sectors of the government here who told me they are willing to sell oil to Argentina…and also to buy weapons…‖  That in parallel and in order to facilitate progress of the cover-up, Cristina Fernandez and Hector Timerman staged actual campaigns of discredit, deceit and manipulation by

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setting up a true web of lies, fallacies, dramatizations and secrets, in order to conceal the criminal intentions and facilitate the implementation of the impunity plan.  That both officials lied in denying that the rapprochement with Tehran was motivated by commercial or geopolitical reasons. They also lied when they claimed that the Memorandum of Understanding only sought truth and justice. When they said that the validity of the red notices was not at risk. When they said that the case was in a deadlock. When they said that an Annex to the agreement would be signed and then denied this. When they said that they would not let the AMIA case become a chess piece in global geopolitics. When they said there were no secret deals or clauses, among many other misrepresentations pointed out throughout this accusation.  Perhaps the most painful of lies was one by the President, who publicly assured to the survivors of the bombing and relatives of the victims that she would consult with them before making any decision if Tehran were to make any proposal. Not only was there no consultation but the relatives had to hear about the signing of the bilateral agreement through the media. However, Mr D‘Elia, who was actively involved in the criminal plan, was informed immediately and personally by the then General Secretary of the Presidency, Oscar Parrilli.  That actions by the President and by the Foreign Minister also included a mise en scène on 27 and 28 September 2013, when it was publicly informed that there had been a meeting between the foreign ministers of Argentina and Iran, while at the same time the masterminds and parties to the plan stealthily and secretly coordinated subsequent declarations and actions to delude public opinion and allow the criminal plan to continue. The operator and party to this plan Luis D‘Elia specified the request: ―…I have an urgent message from the Argentine government to be transmitted urgently over there [a reference to Iran], before tomorrow…I‘m at Government House now…there is no matter of greater importance than this, trust me… I need for you to talk to the sheikh over there [a reference to Rabbani], I mean this is really big ok?‖ The president expected some statements from Tehran that would further the impunity plan.  That reality, as shown throughout the presentation, proved to be diametrically opposed to the public statements by President Fernandez and Mr Timerman. Their deception was premeditated and their contributions were instrumental in the criminal plan. So much so that the accomplices in the plan have stated that it was all ―agreed high up‖, it had all been decided ―at the highest level‖, because ―the boss had requested it‖ and her

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obedient foreign minister had implemented the plan because it was a ―definite order‖. The evidence gathered demonstrates this.  That, in parallel and in order to facilitate the impunity plan, mechanisms of support and protection for Iran‘s contacts in Argentina were established as a result of what had been agreed. Knowing this, the contacts claimed that ―the Government is now in favour‖, ―the Government is backing us…‖ and ―we have an agreement with the national government…are in the context of a negotiation with the national government…‖.  That this cover-up and impunity plan relied on essential cooperation from a group of individuals whose functions and contributions led to the success of the plan.  That Luis D‘Elia, a staunch defender of the Iranian regime and unconditional ―soldier‖ of the President –as he has defined himself- was the person chosen for the transmission and receipt of clandestine messages to Iran. In his own words: ―…I have to play along with Government House…If the order is for me not to go, I‘m a soldier here…‖ In this plan, D‘Elia was the hidden and valid interlocutor on behalf of the Argentine government authorities to overcome the obstacles that the iter criminis presented. Ideologically supportive of both parties to the criminal deal, he went to Iran several times. On one occasion, having been invited by the regime, they offered him a deal similar to the one later signed by Timerman, which already included the end of the red notices. On all of his visits to Iran he met with senior regime officials, had his picture taken with –among others- the fugitive Mohsen Rabbani, with whom he has had contact for years.  That his counterpart on the Iranian side was Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, the top local contact of the regime, ―Iran‘s voice and ears‖ in our country, even with greater actual power than the former Chargé d‘Affaires of Iran. A full time active promoter of Iranian interests, he performed the same functions as D‘Elia in transmitting messages through the parallel communication and negotiation channels, thus acting as the focal point of the parallel diplomacy communicating Buenos Aires and Tehran, which was used to make the impunity plan succeed.  That the intelligence official with access to the presidential entourage known as ―Allan‖, in possession of privileged information –even on the President‘s health-, has expressed his fondness for the Iranian regime and –repeatedly- acted on behalf of foreign interests to the detriment of national interests. He acted as a link between the President and Iran‘s local contact, Jorge Khalil, and behind the scenes, following orders from his superiors,

