The Saber and Scroll Journal Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 © 2021 Policy Studies Organization

TABLE OF CONTENTS Welcome Letter ...... 1 Dr. Robert Young Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD ...... 3 William F. Lawson Afghanistan: America’s Forever War ...... 31 Mason Krebsbach They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and the Tragic Loss of the USS Juneau ...... 49 Jeff Ballard Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution ...... 77 Joseph Frusci, Ed.D. Forging the Vision: Nathanael Greene ...... 91 Christopher Brandon America at War: The Common Cup ...... 117 Meg Groeling The Continental Navy's Shakedown Cruise ...... 133 Michael Romero Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945 – 1956 ...... 149 Lew Taylor Chosin Reservoir: The Battle that Stalled a War ...... 161 Phillip J. Greer A Division at War—Part I ...... 173 Dr. Robert Young Cont’d. Book Review: Roy E. Appleman’s East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950 ...... 193 Lynne Marie Marx Book Review: Patrick J. Sloyan’s When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon ...... 197 Peggy Kurkowski Book Review: Michael Palmer’s Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801 ...... 201 Michael Romero Book Review: Bruce L. Brager’s Grant's Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War ...... 205 Dr. Robert Young Book Review: Russell Crandall’s Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama ...... 209 Lt. Chris Booth, United States Coast Guard Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park ...... 213 Jeff Ballard Saber and Scroll Submission Guideline ...... 227 The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Welcome Letter

s we close down the year 2020, the year of COVID, we at The Saber and Scroll Journal continue to try to put out the best possible in historical scholarship. There are hints of optimism that 2021 will be a far better year Awith vaccines and therapies to treat this awful pandemic. To ignite this optimism, The Saber and Scroll Journal presents an edition focusing on American military history from the Era of the Revolution to the contemporary War on Terror. Any reader interested in American military history will find something to like in our current issue. For the reader of the military aspects of the Revolutionary War, there are su- perb articles on the continued relevance of General George Washington, irregular warfare pioneer Nathaniel Greene, and the Continental Navy. Revolutionary War scholarship has been enjoying a resurgence in recent years, and these works add to the expanding historiography. World War II is of course the most voluminous subject investigated by mil- itary historians, and this issue offers works on a variety of subjects. Our Managing Editor, in addition to his constant diligence in preparing this and other volumes, still managed to pen an article detailing the famous and tragic story of the Sullivan brothers and the USS Juneau. If interested in the European Theater of Operations, the subject of landing craft shortages and the impact of those shortages on Opera- tion OVERLORD will pique your interest. Rounding out the World War II section of this issue is an article by this author, part one of a two-part series, on one of the forgotten Army infantry divisions of the war, the 32nd, and their toils on the island of New Guinea. America’s most destructive conflict, the Civil War, also has a spot here. Can we all have a cup of coffee together? That is the central theme of an article on the impact of coffee on the Union Army and its importance to group cohesion and task orientation. America’s need for coffee is not a phenomenon of only recent times. The post-World War II era is not ignored. Our examination begins with a fine article on one of the Korean War’s famous battles at the Chosin Reservoir. We then examine the root causes of the conflict in Vietnam, which claimed the lives of 55,000 Americans and 2,000,000 Vietnamese. Finally, America’s longest war, the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, rounds out our forum of military topics. From beginning to end, American military history is illustrated. We have also been quite busy reviewing five different books. This writer reviewed a recent work on General Ulysses Grant’s impact on the final outcome of the Civil War. Our other five reviews cover some of the smaller, less known Amer- ican conflicts, such as the Quasi War with France during the 1790s, President Rea-

1 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.1 The Saber and Scroll gan’s deployment of Marines to Lebanon, and the many American interventions in Central America. Finally, a book on the Chosin Reservoir is examined, adding to the article on the subject earlier in this edition. To complete this issue, our Managing Editor conducts a virtual battlefield tour of the Bloody Ridge National Peace Park on Guadalcanal in the South Pacific. Even in these difficult times, we can still avail ourselves of what the world has to offer for those interested in the long story of American military history. Future issues will continue our quest to provide the best history has to offer. Stay safe, and let us hope for a return to normalcy in the near future.

All the best, Dr. Robert Young Associate Professor Department of History and Military History American Military University

2 The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020

The Historical Minature Game Society— Pacific Southwest Essay Contest Tim Keenon Grand Prize Winner Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

William F. Lawson American Military University

Abstract The Allied invasion of Normandy on 6 June 1944 is rightly con- sidered a touchstone event of the Second World War. The Allies’ success marked the beginning of the war’s final phase in Western Europe. Without the Normandy operation, it is difficult to see how the Allies could have achieved final victory in the West. Most ac- counts of the Normandy invasion deal with the assault troops, sea- borne and airborne, but rarely do the means of transporting those troops to the objective receive more than passing mention. The story of those landing craft, and their critical contribution to the Allies’ capability to launch such an operation, is as important as the training and deployment of the troops they carried onto those hos- tile shores. The design, manufacture, and deployment of suitable amphibious landing craft and their availability ultimately proved to be a deciding factor in the final operational plan as well as the overall Allied strategic picture in Europe in 1944. Keywords: Allied amphibious doctrine, landing craft shortage 1943-1944, Operation OVERLORD, D-Day, Normandy invasion, Andrew Higgins, landing craft, LCA, LCI, LCM, LCP, LCT, LCVP

Doctrina anfibia aliada, escasez de embarcaciones de desembarco de 1943-1944 y operación OVERLORD Resumen La invasión aliada de Normandía el 6 de junio de 1944 se conside- ra, con razón, una piedra de toque de la Segunda Guerra Mundial. El éxito de los aliados marcó el comienzo de la fase final de la gue-

3 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.2 The Saber and Scroll

rra en Europa occidental. Sin la operación de Normandía, es difí- cil ver cómo los aliados podrían haber logrado la victoria final en Occidente. La mayoría de los relatos de la invasión de Normandía se refieren a las tropas de asalto, por mar y por aire, pero rara vez los medios de transporte de esas tropas al objetivo reciben más que una mención de pasada. La historia de esas naves de desembarco y su contribución fundamental a la capacidad de los aliados para lanzar una operación de este tipo es tan importante como el entre- namiento y el despliegue de las tropas que llevaron a esas costas hostiles. El diseño, la fabricación y el despliegue de embarcaciones de desembarco anfibias adecuadas y su disponibilidad finalmente demostraron ser un factor decisivo en el plan operativo final, así como en el panorama estratégico general de los Aliados en Europa en 1944. Palabras clave: Doctrina anfibia aliada, escasez de lanchas de des- embarco 1943-1944, Operación OVERLORD, Día D, invasión de Normandía, Andrew Higgins, lanchas de desembarco, LCA, LCI, LCM, LCP, LCT, LCVP

同盟军登陆原则、1943-1944年登陆艇短缺以及霸王行动 摘要

1944年6月6日同盟军入侵诺曼底一事被合理视为二战的一次 重大事件。同盟国的胜利标志着二战西欧地区最终阶段的开 始。没有诺曼底行动，则很难判断同盟国能如何在西方取得 最终胜利。关于诺曼底入侵的大多数记录有关于海上和空中 突击部队，但却几乎没有关于这些部队到达目的地的运输途 径的详细记录。这些登陆艇的故事以及其对同盟军发动行动 的能力所作的关键贡献，与他们在敌军海岸上进行的部队训 练和部署一样重要。适宜的两栖登陆艇的设计、批量生产和 部署，以及其可用性最终证明是1944年欧洲最终行动计划以 及整个同盟战略计划中的决定因素。

关键词：同盟军登陆原则，1943-1944年登陆艇短缺，霸王行 动，D日，诺曼底入侵，安德鲁·希金斯（Andrew Higgins）， 登陆艇，LCA, LCI, LCM, LCP, LCT, LCVP

4 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

Introduction Doctrinal Development

he Allied invasion of Normandy he development of the special- on 6 June 1944 is rightly consid- ized landing craft of the Second ered a touchstone event of the World War dates to the early TSecond World War. The Allies’ success T1920s and the Washington Naval Con- marked the beginning of the war’s final ference, which placed limits on the na- phase in Western Europe as German val power of the United States, Japan, forces were steadily pushed back from Great Britain, France, and Italy. The their conquered territory into Germa- treaty prohibited the expansion and ny itself. Without the Normandy oper- development of naval bases and facil- ation, it is difficult to see how the Allies ities beyond certain well-defined ar- could have achieved final victory in the eas, which led to the recognition of the West. need to take or establish forward bases Most accounts of the Normandy during wartime. This problem applied invasion deal with the assault troops, in particular to the United States, which seaborne and airborne, but rarely do anticipated a war with Japan in the Pa- the means of transporting those troops cific Ocean as the most likely scenario 1 to the objective receive more than pass- for future conflict. ing mention. Without the amphibious War Plan ORANGE articulated landing craft employed by the Allies on the US strategy for a war in the western that June morning, there would have Pacific and the Philippines. Given the been no invasion at all. The story of Japanese mandates in the central Pa- those landing craft, and their critical cific following the First World War, the contribution to the Allies’ capability to US Navy foresaw the need to seize bas- launch such an operation, is as import- es to stage and project American power ant as the training and deployment of where it would be needed. It is import- the troops they carried onto those hos- ant to note that, though War Plan OR- tile shores. ANGE underwent several evolutions, The design, manufacture, and the Philippines were understood to not deployment of suitable amphibious be defensible given the restrictions of 2 landing craft capable of transporting the Washington Naval Treaty. men and equipment to the Normandy In order to ensure its ability to beaches were critical factors in the plan- execute such a plan, as well as take back ning and execution of the operation. any lost territory, the Navy identified Landing craft availability influenced the the need to develop an amphibious size, makeup, organization, operational doctrine aimed at successfully landing area, and landing schedule of the inva- troops on hostile shores in the face of sion force and ultimately proved to be a determined opposition. Though the US, deciding factor in the final operational Japan, and Great Britain each had a plan as well as the overall Allied strate- long history of amphibious operations, gic picture in Europe in 1944. the program undertaken by the US Ma-

5 The Saber and Scroll rine Corps in the 1920s was the first to violence and immediately followed up attempt to create a doctrine for landing by reinforcements including tanks and under fire. The establishment of such a artillery. The greatest threat to the op- doctrine necessarily included the capa- eration was a naval or air attack against bility to execute unopposed landings. the supporting fleet elements, but the Thus the latter was generally ignored most immediate concern was an ene- during training and development exer- my counterattack against the landing cises.3 force.5 Under the leadership of Com- The new doctrine was the result mandant John A. Lejeune, the Marine of realistic training and an honest as- Corps took the lead on the program sessment of the needs in an ever more as it would be the task of the Marines likely Pacific war with Japan. The na- to seize the naval bases in question. ture of such a war would severely cur- Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, am- tail, if not eliminate, the opportunities phibious exercises were conducted by to land forces unopposed and move to the Marines, to include the Navy and assault a suitable port from the land- the Army, which examined a wide va- ward side, a problem that would face riety of techniques and scenarios. The Allied planners in Europe as well. As a exercises emphasized a combined arms result of the efforts of the Marines, with approach including naval gunfire, light Navy and Army participation, the US armor and artillery, engineering, and military possessed the most modern air power.4 amphibious doctrine in the world by In 1938, the Navy published the outbreak of war, if not the forces or 6 Fleet Training Publication 167 (Land- resources to implement it. ing Operations Doctrine), a document The British also studied am- that had been in development by the phibious doctrine during the interwar Marines since 1934 as the Tentative period, though they lacked an organi- Manual for Landing Operations. FTP zation to take the lead on the issue, as 167 was a sober assessment of the les- the Marines had in the United States, sons learned over the previous 17 years until 1938. The Admiralty grew con- of work. The Marines recognized that cerned over the development of am- opposed amphibious operations were phibious capability in the United States possible, but they would be difficult. and Japan and finally established the In- The basic principles read like a broad ter-Services Training and Development summation of the Normandy opera- Centre, under the command of Royal tion itself: the target area would have Navy Captain L.E.H. Maund, to con- to be isolated; a violent barrage of na- duct research and development on am- val gunfire and close air support would phibious operations. With such a late precede and support the landing force; start, the most significant achievement the landing itself would be carried out of the program was to educate British on a broad front by a combined arms defense officials, including the Chiefs team employing the utmost speed and of Staff and the Committee of Imperial

6 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

Defence, about the necessity of com- Upon becoming Prime Minister bined operations, especially those of an in May 1940, Churchill, long an advo- amphibious nature. cate of amphibious capability, ordered Thanks to indifference on the the development of larger craft capa- part of the British Army and Royal Air ble of landing troops and equipment Force, who saw themselves fighting directly onto a beachhead without the sweeping battles on the European Con- need to capture a port. The result was tinent, only the Royal Navy had any the Landing Craft Tank (LCT) and the enthusiasm for amphibious operations. ocean-going Landing Ship Tank (LST), Without the support of the other two a ubiquitous design that saw service into the Twenty-First Century.8 services, the development of amphibi- ous capability beyond what already ex- In the United States, the Marine isted received low priority. Maund be- Corps had developed the doctrine, but gan the study and design of dedicated still lacked suitable craft with which to specialized landing craft based on his implement it. The US Navy Bureau of observations of Japanese operations in Ships had submitted several designs, but China as well as examining the princi- none had proven satisfactory. To make ples of beach defense and overcoming matters worse, the Bureau of Ships jeal- such defenses. Only with the rise of ously guarded its prerogative regarding Winston Churchill in 1940 would the ship and boat design, hampering the 9 supporters of combined amphibious contributions of private enterprises. operations finally receive the attention The performance criteria for they merited.7 such craft were specific and demand- ing. First, they had to be seaworthy. Developing the Tools Operating against hostile beaches did not guarantee the protection of a break- fter the ignominious evacu- water during the approach, so the craft ation from Dunkirk in May must be capable of reliable handling in 1940, the British Army realized rough seas. Second, they had to com- Athat, in order to defeat the Germans, bine shallow draft with heavy lift ca- they would have to develop the capabil- pacity. Third, they should be able to ef- ity to land a sizeable force on the Conti- ficiently disembark troops, equipment, nent against determined opposition. To or cargo directly onto the beach. This this end, Maund’s program to develop last meant that the craft must be able to specialized craft such as the Landing drive themselves onto the beach itself Craft Assault (LCA) and the Land- while still maintaining the capability ing Craft Mechanized (LCM) received to retract after unloading. Finally, the more funding and resources. The LCA craft had to be rugged enough to han- and LCM were small craft designed re- dle heavy surf, debris-strewn water, and spectively to carry infantry and vehicles possible enemy fire and remain opera- onto a hostile beach. tional.10

7 The Saber and Scroll

Andrew Higgins, a New Orleans boatbuilder, built his wooden infantry landing craft for the US Marines based on a design intended for civilian use. With considerable power for their size they easily retracted from the beach. Subsequent variants were constructed of steel and featured a bow-mounted ramp for the debarkation of personnel and vehicles. Pictured an early-model Higgins Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM). US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

8 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

Pictured are two later-model ocean-going Landing Craft, Infantry (LCI). The LCI on the left features a centerline debarkation ramp, which was standard on all models built after 1 June 1944. The LCI embarked six officers,182 enlisted men, or 72-tons of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

9 The Saber and Scroll

Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboats (LCI-G) supplied close fire support of amphibious landings. LCI-G armaments varied depending upon which weapons systems were avail- able when the vessels arrived in theater. Configurations were a mix of 3-in/.50cal. DP, twin-40mm MG, 20mm MG, and 2 ½-in rockets. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

The Higgins Landing Craft, Mechanized (LCM 1) (top) in trials against a Navy Bureau of Ships tank lighter (bottom). The LCM could land one light tank or motor vehicle.US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

10 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

Higgins Landing Craft, Mechanized (3) (LCM 3) could land one 30-ton vehicle, e.g. M4 Sherman medium tank, 60 troops, or 60,000lbs. (27,000 kg) of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

The Landing Craft, Tank (3) (LCT 3) was capable of landing five 40-ton tanks, ten 3-ton trucks, or 300 tons of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

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Enter Louisiana boat-builder nel (LCVP) had beaten it soundly in a Andrew Jackson Higgins. Higgins had head-to-head competition. Under pres- entered his Eureka shallow draft work- sure from the Navy and Marine Corps, boat in a contest sponsored by the Navy the Bureau of Ships finally relinquished in 1936. The Eureka was designed for its less-than-effective hold on the de- use in the swamps and bayous of Lou- sign of small boats. Higgins eventually isiana and already featured many of produced over twelve thousand landing the requirements for an amphibious craft for the US Navy and the British landing craft. It was stable, powerful, with thousands more being produced operated well in shallow water, and under license by other builders.14 could even traverse sandbars and small By the time the British accepted spits of land when underway. It could the need for modern amphibious ca- also retract itself efficiently from being pability in 1940, the doctrine existed, grounded and was of extraordinarily as did the recognition of the necessity 11 robust construction. of specialized landing craft. The prob- In 1939 the Marines and the op- lem was that the development of such erational Navy tested the Higgins de- craft was in its infancy. The late start sign, which won universal praise. In toward the design and development of 1941 Higgins adapted his design, now suitable landing craft meant that there known as the Landing Craft, Personnel were chronic shortages throughout the (LCP), to include a bow ramp for easi- war. The Allies struggled to establish er discharge onto a beach. At the same production priorities, and the needs time, Higgins won a contest between of amphibious forces in the Pacific and his design for a tank lighter and one of- Mediterranean competed directly with fered by the Bureau of Ships. This craft the buildup and deployment of craft for became known as the Landing Craft, the invasion of France. 12 Mechanized (2-6) (LCM 2-6). This The first Higgins-built LCPs craft should not be confused with the were not ordered until September 1940, British boat of the same designation and the first major contracts were not 13 which it eventually supplanted. let until the spring of 1942. The British Higgins endured long battles took delivery of the first LCT in Novem- with the Navy bureaucracy, particular- ber 1940 and, though development was ly the Bureau of Ships, which was de- rapid, the workhorse fourth-generation termined to see its own boats adopted LCT (4) was not ordered in large num- over the clearly superior Higgins de- bers until December 1941. The spring signs. This struggle continued until of 1942 saw the beginning of mass pro- March 1943 when a Bureau-designed duction of landing craft in the United landing craft failed in an exercise, cost- States, including the entire production ing the lives of nineteen men. Higgins of the LST (2), the model which had had criticized the design as unsound, been accepted by the Admiralty and the and his Landing Craft, Vehicle, Person- US Navy.15

12 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

Though production began in The Problem of Lift earnest, it was not without its prob- lems. The US Navy Bureau of Ships he first British examination of continued its obfuscation for another a cross-Channel operation con- year while small boat manufacturers ceived a comparatively small and major shipyards tooled up to pro- Tundertaking launched in the Pas-de- duce the new designs. There was fierce Calais area in the event of a collapse competition for resources, especially of German power in the West. Code- steel, wood, and marine engines. With named ROUNDUP, the plan was envi- the Battle of the Atlantic still raging sioned as the beginning of the final act and the Navy trying to expand its fleet in a protracted war aimed at disrupt- of escorts as well as carriers and capital ing the orderly withdrawal of German ships for the Pacific, the President's list forces as opposed to defeating them in of "must-have" programs for 1943 did battle. As the British were fighting alone not include landing craft.16 at the time, its scale was commensurate 19 There was also a severe shortage with projected British capabilities. of trained operators for the new craft. With the entrance of the United The Navy and Coast Guard established States into the war in December 1941, special training programs but there the form and aim of ROUNDUP began was a lack of experience even among to evolve toward a true offensive opera- the cadre. Andrew Higgins stepped in tion.20 When strategic decisions regard- again. At the request of the Navy and ing North Africa and the Mediterranean Marine Corps, he had established the pushed the cross-Channel operation Higgins Boat Operators and Marine back to 1943 and then 1944, Allied Engine Maintenance School in New planners faced a vacuum of official di- Orleans in July 1941. Higgins Enter- rection. In 1943 the continued planning prises fully funded the school.17 for ROUNDUP was undertaken by the By mid-1942, Higgins had office of the Chief of Staff, Supreme Al- trained over two thousand Navy, Ma- lied Command (COSSAC). There was rine, and Coast Guard personnel, but some wrangling over the makeup of the the demand was insatiable. In June, the planning staff and the command struc- Amphibian Command of the United ture, but by March, British Lt. General States Engineers assumed control of the Sir Frederick Morgan was named Chief school to accommodate Army students of Staff and charged with continuing 21 as well. Even this was not enough, so plans for the operation. Higgins helped the Navy establish its Even before Morgan’s appoint- own schools throughout the country ment and the handover of the plan- which were more accessible to the naval ning responsibilities to COSSAC, Al- bases themselves. Most of the instruc- lied planners under the auspices of the tors were graduates of the original Hig- Combined Chiefs of Staff had begun to gins school in New Orleans.18 review the previous two years' worth

13 The Saber and Scroll of data generated by the ROUNDUP that the Caen sector of the Norman- effort. Most telling among this infor- dy coast was the best, indeed the only, mation were the lessons learned from choice for such an operation. Secondary the Dieppe raid of August 1942. Dieppe landings were planned for the east coast demonstrated that, in light of modern of the Cotentin Peninsula to provide weapons and fortifications, a seaborne access to the port of Cherbourg. On 1 attack on an enemy-held port was not March the new analysis was approved feasible. Also, the ongoing fortification and code-named SKYSCRAPER. of the Northwestern European coast SKYSCRAPER was deliberate- would deny the Allies any opportunity ly ambitious, calling for no less than to land unopposed and move on an en- ten assault divisions afloat, four in the emy port. It became quite clear that any first wave and six in the immediate invasion of Northwest Europe would follow-up, supported by four airborne have to be an amphibious attack against divisions dropped to block enemy re- a defended coastline. Such an attack inforcements. All ten amphibious divi- could only be carried out by the use of sions were to land on the first four tides, specialized landing craft. that is, before the end of D plus 1. The The primary lesson gleaned from stated reason for such a bold enuncia- Dieppe, however, was that the German tion was to bring to light the problems defenses were more formidable than inherent in such an operation so they previously thought. Earlier iterations of could be planned for and dealt with. It ROUNDUP had called for widely dis- did not disappoint in this regard.23 persed landing sites to prevent the en- emy from concentrating and to create Although the Combined Chiefs confusion as to the location of the main of Staff approved SKYSCRAPER as a effort. Upon examination of Dieppe, basis for planning, immediate ques- Allied planners determined that any tions arose as to its methodology. The landing force would have to be concen- British Chiefs challenged the planners' trated and mutually supporting in or- assertion that SKYSCRAPER'S force der to crack the German defenses and allocation was the bare minimum re- withstand the inevitable counterattack. quired for the operation given the justi- A concentrated front also eased logisti- fication that they expected "determined cal concerns and allowed the invaders opposition" from the Germans. The to reinforce the landing quickly and Chiefs pointed out the impossibility of with greater depth.22 basing an operation on projected ene- The new approach called for nu- my strength over a year in the future. merous conditions necessary for suc- The SKYSCRAPER planners cess, such as suitable beach gradients, countered that a firm decision must exits, tides, shelter from the prevailing be made to ensure that the resourc- winds, and access to nearby port facil- es needed to accomplish the mission ities to be taken after the landings. By would be made available. Refusing to early 1943 the planners had determined do so, they believed, opened the door to

14 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD using a lack of resources to justify de- in North Africa. Thanks to the use of laying or even canceling the operation. emergency directives and the creation The Chiefs did not agree and revoked of special expediting machinery, the their approval for SKYSCRAPER for its 1942 production run of landing craft flawed approach which based resource ended with a record of 106,146 light allocation and force structure on un- displacement tons for February 1943.27 knowable enemy strength.24 The Navy maintained that the disloca- When Morgan took charge in tions caused by the building program of March, he made use of the work done on 1942 had reverberated across every oth- SKYSCRAPER, quickly agreeing with its er building effort in every shipyard in conclusion that the assault would have the nation, claiming that the shortfalls would not be made good until the fall to be in France, preferably in the Caen of 1943. Another such delay could not sector.25 He also recognized that the lo- be justified in light of current threats, gistical requirements for SKYSCRAP- especially the record shipping losses of ER had been enormous and, frankly, March 1943 to the German U-boat of- unrealistic. Concerning landing craft, fensive.28 subsequent studies based on projected availability indicated a likely shortfall Thus the Navy blocked the pro- of fifty percent for the assault divisions. posed increase and influenced the Morgan’s approach to the size and struc- tentative plans for the invasion. The ture of the force, however, was not based planners would have to make do with on guessed-at enemy strength, but upon the current landing craft production the resources that could reasonably be schedules which held steady at about expected to be available at the time the 60,000 tons per month for deliveries 29 operation was to take place.26 into the first half of 1944. The land- ing craft situation was poised to impact In March 1943, influenced by strategic priorities on a theater-wide the SKYSCRAPER estimates and Mor- and even global scale. March 1943 gan, the British requested an increase in saw the prediction by Morgan that, al- landing craft production. US planners though the exact number of landing immediately rejected the proposal cit- craft required for the operation could ing the urgent need for escort vessels in not yet be forecast, the figure would be the Atlantic and the continuing buildup "large enough…to present a very seri- in the Pacific. Chief of Naval Operations ous problem, which has no precedent." Admiral Ernest J. King and his staff be- Even Churchill had gotten wind of the lieved that the proposed increase would problem. He wrote in an April memo- siphon off resources and once again de- randum that “the destinies of two great lay desperately needed construction in empires ... seemed to be tied up in some other areas. god-damned things called LSTs whose King’s staff justified their stance engines themselves had to be tickled on by citing the 1942 crash program to by ... LST engine experts of which there produce craft for Operation TORCH was a great shortage.”30

15 The Saber and Scroll

The Higgins Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, the ubiquitous LCVP, could land 36 troops, one 6,000lb vehicle, or 8,100lbs of cargo. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence.

16 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

The DUWK, or “Duck” was the logistical workhorse of Allied amphibious land- ings the world over from mid-1943 on. Built on a 2 ½-ton, 6x6 truck chassis, the Duck could carry 25 combat loaded troops, 12 litters, small-caliber artillery pieces, or 25-tons of cargo.

May also saw the arrival of Brit- comparing this figure with current and ish planners in Washington to discuss, projected production capacity, came to among other things, the allocation of the rapid conclusion that such demands resources for 1944. Despite the rejection would be impossible to meet. of SKYSCRAPER, the British statement The stated requirements were so of requirements for what was again unrealistic that US planners suspected being called ROUNDUP included lift the British of deliberately making an capacity for ten assault divisions simul- impossible demand in order to justi- taneously loaded. The statement called fy delaying or scrapping the plan al- for 8,500 landing ships and craft to pro- together. Such unfounded suspicions vide the needed lift. American planners, ignored the fact that a combined plan-

17 The Saber and Scroll

Armed with between 792 and 1,064, 5-in rockets, each with a 29lb HE warhead, the Landing Craft, Tank (Rocket) or LCT-R was used for close in fire support. US Navy Division of Naval Intelligence. ning staff developed the SKYSCRAP- They determined that such a course ER estimates, but given the British would eliminate any possible justifica- preference for a Mediterranean strat- tions on the part of the British to post- egy, the idea seemed logical. Admiral pone the operation on the grounds of King was the most outspoken in this resource availability. Increasing landing regard, openly declaring that he be- craft production was no longer enter- lieved the British had no intention of tained or discussed, and efforts turned supporting a cross-Channel operation to maximizing the craft that were and in 1944. The more temperate General would be available.31 George C. Marshall merely stated that As mentioned earlier, Morgan it must be concluded that a ten division had already reached a similar conclu- assault was a logistical impossibility for sion, though for different reasons. The 1944. new attitude of the Americans dove- The US Chiefs concluded that, in tailed nicely with his doubts about the order to argue successfully against the feasibility of the SKYSCRAPER force British preference for operations in the structure. Absent an executive authori- Mediterranean, the plan for the inva- ty in the form of a commanding officer, sion of France must be scaled back with- he continued to operate in the realm of in the realm of the logistically possible. the theoretical, but he correctly viewed

18 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

At 2,160-tons landing-load displacement, the Landing Ship, Tank (LST), is the largest sea-going amphibious support ship, second only to the Landing Ship, Dock (LSD). A ramp, behind the clamshell bow doors, allowed the LST to deposit its 500-ton load of motor vehicles directly on the beach. Where coastal geography did not allow the LST to beach, a pontoon causeway was streamed to span the gap and tanks, truck, half-tracks or jeeps rolled-off onto the beach. the rejection of the ten division plan Morgan arrived at these figures as the break that was needed to begin by allowing for two major Mediter- anew. ranean operations for 1943 after the Morgan's assessments quickly invasion of Sicily and the projected reduced the figure of 8,500 landing craft production figures for delivery by late to around 4,000, a much more manage- spring, 1944. The completion of those able number. He estimated that, by the operations should allow for the trans- spring of 1944, the Allies could provide fer of sufficient craft, added to the new lift for five divisions afloat, three in the inventory, for the cross-Channel oper- initial assault and two in the immedi- ation. Twenty-six to thirty Allied divi- ate follow-up. He further determined sions were projected to be present in that two additional divisions could be Britain by the time of the operation and landed using craft returning from the available for use in the reinforcement, assault and immediate follow-up. buildup, and expansion phases. Mor-

19 The Saber and Scroll gan's estimates were accepted, and he al force structure and the tactical plan, was instructed to confine his plans to would such numbers come close to the availability of 4,504 landing ships being accurate. In the meantime, they and craft by the target date.32 served to demonstrate the complexity With the number of available of the task before the planners and pro- landing craft settled, for the time being, vided data that could be used later to a new problem emerged: what was the assemble the final loading plan. load capacity of each ship or craft and COSSAC planners, unlike Wash- how would the loads be structured? The ington, also took into account the ques- definitive answer would only be appar- tion of combat losses among landing ent once the final target was selected, a craft and the effect those losses would detailed estimate of enemy forces com- necessarily have on the buildup phase. piled, a tactical plan developed, and the It is true that there was no real way force structure decided upon. While for the Washington planners to assess the number of craft would determine possible losses given the lack of a con- the options for how the landing force firmed target area and the time distance would be structured and employed, the from the operation itself, but the Amer- plan and structure, once settled upon, ican calculations tended more toward would dictate the loading and mission the higher end of projected capacities for each ship or craft. than those of the British. The preliminary figures for load- Finally, the Washington planners ing were necessarily vague. The Brit- failed to account for specialized support ish and Americans each had different craft mounting guns, rockets, and mor- opinions regarding lift capacity, needs tars that employed landing craft hulls. for individual units, and loading phi- These craft were essential for the close losophy. By May, COSSAC had adopt- support of the landing, especially in ed a "Standard Method for Forecast- the time between the lifting of the na- ing Landing Craft Requirements." This val barrage and the landing of the sup- method, however, was not used at the porting armor. The support craft would Washington Conference that month have to be included in the production when Morgan was directed to move and availability figures for landing craft ahead. In an example of the differences but could not count in the total lift ca- of calculation, COSSAC, using its "stan- pacity for such craft.33 dard method," allotted 3,000 vehicles to The Washington Conference of each assault division. The planners in May 1943 accomplished the American Washington, at the same time, arrived goal of committing resources to the at the figure of 4,380. cross-Channel operation in the spring Why the difference? "Vehicle" of 1944 while also setting the materi- was a relative term and could mean al parameters within a range unlikely anything from a small trailer to a tank. to be challenged by the British. At the Only with the finalization of the actu- same time, the setting of a definite time

20 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD frame for the invasion limited the op- opinion flowed from the American view erational and tactical flexibility of the that OVERLORD was the prime goal planners and commanders by setting a and everything else should be either definite ceiling on available resources, subordinated to it or done in support of not least of which were landing craft. it. The British agreed that OVERLORD should be the primary operation of 1944 Priorities but that efforts in Italy and elsewhere in the Mediterranean were an integral part he differences of opinion be- of preparing for it and were thus equally tween the Americans and the important.35 British regarding European After much discussion, the Chiefs Tstrategy are well-documented. It is issued a joint statement reaffirming the well-known that the British favored precedence of OVERLORD when there an opportunistic strategy based in the was a question of competing needs but Mediterranean while the Americans that Mediterranean operations should advocated a concentrated assault across continue with the resources already the English Channel into France as soon allocated for their use. The Americans 34 as possible. In truth, the differences in also conceded that unforeseen events the two sides were more nuanced than or opportunities in the Mediterranean is generally indicated. These nuances could change the priorities set forth at manifested themselves in the months the conference. General Marshall had leading up to what eventually became stated that the commitment to OVER- Operation OVERLORD, and the avail- LORD should be taken “without condi- ability of landing craft was at the center tions and without mental reservation.”36 of the debate. He was unable to achieve either in Que- The Quebec Conference of Aug- bec, though he did the lay the ground- ust 1943 saw several stormy sessions be- work for such. tween the American and British Chiefs The Americans did manage to of Staff regarding strategy and resource hedge against a possible British push allocation for 1944. The Americans for an increased commitment to Italy or submitted a report recommending that a rumored Balkan expedition. By pro- OVERLORD have "overriding priori- posing a landing on the Mediterranean ty" for resources to ensure readiness by coast of France to coincide with the the target date, which was still undeter- cross-Channel operation, the Ameri- mined. cans were able to focus the British more The British were uncomfortable to the west and show a direct correlation with the term "overriding priority" be- between Mediterranean operations and cause it implied the operations in the OVERLORD. The British Chiefs agreed Mediterranean were of secondary im- to the proposal and General Eisenhow- portance, which is precisely what the er, then commander of Allied forces in Americans meant. The difference of North Africa, was ordered to draw up

21 The Saber and Scroll a plan for such an operation using only en operations in Italy, British support the resources already available to him.37 for ANVIL began to wane. The Quebec Conference also saw As General Morgan expanded the beginnings of an increase in the his plan to accommodate the increased size of the OVERLORD assault force. assault force, he immediately saw his Churchill requested an increase of at landing craft start to slip away. In Au- least twenty-five percent. Marshall con- gust, before the Quebec Conference curred, and Morgan was instructed to concluded and priorities set, the Royal take such an expansion into account Navy appropriated 44 LCTs for net duty in his plans. Morgan, on his own, had at its anchorage at Scapa Flow. It was already been examining just such an unknown if they would return in time. increase. Still, without a commander Also, the allocation of close-support to make executive decisions, he could craft was wholly inadequate. only operate with theoretical models, Morgan was invited to address though OVERLORD’S higher priority the British Chiefs of Staff on 12 August started to give him firmer ground on regarding the rapidly-eroding landing 38 which to stand. craft situation. His estimates showed This priority quickly brought that of the 653 LCTs allocated by the OVERLORD into competition with Washington Conference, up to twen- the just-ordered invasion of Southern ty-five percent were no longer available France, Operation ANVIL. A study of due to reassignment to other tasks or Eisenhower's available capability re- the need to convert them to close-sup- vealed only enough lift for about one port craft. His figures were actually low, division. Also, the lift capacity was not as he had underestimated the number properly balanced in terms of its ca- of support craft required by the Ameri- pability to land even that one division can assault divisions. Even worse, Mor- in such a way for it to be effective. The gan based his estimates on a three-di- Chiefs denied a request to augment the vision assault front which would soon lift capacity because it would take re- increase to four.40 39 sources away from OVERLORD. Inquiries into increased produc- As planning went forward, it tion of landing craft met with no partic- became clear that if ANVIL were to ular success. Admiral King grudgingly take place, there would have to be ad- agreed to an unspecified increase, but ditional resources allocated. As ANVIL it was not clear whether it would posi- began to take on a life of its own, not tively affect deliveries in time to impact least because of Eisenhower's advoca- OVERLORD. The British landing craft cy, it became a primary drain on scarce industry was operating at full capacity, resources needed for OVERLORD. and British authorities were unwilling Again, landing craft and lift capacity to make the changes necessary to in- were the centers of contention. As the crease it. Only in the late fall, when the commitment grew and began to threat- shortage became acute, did Churchill

22 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD directly intervene in order to create ca- another assault division into the mix. pacity for about sixty more craft.41 His new calculations for the creation Shortly after his presentation to of an adequately mounted follow-up the British Chiefs of Staff regarding the force showed a deficit of 251 LCTs for shortages for a three-division assault, a three-division assault and 389 for the Morgan received orders to expand his four-division plan. He would also need plan for a four-division front. Given the an additional 150 LCTs or equivalent difficulties he already faced, Morgan craft for the fourth assault division. decided to start his plans anew based The British Chiefs of Staff reject- on the increased allotment of forces. He ed Morgan's opposition to the strength- quickly concluded that the expansion to ened attack but allowed that increasing four assault divisions was unwise based the number of landing craft had become on the lift capacity he had and expected a top priority. In September, the Chair- to have. Upon examination of the or- man of the U.S. War Production Board, dered increase, he wrote: Donald Nelson, traveled to London Detailed analysis of the present and met with Morgan regarding land- plan shows that while the three ing craft shortages. He left the meeting assault divisions are only bare- convinced that LSTs and LCTs were the ly adequately mounted in craft "most important single instrument of of suitable types, the immediate war from the point of view of the Eu- follow-up formations are most ropean Theater," and that the need for inadequately mounted, and there them had been "grossly understated."42 is a dangerous gap on D-plus-1- Despite Nelson’s determination day .... We already have far too and King’s agreement to increase pro- high a proportion of our goods duction, no action was taken other than in the shop window. To consider to study the problem. As the November any increase in this proportion production schedule was allowed to without adequate stocking of the mirror that of October, it became clear back premises would in my opin- that the only way to increase landing ion be basically unsound. craft availability for OVERLORD would In other words, the follow-up be to maximize the craft that already formations were in no real position to existed or would be delivered through provide follow-up at all, at least not in the established production priorities.43 the immediate sense. The follow-up units were already inadequately load- Command Decisions ed on unsuitable vessels which meant they would not be able to operate un- eneral Bernard Montgomery til at least twelve hours after landing. arrived in London on 2 January Morgan strongly recommended ad- 1944 to assume command of the dressing this problem and creating a vi- GAllied ground forces, under Eisenhow- able floating reserve before introducing er, for OVERLORD. He immediately

23 The Saber and Scroll demanded an expansion of the assault Montgomery and Smith in- force from four to five divisions and formed Eisenhower in early January the frontage for the landing from twen- that the only way to procure the neces- ty-five to about forty miles. Eisenhow- sary craft would be to pull them from er’s Chief of Staff, Major General Walter ANVIL. Eisenhower was a strong advo- Bedell Smith, concurred and apprised cate of ANVIL from the start, believing Eisenhower of the recommendations. that it would tie down German forces Despite his misgivings, Morgan that might otherwise be brought to bear was now able to operate with some ex- against OVERLORD. He resisted draw- press authority under a command staff ing resources from the complementary that could make decisions. He was told operation as long as he could. to plan for the expansions under the ANVIL retained the capacity to assumption that the required landing lift three divisions. British planners, in- craft would be made available. The ad- cluding Morgan, felt that a one division ditional landing craft needed for Mont- threat would be enough to hold the Ger- gomery’s expansion included 72 Land- man units in place while diverting the ing Craft Infantry, Large (LCI-L), 47 rest of the landing craft to OVERLORD. LSTs, and 144 LCTs.44 The British believed that the ANVIL In addition to the five infantry beaches, 500 miles away, were too dis- divisions, lift had to be found for the tant to have a positive impact on OVER- equivalent of four armored brigades, LORD. Churchill heartily agreed and five regiments of self-propelled artil- pushed for the cancellation of ANVIL. lery, shore control groups, air force and Eisenhower was still determined naval personnel, and an immediate fol- to salvage ANVIL if he could. At his low-up force of two-thirds of an infan- direction, plans were changed for the try division. All these units had to be loading of landing craft, especially con- combat-loaded on landing craft so as to cerning vehicles. The requirement per be operational as soon as they arrived division for combat-loaded vehicles on the beach. The rest of the follow-up, was cut from over 3,000 to 2,500, thus one and one-third divisions, would be freeing up additional craft. loaded on transports and not available Serviceability requirements 45 until D plus 2. also increased across the board. The In order to accumulate the neces- COSSAC outline for OVERLORD sary craft for OVERLORD, training ar- had placed the expected serviceability eas in the US and Britain were scoured, rate, the rate of craft that were opera- serviceability rates were improved, load tional at any given time, at eighty-five capacity calculated and recalculated to percent for landing craft and ninety improve efficiency, and, most signifi- percent for ships. In order to squeeze cantly, the competition for resourc- more lift out of the available assets, the es between OVERLORD and ANVIL acceptable rates increased in January to came to the forefront. ninety percent for LCTs and ninety-five

24 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD percent for LSTs. These new rates only only draining resources from OVER- applied to US craft, as the British in- LORD but also Italy. Italian operations sisted on retaining the lower COSSAC retained a high priority with the Brit- figures because they were more realis- ish, a sentiment echoed by Eisenhower, tic. As it turned out, the new rates were which put the Supreme Commander in pessimistic. On D-day, the rates for a tight spot. all American landing craft were above The difference of opinion re- ninety-nine percent, and the British 46 volved around Eisenhower's belief were above ninety-six percent. that ANVIL was vital to the success of In February, Eisenhower met OVERLORD, a view, as noted previous- with Admiral Charles Cooke of the ly, not shared by the British. Field Mar- CNO’s War Plans Division and General shal Sir Alan Brooke, the British Chief John Hull, Chief of the US Army’s Oper- of the Imperial General Staff, made a ational Planning Department to discuss strong case that the needs of Italy and the landing craft situation. Cooke and ANVIL would create either a shortage Hull were able to convince Eisenhower of badly needed divisions in the former that he possessed more than enough lift or a lack of adequate buildup forces for for OVERLORD without having to pull the latter. Doing both was impossible. extensively from ANVIL. The wrangling continued be- On 13 February, Eisenhow- tween Eisenhower and the Combined er, Cooke, and Hull proposed reduc- Chiefs, including some horse-trading ing the numbers of landing ships and of landing craft resources as Mediterra- making up for the loss by overload- nean needs spiked thanks to the diffi- ing others. The plan was criticized by culties at Anzio. By March, Eisenhow- st the command of 21 Army Group, the er began to realize that the resources command headquarters for the ground in men and materiel did not exist to forces, as taking a narrow logistical execute ANVIL simultaneously with view toward loading as opposed to OVERLORD while also maintaining a tactical view. Admiral Sir Bertram the needs of Italy. On 21 March, he rec- Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander, ommended the cancellation of ANVIL. Expeditionary Force, echoed this crit- With the decision made, OVERLORD icism. Ramsay noted in his diary that was assured of the landing craft needed Eisenhower, Cooke, and Hull were “for- to execute the operation.48 getting that we have to look tactically to assault a strongly defended coast & any Conclusion arithmetical calculation is bound to be 47 impractical operationally.” The British he landing craft employed in Op- Chiefs of Staff rejected the proposal. eration OVERLORD performed The British Chiefs also took the admirably. It is impossible to opportunity to reiterate their opposi- Tthink of the operation without conjur- tion to ANVIL, which they saw as not ing images of the assault troops hitting

25 The Saber and Scroll the beach in waves of Higgins LCVPs visionaries who determined the need and other craft. It is difficult to sur - for them in the first place. Though they mise how the Allies might have gained never fired a shot during the war, the a lodgment on the European Continent people responsible for the existence without the development and employ- and eventual deployment of the landing ment of these highly-specialized but es- craft were in their own way just as vital sential craft. to eventual victory as those who did. 4,126 landing craft were em- In a postwar interview, historian ployed at Normandy on 6 June 1944. Over 4,000 were of a specialized vari- Stephen Ambrose was asked by Dwight ety developed for amphibious assaults.49 D. Eisenhower whether he had ever met 291 landing craft of all types were lost Andrew Higgins. When Ambrose said or damaged during the assault. Most of that he had not, Eisenhower replied, those damaged were repairable, a testa- “That’s too bad. He is the man who won ment to their rugged construction.50 the war for us. If Higgins had not de- The success of the landing craft signed and built those LCVPs, we never of World War II is also a testament to could have landed over an open beach. the designers, engineers, and crafts- The whole strategy of the war would men who created them as well as the have been different.”51

Bibliography

Works Cited Cutler, Thomas J., “The Higgins Boat.” Proceedings Volume 141 Issue 1 (January 2015).

Edwards, Kenneth. Operation Neptune. Oxford: Fonthill Media Limited, 2013.

Harrison, Gordon A. Cross-Channel Attack. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2002.

McKissock, Lt. General Gary S, USMC, “Finding the Next Higgins Boat.” In Ma- rine Corps Gazette Vol. 85 Issue 6 (June, 2001), 13-15.

Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R., ed. Military Innovation in the Interwar Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Paret, Peter, ed. Makers of Modern Strategy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

26 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

Stoler, Mark A., Allies and Adversaries. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000.

Strahan, Jerry E. Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats That Won World War II. Eisenhower Center Studies on War and Peace, 1994.

United States Department of the Navy. Allied Landing Craft of World War II. An- napolis, MD: 1985.

Yung, Christopher D. Gators of Neptune, Naval Amphibious Planning for the Nor- mandy Invasion. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006.

Works Consulted Murray, Williamson and Millett, Allan R., A War to be Won. Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000.

Rottman, Gordon. Landing Ship, Tank (LST) 1942-2002. New York: Osprey Pub- lishing, 2005.

Weinberg, Gerhard. A World at Arms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Notes

1 Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millet, Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 50, 56-57, 59. 2 ibid, 57-59. 3 ibid, 51, 58-59. 4 ibid, 71-76. 5 ibid, 77. 6 ibid, 78. 7 ibid, 62-64. 8 ibid, 80-81. 9 ibid, 84.

10 Thomas J. Cutler, “The Higgins Boat,” Proceedings Volume 141 Issue 1 (January 2015).

27 The Saber and Scroll

11 Jerry E. Strahan, Andrew Jackson Higgins and the Boats That Won World War II (Ei- senhower Studies on War and Peace, 1994), 26-48.

12 Murray and Millett, 84.

13 United States Department of the Navy, Allied Landing Craft of World War II (Annap- olis, MD: 1985).

14 Strahan, 162-163.

15 Gordon A. Harrison, Cross-Channel Attack (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, U.S. Army, 2002), 60-61.

16 ibid, 62.

17 Strahan, 90-91.

18 ibid, 128-129.

19 Harrison, 6-8.

20 Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Car- olina Press, 2000), 77-78.

21 Christopher D. Yung, Gators of Neptune, Naval Amphibious Planning for the Norman- dy Invasion (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 50-51.

22 Harrison, 54-56.

23 ibid, 56-58.

24 ibid, 58-59.

25 Yung, 57-58.

26 Harrison, 60.

27 ibid, 62.

28 ibid, 62-63.

29 ibid, 63.

30 ibid, 64.

31 ibid, 64-65.

32 ibid, 65-66.

33 ibid, 66-67.

34 Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 691-692.

28 Allied Amphibious Doctrine, the Landing Craft Shortage of 1943-1944, and Operation OVERLORD

35 Harrison, 97-99. 36 ibid, 98. 37 ibid, 99-100. 38 ibid, 99-100. 39 ibid, 99. 40 ibid, 100-101. 41 ibid, 101-102. 42 ibid, 103-104. 43 ibid, 104-105. 44 Yung, 64-65. 45 Harrison, 170. 46 ibid, 170-171. 47 Yung, 72-73. 48 Harrison, 172-173. 49 Yung, 76. 50 Kenneth Edwards, Operation Neptune (Oxford: Fonthill Media Limited, 2013), 162. 51 Gary S. McKissock, “Finding the Next Higgins Boat,” in Marine Corps Gazette Vol. 85 Issue 6 (June, 2001), 13.

