United States Department of Agriculture The Frog Fire began on July 30, 2015 in a remote region of the Modoc National Forest. “If this accident didn’t happen, I wouldn’t have any sense of the danger we were in.” —Firefighter Frog Fire Fatality Learning Review Report July 6, 2016 Contents Executive Summary ..................................................................................................................... 1 Narrative ...................................................................................................................................... 2 Background........................................................................................................................................... 2 Frog Fire Events .................................................................................................................................... 3 Alex’s Perspective: “Just a normal fire” ............................................................................................... 5 Ryan’s Perspective: “Fire was pretty straight-forward” ..................................................................... 10 Casey’s Perspective: “Fire is starting to take off” .............................................................................. 11 Search ................................................................................................................................................. 14 Engine Accident .................................................................................................................................. 15 Incident Timeline ....................................................................................................................... 19 Sensemaking Discussion ............................................................................................................ 20 Works Cited ........................................................................................................................................ 34 Appendix 1: Fire Behavior Summary ......................................................................................... 35 Appendix 2: Personal Protective Equipment Report ................................................................. 54 Appendix 3: USDA Forest Service Fire and Aviation Management Briefing Paper: Establishing New Minimum Qualification Standards for Forest Service Fire and Aviation Duty Officers (2014) .. 58 Learning Review Team Members Mike Dudley (CRP Response Lead) Randy Draeger (Learning Review Team Lead) Joe Harris Curtis Heaton Kevin Pfister Ruth Spradling Don Boursier Shoshana Cooper Tony Petrilli Joe Duran Frog Fire Fatality Learning Review Report Frog Fire Fatality Executive Summary On the evening of July 30, 2015, 38-year-old Black Hills National Forest Engine Captain David “Dave” Ruhl was entrapped and killed while scouting on foot during initial attack of the Frog Fire on the Modoc National Forest (Region 5, California). A Coordinated Response Team was convened with a delegation of authority from the USDA Forest Service, Washington Office. The team included a diverse cadre of members, who were asked to understand the circumstances that led to this fatality and produce a report. This report tells the story of events surrounding Dave Ruhl’s death based upon information collected through site visits, interviews, and materials, including photos, videos, maps, dispatch logs, incident documentation, weather data, and other resources. Focus group sessions and an academic review were conducted with subject-matter experts to consider the conditions and sensemaking associated with these events. Five contextual themes that directly or indirectly shaped the actions of the firefighters on the ground were developed, including cultural acceptance and normalization of risk; fundamentals of effective training; understanding the risk of scouting fireline; reaffirmation that communication challenges continue to influence tragic events; and finally, ambiguity in standards around key positions and definitions. Figure 1: Frog Fire sketch. Frog Fire Fatality Learning Review Report Page 1 of 62 Narrative Background Situated in northeastern California, the Modoc National Forest (Modoc) is a land of contrasts—an ecologically diverse landscape ranging from timbered mountains to high desert plateaus. The rugged landscape, formed from expansive prehistoric lava flow, is marked with areas of rough, broken lava rock ridges surrounded by deep basins. These “reefs” of boulders rise 10 to 20 feet high, limiting visibility and making walking over them deceptively difficult. The Frog Fire was no exception. The Modoc averages 103 wildfires per year, the majority of which are started by lightning and burn an average of 14,200 acres annually. Composed predominantly of ponderosa pine, scattered juniper, manzanita, bitterbrush, and grasses, “gasoline alley” was primed for fire on the afternoon of July 30, 2015. No red-flag warnings were issued. The scattered clouds offered little relief from the 94° F temperatures, 9° F above the average high for that time of year. Relative humidity measured 13 percent. South-southwest winds at 5 miles per hour, gusting up to 12 miles per hour, were recorded at a nearby remote automated weather station. Live fuel moisture in the bitterbrush, known locally as “plant-based gasoline,” was measured at 113 percent, making for volatile fuel conditions when lightning struck that Thursday. However, in a seasonal context, fuels were wetter than average. The Energy Release Component (ERC) based on National Fire Danger Rating System (FDRS) fuel model G (Northeastern Geographic Area Coordination Center) on July 30 was well below a 23-year average at 57, suggesting a relatively low probability for large fire growth. The ERC values had averaged well below normal for the week prior to July 30. At this time, the Modoc was managed by a Forest Supervisor and two District Rangers covering the four ranger districts. All three line officers had been in place for approximately one year. The forest- level fire organization consisted of Chief 1 (Forest Fire Management Officer), Chief 2 (Deputy Forest Fire Management Officer), Chief 3 (training), and Chief 4 (fuels). Chiefs 1 and 2 had been on the forest for many years. The Forest had two fire zones, each managed by a Division Chief (District Fire Management Officer) who reported to a District Ranger. Each Division Chief had two Battalion Chiefs (Assistant District Fire Management Officers) and a Fuels Specialist. The East Zone Division Chief had been with the Forest Service for just over a year but had a high level of local experience with another federal agency. In the months leading up to the Frog Fire, the west zone fire program experienced a high amount of turnover at the management and module levels, so detailers, new employees, and ongoing vacancies were commonplace. The West Zone Division Chief was new (in place for about three weeks at the time of the Frog Fire). Both West Zone Battalion Chief positions were filled with detailers going into the fire season. Dave Ruhl’s permanent position was Engine Captain on the Black Hills National Forest (Region 2, South Dakota and Wyoming), but he was detailed into one of the two Battalion Chief/Assistant District Fire Management Officer (BC/ADFMO) positions for the west zone of the Modoc National Forest. During the almost seven weeks that Dave worked in this position, he clearly articulated his goal of getting his Incident Commander Type 3 (ICT3) task book signed off to his supervisor. Dave was looking to advance his career, and this qualification would make that easier. Dave’s call sign was Suppression 41 as opposed to Battalion Chief 41. This was a contentious issue that he had raised with leadership several times during the first couple weeks of his detail. Although he met Frog Fire Fatality Learning Review Report Page 2 of 62 Forest Service-Fire Program Management (FS-FPM) BC/ADFMO standards as a qualified Division Supervisor and Burn Boss Type 2, he didn’t meet national standards for Unit Duty Officer (DO) because he was still an Incident Commander (IC) Type 3 trainee. The Modoc required Battalion Chiefs to also meet the national standards for Unit Duty Officer, which direct that both Division Supervisor (DIVS) and Incident Commander Type 3 qualifications be met. The outreach for Dave’s detail stated: “may be delegated to perform as a qualified District Duty Officer and must maintain fire qualifications at the Division Group Supervisor and/or Incident Commander Type 3 level.” Frog Fire Events A lightning strike recorded at 1732 on Thursday, July 30, 2015 started the Frog Fire. Two storm cells located near the fire were reported to be small, light in color with virga, and difficult to pick out from under the tree canopy. Initially, the fire grew to the northwest at a relatively moderate rate influenced by the collapse of a southeasterly storm cell. Approximately one hour after ignition, the fire quickly spread toward the northwest as outflow winds increased to 9 mph with gusts to 28 mph from the southeast. Outflow winds (air that flows outwards from the leading edge of a storm system or thunder cell) from a second storm cell located to the northeast of the fire caused a sudden wind shift to the southwest. This change in wind direction was felt directly on the fireline around 1930. This wind transition created a powerful head fire running southwest with torching, spotting, and intermittent crown runs and flame lengths calculated between 20