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encouraged actions in support of the impunity plan. He explained what could be done and what not, what was convenient and what could create irritation. He also explained the government‘s steps, disclosed sensitive and secret information to agents at the service of a foreign power, like Khalil, and assisted in the implementation of the cover- up, especially by participating in the design of the new criminal hypothesis, to displace the version of the facts upheld by the Argentine Judiciary on the basis of the evidence in the case, which points to the responsibility of Iranian citizens.  That Hector Luis Yrimia, the former prosecutor appointed on the day of the bombing to act jointly, alternatively or successively in the AMIA case, due to his detailed knowledge of the proceedings and his experience in criminal judicial practice –also having served as judge- provided valuable information and technical advice for the construction of this new false hypothesis, in order to make it plausible and adaptable to the reality of a judicial case that he was familiar with as a result of having acted as federal prosecutor.  That Fernando Esteche was a facilitator of the criminal plan, who contributed actively to the conduct of the negotiations through the parallel channels. It was also Esteche that put Khalil in touch with the Argentine intelligence officials, creating an important direct contact channel between agents from both countries. He was the one who made Yrimia join the plan, with all this meant in terms of perfecting the false lead in order to redirect the investigation, to which he also contributed concrete ideas.  That congressman Andrés Larroque, who has direct and frequent contact with the President of Argentina, was chosen, due to his closeness and trustworthiness, to act as a nexus in conveying the presidential decisions to the implementers of the criminal plan, well aware of their criminal nature. There is evidence of several instances in which Larroque transmitted presidential instructions on how to act to both Khalil and D‘Elia. For example, when, in November 2012, Khalil admitted that ―I come from La Matanza, I just had a meeting with Luis D‘Elia and ―Cuervo‖ Larroque, the guy from the La Campora group…they called me early today to say they wanted to talk to me because they had a message for the government to be conveyed…And now I‘m off to Martinez to pass on the message, to the Ambassador‘s residence…‖ His intervention was indispensable in order to avoid, by way of precaution, direct contact between the masterminds and the parties to the cover-up.

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The conclusions presented above are none other than those reasonably and logically resulting from a thorough and detailed analysis of the evidence gathered. As will have been seen throughout the accusation, in most cases the conclusions are the result of direct evidence, whereas in others they result from a number of indications and strict logical inferences which, being grave, unequivocal, precise and consistent with the rest of the evidentiary elements, further substantiate the accusation being presented. Thus, the above exposes the unscrupulous and criminal actions by the perpetrators and parties to the cover-up, who have violated applicable law, disrespected the memory of the victims, used those deaths to their own political advantage and abused the patience and good faith of the survivors of the bombing and the relatives of victims who seek and hope for what they ultimately deserve: that those responsible for this heinous terrorist act be punished to the fullest extent provided for by the law.

VIII. – Summary of Legal Considerations As previously stated, the criminal plan reported herein constitutes, a priori, the following offences: aggravated cover-up, prevention or hindrance of the performance of official duties, and breach of the duties incumbent upon public officials (Sections 277 (1) and (3), 241 (2) and 248 of the Criminal Code). In the first place, it bears noting that the offence of cover-up (section 277 (1)) is aggravated, in the case of some of the accused, because of their position as public officials (section 277 (3) (d)); and, in all cases, because of the extreme seriousness of the original offence (section 277(3) (a)). As is well known, and even though there are a number of aggravating factors, they cannot be accumulated. Rather, the aggravating factor containing —as the case may be— the greatest number of specific elements and entailing the greatest protection of the legal interest concerned will prevail. In the second place, and only in the case of indictees who hold office as public officials, one or many of the actions reported here constitute the offence provided for in section 248 of the Criminal Code, due to the specific official duties inherent in each position that were breached in the course of the criminal plan. This does not prevent the subsequent application of the insolvency provisions in force. In the third place, the criminal action identified and reported herein is deemed to constitute as well the offence of prevention or hindrance of the performance of official duties (section 241