29

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War

Mason Krebsbach American Military University Abstract Within weeks of the attack of September 11, 2001, the United States began a campaign to eradicate Al Qaeda in Afghanistan. This cam- paign would shift from a campaign of “clear and hold” to a focus of rebuilding that nation within two years after the initial Ameri- can presence. More than eighteen years, several billion dollars, and roughly twenty-four hundred US casualties later,1 the US military still maintains a significant presence in Afghanistan, not signifi- cantly closer to exiting than they were in the early days of 2002. The United States’ failure to officially end the war in Afghanistan is founded principally upon the United States’ lack of both sound counterinsurgency (COIN) applications and inconsistent objec- tives prior to the 9/11 attack on New York’s Twin Towers. This paper explores the years prior to 9/11, the United States’ fail- ure to apply sound COIN concepts, and the inconsistent objectives related to the United States’ failure to officially end the war in Af- ghanistan. Keywords: counterinsurgency (COIN), FM 3-24, SIGAR, Afghani- stan, Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden, terrorism, Taliban, RAND Corporation

Afganistán: La guerra eterna de EE. UU. Resumen A las pocas semanas del ataque del 11 de septiembre de 2001, Es- tados Unidos inició una campaña para erradicar a Al Qaeda en Afganistán. Esta campaña cambiaría de una campaña de “limpiar y mantener” a un enfoque de reconstrucción de esa nación dentro de los dos años posteriores a la presencia estadounidense inicial. Más de dieciocho años, varios miles de millones de dólares y aproxima- damente dos mil cuatrocientas bajas estadounidenses después, el ejército de Estados Unidos todavía mantiene una presencia signifi- cativa en Afganistán, no mucho más cerca de salir de lo que estaba en los primeros días de 2002. El fracaso de Estados Unidos Poner fin oficialmente a la guerra en Afganistán se basa principalmente

31 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.3 The Saber and Scroll

en la falta de Estados Unidos de aplicaciones sólidas de contrain- surgencia (COIN) y objetivos inconsistentes antes del ataque del 11 de septiembre a las Torres Gemelas de Nueva York. Este documento explora los años anteriores al 11 de septiembre, el fracaso de Estados Unidos en aplicar conceptos COIN sólidos y los objetivos inconsistentes relacionados con el fracaso de Estados Unidos de poner fin oficialmente a la guerra en Afganistán. Palabras clave: contrainsurgencia (COIN), FM 3-24, SIGAR, Afga- nistán, Al-Qaeda, Bin Laden, terrorismo, Talibán, Corporación RAND

阿富汗：美国的持续战争 摘要

2001年9月11日恐怖袭击之后的几周内，美国开始了一项消灭 阿富汗基地组织的战役。这场战役计划在美军首次到达阿富 汗的两年内从“清除和控制”战役转为重建阿富汗。超过18 年过去了，花费了几百亿美金、近2400名美军伤亡，如今美 军仍然在阿富汗保留大量部队，比起2002年早期，如今保留 的数量距离撤离还有一段距离。美国在正式结束阿富汗战争 上的失败之举主要基于美国缺乏健全的反叛乱（COIN）战 略，以及9•11纽约双子塔袭击事件之前不持续的目标。

本文探究了9•11之前的几年、美国在应用健全COIN概念上的 失败、以及与美国无法正式结束阿富汗战争相关的不持续目 标。

关键词：反叛乱（COIN），FM 3-24，阿富汗重建特别监察 长（SIGAR），阿富汗，基地组织，本·拉登，恐怖主义，塔 利班，兰德公司

32 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War

Air Force OSI members pay respects to six American Soldiers killed in a Taliban attack while on joint patrol near Bagram, Afghanistan. (Winter 2016). Author’s Personal Collection.

n entire generation of Ameri- ties), and perceptions of an illegitimate cans born near the turn of the Afghan government. To fully under- twenty-first century is current- stand the United States’ failure to with- Aly reaching legal adulthood. Although draw from Afghanistan and how US these young people may not under- officials passed down efforts to rebuild stand or appreciate America’s ongoing the nation through two succeeding ad- war with Afghanistan, this military ministrations, a look at the events lead- conflict has been in effect for almost ing up to—and immediately after—the their entire lives. As a result, they may invasion of Afghanistan is essential. be among the first to ask, “Why have Long before President George W. we been at war in Afghanistan for more Bush declared his War on Terror, the than nineteen years?” The answers lie in events of September 11, 2001 had al- a timeline of delays that have prohibited ready been set into motion. The lack of US soldiers from coming home. strong military responses following the These obstacles include a delayed 1983 bombing of the Marine Barracks beginning, a stark lack of oversight in in Lebanon, the bombing of the World economic and infrastructure develop- Trade Center in 1993, and the bombing ment, weakness in unified efforts (in- of USS Cole in 2000 created the impres- cluding cultural and language difficul- sion that the US would be unwilling to

33 The Saber and Scroll take retaliatory action against terrorist force, Ahmad Shah Masoud, known organizations. Usama Bin Laden and as the “Lion of Panjshir.”4 Journalists his followers believed, however, that later called Masoud’s murder “the cur- although America would be slow to re- tain-raiser for the attacks on New York act, a large enough attack would even- City and Washington, DC.”5 Just two tually draw the US into conflict, “bog- days later, on September 11, Al-Qaeda ging them down,” similar to the Soviet operatives hijacked four commercial Union during their occupation from airliners. Two crashed into the World 1979 to 1989. The goal was to deplete Trade Center in New York, one struck the US government of both power and the Pentagon in Washington, DC, and influence.2 the fourth and final plane crashed in a Bin Laden had already played a field near Shanksville, Pennsylvania. In significant role in the August 7, 1998, total, the coordinated attacks were re- bombings of the US embassies in Dar sponsible for the death of approximate- es Salaam, Tanzania, Nairobi, and Ken- ly three thousand people. Although ya and in conspiring to kill US nationals none of the nineteen hijackers were traveling abroad. The United Nations Afghan nationals, and the attack orig- (UN) passed Resolution 1267 on Octo- inated from Saudi Arabia, President ber 15, 1999, calling for the indictment George W. Bush immediately zeroed in of Usama bin Laden and his associates. on al-Qaeda, Usama Bin Laden, and the 6 The resolution reaffirmed its commit- terrorist safe-haven of Afghanistan. ment to the sovereignty of Afghanistan Knowing that Pakistan and Af- while condemning the ongoing viola- ghanistan would not extradite Bin tions of international humanitarian law Laden to the US, President Bush then and human rights and the production turned to Congress, who subsequently of opium. Resolution 1267 also estab- authorized a Joint Resolution. This res- lished an al-Qaeda and Taliban Sanc- olution determined (with the under- tions Committee and granted this panel standing of the war in Afghanistan) “to the ability to prevent the departure of use all necessary and appropriate force any aircraft from land owned, leased, against those nations, organizations, or or operated by either group and froze persons [whom they] determined had assets or financial resources owned or planned, authorized … committed or generated by the Taliban.3 aided the terrorist attacks that occurred Two years after the implementa- on September 11, 2001, or harbored tion of Resolution 1267 and two days such organizations or persons, in order before September 11, 2001, two suicide to prevent any future acts of interna- bombers posing as news correspondents tional terrorism against the US by such 7 assassinated the former defense minis- nations, organizations or persons.” ter of the post-Soviet interim Afghan There has been much debate over government and chief commander of the legality of the US invasion and oc- the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban cupation of Afghanistan. On October

34 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War

7, 2001, the same date as the initial air- ing the beginning of more than a nine- strikes against Afghanistan, US Ambas- teen-year American presence there. sador to the UN John Negroponte sent The first and most blatant is- a letter to the President of the UN Se- sue facing US ambitions was the repu- curity Council stating that the US had tation as a reactive nation due in part initiated the strikes in an act of self-de- to “soft” retaliatory actions against the fense. This letter acknowledged the per- previously mentioned attacks. Because ception of military action against Af- of this perception, it is not entirely in- ghanistan as an act of aggression. Still, the right to self-defense permitted the correct to assert that the US entered US military to prosecute its alleged at- Afghanistan unprepared. Asymmetric tacker, i.e., Bin Laden and the haven of warfare, which encompasses insurgen- Afghanistan, both of which had been cy and terrorism, was written into US relatively unchecked. The same con- National Security Strategy policy only 10 straints bound the United Kingdom; as recently as 1997. The preface of however, under the UN Charter, the Army Field Manual (FM) 3-24 under- United Kingdom offered aid under the scores this lack of preparation where it claim of “collective self-defense,” mean- states, “Counterinsurgency operations ing that a state may assist a nation un- generally have been neglected in broad- der attacks should they request it.8 The er American military doctrine and na- first conventional ground forces arrived tional security policies since the end of in Afghanistan twelve days later,9 mark- the Vietnam War over 30 years ago.”11

US Troops boarding a CH-47 Chinook following a Clearing Operation in the Shah-I-Kot Valley. Gardez, Afghanistan. (Summer, 2002). Author’s Personal Col- lection.

35 The Saber and Scroll

Early operations in Afghanistan, The Taliban adopted strategies four years after the release of the 1997 of protraction and exhaustion, utiliz- National Security Strategy, were still ing ambushes, bombings, or attacks on based upon the false assumption that crucial infrastructure to exhaust oppo- the insurgency would mirror those of sition, intimidate the local population, the 20th century, following the Maoist or compel security to expend scarce re- model of “Protracted Warfare,” cen- sources.15 An update of the 2013 Joint tralized organization and a hierarchi- Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency in cal command structure, with clearly April of 2020, reiterated the commit- defined goals;12 however, it quickly be- ment to “long-term partnering and en- came apparent that the insurgents of gagement,”16 thus demonstrating that the the twenty-first century, aided by trans- United States may be no closer to achiev- national networks, satellite and internet ing its goals of combatting insurgency in communications,13 had abandoned the Afghanistan than it was in 2001. Why rigidity of the past and replaced it with has the world’s largest superpower failed complex “matrices of irregular actors to withdraw from a continuum of opera- with widely differing goals.”14 tions in an underdeveloped nation?

US Soldier Stands in a Temporary Dining Facility. Asadabad, Afghanistan. (Win- ter, 2002). Author’s Personal Collection.

Despite American occupation in 2004, which was then replaced by the beginning in 2001, many guiding doc- FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency Manual in uments on counterinsurgency were not 2006,17 the US Government Counterin- released until years later, such as FMI surgency Guide of 2009,18 the Joint Pub- 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations lication 3-24 Counterinsurgency in 2013,

36 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War an updated FM 3-24 in 2014, and an 445 miles of the Herat Highway, con- updated Joint Publication 3-24 in 2020. struction or refurbishment of 670 clin- Each publication expanded on its pre- ics or health facilities, the distribution decessor, yet failed to yield the changes of $6 million worth of pharmaceuticals, needed to end the conflict. the training of 10,600 health workers Significant audits of COIN ef- and 65,000 teachers, the repair or con- forts did not occur until the US was struction of 670 schools, the printing eleven years into the conflict. COIN is of sixty million Dari and Pashto text- defined as “the blend of comprehensive books, irrigation systems for 1,220,700 civilian and military efforts designed to acres of land, and vaccinations for and defeat and contain insurgency and ad- veterinary medical treatment of twenty- 24 dress its root causes simultaneously.”19 eight million livestock. In 2013, the RAND Corporation pub- The scale of these projects and lished an analysis of the performance of those that would come in the future, twenty-four COIN concepts addressed necessitated independent and objec- in the aforementioned publications. tive audits to identify and eliminate The concepts analyzed by RAND were fraud, waste, and abuse. Coinciden- those of legitimacy in government, cul- tally, the 2006 FM 3-24 had mandat- tural awareness putting a “local face on ed that “Commanders should identify it,” and implementation of democracy,20 contractors operating in their AO and in addition to the concepts of civil se- determine the nature of their contract, curity, civil control, essential services, existing accountability mechanisms, governance, and economic and infra- and appropriate coordination relation- structure development, as provided by ships.”25 Yet it was not until the release the US Army FM 3-24 Counterinsurgen- of the updated FM 3-24 in 2014 that cri- 21 cy Manual. teria expanded to include “enforcing ac- The citizens of a country will countability, building transparency into pursue the “best deal,” in terms of ser- systems, and emplacing effective checks vices, whether government officials or and balances to guard against corrup- insurgent organizations provide them.22 tion are important components to any It is for this reason that military advi- relief, reconstruction, or development sors decided in April of 2002 that the program.”26 Under the authority of Sec- best way to separate the Taliban and its tion 1229 of the National Defense Au- support base was to rebuild the econo- thorization Act, Congress authorized my and infrastructure of Afghanistan. 23 the creation of the office of the Special Within six years after the United States’ Inspector General for Afghanistan Re- initial announcement of Afghan recon- construction (SIGAR) in 2008.27 SIGAR struction plans, the US completed ap- is currently “the only inspector general proximately $7 billion worth of projects. with the interagency authority to audit These include the completion of 1,056 and investigate the activities of all U.S. miles of paved and 685 miles of gravel government agencies and international roads, reconstruction of approximately organizations that receive U.S. funding

37 The Saber and Scroll for Afghanistan reconstruction.”28 In the responsible before the expiration of the years between 2002 and 2020, the costs contractor’s construction warranties. of reconstruction projects have swelled This range eventually required demo- to $133 billion,29 much of which was lition.34 Academic and administrative either mismanaged, unaccounted for, reports assessed that inadequate govern- or like the rule-of-law programs, coun- ment oversight and subpar contractor terproductive.30 By 2015 SIGAR had is- performances were the most significant sued thirty-seven inspection reports on contributors to these issues. Officials in a sampling of forty-five Department of the Nangahar province stopped asking Defense projects with a combined val- about timelines or quality of projects ue of $1.1 billion.31 This figure grew to simply out of fear that Afghan laborers six hundred audits and inspections by would falsely accuse them of seeking 2019.32 The reports serve as a means to bribes.35 US Ambassador Ryan Crocker ensure that tax-funded projects have reflected in a 2016 interview, “I always followed three primary criteria: thought KARZI had a point, that you just cannot put those amounts of money into 1. Construction met contract require- a very fragile state and society, and not ments and technical specifications have it fuel corruption. You just can’t.”36 2. The intended recipients were using Crocker’s statement should have the facilities come as no surprise, as problems with project management surfaced as early 3. The facilities are structurally sound, as 2011 during the proposed military completed on time, and were within draw-downs. Many facilities were not budget.33 accessible to inspectors because of in- Of the forty-five Department creased violent or volatile insurgent ac- of Defense reconstruction projects in- tivities. SIGAR personnel were unable spected by SIGAR personnel members to inspect reconstruction projects per- in 2015, only seventeen met contract sonally, and they relied upon an agree- requirements and/or construction stan- ment for “vetted and well-trained Af- dards. Several of those investigated had ghan civil society partners” to conduct structural deficiencies so severe that the inspections.37 In 2020 testimony they posed physical dangers to the oc- before the Committee on Foreign Af- cupants. For example, a 2013 inspec- fairs, SIGAR claimed to have complet- tion of the Bathkhak School in the Ka- ed more than one thousand criminal bul province found that the contractor and civil investigations.38 These inves- used a wood-trussed roof rather than tigations lead to 130 convictions,39 and the contract-mandated concrete slabs. saved US taxpayers $3 billion;40 howev- A nearly $500,000 dry-fire range at the er, despite these accomplishments, SI- Afghan Special Police Training Cen- GAR maintains that the Department of ter began to disintegrate within four Defense is still incapable of managing months of the range’s completion. Still, the $4 billion allotted to Afghanistan authorities failed to hold the contractor this fiscal year.41

38 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War

Two troopers from the 1/505 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Air- bourne Division (ABN DIV) patrol a small village in the Khost Province. (Sum- mer 2002). Author’s Personal Collection.

Villagers from the Shah-I-Kot Valley pose for a photo, Gardez, Afghanistan (Summer, 2002). Author’s Personal Collection.

It is of note that the Taliban are we need to win arguments with them, not against Western development, but not just battles—and we can’t do that the presence of foreign troops.42 Author without talking to them.”43 For years, James Ferguson argues that “The Tali- US policymakers had failed to consider ban are representatives of an ideology as ideology as a center of gravity, instead, much as they are an army. It follows that measuring progress with firefights and

39 The Saber and Scroll forward lines of effort. It was not until Many of these tribal members the release of early COIN manuals that who travel across the porous border fail culture and societal norms were taken to claim residency in Afghanistan or into consideration. Pakistan. These tribes often lack a sense The RAND Corporation’s con- of nationality, claiming loyalty only to cepts of cultural awareness and put- their clan, and view their leaders as the only legitimate authorities. Even at the ting a “local face on it” overlap with JP national level, officials in the Afghan 3-24’s references to sociocultural fac- capital have always had to contend with tors in working with host nation gov- the smaller, regional leaders, which is ernments,44 FMI 3-07.22’s instructions problematic due to Afghanistan’s sta- on coordination with host nation civil tus as a multi-ethnic state. The country authorities,45 and Chapter Two of FM is comprised of several and often war- 3-24, titled “Unity of Effort: Integrat- ring tribes, of which the Pashtuns are ing Civilian and Military Activities,” the majority. Census data estimates that which explains the criteria for build- the Pashtun tribe comprises as many as ing unity between military and civilian four hundred clans, accounting for 40- organizations. Failure to build unity of 42 percent of the total population of effort failed to such an extent that the Afghanistan.48 After the Pashtuns, the US-trained Afghan National Army had next largest group is the Tajiks at 27-30 an attrition rate of 20 percent as late percent of the populace, the Hazaras at 46 as 2017. However, complications in 15 percent, and the Uzbeks and Turk- building Afghan cohesion, much like men at an estimated 9-10 percent.49 The the attacks of September 11, 2001, are Nuristani, Pashai, Aimaq are the minori- the products of events that occurred ties at a mere 13 percent.50 Each tribe has decades prior. In 1893, Mortimer Du- its own traditions, customs, values, and rand of British India and Afghan Amir views concerning deep-seated religious Abdur Rahman Khan signed an agree- practice and government rule. ment establishing what is commonly Language has always been an known as the Durand Line. ongoing issue in building a unified Af- This line currently serves as the ghanistan. The various tribes do not border between Afghanistan and Pa- speak the same language, nor are they kistan. Pakistan maintains that the able to communicate coherently with Durand Line is a valid international US military members, who mainly boundary, but no modern Afghan gov- speak only American English. Rough- ernment has ever accepted or acknowl- ly 50 percent of the population speaks edged it as legitimate. Furthermore, a dialect known as “Dari.”51 Another 35 the negotiation of the Durand line percent speak “Pashto” or “Pashtu,” and failed to recognize local and/or indige- 11 percent speak Turkic languages.52 nous ethnic groups, thus geographical- These statistics do not account for the ly dividing the Pashtun, Waziris, and other thirty minor languages also spo- Mohmand tribes.47 ken in Afghanistan.53

40 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War

Finally, the majority of Afghan The concept of an elected leader nationals, approximately 80 percent,54 falls within US political norms as well appear different from their Sunni coun- as the COIN strategy of “providing a terparts in that, due to their geograph- framework of political reconciliation, ic location, they tend to show distinct genuine reform, popular mobilization, Mongolian physical features. In con- and governmental capacity-building junction with the Sunni-Shia rift, the around which all other programs and Afghan majority often treats Shia Mus- activities are organized.”56 The US has lims quite poorly, isolating them so- always operated under the assump- cially and politically. Western scholars tion that all nations desire democracy. argue that the Sunni-Shia rift is often Residents often perceive new regimes overgeneralized as an archaic, religious brought to power with the assistance conflict, rather than a modern conflict of the US as American proxies rather in failed or nationalist or geostrategic than a fair representation of the nation’s 57 rivalry.55 The inability of policymak- peoples. In December 2001, the UN, ers to account for modern political re- the United States, and Iran appointed lations in lieu of religious differences Hamid Karzai, leader of the Popalzai tribe of Durrani Pashtuns, as the ad- demonstrates yet another failure to un- ministrative head of the post-Taliban derstand the sociocultural situation in interim government. During an emer- Afghanistan, as mandated by FM 3-24, gency meeting of 1,550 delegates, the JP 3-24, FMI 3-07.22, and the US Gov- UN elected Karzai as the leader of the ernment Counterinsurgency Guide. Afghan government.58 However, Kar- If one were to put a “local face” zai’s election was not without issue. on COIN efforts, would that face ap- His Pashtun origin granted pear as Pashtun, Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, him the popular vote, but this failed Turkmen, Nuristani, Pashai, or Aimaq? to appease the Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, What language should one print the lit- Nuristani, Pashai, and Aimaq tribes. erature aimed at garnering all Afghan Throughout, the Tajiks served as a public support? Dari, Pashto, or Turkic? form of power check due to sheer tribal How would anyone adequately repre- numbers.59 Karzai also allegedly toler- sent the Shia minority that is shunned ated corruption throughout the various by the Sunni majority? The diverse levels of government while simultane- aspects of Afghanistan’s multi-ethnic ously demonstrating an unwillingness culture have been a long-time enigma to pursue the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. for secular Westernized nations. Along It became a popular joke throughout with cultural and language barriers, US Afghanistan that Karzai was “no more forces have had to work with partner than the mayor of Kabul, and even that military, police, and government offi- only until it is dark,”55 meaning the Af- cials whose values or societal norms ghan government ruled during the day, greatly differ from those in the United and the Taliban ruled at night. Karzai’s States. efforts alone are said to have single-

41 The Saber and Scroll

Three troopers of D Co., 1/504 PIR, 82nd ABN DIV on patrol stop briefly on “Bull Run,” an observation post near Camp Wright, Asadabad, Afghanistan. (2002). Author’s Personal Collection. handedly and significantly undermined The lack of Afghan national the COIN effort in Afghanistan.56 pride has caused issues with the legit- The Bush administration had imacy of the current Afghan govern- ment in the eyes of the country’s people. little interest in a nation-building mis- Of the many tribes, the Pashtuns seem sion in the years surrounding Karzai’s to be the only ones who acknowledge appointment, nor had they adequately the Pashtun-majority government. The pursued him to reduce corruption in United States has failed to exit from Af- Afghanistan. Many economic, social, ghanistan for many reasons. The shift in and political responsibilities were then motives (removing insurgents, followed handed to NATO, creating different by nation-building) created a delay in goals or levels of commitment among guidance for all US military members, the Afghan, US, and other govern- which manufactured an arena of trial 60 ments. These two factors, corruption and error. At the same time, remain- and varying degrees of dedication, ing Tajik, Hazara, Uzbek, Nuristani, several authors later identified as poor Pashai, and Aimaq groups continue practices in COIN, not only in Afghan- to look only to their tribal leaders for istan but as proven in previous military guidance. The immediate government mission theaters.58 of the post-Taliban world was either

42 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War unwilling or unable to combat cor- sight. Of those completed, only a frac- ruption, seriously undermining COIN tion have been evaluated or inspected, efforts and attempts to create a secure leaving a large portion in an unknown environment. In the meantime, over state. Retaliatory attacks and rebuild- twenty-four thousand US soldiers have ing have been ongoing for almost two died, and many more were wounded in decades. However, a significant lack of a futile effort to help that country re- oversight in economic and infrastruc- build according to US initiatives. Final- ture development, barriers to unified ly, efforts to reconstruct infrastructure cultural and language efforts, and per- and social projects have been less than ceptions of illegitimate government of- fruitful due to lack of government over- ficials continue today.

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Metz, Steven, and Raymond Millen. 2005. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response. Special Warfare 17 (3): 6.

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43 The Saber and Scroll

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Notes

1 “Soldiers Killed in Action in Afghanistan 2001-2018,” Statista, 2018. https://www. statista.com/statistics/262894/western-coalition-soldiers-killed-in-afghanistan/.

2 Joseph J. Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan (National Defense University Press, 2011), 45. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/Books/understand ing-war-in-afghan.pdf.

3 “Resolution 1267,” United Nations, 1999. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp ?symbol=S/RES/1267(1999).

4 “Ahmad Shah Masoud,” Encyclopædia Britannica, September 11, 2018. https://www. britannica.com/biography/Ahmad-Shah-Masoud.

5 “Timeline: The US War in Afghanistan,” Council on Foreign Relations, accessed No- vember 11, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan.

44 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War

6 Ibid.

7 Collins, Understanding War in Afghanistan, 46.

8 “Chapter VII,” 2020. https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index. html.

9 “Timeline.”

10 Steven Lambakis, “Reconsidering Asymmetric Warfare,” Joint Force Quarterly 36 (De- cember 1, 2004): 102. https://ndupress.ndu.edu/portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-36.pdf.

11 US Army, Field Manual FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5, 2006, vii.

12 Carlos Burgos, David Kilcullen, and Matt Porter, US Government Counterinsurgency Guide (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2009), 5.

13 Ibid., 8.

14 Ibid., 6.

15 Ibid., 11.

16 Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 3-24 Counterinsurgency,” April 25, 2018, iii.

17 US Army, “Army Field Manual 3-24: Counterinsurgency,” Homeland Security Digital Library, November 30, 2006, 5-16. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=468442.

18 “Timeline.”

19 Joint Chiefs of Staff, iii.

20 Christopher Paul et al., “Paths to Victory: Detailed Insurgency Case Studies,” RAND Corporation, September 26, 2013, 122. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/ RR291z1.html.

21 US Army, “Army Field Manual 3-24,” 5-16. https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=468442.

22 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the 21st Century: Reconceptualizing Threat and Response,” Special Warfare 17, no. 3 (2005): 11.

23 Timeline.”

24 Collins, 71.

25 US Army, Field Manual FM 3-24, 2-7.

26 US Army, Field Manual FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5, 2014, 10-14.

27 Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, “About SIGAR,” 2012. https:// www.sigar.mil/about/.

45 The Saber and Scroll

28 Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs US Senate (2015) (testimony of Ohn F. Sopko), 3.

29 Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US Lessons Learned in Afghani- stan (2020) (testimony of John F. Sopko), 2.

30 Ibid., 5.

31 Testimony Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform US House of Representatives, 1-8 (2016) (testimony of John F. Sopko), 2.

32 Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2.

33 Ibid., 5.

34 Testimony Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 9.

35 “Former Governor of Paktika, Laghman, Helmand and Nangarhar Provinces,” Wash- ington Post, December 9, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/inves tigations/afghanistan-papers/afghanistan-war-confidential-documents/.

36 Candace Rondeaux, James Wassetrom, and Kate Bateman, “Ryan Crocker, Retired US Diplomat. US Ambassador to Afghanistan,” Washington Post, December 9, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/ documents-database/?document=crocker_ryan_ll_first_interview_01112016.

37 Testimony Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 7.

38 Ibid., 2.

39 Testimony Before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2.

40 Ibid., 2.

41 Ibid., 18.

42 James Fergusson, Taliban: The Unknown Enemy (New York: Da Capo, 2012), 16.

43 Ibid., 14.

44 Joint Chiefs of Staff, I-4.

45 US Department of the Army, FMI 3-07.22 Counterinsurgency Operations, 2004, 2-11.

46 Kristin Pettersen and Ashley Schortz, “Interview of Unnamed Security Advisor,” De- cember 19, 2019, 3.

47 Durand Line (Routledge, 2001). http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/routc bh/durand_line/0.

48 Collins, 103.

49 Ibid., 7.

46 Afghanistan: America’s Forever War

50 Ibid., 6. 51 Ibid., 8. 52 Ibid., 8. 53 Ibid., 7. 54 Ibid., 9. 55 Ömer Taşpınar, “The Sunni-Shiite Divide in the Middle East is about Nationalism, Not a Conflict within Islam,”Brookings , January 16, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/ opinions/the-sunni-shiite-divide-in-the-middle-east-is-about-nationalism-not-a- conflict-within-islam/. 56 Thomas R. Mockaitis and Army War Coll Strategic Studies Inst Carlisle Barracks PA, “Resolving Insurgencies,” June 2011, 12. http://www.dtic.mil/docs/citations/ADA54 5443. 57 Ibid., 67. 58 Ibid., 74. 59 Paul et al., “Paths to Victory,” xxvi. 60 Mockaitis and Army War Coll Strategic Studies Inst Carlisle Barracks PA, “Resolving Insurgencies,” 74.

47

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau

Jeff Ballard American Military University

Abstract The loss of the Juneau near Guadalcanal in the British Solomon Islands on Friday the Thirteenth (November 1942) was a seminal event in the United States’ World War II experience. The death of the five brothers, in the most ferocious naval battle of the Pacific War, created a windfall of patriotism, which the US government leveraged to boost war bond sales and increase war material pro- duction. The siblings’ deaths had both immediate and far-reaching consequences on the military’s prosecution of the Second World War and the deployment of its troops in the nation’s future con- flicts. Finally, this tragedy left an imprint on American popular cul- ture, renewed by the discovery of the Juneau’s wreck on St. Patrick’s Day 2018. Keywords: World War II, Guadalcanal, USS Juneau, the Sullivan Brothers, Sole Survivor Policy (1944), Special Separation Policies for Survivorship (5 January 2007), Department of Defense Direc- tive 1315.15, Hubbard Act of 2008

Lo dieron todo: los hermanos Sullivan y el trágico hundimiento del USS Juneau Resumen La pérdida del Juneau cerca de Guadalcanal en las Islas Salomón Británicas el viernes 13 (noviembre de 1942) fue un evento funda- mental en la experiencia de Estados Unidos en la Segunda Guerra Mundial. La muerte de los cinco hermanos, en la batalla naval más feroz de la Guerra del Pacífico, generó una ganancia inesperada de patriotismo, que el gobierno de Estados Unidos aprovechó para impulsar las ventas de bonos de guerra y aumentar la producción de material de guerra. La muerte de los hermanos tuvo consecuen- cias inmediatas y de gran alcance en el enjuiciamiento militar de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y el despliegue de sus tropas en los

49 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.4 The Saber and Scroll

conflictos futuros de la nación. Finalmente, esta tragedia dejó una huella en la cultura popular estadounidense, renovada por el des- cubrimiento del naufragio de Juneau en el Día de San Patricio de 2018. Palabras clave: Segunda Guerra Mundial, Guadalcanal, USS Ju- neau, los hermanos Sullivan, Política de superviviente único (1944), Políticas especiales de separación para la supervivencia (5 de ene- ro de 2007), Directiva del Departamento de Defensa 1315.15, Ley Hubbard de 2008

他们献出了全部：苏利文五兄弟和 朱诺号轻巡洋舰的悲剧沉没 摘要

1942年11月13日（星期五）朱诺号沉没于瓜岛（英国所罗门 群岛之一）附近，这是美国二战经历中的一次重大事件。苏 利文五兄弟在太平洋战争之最激烈海战中的丧生掀起了激昂 的爱国主义，美国政府充分利用这一情绪增加战争债券销售 和战争材料生产。五兄弟的死亡对二战美国军事进行以及美 国未来冲突中的军队部署产生了立即的效果和深远的影响。 最后，这一悲剧事件给美国流行文化打下了烙印，2018年圣 帕特里克节期间朱诺号残骸的发现加深了该烙印。

关键词：二战，瓜岛，朱诺号轻巡洋舰，苏利文五兄弟， 仅存者政策（1944），幸存者之特别分离政策（2007年1月5 日），国防部1315.15指令，2008年哈伯德法案（Hubbard Act of 2008）

The solemn pride that must be yours, to have laid so costly a sacri- fice upon the altar of freedom. —President Abraham Lincoln “Bixby Letter of 1864”

n November 20, 1942, an old of the Sullivan brothers, died in the ini- four-stack destroyer rescued tial explosion. Miraculously, more than Othe last survivor of the torpe- one hundred men survived the detona- doed cruiser USS Juneau. Six hundred tion of Juneau’s torpedo magazine, and Juneau crewmen, including all but one endured thirst, starvation, exposure,

50 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau and an armada of circling sharks while Railroad to provide for a stable home awaiting rescue. After eight desperate for his family. Starting as a yard laborer, days, only ten men lived. None were he was steadily promoted into jobs with named Sullivan. increasing responsibility, security, and The loss of the Juneau near Gua- commensurate wages, until his promo- dalcanal in the British Solomon Islands tion to freight train conductor. Fami- on Friday the Thirteenth (November ly friends described Tom’s wife, Alleta 1942) was a seminal event in America’s May (Abel) Sullivan (1895–1972), as a World War II experience. The death of pleasant woman with an energetic per- the five brothers in the most ferocious sonality who enjoyed socializing within naval battle of the Pacific War creat- the rural community. Still others de- ed a windfall of patriotism, which the scribed her as “high-strung and prone US government leveraged to boost war to bouts of nervous exhaustion that 2 bond sales and increase war materi- kept her bedridden for days.” el production. The siblings’ deaths had On February 4, 1914, Tom mar- both immediate and far-reaching conse- ried Miss Abel, then nineteen years old, quences on the military’s prosecution of and twelve years his junior. It was Al- the Second World War and the deploy- leta’s widowed mother, Mary, however, ment of its troops in the nation’s future who anchored the Sullivan family. Mrs. conflicts. Finally, this tragedy left an Abel instilled the values of family and imprint on American popular culture, loyalty in the children, the first of which, renewed by the discovery of the Juneau’s George Thomas, arrived in 1914 (1914– wreck on St. Patrick’s Day 2018. 1942). Sullivan children came steadily With the outbreak of war in Eu- over the next two decades until there rope in September 1939, the United were five more: Francis Henry “Frank” States—and the entire world, for that (1916–1942), Genevieve Marie (1917– matter—were on the precipice of the 1975), Joseph Eugene “Red” (1918– most dramatic and all-encompassing 1942), Madison Abel “Matt” (1919– conflict in world history. No corner of 1942), and Albert Leo “Al” (1922–1942). the globe was untouched, and no fam- Tom’s gainful employment freed ily was exempt from harm. Not even his children from the need to work to the Sullivans of Waterloo, Iowa. “Farm contribute to the household income, as families were close because they have to was the case with many local families. be,” explains Sullivan biographer John Never studious or driven to any partic- R. Satterfield, “in the Sullivan house, ular profession, the boys were free to these bonds especially were strong, follow their frivolous pursuits. These forging a sense of loyalty that bridged usually involved fishing and hunting, generations.”1 but always outdoors, and they were al- Father, Thomas F. “Tom” Sulli- ways together. van (1883–1965), was a union man who “Nearly everybody who knew worked hard for the Illinois Central them agreed they were happy-go-lucky,

51 The Saber and Scroll average, working-class kids,” observes Navy experience. The Sullivans wished Satterfield, “they reflected the values of to avenge the deaths of their childhood a tough neighborhood in a town that friends Bill and Masten Ball, also Wa- offered scant privileges to its residents.”3 terloo residents, both of whom died “They did not get into any more trouble aboard the battleship USS Arizona. than anyone else,” recalls Phyllis Elde- George, always the leader, prophetically ridge-Friesner in a 1989 phone inter- announced the decision to their anx- view with Satterfield.4 Former Waterloo ious parents by saying, “Well, guess our resident S.G. Heronimus remembers minds are made up, aren’t they fellows? the boys differently, however: “They And when we go in, we want to go to- were all fighters. They took and gave no gether. If the worst comes to worst, why shit.” 5 True to their creed, a scrap with we’ll all have gone down together.”6 any Sullivan brother inevitably led to a A few days later, the boys contest with all five. marched into the local Navy recruiting One incident on the Cedar Riv- office to enlist and made serving togeth- er cemented the brothers’ solidarity. er a requirement for their enlistment. While paddling a dilapidated rowboat The Navy challenged this condition downstream, the craft began to take but relented after George wrote a letter on water. Four of the five boys jumped of protest to the Navy Department. Al, out and swam to the shore, but Albert, married with a son named Jim, was el- still a toddler, had to be rescued as the igible for a deferment, but he followed water lapped over the gunwales. Only his brothers into the service with his quick-acting adults, who rescued Albert wife’s blessing. Katherine “Kena” (Sulli- from the sinking craft, averted a trage- van) MacFarland (b. 1922), who passed dy. Afterward, the boys swore, “We stick away in 2016 at the age of ninety-three, together.” This motto became the creed said, “Albert would have been unhap- that defined the brothers’ relationship. py if all the other Sullivans had gone to In 1937, George and Frank en- war, but he had stayed at home.” 7 listed in the military to escape the mo- After basic training at Great notony of the American Midwest. The Lakes Naval Training Center, the broth- two accepted the challenge to join the ers became able seamen in the US Navy. Navy and see the world. The pair served George and Frank were rated Gunners together on an old four-stack destroyer, and Coxswain Mates 2nd-Class, respec- a customary practice in the peacetime tively, because of their previous service, Navy, until honorably discharged in but new to the Navy, Red, Matt, and Al 1940. were all rated Seaman 2nd-Class. The After the attack on Pearl Harbor, five then traveled to the Brooklyn Naval the boys met to discuss their options. Yard and joined up with their ship, the Unanimously they decided to enlist in USS Juneau (CL-52AA) being fitted-out the Navy, but not solely based on patri- in Kearny, New Jersey, at the Federal otic sentiments or the older brother’s Shipyard and Drydock Company.

52 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau

Juneau was the second of eleven served together despite the Navy’s war- Atlanta-class light anti-aircraft cruis- time prohibition. Brothers who enlist- ers. Atlantas were built to perform ed together served together to satisfy fleet screening duties that the older the demand for sailors to crew ships and slower Omaha-class scout cruisers rushed into service. The five Sullivans (1920s) were no longer able to perform. were joined by the Rodgers siblings of The ships of the class measured 542 feet Monroe, Connecticut; however, Joseph, in overall length, had a 53-foot beam, James, Louis, and Patrick heeded the and drew 21 feet of water with a fully Navy’s warnings and separated before loaded displacement of 8,340 tons.8 As sailing.10 Eight other pairs of broth- designed, the Juneau rated a crew of ers boarded Juneau with the Sullivans; 638 seamen and petty officers and thir- Louis and Patrick Rodgers, Williams ty-five officers; however, the ship’s com- and Harold Weeks, Russell and Charles pliment swelled to over seven hundred Combs, Albert and Michael Krall, with the addition of more sophisticated George and John Wallace, Curtis and electronics and weapons systems.9 Donald Damon, Richard and Russell 11 Juneau’s would be a familiar White, and Harold and Charles Caulk. crew. Early in the war, many siblings

Unlike the Sullivans, the Rodgers (left to right) Joseph (24), Patrick (22), Louis (20), and James (18), split up before the Juneau left the United States. Source: Na- val History and Heritage Command, Catalog No. NH 52363.

53 The Saber and Scroll

Although the Atlanta’s mounted four months ahead of schedule. Rushed two quadruple 21-inch torpedo mounts into service, she was the first ship in the and two anti-submarine depth charge Navy commissioned in her North At- racks, the ship’s primary role was fleet lantic camouflage war paint.16 anti-aircraft defense. Juneau’s main and The United States added Hull secondary batteries were ideally suit- No. CL-52(AA) to the Navy roster on ed for this purpose. Her main battery February 14, 1942. Transfer from the consisted of sixteen 5-inch/38 caliber, builder to the Federal government oc- high angle, rapid-fire guns, in six twin curred when her sponsor, Mrs. Harry mounts arranged along the centerline I. Lucas, the wife of Juneau, Alaska’s (turrets numbered 1-3 and 6-8) and mayor, broke a bottle of champagne one more on either side of her aft deck- on the ship’s prow.17 She was the first house (turrets numbered 4 and 5). The ship named for a city in the Territory Juneau’s remaining guns, 1.1-inch and of Alaska, the remote and mostly un- 20 mm anti-aircraft machine guns put inhabited land that would not become up an impressive curtain of flak but a state for another seventeen years. In were woefully ineffective against capital the same ceremony, forty-nine-year-old 12 ships. Captain Lyman K. Swenson, of Pleasant Two powerful high-pressure Grove, Utah (Naval Academy Class of Westinghouse turbines gave the Juneau 1916) became Juneau’s first and only an average top speed of 32.5 knots. Every commanding officer. knot was necessary to keep pace with the The Navy, having overcome its fast carrier task forces, the Greyhounds hesitancy to their joint service, em- of the Pacific. With a fuel capacity of braced the brothers as a valuable pro- 1,436 tons, the Juneau had a range of paganda tool. After the commissioning 13 8,500 nautical miles at 15 knots. Speed concluded, the Sullivans gathered on and range came at the expense of pro- the Juneau’s fantail to visit with family tective armor, however. Her hull armor and pose for photographs. As news- was thickest on her sides (3¾-inches), reel cameras whirred, press camera- and her deck and gun house armor were men took one of the most iconic pho- 14 2-inches thick. By comparison, the tographs of the Second World War. Imperial Japanese Navy’s battleship IJN The picture captured the five Sullivans, Hiei, Juneau’s future opponent, sported dressed in pea coats, buttoned to the eight 14-inch guns and two-and-a-half neck, wearing brimless flat caps circled times the armor thickness of the out- with embroidered “US Navy” ribbons, 15 gunned little cruiser. gathered around a ship’s open hatch. Juneau’s keel was laid down in The next day their bashful, self-con- May 1940, when escorts for the At- science grins dominated the front page lantic convoy duty were in critical de- of the Waterloo Daily Courier, the last mand. She was launched on the Hack- time their friends and family in Iowa ensack River in October 1941, a full would see them.

54 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau

The USS Juneau in New York Harbor, February 11, 1942. Naval History and Her- itage Command, Catalog No. 19-N-31267.

Knute Swensen holding a photograph of his grandfather Captain Lyman Knute Swenson. Surnames are spelled differently because the Navy made an error when Lyman entered the Naval Academy and then refused to correct the misspelling. Source: Author’s Personal Collection.

55 The Saber and Scroll

The Sullivans of Waterloo Iowa (left to right) Joseph (24), Francis (26) Albert (20), Madison (23), and George (28). Source: Naval History and Heritage Com- mand, Catalog No. NH 52362.

After a brief shakedown period to Key West, Florida, before receiving along the Atlantic seaboard, Juneau orders to transit the Panama Canal to participated in the blockade of Vichy the Pacific. On September 11, Juneau French naval units in Martinique and joined Task Force 61, escorting carriers Guadalupe.18 Juneau then made a port USS Wasp and USS Hornet already in call to Annapolis, Maryland in April, the theater. and Captain Swenson visited his son Submarine IJN I-19 torpedoed Robert, a midshipman at the Naval Wasp on September 15, 250 miles Academy for the last time. While the northwest of Espiritu Santo in the New Navy publicly delighted in the Sulli- Hebrides, the submarine-infested wa- vans, the elder Swenson, while proud ters christened “Torpedo Junction.”20 of the brothers’ service aboard his ship, George Sullivan, whose battle station was not happy about it. Robert wrote was the depth charge racks on Juneau’s later, “He [Captain Swenson] felt the fantail, had a front-row seat for the risk of a family tragedy outweighed the action as his ship searched for the of- 19 advantages for public relations.” fending submarine. The escort dropped From mid-May to mid-July 1942, depth charges to no effect. Juneau con- Juneau escorted convoys from Brazil tinued to screen TF 61 until the Bat-

56 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau tle of the Santa Cruz Islands (October When Juneau finally departed 26) when Hornet succumbed to Japa- Nouméa, the Allies’ first offensive cam- nese air attack. After the battle, Juneau paign of the Pacific War was just four transported seventeen officers and 193 months old. The fighting on land, at enlisted men from the Hornet to New sea, and in the air, which began with the Caledonia. First Marine Division’s assault on Gua- For nine days, Juneau rode at an- dalcanal in the Solomon Islands, would chor in Dumbea Bay in the Free French be the bloodiest fighting anywhere. The town of Nouméa. Juneau’s crew had Marines were holding on, but just bare- performed well during the Santa Cruz ly. The Leathernecks needed help to hold battle, with eight confirmed kills —four “Cactus,” the island’s codename, and the dive-bombers and four torpedo planes.21 crushed coral airstrip whose polyglot of Despite the satisfaction of earning their Army, Navy, and Marine planes kept the first battle star, a curious incident left Japanese from reinforcing their garri- Captain Swenson and crew crestfallen son, at least during daylight. over the Hornet’s loss. Juneau had mis- At sunset, the Allies ceded con- understood a signal from the carrier, trol of the sea to Dai Nippon, whose causing Juneau to transfer to Enterprise’s guns, large and small, cratered the air- screen, leaving the “Happy Hornet” with field and grounding the Cactus Air diminished anti-aircraft protection at Force. If the planes were grounded, the the time the carrier needed it the most. “Tokyo Express” could land Imperial Now bloodied veterans, the Sul- Japanese Army soldiers, artillery, and livans and their shipmates set about the even tanks in daylight and in plain sight grim task of transferring the Hornet’s of the Marines who could do nothing wounded to hospitals and replenishing about it. the ship’s magazines with ammunition Twice since the Marine landing and its larder with dry and perishable on August 7, the Navy had confronted goods. Decades later, none of the Ju- the nocturnal intruders. In the first in- neau survivors remembered how the stance, the joint American-Australian brothers felt about the Battle of the San- task force screening the invasion trans- ta Cruz Islands. Still, they did remem- ports were totally surprised and thor- ber, and not surprisingly, “They spent oughly defeated by a numerically inferi- a lot of time together in the enlisted or force at the Battle of Savo Island: the mess, just sitting and talking when they worst defeat in the US Navy’s history. got time off.”22 Each officer, petty offi- The second occasion, two months later cer, and sailor had privately answered off Cape Esperance, a marginal tacti- the question of how they would acquit cal victory for the Blue Jackets failed to themselves in battle. The stoic determi- prevent Japanese battleships from bom- nation of men who had glimpsed their barding Henderson Field the following mortality replaced the cocky invincibil- night. At dawn, Allied sea and air pow- ity of boys spoiling for a fight. er reasserted local control.

