Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, Alias Igor Ivanov Strelkov 1992-1993 Period Girkin's Claims in His Email Correspondence That He

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Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, Alias Igor Ivanov Strelkov 1992-1993 Period Girkin's Claims in His Email Correspondence That He Igor Vsevolodovich Girkin, alias Igor Ivanov Strelkov 1992-1993 period Girkin’s claims in his email correspondence that he participated as a volunteer in the wars for the secession of Transnistria (1992), Bosnia (1992-1993) and the as a regular soldier/officer in the two Chechen Wars. We have cross-referenced his claims and they appear plausible. 1. In 1995 Girkin published, still under his real name 1, a series of memoirs in the émigré military newspaper “Nashi Vesti”. The memoirs are consistent with the events and geographical locations; furthermore at the time of writing no detailed data of the wars from other soruces was widely available. The fact that the memoirs covered recent events with actual survivors being able to verify or dispute his claims, suggests that his participation in the wars was most likely real. 2. In an email from 18-10-2012 to a Ukrainian contact, Girkin described Olga [Kulygina] as a “war-time friend from the Pridnestrovye times” “На реконструкцию в Киев зрителем поедет мой старый боевой товарищ (еще по Приднестровью) Ольга. “ 3. His claims of participation in the Transnistria war is confirmed by Olga and other Transnistria veterans (see below). 4. The most reliable account of Girkin’s early military experience comes from a memoir on his participation in the 2 nd Russian Volunteet’s Unit in Serbia, published in “Nashi Vesti” in October 1995. In this article, Girkin describes the following: a. The Transnistria war, in which he participated, ended at end of July 1992. It was not a conclusive war, and people like him, who had felt the “smell of gun-powder”, had the sense they hadn’t finished fighting. He described a state similar to addiction to fighting in a war. b. Some of the other volunteers went to continue fighting in Abhazhia, others to N. Karabakh, but he and several others went directly to Serbia. c. He was accompanied by Andrey Nimenko and “Ace” (Alexander Miharev), both of them fought in Transnistria [their participation in both wars was confirmed by other sources, for example this book d. He was a monarchist, unhappy with the Russian government. e. He fought until April 1993, when he returned to Russia 1In later publications he never uses Girkin, but only his FSB alias Strelkov October 1993 events We do not have evidence of Girkin’s whereabouts during the October 1993 constitutional crisis, however we have evidence that two of his closest friends – now involved with the Ukrainian invasion – were active participants in the armed attack on Yeltsin. • Alexander Boroday: o Boroday, Girkin and Olga Kulygina fought in the Transnistria war in 1992 . In this TV program, Borday and Kulygina remember that “a common friend form the Transnistria war” introduced them before the October 1993 events. o Boroday was part of the group of communist/nationalist leader Albert Makashov, and in this TV interview claims that Makashov asked him to handle negotiations with Alfa soldiers. He took part in the raid on Ostankino. • Olga Kulygina: o Kulygina was part of the armed volunteers defending the Supreme Soviet, located at Entrance 14 of the White House. Both Boroday and Kulygina were volunteer soldiers in the Transnistrian war. Comment: even though both Boroday and Kulygina discuss and remember the events of 1993 in great detail, (Boroday in several TV programs), they never mention anything about the unidentified snipers shooting at both sides of the conflict in October 1993. This is strange, given the number of deaths caused by sniper shots and the huge public debate about failure to investigate the shooters in the 90’s in Russia. 1995 In October 1995, Girkin writes another article for Nashi Vesti: this time he describes his experiences as a soldier in Chechnya (attached) 1999: In 1999, Boroday and Girkin (already writing under the alias Strelkov) published two articles together in the SpetzNaz journal, describing their experiences in the second part of the Chechen War. 1999-2006 In Girkin’s own words, he served the two Chechen wars in this period. In several memoirs written by Girkin, but also in a recent comment for a Russian extreme-nationalist site from 16.05.2014 (http://rusvesna.su/news/1400165851 ), Girkin confirms that he was engaged in clandestine operations near Khatuni, in the Veden region of Chechnya. According to the Memorial human-rights center, in 2001 alone in Khatuni there were at least 6 kidnappings of Chechen residents, organized by an FSB operative bearing the name “Strelkov”. The kidnapped male Chechens were never found. The kidnappings led to a series of “black widow” type radicalizations of female family members, which in one case was traced to the suicide bombing of an airplane with 42 casualties aboard, and in another – to one of the female terrorists at the Beslan school tragedy. Here is an example from the report on two kidnappings, published by the Memorial center back in 2006: they specifically reference “Igor Strelkov” as one of the perpetrators Ташуев Супьян Муцалиевич и Дуртаев Бислан Хаважиевич . Задержаны 8 июня 2001 г. в с.