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(2) of the Criminal Code), as it amounts to an attack against freedom in the performance of public functions —in this case, of judicial functions in connection with the AMIA case. The normal performance of this function by Judge Rodolfo Canicoba Corral and the ordinary course of the investigation into the bombings of the AMIA building, which are the subject- matter of the case, are —at the very least— hindered by the implementation of a plan aimed at covering up in the abovementioned proceedings the actions of a group of indictees accused of having participated in the act of terrorism referred to above. What is more, from the very moment of the signing of the agreement with Iran —which, as is evident by now, is a central piece in the cover-up scheme— there were serious obstacles to the ordinary exchanges of information, evidentiary elements and other important pieces of evidence for the investigation relating to the ―AMIA‖ case, implemented through international judicial cooperation mechanisms. The agreement signed with Iran translates into restrictions on and serious obstacles to the receipt of information and evidentiary documents provided by third States in order for their inclusion in the case file. As is well known, the agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran includes, among its provisions, the obligation to deliver all of the evidence and information held by the Argentine courts —not to the indictees, as should be the case pursuant to the law— for review by the ―Truth Commission‖ provided for in the Memorandum, so that it may be subsequently notified to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In this regard, the possible notification to Iranian authorities of the information, investigations, findings and/or conclusions of foreign organizations and/or agencies constitutes a serious disruption of those international channels, which provide evidentiary elements that are relevant to the case. This is clearly an obstacle that acts to the detriment of the investigation. In view of the fact that this accusation involves an individual who, according to the evidence gathered, is part of the Intelligence Secretariat and who, in such capacity, has played an active role in the offences referred to herein, the Intelligence Secretary should be requested to authorize access to all of the information relating to such individual (sections 16 and 17 of Law No. 25,520).

IX. – Precautionary Measures a) Pre-Judgment Attachment:

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In view of the large number of evidentiary elements supporting this accusation, the extent of the damage caused by the offence and the multiplicity of victims affected, this Court is hereby requested to order the pre-judgment attachment of the property of the perpetrators of and parties to this cover-up of a crime against humanity, with a view to guaranteeing the reparation of the physical and psychological damage caused to the victims and their relatives (section 29 of the Criminal Code), as such reparation must necessarily be ordered by a potential —and, in this case, probable— conviction. Furthermore, the requested precautionary measure will prevent any of the indictees from taking actions during the proceedings in order to become insolvent and thus escape their legal obligations. In effect, the Code of Criminal Procedure expressly provides for this factual situation in section 518 which sets forth that ―In issuing the indictment, the court shall order the attachment of the indictee‘s property...‖ and adds, at the end, that ―...precautionary measures may be imposed before the indictment where there is danger in the delay and sufficient evidence to justify them‖. This means that the law authorizes the imposition of precautionary measures of a financial nature —such as pre-judgment attachments— before the issuance of an indictment. For such purpose, it demands the fulfilment of two requirements: that there be sufficient evidence to justify such measure and that there be danger in the delay. The first such requirement has been satisfactorily met as a result of the strong evidence provided in this accusation which demonstrates the criminal actions taken by the accused, who —as shown— have carried out all sorts of schemes intended to destroy the indictments in the AMIA case by setting into motion a sophisticated cover-up plan aimed at ensuring final impunity for the accused Iranian nationals, thus violating the right of the victims and their relatives to achieve justice. The second requirement —danger in the delay— is satisfied due to the extraordinary nature of the wrongful act concerned, the magnitude of the legal interests affected and the total lack of scruples on the part of the individuals accused herein, all of which requires this Court to maximize precautions in order to prevent any additional harm to the victims as a result of new schemes and/or plots aimed at making the perpetrators of and parties to this offence insolvent. Hence, a delay in the imposition of the precautionary measure requested herein would render uncertain or even illusory the right of the victims to be awarded damages, which entails full and effective reparation that is appropriate and proportional to the seriousness of the harm suffered.