57 The Saber and Scroll

November 8 found the Juneau at- USS South Dakota were in the theater tached to Rear Admiral Norman Scott’s but too far away to help. task force escorting three troop trans- Scott was junior to Callaghan ports. On the 11th, Scott rendezvoused by just a few days. Although he led the with Rear Admiral Daniel J. Callaghan’s victorious American fleet at the Battle task force escorting four more troop of Cape Esperance, Callaghan, in his transports bound for Guadalcanal. To- flagship USS San Francisco, assumed gether, the two groups were combat overall tactical command. “Uncle Dan,” loaded with six thousand troops from formerly President Roosevelt’s Naval the Army’s 182nd Infantry Regiment, Attaché, and most recently chief-of- the 4th Marine Replacement Battalion, staff to Halsey’s predecessor, was com- and 1st Marine Air Wing personnel. manding a wartime task force for the The decision to commit all avail- first time. Despite the relative experi- able resources, land, sea, and air, to ence of the commanders, Callaghan did support the First Marine Division was not seek, nor did Scott offer, advice on a promise Admiral William F. Halsey formation or tactics. Jr., newly appointed Commander of the Neither task force had operated South Pacific Fleet, made to his subor- together before that day, necessitating dinate officers in mid-October. Rein- a comprehensive battle plan, or at the forcement put an exclamation mark on very least a meeting of the captains. the Allies’ willingness to begin the long Neither of those events occurred, nor road to Tokyo from where Major Gen- does history record the two admirals eral Archer A. Vandergrift (USMC) was meeting while in the theater. standing in his headquarters south of Before dawn on the 12th, the the airfield. combined task forces navigated be- Like the Allies, Imperial Japa- tween San Cristobal and Guadalcanal, nese Headquarters concluded that the through Indispensable Strait and Len- Solomon Islands, and not Papua, had go Channel, the southern entrance to become the defining action of the Pa- “Ironbottom Sound.” Arriving at their cific War. Decoded Japanese radio mes- destination off Lunga Point, the trans- sages revealed plans to reinforce the ports dropped anchor and began dis- island garrison with seven thousand embarking troops. The escorts assumed fresh troops, initially intended for New anti-aircraft dispositions and waited Guinea, were already underway. Halsey for the inevitable air attack, which ma- knew a valuable Tokyo Express, such as terialized that afternoon. Warned by this, would be heavily defended by big- Coastwatchers, the transports stopped gunned escorts. The dual tasks of es- unloading, weighed anchor, and ma- corting the troopships and interdicting neuvered with all their available speed. the Japanese force fell on Callaghan and The Japanese arrived, as predict- Scott. The carrier USS Enterprise and ed at 1400 hours. Anti-aircraft cruisers the battleships USS Washington and Juneau and her sister Atlanta (Scott’s

58 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau flagship) were placed at the outer edge nal on the 12th. Callaghan had received of the screen and were the first to en- an abundance of aircraft intelligence gage. In his unpublished memoir “Sev- about the Japanese disposition through- en Days in Hell,” Seaman 1st Class Wy- out the day, and the morning’s aerial att Butterfield recalls, “It was like ten observation sighted two battleships Fourth of July’s all rolled into one.”23 or heavy cruisers and six destroyers.26 While Wildcat fighters scram- No doubt, this was the bombardment bled from Henderson to engage thirty group intending to lay waste to Cactus Japanese Zero fighter planes, sixteen and ensure follow-on transport units twin-engine “Betty” bombers split into could unload troops and supplies at two groups and began their torpedo their leisure, returning home unmolest- runs. South Pacific captains, however, ed. At their current course and speed, the Japanese would arrive off Lunga had become adept at dodging Japanese Point at thirty minutes after midnight. torpedoes. Juneau was strafed by Ze- ros and lifted out of the water by a near Vice Admiral Hiroaki Abe was miss, but Dr. Roger O’Neil, Juneau’s perturbed that his bombardment was surgeon, remembers there were no ca- behind schedule. He had canceled the sualties.24 mission once that night after the Impe- rial Army Headquarters on Guadalca- Unfortunately, the Navy did not nal failed to give timely reports of the go unscathed by the air raid. San Fran- weather over the airfield. When Head- cisco, the largest ship in Savo Sound, quarters finally reported clear weath- was intentionally targeted by a burn- er in the Sound, his fleet, centered on ing Betty. The collision and fire in the 14-inch gunned battleships Hiei (Abe’s after-deckhouse killed two dozen and flagship) andKirishima, became sepa- wounded fifty, including the ship’s ex- rated while reversing course in a local ecutive officer. A low-trajectory, 5-inch rainsquall. Valuable time was lost trying shell from an American ship hit de- to organize his escorts: cruiser Nagara stroyer USS Buchanan and wrecked its and eleven destroyers. Despite Abe’s torpedo tubes killing five while wound- best efforts, the Raiding Group looked ing seven.25 like a flock of migrating geese. At least The air raid was over in eight the area was empty of enemy shipping, minutes, and the transports were mov- or so he thought. ing back into position to continue un- Rear Admiral Callaghan, a pro- loading by 1430. At dusk, their task foundly religious man, was resigned to completed, the transports hauled out his fate. He and his subordinates under- of the Sound, escorted by damaged Bu- stood the approaching Japanese armada chanan and four more ships, for Espir- was superior in number and firepower. itu Santo, where they arrived without He had no choice. Running from this incident on the 15th. fight meant the Japanese would be Naval Intelligence reported a free to level Henderson Field, and the heavy surface force north of Guadalca- Japanese garrison would receive fresh

59 The Saber and Scroll reinforcements. When the battle com- As the last ship in the cruiser column, menced, Callaghan made no effort to her radar became masked, and Juneau maneuver for advantage but struck the made few other contacts. Captain Sw- enemy head-on. The clash was sudden enson was therefore surprised when at and incredibly violent, one that Com- 0130 hours the message was passed by mander-in-Chief of the US Fleet Ad- blinker to “Stand-by for enemy contact miral Ernest J. King called, “One of the momentarily.”29 27 most furious sea battles ever fought.” Those ships with the less capable The thirteen American ships as- SC meter-wave radar, or no radar at all, sumed disposition B-1, a long snake- were virtually blind. Partially overcast, like column resembling the line-of- the weather was punctuated by sheet battle from the age of sail. Cruisers lighting from friction storms over Gua- Atlanta, San Francisco, Portland, Hele- dalcanal, which reduced visibility to na, and Juneau followed the lead divi- almost nothing. Juneau survivor, Sea- sion of four destroyers, with another man 1st Class Joseph Hartney, recalls four destroyers in the rear. Several of the darkness as “a blackness so thick, Callaghan’s ships had the newest radar, so heavy, so velvety, you felt you could which spotted the Japanese at a range of take the night in your hands and wring 32,000 yards (18.1 mi), but San Francis- it like a rag.”30 co was not one of them. Blind for want At 0141, the destroyer Cushing, of an adequate radar picture, Callaghan first in the column, nearly collided with made frequent and urgent requests for an enemy destroyer. Turning quick- the enemy’s course and distance from ly to avoid Yudachi, Cushing caused his seeing-eye dog Helena, until the a four-ship pile-up in the vanguard. radio circuits became hopelessly over- Commander Thomas M. Stokes, lead- loaded. The Americans lost their radar ing Destroyer Division Ten in Cushing, advantage as Callaghan dithered for ten asked Callaghan for permission to fire minutes while the two fleets closed at 40 torpedoes, but the admiral hesitated. knots or 46 mi/hr. At 0145, Callaghan gave the order to 31 Like Helena, Juneau possessed “Stand By to Open Fire!” the newest “Sugar George” centime- The Japanese were startled but ter-wave surface-search radar. Merely not asleep. Cruiser Atlanta, next in possessing the technology, however, line behind Cushing, longer and heavi- did not guarantee accurate interpre- er than the smaller ships swung wide. tation of the images on the repeater Its high superstructure presented Jap- scope. Further examination of Juneau’s anese gunners with a juicy target. At first contact proved it to be the volcanic 0150, Japanese searchlights snapped on cone of Savo Island, imposing but quite and illuminated the lead cruiser. This harmless. Dr. O’Neil remembered, “We kind of light, the kind sailors fear, star- first thought [the contact] was the en- tled Callaghan to action, He ordered, emy, but later found it to be land.”28 “Commence Firing! Counter Illumi-

60 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau

Diagram of night cruiser action on November 12-13 1942. Source: Author’s Personal Collection. nate!”32 The misnamed “Lucky A” was Atlanta, now dead in the wa- soon a smoking hulk, being smothered ter, began drifting backward into the with Japanese shells fired from a scant San Francisco’s line of fire, just as Hiei 1600 yards.33 came into San Francisco’s gun sights. The San Francisco was next into The heavy-cruiser fired every 8-inch the melee, coming face to face with the gun whose muzzle would bear, and 14-inch guns of Abe’s flagship. With her secondary 5-inch battery targeted Japanese ships all around him, Uncle the Hiei’s pagoda superstructure. Cal- Dan issued a series of orders, which laghan realized Atlanta’s peril a salvo sounded quite heroic, but only add- too late. A horrified Callaghan watched ed to the confusion. “Odd ships com- as San Francisco’s fire destroyed Atlanta’s mence firing to starboard, even ships bridge. He immediately ordered, “Cease to port!”34 “Give her hell!”35 “We want firing, own ships,” but it was too late. 38 the big ones! Get the big ones first!”36 Scott and all his staff were all dead. Chaos reigned. This situation became Callaghan’s directives ceased sud- so chaotic that one participant summed denly when a salvo from Hiei wrecked the action perfectly: “A barroom brawl San Francisco’s superstructure, mortally with the lights turned out.”37 wounding her captain and killing Cal-

61 The Saber and Scroll laghan and his staff. Had Japanese shell were useless in a fight against surface hoists been loaded with armor-piercing ships. Heyn remembered seeing a Jap- shells, and not thin-skinned bombard- anese battleship materialize out of the ment rounds, San Francisco’s damage dark and firing right at him, “so close would have been fatal. Furthermore, you’d think you could almost throw the two ships were so close, often just something at it.”40 a few hundred yards, that the battleship Moments later, as she turned to could not depress its guns sufficiently to avoid San Francisco, a Japanese “Long hit San Francisco below the waterline. Lance” torpedo struck Juneau’s forward Cruiser Portland, seventh in the fire room on her port side, causing an column, came to San Francisco’s aid but enormous explosion. The blast disabled only momentarily. “Sweet Pea” loosed central fire control, which powered several 8-inch salvos at Hiei, but a Japa- her gun turrets, and crippled the ship’s nese torpedo struck her fantail. A mas- steering controls. Captain Swenson had sive hunk of steel from her stern acted little choice now but to get clear of the as an auxiliary rudder and jammed her action and labor to keep his ship afloat. steering hard over. As Portland made The four rearmost destroyers endless circles, her main battery got off were last to join the slugfest, but their a few rounds aimed at Abe’s flagship opening ranges were greater than the before checking fire to avoid hitting side-scraping distances at which the friendly ships. vanguard destroyers fought. Station Helena also came to San Fran- keeping and target selection were near- cisco’s aid by sinking destroyer Akat- ly impossible among the shattered de- suki in place and pouring small-caliber bris that was the American column. rounds into cruiser Nagara. Always Individual ships maneuvered as best considered a good (lucky) ship, Helena they could, avoiding the sinking Cush- received minimal damage, but a Japa- ing and Laffey, the dead-in-the-water nese shell struck her bridge, freezing Atlanta, and the un-steerable Portland. the wall-mounted clock at 0148.39 They fired on targets of opportunity Last in the cruiser column, Ju- and checked fire when the range be- neau plowed ahead as hell swarmed all came fouled. Eventually, however, luck around her. Her sixteen 5-inch guns ran out for all but one destroyer. Only spewed a continuous stream of fire, first tail end Charlie, the Fletcher, reported at destroyer Yudachi or Harusame and to the rendezvous at daybreak. then Hiei and Kirishima. Seaman Allen No American knew, but by four Heyn and George Sullivan, standing bells of the midwatch, Abe decided to just a few feet apart at their battle sta- withdraw. There would not be enough tions on the fantail, watched the grow- time to gather his dispersed ships and ing danger. Heyn, who handled the 1.1- complete the mission before daylight, inch machine gun, could do something and so at 0200, the Japanese com- about it, while George’s depth charges mander ordered a general retreat. Hen-

62 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau derson Field and her precious planes the end, however, mistakes were can- would live to fight another day and celed out by courage as the Japanese fight they would. In the morning, Cac- bombardment of Guadalcanal had been tus dive-bombers caught up with dam- thwarted. aged Hiei and her consort Yukikaze and As dawn broke, the US vessels bombed the battleship mercilessly until that were able departed Iron Bottom it capsized and sank north by northeast Sound via Indispensable Straight. The of Savo Island. formation included three lame ducks. So ended the most ferocious San Francisco’s topsides were demol- night surface action of the Pacific War, ished by her duel with Hiei. Juneau, one that historian Samuel Eliot Mor- with a broken keel, settled four feet ison described as “the most desperate lower in the water with a slight list to sea fight since Jutland” and “a struggle port. More concerning, she developed a that recalled the Anglo-Dutch naval crack along the short axis aft of turret battles of the seventeenth century.”41 In no. 5.42

Starboard side 5-inch gun mount (turret no. 5). The transverse crack in the Ju- neau’s deck developed behind this turret. Photo reprinted with the permission of Vulcan, Inc.

Fearing she might tear apart at mit a message to Admiral Halsey. Cap- any minute, Captain Swenson ordered tain Gilbert Hoover in Helena, as the lashings loosened on all the life rafts. Fi- senior surviving officer and Swenson’s nally, destroyer O’Bannon, whose sound Naval Academy classmate, ordered his gear had been damaged by an underwa- formation of six ships to zigzag on a ter explosion, was sent ahead to trans- southeasterly base course for Nouméa.

63 The Saber and Scroll

As Juneau and her consorts later testifying that he did not want to passed San Cristobal, the southern- give his position to the enemy. In ret- most island of the Solomon chain, the rospect, Hoover’s was a specious argu- Japanese submarine I-26, skippered by ment considering that I-26 must have Commander Minoru Yokota, lurked already reported the cripple’s location. 43 nearby. Cruising at periscope depth, A B-17, piloted by Lieutenant I-26 fired a spread of torpedoes at San Robert Gill (USAAF), was attracted to Francisco, the largest ship in the for- the location by the pillar of smoke, and mation, but missed. With no means of Hoover signaled the patrolling aircraft warning the others, its radios wrecked to report the Juneau’s sinking and po- and signal flags shredded, San Francis- sition. Gill’s crew saw the vast oil slick co’s crew watched helplessly as a single and approximately 180 men in the wa- torpedo shot past her stern and straight ter. Later, the Juneau survivors estimat- towards Juneau. ed that, at the time, there were between At 1101, the torpedo detonated 125 and 140 men in rafts and clinging on Juneau’s port side under the bridge, to floating nets and debris.45 igniting the cruiser’s torpedo maga- Hours passed before Gill, who zine. The Juneau seemed to disintegrate also elected not to break radio silence, wholly and instantaneously. The only landed at Esprítu Santo and reported trace was a pillar of smoke seen for- the Juneau’s location and the number ty miles away. “The Juneau didn't sink of survivors to an Army Intelligence of- ... she blew up with all the fury of an ficer.46 Another three days would pass erupting volcano,” recalled Lieutenant before anyone read Gill’s report, as it Commander Bruce McCandless, who became buried deeper and deeper in witnessed the detonation from San the officer’s inbox. In the meantime, Gill Francisco. dutifully overflew the survivors daily Similarly, Fletcher’s executive of- and reported their dwindling number 47 ficer Lieutenant Commander Joseph and position to the same officer. Wilely watched in awe as a 40-ton, For the men in the water, hours 5-inch gun mount flew a mile through turned into days, and the surviving Ju- the air and crashed into the destroyer’s neau’s crewmen began to die. Merciful- wake just 100 yards astern of his ship.44 ly, the severely wounded men perished When the smoke cleared, the Ju- quickly. For a short time, the survivors neau had disappeared. Captain Hoover had fresh water and meager rations did not believe anyone could have sur- stored in the rafts that survived. How- vived such an explosion. Fearing the ever, when the water was gone, sailors submarine inside his destroyer screen, drank seawater and became delirious. he chose to exit the area at top speed. By day, the drifters were scorched Hoover did not even order a life ring by the tropical sun, despite a coating of thrown overboard, so firm was his con- fuel oil, which gave them some protec- viction. Nor did he break radio silence, tion. At night, men urinated on them-

64 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau selves in a futile effort to stay warm. Joseph “Jimmy” Hartney and Seaman After the first few died and drifted out 1st Class Victor Fitzgerald, were blown to sea, an ever-increasing armada of by the wind to a nearby island where sharks shadowed the rafts. As delirious they were taken by friendly natives to sailors left their rafts (for whatever rea- a Dutch planter.50 Seaman 1st Class son), they were set upon and devoured. Wyatt Butterfield, Seaman 1st Class Ar- With airplanes periodically flying over- thur Friend, Machinist Mate 2nd Class head, this deadly pattern repeated for Henry Gardner, Seaman 2nd Class eight days. Frank Holmgren, Chief Gunner's Mate George Mantere, and Signalman 1st George Sullivan survived the Class Lester Zook were rescued by two explosion, but no other brothers lived. PBY Catalina flying boats, the second Several survivors remember an an- nearly crash landing in rough seas.51 Fi- guished George swimming from raft nally, Allen Heyn, the sole survivor of to raft calling out in vain to his bothers one raft, was plucked from the water by and wiping the faces of the dead and the seaplane tender USS Ballard.52 The unconscious to be sure. total number of survivors was ten. The dead included Joseph and The Navy made Captain Hoover James, two of the four Rodgers broth- the scapegoat for failing to rescue the ers who elected to split before depart- survivors. As his punishment, Admiral ing the United States. The Sullivans had Halsey relieved him, effectively end- also considered splitting up, but now it ing the career of the three-time Navy was too late. George lived until the third Cross recipient. But there was plenty of or fourth day, when he too succumbed blame to go around. Both Hoover and to delirium caused by drinking seawa- Gill were handcuffed by woodenheaded ter and dove into the sea. Allen Hyen, Navy regulations that prevented break- a fellow raft mate remembers George ing radio silence even to broadcast dis- saying he was going to swim to the is- tress calls. The Army Intelligence Of- land and get some buttermilk before he ficer who failed to sound the alarm is 48 disappeared. at least as culpable, if not more so. This The Navy organized a deter- fact became apparent to Halsey after mined rescue effort once they awoke to Gill demonstrated that on three sepa- the fact that some of Juneau’s crew were rate occasions, he tried to escalate his alive and adrift in the Solomon Sea. reports to higher headquarters within Roger O’Neil, Juneau’s surgeon, and the 5th Army Air Force, to no effect. three of his Pharmacist Mates were al- Not since President Abraham ready accounted for, having been trans- Lincoln consoled Mrs. Lydia Bixby on ferred to San Francisco the morning of the death of her five sons had an Ameri- the sinking to assist with her casual- can family been so tragically affected by ties.49 Lieutenant j.g. Charles Wang, the war. The Navy did not dare report the only officer to survive being adrift, and loss of the Juneau to the public. Nor did his two raft mates, Signalman 2nd Class it notify the next of kin until after vic-

65 The Saber and Scroll tory in the Solomons was guaranteed. vortex of public attention after Janu- But neither could they ignore the patri- ary 11, avoiding, for the time being, otic harvest that would be reaped from those doubts and the misery the doubts the loss of all the male children of one e v o ke d ,” 55 observes Satterfield. Alle- family during the most ferocious naval ta, with Tom watching pensively in the battle of the war. background, gave a multitude of radio Once announced, the family’s and newsreel interviews in which she tragedy was an even bigger boost to the repeated over and over again the phras- war effort than their recruitment and es that whitewashed the family’s façade, 56 insistence on serving together. Both cir- “Keep your chin up.” “Our boys did 57 cumstances the Navy put to good use in not die in vain.” “They went together 58 its recruiting campaigns. The reaction like they wanted.” “It’s a big loss to lose of the family to the inevitable deluge of them, but I know they did a big service 59 reports and government officials, how- to their country.” Her most famous ever, would be critical to steering the platitude adorned recruiting posters public perception of the tragedy. Had for the remainder of the war; “They did 60 the Sullivan family reacted negatively, their part.” public support for the war effort could In February, the Navy’s Industri- have diminished. al Incentive Division arranged for Tom, The Navy informed the Sullivans Alleta, and Genevieve to come to Wash- that their boys were missing in action ington DC to “tour of war plants in the on January 11, 1943. A telegram from hope their fortitude in their time of sor- Vice President Henry A. Wallace en- row might inspire workers to maximum couraged the parents to remain hope- production efforts.”61 While at the cap- ful in light of “the most extraordinary itol, Alleta met with Eleanor Roosevelt tragedy which has ever been met by any and newspaper reporters to encourage family in the United States.” 53 Still, his all America to “work harder to turn out news did not come as a complete sur- more ships and win the war,” but more prise to Tom and Alleta. The couple had poignantly “mothers should pray for been warned by a neighbor whose son, their boys and, above all, be brave and also in the Navy, had written her to say, keep their chins up.”62 “Wasn’t it too bad about the Sullivan So began the Sullivan’s morale 54 boys?” A handwritten note from an tour, which would conclude in San anonymous Juneau survivor, who felt Francisco four months later. The trio he owed the family the truth about their visited sixty-five cities, attended 235 sons, crushed any hope that their boys rallies, and spoke to millions of war would be found alive. industry workers.63 At each gathering, These revelations, however, failed they repeated their mantra of hope and to destroy the shield of hope the fami- increased industrial output. Within a ly outwardly projected. Mother, father, few weeks, the government, with the and sister “enveloped themselves in a media’s help, “had transformed the Sul-

66 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau livans’ tragedy into an inspiring national and 166 from the carrier Bunker Hill call to arms.”64 As a result, the Industrial after it was struck by a suicide plane,67 Incentives Division received dozens of earning a total of nine battle stars. letters from factory managers attesting DD-537 The Sullivans also to the increased worker productivity served in both the Korean Conflict and after the family’s visit. Consequently, the Cold War under its green and white the Navy “credited [the Sullivans] with shamrock flag. The ship whose motto, increasing the output of war materials like that of the brothers’, was “We stick 65 during the tour.” together,” earned three more battle stars While in Connecticut, Chicago, and never lost a single man. Decommis- and San Diego, the Sullivans met with sioned in 1965, after twenty-two years Juneau survivors. They also met with of active duty, it still serves the Ameri- the Rodgers family to offer their condo- can people as a Sullivan Memorial and lences and repeat their message of hope World War II museum ship in Buffalo, that the boys were just missing in ac- New York. tion. In Los Angeles, the Sullivans were The Navy once again honored guests of Paramount Motion Pictures the memory of the brothers in 1995. On who were casting a film tribute to their August 12, Kelly Sullivan Loughren, sons. While in Chicago, Genevieve an- granddaughter of Albert, christened the nounced that she would follow in her second USS The Sullivans (DDG-68) brothers’ footsteps and enlist in the then under construction by the Bath Navy as a WAVE, a Woman Accepted Iron Works in Bath, Maine. This ship is for Volunteer Emergency Service, tak- an Arleigh Burke-class guided-missile ing the oath at tour’s end. destroyer that will serve the US Navy The Navy further honoredwell into the twenty-first century. George, Francis, Joseph, Madison, and At the conclusion of the April 4, Albert by renaming a Fletcher-class 1943 commissioning ceremony, which destroyer hull just then coming off the everyone knew would be the climax builder’s ways. The USS The Sullivans of the tour, Alleta caved in emotion- (DD-537) was the first instance where ally. Unable to put off her grief any the Navy gave a ship a plural name.66 longer, sobbing and on the verge of Alleta Sullivan christened the vessel in collapse, doctors accompanying the a ceremony on San Francisco Bay on family forbade her from attending any April 4. further christening functions. The fam- The Sullivans would survive the ily returned to Waterloo to care for war after participating in the bombard- their grandson and daughter-in-law, ment of Truk, the Saipan and Iwo Jima hospitalized with pneumonia. campaigns, and dangerous Kamikaze In early August, Secretary of the picket duty off Okinawa in 1945. During Navy Frank Knox, sent a personal letter the latter battle, she rescued 118 sailors to the Sullivans. Given the eight-month from the torpedoed cruiser Houston lapse since the sinking of the Juneau

67 The Saber and Scroll and the circumstances surrounding the quences on how the military deployed disaster, the Secretary reluctantly con- its personnel. Immediately, the US mil- cluded that the boys were not missing itary began to strictly enforce its poli- in action but “were in fact killed by en- cy forbidding siblings to serve together emy action.”68 The Navy’s official state- on the same ship, same unit, or even in ment found that, “The loss of the five the same theater of war. This strict en- Sullivan brothers ranks as the greatest forcement spared the Niland family of single blow suffered by any one family Tonawanda, New York a loss like that since Pearl Harbor and, probably, in experienced by Tom and Alleta.73 69 American Naval history.” The Navy With an end to the War in the then declared that the four-month tour Pacific in sight, Congress debated sev- of Mr. and Mrs. Thomas F. Sullivan had eral bills related to family members ended. Biographer Satterfield concludes serving together in military units. How- that “Americans had fought too many ever, no “Sullivan Law” ever passed. other battles and lost too many other Instead, Congress approved the Sole sons to preserve the Sullivan brothers’ Survivor Policy (1944), which permit- 70 special significance.” The nation had ted the “discharge of the last surviving moved on from the loss of the Juneau child of parents whose other children and her crew. died in the war.”74 In light of this new Ironically, the crew of the Hele- legislation, Navy officials encouraged na, the ship whose commander had left Genevieve to accept an honorable dis- the Juneau survivors in her wake, would charge and return home after serving benefit from the new sensitivity to the twenty-one months. plight of survivors that arose after the Over the decades, the Sole Survi- loss of the Juneau. During the Battle vor Policy evolved into the Department of Kula Gulf (July 7, 1943), the Hele- of Defense Directive 1315.15, the Spe- na, now under the command of Cap- cial Separation Policies for Survivor- tain Charles Cecil, was struck by three ship (January 5, 2007), and this revised Japanese torpedoes causing the cruiser policy protects American military fam- to jackknife amidships and sink in less ilies today. The Hubbard Act of 2008 than twenty minutes. Immediately, two expanded the definition of a sole survi- destroyers picked up 735 Helena sur- vor to include the missing-in-action or vivors despite the presence of Japanese 100% service-related disabled status of warships.71 A flotilla of whaleboats and the sole survivor’s siblings.75 Its protec- life rafts, commanded by Captain Cecil, tions have been activated twice in the made landfall on New Georgia, and de- last decade with the most profound ap- stroyers Radford and Nicholas rescued preciation of the Hubbard (Jason Hub- more. Of Helena’s 1267 crew, fewer than bard, Iraq, 2007) and Wise (Beau Wise, three hundred died during the sinking Afghanistan, 2011) families.76 72 and the remainder rescued. Finally, this patriotic, and at the The tragic death of the siblings same time tragic, story of the Sullivans had immediate and far-reaching conse- has had a profound effect on US popular

68 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau culture. The movie entitled The Fighting survivor stories, but most closely re- Sullivans premiered in New York with sembles the predicament of Sergeant both Tom and Alleta in attendance. The Frederick “Fritz” Niland. In the case of film, which concentrated on the boy’s the four Niland brothers, the US Army childhood, required two sets of actors believed that all but one of the brothers to play the bothers. Columnist Walter had died in combat: Edward, a Techni- Winchell, who accompanied the par- cal Sergeant in the USAAF, was killed ents to the first showing, heaped high in Burma; Preston, a 2nd Lieutenant in praise on the film calling it “Twentieth’s the 22nd Infantry Regiment, 4th Infan- great tribute to the Sullivans ... but not a try Division, died on D+1 near Utah tear-jerker ... done in grand taste.”77 Beach; and Robert, a Technical Sergeant The movie won critical acclaim from the 505th Parachute Infantry Reg- and garnered Anne Baxter a Best Ac- iment, 82nd Airborne Division, killed 81 tress Academy Award nomination for on D-Day near Neuville-au-Plain. her role as Katherine Sullivan. The Several days after D-Day, Fritz, a Ser- movie opened in Waterloo on March geant in the 501st Parachute Infantry, 9, 1944 where five hundred people paid 101st Airborne Division, traveled to the $1.10 each to see the film, with all pro- 82nd Division area to locate his brother. ceeds going to the Sullivan Memorial There he learned that Robert died man- Fund.78 Kena, who saw the opening in ning a machine gun so that two other the boy’s hometown, thought, “the pic- men could escape. ture was a wonderful tribute to the boys News of the deaths of Preston and and what they fought for.”79 While The Robert and the presumed death of Ed- Sullivans earned respectable box-office ward reached Mrs. Niland in Tonawan- receipts, the profits were nowhere near da, NY, on the same day. When the War what would be needed to provide for Department realized that Fritz was the Jimmy’s education. sole surviving Niland son, the Army Jimmy Sullivan followed in his brought the young man home. Unlike father’s footsteps and joined the Navy the fictitious Private Ryan, however, no in 1958. He steadfastly refused to serve patrol was dispatched to retrieve Sgt. aboard the ship that bore his fami- Niland. Father Francis Sampson, the ly name because “he did not want the 501st Regimental chaplain, informed publicity or possible favoritism.”80 After Fritz of the death of his brothers and active duty service, he joined the Na- was charged with making sure he got val Reserves and served as a SeaBee for home safely.82 He transferred to En- more than thirty years. gland before being shipped to New Fans of Steven Spielberg’s Sav- York, Sgt. Niland served as an MP for ing Private Ryan (1998) will recognize the remainder of the war. the Sullivans’ story as an integral part To the family’s relief, Edward of the film’s plot. However, Saving Pri- survived the war, held in a Japanese vate Ryan is a composite of several sole prison camp in Burma, and released

69 The Saber and Scroll in late 1945.83 Fritz, awarded a Bronze of the Second World War. With stun- Star for his World War II service, died ning regularity, Allen-led expeditions in 1983, at the age of sixty-three, fifteen explored USS Astoria (February 2015), years before the premiere of Saving Pri- Japanese battleship IJN Musashi (March vate Ryan.84 2015), the USS Indianapolis (August Almost eighty years have passed 2017), and the aircraft carrier USS Lex- since the tragic loss of the USS Juneau ington (March 2018) lost at the Battle of and her crew. In the intervening de- Coral Sea. His team, under the direc- cades, no one has attempted to pho- tion of Robert Kraft, Director of Sub- tograph the wreck. Unlike countless sea Operations, was also responsible ships that have disappeared without a for retrieving the ship’s bell from the trace, the Juneau location was well doc- HMS Hood for presentation to the Brit- umented: 10-33S, 161-03E.85 No fewer ish Navy in honor of its heroic service. than four individuals witnessed the ex- In the spring of 2018, Petrel ar- plosion and noted the cruiser’s precise rived in the southern Solomon Sea, an coordinates: San Francisco’s Lieutenant area called “Torpedo Junction” by US Commander Bruce McCandless, Hel- sailors. Armed with the latest is side- ena’s skipper Captain Gilbert Hoover, scan sonar, remotely operated vehicles the B-17 pilot, Lieutenant Robert Gill, (ROVs), and autonomous underwater and of course Commander Minoru Yo- vehicles (AUVs), Allen completed a kota of I-26. winning season and located the Juneau. The explanation lies in the depth The Petrel’s AUV first identified of the ocean in this part of the world. the ship with its side-scan sonar on Unlike the shallow lagoons of Truk March 17, 2018. Upon analysis of the Atoll in the Caroline Islands and Kwa- sonar data, the Petrel crew deployed jalein Atoll in the Marshall Islands, the its ROV the next day and verified the depth of the Solomon Sea did not give wreck’s identity with its high-definition up her secrets so easily. There was also video cameras. “We certainly didn’t plan the question of how much of the Juneau to find the Juneau on St. Patrick’s Day. remained to be discovered. Recall that The variables of these searches are just Robert Gill likened the torpedo mag- too great,” said Kraft. 86 azine detonation to that of the atomic Juneau lies on her side at a depth bomb blast. How could there be any- of 4200m/13,780ft, a little more than thing left to find? 2.5 miles down.87 The video and still Enter the Research Vessel Petrel, photos released by Vulcan, Inc. are of owned and operated by Vulcan Inc., the aft one-third of the ship. Images a philanthropic venture of Microsoft show Juneau’s stern is surprisingly well co-founder Paul Allen. Petrel began op- preserved, but with the expected accu- erating in the Western Pacific in 2015 mulation of marine organisms. The fact and subsequently located and photo- that the stern is still very much intact graphed some of the iconic shipwrecks jives with survivor accounts and the

70 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau fact that most Juneau sailors who sur- who were lost on that Friday the Thir- vived the initial blast were stationed on teenth. Perhaps the short life of the ship or near the fantail: Allen Hyne, George and its valiant crew were summed up Sullivan, and Charles Wang. best by Vice Admiral Richard A. Brown, commander, Naval Surface Forces, US Locating the USS Juneau on Saint Pacific Fleet: “The story of the USS Ju- Patrick’s Day was an unexpected coinci- neau crew and Sullivan brothers epit- dence that honored not only the Sulli- omize the service and sacrifice of our van brothers but also all crewmembers nation’s greatest generation.”88

Juneau’s fantail as photographed on St. Patrick’s Day 2018. Top center, one of the two depth charge racks that were George Sullivan’s battle station. Photo reprinted with the permission of Vulcan, Inc.

Bibliography

“Department of Defense Instruction Number 1515.15.” January 5, 2007. Revised and amended January 1, 2012.

Jane’s Fighting Ships of World War II. Reprint, New York: Crown Publishing Com- pany, 1989.

Ballard, Robert D., with Rick Archbold. The Lost Ships of Guadalcanal. New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1993.

71 The Saber and Scroll

Dickson, Rod. U.S.S. Juneau CL(AA) 52. Kregsville, PA: The Floating Drydock, 1993.

Domagalski, John J. Sunk in Kula Gulf: The Final Voyage of the USS Helena and the Incredible Story of Her Survivors in World War II. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books Inc., 2012.

Kurzman, Dan. Left to Die: The Tragedy of the USS Juneau. New York: Simon and Schuster Inc., 1994.

Hornfischer, James D. Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal. New York: Bantam Books, 2012.

“IJN Submarine I-26: Tabular Record of Movement.” Imperial Japanese Navy Page. Accessed September 23, 2020. http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-26.htm.

Metcalf, Roy. “So Costly a Sacrifice: Saving Private Ryan.” Social Policy 29, no. 9 (Summer 1999): 44-49.

Morison, Samuel Eliot. The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II. Boston: Lit- tle, Brown and Company, 1959.

Satterfield, John R. We Band of Brothers: The Sullivans and World War II. Parkers- burg, IA: Mid-Prairie Press, 1995.

Wylie, Joseph C. (Rear Admiral, USN – Retired). “Executive Officer’s letter re- garding the loss of the USS Juneau on November 13, 1942,” (1986). http://www. ussfletcher.org/stories/juneau.html.

Notes

1 John R. Satterfield, We Band of Brothers: The Sullivans and World War II (Parkersburg, IA: Mid-Prairie Press, 1995), 12. 2 Ibid., 17. 3 Ibid., 25. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.

6 Ibid., 55.

72 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau

7 Ibid., 56.

8 Ibid., 50–51.

9 Ibid., 51–52.

10 Ibid., 57.

11 Ibid., 57–58.

12 Rod Dickson, U.S.S. Juneau CL(AA) 52 (Kregsville, PA: The Floating Drydock, 1993), 17–19.

13 Satterfield,We Band of Brothers, 50.

14 Dickson, U.S.S. Juneau CL(AA) 52, 44.

15 Janes Fighting Ships of World War II (New York: Crown Publishing Inc., 1989), 184.

16 Dickson, 1; Satterfield 67.

17 Satterfield, 52.

18 Ibid., 57.

19 Ibid., 67.

20 Samuel Eliot Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal: August 1942 – February 1943, vol. 5 of History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959), 136.

21 Satterfield, 118.

22 Ibid., 122.

23 Ibid., 124.

24 Ibid.

25 Satterfield, 125.

26 Morison, The Struggle for Guadalcanal, 235.

27 Satterfield, 136.

28 Ibid., 127.

29 Ibid.,

30 James D. Hornfischer,Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal (New York: Bantam Books, 2012), 265.

31 Morison, 242.

32 Ibid.

73 The Saber and Scroll

33 Ibid., 243.

34 Ibid.

35 Satterfield, 128.

36 Ibid.

37 Satterfield, 128; Morison, 244.

38 Morison, 245.

39 Satterfield, 132.

40 Ibid., 133.

41 Morrison, 258.

42 Satterfield, 137.

43 IJN Submarine I-26: Tabular Record of Movement, in the Imperial Japanese Navy Page, accessed September 23, 2020. http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-26.htm.

44 Joseph C. Wylie, “Executive Officer’s letter regarding the loss of the USS Juneau on November 13, 1942,” accessed January 28, 2014. http://www.ussfletcher.org/stories/ju neau.html.

45 Dan Kurzman, Left to Die: The Tragedy of the USS Juneau (New York: Simon and Schus- ter, 1994), 168–69.

46 bid., 175.

47 Ibid., 90, 207, 241.

48 bid., 194.

49 https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/browse-by-topic/disasters-and- phenomena/the-sullivan-brothers-and-the-assignment-of-family-members/list-of- uss-juneau-survivors.html

50 Satterfield, 158–59.

51 Ibid., 160.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid., 169.

54 Ibid., 169, 172.

55 Ibid., 169.

56 Ibid.

74 They Gave Their All: The Sullivan Brothers and Tragic Sinking of the USS Juneau

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid., 170.

60 Ibid., 169.

61 Ibid., 183.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., 192

64 Ibid., 185.

65 Ibid., 192.

66 Ibid., 189.

67 Ibid., 199.

68 Ibid., 191.

69 Ibid., 8.

70 Ibid., 199.

71 John J. Domagalski, Sunk in Kula Gulf: The Final Voyage of the USS Helena and the Incredible Story of Her Survivors in World War II Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books Inc., 2012), 107–10.

72 Ibid., 224.

73 Roy Metcalf, “So Costly a Sacrifice: Saving Private Ryan,” Social Policy 29, no. 9 (Sum- mer 1999): 45.

74 Satterfield, 198.

75 “Department of Defense Instruction Number 1515.15,” revised and amended January 1, 2012.

76 Metcalf, 48.

77 Satterfield, 197.

78 Ibid., 198.

79 Ibid., 197.

80 Ibid., 202.

81 Metcalf, 45

82 Ibid., 47.

75 The Saber and Scroll

83 Ibid., 48. 84 Ibid., 49. 85 “IJN Submarine I-26: Tabular Record of Movement,” Imperial Japanese Navy Page, ac- cessed September 23, 2020. http://www.combinedfleet.com/I-26.htm. 86 “Sunken USS Juneau Famous for the Sullivan Brothers Discovered on St. Patrick’s Day,” accessed October 1, 2020. https://www.paulallen.com/rv-petrel/uss-juneau-wreck-lo cated-famous-for-sullivan-brothers. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

76 The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution

Joseph Frusci, EdD Northeastern University

Abstract On January 6, 1783, three senior officers, then stationed at New- burgh, New York, arrived in Philadelphia with a dire warning for the Continental Congress. The officers were General Alexander McDougal from New York, Colonel Matthias Ogden from New Jersey, and Colonel John Brooks from Massachusetts. Their warn- ing to the members of Congress was that the Continental Army at Newburgh was on the verge of mutiny. Congress did not imme- diately understand how this could have happened, but America’s newfound independence was in danger of being lost after eight long years of warfare. In dealing with this event, General George Washington faced the greatest threat to the American Revolution: a disgruntled army and some of the senior officers plotting against the Continental Congress. Keywords: American Revolution, Thirteen Colonies, United States, Continental Congress, Continental Army, mutiny, George Wash- ington, Newburgh Address

Por qué es importante Washington: Cómo el General George Washington salvó la Revolución Americana Resumen El 6 de enero de 1783, tres oficiales superiores, entonces aposta- dos en Newburgh, Nueva York, llegaron a Filadelfia con una terri- ble advertencia para el Congreso Continental. Los oficiales eran el general Alexander McDougal de Nueva York, el coronel Matthias Ogden de Nueva Jersey y el coronel John Brooks de Massachuse- tts. Su advertencia a los miembros del Congreso fue que el Ejército Continental en Newburgh estaba al borde del motín. El Congreso no entendió de inmediato cómo pudo haber sucedido esto, pero la recién descubierta independencia de Estados Unidos estaba en peligro de perderse después de ocho largos años de guerra. Al lidiar

77 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.5 The Saber and Scroll

con este evento, el general George Washington enfrentó la mayor amenaza para la Revolución Americana: un ejército descontento y algunos de los oficiales superiores conspirando contra el Congreso Continental. Palabras clave: Revolución Americana, Trece Colonias, Estados Unidos, Congreso Continental, Ejército Continental, motín, Geor- ge Washington, Discurso de Newburgh

为什么华盛顿十分重要：上将乔治· 华盛顿如何挽救了美国革命 摘要

1783年1月6日，彼时驻扎在纽约州纽堡的三名高级军官来到 费城，给大陆会议(Continental Congress)带来一个可怕的警 告。这三名军官分别是纽约州上将Alexander McDougal、新 泽西州上校Matthias Ogden和马萨诸塞州上校John Brooks。他 们给会议成员的警告是，纽堡大陆军快要发生兵变。会议并 未立刻明白如何会出现这一情况，但美国新建立的独立在8 年战争之后有丢失的危险。在应对这次事件中，上将乔治·华 盛顿面临了美国革命的最大威胁：一支不满的军队和策划反 对大陆会议的部分高级军官。

关键词：美国革命，13个殖民地，美国，大陆会议(Conti- nental Congress)，大陆军，兵变，乔治·华盛顿，纽堡演说

t is usually taught, erroneously, The British Navy, while it was defeat- that the Revolutionary War ended ed at the Battle of the Capes during the in October 1781 at Yorktown after Yorktown campaign, was still dominant IGeneral Cornwallis surrendered to the against what remained of the Continen- US and French forces under the com- tal Navy, as it was known as the mistress mand of General George Washington. of the ocean. Although the British did surrender at The British were far from beat- Yorktown, they still occupied Wilming- en, and the commander-in-chief of the ton, North Carolina, Charleston, South Continental Army, General Washing- Carolina, Savannah, Georgia, New ton, understood this better than anyone York, and a sizeable portion of Maine. else. He feared that the US effort would

78 Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution be weakened after the news of the York- Continental Army had not been paid town victory. Shortly afterwards, Wash- for the last couple of years. These men ington wrote to Governor Thomas Nel- formed the core of an early nationalist son of Virginia: “Instead of exciting our movement in Congress. They believed exertions, the victory at Yorktown will the United States could become a great produce such a relaxation in the pros- nation, but only if it had a more pow- ecution of the war, as will prolong the erful central government that could calamities of it.”1 He wrote a few days levy taxes. However, general feeling later to the US commander in the South, in Congress was that the rights of the General Nathanael Greene, “that my states were paramount and should not greatest fear is the Congress may think be overridden by a central government. our work is closed and will fall into a In the meantime, the Continen- state of languor and relaxation.”2 Just af- tal Army, unpaid and waiting, was in ter these correspondences, Washington winter quarters in the Hudson Valley. briefly visited his home in Mount Ver- Although it was not certain, rumors non; this was only the second time that were circulating that the war was com- he had returned home during the war. ing to an end, even though the infor- He and Martha subsequently traveled to mation was not forthcoming from the Philadelphia, where they spent the win- negotiations in Paris, France. Washing- ter of 1781–1782. Washington arrived ton presented himself to the Congress in Philadelphia to great acclaim with in March 1782 and asked their permis- massive parades and fireworks, many sion to return to the army. They called banquets, and toasts. An opera was even on him to meet before them and said, written in his honor. Indeed, he was “we have nothing particular to give you, having a wonderful social time in Phila- and have appointed this audience, only delphia. Washington pointedly avoided to assure you of our esteem and confi- the Congress’s sessions, feeling it would dence and to wish you happiness and have been improper for the command- success.”3 er-in-chief of the army to attend. Washington departed for New As the winter months pro- gressed, George and Martha enjoyed York to rejoin the Continental Army, themselves, but accomplished virtually still occupied watching the British. nothing politically. Instead, every Mon- The British Army was under the com- day night, he; Robert Morris, who was mand of newly arrived General Sir Guy the financier, which is equivalent to a Carleton. He served as His Majesty’s Secretary of the Treasury; Gouverneur commander-in-chief, but Sir Guy was Morris, an essential figure in the Con- instructed to take no offensive action gress; Alexander Hamilton; and James against the Continental Army. Instead, Madison met for dinner. They dis- he was to prepare to evacuate the Col- cussed the happenings in Congress that onies. day: how the nation was bankrupt, the While Washington observed the Congress was nearly powerless, and the British preparations, the French Army

79 The Saber and Scroll under General Rochambeau arrived. men, in particular, the weakness The French had spent the winter near of Republics.4 the Yorktown battlefield in Virginia, but Usually, when he received a com- with the approach of spring, it was time munication from one of his subordi- for them to move. The French Army nates during the war, he would surely was leaving the United States and in- reply, but the reply came within a few tended to pass through New York to days or perhaps longer. Washington Boston and depart from there for the was so stunned by the letter that he re- West Indies. There was a grand cere- plied to Nicola the very same day his mony at the Newburgh encampment letter was received. Washington wrote where troops from both armies passed to the colonel: in review. Rochambeau and Washing- ton reviewed each other’s armies and With a mixture of great surprise then bade one another farewell. Once & astonishment, I have read with the French Army was gone, the Ameri- attention the Sentiments you cans would be very much on their own. have submitted to my perusal. During this time, General Wash- Be assured, Sir, no occurrence in ington received an extraordinary letter the course of the War, has given from Colonel Lewis Nicola, command- me more painful sensations than er of the “Corps of Invalids.” These were your information of there being men who had been injured in combat, such ideas existing in the Army suffered from disease or infirmity, and as you have expressed ... no man were deemed unfit to serve in combat. possesses a more sincere wish They were perfectly able to perform to see ample Justice done to the guard duty and support services, how- Army than I do, and as far as my ever. Colonel Nicola had seen firsthand powers & influence, in a consti- every day the cost of war in the faces tutional way extend, they shall and disabilities of his men. His Corps be employed to the utmost of my 5 had not been paid, either. Nicola wrote abilities to effect it. to General Washington: Colonel Nicola quickly tried to When this war is over. We who recant, and there were several more have born the heat and labor of letters sent to the general apologizing the day will be forgot and ne- for his statements. Nevertheless, Colo- glected. The army will not sub- nel Nicola’s letter reflected the feelings mit to this grave in justice. From of many officers serving in the army. several conversations I've had About two weeks after Colonel Nico- with officers I believe it is gen- la’s first letter, General Washington re- erally intended, not to separate ceived another communication from after the peace to all grievances Major General James Mitchell Var- redressed, engagements & prom- num. He was from Rhode Island and ises fulfilled .... This war must served in Congress after retiring from have shown to all, but to military the Continental Army. He was an indi-

80 Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution vidual of significant influence and no- look forward to securing American in- toriety. General Varnum wrote: “The dependence. Keeping these men togeth- Congress is a baseless fabric. My fellow er and preventing a mutiny weighed citizens are totally destitute of the law heavily on Washington. During the of equality. That is requisite to support a winter, several Continental Army offi- republic. Only an absolute monarchy or cers, including some regimental leaders a military state alone can save us from and members of the senior staff, gath- the horrors of subjugation.”6 ered without Washington’s permission. They drafted a memorial and asked the All of this weighed heavily on general’s permission to take it to the Washington’s mind. Instead of respond- Congress in Philadelphia. This made ing to Varnum directly, he sought out Washington uneasy; it was a violation Secretary at War Benjamin Lincoln, of military protocol and could be seen who previously served as a major gen- as a challenge to civilian authority, eral in the Continental Army and was which Washington had always respect- Washington’s second in command ed. Nevertheless, the situation was so throughout the Yorktown Campaign. dire that he feared the consequences if Washington wrote: “if these men who, he prohibited his officers from taking have spent the flower of their days in their memorial to Philadelphia. establishing the freedom and indepen- dence of their country are sent home Colonels Ogden and Brooks and without a one filing of money, great General McDougal were assigned to discontent will arise. The patience and deliver the memorial to Congress. It long-suffering of this army are almost began by asking the Congress, “as the exhausted.”7 With a year passed since head and sovereign to hear our plea. We have borne all that men can bear in fur- the end of the Yorktown Campaign and ther experiments on our patients may very little activity among the Continen- have fatal effects.”8 Congress accepted tal Army, the frustration among the the memorial and gave it to a commit- soldiers and ranking officers continued tee that deliberated for weeks. In the to grow. Washington was well aware meantime, those previously mentioned of this and stressed to Lincoln that he nationalists, Morris, Morris, Madison, was particularly concerned because the and Hamilton, began to devise a plan. army was about to go into winter quar- They saw an opportunity to use the dis- ters once again, and he knew the mis- gruntled army against the states and the ery of winter quarters. The Continen- Congress and force them to give greater tal Army had come through miserable power to the Congress. The army would times before in the Revolution, such as demand their pay from Congress, but at Morristown and Valley Forge, but the the only way for Congress to deliver winter of 1782 to 1783 seemed different. would be if the states sent money and Unlike previous winters, there increased the power of the central gov- would be no campaign in the coming ernment. Under the Articles of Con- spring during which the army could federation, the Congress was forbidden

81 The Saber and Scroll from levying taxes on the states. The particularly Samuel Adams and other nationalists began to play an extremely New Englanders, who suggested that dangerous game of using the army. General Gates might make a better Peace was what the nationalists commander-in-chief. Plans were made feared most. They knew that if peace to place Gates in Washington’s position, was made, the army would disband and which Washington knew, but none of their plans to use them would fall apart. these plans were ever followed through. They had not heard anything from the General Gates was put in com- commissioners in Paris, John Adams, mand of the Continental Army’s South- John Jay, and Benjamin Franklin, who ern Department, where he fought the did not correspond with Philadelphia. Battle of Camden. This was one of the Rumors were circulating in Congress worst defeats the Continental Army that peace was near, and the nationalists ever suffered. After the smoke cleared would need to act quickly before peace from the battlefield, General Gates was came. Gouverneur Morris wrote to nowhere to be found. He had retreated his friend Matthew Ridley, “not much nearly 60 miles, supposedly to reorga- for the interest of America, that peace nize his army, then went another 120 should be made at present.”9 He sug- miles to Hillsborough before sending gested that it was in the best interests of his report to Congress. As a result of the nationalists for the war to continue. this embarrassing defeat, he was re- Meanwhile at the Newburgh en- placed by General Nathanael Greene. campment, army officers were grum- Gates was now in disgrace and Wash- bling and frustrated when a new gen- ington deeply disliked him. Neverthe- eral arrived. The newcomer was not less, Gates was an influential politician, much troubled by loyalty or principle. and he convinced Congress to appoint His name was Horatio Gates, and he him as the commander of the army en- had distinguished himself as the com- camped at Newburgh without the con- mander of the Continental Army at sent of General Washington. Congress the Battle of Saratoga, the great victory advised Washington to use Gates as he of 1777, where General Burgoyne was wished. defeated. It is interesting to note that Washington was still command- the British called 1777 the year of the er-in-chief of the entire Continental hangman, the three sevens being gal- Army, while Gates arrived to be the lows. In the same year that Americans commander only of the army at New- celebrated the victory at Saratoga and burgh, which consisted of nearly sev- the accomplishments of General Gates, en thousand soldiers. Gates ordered General Washington had not lost Phil- them to build their huts at nearby New adelphia but also retreated from Ger- Windsor. There, they built nearly sev- mantown and Brandywine. These loss- en hundred wooden huts neatly laid as es sank Washington’s reputation fast, they prepared for winter quarters. To and there were those in the Congress, keep the soldiers busy, Gates had them

82 Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution drill and build more huts, build roads dergraduate college of Columbia Uni- and clear forests. Despite the work, the versity. He became a lawyer just as the growing discontent in the army was ev- Revolutionary War started. After join- ident. Chaplain Evans suggested that a ing the Continental Army and distin- “Temple of Virtue” be built to serve as guishing himself as a captain, he caught a gathering place for Sunday services. the attention of General Washington. During the week, it could also be where The General invited Hamilton to serve the administration of the army took as his secretary. This was a fine arrange- place. The soldiers accordingly built the ment until Hamilton once kept Wash- Temple in the middle of the New Wind- ington waiting to see him longer than sor encampment. the general liked. Washington turned Washington remained deeply on Hamilton and scolded him in front concerned about the murmurings of of the other officers, leading him to re- great discontent in the army, as ru- sign as Washington’s secretary. Ham- ilton returned to the army and served mors of peace were still circulating with honorably at the Battle of Yorktown, no mention of the soldiers being paid. which earned him new respect from Pressed now, fearing that peace was General Washington. Hamilton later coming, the nationalists in Congress de- left the army and served as a congress- cided to make their move. Gouverneur man from New York. Morris wrote to his good friend, Gen- eral Henry Knox, the bookseller from As Hamilton addressed Gener- Boston who now commanded at West al Washington, the nationalists never Point. Knox had been with Washing- thought Washington would take part ton since the early days of the war and in any plot, but they believed he needed he was Washington’s closest friend in to be tested. Hamilton informed Wash- the field. Morris suggested that if Knox ington that the army was on the verge agreed, he could lead the army to put of mutiny and advised that he might 11 pressure on the states. Morris contin- wish to “direct the torrent.” He went ued, “the army may now influence the on with something the general found legislatures and if you will permit me a hurtful and insulting. metaphor from your own profession af- Washington was told that there ter you have carried the post the public were rumors in the Congress and the creditors will garrison it for you.”10 army that the soldiers were disappoint- As Morris wrote to Knox, Alex- ed with his leadership. The rumors also ander Hamilton was asked to write to suggested that the commander-in-chief General Washington. Hamilton and did not do enough for them in passing Washington had a tumultuous relation- their grievances about not being paid to ship. Alexander Hamilton came to the Congress. United States just before the Revolu- Hamilton concluded the letter by tion and attended Kings College, now suggesting that Washington speak with Columbia College and the oldest un- General Knox, as their headquarters

83 The Saber and Scroll

The Resignation of George Washington December 23, 1783, c.1822 (oil on canvas) by John Trumbull (1756–1843); Yale University Art Gallery, New Haven, CT, USA. were roughly 10 miles apart. Both Knox Morris, Washington replied to Hamil- and Washington had an idea of what ton that “the fatal tendency to involve was being planned in Philadelphia, but the army in political matters, would now it appeared they were being drawn be productive at civil promotions and in. It is likely both generals shared the end in blood. I stand as citizen and sol- letters they received, as it was suggested dier.”13 that they speak with one another. Both The nationalists had clearly been replied to the nationalists from Phila- rejected by Knox and Washington. This delphia. turned the nationalists’ attention to a The first to respond, Knox wrote man with whom they knew they could to Gouverneur Morris that “I consider work with, General Horatio Gates. the reputation of the American army, as General Gates had his headquarters at one of the most immaculate things on a place called Ellison House, where he Earth. We should even suffer wrongs was surrounded by young staff majors and injuries to the utmost verge of tol- and lieutenant colonels, several cooks, eration rather than sully it in the least and the Ellison family, who had not degree. I hope to God, that the army vacated the house. It is often suggest- will never be directed that against the ed that Gates was unaware of what was enemies of the liberties of America.”12 being planned by his junior officers at Just after Knox sent his response to Ellison House.