Хатуни военнослужащими на бронетехнике и увезены в неизвестном направлении. Согласно информации Уполномоченного по правам человека в ЧР, похитителями командовали офицеры 45 ОРП СПН ВДВ Проскурин и Игорь Стрелков . Ни одна из силовых структур не признала свою причастность к их задержанию. По факту их похищения прокуратура Веденского р-на возбудила уголовное дело № 73016 по ст.126 ч.2 УК РФ, вскоре приостановленное «в связи с невозможностью установить лиц, причастных к преступлению» (п.3 ст.195 УПК РСФСР). Судьба Супьяна Ташуева и Бислана Дуртаева неизвестна. SOurce: Здесь живут люди. Чечня: хроника насилия. Часть 3. Апрель-июнь 2001 года. / М.: «Звенья». 2006. СС.49-51, 124-125, 303-304, 389-391. The full summary of the 6 kidnappings and the consequences can be found in this report by Echo of Moscow: http://www.echo.msk.ru/blog/shalommani/1324504-echo/ 2010: While working at the FSB, Girkin received a proposal by Rasul Gamzatov to launch a “patriotic web site”. In his reply, Girkin describes that the previous year (2009) he tried to get financial support from possible sponsors of a “patriotic project”, including a visit to [Michail] Yuriev, nationalistic-minded businessman and close Putin supporter at the time. Girkin was introduced to Yuriev by Michail Leontiev [the ORT TV host who is persona non-grata in sseveral EU countries, including for denying the existence of a Ukrainian nation] In the email he points out that a friend of him is working on a “Ukrainian project”, for which funding has been allocated by the Kremlin. He further suggests a “Transnistria option” for Ukraine – i.e. secession of parts without annexation. His contact replies that this might be a politically acceptable scenario even for Ukraine. 05.01.10, Стрелков Игорь <[email protected] > написал(а): Приветствую, Беркем! XXX Где-то год назад2 озверев от безнадеги2 пробежался по вероятным спонсорам "патриотического проекта" - был в частности у г-на Юрьева Eодин из спонсоров "Проекта Россия"2 через Мишку Леонтьева на него выходил - по Чечне с ним знакомы) - все без толку - выслушал и "поклялся в вечной верности Путину". Еще кое с кем общался - результат тот же. Буквально перед НГ опять встречался с Мишкой по частному поводу - он в пьяном бреду трепался про то2 что "через полтора года власть будет валяться на земле и некому будет ее поднять". Трепло он известное2 но все же настораживает такое заявление этого "верного путинца". Кое-кто из моих друзей-приятелей занимается "украинским проектом" и пытается его провернуть как нибудь на что-то более реальное, чем тупой "распил" выделенных на это Старой Площадью бабок (для чего этот проект, собственно, и придуман, к сожалению). Не очень верится, но все же , если поднапрячься, возможен "Приднестровский вариант" - как думаешь? В России же2 похоже2 сейчас ни хрена не сделать - нет конфликта2 нет катализатора EКавказ не в счет - "отвлечение на ложный объект")2 все плотно контролируется. У меня масса друзей и камрадов по обеим чеченским войнам - но те2 кто еще служит2 и чем то реальным командует2 "как огня боятся" даже разговоров о "мрачном будщем"2 либо Eтак же как я) ни хрена не обладают какими-то возможностями по службе. А не лезть в дурацкие "народные ополчения"2 укомплектованные наполовину "полосатыми друзьями"2 ума все же хватает. И имей в виду на всякий случай, что десяток-другой "ветеранов" с реальным опытом и готовностью "рискнуть всем" в "час Х" собрать смогу. С уважением, Игорь WWWWWWWWWW.. 05.01.102 21M152 "Расул Гамзатов" R rasoul9nSgmail.com TM WWWWWW Насчет приднестровского варианта на Украине - не эксперт2 но возможность такая на мой взгляд очень даже возможна. Отдать России кусок мятежной территории, ославить жутким агрессором и подкинуть мощный источник всяческих проблем - да, это было бы очень разумным ходом со стороны противника. Однако2 увы2 на сегодня вижу и более печальные варианты. Ну да не мне об этом рассуждать. 14.01.2012 Girkin writes to his historical reconstruction friend Ale5ander Lysev ( lysevale5Xmail.ru ) Времени тоже особо нет ни на что. Приближается весна - а с ней множество проблем, связанных с возможностью новой революции - "оранжевой"... Слов нет, предельно коррумпированная нынешняя власть всех достала - она превратила страну в помойку, Империю - в жалкую сырьевую колонию. Но те, кто лезет (вернее - кого пихают из-за "бугра"), как минимум - ничуть не лучше. Много ездил осенью в командировки. Был в Кызыле и Якутске. Мрачные впечатления. Все вымирает и деградирует на глазах. В феврале никуда не поеду - со службы не удастся вырваться. Что будет в марте2 пока не знаю. 13.08.2012 Girkin makes a reFuest to Olga 1ulygina to arrange the transfer of a friend – Cournalist Dmitry Starostin to Syria. It appears from the correspondence that 1ulygina’s boss – Marat Musin – is the person organiBing recruitment of Russian volunteers to Syria 13.0n.20122 16M212 "Стрелков Игорь" Rigo-strelkoSyandeF.ruTM Привет2 ОльгаW Поговори с Маратом2 тут Дима Старостин хочет и может поехать в Сирию - поработать на постоянной основе.
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