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In other words, we may assume with a high degree of certainty that the same individuals who did not hesitate to carry out a criminal cover-up plan in order to destroy the main investigation into the AMIA bombings will do what it takes to safeguard their own property, thereby escaping the financial obligations arising from the commission of the crime reported herein. Therefore, the body of evidence supporting this accusation justifies —because of its sheer strength— the imposition of the precautionary measure requested. As for the amount to be attached, regardless of the precautionary nature of the measure, the truth is that, as required by the legal rule, it must be a sufficient amount to guarantee payment of the financial penalty, the damages awarded under civil law, and the court costs and attorneys‘ fees. In light of the foregoing, in order to determine the amount of the compensation, we must not only take into account the seriousness of the crime committed and its institutional significance, but also the substantial number of victims, bearing in mind the actual damage sustained, plus the pain and suffering caused by the offence. In view of the fact that it is necessary to fully compensate the damage caused, the number of victims that are in a position to demand compensation for their affected rights is a determining factor when it comes to calculating the amount of the attachment. It bears stressing that there is a direct connection between the crime and the denial of justice; that it has already taken 18 months, thus far; and that some of the individuals involved in the scheme have a very high institutional position within the federal government. These parameters must be taken into consideration in order to properly determine the amount for which the accused individuals are to be held liable. Even though such amount cannot be the subject of an objective monetary assessment, this is the only accepted way to compensate for the anguish, despair and impotence suffered by those who have to put up with yet another cover-up in the investigation into the AMIA bombings. Since those responsible are jointly and severally liable for the fulfilment of the obligation to compensate for the damage caused, I believe that the imposition of an amount of ARS 200,000,000 (two hundred million Argentine pesos) is in order. b) Prohibition against leaving the country: With a view to ensuring from the very beginning that the purpose of the proceedings is fulfilled, I hereby request this Court to immediately prohibit Luis Angel D‘Elia, Fernando Luis Esteche, Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‖ Khalil and Hector Luis Yrimia from leaving the country. The same

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measure should be taken with respect to ―Allan‖, who will have to be correctly identified and whose real name, according to the evidence gathered so far, appears to be Ramón Allan Hector Bogado. As regards the other persons accused herein —i.e. Cristina Elisabet Fernandez, Hector Marcos Timerman and Andres Larroque—, in light of the high public offices they hold, as well as the privileges they enjoy, in my opinion and for the time being, there are no circumstances warranting that they be bound by such a measure. Nevertheless, this criterion may be changed, pursuant to the law. However, in all other respects, the institutional seriousness of this accusation —due to the fact that it involves the Argentine President and a Minister of the Federal Executive Branch who still hold his office, as well as other senior public officials of the national government— must not become an obstacle to the court investigation or the performance of the tasks inherent in an independent Judiciary, especially if we take into account the gravity of the actions referred to herein. Quite on the contrary, swiftness in the clarification of these serious events is of utmost importance. Finally, I consider that this accusation must be submitted to Court No. 4 in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters for the City of Buenos Aires, where Judge Ariel Lijo sits, as he is already dealing with events and irregularities in this investigation, which also involve false accusations to divert the investigation and/or cover up the actions of indictees for their protection. These investigations, which were—and in part still are— pending before Judge Lijo‘s Court, involve the same procedural concepts as the events reported herein, since they also refer to activities aimed at covering up the actions of the individuals accused of the bombings, even though such activities have been carried out by different persons and at different times in the investigation. The truth is that both instances involve criminal operations designed to obstruct the court investigation into the AMIA bombings. In this respect, it bears highlighting that the Public Prosecutor‘s Office is an independent agency having functional autonomy and financial self-sufficiency, whose function is to promote the actions of the courts in defence of legality and the general interests of society (Art. 120 of the Argentine National Constitution and Federal Law No. 24,946). Thus, in compliance with those functional mandates and in accordance with the provisions contained in section 177 (I) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I hereby make this accusation, as I consider that the actions described herein constitute, prima facie, the following offences: aggravated cover-up, prevention or hindrance of the performance of official duties, and breach of the duties

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incumbent upon public officials, in pursuance of Sections 277 (1) and (3), 241 (2) and 248 of the Criminal Code.