84 Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution

This is hard to imagine, given a general order canceling the meeting, the number of people crowded into four but knew he was running a risk of his rooms on the first floor and four rooms top officers moving against him and on the second floor of the house. And so the Continental Congress with this plot now at Ellison House, the plot begins. forming. He knew he had to act quickly Colonel Walter Stewart, the In- by controlling any meeting that was set. spector General of the Continental Immediately following the cancellation Army in the North and a former aide to of the first meeting, Washington called General Gates, arrived at the Newburgh another meeting, which he would con- Encampment on Saturday, March 8, trol. Washington’s meeting was sched- 1783. He went to first to greet General uled for noon on Saturday, March 15, at Washington, who was none too pleased the Temple of Virtue, but Washington with Colonel Stewart. After leaving announced that he would not be in at- Washington, Stewart went immediate- tendance. ly to General Gates, who later wrote to Throughout the entire course a friend that Colonel Stewart arrived of the war, Washington met with his with “interesting information from our staff, but never addressed the army’s of- friends in Philadelphia.” Those friends ficers as a group. He believed this was could only have been Madison, Hamil- not proper protocol for the command- ton, Morris, and Morris.14 er-in-chief. Washington would not The next day was terribly at the attend the meeting, but left it for the Newburgh Encampment. Colonel John senior officer in command to preside Armstrong at Ellison House was asked over. The senior officer in command to write an address to the army at New- was General Horatio Gates. Upon hear- burgh. The original document is in ing this, Gates and the others swung Armstrong's handwriting and was cop- into action. As soon as Washington is- ied that night to be taken to the Temple sued his general order, another anon- of Virtue on Monday morning, where ymous address was put out suggesting the soldiers would get their daily or- that General Washington was with the ders. Armstrong’s address began: plotters. This gave Washington and his “A fellow soldier, whose inter- staff time to plan; Washington believed ests, and affections bind him strongly to that those plotting were attempting to you, whose past sufferings have been as draw him in, and he was unable to trust great, and whose future fortunes may be his generals at this moment. as desperate as yours would beg to leave Nevertheless, there was one to address you will.”15 The address went thing that Washington did understand. on to rally the officers, and then de- Although the generals made the plans, clared at the end “we will meet tomor- it was the junior officers, lieutenants, row, Tuesday, the 11th at the Temple of captains, and majors who actually com- Virtue.” As soon as Washington learned manded and controlled the troops. of this address, he immediately issued Washington began to lay out a plan with

85 The Saber and Scroll

Colonel Brooks, who later became Gov- convene you together. How in- ernor of Massachusetts, and his secre- consistent with the rules of pro- tary Jonathan Trumbull. They decided priety how on military and how to prepare a speech and address the ju- subversive of all order and disci- nior officers directly. pline. Let the good sense of the Several days were then spent army decide .... writing what is probably the most im- Thus much, Gentlemen, I have portant speech in US history. All was thought it incumbent on me done in secret because Washington had to observe to you. To show you already announced that he would not upon what principles I oppose attend the Saturday meeting. the irregular and hasty meeting, On March 15, about three hun- which was proposed to have been dred officers entered the Temple of Vir- held on Tuesday last. And not tue. Everyone snapped to attention as because I wanted a disposition General Gates entered the Temple. As to give you every opportunity, he started the meeting and the officers consistent with your own honor took their seats, the sounds of rattling and the dignity of the army to sabers and thundering hooves came make known your grievances. If from outside. General Washington’s my conduct here to for has not bodyguard entered the temple, and events to you that I have been a a moment later, to everyone’s shock, faithful friend to the army. My General Washington stood in the door- declaration of it at this time will way. Of course, the officers again stood be equally one availing and im- at attention. General Washington went proper. But as I was among the to the front of the room and General first to embarked in the cause of Gates stepped aside. our common country, as I have Washington pulled a sheaf of never left you aside. One mo- papers from his pocket and informed ment. But when called from you the officers that the meeting was so on public duty, as I have done the important that he had committed his constant companion and witness thoughts to paper. He then began to ad- of your distresses and not among dress them. In a short speech that was the last to feel and acknowledge no more than ten minutes in length, your merits. I have ever consid- General George Washington saved the ered my own military reputation American Revolution. as inseparably connected with Washington’s Newburgh Address that of the army. As my heart has began: ever expanded with joy when I have heard its praises and my Gentlemen, indignation has arisen when the By an anonymous summons mouth of detraction has been and attempt has been made to opened against it. It can scarcely

86 Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution

be supposed at this late stage of lost his officers and stood not with his the war that I am indifferent to army, but in opposition to it. Fearing its interests ... this, he reached into his pocket and pulled out a letter from Virginia con- And let me conjure you in the gressman Joseph Jones. Washington name of our common country. began to stumble over his words as he As you value your own sacred read the letter and stunned the officers honor. As you respect the rights by reaching for his glasses. The com- of humanity. As you regard the mander-in-chief had never been known military and national character to wear glasses. Washington had re- of America to express your ut- ceived the glasses two weeks prior from most horror and detestation of David Rittenhouse in Philadelphia and the man who wishes under any was having a hard time adjusting to species pretenses to overturn the them. To read Jones's letter, Washing- liberties of our country, and who ton wore his glasses for the first time wickedly attempts to open the in public. He looked out at the officers floodgates of civil discord and seated and said, “Gentlemen, you must deluge our rising empire in blood forgive me. Through the course of the by dust determining, and thus war, my eyes have grown dim, and my acting, you will pursue the plain hair has grown gray in the service of my and direct road to the attainment country.”17 There was not a dry eye in of your wishes you defeat the in- the room. In that moment the officers sidious designs of our enemies understood that General Washington who are compelled to reason had sacrificed as much as they had. from open force to secret arti- fice, you will give me one more After reading Jones's letter, Wash- distinguished proof of an exam- ington gathered his papers, removed his ple patriotism and patient virtue, glasses, and walked out. General Knox rising superior to the pressure of that jumped from his seat and offered the most complicated sufferings; resolutions in support of Congress and the commander-in-chief. The resolu- .... And you will, by the dignity of tions were proposed, voted on, and ad- your conduct afford occasion for opted unanimously. It is worth noting posterity to say when speaking that General Gates and Colonel Arm- of the glorious example you have strong did not cast a vote for the resolu- exhibited to mankind had this tions. The resolutions were sent to Con- day been wanting the world has gress to assure the legislative body that never seen the last stage of per- the army, while disgruntled, remained fection, to which human nature loyal. Nearly at the same moment the is capable of attaining.16 resolutions arrived from Newburgh, When Washington finished his news arrived from Paris, France that peech and there was silence. For that peace had been reached with England. one terrible moment he thought he had The final treaty that would take a little

87 The Saber and Scroll bit longer, but King George III finally gress what they gave to him in June of conceded independence for the Thir- 1775: his commission as command- teen Colonies. The war was essentially er-in-chief. In a very brief, but somber over. When the news reached General ceremony, General George Washington Washington, he announced a cessation returned command of the Continental of hostilities. The Treaty of Paris of 1783 Army to the Congress, setting the prec- was ratified shortly after. edent (which still stands today) that the US military is subordinate to civilian Washington made the an- authority. Washington arrived home at nouncement at the Temple of Virtue Mount Vernon on Christmas Eve, 1783 on April 19, 1783, exactly eight years to thinking that his time in public service the day of the Battles of Lexington and was over, not knowing what truly lied Concord, which began the Revolution- ahead. ary War. Once the army heard the news, they erupted in cheers. Although they This does not suggest that the had not been paid, and they would not Continental Army was plotting to be for quite some time, they just wanted overthrow the Continental Congress to leave the encampment and go home. in March of 1783. Nevertheless, if the army had taken up arms or marched This left Washington with one last task against the Congress as a means of to complete. protest, the separation that stands in On December 23, 1783, Wash- our republic between the military and ington arrived at the Maryland state- civilian government would have been house in Annapolis to meet with the shattered and could never have been Continental Congress after the leg- put back together. It can be difficult to islative body temporarily relocated understand why some revolutions fail there in the late fall of 1783. Washing- while others succeed, but history is ton acknowledged the many sacrifices clear as to why the American Revolu- and professionalism of the Continen- tion was successful: the leadership of tal Army, then returned to the Con- George Washington.

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Fowler, Jr., William M. American Crisis and the Dangerous Two Years After Yorktown. New York: Walker Publishing Company, 2011.

88 Why Washington Matters: How General George Washington Saved the American Revolution

King, Charles R. The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King.6 vols. New York: G.P. Putnam Sons, 1894.

Kohn, Richard. “The Inside Story of the Newburgh Conspiracy: America and the Coup d’Etat.” The William and Mary Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1970): 187-220.

Mattern, David. Benjamin Lincoln and the American Revolution. Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1995.

Morris, Gouverneur. Life of Gouverneur Morris, 3 vols. Boston, MA: Gray and Bowen, 1832.

Quincy, Josiah. The Journals of Major Samuel Shaw. Boston, MA: Wm. Crosby and H.P. Nichols, 1847.

Skeen, C. Edward, and Richard H. Kohn. “The Newburgh Conspiracy Reconsid- ered.” The William and Mary Quarterly 31, no. 2 (1974): 273-98.

Syrett, Harold. The Papers of Alexander Hamilton. 27 vols. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961-1987.

Varnum, James M. Library of Congress: George Washington Papers, Series 4, Gen- eral Correspondence: James M. Varnum to George Washington. December 4, 2016. https://www.loc.gov/item/mgw431326/.

Washington, George. National Archives: Founders Online. June 27, 2013. https:// founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08500.

Notes

1 George Washington to Governor Thomas Nelson, October 27, 1781, FW, 23:271. 2 George Washington to Nathanial Greene, 1781. 3 Washington leaving the Congress to join his army at Newburgh. JCC, 22:141 4 “To George Washington from Lewis Nicola, 22 May 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08500. 5 “From George Washington to Lewis Nicola, 22 May 1782,” Founders Online, National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-08501. 6 George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence: James M. Varnum to George Washington. 1782. Manuscript/Mixed Material. https://www.loc.gov/item/mgw4 31326/.

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7 George Washington Papers, Series 4, General Correspondence: George Washington to Benjamin Lincoln. 1782. Manuscript/Mixed Material. https://www.loc.gov/item/ mgw431472/. 8 Memorial delivered to Congress by Ogden, Brooks, and McDougal. 9 G. Morris to Matthew Ridley, 1783 10 G. Morris to Knox, Feb. 7, I783, Burnett, ed., Letters, VII, 34n. Since the two letters are dated so closely, and because Morris's was so incriminating, it is likely that Brooks c. 11 Hamilton to Washington, Feb. I3, Apr. 8, I783, Syrett and Cooke, eds., Papers of Ham- ilton. 12 Knox to McDougall, Feb. 2I, I783, Knox Papers, XI, I48. 13 Washington to Hamilton, Mar. I2, I783, Syrett and Cooke, eds., Papers of Hamilton, 286. 14 There is no record of Stewart's meeting with Gates. But judging by the rumors that be- gan circulating (see next paragraph) and by what Armstrong told Duer (King, “Notes on conversation,” Oct. I2, I788, King, Rufus King, I, 622), Stewart undoubtedly pledged Morris's help. 15 Armstrong’s “address” is printed in JCC, 24:295-97. 16 Washington’s Newburgh Address, Mar. 15, 1783 17 Quincy, Journals of Shaw, 104.

90 The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green

Christopher Brandon American Military University

Abstract The American Revolution was a time when ordinary men were often put in positions to accomplish extraordinary things. Ma- jor-General Nathanael Greene was no exception; however, his ac- complishments far surpassed many of his contemporaries. A jour- ney that began in his youth, Greene crafted a vision throughout his life that often defied the laws of tradition. As a result, Greene’s methods were oftentimes unorthodox, which led to a certain de- gree of criticism. His circumstances were often unfavorable; there- fore, he believed that success must be achieved through non-tradi- tional means. He developed his understanding of success through his studies and the culmination of his life events, developing and executing bold yet unconventional strategies with a great degree of success. The following explores Nathanael Greene’s evolution as a visionary leader from his humble Quaker beginnings through the apex of his accomplishments during the Southern Campaign. Keywords: Nathanael Greene. American Revolution, military his- tory, leader development, Southern Campaign, visionary leader- ship, military strategy, self-development

Forjando la visión: Nathanael Green Resumen La Revolución Estadounidense fue una época en la que a menudo se colocaba a hombres comunes en posiciones para lograr cosas extraordinarias. El general de división Nathanael Greene no fue una excepción; sin embargo, sus logros superaron con creces a mu- chos de sus contemporáneos. Un viaje que comenzó en su juven- tud, Greene elaboró una visión a lo largo de su vida que a menudo desafiaba las leyes de la tradición. Como resultado, los métodos de Greene fueron a menudo poco ortodoxos, lo que generó cierto grado de crítica. Sus circunstancias eran a menudo desfavorables; por lo tanto, cree que el éxito debe lograrse por medios no tradicio- nales. Desarrolló su comprensión del éxito a través de sus estudios

91 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.6 The Saber and Scroll

y la culminación de los eventos de su vida, desarrollando y ejecu- tando estrategias audaces, pero poco convencionales con un gran grado de éxito. A continuación, se explora la evolución de Natha- nael Greene como líder visionario desde sus humildes comienzos cuáqueros hasta la cúspide de sus logros durante la Campaña del Sur. Palabras clave: Nathanael Greene. Revolución Americana, historia militar, desarrollo de líderes, Campaña del Sur, liderazgo visiona- rio, estrategia militar, autodesarrollo

打造愿景：纳瑟内尔·格林 摘要 美国革命期间，普通人经常被置于需要完成非凡任务的位置 上。少将纳瑟内尔·格林也不例外；不过，他的成就远超过 同时代的人。从青年时期开始，格林便构想了一个经常违反 传统法则的愿景。结果则是，格林的方法经常是非正统的， 这引起了一定程度的批判。他的情况经常是不利的；因此， 他相信必须通过非传统手段取得成功。通过学习和重大生活 事件，他形成了对成功的理解，提出并执行了一系列大胆又 非传统的战略，并在很大程度上取得了成功。以下内容探究 了纳瑟内尔·格林作为一名愿景领导者的历程—从卑微的贵 格会成员开始到南方战役期间取得的最高成就。

关键词：纳瑟内尔·格林，美国革命，军事历史，领导者发 展，南方战役（Southern Campaign），愿景型领导，军事战 略，自我发展

92 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green

Major General Nathanael Greene, August 7, 1742–June 19, 1786, oil on canvas by Charles Wilson Peale. Bridgeman Images: Peter Newark American Pictures.

t the onset of the American wartime exploits made him the most Revolution, the rebel forces significant antihero of the Revolution- had many disadvantages in ary War. Acomparison to their British adversary. At the onset of the war, very few Aside from insufficient funding and Patriot military leaders could have been resources, perhaps the Patriots’ most considered extraordinary and experi- significant shortcoming was the lack of enced by traditional standards. Overall, a unified, standing military, a problem rebel leaders lacked training and ex- that was exacerbated by a serious deficit perience compared to the officers they of men skilled in the broader adminis- took the field against. Although many tration of warfare. If the Patriots were Patriots experienced combat alongside to be successful, they required men of the British during the American-Indian vision who could find possibilities and campaigns and French and Indian Wars, solutions where others could not. While few served in positions that would pro- many Patriot military leaders demon- vide them the skills necessary to devel- strated a capacity for visionary leader- op, design, and execute broader context ship, Nathanael Greene’s (1742–1786) strategic planning. Thus, many Patriots unlikely ascendency and unorthodox were thrust into positions of leadership

93 The Saber and Scroll out of necessity, oftentimes based sole- Early on, Greene read whatev- ly on socioeconomic status rather than er books he could acquire. However, previous military accomplishments. As around 1760, he befriended educated such, the learning curve was steep, as minds who introduced him to the vast the unprepared bands of loosely orga- expanse of secular education. Greene nized militias assembled in 1775.1 befriended future president of Yale Uni- Among these inexperienced versity, Reverend Ezra Stiles, and a man leaders was Nathanael Greene, a man only known as “Giles,” who played sig- with little formal schooling and ex- nificant roles in expanding his educa- 4 tremely limited professional military tional endeavors. On their recommen- training; however, what he lacked in dations, Greene’s independent studies terms of experience, he made up for in included the histories, mathematics, prescience, determination, an ability to sciences, philosophy, and a multitude bring concepts to fruition, and synthe- of other subjects his religious upbring- sizing these concepts into broader strat- ing had previously denied him. Using egies. These are but a few of the qualities his blacksmithing abilities and spare re- Greene possessed that eventually found sources from the forge, Greene crafted him as Washington’s “favorite officer.”2 souvenirs to sell in Boston to fund his educational endeavor. Nothing from Nathanael Greene’s upbringing would have suggested his as- Circumstances brought new cendency into military leadership. Born focuses for Greene as he began using into the Society of Friends, Greene was his desire for knowledge, not only for confined to the strict tenets of Quaker- general interest, but also for deliberate ism that not only included pacifism but self-development. He began studying also viewed an education outside of re- law, which paid dividends when his ligious texts; Quaker-approved books; father’s businesses required legal rep- and basic reading, writing, and arith- resentation. He immersed himself not metic as a “worldly luxury” that only only in law books, but also observed paved the way for “temptation, heresy, legal proceedings that provided him a and other sins.”3 Therefore, the young significant foundation in the law. Al- Greene received only a basic education though he never intended on pursuing while being raised to appreciate labor law as a profession, he believed that an and business per the demands of his understanding of the legal system was inherited faith and his father’s business important for him to be a “useful or 5 ventures. Nonetheless, Greene devel- conspicuous citizen.” oped an insatiable thirst for a liberal Greene entered politics as a education that he religiously quenched member of the Rhode Island General once he was given the gifts of time and Assembly in 1770. His ascent to poli- space. In 1770, when he took over his tics together with his affection for the father’s forge in Coventry, Rhode Island, anti-British writings of his favorite au- 10 miles east of the family homestead, thor, Jonathan Swift, accusations of in- he was provided that opportunity. volvement in the Gaspée affair in 1772,

94 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green and the subsequent seizure of one of his Greene’s passion for learning merchant ships ignited a fire in him.6 Al- undoubtedly gave him a broad wealth though he was exonerated from the ac- of knowledge that established not only cusations of involvement in the Gaspée his view of the world but provided him affair and his ship and goods were re- with a baseline understanding of tactics, turned, these events made him a prime strategy, and a multifaceted philosophi- candidate for the rebellion. Greene cal perspective. Although one could ar- never abandoned his Quaker roots; gue that consuming such a vast amount however, he determined that while pac- of information on as many different ifism was a righteous idea, it was simply subjects would be counterproductive, it impractical under the circumstances. seems that he had an uncanny ability to Echoing the sentiments of Swift’s Dra- retain only what he found useful while pier’s Letters, Greene stated that, “the disregarding the rest. Greene biogra- injury done my country, and the chains pher William Johnson noted that those of slavery forging for posterity, calls me who knew him were curious about his forth to defend our common rights, and limited knowledge of history, despite repel the bold invaders of the sons of that being his favorite subject.9 freedom. The cause is the cause of God Ultimately, Greene’s book col- and man… I am determined to defend lection was comprised of between 200 my rights, and maintain my freedom, or and 250 volumes. He worked diligent- sell my life in the attempt.”7 ly shaping his mind, refining his skills, By 1774, Greene shifted his ed- and building a repertoire that would ucational focus toward military man- serve as the basis for his future exploits. uals, tactics, strategy, and history. He The work ethic he developed and the immersed himself in the writings of knowledge he acquired paid dividends Plutarch, Turenne, and Saxe. He stud- not only for himself, but also for the ied Sharp’s Military Guide, Bland’s country he so loved. manual on tactics, The Instruction of Although Greene worked to de- Frederick the Great for His Generals, velop his mind, he lacked perhaps the and Caesar’s Commentaries. From his most important aspect of any military studies, Greene developed a dynamic leader: experience. Quakers, by na- understanding and interpretation of ture and virtue, were farmers rather military science by analyzing the mil- than fighters. As devout pacifists, they itary successes, failures, tactics, and viewed weapons as instruments of war; strategies of various cultures through- thus, Greene did not own or ever use out history. Furthermore, on his visits a gun. However, he was far from the to Henry Knox’s bookstore, the two dis- staunch Quaker of his upbringing. Like cussed military tactics and strategy and many other things in his life, he seemed formed a bond that would serve them to adopt what resonated with him from long and well as they worked together the faith and discarded the rest to build during the war.8 something that suited him. Therefore,

95 The Saber and Scroll just as he abandoned his religiously re- As a result, Greene contemplated stricted education in pursuit of obtain- leaving the militia altogether. However, ing a liberal education in his youth, he despite his damaged ego, he promised also abandoned the pacifistic tenets of his friend, and newly selected Captain Quakerism so he could do his part to of the Kentish Guard, James Mitchell correct the wrongs he perceived in Brit- Varnum, that he would continue to sup- ish-colonized America. Accounts vary port the militia financially even if he did as to why Greene was removed from the not participate. Varnum, also frustrated Society of Friends, but in 1773, he was with the treatment of Greene, also felt excommunicated for either attending a compelled to leave the militia. Varnum military parade or being at an alehouse. knew that Greene should have been Nonetheless, this removal gave him the selected as an officer and certainly did freedom he needed to pursue his mili- not appreciate his friend being treated tary ambitions. with such contempt. However, neither On October 29, 1774, the men man left, training together through the of East Greenwich, Rhode Island estab- winter of 1774 and into 1775: Varnum lished the Kentish Guards as a means as the commander and Greene as a Pri- 12 of protecting their province from the vate. threat of potential attacks by local To- In the autumn of 1774, the Rhode ries.10 Nathanael Greene was a found- Island Assembly determined that it ing member and financier of the group, needed to review its provincial laws but when he volunteered to serve as an concerning the militias. To accomplish officer, he was not selected. Although this, the Assembly established a defense Greene was regarded as one of the most committee to which Greene was as- informed minds on military matters in signed. The panel consisted primarily of Rhode Island, he ultimately became a senior military officers, so the fact that Private in the group he helped found Private Greene was among them speaks and fund. volumes of the Assembly’s faith and Greene was already an unlikely confidence in his military knowledge. candidate for military leadership given Greene made quite an impres- his Quaker background, but his phys- sion on the members of the committee, ical ailments sealed his fate in terms while his military superiors certainly of achieving a foothold in the Kentish took note of his abilities and potential. Guard. He walked with a pronounced In response to Greene’s contributions limp and was prone to severe bouts of to the committee, he received “mag- asthma. Although he provided the mili- nanimous” recognition of his “fitness tia with funding and support, he joined for command” based on his energy and the militia at the lowest rank, Private, the “ascendency of his intellect.” He was where his peers viewed him as a “blem- considered unanimously by those su- ish” on the organization for his physical perior to him in rank as more qualified ailments.11 than any other in the colony to serve

96 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green as the head of the colony’s armed forc- the province, they also needed a regular es. According to biographer Theodore army. The result was the establishment Thayer, Greene’s performance on this of a fifteen-hundred-man army dubbed committee removed any doubt of his the Army of Observation on May 8, military competence.13 1775. This new outfit needed a com- In late 1774, when Greene made mander, and while most sources lead his usual trek to Boston, instead of one to believe that Greene was the first choice, he was not. Rather, their first books, arming himself was the mis- choice was an Episcopalian and their sion. Although he did acquire a rifle, he second choice was a Congregationalist. brought home something perhaps even Both declined. Rhode Island then set- more valuable. He engaged and enlisted tled on Private Greene, commissioning the aid of William Johnson, a desert- him as Brigadier General in charge of er from the British army. Greene con- all of Rhode Island’s forces.16 vinced Johnson to come back to Rhode Island and become the drillmaster for Meanwhile, the colony of Massa- the Kentish Guard. Johnson agreed, re- chusetts understood that it would only located to East Greenwich, and trained be a matter of time before the British the Guard in the style of the British forces would seek revenge on their em- army. The installment of this former barrassments at Lexington and Con- British soldier paid dividends for the cord. They called for all New England Guard as Johnson drilled them three troops to assemble at Cambridge, and times per week, preparing them for the the Rhode Island assembly ordered fight ahead.14 Greene and his brigade to the rebel rally point. It did not take long for Rhode Is- Immediately following the en- landers to take notice of Greene’s efforts gagements at Lexington and Concord as he worked tirelessly “raising, equip- on April 19, 1775, the Kentish Guards ping, and drilling” his troops. The way were activated and marched as far as he handled the problems he encoun- Pawtucket, Rhode Island, when a mes- tered, and the progress he made with senger intercepted them with a message his brigade, ensured Rhode Island that from the governor. They were instruct- Greene was the right choice. On May ed not to engage and return to their 20, 1775, twelve days after receiving his homes. While most of them complied, commission, Greene began moving his Greene, two of his brothers, and at least army in waves to join the New England one other man ignored the order and militias’ rallying point in Massachu- pressed on until hearing that the British setts.17 had retreated to Boston. Only then did 15 At Cambridge, Greene was quick they return to their homes. to make a good impression on the more In response to the outbreak of seasoned generals roaming the rebel the war, Rhode Island decided that in encampment outside Boston. Among addition to its requirement for each mi- generals such as Israel Putnam, Philip litia-aged male to be prepared to defend Schuyler, and Charles Lee, Greene was

97 The Saber and Scroll a fledgling; however, he possessed qual- forces stand a chance. While most of ities that quickly set him apart from his the other colonial militia leaders stood contemporaries. These qualities quick- stubborn in their independence and ly found Greene in the graces of the suspicions, Greene did not hesitate to eventual Commander-in-Chief, George become subordinate to another colonial Washington. commander. On May 23, 1775, Greene offered his services to Artemas Ward, It could be reasonably argued commander of the Massachusetts mili- that many Americans have an overly ro- tia, requesting to serve as one of Ward’s manticized mental image of the Amer- subordinate commanders.20 ican Revolution. One where American Patriots set aside their disagreements, This is not to say that Greene banded together, and worked seam- was alone in this idea of a consolidated lessly to win their independence. This army. On the contrary, Greene attend- image was largely propagated by nine- ed a meeting on June 5, 1775, featuring teenth-century poets and authors, Generals Joseph Spencer, Israel Put- such as William Gilmore Simms, and nam, William Heath, and John Thom- it seems that any deviance from this as, who were trying “to give shape and narrative would be viewed as almost order” to the mobs in the encampment. unpatriotic. However, the reality of the However, an idea of a “single head” to situation throughout the war was a far command the army only “crept in” over cry from the charming portrayals com- time. Greene, on the other hand, did monly found in pop culture.18 not hesitate to offer his services under Ward and had done so nearly a month Although there were certainly before Congress established the Con- social, economic, and cultural divisions tinental Army. The Continental Army between the Northern and Southern was established on June 14, 1775, under colonies, perhaps the most significant the command of George Washington, divisions among the colonies were pro- with Greene selected as one of its first vincial. Boundary disputes between Brigadier Generals.21 provinces were commonplace and did As evidenced by George Wash- not simply dissipate when the war be- ington’s General Orders from July 1775, gan. Rather, these divisions transcend- troop discipline was a major concern. ed civil affairs and manifested among Greene, however, stood at the forefront the provincial militias who remained of troop discipline. He understood in autonomous and suspicious of one an- 1775 what Baron Friedrich von Steuben other. In early 1775, there was no for- proved two years later at Valley Forge: mal, overarching command structure that discipline and drill were vital keys or even a common supply line. Seem- to the success of the military. Greene ingly, the only unifying factor at this held his soldiers to the highest stan- 19 time was the cause itself. dards, which not only garnered him Greene saw this dynamic and felt the favorable attention of Washington that only through unity did the rebel and other generals but also made his

98 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green troops an example for others to emu- the setup of their encampments, was to late. Furthermore, Greene understood be clean and orderly. Personnel were the broader context of military disci- required to maintain personal hygiene pline, not only how discipline applied and to keep their uniforms clean and to combat, but how it also impacted serviceable. Greene’s army religiously public perception.22 conducted maintenance and cleaning On the surface, military drills of their weapons and equipment and were subject to routine inspections. can seem mundane and burdensome, This was undoubtedly a breath of fresh and it is something that soldiers com- air to George Washington, who, upon plain about even today. However, at its arriving at Cambridge, described the core, drill provides soldiers with many New England militiamen as “an exceed- practical and necessary skills. It instills ingly dirty and nasty people.”24 instant obedience to orders, discipline, standardization, synchronization, and Greene understood that if his organization. In linear warfare, espe- troops were to be disciplined, he needed cially, these skills were of the utmost to be a leader who exhibited discipline, importance. inspired, and commanded respect. He seemingly never spared himself, work- As a Private in the Kentish ing diligently and tirelessly on his per- Guards, Greene participated in the drills sonal affairs while ensuring that his of William Johnson three times per presence was known and felt among the week for approximately eight months. troops. Although Greene was one of the While not an exorbitant amount of most inexperienced general officers, his time, it seemed enough for Greene to self-discipline and the discipline of his comprehend its importance as drill troops earned him accolades and praise became a priority for his troops when from his contemporaries and senior of- he took command of the Rhode Island ficers alike. forces. At his direction, his troops were This was especially true in his required to drill and parade daily even relationship with George Washington, after their arrival outside Boston. Every who eventually considered Greene his day at four o’clock, his troops “mustered favorite officer, and whom many pre- and paraded” unless sick or otherwise sume was Washington’s heir apparent. engaged.23 Washington understood Greene’s val- The discipline and presentation ue and used him to his strengths. He of Greene’s army stood in stark contrast knew that if something needed to be to the chaos at Cambridge. Greene was fixed and the need was urgent, more fortunate to be supported by stellar of- often than not, Greene was the man ficers, including James Varnum, who for the job. Unfortunately for Greene, shared his vision. Greene and his officers sometimes this meant his assignments toured their encampment with regular- removed him from the battlefield, such ity, ensuring that their high standards as his appointment to the position of were maintained. Everything, including Quartermaster General.

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When Greene was promoted to seems early on that, although he made the rank of Major General in August his presence known within the coun- 1776, he was once again the youngest cil, he remained somewhat outside the and most inexperienced of his contem- circle of Washington’s more seasoned poraries. The other Continental Major generals. Their seeming lack of faith in Generals had largely obtained their his judgment, although arguably war- rank based on military service before ranted, sometimes proved fateful, as it the American Revolution. Nonethe- could be argued that the British would less, he did not earn the rank of Major not have established themselves so General by accident. Rather, he was quickly in New York had they taken his driven by an uncanny desire to solidify advice. his legacy that was coupled with an un- On September 5, 1776, Greene dying desire to impress his command- suggested that they burn New York City er-in-chief, George Washington. As a and its suburbs before evacuating it. He result, Greene performed commend- understood and openly expressed its ably both on the battlefield and through indefensibility based on the number of his auxiliary roles. available troops. He knew that the army Greene seemed to hide his inex- could not stop a British attack on the perience behind a bold, intrepid per- region, and should it fall into British sonality and strong demeanor. He was hands, they would be gifted a ready- a student of human nature, which he made military garrison at the Patriots’ used not only to mask his weaknesses expense and that if it were lost they but also to give him valuable insight would never again regain control of the into other people. Through his life ex- city.26 periences, his studies of history, and The council disagreed with his deliberate attention to human na- Greene’s assessment of New York’s de- ture and behavior, Greene became so fensibility and argued against abandon- adept in human psychology that it was ing it, while Congress refused to permit almost as if he possessed the ability to the burning of the city. The council de- “read the thoughts of others as if they cided to defend the city. At the press- had been his own.” He understood the ing of Greene, in what could have been significance of this ability and used it to perceived as an act of insubordination, such a degree that within a few months a re-vote was requested via a petition in command, his voice was listened to on September 11. A second council was with the respect that “is only accorded summoned the following day, and the 25 to acknowledged superiority.” decision was reversed “with only three While Greene’s façade was con- dissenting voices,” but it was too late. vincing to most, he still experienced With only enough time to evacuate in resistance, especially within the coun- what was described as a “miserable and cil of war. Given that Greene would not disorderly retreat,” the British seized command in direct combat until the New York and its assets on September Battle of Trenton at the end of 1776, it 15, when “Howe landed between Kips’s

100 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green and Turtle Bay.” Britain maintained unfeasible as the Continentals stood at control of the city for the duration of nearly every disadvantage. Although the war, just as Greene predicted.27 subservient to Washington, it is well However, while Greene’s fore- documented that Greene had Washing- sight and intuition were acute, he was ton’s ear above the other generals. The not always correct. Only a few months marriage of these contrasting strategies later, in November 1776, he was re- was arguably one of the most significant 29 sponsible for the fall of Fort Washing- relationships of the war. ton, which proved to be the most signif- Greene understood that tradi- icant loss of the American Revolution tional ideas would be difficult to over- until the fall of Charleston. While ini- come. He keenly observed the civilian tially instructing Greene “to defend the pressure on Washington to take on the post to the last Extremity,” Washington British head-to-head. Greene believed later modified this order, giving Greene this was an impractical, if not reck- full authority to act as the situation dic- less, strategy. In 1777, Greene wrote to tated. Greene, although encouraged by Washington, expressing the concerns Washington to evacuate the fort, decid- of his observations, stating that he has ed to reinforce it. When the British at- seen the “difficulty of [Washington] ... tacked, the fort and its three thousand to satisfy the Expectations of an igno- troops, along with arms and supplies, rant Populace, with great Concern.” were captured in a mere five hours. The However, Greene felt he understood subsequent loss of Fort Lee, also under what the army needed to do to be suc- Greene’s charge, left him feeling “mad, cessful, and had no qualms about relay- vext, sick, and sorry,” but the lessons he ing these ideas to Washington.30 learned were a valuable part of his ma- Greene told Washington that he 28 turing process. believed Washington had two strategic Greene’s experiences in combat options: to fight “upon the common led him to the conclusion that direct Principles of War” without “the least combat with Britain was a failing strate- Prospect of Success” or to “remain in- gy. Therefore, he gravitated towards the active, & be subject to the Censure of Fabian strategy of the Roman Quintus an ignorant & impatient populace.” Fabius Maximus Verrucosus, one that Greene suggested that if he went with maximized the army’s strengths while the former, it would make a bad situa- compensating for its limitations. Wash- tion worse, and when it failed he would ington, on the other hand, tended to ebb forever “stand condemned.” However, if and flow between a conservative Fabian he opted for the latter, he could rely on and aggressive Hannibalic strategy, but his own judgment, giving himself the ultimately Washington envisioned a necessary time to overcome the army’s Hannibalic victory that would give the deficiencies, and in doing so, would British a final crushing blow. Greene prevail and be revered by “all future found this approach impractical and Generations.”31

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Greene’s time as a combatant mately seventy-five thousand farmers commander in the Northern Theater throughout the Northern Theater had (1775–1777) served as a significant dried up for many reasons: “bad plan- learning period. Seemingly, he learned ning, no planning, inexperience, inept- his lessons well, as he continued to de- itude, criminality, villainy, the structure velop and refine his repertoire, prepar- of governance in America, and a large ing him for subsequent assignments of dose of bad luck.” By the end of 1777, increased responsibility and autono- the Continental Army’s Quartermaster my. His next assignment played to his General, Major General Thomas Mif- strengths and experience learned not flin, and Commissary General, Colo- only from his time as a commander, but nel Joseph Trumbull, had abandoned also from running his father’s business- their posts in pursuit of other endeav- es: Quartermaster General of the Army. ors, leaving Washington’s commissary When the army arrived at Valley general lost as to what to do. Thus, to Forge in the winter of 1777, the supply supplement the quartermaster and situation was in shambles. Simply put, commissary departments, Washington the soldiers did not have the resources relied on his aspiring young Gener- required to survive the impending win- al Greene to scour the countryside for ter, let alone be comfortable. The future provisions and equipment.33 of the war also hung in the balance, Greene headed out with his de- as supply problems routinely plagued tail of troops numbering in the thou- Washington’s army. Crucial items such sands to procure supplies for the suf- as gunpowder and ammunition were in fering masses collected in Valley Forge. short supply, in addition to a shortage He was given full authority to seize of food, blankets, and even shoes. whatever assets deemed vital to the Greene possessed a great under- sustainment of the army. Well aware of standing of logistics, as evidenced by his authority, Greene also understood his letter to George Washington on De- the power of public opinion. Thus, he cember 1, 1777, where Greene not only implemented a system of providing re- outlined how the winter encampment at ceipts for all goods commandeered for Valley Forge should be established, but the army’s use. It was a system of good- also provided a list of necessary actions will that promised repayment for any to be taken for their sustainment. Ad- materials or livestock surrendered. ditionally, he warned of the adverse ef- However, this goodwill was not fect of too much leisure time, addressed always enough for those who were des- troop psychology, and emphasized the perate, had no interest in assisting the necessity for exercise during the army’s cause, or had legitimate concerns about winter hiatus. He even discussed lever- the grossly inflated Continental cur- aging logistical warfare against the Brit- rency. To protect their resources from 32 ish in their quarter. being seized, some locals began hiding The large quantities of agricul- their wagons, livestock, and other pro- tural goods provided by the approxi- visions in the woods or wherever they

102 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green could to try to maintain their property. of logistics and an aptitude for problem Greene’s solution for this was to offer solving. The army was in such need of no receipts or any repayments for items transport equipment and animals that taken that were found in hiding. many units were reduced to building There was also the problem of makeshift wagons that the soldiers, locals supplying the British. For those themselves, were yoked to or they sim- 36 caught doing so, Greene ordered them ply carried the cargo on their backs. publically whipped. Greene believed Although Greene did not desire this lesson was not only necessary for to be “taken out of the Line of splen- the perpetrators, but for his subordinate d or,” Washington impressed to him officers as well. Greene lamented the the importance of the Quartermaster tactics he felt he had to employ. How- General. While Greene felt this respon- ever, he believed he had to harden not sibility was in line with his previous only his own heart but also the hearts experiences, he believed a position of of his subordinate officers so that they this magnitude was greater than his could fulfill their mission. He made it abilities. Nonetheless, he accepted the known that he would inflict the severest position and was appointed as Quarter- of punishment for the minutest neglect master General on March 24, 1778. Five to maintain the order and discipline months passed between the exodus of necessary to accomplish this difficult, Quartermaster General, Thomas Miff- necessary, yet ethically questionable lin, and the appointment of Nathanael task.34 Greene, which only served to intensify Forage was another issue that he the supply crisis. encountered around Valley Forge. The Greene went to work procuring amount of forage required to sustain the supplies necessary for the army to the army wreaked havoc on the sur- survive the winter and to fight when rounding landscape. Greene instructed spring came. Greene was told by Wash- the Commissary-General to forage the ington to spare no expense to outfit the country bare, which caused the sub- army, and he did so much to Congress’s sequent problem of starving out the dismay. The military spending by the local animals. However, Greene was a Quartermaster and Commissary De- problem-solver and, to mitigate civil- partments ballooned from between ian complaints about forage shortages, $5.4 and $9.2 million under Mifflin ordered his troops to confiscate all ani- from 1776 to 1777, to an astounding mals that were fit for either military ser- $37 million in 1778 under Greene.37 35 vice or slaughter to ease their burden. Inflation, supply, and demand The army still needed a long- issues increased the cost of goods; term solution for keeping the troops however, these facts seemed to elude supplied. Greene’s command of this Congress. The Continentals were also mission proved to Washington that he competing with the British for resourc- was a capable leader with a keen sense es from the local economies and the

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British not only paid better, but also commissary departments.40 Congress did so in coin money, as opposed to the subsequently halted all bills of credit inflated paper currency the Americans and recommended that the army look could offer. Greene’s expenditures put to the colonies to support the war, a him at odds with Congress, which ac- burden they ultimately refused. This cused him of inflating purchases and left the army with no way to fund itself. profiteering.38 Greene saw the proverbial “writing on Regardless of the pushback from the wall,” and wrote Congress his con- Congress, Greene diligently carried out ditional resignation as Quartermaster his duties as Quartermaster. Brokering General. His request was ignored. deals with New England and French Greene was adamant about mov- companies, he obtained much-needed ing out of the department, but Congress supplies and equipment. He enlisted ignored his repeated requests for resig- skilled tradesmen to build and repair nation. When he finally got a response, transport vehicles, weapons, and a myr- it was in the form of an investigation iad of other equipment that required into his department on accusations of routine maintenance. He even estab- inflation and profiteering. Fortunately, lished standards for encampments that for Greene, the results of the investiga- mitigated many of the messes he had tion were favorable, finding no fault in encountered as a commander. These either his organization or the admin- standardizations included site selection istration of the department. Neverthe- considerations, latrine locations, and less, Congress felt it was in their best security checkpoints emplacements. interest to intervene anyway, proposing Additionally, Greene established chains a complete overhaul of the department of supply stores and magazines, the aimed at cutting costs while bolstering construction of boats, and transpor- accountability. Congress’ interference tation routes that took into consider- with Greene and his department pro- ation both land routes and waterways.39 voked him to write Congress a scathing Greene made vast improvements to the letter that almost cost him his commis- Quartermaster Department, seemingly sion. However, at Washington’s press- making the best of a less than ideal sit- ing, Greene maintained his commis- uation for a man who pined for battle- sion and Congress finally honored his field glory. resignation on July 26, 1780.41 Regardless of his improvements Between his resignation from to the department, his conflict with the quartermaster department and his Congress only grew worse over time. assignment as the commander of the When a projections report was sub- Southern Department, Greene was sent mitted to Congress proposing a supply to preside over the trial of Major John budget for 1779, the number came in André in the wake of the Benedict Ar- at over $200 million, a figure that infu- nold affair. André was sentenced on riated Congress, which opened an in- September 29, 1780, and was hanged vestigation into the quartermaster and October 2. Following the tribunal,

104 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green

Greene requested to fill the void left ed, the Southern Department was just as by Arnold as the commander of West dire. Command of the department had Point. Greene’s request was granted on changed hands four times since the be- October 14, but it would be a short- ginning of the war, with little strategic lived assignment.42 success. When Greene arrived in North After Horatio Gates was rout- Carolina to replace Gates on December , ed at Camden on August 16, 1780, the 2 1780, he was met with what little re- Southern Department was in a des- mained of the department. Although of- perate state. The militia had scattered: ficially authorized seventeen thousand many of the Continentals were slaugh- troops, he had 2,307 on paper, 1,482 tered, while just as many were captured, of whom were present for duty and of conscripted, or imprisoned by the those, less than eight hundred who were 43 British. The war in the South had been properly fit and equipped for combat. raging on in the background since the Greene believed that an offensive beginning of the war. However, its sig- strategy was a failing endeavor and felt nificance and intensity were amplified that establishing a defensive posture when Britain tried to use the South as would provide the army the time and a back door into the country starting space required to build a formidable with Savannah, GA on December 29, fighting force of regular troops. Greene 1778. Britain quickly capitalized on its believed that Britain’s offense-driven new strategy, seizing the whole of Geor- strategy in the North was flawed. He gia in late 1779 before moving up into likened their efforts to a ship “a ship the Carolinas. plowing the Ocean.” He observed that as Britain planned to use its Loyal- soon as the British had passed, the rebels ist following in the Southern colonies reformed around and behind them. He to bolster their war effort. The intent figured that as long as the army could was to employ a small force of British prove they could provide support to the regulars to orchestrate and inspire the people, the army could not be beaten. Loyalist militias; however, the turnout However, if the army were destroyed, of Loyalist fighters did not meet expec- the people would not rally.44 tations. Nonetheless, it certainly aggra- Greene sensed the same dynamic vated the ongoing civil war between in the Southern colonies. Much of what Whig and Tory partisans. While Britain Greene had determined was shaped by planned to only supplement the militias the conclusions he had made regarding in the South, Lord Charles Cornwallis public opinion. Where he once would was ultimately given about one-third of have justified the killing of Loyalists out the British force to execute the strategy. of principle, he now understood that Greene was appointed as the this would only exacerbate the problem. commander of the Southern Depart- By considering public opinion he hoped ment on October 14, 1780. Like the to embolden Patriots and leverage neu- Quartermaster Department he inherit- trals while mitigating Tory upheavals.45

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Greene felt that the troops were in the Southern colonies, but Greene “living symbols” of the American cause loathed militiamen. His experience had and that the “righteousness of the cause” shown him that they were unreliable would be judged by how the troops were and that they often scattered in battle. perceived.46 This dynamic would argu- Nonetheless, the bulk of Greene’s force ably be more significant in the South throughout the Southern Campaign where atrocities were being committed was comprised of militiamen.48 by both sides. Greene believed that if The Partisans in the south had his soldiers lacked discipline, not only been fighting their war since the begin- could they lose local Whig support, but ning of the revolution and possessed a also could also energize dormant Loy- unique set of skills obtained from fight- alists and turn neutral parties against ing irregular warfare with Natives. They them. By conducting themselves ap- also possessed an unparalleled knowl- propriately, they could bolster support edge of the Southern landscape, one while mitigating resistance. that differed greatly from those in the Public opinion had long been northern and middle-Atlantic colonies. a part of Greene’s strategy. This is evi- While Greene may not have cared for denced through his general orders and irregular troops, they were indispens- directives dating back to 1775 where he able to him, and he put them to work ordered his troops “to prevent plunder- the best way he could when they decid- ing, destruction to property, or even in- ed to show up.49 sults to civilians.” However, at the time Supplies were also an issue in the Greene only applied these orders to the Southern colonies. While the north- Whigs. In the South, Greene came to ern and middle-Atlantic colonies were believe that these same courtesies need- more densely populated and estab- ed to be extended to the Tories if they lished, the Southern colonies contained were to succeed. His orders during the vast expanses of wilderness. The supply Southern Campaign stated that there issues experienced in the North were needed to be “a happy medium between naturally worse in the South. Further- too great severity and too much indul- more, the years of bloody civil war gence [and that] [a]ny punishment for had wrought havoc on the southern Tories should not extend to ‘proscrip- landscape, which found both armies tion and confiscation.’”47 scrounging for resources. Although Greene’s defensive strategy was Greene had done well to establish con- also out of necessity for his lack of a tracts for supplies in preparation for his standing army. Though he understood command of the Southern Department, that neither side could maintain a large there was no shortage of problems fac- force in the region, he needed to buy ing his supply crisis. time until he could build a regular army Greene’s Southern Department strong enough to take on Cornwal- needed a strategy that took all of these lis. There was no shortage of Partisans elements into account. Against con-

106 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green ventional wisdom, Greene did the un- incurred by Greene’s army at Guilford thinkable and divided his forces into Courthouse were a sour victory for two major elements in the face of a nu- Cornwallis. Britain knew they could merically superior force. He sent eight not continue to sustain such burden- hundred light troops, dubbed the “fly- some victories. ing army,” west under the command Greene’s Southern strategy is of- of Brigadier General Daniel Morgan ten considered an integral link between while Greene maintained a force of conventional and unconventional war- one thousand troops as the main army. fare. He figured out how to effectively His orders to Morgan were to protect use conventional forces and strategy in the people in his quarter, while rallying concert with unconventional forces and their spirit, antagonizing the British, strategy, ebbing and flowing as the sit- collecting supplies, and establishing uation dictated. Elements of his strate- supply stores. gy are found in Maoist mobile warfare, Greene understood that he could the conflict in Vietnam, and even the not keep all of his troops in one loca- current conflicts in the Middle East. tion. To do so not only held the poten- Seemingly, over two hundred years ago, tial to exhaust local resources, but also Greene helped design a strategy that put him in a position to place the whole wreaks havoc on those who find them- of his army in harm’s way at one time selves on the receiving end of it. should Cornwallis engage. By splitting Nathanael Greene was certain- his forces, he could move faster, spread ly not the only Continental officer to out resource consumption over a larger ascend to military fame with a limited area, and subsequently cause Cornwal- background in military affairs, but it lis to thin out his forces in pursuit, thus seems certain that no other rose either creating a more manageable enemy for higher or faster than he. Greene pos- Greene. sessed an unparalleled ability to ob- Greene’s Southern Campaign re- serve, learn, synthesize, design, apply, lied heavily on small-scale operations. It and execute winning strategies. The is estimated that 80 percent of the fight- development of his intellect that started ing during the American Revolution in his youth came to an apex during his was conducted in the South; however, command of the Southern Department. most of them were minor skirmishes While he may be considered by some as that remain unnamed.50 Nonetheless, a conservative, mediocre battle captain the few pitched battles Greene’s army with a losing record, Greene challenged engaged in proved successful. The Bat- tradition by learning that the key to suc- tle of Cowpens was a tactical victory cess was not necessarily in one’s ability for Daniel Morgan, and the Battle of to compile decisive victories. His strate- Guilford Courthouse, though a tacti- gy is validated in that he won one of the cal loss, proved to be a strategic success most significant campaigns of the war for Greene. The casualties the British without a single decisive victory. He

107 The Saber and Scroll understood that attempting to achieve major areas of concern when predict- traditional measures of success could ing success. Nonetheless, he possessed ultimately lose the war, but that tactical exactly what the army needed: superior losses could be considered strategic vic- intellect, competence, a vision, and the tories, and that these strategic victories audacity to carry out that vision. Real- held the potential to lead to total vic- izing Greene and his ability to develop, tory. This strategy proved true and ef- implement, execute, and succeed at the fective for Greene during the Southern seemingly impossible proves that he was Campaign. not the overly conservative commander Nothing about Greene suggest- with a lack of battlefield splendor as he ed that he would become one of the is sometimes depicted. Rather, he was most significant military leaders of the a man who understood his circum- American Revolution. His physical ail- stances, determined what was possible, ments coupled with his meteoric rise and executed successful strategies, thus to military leadership without having making him the most significant anti- the requisite experience are arguably hero of the American Revolution.

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Washington, George. “Commander Washington’s General Orders, July 4, 1775.” Library of Congress. Accessed May 2, 2020. http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroom materials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/or derone.html.

Washington, George. “Commander Washington’s General Orders, July 5, 1775.” Library of Congress. Accessed May 2, 2020, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroom materials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/or dertwo.html.

Washington, George. “Commander Washington’s General Orders, July 7, 1775.” Library of Congress. Accessed May 5, 2020. http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroom materials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/or dertri.html.

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Caldwell, Charles. Memoirs of the Life and Campaigns of the Honorable Nathaniel Greene, Major General in the Army of the United States, and Commander of the Southern Department, in the War of the Revolution. Philadelphia: Robert DeSilver, 1819.

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Notes

1 European military tradition placed aristocrats in the position of higher commands while those of lesser status served as captains and lieutenants. Ascension was often based on a balance of wealth and influence, coupled with military exploits and accom- plishments. The Patriots did not necessarily have this luxury. Even of the first eight Brigadier Generals in the Continental Army, two had no prior combat experience: John Sullivan and Nathanael Greene. Aside from combat experience, even George Washington understood “that he lacked the experience and knowledge in handling large bodies of men.” These dynamics were even more prevalent in positions of less- er rank. Richard W. Stewart, ed., American Military History, vol. 1: The United States Army and the Forging of a Nation, 1775–1917 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2005), 23, 51.

2 John W. Hall, “My Favorite Officer,” Sons of the Father: George Washington and His Protégés, ed. Robert McDonald (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2013), 161.

3 Terry Golway, Washington’s General: Nathanael Greene and the Triumph of the Amer- ican Revolution (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 2005), 15; Gerald M. Carbone, Na- thanael Greene: A Biography of the American Revolution (New York: Palgrave MacMil- lan, 2008), 15.

4 Theodore Thayer, Nathanael Greene: Strategist of the American Revolution (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960), 44. Thayer speculates that “Giles” was William Giles (Yale, Class of 1763); however, Johnson, in Sketches, 9, stated that “Giles” was attending the University of Rhode Island.

5 William Johnson, Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, Major General of the Armies of the United States, in the War of the Revolution vol. 1 (Charles- ton: A.E. Miller, 1822), 16.

6 Henry A. Brown, Oration at Valley Forge, June 19, 1878 (Philadelphia: Christopher Sower Co., 1911), 52; Justin S. Liles, “The Reluctant Partisan: Nathanael Greene’s South-

112 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green

ern Campaigns, 1780–1783,” Thesis, University of North Texas Libraries Digital Li- brary, May 2005, 12, https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc4766/m2/1/high _res_d/thesis.pdf.

7 George W. Greene, The Life of Nathanael Greene, Major-General in the Army of the Revolution (Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1846), 83.

8 Thayer,Nathanael Greene, 36–39.

9 Johnson, Sketches of the Life and Correspondence of Nathanael Greene, 15.

10 “Kentish Guards: Rhode Island Militia,” accessed April 9, 2020, http://www.kentish guards.org/.

11 Thayer, 44.

12 Carbone, Nathanael Greene, 16–17.

13 Thayer, 46; Charles Caldwell, Memoirs of the Life and Campaigns of the Honorable Na- thaniel Greene, Major General in the Army of the United States, and Commander of the Southern Department, in the War of the Revolution (Philadelphia: Robert DeSilver, 1819), 40.

14 Thayer, 44; Carbone, 17.

15 Carbone, 19.

16 Thayer, 50–51.

17 Thayer, 51.

18 John M. Dederer, Making Bricks without Straw: Nathanael Greene’s Southern Campaign and Mao Tse-Tung’s Mobile War (Manhattan, KS: Sunflower University Press, 1983), 5; Roger J. Bresnahan, “William Gilmore Simms's Revolutionary War: A Romantic View of Southern History,” Studies in Romanticism 15, no. 4 (1976): 575, https://doi. org/10.2307/25600050; Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The National Experience (New York: Random House, 1965), 362–72. Boorstin provides a good overview of the writing and publishing dynamic in the new republic. In the chapter “The Quest for a National Past,” Boorstin explains the circumstances, motives, and evolution of Amer- ica’s attempt at creating its documented identity. Understanding the situation during early publications helps to explain the portrayal of the American Revolution.

19 Don Higginbotham, “Some Reflections on the South in the American Revolution, The Journal of Southern History 73, no. 3 (August, 2007): 660; Golway, Washington’s Gener- al, 49.

20 Golway, 49.

21 G.W. Greene, The Life of Nathanael Greene, 88-89; Golway, 56.

22 George Washington, “Commander Washington’s General Orders, July 4, 1775,” Li- brary of Congress, accessed May 2, 2020, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommater

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ials/presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/orderone. html; Washington, “Commander Washington’s General Orders, July 5, 1775,” Library of Congress, accessed May 2, 2020, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/ presentationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/ordertwo.html; Washington, “Commander Washington’s General Orders, July 7, 1775,” Library of Con- gress, accessed May 5, 2020, http://www.loc.gov/teachers/classroommaterials/presen tationsandactivities/presentations/timeline/amrev/contarmy/ordertri.html.

23 G.W. Greene, The Life of Nathanael Greene, 89.

24 Carbone, 24; George F. Scheer and Hugh F. Rankin, Rebels and Redcoats (New York: De Capo Press, 1957), 82.

25 G.W. Greene, “Life of Nathanael Greene,” The Library of American Biography, vol. X, ed. Jared Sparks (Boston: C.C. Little and J. Brown, 1846), 31. Liles, “The Reluctant Par- tisan,” 9.

26 Nathanael Greene, “To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 5 September 1776,” National Archives, accessed July 16, 2020, https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Washington/03-06-02-0180.

27 John Buchanan, The Road to Guilford Courthouse (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1997), 266; G.W. Greene, The Life of Nathanael Greene, 215–16.

28 Benjamin L. Huggins, “Washington’s Worst Defeat,” Washington Papers, May 25, 2017, https://washingtonpapers.org/washingtons-worst-defeat/; Carbone, 44.

29 “Fabian Strategy,” George Washington’s Mount Vernon, accessed March 29, 2020, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/fa bian-strategy/.

30 Nathanael Greene, “To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 24 November 1777,” National Archives, accessed April 23, 2020, https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Washington/03-12-02-0373.

31 Ibid.

32 Nathanael Greene, “To George Washington from Major General Nathanael Greene, 1 December, 1777,” National Archives, accessed April 30, 2020, https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Washington/03-12-02-0445.

33 Golway, 162; Curtis F. Morgan Jr., “Nathanael Greene’s Northern Apprenticeship,” Gen- eral Nathanael Greene and the American Revolution in the South, ed. G. Massey and J. Piecuch, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 2012), 46; John Ferling, Almost a Miracle: The American Victory in the War of Independence (Cary: Oxford University Press USA - OSO, 2009), 278.

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

114 Forging the Vision: Nathanael Green

36 Golway, 165; Morgan, “Nathanael Greene’s Northern Apprenticeship,” 47. 37 Ferling, Almost a Miracle, 280. 38 Norman C. Boling, “Nathanael Greene – Underappreciated Patriot Part I,” Officer Re- view 54, no. 4 (November 2014): 7. 39 Morgan, 47–48. 40 G.W. Greene, The Life of Nathanael Greene, 315–19. 41 Thayer, 278; Nathanael Greene, “To George Washington from Nathanael Greene, 29 September 1780,” National Archives, accessed July 22, 2020, https://founders.archives. gov/documents/Washington/99-01-02-03434. 42 Nathanael Greene, “To George Washington from Nathanael Greene, 7 December 1780,” National Archives, accessed May 7, 2020, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Washington/99-01-02-04138; Raymond W. Lemaster, “Supplying Low Intensity Con- flict: Nathanael Greene's Southern Campaign of 1781,” Quartermaster Professional Bul- letin (Spring 1990): 20. 43 James Haw, “‘Everything Here Depends upon Opinion’: Nathanael Greene and Public Support in the Southern Campaigns of the American Revolution,” South Carolina His- torical Magazine (July 2008), 215. 44 Haw, “‘Everything Here Depends upon Opinion,’” 220; Nathanael Greene, “To Alex- ander Hamilton from Major General Nathanael Greene, 10 January 1781,” National Archives, accessed April 13, 2020, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/ 01-02-02-1014. 45 Golway, 51. 46 Haw, 217.

47 N. Greene, “To Alexander Hamilton from Major General Nathanael Greene, 10 Janu- ary 1781.” 48 Haw, 220. 49 Jac Weller, “Irregular but Effective: Partizan Weapons Tactics in the American Revolu- tion, Southern Theatre,” Military Affairs 21, no. 3 (1957): 118. https://doi.org/10.2307 /1984281. 50 Liles, 50; Mao Tse-Tung, “Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung: Basic Tactics, 1937,” marx ists.org; https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-6/m swv6_28.htm; Daniel Canfield, “The Futility of Force and the Preservation of Power: British Strategic Failure in America, 1780-83,” Parameters 42, no. 3 (October 1, 2012): 70–73.

115

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 America at War: The Common Cup

Meg Groeling American Military University

Abstract “The Common Cup” is an approximately four-thousand-word dis- cussion of the importance of coffee in the Union armies during the American Civil War. The history of Civil War coffee is traced, in- cluding the lack of coffee in the Confederacy due to the blockade of Southern ports. Several letters and diaries are quoted concerning the importance of coffee to a soldier’s daily routine, and how dis- tressed a soldier became when there was no opportunity for even the briefest coffee break. The Christian Commission’s “Coffee Wagon” is noted as one of the ways volunteer citizen groups could provide comfort to their fight- ing men in the field and in hospitals. The story of the Sharps Car- bine “Coffee Grinder” Rifle is told; exposing it as a hoax, although there was no proof it was perpetrated intentionally. Finally, the importance of coffee to group cohesion and task ori- entation is noted. Coffee was more than just a beverage. An “Af- terward” presents several links to video offerings concerning Civil War coffee. This is included because of the quality of the videos and the belief of the author that video offerings such as these are a vital part of the changes in the way history will be presented in the twenty-first century. Keywords: Christian Commission “Coffee Wagon,” coffee sub- stitutes in the South, Hardtack & Coffee, Sharps Carbine “Coffee Grinder” Rifle, trading coffee for tobacco, Union blockade, video blogs

EE. UU. en guerra: The Common Cup Resumen “The Common Cup” es una discusión de aproximadamente cua- tro mil palabras sobre la importancia del café en los ejércitos de la Unión durante la Guerra Civil estadounidense. Se rastrea la histo-

117 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.7 The Saber and Scroll

ria del café de la Guerra Civil, incluida la falta de café en la Confe- deración debido al bloqueo de los puertos del sur. Se citan varias cartas y diarios sobre la importancia del café en la rutina diaria de un soldado, y lo angustiado que se sentía un soldado cuando no había oportunidad ni siquiera para un breve descanso para tomar café. El “Coffee Wagon” de la Comisión Cristiana se considera una de las formas en que los grupos de ciudadanos voluntarios pueden brindar consuelo a sus combatientes en el campo y en los hospita- les. Se cuenta la historia del rifle Sharps Carbine “Coffee Grinder”; exponiéndolo como un engaño, aunque no había pruebas de que fuera perpetrado intencionalmente. Finalmente, se destaca la importancia del café para la cohesión del grupo y la orientación a las tareas. El café era más que una bebida. Un “Afterward” presenta varios enlaces a ofertas de videos sobre el café de la Guerra Civil. Esto se incluye debido a la calidad de los vi- deos y la creencia del autor de que las ofertas de videos como estas son una parte vital de los cambios en la forma en que se presentará la historia en el siglo XXI. Palabras clave: “Coffee Wagon” de la comisión cristiana, sustitutos del café en el sur, Hardtack & Coffee, fusil Sharps Carbine “Coffee Grinder”, cambio de café por tabaco, bloqueo sindical, blogs de video

战争中的美国：The Common Cup 摘要

“The Common Cup” 是一次关于美国内战期间咖啡对联邦 的重要性的近4000字的讨论。追溯了内战咖啡史，包括联盟 因南方港口被封锁而缺少咖啡。引用了几封信件和日记，它 们记录了咖啡对士兵的每日流程的重要性，以及当连最简单 的咖啡休息机会都没有时士兵的沮丧程度。

基督教委员会（Christian Commission）的“咖啡车”被认 为是志愿公民团体能为战场和医院中的士兵提供舒适的其中 一种方法。讲述了能“研磨咖啡豆”的夏普斯卡宾步枪的故 事；这是一个骗局，虽然没有证据证明这是有意为之的。

最后，提到了咖啡对团队凝聚力和任务定向的重要性。咖啡

118 America at War: The Common Cup

不仅仅是一杯饮料。提供了几个关于内战咖啡的视频链接。 提供这些链接是因为视频的高质量和作者的信念—即这样的 视频是变革（21世纪历史呈现方式的变革）的重要部分。

关键词：基督教委员会“咖啡车”，南方的咖啡替代物，《 硬饼干和咖啡》（Hardtack & Coffee），夏普斯卡宾步枪（伴 有“咖啡研磨”功能），以咖啡换烟草，联邦封锁，视频博 客

merica may have begun as a To many, Union General-in- tea-drinking collection of colo- Chief Winfield Scott’s far-reaching “An- nies, but that did not last long. aconda” plan to encircle the seceded A“Boston Harbor Sun Tea” never caught Confederate states seemed like a purely on, but coffee did. Even John Adams economic approach instead of a plan of called for the universal adoption of action that would get the North’s blood coffee. “Tea must be universally re- in a boil. The blockade of southern nounced!”1 And so coffee it was, except ports appeared passive. A noisy faction in the military, which got a daily ration of Union generals who wanted a more of alcohol. Until October 1832, that is. vigorous prosecution of the war wide- In response to complaints from offi- ly derided Scott’s idea. They likened the cers and the public about injuries and plan to the coils of a snake suffocating insubordination, President Andrew its victim. The image caught on, giv- Jackson substituted coffee and sugar for ing the proposal its popular name. The the daily military allotment of rum and Union generals proved to be shortsight- 2 brandy. This caused the average impor- ed in the extreme. tation of coffee to rise from twelve mil- But back to coffee .... The cap- lion pounds a year to over thirty-eight ture of the port of New Orleans early in million pounds. By 1840, New Orleans the war cut off most of the available cof- became the second-largest importer of fee beans in the South. Union General coffee beans due to proximity to Brazil Ben Butler was able to reroute coffee and public demand. By 1860, Ameri- ca imported over 182 million pounds ships up the coast to Boston and New of the unroasted bitter green beans. York. The North never had a problem New Orleans gained fame for its care- getting coffee or paying far too much ful roasting and blending of coffee, al- for it. The South was another matter. though it also shipped green (unroast- For Confederates—soldiers and ed) beans to the South, the North, and civilians alike—real coffee was in very the Midwest. Then came the Civil War short supply. President Jefferson Davis’s and the Anaconda Plan.3 commissary did not even attempt to

119 The Saber and Scroll

“Coffee Call,” by Winslow Homer. Print shows Army of the Potomac soldiers wait- ing for coffee at a campfire in an encampment. Library of Congress, 2013650297.

Coffee advertisement, US Standard Coffee, Inline Images, Getty Museum.

120 America at War: The Common Cup supply the Southern armies with a hot indicated that a soldier was miserable beverage. Gray-clad soldiers tried ev- when he missed his cup of coffee. The erything they could think of to replace worst thing possible was for someone the magic bean, including alternatives to accidentally spill coffee or ground like roasted acorns, malted barley, cot- beans, depriving others of their right- tonseed, sweet potato peels, and the ful ration. The North’s access to caffeine ever-present chicory root.4 Each was may have given Union soldiers a strate- toasted or mixed with a little bit of cof- gic advantage. General Benjamin Butler fee so that the drink would be brown. ordered his men always to carry coffee It looked like coffee, anyway. The most in their canteens. He was said to have successful of the substitutes was chicory planned attacks based on when his men root. In 1863, a small stand opened in would be most wired. His advice to oth- the French Market, New Orleans. The er generals: “If your men get their coffee coffee sold at Café du Monde is still one early in the morning, you can hold.”6 of the most popular coffees in Ameri- ca. Confederate General George Pickett John D. Billings, in his appro- grew very fond of one of these substi- priately named book Hardtack & Cof- tutes, preferring a cup of morning sweet fee, wrote: potato to one of actual coffee. No one is The rations may have been small, certain if this continued after the war.5 the commissary or quartermaster The Union, however, had cof- may have given us a short allow- fee. Prices went up, but the value of the ance, but what we got was good. dollar held up as well. It was plentiful And what a perfect Godsend it and affordable for most. At 1.25 ounces seemed to us at times! How of- per day per soldier, the average blue- ten, after being completely jaded clad drank over thirty-six pounds of by a night march,—and this is coffee in a year. What is known about an experience common to thou- Civil War soldiers and their beverage of sands,—have I had a wash, if choice comes from several sources: dia- there was water to be had, made ries, letters, and memoirs are the prima- and drunk my pint or so of cof- ry places in which coffee is mentioned. fee, and felt as fresh and invig- According to historian Jon Grinspan, orated as if just arisen from a the curator of political history at the night’s sound sleep! 7 8 Smithsonian Institution’s National Mu- Billings argued that bread, not seum of American History, “The word coffee, should top the list of importance ‘coffee’ is mentioned more times than to a soldier. He then offers several ex- ‘bullets,’ ‘war,’ ‘cannon,’ ‘Lincoln,’ and even ‘mother.’ You can only ignore what amples of pertinent coffee information they’re talking about for so long before that, collectively, prove him wrong: you realize that’s the story.” Even around Whatever words of condemna- the campfire, much of the talk centered tion or criticism may have been on the quality of that day’s joe. Letters bestowed on other government

121 The Saber and Scroll

“Trading for Coffee and Tobacco Between the Fortified Lines During a Truce” plate35 is from Edwin Forbes’ publication “Life Studies of the Great Army.”8

rations, there was but one opin- cern about the safety of his coffee and ion of the coffee which was regularly noted when he had made his served out, and that was of un- daily cup: 9 qualified approval. I had an excellent breakfast that It was coffee at meals and be- morning; if you doubt it, allow tween meals; men going on guard me to tell you what I had. I had or coming off guard drank it at a slice of fat pork, good enough all hours of the night. and to-day, for anybody to eat, plenty of hard the old soldiers who can stand it tack, and COFFEE. I doubt if are the hardest coffee-drinkers ever the Prince of Wales enjoyed 11 in the community, through the a meal better. schooling they received in the Often Fisk related stories concerning 10 service. the results of the lack of coffee: Private Wilber Fisk of the 2nd Vermont One fellow ... had been assid- Volunteers mentioned coffee several uously preparing him a cup of times in his diary, published as Hard coffee for his dinner, and which Marching Every Day. He evidenced con- he seemed to regard as of more

122 America at War: The Common Cup

than ordinary value because it son Gilpin, a Union cavalryman, wrote was the last that he had the ma- in his diary, “Everything is chaos here. terial for making. He has ... just The suspense is almost unbearable. We got his coffee heated to the boil- are reduced to quarter rations and no ing point when the officer of the coffee,” he continued. “And nobody can day came along, and he was or- soldier without coffee.”13 dered with the rest of us to fall in. The lack of coffee in the Con- Everybody knows that when cof- fee first boils, it takes a mischie- federacy affected soldiers and civilians vous fancy to running over. This alike. The acquisition of “magic beans” fellow waited a little too long. His became a major preoccupation. An coffee made out to boil, and in American Battlefield Trust article on his hurry to remove it from the coffee relates an oral history from one fire, he spilled the whole of it and Virginia family: burned himself in the bargain As Union soldiers moved out .... it was more than this soldier after a small skirmish in the could muster, and the conse- Northern Neck, Confederates quence was that he invoked ter- scoured the campsites for every rible imprecations of wrath upon bean left behind, regardless of the heads of all officers in general 12 the dirt and debris clinging to and this one in particular. the dropped bits. It was too pre- In April 1865, at the bloody, bit- cious of a commodity to leave in ter end of the Civil War, Ebenezer Nel- the field.14 15

The Coffee Wagon,” The US Christian Commission. The Coffee Wagon was in- vented, built, and presented to the Commission, by Mr. Jacob Dunton, of Phila- delphia.15

123 The Saber and Scroll

Union soldiers suffered, al- ment to soldier comfort to new heights. though not as much, from a lack of Firm in the belief that caring for bodies tobacco. The blockade cut both ways, was a conduit to caring for the soul, the and Civil War soldiers were enterpris- men and women of the YMCA went so ing. When armies were camped close far as to invent and use a new-fangled together, informal truces were created contraption called the Coffee Wagon.17 to help alleviate the tobacco-caffeine Jacob Dunton of Philadelphia designed, situation. Some degree of stealth was built, and presented the first one to the involved, and stories abound of ways in Commission. Reverend C.H. Richards, a which soldiers communicated their dis- commissioner who rendered service to parate needs. the Ninth and Eighteenth Corps, in July Soldiers frequently mentioned 1864, described its use: physical truces with the opposing side. There was a call for coffee. A In Petersburg, Virginia, James Hall, a party of Delegates at once vol- soldier in the Thirty-First Virginia In- unteered to respond to the call. fantry, wrote that his troop and a Union The fires were lighted, the water unit maintained a truce “for a few min- boiled, the coffee made, and soon utes,” while he “exchanged papers with the vehicle, drawn by two power- a Yankee,” and others received coffee ful horses, and attended by half a before “both parties resumed firing.” score of willing laborers, was on Charles Lynch, a soldier in the 18th its way from division to division. Connecticut Infantry, describes a sim- ilar situation: Up the hospital avenue it rum- bled and rolled, past the long Our boys and the Johnnies on rows of white tents, stopping at the skirmish line entered into an this cluster and that, giving to agreement not to fire on one an- all from its generous supply. You other. For proof, they fixed bayo- should have seen the wondering nets on their guns, sticking them look of the men as it passed by. in the ground, butts up .... Boys They rolled themselves over to would meet between the lines, 16 get a glimpse of it. They stretched exchange tobacco for coffee. their necks for a sight of it. The There are Civil War coffee tales, wounded heads forgot to ache, and there are Civil War coffee legends, and the wounded limbs almost some true, some not so much. A couple forgot to cry for nursing in that of these legends revolve around devices moment of eager curiosity. Was created specifically for coffee. The US it a new sort of ambulance? It Sanitary Commission, Clara Barton, and didn’t look like one. What did the Christian Commission all recognized those three black pipes mean, the importance of coffee to the Union and those three glowing fires? Is it soldier. However, it was the Christian a steam fire-engine, and are they Commission that took their commit- going to give us a shower-bath?

124 America at War: The Common Cup

But the savory odor that sa- of men wet, muddy, battle-worn, lying luted their nostrils, and the down on the ground, without shelter or delicious beverage the engine fire,” he asked, “have been saved by the poured into their little cups, hot draught of coffee thus administered soon put the matter beyond all to them?”19 doubt. They soon found that The second “contraption” in- there was no necromancy about volving coffee and the Civil War has a it, for it had a substantial bless- less illustrious, and probably more du- ing for each of them, giving it bious story behind it—The Sharps Car- their blessings in return. One by bine Coffee Grinder Rifle. Legend has one, such as were able, crowded it that Missouri cavalryman Lieutenant about it with curious faces, and Col. Walter King developed a grinding the wagon, as it stood steaming mill that could be incorporated into the and glowing in the midst, was buttstock of a Sharps carbine. In Janu- the theme of many affectionate ary 1865, King’s invention was tested comments. ‘I say, Bill, ain’t that a and reviewed by Lincoln’s inspection bully machine?’ ‘Yes, sir; it’s the board. However, their reports claim that greatest institution I ever saw.’ the mill was actually to be used to grind ‘That’s what you might call the grain, not coffee. According to plans, Christian Light Artillery,’ says the purpose of such an invention was to a third. ‘Good deal pleasanter supply one man in each cavalry compa- ammunition in it than the Rebs ny one of these grinder guns. That sol- sent us this morning.’ ‘Well, doc- dier would be responsible for grinding tor,’ said a Delegate to a surgeon, grain for the men in his unit when they ‘what do you think of this?’ ‘I were living “out of the saddle.” thank the Lord for it. That’s all I can say,’ was his reply. There were issues: And so the new invention was • efficiency—if soldiers were lucky crowned with the praises and enough to stumble upon a sizable benedictions of the admiring amount of grain while out forag- crowd. It was a marked feature ing, chances are that it would have in the work of the day, and must been near a mill that could be used be set down as one of the ‘pe- to grind the grain in a much more culiar institutions’ of the Com- efficient manner. mission.”18 • compatibility—the mill was de- George Stuart, the Philadelphia signed to work with a solid buttstock, dry goods merchant who served as Pres- meaning it could not be adapted for ident of the Commission throughout its use in a Spencer carbine because the lifespan, was not shy about singing the magazine tube was located where coffee wagons’ praises: “How many lives the grinder would need to go.

125 The Saber and Scroll

• weight—officials believed that if Nevertheless, Lt. King’s contraption a soldier was going to have to add certainly looked like a coffee grinder. weight to his kit, it should come in Since grain is usually ground in larger the form of ammunition, not a nov- quantities than the amount held by the elty grinder. Sharps grinder, many assumed it was, in fact, a coffee grinder.20

“William McKinley Serves Coffee.” “Coffee Bill” Monument, Antietam National Battlefield, National Park Service.

Several years ago, the gun at the grind coffee beans with one of the rifles Springfield Armory in Massachusetts in their collection. They, too, found that was discovered with coffee grounds it was unsuitable. As impressive as the still in the mill when it was cleaned by idea might be, and intriguing as the im- museum staff. The leftover coffee was ages are, the Sharps Carbine Coffee Mill not from the Civil War. It was from a Rifle was never really a “thing.” Sever- more recent test done by the armory’s al museums claiming to have original director, who did not thoroughly clean versions of this gun have probably been it afterward. His results indicated that taken in. Most of America’s gun collec- the mill could grind coffee, but not tors claim that there are perhaps twelve particularly well. Even the redoubtable authentic versions in existence. There historians at the National Park Service were Coffee Wagons, but no coffee mill tested the coffee mill. They attempted to guns.21

126 America at War: The Common Cup

One of the most memorable ex- The men held out tin cups, gulped Pri- amples of just how much a cup of coffee vate McKinley’s brew, and started firing meant to a Union soldier is illustrated again. by a monument on the Antietam bat- The monument at Antietam reads: tlefield near Burnside’s Bridge. It was erected in 1903 and commemorates William McKinley the place where an enlisted nineteen- January 29, 1843 - September year-old brought pots of hot coffee to 14, 1901 his battling regiment during combat in Fourteen Years Member of the battle of Antietam. It was the morn- Congress ing of September 17, 1862. The Twen- Twice Governor of Ohio 1892- ty-Third Ohio had marched two miles 2 and 1894-5 to enter the firefight at a stone bridge spanning Antietam Creek. They had left Twice President of United camp without breakfast or even a cup States 1897-1900-1901 of coffee. It was the job of young Pri- Sergeant McKinley Co. E. 23rd vate William McKinley, former Ohio Ohio Vol. Infantry, while in schoolteacher and current Commissary charge of the Commissionary Sergeant, to feed his men, and there had Department, on the after- been no time to do so. From McKinley’s noon of the day of the battle of position back at camp, he could hear Antietam, September 17, 1862, the sound of battle. He quickly decid- personally and without orders ed what he could do to help the cause. served hot coffee and warm food He brewed as much coffee as possible, to every man in the Regiment, grabbed some food, and loaded ev- on this spot and in doing so had erything into two wagons. Driving a to pass under fire.23 couple of mules, McKinley guided his team toward the battlefield. General J. When William McKinley braved enemy L. Botsford of the Ohio Volunteers later fire to bring his comrades a warm cup, wrote: he knew what it meant to them. It was nearly dusk when we heard Almost every event of the Civil tremendous cheering from the War has a coffee aspect, and this de- left of our regiment. As we had serves attention for one specific reason. been having heavy fighting right In general, Americans have always sup- up to this time, our division com- ported their military—from the earliest mander, General Scammon, sent militias before the Revolution to today’s me to find out the cause which I armed forces spread over the globe. Cit- very soon found to be cheers for izens have sought ways to show our peo- McKinley and his hot coffee. It ple in uniform that they are supported. was like putting a new regiment Coffee has long been recognized as es- in the fight.22 sential to good unit cohesion. Making

127 The Saber and Scroll and drinking coffee helps soldiers bond. makeshift cities, housing hundreds of They help each other make the brew, thousands of men. “They were in battle talk about its pros and cons, collectively maybe one or two weeks of the whole attempt to make better coffee, and com- year,” according to John Grinspan. plain about its absence when it is not “They weren’t always shooting their ri- there. To have coffee in common con- fles at enemies, or being chased or fired tributes to building and sustaining the upon, but every day they made coffee. will and the commitment to each other Here’s an irony. These soldiers who and the unit that is essential to success, were fighting ostensibly to end slavery despite combat or mission stress. This is were fueled by coffee from slave fields as true today as it ever was. Making and in Brazil.”24 sharing coffee brings aid and comfort to the battlefield and the camp. The Coffee Afterword Wagon, the steaming tin cup, and the communal pot draw troops together for his piece was written during the a moment of camaraderie amid the re- COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. alities of war. One of the interesting ideas to As the Civil War continued and Tcome from adapting to life in quaran- the Union army grew, its camps became tine was the increase in podcasts and

Private William McKinley, Twenty-Third Ohio Vol. Infantry, Co. E. National Park Service.

128 America at War: The Common Cup videos concerning a variety of subjects. The last two are videos of Zoom Most Civil War museums and many presentations created by the Nation- Civil War bloggers created a variety of al Museum of Civil War Medicine, in videos that, cumulatively, brought the Frederick, Maryland. These are excel- Civil War to the viewer at a time when lent examples of how a museum can it was impossible to travel to Civil War extend its influence beyond its walls. sites and museums. I watched many of Hopefully the success of such offerings these presentations and was inspired will start a trend. Jake Wynn and Kyle enough to choose coffee as a topic for Dalton—young historians of great per- this offering. Being a soldier is sort of sonality and presence—discuss a variety like being in quarantine, after all. The of topics, interacting with a computer links I am listing will inspire you as well, audience at the same time. “Coffee & the I am sure. Civil War” explains the history of coffee The first three are created by the as a military brew, adding the unique Civil War Digital Digest blog, or vlog. perspective of the NMCWM and their Reenactors provide a look at hands- own quirky personalities. One topic that comes up several times is the one of cof- on demonstrations of how to make an fee substitutes used in the Confederacy. authentic cup of Civil War coffee—no This lively exchange led to the second room for farbs in these presentations. video, “Confederate Coffee Substitutes.” “Coffee on Campaign” demonstrates This is a “home-made” offering shot in how to make an individual cup of cof- Kyle Dalton’s kitchen. Kyle, a coffee lov- fee while marching toward Georgia, or er in real life, cooks up five types of cof- anywhere else. “How to Roast Coffee” fees from Civil War recipes. Only one— shows how green coffee beans—which the “control”—is actual coffee. There are what were often delivered to the are four varieties of faux coffee: coffee camps—were cleaned, separated, and with whipped egg creamer, “Essence of carefully roasted by the individual sol- Coffee,” sweet potato coffee, and acorn/ dier. This is trickier than it sounds, and bacon coffee. Kyle’s long-suffering girl- the viewer can almost smell the results friend is asked to try them all and rate through the computer screen. “Coffee them. Spoiler alert! She survives. a la Zouave” demonstrates how camp cooks and commissary workers made Please, readers—brew up a cup coffee in larger batches, tending the of your favorite coffee, check these on- beans while the rest of the unit set up or line offerings out, and enjoy them. And cleaned camp. These are relatively short, always remember those who drank beautifully filmed, and very accurate. their coffee out of tin cups while under Whether creating a personal living his- fire. Huzzah! tory impression or doing research into the common soldier, each of these offer- ings is first-rate.

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Civil War Digital Digest Vol. 1, Episode 7, “Coffee a la Zouave.” https://video.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?fr=yhs-Lkry-SF1&h simp=yhs-SF1&hspart=Lkry&p=civil+war+digest+coffee# id=3&vid=ad9886307b86d9f38da6939c35337b8e&action=view. Civil War Digital Digest. Vol. 2 Episode 15, “Coffee on Campaign.” https://video.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?fr=yhs-Lkry-SF1&h- simp=yhs-SF1&hspart=Lkry&p=civil+war+digest+cof- fee#id=1&vid=547f861e5a0ffe9ff175bd02a4c0180a&action=click. Civil War Digital Digest, Vol. 2, Episode 22, “How to Roast Coffee.” https://video.search.yahoo.com/yhs/search?fr=yhs-Lkry-SF1& hsimp=yhs-SF1&hspart=Lkry&p=civil+war+digest+cof fee#id=2&vid=729d8a40dffdbb8025d3b2a04c42b610&ac tion=view. National Museum of Civil War Medicine, “Confederate Coffee Sub- stitutes, Kyle Dalton. https://www.facebook.com/CivilWarMed/ videos/2124041691074767/?notif_id=1592870649073365¬if_ t=live_video. National Museum of Civil War Medicine, “Coffee & the Civil War,” Jake Wynn & Kyle Dalton. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jm ORp0siOcs.

Notes

1 Letter from John Adams to Abigail Adams, July 6, 1774. https://www.masshist.org/ digitaladams/archive/doc?id=L17740706jasecond.

2 Ashley Webb, “Coffee & the Civil War.” https://www.battlefields.org/learn/articles/cof fee-and-civil-war.

3 Ibid.

4 Stephanie Ann, “Civil War Era Blockade Coffee Recipe,” World Turn’d Upside Down, March 10, 2016. https://www.worldturndupsidedown.com/2016/03/civil-war-era-bloc kade-coffee-recipe.html.

5 The Kitchen Sisters, ““If War Is Hell, Then Coffee Has Offered U.S. Soldiers Some Salva- tion,” NPR, July 25, 2016. https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/25/485227943/ if-war-is-hell-then-coffee-has-offered-u-s-soldiers-some-salvation. Of further note, if you’d care to try a little Civil War in your coffee mug, it is available: https://shop.cafedu monde.com/product/gifts/cafe-du-monde/cafe-du-monde-coffee-and-chicory/.

130 America at War: The Common Cup

6 Jon Grinspan, “War, Peace, & Coffee.” http://www.kitchensisters.org/hidden-kitchens/ war-and-peace-and-coffee/. 7 John D. Billings, Hardtack & Coffee (Chicago: The Lakeside Press, 1960), 123. 8 http://images.indianahistory.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/dc008/id/576/rec/2379 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., 130. 11 Emil & Ruth Rosenblatt, ed., Hard Marching Every Day: The Civil War letters of Private Wilber Fisk-1861–1865 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 119–20. 12 Ibid., 156–57. 13 Grinspan 14 Webb 15 https://www.asymca.org/coffee-wagon. 16 Ibid. 17 The Kitchen Sisters, “If War Is Hell, Then Coffee Has Offered U.S. Soldiers Some Salva- tion,” NPR, July 25, 2016. https://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/07/25/485227943/ if-war-is-hell-then-coffee-has-offered-u-s-soldiers-some-salvation. 18 Rachel Williams, “The United States Sanitary and Christian Commissions and the Union War Effort,” National Museum of Civil War Medicine, May 25, 2017. https:// www.civilwarmed.org/commissions/ 19 Armed services YMCA, “The Coffee Wagon,” reprinted from The Annals of the Chris- tian Commission, https://www.asymca.org/coffee-wagon. 20 Logan Metesh, “‘Coffee Mill’ Sharp’s Carbine–The Original Guns and Coffee,”The Truth About Guns, April 19, 2018. https://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/coffee-mill- sharps-carbine-the-original-guns-and-coffee/. 21 Chris Eger, “The ‘Coffee Grinder’ Sharps Carbine with a Mill Right in the Stock,” Feb- ruary 5, 2016. https://www.guns.com/news/2016/02/05/the-coffee-grinder-sharps-car bine-with-a-mill-right-in-the-stock-10-photos 22 Webb. 23 Ibid. 24 Grinspan.