X- Prayer for relief

In view of the foregoing, I hereby request Your Honour: I. – That this accusation be deemed to have been duly made in accordance with the provisions of section 177 (I) of the Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure, and that it be processed following the procedure set forth in said Code. II. – That notice be taken of the considerations contained in Section VIII, last part, under the terms of sections 16 and 17 of Law No. 25,520, for such purposes as Your Honour may deem fit. VII.- That, pursuant to the provisions of section 294 of the Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure, Cristina Elisabet Fernandez, Hector Marcos Timerman, Luis Angel D‘Elia, Femando Luis Esteche. Jorge Alejandro ―Yussuf‖ Khalil, Hector Luis Yrimia, Andres Larroque and the individual known as ―Allan‖ —whose real name, according to the evidence gathered so far, appears to be Ramón Hector Allan Bogado— be interrogated. VIII.- That a pre-judgment attachment order be entered against Cristina Elisabet Fernandez, Hector Marcos Timerman, Fernando Luis Esteche, Luis Angel D‘Elia, Hector Luis Yrimia, Jorge Alejandro Khalil and Andres Larroque, in the amount of two hundred million Argentine pesos (ARS 200,000,000), for which they shall be jointly and severally liable, in accordance with the provisions of section 518 of the Argentine Code of Criminal Procedure. IX.- That the following evidence be deemed to be accompanied herewith: a) Electronic copies containing the product of the court-ordered wiretaps for telephone numbers 11-3238- 4699; 11-3315-6908, 11-3964-0799 and 11-6224-0263, in case No. 8566, ―Pasteur 633 – atentado (homicidio, lesiones, daño) - Damnificados: AMIA y DAIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina y Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas)‖ [on the bombings (homicide, injuries and damage)] before Court No. 6 in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters for the City of Buenos Aires, Clerk‘s Office No. 11 —AMIA Annex—. b) Certified copies of the testimonies given by Luis Angel D‘Elia and José Ricardo Eliachev; of the official letter dated 5 November 2012 and included on page 132.805; of Letter No. 2194 dated 8 November 2012 contained in DIAJU File No. 7102/11 and Letter

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No. 5572/14 dated 9 May 2014, both of them from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship; and of the official letter to the Head of the Interpol Department of the Argentine Federal Police dated 12 May 2014, all of which relate to the case mentioned in the previous paragraph. c) Simple copies of the newspaper articles, publications and other documents referred to in this accusation and included in a list enclosed herewith. d) One (1) compact disc labelled ―Audios y Videos - Denuncia‖ containing nine (9) audio and video files, mentioned in this accusation and included in a list enclosed herewith. X.- That a certified copy of this accusation be added to the main file for Case No. 8566, “Pasteur 633 - atentado (homicidio, lesiones, daño) - Damnificados: AMIA y DAIA (Asociación Mutual Israelita Argentina y Delegación de Asociaciones Israelitas Argentinas)‖ before Court No. 6 in Federal Criminal and Correctional Matters for the City of Buenos Aires, Clerk‘s Office No. 11 —AMIA Annex—.

Prosecutorial Investigation Unit, 13 January 2015.-

[Signature]

ALBERTO NISMAN

GENERAL PROSECUTOR

Received at the Clerk‘s Office on this 14th day of January, 2015, at 8:45 am. [Signature]

TRANSLATED FROM SPANISH. Buenos Aires 10 February 2015.

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