131

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise Michael Romero America Public University Colonial Williamsburg Foundation

Abstract Eight ships of the recently established Continental Navy set sail from Philadelphia in February 1776. They were under orders from the Continental Congress to clear the Southern states’ waters of marauding British naval forces, such as those organized by Lord Dunmore of Virginia. Instead, Commodore Esek Hopkins led his squadron to New Providence in the Bahamas, where they captured desperately needed military stores. On the return trip, the Conti- nental crews contended with outbreaks of smallpox and tropical fe- ver aboard ship. Approaching New England, the squadron captured two small British vessels and chased the 20-gun HMS Glasgow into port. Despite Hopkins’ casual disregard of orders, Congress and the general public hailed the expedition as a great success upon the squadron’s return in April 1776. The ships of the Continental Navy had gathered valuable experience at sea and in combat that would serve the infant service well in the years to come. Keywords: American Revolution, Continental Navy, New Prov- idence, HMS Glasgow, Esek Hopkins, John Paul Jones, Nicholas Biddle, Samuel Nicholas, naval warfare, eighteenth century

El crucero Shakedown de la Marina Continental Resumen Ocho barcos de la Marina Continental recientemente establecida zarparon de Filadelfia en febrero de 1776. Estaban bajo las órde- nes del Congreso Continental de limpiar las aguas de los estados del sur de las fuerzas navales británicas merodeadores, como las organizadas por Lord Dunmore de Virginia. En cambio, el como- doro Esek Hopkins llevó a su escuadrón a New Providence en las Bahamas, donde capturaron provisiones militares que se necesita- ban desesperadamente. En el viaje de regreso, las tripulaciones de Continental se enfrentaron a brotes de viruela y fiebre tropical a bordo del barco. Al acercarse a Nueva Inglaterra, el escuadrón cap- turó dos pequeños buques británicos y persiguió al HMS Glasgow

133 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.8 The Saber and Scroll

de 20 cañones hasta el puerto. A pesar de la indiferencia casual de Hopkins hacia las órdenes, el Congreso y el público en gene- ral elogiaron la expedición como un gran éxito tras el regreso del escuadrón en abril de 1776. Los barcos de la Armada Continental habían acumulado una valiosa experiencia en el mar y en combate que serviría bien al servicio infantil. en los años venideros. Palabras clave: Revolución Americana, Marina Continental, New Providence, HMS Glasgow, Esek Hopkins, John Paul Jones, Nicho- las Biddle, Samuel Nicholas, guerra naval, siglo XVIII

大陆海军的试航巡洋舰 摘要

1776年2月，新成立的大陆海军派出8艘巡洋舰从费城启航。 它们受大陆会议（Continental Congress）的命令，清理在南 方州肆意掠夺的英国海军的水域，诸如这类由弗吉尼亚自治 领的邓莫尔勋爵组织的活动。然而，海军准将伊萨克·霍普 金斯（Esek Hopkins）将中队带到了巴哈马的新普罗维登斯 岛，他们在那获取了急需的军事储备。返程途中，大陆海军 船员与天花爆发及热带性发热病（tropical fever）作斗争。靠 近新英格兰时，中队俘获了两艘小型英国船只，并将装有20 炮的皇家海军舰艇“Glasgow”赶进了港口。尽管霍普金斯随 意忽视命令，但当中队于1776年4月返回后，大陆会议和公众 将这次探险称赞为一次巨大的成功。大陆海军巡洋舰在海上 和战争过程中获得的宝贵经验将在未来几年里为这一初期海 军事业服务。

关键词：美国革命，大陆海军，新普罗维登斯岛，皇家海军 舰艇“Glasgow”（HMS Glasgow），伊萨克·霍普金斯（Esek Hopkins），约翰·保罗·琼斯（John Paul Jones），尼古拉·比德 尔(Nicholas Biddle)，塞缪尔·尼古拉斯(Samuel Nicholas)，海 战， 十八世纪

n 5 January 1776, as newly engage any British forces they encoun- appointed “Commander-in- tered in the waters of Virginia and the Chief” of the Continental Carolinas, returning to do the same off ONavy, Esek Hopkins (1718–1802) was Rhode Island. He made use of an “un- ordered to take his squadron to sea and foreseen accidents” clause in his orders

134 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise from the Continental Congress rather other perceived shortcomings. Howev- than following them directly and ad- er, by disregarding his orders, Commo- opted his plan: the squadron conducted dore Hopkins provided the Continental an amphibious raid on the British colo- Navy with a valuable initial experience ny of New Providence in early March, that demonstrated its viability without weathered an outbreak of disease at sea, risking its early destruction. This paper and fought an unsuccessful engage- demonstrates the above thesis by exam- ment with the 20-gun HMS Glasgow ining Hopkins’s orders and the squad- before arriving at New London, Con- ron’s resources at his disposal and then necticut on 8 April. While the Conti- analyzing British naval strength in Vir- nental Congress initially praised the ginia as of spring 1776, the squadron’s squadron’s performance, Hopkins was performance at Nassau and against eventually censured and relieved of his Glasgow, and the immediate aftermath command for violating his orders and of their expedition.

Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet of the United Colonies, 1775– 1777. Citation: Painting by Orlando S. Lagman after a nineteenth-century en- graving by J.C. Buttre, Naval History and Heritage Command Photograph Col- lection, NH 85750-KN.

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Esek Hopkins was born on 26 tack, take or destroy all the Naval force April 1718 in Scituate, Rhode Island. He of our Enemies”3 that could be found. began to build his fortune from the sea The squadron was then to repeat the early on when he used money acquired process in the Carolinas and again in from his marriage to Desire Burroughs Rhode Island upon their return north. to purchase a merchant ship. The ship The squadron was also under orders to would prove to be a wise investment, “seize and make prize of all such Trans- as, during the French and Indian War, port Ships and other Vessels as may be Hopkins made the transition from mer- found carrying Supplies of any kind to chant captain to successful privateer. or any way aiding or assisting our Ene- During the interwar years, he com- mies.”4 A clause toward the end of the manded the slave ship, Sally, during a Naval Committee’s instructions would calamitous voyage in which 109 of his eventually form the basis of Hopkins’s 196 human cargo perished in transit. By plans: “if bad Winds, or Stormy Weath- the outbreak of the American Revolu- er, or any other unforeseen accident or tion, the Hopkins family had accumu- disaster disable you to do so You are lated much political influence in Rhode then to follow such Courses as your Island: Esek received a commission as a best Judgment shall Suggest to you as Brigadier General in the militia, while most useful to the American Cause and his brother Stephen was appointed to to distress the Enemy by all means in the Continental Congress. Shortly after your power.”5 Stephen became Chairman of the Naval Those were remarkably bold or- Committee, Esek was appointed Com- ders given the limited resources of the mander-in-Chief of the Fleet of the nascent Continental Navy. The ships of 1 United Colonies on 5 November 1775. Commodore Hopkins’s squadron were This rather wordy title was occasionally all converted merchantmen, coastal shortened to “Admiral” in contempo- traders, or pilot boats. Loading such rary letters and newspapers (though the vessels down with the cannon, mili- United States did not officially appoint tary stores, and extra crew necessary an admiral until well into the next cen- to turn them into warships inevitably tury). However, today’s US Navy lists changed their sailing qualities for the 2 Esek Hopkins as a commodore. worse. The merchantman Black Prince, Commodore Hopkins received for example, logged the fastest day of his “Orders and Directions” from the sailing recorded in the eighteenth cen- Naval Committee on 5 January 1776. tury in September 1775, but crammed In response to appeals made by the with twenty-four guns and rechristened Southern delegates to the Continental Alfred barely three months later, she Congress, his squadron was to proceed proved to be “clumsey [sic] and crank” directly to the Chesapeake Bay and de- throughout her military career.6 Until termine the strength of British forces in the thirteen purpose-built frigates or- Virginia. If the conditions were favor- dered by the Continental Congress in able, Hopkins and his ships were to “at- December 1775 were completed, Hop-

136 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise kins would have to make do with con- I fear the destination of the verted merchantmen. In addition to Al- Vessels from your Port is so gen- fred, and the squadron consisted of the erally known as to defeat the ship Columbus (twenty guns), the brigs end. two Men of War (40 guns) Andrew Doria and Cabot (fourteen guns it is said, put into New York the each), the sloops Providence and Hor- other day & were instantly or- net (twelve and ten guns respectively), dered out—supposed to be for and the schooners Wasp and Fly (eight Virginia.10 guns each).7 Military service was also a new experience for the majority of the Even without two additional officers and men. Like Commodore frigates at their disposal, British forces Hopkins, Captain Dudley Saltonstall of in Virginia would have met Hopkins Alfred had served in privateers. Nicho- and his squadron with significant orga- las Biddle, commanding Andrew Doria, nized resistance. The beleaguered royal was the only captain in the squadron governor, Lord Dunmore, had fled the who had served in the Royal Navy, and capital at Williamsburg in June 1775. then only as a lowly midshipman.8 Dunmore spent that summer and fall raising military support from loyalists Incessant winter weather and icy and slaves from rebel masters and gath- conditions kept the squadron stuck in ering what few regular British forces he the Delaware River well into February could find. By December, Dunmore had 1776. On the 14th, Commodore Hop- seized the merchantman William for kins distributed signals and general use as his headquarters and augmented instructions for the anticipated expe- his naval power with the sixteen-gun dition. The eight ship captains were sloops-of-war Otter and Kingfisher and ordered to sail in company with the the twenty-eight-gun frigate Liverpool, Commodore, and also “to use all pos- in addition to the numerous armed ten- sible Means to join the Fleet as soon as ders these vessels could deploy. Dun- possible” at Abaco in the Bahamas if more’s forces quickly became adept at foul weather or other accident caused raiding rebel plantations on the James the squadron to separate. However, River, capturing munitions, provisions, in his April 1776 report to President and other supplies while based out of John Hancock of the Continental Con- Norfolk and Gosport.11 gress, Hopkins wrote, “I did not think we were in a Condition to keep on a Congress had recently been in- cold Coast.”9 The Commodore smartly formed that “a frigate of thirty guns, had never intended to sail for Virgin- with metal proportionate ... would not ia; Congress’s plan for the squadron only become master of these, [Otter, had become public knowledge almost Kingfisher, and Liverpool] but of Dun- immediately. As early as 25 December mores ship Wm. & a vast many other 1775, General George Washington had vessels loaded with the floating prop- written to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph erty of Tories.”12 Hopkins’s squadron, Reed in Philadelphia: however, would have been no match

137 The Saber and Scroll for such a concentration of force. By the and spent the next year patrolling Dela- time the Continental squadron sailed, ware Bay.14 Ten subsequent days of clear Dunmore’s vessels had already spent weather allowed the remaining ships to months operating together and navi- repair their storm damage and begin gating the rivers and small waterways gunnery drills.15 The squadron dropped of southeastern Virginia. By contrast, anchor off the southern end of Abaco Commodore Hopkins’s ships and crews on 1 March. were thoroughly inexperienced and un- Almost immediately upon their tested. Given their haphazard perfor- arrival, the squadron took two sloops mance against HMS Glasgow in April from the island of New Providence. 1776, an engagement with Lord Dun- Several of the captured crew informed more’s vessels could easily have resulted Hopkins that a large amount of gun- in severe damage to, if not the outright powder, military stores, and cannon destruction of, Hopkins’s squadron. were held in two forts near the town of The Continental squadron final- Nassau, defended only by the inhabi- ly got underway for the Bahamas on 18 tants instead of British regulars. The February 1776. Interestingly, Congress Commodore and his captains devel- had met in secret session late the previ- oped a plan to load the captured sloops ous November to discuss “a large quan- with sailors and marines and send them tity of powder” held on the island of in to take the forts by surprise while the New Providence and the feasibility of rest of the squadron remained hidden sending a naval force to capture it.13 No nearby. Inexplicably, when the sloops records survive of Congress issuing any entered Nassau harbor on 2 March, the orders to raid New Providence. Still, entire Continental squadron went in if his brother Stephen had informed with them. The locals manning the fort him of these discussions, Commodore fired alarm guns as the Americans ap- Hopkins would have seen his chosen proached. With the element of surprise destination as a tempting target of op- lost, Commodore Hopkins ordered a portunity. retreat.16 In any case, the expedition got The following day, the captured off to a tempestuous start. Two days af- sloops supported by Providence and ter departure, Hornet and Fly ran afoul Wasp staged an amphibious attack on of one another in a storm off the Vir- Fort Montague, a short distance from ginia Capes, resulting in their separa- Nassau. The defenders fired a total of tion from the squadron. Fly rejoined five cannon, doing no damage to the on 11 March but was detached again approaching Americans. The 270 men before the squadron left New Prov- who landed under the command of idence; word subsequently reached Captain Samuel Nicholas of the Conti- Commodore Hopkins that they had nental Marines were initially mistaken gotten into port in South Carolina. Hor- for attacking Spaniards, but Captain net remained off the mid-Atlantic coast Nicholas soon “undeceived” them. Ac-

138 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise

Continental forces land at New Providence on 3 March 1776. Oil on canvas by V. Zveg, 1973. US Navy Art Collection, Washington, DC. US Naval History and Heritage Command #NH 79419. cording to the letter published later by and easily repairing seventeen 32-, 18-, Nicholas, a messenger from the Royal and 12-pound cannon, Nicholas raised Governor of the Bahamas approached American colors and had his men camp the Americans to ask their intentions. at Fort Montague for the night.17 When Nicholas declared his intent to Meanwhile, in anticipation of an seize all the Crown’s military stores on advance on Fort Nassau on the morn- the island and advanced on the fort, ing of 4 March, Commodore Hopkins the defenders opened fire with three sent the following manifesto to the in- 12-pound shot. Even though the Amer- habitants of the Island of New Provi- icans had escaped damage once again, dence: Captain Nicholas called a halt and sent The Reasons of my Landing an a messenger to Fort Montague, who in- armed force on the Island is in sisted the Americans would only seize Order to take Possession of the military resources and promised not Powder and Warlike Stores be- to take any private property or harm longing to the Crown, and if I the inhabitants except in self-defense. am not Opposed in putting my The defenders promptly sabotaged design in Execution the Persons the guns and retreated to Fort Nassau and Property of the Inhabitants within the town itself. After capturing Shall be Safe, Neither shall they

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be Suffered to be hurt in Case gunpowder away during the night, they they make no Resistance.18 placed him under arrest along with his secretary, James Babbidge, and Thom- While this echoed the tone of the mes- as Arwin, the Inspector General of His sages sent to the town by Captain Nich- Majesty’s Customs in North America.21 olas, Governor Montfort Brown was determined to resist anyway. No armed The Continental crews spent attack was made against the Continen- two weeks following the capture of tal Marines holding Fort Montague, Fort Nassau loading their captured but the governor arranged to have 150 munitions. They had taken so much half-barrels of gunpowder removed ordnance that Commodore Hopkins from Fort Nassau and secreted aboard had to hire a privately owned sloop to a sloop that easily eluded Hopkins’s carry a portion of it to Rhode Island.22 squadron, which had not blockaded the An outbreak of disease delayed the harbor. According to John Paul Jones, squadron’s work. Hopkins later report- second-in-command of Alfred at the ed that four of his ships had many men time, “This was foreseen, and might sick with smallpox when they first set have been prevented, by sending the sail, and the disease had spread during two brigantines [Andrew Doria and the intervening weeks. Andrew Doria Cabot] to lie off the bar.”19 Writing in served as a hospital ship for a time, as 1974, Nathan Miller was more direct: Captain Biddle previously had his crew “The commodore’s carelessness cost inoculated. Protecting against smallpox him the bulk of the powder that had did little against the wave of tropical fe- brought him to New Providence in the ver that spread throughout the squad- first place.”20 ron in early March, and soon Biddle After spending the night at Fort had a long sick list of his own. When Montague, Captain Nicholas and his the squadron arrived at New London men marched into town, seized Gov- in April, Andrew Doria reported three ernment House, and demanded the men dead and forty-nine sick out of an 23 keys to Fort Nassau. The local defenders original complement of 110. Other did not fire a shot to prevent the Amer- ships in the squadron reported illness icans from taking possession from the in similar proportions; difficulties in re- fort. Therein they found a veritable placing men discharged sick resulted in treasure trove: seventy-one cannon significant delays to future deployments from 9- to 32-pounders, fifteen mortars of Hopkins’s ship, which was a factor in from 4 to 11 inches, thousands of shells his eventual censure and relief. and various types of shot, 140 “hand The squadron departed New Grenadoes,” assorted military imple- Providence on 18 March, passing Geor- ments and provisions, and twenty-four gia, the Carolinas, and Virginia again half barrels of gunpowder. When Hop- without a thought of stopping; if it had kins and Nicholas learned that Gov- been unwise for the Commodore to ernor Brown had gotten most of the engage Dunmore’s forces in February,

140 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise smallpox and tropical fever had reduced no signals to the rest of the squadron. their chances even further. The weather In the words of Captain Biddle aboard during the return trip proved trouble- Andrew Doria, “Away we went all Helter some as well; Wasp was separated from Skelter one flying here another there to the squadron in a storm and made her cut off the Retreat of a fellow that did not way independently back to Philadel- fear us. I kept close to the Admiral that I phia by 4 April.24 That same day would might sooner receive his orders. But he prove an auspicious one when Colum- had none to give.” As Glasgow’s captain bus came across the 6-gun schooner called out for the Continental ships to Hawke (a tender to the British squad- identify themselves, an over-eager ma- ron operating out of Newport, Rhode rine threw a grenade from Cabot, which Island) near Long Island and compelled was promptly answered by a full British her to strike her colors without having broadside.26 to fire a shot. The brief action was the Cabot returned fire but Glasgow’s first time a Continental Navy ship cap- better-drilled gun crews and heavi- tured a Royal Navy vessel. The follow- er cannon quickly outmatched the ing day, Hopkins’s squadron captured American vessel. Multiple broadsides the bomb brig Bolton, designed to lob smashed into Cabot’s hull and rigging, explosive shells from two howitzers, killing four men and wounding sev- armed with eight additional cannon, en others, including young Captain and “well found with all sorts of Stores, Hopkins. Barely under control, Cabot 25 Arms, Powder &c.” While the expedi- broke off for the rest of the battle and tion had not been without its challenges nearly ran afoul of Andrew Doria, forc- up to that point, Commodore Hopkins ing Captain Biddle to steer away and and his squadron approached Rhode Is- delayed his entry into the action. Next land with a respectable haul of captured to engage Glasgow was Alfred herself, vessels and military supplies. which kept in close combat for nearly a Around half-past one in the half-hour until Alfred’s tiller ropes were morning on 6 April, as the squadron shot away. As Alfred drifted out of con- approached Block Island off southern trol, Glasgow was able to rake the Con- Rhode Island, the American crews were tinental flagship fore-and-aft, inflicting suddenly roused by shouts to prepare heavy damage, and killing six men and for action. With the brig Cabot (com- wounding six more. Andrew Doria was manded by the Commodore’s son, Cap- then able to join the battle, along with tain John Burroughs Hopkins) in the Columbus. According to Biddle, “we ex- van of the squadron, her crew detected ercised Great Guns and small arms and an unknown ship steering directly for had two men hurt by it.” Alfred was able them. The newcomer was the 20-gun to regain steering control, and the three HMS Glasgow, one of the vessels of the Continental vessels chased Glasgow to- British squadron at Newport. Commo- wards Newport until daylight. At that dore Hopkins, in Alfred, was a short point, Commodore Hopkins felt they distance behind his son’s brig but issued were being drawn imprudently close

141 The Saber and Scroll to the rest of the British squadron and During this first expedition of broke off the chase. The sloop Provi- the Continental Navy, the leadership dence had never attempted to engage of Commodore Hopkins was certainly the enemy. By mid-morning, Glasgow not without its flaws. On 2 March 1776, was safely in Newport with extensive for example, Hopkins failed to enforce damage to her masts and rigging. The the provisions of his plans when the en- British crew suffered only a single death tire squadron accompanied the landing and three men wounded, all from mus- force to attack Fort Nassau, giving the ket fire from Captain Nicholas’s Conti- inhabitants time to prepare their de- nental Marines.27 fenses and plan the removal of the ma- jority of their gunpowder. Just over one The battered Continental squad- month later, he never issued instruc- ron arrived at New London, Connecti- tions or made a single signal that could cut, on 7 April 1776 and were greeted have possibly resulted in the capture of by the local population as conquering HMS Glasgow. Once the initial glow of heroes, their two hundred sick and the squadron’s arrival at New London wounded notwithstanding. When Hop- had faded, criticisms of the battle soon kins’s official report reached Philadel- made their way through letters and phia, the Continental Congress was newspapers. Captain Nicholas Biddle ecstatic with the expedition’s results. wrote that “a More imprudent ill con- While the squadron had not traveled ducted Affair never happened .... And to any of the destinations in Hopkins’s yet I do not see how the Admiral can be orders, they had certainly proven “most Blamd [sic] for whether it was against useful to the American cause” and “dis- his judgement or not he could not help tressed the Enemy” as Congress had en- the Action being brought on.” Biddle joined. President Hancock wrote to the was nonetheless so soured on the idea Commodore: of sailing under Hopkins’s command I beg Leave to congratulate you that he “had Rather have Dawson’s Pi- on the Success of your Exped- lot Boat to Cruise where I please than ition. Your Account of the be even in the A.Doria and follow the Spirit and Bravery shown by the fleet.”29 Men, affords them the great- Soon after his arrival, Commo- est Satisfaction; and encourages dore Hopkins wrote to the governors of them to expect similar Exertions Connecticut and Rhode Island, offer- of Courage on every future Oc- ing some of his captured cannons and casion. Though it is to be regret- ammunition for the defense of their ted, that the Glasgow Man of War colonies, despite having no authority made her Escape, yet as it was from Congress to distribute any Con- not thro’ any Misconduct, the tinental stores.30 He would also soon Praise due to You and the oth- be criticized for failing to see that the er Officers, is undoubtedly the squadron’s officers and men were paid same.28 promptly and an apparent inability to

142 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise run Newport’s British blockade and single-handedly, the fact that she fled thereby protect the New England coast. for the support of nearby reinforce- These factors and the reminder that ments was taken by Congress and the he had technically disobeyed his ini- American public alike as a moral victo- tial orders led to Hopkins’s censure by ry similar in scope to that achieved by the Continental Congress on 16 Au- Massachusetts soldiers at Bunker Hill. gust 1776. When delays in refitting and The squadron also endured its re-manning the squadron persisted for share of mistakes and mishaps. Three more than six months after, Hopkins of Commodore Hopkins’s original was suspended from command on 26 eight vessels were separated at differ- March 1777. He promptly embarked ent points from the west in stormy on a campaign of self-vindication and weather. The squadron departed Phil- criticism of Congress, which brought adelphia with smallpox raging among about his dismissal from the Continen- the crews, which were further ravaged tal Navy on 2 January 1778.31 by tropical fevers. Commodore Hop- The Continental Navy’s expe- kins’s shortcomings in executing the dition from February to April 1776 New Providence raid and the battle proved the viability of the infant service. with HMS Glasgow are now obvious. Commodore Hopkins wisely chose not However, this same expedition gave the to sail to Virginia and risk a dangerous Continental Navy valuable shakedown engagement with a well-organized ene- time and experience in single-ship and my force that likely would have known squadron operations and gave them the squadron was coming. Instead, their first taste of naval combat. They Hopkins struck at more lightly defend- completed the expedition without the ed targets on New Providence. This raid loss of a single vessel and relatively few captured cannons, gunpowder, ammu- combat casualties. nition, and other military stores that While his tenure as Command- Continental forces were in desperate er-in-Chief of the Fleet of the United need of at the time. The squadron’s cap- Colonies was not a lengthy or partic- ture of small warships such as Hawke ularly glorious one, Esek Hopkins suc- and Bolton demonstrated that the Royal cessfully demonstrated that America Navy was not invincible. While Glasgow could stand against Great Britain on did succeed in fending off four ships the sea.

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Cross, Charles Brinson. A Navy for Virginia: A Colony’s Fleet in the Revolution. Yorktown: The Virginia Independence Bicentennial Commission, 1981.

McGrath, Tim. Give Me a Fast Ship: The Continental Navy and America’s Revolu- tion at Sea. New York: NAL Caliber, 2014.

144 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise

McGrath, Tim. John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail. Yardley: West- holme Publishing, 2010.

Miller, Nathan. Sea of Glory: The Continental Navy Fights for Independence, 1775– 1783. New York: David McKay Company, 1974.

Tucker, Spencer, ed. Naval Warfare: An International Encyclopedia. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2002.

Notes

1 “Esek Hopkins and the Formation of the Continental Navy,” Redwood Library & Athenae- um, accessed June 26, 2020. https://www.redwoodlibrary.org/blog/lwhite/2016/12/20/ esek-hopkins-and-formation-continental-navy; “Esek Hopkins: 26 April 1718–26 February 1802,” Naval History and Heritage Command, accessed June 26, 2020. https:// www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/people/historical-figures/esek-hopkins.html.

2 “Esek Hopkins and the Formation of the Continental Navy”; Dixon and Hunter, “New York, April 10,” Virginia Gazette, April 27, 1776, 3. https://research.colonial williamsburg.org/DigitalLibrary/va-gazettes/VGSinglePage.cfm?issueIDNo=76. DH.19&page=3&res=LO; William Bell Clark, “The Letters of Captain Nicholas Bid- dle,” The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 74, no. 3 (July 1950): 385.

3 “Naval Committee to Commodore Esek Hopkins, January 5, 1776,” in Naval Docu- ments of the American Revolution. Vol. 3 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1968), 638.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid.

6 According to the ship’s log kept by Captain John Barry on September 12, 1775, Black Prince sailed 237 miles in a twenty-four-hour period. Tim McGrath, John Barry: An American Hero in the Age of Sail (Yardley: Westholme Publishing, 2010), 51; Nathan Miller, Sea of Glory: The Continental Navy Fights for Independence, 1775–1783 (New York: David McKay Company, 1974), 2.

7 “Journal of the Continental Congress, December 13, 1775,” in Naval Documents 3, 90; Miller, Sea of Glory, 528.

8 Tim McGrath, Give Me a Fast Ship: The Continental Navy and America’s Revolution at Sea (New York: NAL Caliber, 2014), 48–49.

9 “Commodore Esek Hopkins to Captain Nicholas Biddle,” in Naval Documents 3, 1291; Alverda S. Beck, The Letter Book of Esek Hopkins, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Navy, 1775–1777 (Providence: Rhode Island Historical Society, 1932), 44, 47.

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10 “From George Washington to Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Reed,” Founders Online, National Archives, accessed July 23, 2020. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/ Washington/03-02-02-0563.

11 Charles Brinson Cross, A Navy for Virginia: A Colony’s Fleet in the Revolution (York- town: The Virginia Independence Bicentennial Commission, 1981), 2–12.

12 “Thomas Ludwell Lee to Richard Henry Lee,” in Naval Documents 3, 27.

13 Miller, 99.

14 “Fly,” Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, Naval History and Heritage Com- mand, accessed June 28, 2020. https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/re search/histories/ship-histories/danfs/f/fly.html; Beck, The Letter Book of Esek Hopkins, 47; “Hornet I (Sloop),” DANFS, NHHC, accessed June 28, 2020, https://www.histo- ry.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/h/hornet-i. html.

15 McGrath, Give Me a Fast Ship, 47.

16 “Journal Prepared for the King of France by John Paul Jones” in Naval Documents of the American Revolution. Vol. 4 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1969), 133; Beck, 47.

17 Beck, 47; “Extract of a Letter from the Captain of Marines [Samuel Nicholas] on board the Ship Alfred, dated at New-London, April 10, 1776,” in Naval Documents 4, 748–49.

18 Beck, 44.

19 Ibid, 47; “Extract of a Letter from the Captain of Marines,” 749; “Journal Prepared for the King of France,” 133–34.

20 Miller, 110.

21 “Extract of a Letter from the Captain of Marines,” 749; “Inventory of Stores &c taken at Fort Nassau” in Naval Documents 4, 711; Beck, 47.

22 Ibid, 46.

23 Ibid, 46–47; McGrath, Give Me a Fast Ship, 56; “List of the People on Board the Andrew Doria from February 1776,” in Naval Documents 4, 715.

24 “Wasp I (Sch),” DANFS, NHHC, accessed June 28, 2020. https://www.history.navy.mil/ content/history/nhhc/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/w/wasp-i.html.

25 McGrath, Give Me a Fast Ship, 57; “Extract of a Letter from the Captain of Marines,” 750–51; Beck, 48.

26 “Extract of a Letter from the Captain of Marines,” 751; Clark, “The Letters of Captain Nicholas Biddle,” 386; McGrath, Give Me a Fast Ship, 62.

27 Beck, 48; Clark, 382; McGrath, Give Me a Fast Ship, 62–64.

146 The Continental Navy’s Shakedown Cruise

28 “John Hancock to Commodore Esek Hopkins, April 17, 1776,” in Naval Documents 4, 868. 29 Clark, 384–85. 30 McGrath, Give Me a Fast Ship, 66-67; Miller, 117. 31 “Esek Hopkins: 26 April 1718–26 February 1802.”

147

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945–1956

Lewis A. Taylor II American Military University

Abstract In 1945, the United States began its involvement in Vietnam -- an involvement that spanned thirty years and ended up causing the deaths of over 55,000 American servicemen and women, as well as many as 2,000,000 Vietnamese. This involvement was tragic and avoidable. Beginning with the Administration of Franklin D. Roo- sevelt and continuing through the administrations of Truman, Ei- senhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, the United States labored under the misguided impression that the suppression of Commu- nism in Southeast Asia was vitally important to the security of the United States. Was the war in Vietnam a civil war, or a proxy war be- tween the United States, Russia, and China? Or was it the Vietnam- ese people’s determination to rid themselves of foreign domination?

Keywords: Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, France, Japan, Dien Bien Phu, Communism, OSS, Viet Minh, Domino Theory.

Dentro del maelstrom: EE. UU. y Vietnam, 1945-1956 Resumen En 1945, Estados Unidos comenzó su participación en Vietnam, una participación que duró treinta años y terminó causando la muerte de más de 55.000 hombres y mujeres estadouniden- ses en servicio, así como de 2.000.000 vietnamitas. Esta parti- cipación fue trágica y evitable. Comenzando con la adminis- tración de Franklin D. Roosevelt y continuando a través de las administraciones de Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson y Nixon, Estados Unidos trabajó bajo la impresión equivoca- da de que la supresión del comunismo en el sudeste asiático era de vital importancia para la seguridad del Estados Unidos. ¿Fue la guerra de Vietnam una guerra civil o una guerra indirecta en- tre Estados Unidos, Rusia y China? ¿O fue la determinación del pueblo vietnamita de deshacerse de la dominación extranjera?

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Palabras clave: Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh, Francia, Japón, Dien Bien Phu, Comunismo, OSS, Viet Minh, Teoría del dominó

进入大混乱：1945-1956年的美国和越南 摘要 1945年，美国开始参与越南事务—这一参与延续了30年 之久，并最终导致超过55,000名美国军人死亡，以及 2,000,000名越南军人死亡。这次参与是悲惨的，可避免 的。从富兰克林·D·罗斯福政府开始，再到杜鲁门、艾森 豪威尔、肯尼迪、约翰逊、尼克森政府，美国的行动源于一 个错误印象，即对东南亚地区的共产主义进行压迫对美国的 安全而言至关重要。越南战争是一场内战，还是美国、俄罗 斯和中国之间的一次代理人战争？又或者，是越南人民决定 摆脱外国统治的一次战争？

关键词：越南，胡志明，法国，日本，奠边府，共产主 义，OSS，越盟，多米诺理论

t has been 45 years since Saigon fell, ical, military, and diplomatic leaders ending American involvement in deluded themselves, accepting a series the Vietnam War. “Decades after the of myths and illusions about Vietnam Ifirst U.S. soldier set foot in Saigon, the that exacerbated and deepened the ul- Vietnam War remains one of the most timate catastrophe.”2 Today millions of tragic and unresolved events in Ameri- people in both Vietnam and the United can history and foreign policy.”1 States suffer from the quarter-century The United States could have war that shattered both countries social avoided the Vietnam conflict, but Pres- and political fabric. The Vietnam War idents Truman and Eisenhower, and still impacts our elections as well as our 3 later Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, foreign and defense policies. along with Senators and Congressmen, Although there are many books had divorced themselves from losing about America’s involvement in Viet- ground to Communism. The theory that nam, there is still no explicit agreement suppression of a communist takeover of about the character of the war or its Vietnam was vital to United States secu- roots. What was (or were) the origin(s) rity became policy. From the beginning of the conflict? Was it a civil war, or was of America’s involvement until its final it the Vietnamese people’s resistance withdrawal in 1975, America’s “polit- against the domination of foreign pow-

150 Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945–1956

Hồ Chí Minh, also known as Nguyễn Ái Quốc, and “Uncle Hồ” (19 May 1890 – 2 September 1969), served as Prime Minister of North Vietnam from 1945 to 1955 and President from 1945 to 1969. Ideologically a Marxist–Leninist, Hồ served as Chairman and First Secretary of the Workers’ Party of Vietnam. This photo has been used on the face of North Vietnamese currency since 1951.3 ers? Or was it, as some argue, another complex conflicts in modern history. proxy war between the United States The early struggle began when and the Soviet Union. Todd Gitlen, the Han dynasty of China began a rule a well-respected sociologist, believes that would have China controlling In- that the Vietnam War caused a division dochina for the better part of a thousand in how America views itself, writing, years. When the Tang dynasty collapsed “America, whatever its rights and its wrongs, stands triumphant, it glorious in 907 AD Vietnam was able to gain destiny manifest. On the other, Ameri- and maintain its independence for over ca knows defeat, even shame.”4 900 years. This period of independence ended in the mid-1800s when Vietnam’s Most historians agree that the emperor, Tu Duc, agreed to cede the Vietnam War began in the 1950s; how- ever, the struggle for control over In- provinces of Bien Hoa, Gia Dinh, and dochina had roots that reached back to Din Tuong to France. In 1887, France the first century B.C. Over the succeed- imposed a colonial government system ing years, many countries—the United in Vietnam and began referring to the States, France, China, the Soviet Union, area as French Indochina. This system Cambodia, Laos, Australia, Korea, included Tonkin Annam, Cochin-Chi- and others became involved in one of na, and Cambodia, and eventually add- the most protracted, most violent, and ed Laos.

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Ngo Dinh Diem (3 January 1901 – 2 November, 1963) served as the South Viet- namese President from 1955 until his assignation.5

During World War II, Japan oc- to get information regarding the move- cupied Vietnam but left the French gov- ments and numbers of Japanese troops. ernment in place, even though they had While there was no formal alliance, Ho little or no authority. The Japanese did Chi Minh believed that his aid might not believe they had enough resourc- help sway Washington to support his es for a total occupation, so by leaving fight for Vietnamese independence. 6 the French government in place, Japan Following their defeat in 1945, was able to develop Vietnam as a client Japan abandoned Indochina, giving rise state. It was the Japanese occupation of to a period where there were no foreign Vietnam that first attracted the atten- governments involved in the running tion of the United States. Even though of the country. This opened the door the United States and Japan were not for two competing forces to struggle at war at this time, the United States for control. Because the Japanese did actively attempted to thwart any Japa- not totally disband the French colonial nese expansion in Asia that would dis- government, in March 1945, the French rupt the importation of raw rubber and took total control of the country and tin. Southeast Asia was also a producer installed Emperor Bao Dai as a puppet of petroleum products as well as other leader. This vacuum also provided an commodities. During this time of Japa- opening for Ho Chi Minh and his rev- nese occupation, the Americans worked olutionary movement which was dedi- with Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh cated to ending all colonial control over

152 Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945–1956

Hồ Chí Minh in 1945 (fifth from left standing) with members of the clandestine Office of Special Services (OSS) Deer Team (from l. to r.: Rene Defourneaux, (Ho), Allison Thomas, (Giap), Henry Prunier and Paul Hoagland, far right. Kneeling, left, are Lawrence Vogt and Aaron Squires). Black and White Photographs of U.S. Air Force and Predecessors’ Activities, Facilities, and Personnel, Domestic and Foreign, 1930 – 1975.6

In 1945, members of the American "Deer Team," part of the OSS, worked with Vietnamese guerrilla fighters to throw Japanese troops out of Indochina. As the war ended, the people of Vietnam looked to the United States to support their dreams of independence. Source: The OSS in Vietnam, 1945: A War of Missed Opportunities by Dixee Bartholomew-Feis.7

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Indochina and the guarantee of a new tence of the American Declaration of and better life for the Vietnam peasants. Independence. He concluded, “[t]he In September 1945, Ho Chi Minh de- entire Vietnamese people are deter- clared North Vietnam an independent mined to mobilize all their physical state and rejected France’s proposal of and mental strength, to sacrifice their allowing for limited self-government in lives and property in order to safeguard Vietnam. This declaration began a war their independence and liberty.”9 These between the Viet Minh and France that words proved to be prophetic in the lasted for nearly a decade, ending in years to come. Dr. Tran Duy Hung, a the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu on leader of the Viet Minh resistance and a May 7, 1954. One of the revelations of medical doctor, remembered that mo- the Pentagon Papers, released in 1971, ment in 1945, saying, “I can say that the showed United States involvement in most moving moment was when Pres- this reconquest by paying approximate- ident Ho Chi Minh climbed the steps ly 80 percent of France’s expenses. From and the national anthem was sung. It Truman’s administration forward, the was the first time that the national an- United States had shown no interest in them of Vietnam was sung in an offi- helping the Vietnamese achieve self-de- cial ceremony.”10 Hung did not mention termination. that the crowd broke into cheers when Using a beginning date of 1950 an aircraft bearing the Stars & Stripes and an ending date of 1975, historians flew low over the ceremony. He also did have centered their arguments on three not mention that Captain Archimedes different causes of the conflict: Amer- Patti, head of the American mission to ica’s focus on containing the spread of Hanoi, shared the stage with Minh and Communism, European imperialism, that the band played the American na- and one of several Cold War-era proxy tional anthem in honor of their foreign wars between the United States, the So- guest. 11 viet Union, and China. However, there During the early years of the has been little or no consideration “to Vietnam War, most of the players were what the nature of the conflict in Viet- flexible and evolving. In 1945, what nam was, and to what the goals of all was taking place was a conflict between the major actors involved in the drama France, who wanted to regain control 8 w e re .” Forty years later, there is still no over Indochina, control that they lost consensus about what the governement to the Japanese during World War II, of the United States learned from the and the Viet Minh, who were seeking Vietnam War and how to approach sit- total Vietnamese independence. Both uations like this in the future. players were more than willing to use In September of 1945, Ho Chi force to accomplish their objectives Minh addressed a crowd in Ba Dinh if necessary. It is at this point that the Square in Hanoi, declaring Vietnam’s United States first entered the picture. independence from France. In his The United States became convinced speech, Minh repeated the first sen- that the Viet Minh was totally under the

154 Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945–1956

On 2 September 1945, Hồ Chí Minh declared the independence of Vietnam from France. The proclamation paraphrased the U.S. Declaration of Independence in declaring, “All men are born equal: the Creator has given us inviolable rights, life, liberty, and happiness!”11 control of the Soviet Union and need- the Soviet Union and was concerned ed to be defeated, so its involvement that supporting Ho Chi Minh and in Vietnam was “a political reaction to the Viet Minh would antagonize the events elsewhere in Asia.”12 French, leading them into a partnership Between 1945 (the end of World with the Soviet Union. Truman was de- War II) and 1948, the United States’ po- termined to everything in his power to sition on Vietnam underwent a change. contain the growth of Communism, es- President Franklin Roosevelt opposed pecially in Southeast Asia, and this pol- colonialism, especially French colonial- icy of containment came to be referred ism, and supported the Atlantic Char- to as the Truman Doctrine. This argu- ter, which, in one section, “affirmed the ment for containment led to the use of right of all peoples to choose their own the term “Domino Theory” to justify form of government; in his opinion, it America’s involvement in Vietnam, just was as applicable to the peoples of Asia as it had done in Korea. On April 24, as to those of Europe.”13 After Roos- 1950, Truman “endorsed NSC64, with evelt’s death and the ascension of Harry its requirement that ‘all practicable Truman to the presidency, attitudes be- measures be taken to prevent further gan to change. Even though the Office of communist expansion in Southeast Strategic Services recommended assist- Asia.’”14 The “Domino Theory” argued ing the Viet Minh in their fight against that “the neighboring countries of Thai- the French, the State Department ar- land and Burma could be expected to gued against supporting Ho Chi Minh fall under Communist domination if because the United States was trying to Indochina were controlled by a com- keep France from becoming allied with munist-dominated government.”15 The

155 The Saber and Scroll

United States first mentioned the defeat man stated that the United States would of Communism as an objective in Indo- provide assistance to any country that china in a speech given to Congress by was threatened by Communism. President Truman. In this speech, Tru-

President Hồ Chí Minh read the Declaration of Independence at Ba Dinh Square, 2 September 1945.16

In June 1952, a secret memo they will live.”19 Truman never respond- written by the National Security Coun- ed to any of these letters. cil stated that “Communist control of One major event that proved in- all of Southeast Asia would render the fluential in the future of the Vietnam U.S. position in the Pacific offshore is- conflict was the establishment of the land chain precarious and would seri- People’s Republic of China by Mao Ze- ously jeopardize the fundamental U.S. dong in 1949. The loss of China to Com- security interests in the Far East.”17 munism was a thorn in the side of the Even though Ho Chi Min wrote “eight United States from that point forward. letters to President Truman reminding him of the self-determination promis- In early 1950, both the People’s Republic es of of the Atlantic Charter,”18 the NSC of China and the Soviet Union gave for- could not (or would not) believe that mal recognition to the communist-led the events taking place in Vietnam were Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and not under the direct control of the Sovi- began to ship military and economic et Union. One of the stipulations of the supplies to North Vietnam, which al- Atlantic Charter that Minh pointed out lowed the Viet Minh to increase their in his letters seny sent between October offensive movements against French 1945 and February 1946 was a declara- military installations. This recognition tion by Roosevelt and Churchill to “re- and support led to the identification of spect the right of all peoples to choose the Viet Minh as a communist organi- the form of government under which zation. The United States, at this time,

156 Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945–1956 also began to increase the amount of Vietnam. Diem was the perfect person military assistance given to the French, for the United States to support because assistance that would help them defend he was both anti-French and anti-Com- their installations and increase their munist, and a western-educated nation- operations against Ho Chi Minh and alist. The United States, while backing the Viet Minh. Diem as a potential leader of Southern In April 1954, the French suf- Vietnam, had misgivings because he fered a humiliating defeat by the forces had no experience in politics. of the Viet Minh at Dien Bien Phu. The The summer of 1956 came and battle lasted for fifty-seven days and went without the election stipulated in ended France’s influence in Indochina. the Geneva Accords. Many argue that The Geneva Accords, which settled the Diem’s refusal to hold an election could issue of the war, stipulated that Vietnam be considered an unofficial declaration would become an independent nation, of war. However, Ho Chi Minh still held as would Laos and Cambodia. Vietnam out hope that an election would take was to be divided along the 16th paral- place and that Vietnam would become lel, a division “that was not to be inter- unified. Many attribute this refusal to preted as constituting a political or ter- hold an election because both the Unit- ritorial boundary.” The Geneva Accords ed States and Diem were certain that also included a stipulation that elec- Ho Chi Minh would win. tions would be held within two years From this point forward, North -- elections that would unify North and Vietnam, under the leadership of Ho South Vietnam under one government. Chi Minh (and backed by the Soviet These elections never took place be- Union and China) and South Vietnam, cause Eisenhower was a firm believer under the leadership of Ngo Dinh Diem in the Domino Theory. The Republican (backed by the United States), could Party had accused the Truman admin- never reach a compromise. The Gene- istration of losing China to the Com- va Accords, meant to unify Vietnam, munists, and Eisenhower was going to failed miserably. make sure that he did not lose Indochi- Over the next twenty years, the na. Eisenhower’s commitment to not conflict in Vietnam raged not only lose Indochina, in effect, prevented the claiming millions of lives, but also de- unification of Vietnam. stroying forests and farmlands, pollut- Prior to the signing of the Ge- ing rivers, and virtually devastating the neva Accords (the United States never entire region. The Vietnam War also agreed with the Accords, never signed saw the people of the United States be- them, and were not bound by them), ginning to question the truthfulness of Emperor Bao Dai appointed Ngo Dinh their government and the need to be Diem as prime minister of Southern the policeman of the world.

157 The Saber and Scroll

Bibliography

Appy, Christian G. American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Iden- tity. New York: Viking Press, 2015.

Bigelow, Bill. “Camouflaging the Vietnam War: How Textbooks Continue to Keep the Pentagon Papers a Secret.” Zinn Educational Project. https://www.zinnedproje ct.org/if-we-knew-our-history/camouflaging-the-vietnam-war/. Accessed July 10, 2020.

Boot, Max: The Road not Taken: Edward Lansdale and the American Tragedy in Vietnam. New York: Liveright, 2018.

Dulles, Foster Rhea and Gerald E. Ridinger. “The Anti-Colonial Policies of Frank- lin D. Roosevelt.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 1 (March, 1955). Ac- cessed July 10, 2020

Grant Zalin. Facing the Phoenix: The CIA and the Political Defeat of the United States in Vietnam. New York: W.W. Norton, 1991.

Hastings, Max. Vietnam: An American Tragedy, 1945 – 1975. New York: Harper/ Collins, 2018.

Herring, George C. America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950 – 1975. New York: McGraw/Hill, 2004.

Langguth, A.J. Our Vietnam: The War, 1954 – 1975. New York: Touchstone, 2000.

Logevall, Fredrik. Embers of War: The Fall of an Empire and the Making of Ameri- ca’s Vietnam. New York: Random House, 2012.

Mann, Robert. A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam. New York: Per- seus Books, 2001.

Minh, Ho Chi. Selected Works, Volume 3. Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960 – 1962.

Morgan, Ted. Valley of Death: The Tragedy at Dien Bien Phu that led America into the Vietnam War. New York: Random House, 2010.

Moyer, Mark. Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954 – 1965. New York: Cam- bridge University Press, 20016.

158 Into the Maelstrom: America and Vietnam, 1945–1956

Van De Mark, Brian. Road to Disaster: A New History of America’s Descent into Vietnam. New York: Harper/Collins, 2018.

Young, Marilyn B. The Vietnam Wars, 1945 – 1990. New York: Harper Perennial, 1991.

Zinn, Howard. A People’s History of the United States: 1942 - Present. New York: Routledge, 2013.

———.The Twentieth Century. New York: Harper/Collins, 2003.

Notes

1 Robert Mann. A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam. (New York: Perseus Books, 2001), Inside Front cover.

2 Ibid. 2

3 Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ho_Chi_Minh

4 Mark N. Katz. “The Origins of the Vietnam War 1945-1948.”The Review of Politics 42, no. 2 (1980): 131-51. www. Jstor.org/stable/1406989. Accessed July 20, 2020.

5 Source: ARC Identifier: 542189 Item from Record Group 342: Records of U.S. Air Force Com- mands, Activities, and Organizations, 1900 – 2000.

6 Source: U.S. Army (according to Air Force Magazine (May, 2020), p. 56) - Stewart, Richard W. (2012), Deepening Involvement 1945-1965, Center of Military History, United States Army.

7 Source: https://www.nationalww2museum.org/war/articles/oss-vietnam-1945-dixee-bartholo mew-feis.

8 Bill Bigelow. “Camouflaging the Vietnam War: How Textbooks Continue to Keep the Pentagon Papers a Secret. Zinn Educational Project. https://www.zinnedproject.org/if-we-knew-our-histo ry/camouflaging-the-vietnam-war/. Accessed July 10, 2020.

9 Ho Chi Minh, Selected Works, Volume 3 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1960 – 1962), 17-21.

10 Ibid.

11 Source: https://www.zinnedproject.org/news/tdih/vietnam-declared-independence.

12 Mann, 723.

13 Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger. “Policies of Franklin D. Roosevelt.” Political Science Quarterly Vol. 70, No. 1 (Mar., 1955), 6.

159 The Saber and Scroll

14 Howard Zinn. The Twentieth Century. (New York: Harper/Collins, 2003). 216

15 Ibid.

16 Source: http://tapchiqptd.vn/en/research-and-discussion/the-1945-declaration-of-independen ce-historical-and-realistic-values/10634.html.

17 Ibid., 215.

18 Howard Zinn. A People’s History of the United States: 1492 - Present. (New York: Routledge, 2013). 470.

19 Foster Rhea Dulles and Gerald E. Ridinger. “The Anti-Colonial Policies of Franklin D. Roos- evelt.” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 70, No. 1 (Mar., 1955), 6.

160 The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War

Phillip J. Greer American Military University

Abstract The onset of the Korean War was indicative of the superpowers’ quest for ideological supremacy, with multiple factors setting the stage for massive confrontation. North Korean forces were able to quickly overwhelm those of South Korea. The United States entered the conflict and was able to reverse the North Korean gains and drive them to their border with China. Unknown to NATO forces, the Chinese Army was mobilized to intercept the allied forces at the Chosin Reservoir. Despite having superior numbers, US forces were able retreat and save the majority of their personnel in North Korean territory. The combined North Korean and Chinese armies won a pyrrhic victory that shocked both sides into a stalemate. Keywords: Chosin Reservoir, Chosin Few, Korean War, Cold War, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, Major General Edward “Ned” Almond, Major General Oliver Smith, People’s Volunteer Army

Embalse de Chosin: la batalla que detuvo una guerra Resumen El inicio de la Guerra de Corea fue indicativo de la búsqueda de las superpotencias por la supremacía ideológica, con múltiples fac- tores preparando el escenario para una confrontación masiva. Las fuerzas de Corea del Norte pudieron abrumar rápidamente a las de Corea del Sur. Estados Unidos entró en el conflicto y pudo rever- tir las ganancias de Corea del Norte y llevarlos a su frontera con China. Desconocido para las fuerzas de la OTAN, el ejército chino se movilizó para interceptar a las fuerzas aliadas en el embalse de Chosin. A pesar de tener un número superior, las fuerzas estadou- nidenses pudieron retirarse y salvar a la mayoría de su personal en territorio norcoreano. Los ejércitos combinados de Corea del Nor- te y China obtuvieron una victoria pírrica que dejó a ambos lados en un punto muerto. Palabras clave: Embalse de Chosin, Chosin Few, Guerra de Corea, Guerra Fría, 1950, General Douglas MacArthur, General de Divi-

161 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.10 The Saber and Scroll

sión Edward “Ned” Almond, General de División Oliver Smith, Ejército de Voluntarios del Pueblo

长津湖战役：让战争停止的一次战役 摘要 朝鲜战争的开端表明了超级大国对意识形态主导的追求，伴 随着多个因素（为大范围冲突奠定基础）。朝鲜军力迅速战 胜了韩国。美国进入这场战争，逆转了朝鲜优势并将其驱逐 到与中国交界处。北约军并不知道中国军队的加入，后者被 动员在长津湖拦截联盟军。除了在数量上占优，美军还成功 撤离战场并挽救了在朝鲜境内的大多数人员。朝鲜和中国军 队的合作赢得了一场让交战双方都陷入僵局的惨胜。

关键词：长津湖，长津精英，朝鲜战争，冷战，1950，上将 道格拉斯·麦克阿瑟，少将爱德华·“奈德”·阿尔蒙德（Ed- ward “Ned” Almond），少将奧利弗·史密斯（Oliver Smith）， 中国人民志愿军

he Korean War was the initial that neither could recover from without culmination of the geopoliti- risking all-out global war. In the end, cal and ideological struggle for the Chosin Reservoir was the climax of Tdominance at the onset of the Cold a war that stalled efforts on both sides War. The two superpowers sought to to secure a total victory. support their ideological platforms, but The Korean Peninsula became a the concept of Nuclear War, or World political stage for the world powers to War Three, prevented a direct confron- flex their respective ideologies. Like all tation. The Korean Peninsula provided stages, this one has a number of actors multiple nations with an opportunity to that had their own motivations behind prevent the spread of an opposing polit- their support that played a factor in the ical system on a neutral stage. All major decisions leading up to the Battle of the powers rose to bring their influence to Chosin Reservoir. These motivations bear, culminating in the Battle of the show how the confrontation between Chosin Reservoir. That confrontation US and Chinese forces became inevi- became inevitable and the results of table. It all begins with the end of the the battle left both sides in a stalemate Second World War.

162 Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War

At the end of the Second World of the Communist Party of China, led War, there was an ideological divide by Mao Zedong, and the Kuomintang between the two major superpowers, resumed fighting, with the Commu- the United States and the Soviet Union, nist Party taking the country by 1950. and their respective political ideologies, Once firmly in power, China was able capitalism and communism. Former to begin to support communist parties Nazi Germany-held territories were in countries along its own borders, such divided into spheres of influence dom- as Burma, Laos, North Vietnam, and inated by occupying countries. A split North Korea. into East and West was created by both Europe was split into the two superpowers in a bid for dominance. ideological spheres of influence based This gave rise to a military alliance in on whichever country had effective the form of the North Atlantic Trea- control of that area. Korea was arbi- ty Organization (NATO) between all trarily divided during the Yalta Con- nations allied with the United States. ference into two halves along the 38th Some nations became battlegrounds Parallel, with the former Korean capi- for the spread of communism, such 1 tal of Seoul lying within the southern, as Turkey and Greece. In response to 3 this, President Truman developed the US-controlled territory. Once World Truman Doctrine, which stated that War II ended, both superpowers pro- the United States would provide neces- vided support to their controlled terri- sary support to prevent, or contain, the tory. Additionally, North Korean fight- spread of communism. In Turkey and ers supported the Communist Party of Greece, this was in the form of econom- China during the Chinese Civil War. ic and military aid. Korea was a differ- The North Koreans returned to North ent matter. Korea with their arms and equipment and the valuable experience they gained The Soviet Union had commit- fighting the Kuomintang. The bonds ted itself to supporting growing com- between Josef Stalin, Mao Zedong, and munist governments all over the world. Kim-Il Sung bolstered North Korean In Europe, this meant that it supported interests for a forcible reunification. As puppet regimes in the Eastern Euro- evidence of this, Kim-Il Sung sought pean territories taken from Nazi Ger- approval for all war plans against South many.2 In other locations around the Korea before acting on them.4 world, the Soviet Union provided eco- nomic and military aid and advisors to With that approval, the North facilitate the overthrow of democratic Korean forces moved south of the 38th governments. The most significant case Parallel on June 25, 1950, meeting min- was that of China. China had been em- imal resistance from South Korean broiled in a civil war beginning in 1927, emplacements.5 Two months into the which was essentially paused during conflict, the South Korean forces and the Japanese invasion of Mainland Chi- those US Army units that had arrived na. Once Japan was defeated, the forces from Japan had been pushed back into

163 The Saber and Scroll a perimeter around the port city of Pu- X Corps, which comprised forty thou- san. The attacks were repelled due to sand men from the 1st Marine Division the combination of well-entrenched and the 7th Infantry Division. MacAr- defenders and constant attacks on the thur also brought in Major General Ol- North Korean supply lines by the newly iver Smith to help devise the landing. minted US Air Force. Despite some counterintuitive guid- The United Nations officially ance from MacArthur, the invasion of condemned the attack. However, this Inchon was a success, and the troops at- was primarily due to the absence of the tacking Pusan were forced to withdraw 8 Soviet Union and China’s veto authori- to North Korea. However, Almond and ty, which was still in possession of Tai- Smith clashed frequently with MacAr- wan’s government in exile. The Truman thur supporting Almond’s positions. administration was initially hesitant to The North Korean forces with- get involved, due to its focus on pre- drew past the 38th Parallel by the begin- venting the spread of communism in ning of October 1950. Initially MacAr- Europe. However, the United States de- thur was instructed not to pursue them, cided to intervene to protect Japan after as the United States did not want to the interception of a Soviet communi- bring the Soviets or Chinese into the qué stating that the Soviet Union would war.9 South Korean forces continued to not deploy forces in support of North push past the 38th Parallel and the Unit- Korea. President Truman entrusted ed Nations task force followed. MacAr- the plan to General Douglas MacAr- thur himself felt that the only possible thur. MacArthur had developed a living outcome was to push all the way into legend persona and was viewed as “a China to fully crush the North Korean man with a solemn regard for his own forces. However, China was expecting divinity.”6 MacArthur put together a a confrontation with the United States brilliant plan to turn the tide of war. He and had been preparing since June of planned to use the US Marine Corps’ that year. As United Nations forces ap- amphibious landing capabilities to in- proached the North Korean/Chinese sert at the port city of Inchon, located border along the Yalu River, Chinese in close proximity to Seoul. The landing forces secretly entered North Korea and was thought impossible due to low tide engaged the South Korean and United waters and treacherous inlet sandbars. Nation forces. They first engaged in bat- To accomplish this, MacArthur brought tle on October 25 at Onjong, surprising in two individuals. The first was one of the Republic of Korea (South Korean his most trusted, or at least most agree- military – ROK) forces. The battle was able, generals: Major General Edward a disaster for ROK forces, which were “Ned” Almond. Almond was a devoted forced to retreat south and were sepa- believer in MacArthur’s cult of person- rated by impassable terrain in the form ality and was guaranteed to follow any of the Taebaek Mountains along the order presented to impress MacArthur.7 eastern peninsula. As part of the First Almond would be given command of Phase Campaign, China was able to win

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The Chinese Intervene in the West - October 25 - November 1, 1950. The US Army in the Korean War, Center of Military History, US Army, Washington, DC. a victory over the Eighth Army, turn- cerned that the Americans would not ing the tide of the United Nations’ cam- stop at the Chinese/Korean border as paign. This was followed by an attack on part of the Truman Doctrine’s approach the X Corps’ Marines at Sudong, which to communism. China’s response was was repulsed. to form the People’s Volunteer Army A number of factors had come to- (PVA) of expatriated North Koreans in gether to bring these events to fruition. the same manner US forces were offi- MacArthur believed in a guaranteed cially dubbed the United Nations Police victory despite the input he was receiv- Force. Both of the administrative moves ing from his field commanders. In fact, indicated that both nations were com- MacArthur was noted as not spend- mitted to fight for dominance but did ing a single night in Korea, preferring not want to risk an all-out war between to return to his headquarters in Japan. the two countries. The overwhelmingly successful land- MacArthur’s response to Chi- ing in Inchon had bolstered his view of nese forces joining the conflict was to the X Corps and his dangerous under- organize a Home-By-Christmas cam- estimation of China. China was con- paign due to his belief that the PVA had

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Marines talking cover at the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, Korean War. Photo by Sergeant Frank C. Kerr, US Marines. withdrawn to Chinese territory.10 To both sides having to endure harsh cold this end, Almond formulated a plan for weather conditions. the X Corps to move west into Yuda- Almond and Smith continued to mi-ni, while the Army’s 7th Infantry clash over strategy, as the former only Division moved east to Sinhung-ni. The wanted to meet MacArthur’s arbitrary 3rd Infantry Division providing secu- deadline for victory. Smith cautioned rity along the western flank of the ad- Almond about the overextended Ma- vancing task force became spread over rine Division but was overruled. X 400 miles of front lines. The Americans, Corps’ Marines moved into Hagaru-ri, along with the ROK forces, had begun which they simply called Hagaru, and to envelope Lake Jangjin, which maps began to fortify it.11 There were also bat- referred to by their Japanese pronun- talion-sized Forward Operating Bas- ciation as the Chosin Reservoir. The es (FOB) at Koto-ri and Chinhung-ri PVA had also staged around the Chosin along the supply route from the south. Reservoir with fifteen divisions of ap- The 7th Marines continued to push for- proximately 120,000 infantry. The stage ward from Hagaru and into Yudam-ni was now set, with both sides seeking the while the 5th Marines enveloped right complete destruction of the other, and of the reservoir. Smith opposed this

166 Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War

A column of the US First Marine Division move through Chinese lines, Battle of Chosin Reservoir. Photo by Corporal Peter McDonald, USMC form of deployment and convinced Al- Reservoir. Simultaneously three divi- mond to make some concessions. First, sions moved around the reservoir to Colonel Allan MacLean split from the the south of Hagaru in order to attack 7th Infantry Division and replace the Koto-ri and thereby cut US supply 7th Marines in the east. The second lines. In the evening of November 27, concession was to allow the Marines to the PVA launched attacks at Hagaru, construct an airfield at Hagaru, which Koto-ri, and Yudam-ni. Thanks in large Almond only allowed because only Ma- parts to Smith’s preparations, the 5th rines would perform the labor. The date and 7th Marines recognized the need was November 27, 1950 and the PVA to dig in for the evening and were pre- forces were about to attack in force. pared to do so. The PVA 59th Division The PVA 9th Army crossed the attempted to block the road between border of China mainly on foot due to Hagaru and Yudam-ni, but Company fears of being targeted by the US Air F, referred to as Fox Company, 7th Ma- Force. Five divisions moved down from rines were defending the Toktong Pass. the north on both sides of the Chosin US forces were able to hold out against

167 The Saber and Scroll the Chinese onslaught, with the excep- would “attack in a different direction” tion of Task Force MacLean, which was and head to Hagaru.13 spread out across the eastern shore of The withdrawal involved the the Chosin Reservoir. Task Force Ma- movement of all United Nations forces cLean withdrew to Hagaru with ap- south to the port of Hungnam with the proximately 75 percent killed in action 7th Marines in the lead and the 5th Ma- and 50 percent of the remaining forces rines covering the rear flank. The 26th able to continue fighting.12 Additional- Corps attacked Hagaru on the night of ly, Smith and Colonel Lewis “Chesty” the 6th but were repulsed as the 7th Ma- Puller had ordered a convoy to move rines continued to clear the route be- from Koto-ri to Hagaru in order to re- tween Koto-ri and Hagaru. The break- inforce Hagaru. The PVA was able to out continued well for the Americans, ambush the convoy and separate it into but the PVA began to destroy roadways three. One-third was able to press on to and bridges in order to trap the X Corps Hagaru, while another third was forced north of Hungnam. This included the to return to Koto-ri. The remaining pivotal Funchilin Pass south of Koto-ri. third did not survive the battle. With the bridge destroyed, the Chinese The PVA did not fare much were successful in stopping the retreat better and received heavy casualties of US forces and had a solid defensive from their attacks on Yudam-ni and point. The Marines contested the de- Hagaru compared to casualties for the fenders and were able to airdrop several Americans, which ranged from 30-50 bridges to allow for the Marines’ with- percent. The PVA 58th Division was drawal to Hungnam, although the Chi- nearly completely destroyed, as was nese continued attacks on Hungnam.14 much of the 20th Corps. To the east, the PVA successfully turned back the Evacuations at Hungnam had US Eighth Army at the Battle of the begun as early as December 8, while Ch’ongch’on River inflicting heavy los- the Eighth Army continued south. es. In response, MacArthur ordered the Supporting aircraft and naval gunfire X Corps to withdraw from the Chosin were able to aid in the defense, while Reservoir. The issue became how to the remaining X Corps personnel and move the entirety of the X Corps out equipment was evacuated, along with of the battlespace under threat of Chi- approximately one-third of the Korean nese attack, which had become more refugees. The last ship departed Hun- precarious once the PVA 26th Corps, gnam on December 24, and the port comprised of the 76th and 77th Divi- was destroyed to prevent its use by Chi- sions, arrived at Hagaru on December nese forces, which took what remained 6. Almond initially wished to fly out all of the port the following day.15 The troops from Yudam-ri and Hagaru, but original intent of the withdrawal was Smith refused to abandon the Marines’ to Wonsan north of the 38th Parallel, heavy equipment and artillery. Smith but X Corps returned to South Korea in famously declared that those garrisons early 1951 instead.

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At the end of the Battle of the PLA was forced into a pyrrhic victory Chosin Reservoir, both sides were dev- at a cost of an estimated forty thousand astated. US and ROK losses totaled casualties with some estimates ranging 17,833 casualties as a result of com- from sixty to eighty thousand troops bat and non-combat related injuries.16 lost. A total of twelve PVA divisions The 1st Marine Division reported over were no longer combat effective and the seven thousand of these non-com- entirety of the PVA Ninth Army was bat casualties, a direct result of the in- unable to return to the war effort until tense cold weather.17 Smith’s successful March of 1951. Two PVA divisions were withdrawal of troops and equipment disbanded as a result of the battle. De- allowed for those troops to reinforce spite these losses, China pushed forward the Eighth Army almost immediately. and was able to retake Seoul, bolstered The PVA forcing US troops to retreat by the victory at the Chosin Reservoir. resulted in a huge blow to the concept As the Eighth Army was able to survive of US military superiority. Chinese in- and rejoin the war effort quickly, US tervention and the withdrawal of troops forces were able to retake Seoul again from North Korean territory ended all in March 1951. This caused the Chinese hopes of a quick United Nations victory Fourth Phase Offensive to fail and the and MacArthur’s Home-by-Christmas Fifth Phase Offensive was a catastroph- campaign. MacArthur’s opinion of US ic failure for China. The resulting Unit- forces remained unchanged and shortly ed Nations counteroffensive stabilized the front lines just north of the 38th after, he challenged China by declaring Parallel. The combination of all of these to them that they had been defeated. losses forced China to change their fo- His initial belief that China would not cus from driving the United States from enter the war, his refusal to acknowl- the Korean Peninsula to defending Chi- edge the full scope of the situation, and nese assets. Both sides bore terrible los- his conflicts with President Truman led es that made the concept of a quick to- to his relief as Commander-in-Chief of tal victory impossible, resulting in two the United Nations Command. more years of relative stalemate due to North Korean territory lost to stalled peace talks regarding prisoners the United Nations Command was re- of war. As such, the outcome of the Bat- turned to North Korea by January 1951. tle of the Chosin Reservoir produced The combined Chinese and North Ko- conditions that stalled the Korean War rean army would have been able to oc- and prevented either side from gaining cupy the whole peninsula. However, the a decisive advantage.

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Bibliography

Cleaver, Thomas McKelvey. The Frozen Chosen. Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2017.

Davis, Burke. Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller. New York: Bantam Books, 1962.

Dinan, Desmond. Origins and Evolution of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014

Fehrenbach, T.R. This Kind of War. Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2000.

Montross, Lynn, and Captain Nicholas Canzona. USMC, US Marine Operations in Korea, 1950-1953, Volume III: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign. Washington, DC: Headquarters US Marine Corp, 1957.

Sides, Hampton. On Desperate Ground. New York: Anchor Books, 2018.

Notes

1 Desmond Dinan, Origins and Evolution of the European Union (Oxford: Oxford Uni- versity Press, 2014), 39–40.

2 Ibid., 48–49.

3 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2000), 18.

4 Thomas McKelvey Cleaver,The Frozen Chosen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 54.

5 Ibid., 44–52.

6 Hampton Sides, On Desperate Ground (New York: Anchor Books, 2018), 16.

7 Ibid., 17.

8 Burke Davis, Marine! The Life of Chesty Puller (New York: Bantam Books, 1962), 233– 38.

9 Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, 180–82.

10 Sides, On Desperate Ground, 132–33.

11 Ibid., 119.

12 Lynn Montross and Captain Nicholas Canzona, US Marine Operations in Korea, 1950- 1953, Volume III: The Chosin Reservoir Campaign (Washington, DC: Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1957), 243-44.

170 Chosin Reservoir: The Battle That Stalled a War

13 Sides, Ground, 261. 14 Cleaver, Frozen, 322–24. 15 Fehrenbach, War, 250. 16 Cleaver, Frozen, 343–79. 17 Montross, Marine Operations, 382–83.

171

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 A Division At War—Part I

Dr. Robert Young Associate Professor, Department of History and Military History American Military University

Abstract Often forgotten in the discussions of the ground war in the Pacif- ic during the Second World War are the contributions of several prominent US Army infantry divisions. The 32nd Infantry Division was one such unit. They spent more days in combat in the Pacific than any other US Army unit. The 32nd had its baptism of fire on the southeastern coast of New Guinea at Buna in November 1942. A brutal two-month campaign saw an unprepared, inexperienced 32nd victorious. The division returned to combat on New Guinea’s northern coast in 1944 at Aitape before another grueling campaign along the Driniumor River. Although victorious, the 32nd Infan- try Division left New Guinea in the fall of 1944 for the Philippines tired and depleted. Keywords: 32nd Infantry Division, Buna, MacArthur, Eichelberg- er, Driniumor River, Krueger, Port Moresby, Japanese Eighteenth Army, US Sixth Army

Una división en guerra—Parte I Resumen A menudo se olvidan en las discusiones sobre la guerra terrestre en el Pacífico durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial las contribu- ciones de varias divisiones de infantería prominentes del ejército estadounidense. La 32ª División de Infantería fue una de esas uni- dades. Pasaron más días en combate en el Pacífico que cualquier otra unidad del ejército estadounidense. El 32 tuvo su bautismo de fuego en la costa sureste de Nueva Guinea en Buna en noviembre de 1942. Una brutal campaña de dos meses vio a un 32º sin prepa- ración y sin experiencia victorioso. La división regresó a combatir en la costa norte de Nueva Guinea en 1944 en Aitape antes de otra campaña agotadora a lo largo del río Driniumor. Aunque victorio- sa, la 32ª División de Infantería salió de Nueva Guinea en el otoño de 1944 hacia Filipinas cansada y agotada.

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Palabras clave: 32a División de Infantería, Buna, MacArthur, Ei- chelberger, Driniumor River, Krueger, Port Moresby, Decimoctavo Ejército Japonés, Sexto Ejército de EE. UU.

战争中的一个师—第一部分 摘要 关于二战期间太平洋地区陆战的探讨经常忽略由几个杰出美 国陆军步兵师所作的贡献。美国陆军第32步兵师就是其中一 个。比起其他美军部队，第32步兵师在太平洋地区的战斗时 间最长。1942年9月，第32步兵师在新几内亚东南海岸的布纳 镇经历了战火洗礼。血腥的两个月战斗后，毫无准备的、经 验不足的第32步兵师取得了胜利。该师于1944年返回到新几 内亚北部海岸的艾塔佩参战，在这之后又在德林乌莫尔河上 进行了另一场疲劳战。尽管取得了胜利，第32步兵师于1944 年秋季离开新几内亚，精疲力竭地前往菲律宾。

关键词：美国陆军第32步兵师，布纳（Buna），麦克阿瑟， 艾克尔伯格，德林乌莫尔河（Driniumor River），克鲁格， 莫尔兹比港，日本第18军，美国第6集团军

he American Army and Marine from beginning to end and fought gal- Corps each had many famous lantly throughout, despite doing so in divisions during the Second the most deplorable battlefield condi- TWorld War. In Europe, the 82nd and tions possible. One such division was 101st Airborne Divisions, the 1st and the 32nd Infantry Division. They fought 2nd Armored Divisions, and the 1st in every major campaign of the SWPA, Infantry Division achieved legendary from Buna to Luzon and stood ready to status. In the Pacific, most of the fame join in the war’s biggest operation, the belongs to the Marine divisions that invasion of Japan. It was not an easy fought across the Central Pacific. The Army and its contribution are almost war for the 32nd. Thrust into their first forgotten. In a part of the war known battle at Buna unprepared and ordered as the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA), to the Driniumor River undermanned the Army did the fighting and though and to Luzon exhausted, they fought on seemingly devoid of accolades, sever- and saw more combat than any Ameri- al of its divisions experienced this war can unit in the Pacific.

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The Japanese attack on Pearl the Japanese could never reach Port Harbor started the Pacific War. Gener- Moresby. They were wrong. The small al Douglas MacArthur’s forced escape Australian force gradually gave ground, from the Philippines in April 1942 and lengthening the Japanese supply lines subsequent vow of “I shall return” start- to the breaking point. The jungle with ed the war in the SWPA and the World its constant heat, hunger, thirst, and War II résumé of the 32nd Infantry Di- disease, and by mid-September, Ken- vision. ney’s planes whittled down Japanese Before returning to the Philip- strength. Moving back towards Gona pines, MacArthur first had to protect in November, they eventually occupied his new base of operations, Australia. defensive positions there and at nearby Immediately to the north of Australia Buna. US and Australian intelligence lies the world’s second largest island, believed that what was left of the Japa- New Guinea. To protect Australia, New nese was a force of skeletons. Buna had Guinea could not become a major Jap- two airstrips, and Australia could be anese base. To retake the Philippines, it attacked from them. General MacAr- must become a major US base. This ear- thur saw this as the perfect opportunity ly in the war, the former was the main to send in US ground forces. He only concern. In May 1942, the Japanese also had two divisions to choose from, the recognized this and planned a major 32nd and 41st Infantry Divisions, both operation to take Port Moresby, a port former National Guard units and com- on New Guinea’s southern coast. US pletely unprepared to fight a war in the code breakers penetrated the Japanese jungle. Buna became the 32nd Infantry 1 code and knew of the exact date and Division’s baptism of fire. location of the operation. The famous The geography of the Buna bat- naval battle of the Coral Sea happened tlefield was the last place an army would on 4 May and resulted in an American want to fight a battle: strategic victory. The Japanese invasion The principal swamp in the Buna force turned for home. area lies between Entrance Creek Undeterred, the Japanese man- and Simemi Creek .... It is abso- aged to land a force on New Guinea’s lutely impenetrable, a fact of vi- northern coast, approximately two tal importance in the campaign. thousand men, that summer at Gona. Between the closely spaced trees, Port Moresby was only 100 miles away. which are 25 to 100 feet high, is It may as well have been 1,000. Between a tangle of roots, creepers, and Gona and Port Moresby stood the underbrush. Much of the other Owen Stanley Mountains, unmapped ground in the area, though not and impenetrable jungle, a small Aus- actually swamps, is thoroughly tralian ground force, and the US Fifth waterlogged. Much of the dri- Air Force, commanded by General er land is covered with a thick George Kenney. All these obstacles con- growth of kunai grass or plan- vinced Australian and US intelligence tations of coconut palms. This

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coarse grass grows to a height of and reinforced with coconut logs; earth more than 6 feet, but its height and sand protected the top of them varies greatly, depending on how from mortar and artillery fire. The recently it has been, burned over walls were reinforced with logs, rocks, or cut. Its leaves are broad and sand-filled ammunition boxes, and oil sharp-edged: its stems are about drums. Fast-growing vegetation cam- the thickness of a pencil. The ouflaged everything.4 coconut palms are usually plant- The Japanese force defending ed about 18 feet apart and the Buna, even with all their defensive ad- growth under them is relatively vantages, lacked the physical stamina clear of cover.2 to fight alone. Unbeknownst to US in- General MacArthur was aware of Bu- telligence, the weakened enemy force na’s difficulties, noting: of 1,250 received approximately fifteen hundred reinforcements only days be- In addition to all our other dif- fore the attack.5 These reinforcements ficulties there was New Guinea were veterans, unlike their opponent, itself, as tough and tenacious an the 32nd Infantry Division. enemy as the Japanese. Few areas The 32nd Infantry Division was in the world present so formida- an upper Midwest (Michigan and Wis- ble an obstacle to military op- consin) National Guard unit activated erations. The jagged mountains after the US originally entered World rear their tall peaks amid sudden War II. They received their orders for plunging gorges, towering above Australia in March, yet did not arrive the trackless jungle that covers until the middle of May. From there it nearly the entire surface of the was move after move, one area to anoth- sprawling island .... In the jungle er. They never had their feet grounded; itself, trails were a sea of mud, they were unable to set up a cohesive with little relief from the swollen training program in an environment rivers and the razor-edged ku- none had ever experienced. The divi- nai grass that grows in treacher- sion commander, General Edwin Hard- ous bunches higher than a man’s ing, was clearly frustrated: head .... Nature did not stop with adverse terrain however .... Unfortunately we had no oppor- Health conditions matched the tunity to work through a system- world’s worse.3 atic program for correcting defi- ciencies. From February, when I The Japanese enhanced the natural took over until November when potential available in defending the we went into battle we were al- airstrips. They constructed a series of ways getting ready to move. No bunkers impervious to all but heavy sooner would we get a systemat- weapons. The 32nd Infantry Division ic training program started then had few such weapons. The bunkers orders for a move came along to were constructed in shallow trenches interrupt it.6 7

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The very simple Buna battlefield. The airstrips dominate and were the main ob- jectives. Of particular note is the jungle that surrounds everything.7

MacArthur also recognized this fret- town Middle West,” he still sent them ting: “none of the three elements of my into action.9 This division, severely un- command: naval, air, or ground, was derstrength before leaving for Australia, adequate for the job .... The ground received a huge influx of basic trainees, troops ... not only were they too few in bringing its three infantry regiments number, but they lacked the equipment (126th, 127th, 128th) up to strength, and strenuous training necessary for although most of the division support combat.”8 Yet, he still sent them to Buna units lacked men and equipment. Nei- because, given his intelligence section ther the veteran National Guardsmen and their appraisal of Japanese strength, nor the new basic trainees knew any- even the inexperienced 32nd should thing about fighting in the jungle. Gen- have had little trouble. Even after send- eral Eichelberger instituted a rigorous ing the soon to be famous General Rob- conditioning and jungle warfare-train- ert Eichelberger to evaluate this unit, a ing program that the 32nd did not reap unit he rated “barely satisfactory” and the benefits of because they went to “high on itself, full of confidence, but Buna in November. quite unprepared for the miseries and The battlefield itself was bare- terrors of jungle warfare so alien to the ly two miles wide. The objectives were experience of boys from the clipped the two airstrips, the Old Strip and New green lawns and serene streets of small- Strip, and a small footbridge across Si-

177 The Saber and Scroll memi Creek linking them. Other posi- brilliantly camouflaged. Major David tions such as Buna Mission and Buna Parker, an observer sent by the War De- Village also saw major fighting. The partment, noted: first attack on 19 November would mir- It was impossible to see where ror all the attacks that followed for the the enemy fire was coming from; next month. There was no air support consequently, our own rifle and and one, only one American artillery machine gun fire was ineffec- piece without ammunition. There were tive during the early stages .... no tanks. Not expecting much of a fight, Grenades and mortars were dif- the 1st Battalion of the 128th Infantry ficult to use because, first, it was Regiment advanced. No reconnaissance difficult to pick out a nest position preceded the attack. While approach- to advance upon with grenades, ing the bridge, they were stopped cold second, the thick jungle growth by murderous small arms fire, fire they and high grass made throwing could not respond to because they and firing difficult, and third, be- could not see it, the Japanese used flash- cause it was nearly impossible to less weapons and their positions were fire.10

The Simemi Creek Bridge. This is clearly not much of a bridge and is meant for only foot traffic. It is also an easy point for Japanese fire to concentrate on and US infantry would be limited to that bridge as it is surrounded by jungle.11

178 A Division At War—Part I

Another observer emphatically stated: for the first time, including their lead- “We were stopped cold.”12 The next at- ers. Suddenly the noise of machine gun tack, hopefully, would be better. Sched- fire erupts. The lead rank is cut down; uled for 21 November, the 32nd’s 126th there are dozens of killed and wound- Infantry Regiment would make the ed. Scared but resilient, they look for main attack. They now had a gener- the Japanese so they can return fire. al idea of the Japanese position’s loca- They cannot see them; they cannot see tion. An air attack followed by a mortar the fire from the enemy weapons. The and artillery preparation (with several easy fight is no longer easy. The lack of Australian guns) preceded the infantry reconnaissance now rears its ugly head. attack. The air attack was late and off The wounded from the lead ranks now target (even hitting some US troops). have a general idea where the Japanese The mortars and artillery also had little are so that the next attack should fare effect. They all used ammunition with better. The men, still shocked but ready quick fuses (exploding on contact) be- to move again, are told there will be an cause delayed action fuses were in short air attack and artillery barrage before supply. All the bombardment did was the attack. The air attack is late, forcing blow the jungle camouflage around. the men to boil in the heat of their for- The infantry still advanced, and once ward positions. When it does come, it is again machine gun fire stopped them. not all on target; some US positions are For the next several days, the 32nd con- hit. The resulting chaos is alleviated a bit tinued to probe forward and continued when the guns and mortars start firing. to be thrown back. Many factors were They see them hitting the area where in play here. Inexperience, the tenacity the Japanese had stopped the previous of the Japanese, and the lack of proper attack. The men think this should now weapons to deal with bunkers all began be OK. When they advance, the same to break the 32nd Infantry Division. enemy fire stops them again. What The jungle also took its toll. good was the artillery? Frustration sets Imagining what it was like for the in; exhaustion takes an even greater toll. infantry in those first attacks is chill- Something has to change. ing. These green soldiers, already worn As November came to a close, from their first few weeks in the jungle, the men of the 32nd were drained, their are told of their first attack. Tired and lack of preparation and acclimation to uneasy, they are given confidence by a jungle environment making its mark. all their officers repeatedly telling them General Eichelberger sent an officer to there will not be much opposition and observe the frontline infantry. He was that the Japanese are already defeated. appalled at what he saw: “The troops They advance. They can see their objec- were deplorable. They wore long, dirty tive several hundred yards ahead. This beards. Their shoes were uncared for or is all too easy. There is an eerie silence worn out. They were receiving far less that the men do not realize is danger- than adequate rations and there was ous; they are all experiencing a battle little discipline or military courtesy.”13

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Physical deterioration also led to a dete- looked to Robert Eichelberger to re- riorating state of mind. The realization place him. Eichelberger received one of that they had no weapons capable of de- the more famous sendoffs in American stroying the Japanese bunkers created a military history: sense of hopelessness, the worst state of I want you to go to Buna and cap- mind a soldier can have. What they had ture it. If you do not do so I don’t did not work. What they needed (tanks, want you to come out alive and flamethrowers, bazookas) was unavail- that applies to your Chief of Staff able. Yet, the division commander, also. Do you understand Bob? General Harding, ordered another ma- Time is of the essence! I want you jor attack for 26 November. to relieve Harding Bob. Send him Harding had little choice but to back to America. If you don’t do order another attack. General MacAr- it I will. Relieve every regimental thur consistently prodded him and and battalion commander. Put was growing impatient. Harding put corporals in command if nec- together everything he had to support essary. Get somebody who will the new attack. Six Australian guns, a fight. When do you want to start dozen 81-mm mortars, heavy machine Bob?16 guns, and thirty-five aircraft would play Eichelberger left for Buna the next a role. None of it mattered. The air at- morning. He did not launch an imme- tack was inaccurate (precise bombing diate attack, a decision that no doubt in the jungle is nearly impossible), the infuriated MacArthur. After inspecting artillery and mortars did little damage, the front he noticed several major defi- and the infantry was once again driven ciencies: back. Defending against these attacks was not difficult; they were all frontal 1. The state of mind of the troops attacks. The terrain gave US command- must improve. They above all ers little choice. To break the stalemate needed a sense of aggressiveness, and to drive the Japanese from their a desire to close with and defeat bunkers, tanks and better artillery were the enemy. needed. General Harding pleaded for tanks. They would come. Harding was 2. All indirect fires would be placed gone when they arrived.14 under the control of a Fire Direc- tion Center and the location of General MacArthur was not a all Japanese positions would be patient man. He never visited the bat- registered. Vigorous scouting and tlefield; he never saw the conditions patrolling would begin immedi- his men were fighting and dying in. ately to pinpoint those positions. He also had Australian officers in his headquarters chirping in his ear about 3. Commanders would operate the “inadequate” fighting abilities of US from the front, not rear command soldiers.15 He wanted Harding out and posts.

180 A Division At War—Part I

4. They needed change of tactics: no mander at each location. The airstrips more frontal attacks unless abso- were the responsibility of the Warren lutely unavoidable.17 Force, Buna itself the Urbana Force. Eichelberger also wanted tanks, the same Tanks had yet to arrive, so Eichelberger tanks Harding wanted, and the right received five Bren Gun Carriers, lightly ammunition for his one US gun before armored, open at the top vehicles, with launching another attack. MacArthur little armament and very unreliable in would not wait, and Eichelberger or- jungle terrain. Attached to the Warren dered an attack on 5 December. Force, they moved with the infantry af- The Buna battlefield had essen- ter another ineffective preliminary air tially become two separate fights: the and artillery attack. All five Bren Gun first at the airstrips and the other at Carriers were quickly knocked out. Un- Buna Village. Each had a force dedi- like previous battles the infantry did cated to it named after the senior com- not wait to attack.

The first so-called armored vehicles to arrive at Buna, Bren Gun Carriers. They were useless since they could not engage bunkers, did not offer much protection, and were prone to mechanical failure in the jungle.18

They followed right behind the explod- Village was more successful. The village ing shells and managed to advance was now isolated and its bunkers could within 150 yards of the Simemi Creek be systematically destroyed. By 15 De- Bridge, destroying several bunkers in cember Buna Village was totally secure, the process. The attack against Buna but the airstrips remained under Japa-

181 The Saber and Scroll nese control. Eichelberger would not tinued to drive on without the weapons attack again until the tanks arrived. they needed. If only the tanks and the proper ammunition for the one gun ex- At this point, although their isted for the first attack on 18 Novem- month in combat had been a constant ber. Would the Buna campaign have struggle, the 32nd Infantry Division had already ended? It is a relevant question grown as a fighting unit. Although most since all took place in the attack of 18 attacks did not succeed, the men con- December.

The M3 Stuart Light Tank. While small in size and armament its armor allowed it to advance to effective distance of the Japanese bunkers where its 37-mm gun could engage.19

These tanks were not the mon- isted. Five tanks and two veteran Aus- sters often cited when discussing World tralian infantry companies attacked to- War II. Eichelberger received eight M3 ward the Duropa Plantation, followed Stuart light tanks. With a 37-mm main by the 3rd Battalion, 128th Infantry gun, a machine gun, and light armor, Regiment. They reached Simemi Creek, they did not seem like much. Against allowing the 1st Battalion, 126th In- the Japanese, they were plenty. The Jap- fantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion, anese had few anti-tank weapons and 128th Infantry Regiment to reach the once approaching the bunkers, they Bridge at the Creek. The airstrips were seemed to forget the infantry even ex- now in sight.20

182 A Division At War—Part I

The tanks allowed this advance. US gun destroyed one of the 3-inch Colonel MacNab, one of the battalion enemy naval guns but could not locate commanders, described their effects: the others. The infantry resumed their The tanks really did that job. advance and seized all the big Japanese They apparently completely de- guns, finding them out of ammunition. moralized the Japs ... who fought Any remaining Japanese bunkers were like cornered rats when they were eliminated over the next week. By 3 Jan- forced into the open as a result of uary 1943, the battle finally ended. having their fires masked when Six weeks of combat in the jungle the tanks broke through their fi- had taken its toll: 707 killed in action nal protective line .... There were and 1,680 wounded in action. Those few holes knocked in the bunkers numbers were compounded by 7,125 except where the tanks stood off non-battle casualties (sickness, heat ex- and blasted them at short range haustion, battle fatigue). The 32nd In- with their 37-mm guns.21 fantry Division entered this battle with 10,825 men. Ninety percent at some The Stuarts ran right through the heavy point were not effective. It is remark- small arms fire. Two were lost: one to a able they fought as well as they did. Molotov cocktail and the other to me- New Guinea was their wartime home chanical failure. The remaining three for the next two years. The next major tanks advanced to within 500 yards of battle along the Driniumor River saw Cape Endaiadere, destroyed a strong- the 32nd Infantry Division once again point, and then moved to the New Strip, in an avoidable, precarious situation. where another attack with three more tanks took place. A system of twenty After Buna, the 32nd needed bunkers, a system that had held up a rest. They also needed intense train- month of repeated attacks, was engaged ing, both for replacements and veter- and destroyed.22 ans, and plenty of heavy weapons and equipment. Never again would they en- The Old Strip still remained. All ter battle with only one artillery piece of the Japanese heavy weapons (two 75- and no tanks. The year 1943 would be mm guns, two 37-mm guns, several 25- a year of training, integration of new mm dual and triple pom-poms, three weapons and equipment, and assimila- 3-inch dug in naval guns) defended the tion of a new command structure. Gen- Old Strip. Getting there meant cross- eral Eichelberger moved on. The new ing the bridge, which the Japanese had division commander was General Wil- blown a hole in. It was repaired and on liam Gill (leading the division through Christmas Eve, Eichelberger launched the end of the war). The 32nd Infantry 23 his next attack. Division became part of the US Sixth The attack, preceded by the fire of Army, General Walter Krueger com- the lone US gun, went well, at first. The manding. Krueger was responsible for Japanese then knocked out three more the tactical part of the New Guinea tanks. The infantry advance stalled. The campaign. Strategically, MacArthur and

183 The Saber and Scroll his headquarters determined objectives not go below army commanders) and and timetables. below often received orders from army In addition to men and material, commanders that may have seemed the SWPA received another major tool: nonsensical yet always seemed to work. ULTRA. ULTRA was the information General Walter Krueger received a gleamed from enemy military codes, continuous flow of ULTRA informa- both Japanese and German. It enabled tion throughout the 1944 New Guinea Allied cryptologists to secure informa- campaign, and that information deter- tion as specific as exact times, locations, mined the majority of the 32nd Infan- and attacks. It was why commanders try Division’s deployments throughout at the corps level (this information did that year.

The march across the coast on northern New Guinea, 1944.24 As the spring of 1944 ap- force, the fifty-five-thousand-strong proached, the Sixth Army was ready Eighteenth Army, occupied Wewak. to bound across the northern coast of Generals MacArthur and Krueger of New Guinea as they moved closer to course knew this, so they decided to the Philippines. ULTRA provided the land the 24th and 31st Infantry Divi- locations and numbers of Japanese forc- sions at Aitape and Hollandia in April, es throughout the island. Enemy forces 300 miles further west. Only scant ene- were scattered, although still strong in my forces defended the proposed land- isolated positions. The main Japanese ing sites and the operation was easy and

184 A Division At War—Part I losses small. Not only had MacArthur staking all on an encounter with the en- set up a great anchorage and base for emy in the vicinity of Aitape about 10 future operations, he had also bypassed July. At present we are preparing to at- and isolated an entire Japanese army. tack.”26 The second was very specific as Half of the 32nd garrisoned Aitape and to troop and equipment strength, inten- Hollandia, while the rest essentially be- tions, and dispositions. came a theater reserve. A few months The attack planned against later, they reentered the fight. Aitape is scheduled to begin The Japanese Eighteenth Army about 10 July and to be made found itself in a precarious position af- by approximately 20,000 troops ter the US landings. Cut off, they had no ... the 20th and 41st Divisions hope for reinforcement or resupply. US are to participate in the attack naval dominance prevented any hope and enumerates the follow- of rescue. They could remain at Wewak, ing additional troops to be at- move west to try and link up with anoth- tached to the 41st Division: the er Japanese force, or surrender. Surren- 66th Infantry Regiment of the der was not an option. Staying in place 51st Division, 1 mortar compa- meant starvation as supplies whittled ny, and a provisional Army ar- away. So, the Japanese army command- tillery unit composed of Army er, General Hatazo Adachi, decided to and Navy Anti-Aircraft troops take approximately thirty-five thousand .... The 20th Division is believed men west. Their ultimate objective: Ai- to be located on the right bank tape and Hollandia. To get there, they of the Driniumor River (about had to cross the nearby Driniumor Riv- 20 miles east of Aitape). The er. Only fifteen thousand of that force 41st Division and the attached ever reached the vicinity of the Drini- troops are scheduled to be con- umor, the jungle savaging their ranks, centrated in the Yakamul-Ulau and only five thousand were combat area about 5 July. The plan calls troops. ULTRA told General Krueger for the 20th Division to attack 25 all of this. west across the Driniumor River, The Japanese were expected to while the 41st Division moves reach the Driniumor in early July. At around to the south and attacks that time, in addition to garrisoning Ai- north and northwest towards the tape and Hollandia, Sixth Army units Aitape and Tadji airfields. The were conducting operations further 18th Army has made a number west at Sarmi and Biak and other op- of urgent requests for submarine erations were imminent. Suddenly, a shipment of materials (principal- substantial enemy force could appear ly wire-cutters and signal equip- in Sixth Army’s rear, threatening every- ment) necessary for the Aitape thing else. Krueger received two vital operation. An indication that ULTRA messages in late June. The first it has been having serious local quoted General Adachi, stating: “we are supply difficulties as well appears

185 The Saber and Scroll

in a 21 June message in which eration. The standard operational man- the Army reported that it had ual of the time, FM 100-5, defines a cov- only 60 usable trucks.27 ering force operation as “providing time Given this wealth of information, the for the main force to prepare itself for destruction of the Japanese Eighteenth combat, to deceive the enemy as to the Army should have been easy. It may actual location of the main battle posi- have been if adequate forces engaged tion, to force the enemy to deploy early, them as they reached the Driniumor and to provide a deeper view of the ter- River. Those forces were employed else- rain over which the attacker would ad- where. vance.”28 Delay, delay, delay. What units The fighting along the Driniu- received this mission? Three battalions mor River is not even referred to as a of the 32nd Infantry Division and the defensive battle but a covering force op- 112th Cavalry Regiment.

This map displays the hopeless situation presented to the US covering force. The 128th Infantry Regiment, specifically two companies of its 2nd Battalion, had 2 miles of front to cover. The Japanese poured through that line, often outnumber- ing the American defenders ten to one. The 128th Infantry’s 1st Battalion could have helped, some, but was sent on a reconnaissance to find the Japanese.29

186 A Division At War—Part I

At Buna, the 32nd was sent to it of little use. There were two other attack without experience or proper units available, the 32nd’s 1st Battalion, weapons. At the Driniumor, the ele- 128th Infantry Regiment and the 2nd ments of the division employed had an Squadron of the 112th Cavalry. They impossible task. They were given far too were held back, not as a reserve for a much front to cover with too few troops. counterattack but to conduct a long- Only three of the division’s nine infan- range reconnaissance. As July came and try battalions participated and only the Japanese had yet to attack, Krueger two of them were actually defending became frustrated. Despite the line des- the river. Each battalion at full strength perately needing these men and above only had 871 men and none of the bat- the vocal protests of the commanders, talions were at full strength.30 Further, on 8 July the two battalions moved out not all of that 871 were infantry. The along the flanks of the line, approx- one cavalry squadron deployed forward imately five miles apart.32 It accom- had but five hundred men: roughly two plished nothing. 31 thousand men for five miles of front. It The jungle was as thick and un- broke down as follows: bearable along this route as it was ev- 1. 1st Squadron, 112th Cavalry Reg- erywhere else in New Guinea. The heat iment – Afua to the right flank of was debilitating. There was an enor- the 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry mous gap between the two units and it Regiment (1 mile) should have surprised nobody they did not find the Japanese. During the night 2. 3rd Battalion, 127th Infantry Reg- of 10-11 July, they heard the Japanese iment – 1.5 miles to the 2nd Bat- several miles in their rear as the enemy talion, 128th Infantry Regiment stormed across the Driniumor River. Several thousand Japanese sol- 3. 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry diers initially attacked the weakest part Regiment – 2.5 miles to the end of the 32nd front, 1.5 miles held by a of the line mere two rifle companies (E and G) of They would have plenty of fire support: the 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry Reg- forty-eight 105-mm howitzers (the en- iment. The enemy announced their at- tire 32nd Infantry Division artillery tack, screaming as they emerged from regiment) and sixteen 155-mm guns. the jungle. Artillery wreaked havoc, in Thanks to ULTRA, the US units knew one case killing 370 of a four-hundred- where the Japanese attack would take man Japanese battalion. As the Japa- place, so the artillery could register and nese hit the barbed wire, the infantry deliver accurate fire almost immediate- fired. Bodies of enemy soldiers began ly. Given that the Japanese were expect- piling up, but dwindling ammunition ed to attack at night, this became even and overheated machine gun barrels more vital. There was plentiful air sup- allowed the enemy through sheer num- port, but darkness and the jungle made bers to achieve a breakthrough. River

187 The Saber and Scroll

X, some 4,500 yards west of the Drin- Troop movements have been de- iumor, was the fallback position. It layed and I cannot promise you took the 2nd Battalion, 128th Infantry any reinforcement. I don not at- Regiment three days to reach the river. tempt to tell you what measures The 127th Infantry Regiment and 1st to take to counter an offensive Squadron, 112th Cavalry also with- from the east and at the same drew. It was necessary, although some time clean up the situation west disagreed.33 of the Driniumor. It cannot be General Charles Hall command- done by defensive action. I ex- ed the entire front. His superior, Gener- pect you to take all offensive al Krueger, believed the withdrawal un- measures not only to clarify the necessary.34 He believed this despite the situation but to eradicate the defenders being outnumbered ten to enemy west of the Driniumor. one and the Japanese pouring through You must do it with your own huge gaps in the line. He ordered Hall forces which are considered ade- to drive the Japanese back and sent quate for the purpose. We cannot him three more battalions to do so, two waste time by dilatory tactics. from the 31st Infantry Division, the While I appreciate that some of other from the 32nd’s 127th Infantry your troops are tired I know of Regiment. Before any attack could be no battle which was entered into launched, units had to consolidate and with fresh troops. Please give this cut off groups brought back into friend- your personal attention and push ly lines and eliminating scattered pock- it to a conclusion in order that ets of Japanese. By 15 July, only five days incoming troops may be used to after the initial attack, General Hall was finish up this situation outside of 35 already pushing General Gill to get the your area. 32nd Infantry Division and other units This message, while worded differently, moving again: parallels that which MacArthur gave Careful analysis of your situa- Eichelberger before dispatching him tion discloses at your dispos- to Buna. Hall said the Japanese were al 127, 128(-), 124 (-), 112th, not Gill’s equal in numbers. Wrong. some tank-destroyers and engi- He could not give him any more men neers. Confronting you west of or support. The use of the word “dila- Driniumor is an undetermined tory” was insulting to all who absorbed number of Japs but certainly not that attack and prepared to launch their your equal in either numbers own. Yet, in New Guinea, such was the or firepower. It appears to me life of the 32nd Infantry Division. The with the forces at your dispos- situation was never ideal, even this late al if the proper offensive action in the war. By the end of August, all is instituted at once you should had returned to normal. The line was be able to clear the area west of restored and the Eighteenth Japanese the Driniumor within 48 hours. Army was shattered. The entire Amer-

188 A Division At War—Part I ican force, mostly the 32nd, lost 440 mor: there never seemed to be a pos- men KIA, 2,550 WIA, and ten MIA.36 itive scenario that the Division faced. Japanese losses, mostly dead, were be- Yet, they persevered. Throughout their tween twelve and fourteen thousand.37 two years on New Guinea, they op- The 32nd soon left New Guinea for the erated under the massive shadow of Philippines, tired but ready for an en- MacArthur and his unrealistic expec- tirely new set of challenges. tations. At Buna, they were supposed It was nearly two years earlier to take airfields and defeat Japanese that the 32nd Infantry Division first positions with one piece of artillery, a entered combat at Buna. A vicious few tanks that came a month after the campaign made worse by their unpre- campaign started, and no support from paredness, inadequate weapons, and higher headquarters. Buna cost the Di- poor leadership at the highest level still vision its commander. Along the Drin- resulted in a victory, although at high iumor River, only part of the Division cost. The division trained and prepared was expected to hold a line several full for their next campaign that started strength divisions would find challeng- in the spring of 1944 at Hollandia and ing and again with little support, in ended in another bitter struggle along this case from their Army commander, the Driniumor River, against superior General Walter Krueger. They perse- numbers and once again with poor di- vered once again. After the Driniumor, rection from top leadership. The 32nd the 32nd was placed in reserve for the seemed to always find itself in the worst upcoming Leyte operation. MacArthur possible situation. Buna, the Driniu- was returning to the Philippines.

Bibliography

Drea, Edward. Defending the Driniumor: Covering Force Operations in New Guin- ea, 1944. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1984.

Eichelberger, Robert. Our Jungle Road To Tokyo. New York: The Viking Press, 1950.

FM 100-5. Field Service Regulations (Operations). June 1944.

Kenney, George C. George Kenney Reports: A Personal History of the Pacific War. New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1949.

MacArthur, Douglas. Reminiscences. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964.

Milner, Samuel. Victory in Papua. Washington DC: Department of the Army, Of- fice of the Chief of Military History, 1957.

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Smith, Edward Jaquelin. Always A Commander: The Reminiscences Of General William H. Gill. Colorado: The Colorado College, 1974.

Smith, Robert Ross. The Approach To The Philippines. Washington DC: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1974.

The Buna-Sanananda Operation, 16 November 1942 – 23 January 1943. Washing- ton, DC War Department, Military Intelligence Division, 1944.

Notes

1 Robert Young, They Too Fought the Japanese, 5–10. 2 Military Intelligence Division, The Buna-Sananda Operation, 10. 3 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, 155. 4 Young, They Too Fought the Japanese, 22. 5 Ibid. 6 Samuel Milner, Victory In Papua, 133. 7 Ibiblio.org. 8 MacArthur, Reminiscences, 153. 9 Robert Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road To Tokyo, 22. 10 Milner, Victory In Papua, 175.

11 Milner, 269. 12 Ibid., 176. 13 Eichelberger, Our Jungle Road To Tokyo, 25. 14 Young, 32. 15 George Kenney, George Kenney Reports, 153. 16 Introduction To The Eichelberger Papers. 17 Young, 33–34. 18 Milner 239 19 Milner, 265.

20 Young, 37.

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21 Milner, 263. 22 Young, 37–39. 23 Ibid., 39. 24 Edward Drea, Defending the Driniumor, 17. 25 Ibid., 62. 26 Ibid., 156. 27 Young, 124–25. 28 FM 100-5, Field Service Regulations (Operations), para. 597. 29 Robert Ross Smith, The Approach To The Philippines, 141. 30 Drea, Defending the Driniumor, 141. 31 Smith, The Approach To The Philippines, 135. 32 Ibid., 136. 33 Young, 133–36. 34 Smith, 158. 35 Drea, 95–96. 36 Smith, 204. 37 Ibid., 205.

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The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Book Review: Roy E. Appleman’s East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout in Korea, 1950

Lynne Marie Marx American Military University

Roy E. Appleman. East of Chosin: Entrapment and Break- out in Korea, 1950. College Station, Texas: Texas A&M University Press, 1987. ISBN 9780890962831. 399 pages.

oy E. Appleman was an army Appleman’s central thesis is that combat historian, a World War the loss of life at the Battle of Chosin Res- II and Korean War veteran, a ervoir occurred as a result of deficient RNational Park historian, and the author divisional leadership and organization; of several Korean War historical works almost nonexistent communication; including East of Chosin: Entrapment shortage of weaponry, ammunition, and Breakout in Korea, 1950. With Ko- and supplies; insufficient planning; and rea known as “The Forgotten War,” Ap- inhospitable environment and terrain. pleman elected to investigate the 31st He also argues that with some changes, Regiment Combat Team’s (RCT) ex- such as more reliable radios for effec- perience at the Chosin Reservoir near tive communication between officers Manchuria, China. East of Chosin is a and assigning Brigadier General Henry vital entry in Korean War historiogra- I. Hodes to command, as he was famil- phy since, previous to its publication, iar with 31st RCT, more soldiers would the Battle of Chosin Reservoir received have survived the breakout. very little documentation or research. Appleman combed through docu- Having clearly stated his argu- ments, written interviews, and oral his- ment, he supports his theories concisely tories to piece together the story of the with well-written chapters and the ex- 31st RCT. Therefore, East of Chosin is a cellent use of written histories and oral critical book for any historian to exam- interviews. For instance, he includes ine to see if Appleman’s theories have interviews about the deficiency of expe- stood the test of time. rienced command leadership. Marine

193 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.12 The Saber and Scroll

Captain Edward P. Stamford, Tactical of the 1st Marine Division had encour- Air Control Party (TACP) Commander aged Almond to permit the command- assigned to 31st RTC, declared, “Most ers of the 31st RCT to remain togeth- of the Army officers and many of the er. Instead, Almond ignored the CCF NCOs seemed to be very well trained intelligence and ordered the 31st RCT and apparently good leaders. The weak- to advance towards the Chosin Reser- ness lay in that the 7th Infantry Division voir to spread out over the area, which lost many of its senior NCOs through led to the 31st RCT disaster, as the transfers to units in Korea prior to its CCF overwhelmed the small American departure from Japan” (319). Also, First units throughout the reservoir. Chaos Lieutenant Hugh R. May of the 31st reigned among the ranks as numerous RCT acknowledged that “As long as the senior combat-experienced officers lost men had leaders they performed with- their lives, and the 31st RCT ceased to out questioning orders from their offi- exist with everyone trying to survive. cers; once the officer ranks were deci- Appleman takes the time to fo- mated it was impossible to maintain cus on the different officers of the 31st control” (318). RCT, introducing the reader to the men Appleman portrays the role of with small snippets about them. While the Commander of X Corps, Army chronicling the Battle of Chosin Reser- General Edward Almond, accurately in voir, Appleman makes sure to bring the the 31st RCT’s disaster at the Battle of human element to the historical event Chosin Reservoir. He demonstrated the with his vivid portraits of the officers concern of Almond’s staff while depict- and soldiers. For example, he introduc- ing Almond’s desire to please General es Colonel Robert E. Jones, who be- Douglas MacArthur, Commander of came Lieutenant Colonel Don C. Faith’s the United Nations Forces and Far East adjutant. After Jones graduated college, Command. For example, Lieutenant he attended the army’s airborne train- Colonel William J. McCaffrey, Al- ing at Fort Benning. Then, he joined the mond’s deputy chief of staff, expressed 502nd Parachute Regiment in the Euro- concerns about the operation and Ma- pean Theater of the Second World War rine Colonel Edward H. Forney, the and fought at Inchon and Seoul, Korea, liaison officer and amphibious-move- where he earned a purple heart. Finally, ment expert, had opposed the race to after surviving the Battle of Chosin Res- Yalu River through the Chosin Reser- ervoir, he proceeded through the ranks voir (11). Nonetheless, Gen. Almond disregarded the advice of his staff while until he attained the rank of Colonel attempting to please MacArthur. For (58–59). example, General Almond had received Likewise, he presents a balanced reports on the Chinese Communist perspective on the Korean Augmenta- Forces (CCF) in the Chosin Reservoir tion United States Army (KATUSA), and interviewed captured CCF soldiers. also known as the Republic of Korean Furthermore, Major General O.P. Smith Army (ROK). He depicts the KATU-

194 Book Review: Roy E. Appleman’s East of Chosin

SA as an army of young South Kore- ceeds to answer in “Could Task Force ans compelled into service by President Faith Have Been Saved?” (305). By Syngman Rhee’s impressment unit. They taking his readers through the journey had virtually no training before the US with him, exhibiting all the elements, Army attached them to X Corp. In the Appleman ultimately elucidates the di- Battle of Chosin Reservoir, the KATU- saster at the Chosin Reservoir.

SA became a hindrance to the 31stRCT. However, Appleman has not in- Yet, Appleman also praises the KATU- cluded all of X Corp in his analysis since SA as good soldiers when they obtained he has not examined the 1st Marine Di- the proper training and, indeed, they vision’s combat on the western side of produced some great officers. Apple- the reservoir. Furthermore, he has not man believes that any study of the Battle asked why the Marines had fewer ca- of Chosin Reservoir required the inclu- sualties than 31st RCT or why the Ma- sion of the KATUSA (61). rines had not disintegrated into chaos Additionally, the maps, pictures, when the CCF had surrounded them. and appendices are a noteworthy ad- Without researching the 1st Marine Di- dendum to the book. Interspersed vision, Appleman excludes a significant throughout the paperback edition are part of the battle, and yet, he has still maps and pictures of the region, al- written a compelling 31st RCT’s history lowing the reader to discern the move- of the Battle of Chosin Reservoir. ments of the 31st RCT in the challeng- Among Korean War historiog- ing terrain. The appendix is useful for raphy, East of Chosin in an excellent and grasping the elements of the command important history of the battle, support- structure. ed by a wealth of documentation and Another compelling component oral history, which presents a coherent of the book is the arrangement of the chronicle of the 31st RCT at the Chosin chapters. Beginning with an introduc- Reservoir. For any inspiring historian tion to the Korean War in “War in Ko- of the Korean War, Roy E. Appleman’s rea, November 1950” (3). Appleman East of Chosin: Entrapment and Break- poses many questions, which he pro- out in Korea, 1950, is a must-read book.

195

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Book Review: Patrick J. Sloyan’s When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon

Peggy Kurkowski American Public University

Patrick J. Sloyan, When Reagan Sent in the Marines: The Invasion of Lebanon. New York: Thomas Dunne Books, 2019. ISBN 9781250113917. Pp 240. Hardcover $29.99

n the long annals of American mil- Operation Desert Storm in the 1991 itary operations, the deployment Gulf War. His penchant for fearless of U.S. troops to Beirut in 1982 to “muckraking” journalism was on full Istabilize a war-torn city is one typically display in his 2015 book, The Politics under-reported or studied. In Patrick J. of Deception: JFK’s Secret Decisions on Sloyan’s new book, When Reagan Sent Vietnam, Civil Rights, and Cuba. Sloy- in the Marines: The Invasion of Leba- an’s eye for truth-telling (as he sees it) non, the author redresses this oversight is also hard to miss in his latest—and with an extremely harsh analysis of last—book. Sadly, Sloyan died at age 82 the events leading up to America’s be- in February 2019, shortly after complet- fuddled involvement, which ultimately ing When Reagan Sent in the Marines. climaxed with the horrific death of 241 Sloyan begins his narrative 10 U.S. Marines in the worst terrorist at- years before America’s official “boots tack upon Americans until the events on the ground” entry into Beirut in Au- 9/11, 18 years later. gust 1982, setting the countdown clock Sloyan, a Pulitzer-Prize winning of American involvement to Egyptian journalist, covered the momentous sto- President Anwar el-Sadat’s surprise at- ries of the 1960s and 1970s, including tack on Israel during the Yom Kippur the Vietnam War and the Watergate War of 1973. This highly effective offen- scandal. He won the Pulitzer for his ex- sive shattered Israel’s military arsenal. posé of U.S. friendly fire deaths during Consequently, America responded to

197 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.13 The Saber and Scroll its wounded ally by showering Israel minister of defense, Ariel Sharon, Sloy- with billions of dollars worth of new, an paints a dark portrait: state-of-the art weaponry. Even after “Their ambition was to use the Yom Kippur War wound down and American military hardware and peace was achieved with Israel in Oc- Israeli troops to change the map tober 1983, the rearmament of Israel of the Mideast. They sucked the would not be forgotten by America’s unwitting Reagan into a con- enemies in the Middle East. frontation with ferocious and Up until this point in Sloyan’s relentless opponents who con- brief book (less than 200 pages, minus ducted diplomacy with knives notes and bibliography), the tone is and bombs. It ended in defeat straightforward and relates events in a and blood-spattered humiliation mostly objective light. It begins to lose for both Israel and the United its tight historical focus when it intro- States.” (p. 1) duces memoir-like vignettes from the author, however, who was a reporter for According to Sloyan, America and Is- Newsday during the time of the events rael “embarked together” on a war to beginning with the assassination of An- oust Syria and the Palestinian Libera- war el-Sadat in 1981. What reads like a tion Organization (PLO) from Leba- third-person history suddenly moves non in order to remake the Levant into into a jarring first-person account, as a more pliant political entity, devoid of Sloyan remembers walking in Sadat’s perceived Soviet influence (which was funeral procession along with former Reagan’s obsession). Sloyan is at his presidents Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, reportorial best when he lays out the and Jimmy Carter. “As we arrived at the unfolding events of Israel’s chaotic and viewing stand where Sadat was gunned blood-drenched invasion in June 1982, down, I pointed out bullet holes to Nix- as well as the horrors of the 56-day Is- on. He alerted Carter and Ford. We all raeli siege of West Beirut, which ulti- gawked,” Sloyan writes. These random mately drove Reagan to send in the U.S. reminiscences lead the reader to won- Marines to a lead a multinational force der whether the book was incorrect- to maintain some semblance of order. ly categorized as history rather than His chapter on the complicated rela- memoir. tionship of Bashir Gemayel’s Maronite There are a lot of people who Christian Phalangists and Israel are as come off very badly in Sloyan’s book riveting as they are repulsive. One will (President Ronald Reagan and Secre- not forget Sloyan’s chapter on the Sabra tary of State Alexander Haig topping and Shatila massacres, one of the most the list), but one nation specifically heinous events in a most heinous war. comes across decidedly ugly and Ma- While Sloyan has some good chiavellian in his telling: Israel. Be- moments in this slim volume, he of- tween Israel’s “obsessed” prime minster, ten loses his focus and jumps from Menachim Begin, and his “duplicitous” one hot-button topic to the next. Just

198 Book Review: Patrick J. Sloyan’s When Reagan Sent in the Marines when his established narrative thread is evocative and powerful. More than thrumming with action, a new chapter any other head-of-state, Mitterrand takes us to another place or person that saw and smelled the horror wreaked eventually ties us back into the overar- upon the American Marines. The bar- ching picture. For example, he digresses rack images Sloyan shares are viscer- into the role of Iran in Syria as well as al and gut-churning, but Mitterrand their involvement in the terrorist attack toured them dutifully and prayed over on the Marine barracks, leading us into the physical remains of more than 200 a segue of America’s non-response and American soldiers. “In a classic Gallic where it leaves us today. Also, a final gesture, Mitterrand raised both arms chapter in the book is devoted expressly with palms skyward. He implored heav- to Reagan after the slaughter of the U.S. en for an answer to the enormity of so Marines in Beirut and his re-election many young men in tragic death” (p. campaign, his subsequent Iran-Contra 136) Sloyan recounts eloquently. He scandal, and his ability to get away with contrasts this French display of solidar- so much because of “his ability to make ity in mourning to the silence of Presi- listeners laugh” (p. 163). One is left to dent Reagan, who did not call to offer conclude that a stronger editor could personal condolences to Colonel Tim- have sculpted this into a more seamless othy Geraghty, the Marine battalion work. commander on the ground. One of the most puzzling omis- In terms of readability, the book sions of When Reagan Sent in the Ma- unfortunately suffers from the lack of rines, however, is the lack of a dramatic a diligent copy editor. Certain phrases, minute-by-minute telling of the Marine titles, and timelines are repeated un- barracks bombing on October 23, 1983, necessarily in every new chapter, and which was the nadir of American for- sloppy typos or redundant words mar eign policy in the Mideast and Reagan’s an otherwise interesting, if somewhat biggest failure as commander-in-chief. wandering, narrative. When Reagan The bombing is explored mostly via the Sent in the Marines is not the last word grim after-images that met the eyes of in the history of America’s involvement French president François Mitterrand, in Lebanon, which deserves a study who lost 58 French soldiers in a simul- more robust and less strident in tone. taneous truck bombing that fateful Oc- However, this book does raise serious tober morning. questions about America’s judgment While one would like more of a and leadership in Middle East foreign before-and-during telling of the bar- affairs with ramifications extending to racks bombing, Sloyan’s description of current times. Mitterrand’s visit afterwards is quite

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The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020

Book Review: Michael Palmer’s Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1801 (Classics of Naval Literature)

Michael Romero American Public University

Michael Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations during the Quasi-War with France, 1798–1801 (Clas- sics of Naval Literature). Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000. ISBN 1557506647, pp. 350. Hardcover, out of print.

ichael A. Palmer served in Michael Palmer wrote to fill a the US Navy, worked for the void when the first edition of Stoddert’s Naval Historical Center, and War was released; as of 1987, there had Mworked for many years in the history been no scholarly treatment of the Qua- department at East Carolina Univer- si-War published since Gardener Allen’s sity. His books on history cover ma- Our Naval War with France in 1909. terial on land and at sea from the six- Allen’s book concentrated primarily teenth century to beyond the first Gulf on the “stirring exploits” of the differ- War. Originally published in 1987 by ent tactical actions which took place, the University of South Carolina Press but Palmer sought to write more of an and rereleased as one of the US Naval operational history that examines the Institute’s Classics of Naval Literature in strategy and policy of Benjamin Stod- 2000, Michael Palmer’s first book, Stod- dert, the first Secretary of the Navy and dert’s War, is currently accessible only illuminates the events in Europe that through libraries and used booksellers. brought about the Quasi-War in the This is a problem that needs rectifying, first place. Palmer accomplishes this as Palmer’s examination of the nascent through an exhaustive study of letters, US Navy at the turn of the eighteenth logbooks, policy documents, and espe- and nineteenth centuries offers surpris- cially the seven volumes of Naval Docu- ingly relevant lessons to the present day. ments Related to the Quasi-War Between

201 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.14 The Saber and Scroll the United States and France published of the relationship with France. French in the 1930s. In general, Palmer’s work depredations against American ship- is both entertaining and exceptionally ping worsened, and when a 1797 diplo- informative, providing valuable insight matic mission refused to pay a $220,000 into a rarely discussed conflict in early bribe before they could be received by US history. the French foreign minister, the two na- It is relatively common knowl- tions effectively broke off all relations. edge that the US Navy was established The United States began preparing to in 1794 in response to depredations fight a foreign war for the first time committed against US shipping by the since the ratification of the Constitu- Barbary States. Construction of six frig- tion. ates was authorized with the stipulation Palmer takes valuable time to that work would halt if a peace trea- study the creation and growth of the ty were concluded with Algiers. Such Navy Department during the adminis- a treaty was ratified in 1796, but after tration of President John Adams, which strong encouragement from President made for a great parallel to the pur- George Washington, Congress autho- chase, construction, and launch of the rized completion of the three frigates navy’s first warships. Upon his appoint- in the most advanced state. Lesser well ment as secretary, Benjamin Stoddert known is that subsequent legislation in literally built the Navy Department up 1797 and 1798 authorized the arming from nothing. Palmer deftly brings to of the first three frigates, the comple- life Stoddert’s travails in supervising the tion of the second three frigates, and completion of multiple warships, creat- the purchase and construction of addi- ing naval strategy (such as the desire to tional warships to counteract rising pri- confront French privateers near their vateer activity from France, America’s bases in the Caribbean after they had first ally. been mostly cleared from the US coast), Stoddert’s War begins with the adjudicating disputes between touchy infant United States trying to claw its politicians and even touchier naval of- way out of the economic depression ficers, and everything required to fight that followed the 1783 Treaty of Paris. a maritime war. Through Stoddert’s When war broke out between Great tireless efforts, the US Navy established Britain and Revolutionary France, itself as a viable military service, sur- America strove to remain neutral and vived the massive cuts of the Jefferson carried on a lucrative maritime trade Administration, and blooded the offi- with both belligerents. Britain and cers who would be called upon to sight France alike regularly halted, searched, a similar war with Tripoli less than a and seized American merchant vessels, decade later. straining contemporary definition of While Palmer briefly disparaged the rights of neutrals. Ratification of the himself in the preface by suggesting Jay Treaty in 1796 improved America’s that his concentration on strategy and relationship with Britain at the expense planning do not make for the kind of

202 Book Review: Michael Palmer’s Stoddert’s War

“rattling good history” that Thomas thorough as Stoddert’s War certainly Hardy spoke about (xvii), there is plen- was, it makes evident the need for more ty of action to be found in Stoddert’s research into the Quasi-War. War. Captain Thomas Truxtun’s capture While it has certainly come a of the French frigate l’Insurgente while long way since the 1790s, the US Navy commanding USS Constellation in 1799 is in a period of transition today. Cur- is heavily featured as the Quasi-War ex- rent leaders have repeatedly called for ploit most celebrated by contemporary expansion of the navy from today’s 280- Americans. Coast Guard historians will plus vessels to 355, even as many as five be thrilled to read of USS Pickering’s hundred when the latest concepts of (a vessel borrowed from the US Rev- unmanned platforms are considered. enue Cutter Service) defeat of l’Egypte Even as naval planners are taking hard Conquise, a privateer with three times looks at Russia and China as potential Pickering’s firepower and four times future adversaries, multiple new tech- her manpower. Such figures from John nologies are being developed and de- Paul Jones to David Farragut to William ployed throughout the fleet ... arguably Halsey and beyond could take great prematurely in some cases. As the US pride in the young navy described by Navy continues to grow and sail into Palmer’s work. an uncertain future, the lessons of the I found it interesting to discov- Quasi-War remain quite relevant. The er that Michael Palmer apparently was forward-thinking and flexible Benjamin not quite through with the Quasi-War Stoddert, the initiative of the navy’s first when Stoddert’s War was published. In squadron commanders, and the tenac- the author’s own words, “I still suspect ity and courage of eighteenth-century that the US Navy was more active in sailors provide many examples worthy and around St. Domingue during the of emulation. Quasi-War than we will ever know” Given the recent announcement (xiv), although he was unable to docu- from Secretary of the Navy Kenneth ment anything beyond shipping arma- Braithwaite that the US Navy’s next ments and supplies to support Tous- generation of frigates will be named saint l’Ouverture’s rebellion in what Constellation-class, partially in honor later became Haiti. Such open support of Truxtun’s celebrated ship, it is obvi- of rebels in the French colonies would ous that the Quasi-War’s examples are certainly have escalated the conflict if it still being examined. For that reason, had been discovered, and the topic defi- Stoddert’s War is well deserving of an- nitely merits further study. Palmer also other reprint, and historians would be lamented the lack of a history of the wise to answer Michael Palmer’s call to common seaman in the early US Navy, dig deeper into US naval history of the similar in scope to the light that Ste- 1790s. phen Taylor’s recently published Sons of the Waves has shined on the British Royal Navy during the Age of Sail. As

203

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Book Review: Bruce L. Brager’s Grant’s Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War

Robert Young, PhD Associate Professor, Department of History and Military History American Military University

Grant’s Victory: How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civ- il War, by Bruce L. Brager. Lanham, Maryland: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2020. ISBN 9780811739191. Notes. Index. Bibliography. Pp. 167. Hardcover $20.85, Electronic version available.

ruce L. Brager is a writer of the Chancellorsville chapter, and then only US Civil War, having previously because he was squeezing Vicksburg at published titles including Here the same time. BHe Stands: The Story of Stonewall Jack- Given the work’s title, one would son, Petersburg, and Monitor vs. Mer- expect major decisions or moments ini- rimack. In Grant’s Victory: How Ulyss- tiated by Grant to dominate its pages. es S. Grant Won The Civil War, Brager They do not. Progressing from chap- demonstrates the major differences be- tween the Chancellorsville and Wilder- ter to chapter, it seems like a concise ness campaigns, specifically the change though typical history of the Civil War in leadership from General Joseph in the East, most of it from the Union Hooker to General Ulysses S. Grant. perspective. The text portion of the Brager dedicates most of this work to a book is 133 pages, and three-quarters synopsis of the campaigns in the Civil of that seem unrelated to Brager’s title. War’s Eastern Theater, with an emphasis Once the chapter on the Wilderness on leadership deficiencies in the Army Campaign begins, the reader still won- of the Potomac. It does leave the read- ders how this could possibly be “Grant’s er at times in its early pages wondering Victory.” Finally, Brager states that the when Grant will enter the discussion, as moment Grant decided to head south Grant is not really mentioned until the after several repulses by Robert E. Lee

205 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.15 The Saber and Scroll was the most decisive single military ground with a concussion. Hooker was decision of the war. Grant’s vision of the also given brandy after that, no doubt war, a vision wholly supported by Pres- further weakening his faculties (69). ident Abraham Lincoln, was to fight Hooker’s lack of aggression can there- the Confederates everywhere until they fore at least be partially understood. At were overwhelmed by superior Union Gettysburg, Brager refutes the idea that numbers and resources. This vision Confederate General Ewell cost Robert won the war. General Joseph Hooker E. Lee the battle on Day 1 when Ewell had the same numbers and resources did not take Culp’s Hill. “If practicable,” at Chancellorsville a year earlier and the phrase Lee sent to Ewell when de- squandered them. Brager examines the ciding if Ewell could take the hill left the long line of Union failures from First decision to the general on the ground. Bull Run to Chancellorsville. With each Ewell, with federal troops beginning to battle, Brager examines the failures of entrench, viewed the situation as not the commanders of those battles (Mc- practicable. According to Brager, Ewell Clellan in the Peninsula and at Antie- was only following orders and does not tam, Pope at Second Manassas, Burn- deserve the criticism that it was the fact side at Fredericksburg, and Hooker at that Ewell was new to Corps command Chancellorsville).These failures are well that stopped him from taking Culp’s known and nothing original tactically is Hill (81). Later in the battle, Brager also seen in these chapters. General Grant’s defends Meade for not attacking Lee superiority is informally established as right after repulsing Pickett’s Charge, those Grant is compared to exhibit their as Lee had a strong position and could many poor decisions. Brager is compli- have likely thwarted any counterattack mentary of General George Meade, the (89). The fact that Meade’s army was commander of the Army of the Poto- exhausted and battered, according to mac from Gettysburg until the end of Brager, never even seems to enter the the war. equation. These points would intrigue In addition to demonstrating any avid reader of the Civil War. Grant’s path to victory, Brager takes There is little in Grant’s Victory: the time throughout his book to dis- How Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War pel common Civil War moments and that has not been described and ana- decisions accepted as fact. On Hooker lyzed in hundreds of other books. The at Chancellorsville, the traditionally US Civil War is one of military histo- accepted belief is that Hooker floun- ry’s most overanalyzed topics and while dered when an attack was needed or Brager does a good job refuting tradi- that the Army of the Potomac com- tional beliefs such as Hooker at Chan- mander seemed out of touch at critical cellorsville, there is little original analy- junctures. Brager reminds the reader sis. Grant’s decision to head south after that an artillery shell hit the pillar of his repulse in the Wilderness has been a house Hooker was leaning against analyzed countless times. Grant’s deci- during the battle, throwing him to the sion’s effect on the Army of the Poto-

206 Book Review: Bruce L. Brager’s Grant’s Victory mac’s morale has been analyzed count- al of where the fighting took place is less times. An avid reader of the Civil a welcome part of this work. While it War will find little new here. does take some time to note Brager’s purpose, it becomes obvious as the The book contains fourteen pag- book progresses. Grant’s Victory: How es of notes and an extensive bibliogra- Ulysses S. Grant Won the Civil War is a phy of prominent Civil War literature. good addition to Civil War history, es- Further, Brager actually walked/drove pecially for a synopsis of the key battles the ground, and his intimate portray- of the war’s Eastern Theater.

207

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Book Review: Russell Crandall’s Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Republic, Grenada, and Panama

Lt. Chris Booth United States Coast Guard

Gunboat Democracy: U.S. Interventions in the Domin- ican Republic, Grenada, and Panama by Russell Cran- dall. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2006. ISBN 978-0742550483. Pp 256. Paperback $41.

he military actions of the United where it is due for the various successes States during the Cold War have of each military intervention, while also been well researched and docu- exacting sharp criticisms when warrant- Tmented, and while not as regularly dis- ed for leadership errors or miscalcula- cussed as wars from other periods such tions. However, the book is not without as World War II or the Civil War, its mil- its flaws. The author’s choice to focus itary efforts during the latter half of the solely on the strategic and operation- 20th Century were still incredibly im- al levels of war while ignoring almost pactful to American foreign policy and completely the tactical level of decision the global power struggle. One piece of making is an omission that leaves the solid literature based on American mil- book with a lack of depth and context, itary operations during the Cold War is otherwise easily achieved with even a Russel Crandall’s Gunboat Democracy: token observation of ground-level mil- U.S. Interventions in the Dominican Re- itary action. public, Grenada, and Panama, an engag- Historically speaking, U.S. mili- ing and thought-provoking book that tary actions in the Dominican Repub- focuses on three of the least discussed lic, Grenada, and Panama are some military actions in American history. of the shortest conflicts in which the Overall, the book is well researched and country has participated. Nevertheless, strikes a fair balance of giving credit many important books have been writ-

209 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.16 The Saber and Scroll ten on these conflicts, with many more on President Reagan’s desire to avoid a that focus on how these three military Tehran-like hostage situation in Grena- actions fit into the United States’ ev- da that crippled the Carter presidency, er-shifting foreign policy during the while later delving into how the per- Cold War. Seyom Brown’s Faces of Pow- ception of being a “wimp” during the er: Constancy and Change in Foreign presidential election unconsciously im- Policy from Truman to Clinton (Second pacted President Bush’s determination Edition), Gabriel Kolko’s Confronting to invade Panama to oust strongman the Third World, United States Foreign Manuel Noriega. These vignettes help Policy 1945-1980, and Lars Schoultz’s give the read a better understanding of Beneath the United States: A History of why various leaders decided to resort to U.S. Policy toward Latin America are all armed conflict, outside of the already excellent examples of great works that pre-existing parameters of containing focus on higher-level foreign policy in communism and promoting democrat- the Caribbean region. Other well re- ic regimes abroad. nowned books that revolve around the However, as mentioned earli- specifics of each of the aforementioned er, one of the major shortcomings that conflicts are Eric Chester’s Rag-Tags, keeps Gunboat Democracy from being Scum, Riff-Raff, and Commies: The U.S. an even more influential study is the Intervention in the Dominican Republic, lack of a tactical perspective. Through- 1965-1966, Mark Adkin’s Urgent Fury: out the book, the author clearly makes The Battle for Grenada, and Thomas the choice to focus almost exclusively Donnelly’s Operation Just Cause: The on the strategic and operational levels of Storming of Panama. Crandall’s Gun- decision making and how these conflicts boat Democracy fits right in the middle fit into the overall legacy of American of these groups, using each conflict to foreign policy. The absence of any type discuss overall foreign policy in the re- of tactical analysis of military actions gion on a case-by-case basis. places the fighting in a seemingly theo- The best feature of Gunboat De- retical realm and dehumanizes it almost mocracy is the solid manner in which completely. Crandall does occasionally the author describes how the passage mention the deaths of U.S. soldiers (as of time and ever-changing administra- in the invasion of Grenada) when he tions that occurred between each mili- writes of the passing of a SEAL team tary action influenced the overall deter- who “vanished in rough seas during a mination to go to war in the first place. reconnaissance mission,” but these de- Crandall explains how, other than the tails are seemingly few and far between omnipresent fear of the spread of com- during the author’s brief descriptions of munism that existed throughout the the conflicts. There are no detailed maps Cold War, each president had his own of troop placement, nor any discussion reasoning to send in the U.S. military of actual fighting between opponents to the Dominican Republic, Grenada, in Gunboat Democracy, and that is a and Panama. For instance, Crandall hits tactical mistake in its own right. These

210 Book Review: Russell Crandall’s Gunboat Democracy conflicts were not war games, but rath- and strategic analysis of why the U.S. er life-or-death situations for thousands spent millions of dollars to send troops of soldiers. Including their exploits in to these three countries. But readers more depth would have provided the wanting more tactical details should book the gravity it lacks. look to some of the other books men- Russell Crandall’s Gunboat De- tioned in this review, since this book mocracy: U.S. Interventions in the Do- does not deliver on that front. In the minican Republic, Grenada, and Pana- end, Gunboat Democracy’s brief exam- ma is a decent contribution to the study ination of the three U.S. military actions of American foreign policy in the Ca- in the Caribbean during the Cold War is ribbean during the Cold War. To those a worthwhile contribution to the study new to the field, it can serve as a solid of American foreign policy during that starting point, providing background fascinating period.

211

The Saber and Scroll Journal • Volume 9, Number 3 • Winter 2020 Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park

Jeff Ballard American Military University

Bloody Ridge National Peace Park, Guadalcanal Province, Solomon Islands Google Earth: 9°26’48” S 160°03’41” E

The Battle dalcanal and adjacent Tulagi Island between 7-9 August. The Marines then n 4 July 1942, an Allied recon- completed the captured airfield and naissance plane photographed named it for a Marine Corps pilot and Japanese airfield construction hero of the Battle of Midway. Hender- Oon Guadalcanal in the British Solomon son Field, its defense, and Japanese ef- Islands. When completed, Japanese forts to recapture it became the vortex twin-engine bombers could fly deep into of combat in the South Pacific during the waning months of 1942. Few battles the Coral Sea and threaten the United in World War II matched the sustained States and Australia’s vital lifeline. violence on the land, sea, and air than The 1st Marine Division subse- the Guadalcanal Campaign (7 August quently assaulted and captured Gua- 1942 to 9 February 1943).

213 doi: 10.18278/sshj.9.3.17 The Saber and Scroll

1st Marine Division Lunga Point perimeter, 12-14 September 1942. Source: West Point Atlas of the Second World War Asia and the Pacific, Diagram 17C.

Imperial Japanese General Head- Henderson Filed despite being short of quarters reacted quickly to the threat. men and critical supplies. Fearing a Jap- However, their response was ineffective anese counter-landing on Lunga Point because estimates of the landing force’s more than an attack from the island’s size and Marine intentions were flawed. interior, Vandergrift’s lines were weak- IGHQ believed fewer than 2,000 Ma- est to the south. rines landed on Guadalcanal, and like After heavy fighting on Tulagi the 2nd Raider Battalion’s raid on Ma- and a commando-style raid on the Jap- kin Atoll (17 to 18 August 1942), the anese supply depot at Tasimboko, the Marines would destroy the airfield and depleted 1st Raider and the 1st Para- depart. The Japanese were wrong on chute Battalions needed a rest. Vander- both counts. grift placed the exhausted Marines on By mid-September, Major Gen- a grassy hog-back ridge several thou- eral Archer A. Vandergrift’s 1st Marine sand yards south of the airfield for rest Division, 11,000 strong, had scratched and recuperation. Lieutenant Colonel out a defensive perimeter surrounding Merritt A. (Red Mike) Edson, in over-

214 Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park all command of the composite Battal- Ichiki and the Regiment’s surviving of- ion, had reconnoitered the terrain the ficers committed suicide. week before the Tasimboko Raid and Next into the breach was Major knew they were in for trouble. The high General Kiyotake Kawaguchi’s 35th In- ground running straight towards the fantry Brigade, the victors of the fight- airfield would provide a well-defined ing in British Borneo. IGHQ was so sure line of approach for a night attack on the Brigade would be victorious, it dis- the airfield. Marine patrols that fre- patched 1,500 soldiers to occupy Gua- quented the area south of Henderson dalcanal. The 35th, however, would not Field amplified Edson’s concerns, re- engage the Marines as a single brigade porting increasing numbers of Japa- but as individual battalions with little nese soldiers and many small artillery coordination. Kawaguchi lost unity of pieces. Finally, on 10 September, native command before his troops arrived on scouts reported the Japanese were cut- Guadalcanal. Units embarked in the ting a trail through the jungle east of the “Tokyo Express” fast destroyer-trans- Tenaru River, about five miles from the ports arrived unharmed and in the cor- Lunga perimeter. Both observations in- rect location. The troops transported dicated that a major Japanese offensive by open flat-bottomed barges suffered was in the making. a slow and tedious journey, traveling The Japanese mid-September of- only at night and hiding in island coves fensive to recapture the airfield would and mangrove swamps during the day. be their second attempt. When word of One barge-borne battalion, caught in the 7 August landings reached Tokyo, the daylight, was strafed mercilessly by IGHQ dispatched the 28th Regiment, Henderson Field planes, lost its com- under Colonel Kiyonao Ichiki, to evict mander, half its men, and landed on the the Marines from Guadalcanal. Ichiki, wrong end of the island. Consequently, whose Regiment had been designated Kawaguchi could only gather four bat- to occupy Midway Island, was a former talions from three different regiments instructor of “bamboo spear” tactics in the main body for the assault on or “Banzai charges” at the Toyama In- Henderson by way of the ridge Japanese fantry School. Hyper-aggressive, Ichiki maps labeled “the Centipede.” did not wait for his entire Regiment to At noon on 12 September, the gather before leading his men in an un- daily Japanese air raid arrived and coordinated Banzai charge against the dropped its bombs, not on the airfield, Marine perimeter. At Alligator Creek but along the ridge’s length. At about (21 August), eight hundred men of the the same time, the Raiders attempted a Ichiki Detachment charged across the reconnaissance in force south of their Tenaru River’s mouth into the prepared position and encountered unexpected Marine positions and died. The com- Japanese resistance and broke contact. bined arms fire from rifles, machine- Vandergrift now knew what Red Mike guns, and mortars was murderous. suspected all along—the fight was com-

215 The Saber and Scroll ing to him. Edson’s men strung barbed but most shells overshot the crest and wire and settled into their positions on landed in the jungle. the ridge complex. [See Image F] However, Sendai’s beacon must The terrain around the ridge was have come as a godsend to Kawagu- deceiving. The jungle, which lapped at chi’s 1st and 3rd Battalions (124th In- the ridge’s slopes, was so close the Raid- fantry Regiment). The two battalions ers and the late-arriving Parachutists, advanced through the jungle, trying to that they would have little time to re- stay on schedule at nearly a dead run, act to a sudden attack. Edson had no but having difficulty locating the Ma- choice but to place his first line compa- rine position. nies, Baker and Charlie Companies, 1st The long and noisy naval bom- Raider Battalion and Baker Company, bardment masked the sound of the 1st Parachute Battalion, in vulnerable advancing Japanese until they were jungle outposts. near or within the Raider’s lines. Ma- The steep slopes of the saddle- jor Kokusho’s I/124 came closest to back ridge were covered with kunai meeting the timetable and jumping-off grass and ascended to two modest point but was pushed west across the crests. The Marines labeled the south- Lunga when it became entangled with ern knoll “Hill 1” (100-ft elevation) Lieutenant Colonel Watanabe’s surging and the northern knoll “Hill 2” (120-ft III/124. Kawaguchi regretted the loss of elevation). [See Image A] The Lunga control over his battalions, but the sol- River anchored the Marines’ western diers who did penetrate Marine lines flank, and a swampy marsh separated did so with the deadly skill of veteran the Raider’s Baker, and Charlie posi- jungle fighters. tions. Edson positioned the remainder The Japanese attacked either side of his forces in a 1,800-yard horseshoe of the swamp, driving a wedge between around Hill 2. [See Image D] A broad the two forward Raider companies, footpath connected the two hilltops and forcing elements of each to fall back then continued north past Vandergrift’s towards the western slope of the ridge. headquarters to Henderson Field. Some I/124 soldiers crossed the Lunga The attack began at 2130, when and overran Charlie company positions the Imperial Japanese Navy cruiser Sen- nearest the river. Kawaguchi’s men cap- dai began to bombard the ridge with tured several Raiders and brutally tor- its seven 5.5-in guns. Five shells stuck tured them with bayonets and swords. the Raider Command Post. Only one The screams of the dying haunted the exploded, but caused no casualties. The men dug in around the ridge’s crest as scene became even weirder when Sen- they waited for a Japanese surge that dai’s searchlight snapped on and swept did not come that night. the ridge, causing the Marines to feel The first night’s fighting on the “naked and exposed.” The cruiser bom- ridge alarmed Edson’s company com- barded the ridge for well over an hour, manders. For the first time, the Japanese

216 Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park had driven the Raiders from prepared day, the General failed to alter his plan positions and forced them to abandon in any meaningful way and gave no weapons and wounded. Had Charlie more insightful orders than: “The Bri- company, and its attached Easy com- gade will again execute a night attack pany machinegun platoon, not with- tonight. The duty of each Battalion is drawn, which it did about midnight, it the same as before.” would have been flanked, cut-off, and The next morning Edson at- destroyed. Marine casualties were high, tempted to use his reserve companies more than fifty, with KIA accounting for to dislodge the Japanese that occupied half. The Japanese likely suffered twice Charlie’s old position. Edson ordered that. For his part, Red Mike was con- Able and Dog companies to probe the cerned but not discouraged. “The Nip flanks of the salient. Throughout the will be back. I want to surprise him.” day, the Marines engaged in small unit The attitude of the two com- actions made most difficult by the ex- manders could not have been more treme heat. Despite repeated efforts, a different. Despite the 124th Regiment’s few under-strength companies would success in forcing a bulge in the Marine not be able to eject the Japanese. To lines, Kawaguchi regarded the attack as make matters worse, the jungle sur- “a tragedy ... a miserable failure.” The rounding the ridge complex was teem- Brigade commander could not have ing with Kawaguchi’s veteran infantry. known how close the 124th had come With the pocket still in Japanese hands, to a breakthrough, but 12 September Baker’s position was untenable, its right was a night of missed opportunities flank exposed. Red Mike had no choice for the Japanese. After translation and but to order the Raiders and Para- study of Japanese unit diaries, histori- chutists to concentrate their positions an Richard Frank summed up the first around Hill 2, dig in, wire up, get some night of the battle on Bloody Ridge this sleep, and be ready for the inevitable way: night attack. “The [Japanese] battalions lost Lieutenant Colonel Merrill B. their sense of direction, almost Twining, Vandergrift’s assistant oper- entirely missed the ridge, and ations officer, visited Edson’s forward instead drifted into the low, wa- command post on Hill 2 in the mid-af- terlogged swath of jungle be- ternoon and was impressed with Ed- tween the ridge and the Lunga. son’s handiwork. [See Image C] The Units became lost; lost units be- concentrated positions significant- came scattered; scattered units ly improved the automatic weapons’ became intermingled. Control fields of fire. Furthermore, the Japa- slipped away from Kawaguchi nese would now have to cross a hun- and battalion commanders.” dred yards of open ground, once they Despite Kawaguchi’s dismay at the per- emerged from the jungle, before reach- formance of his battalions on the first ing the Marine lines.

217 The Saber and Scroll

Marine disposition on the first night of the battle. Author’s collection.

Twining was, however, con- Throughout the day on the 13th, cerned about Edson, who was “terribly Japanese planes attacked the Lunga pe- fatigued and glassy-eyed.” Twining rec- rimeter but avoided the ridge complex ommended that the Division Reserve because the “Sea Eagles” were unsure of (the 2nd Battalion 5th Regiment) re- Kawaguchi’s position. lieve Edson, but an air raid prevented the 2/5 from moving until after dark. Kawaguchi’s attack on the sec- The best he could do was to shore up ond night attack began much like the Edson’s right flank with a company of first. IJN destroyers standing off Lun- engineers to act as riflemen. ga Point shelled the ridge but without

218 Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park using searchlights. The illumination understood the message and brought that night was provided by rocket flares his men forward. With 2/5 reinforce- which proceeded each Japanese attack. ment and Colonel Pedro de Valle’s guns The General knew that in order to cap- firing direct support at close range, the ture Henderson Field, his three bat- defending Marines held. talions would have to overwhelm the Before dawn on the 14th, Edson Raiders and Parachutists completely. sent Bailey to Henderson Field to beg Consequently, he ordered a dozen sep- for close air support from Army Cap- arate attacks on the Marine positions. tain John A. Thompson’s 67th Fighter Each wave succeeded in driving the Squadron. At first light, Thompson led Marines back towards the northern- a trio of P-400s in repeated passes over most knoll of the ridge. [See Images B the ridge and nearby jungle clearings. and D] From their final positions on The trio’s six wing-mounted .50-cali- Hill 2, the Marines held back the Japa- ber machine and nose-mounted 20mm nese onslaught in fierce fighting, much cannon cut down exposed Japanese like of it at hand grenade-range. [See Image a scythe through a wheat field from G] Edson now realized his men were their first pass. no longer just fighting to save Hender- son Field—they were fighting to save With the departure of the Army their lives. olive-drab fighters, Kawaguchi knew he was defeated. The majority of his troops The 75mm and 105mm howit- lay dead or dying in the jungle or on the zers of the 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines slope of the Centipede. Once the victor fired continuously throughout the night of Borneo, the rising sun set on the Gen- with murderous results. Flares fired by eral’s career. Kawaguchi was recalled to Kawaguchi’s troops served as a signal Rabaul to explain the disastrous cam- to attack, but also made an excellent paign, which concluded with the air- reference point for Marine artillery. As field still in Allied hands. Thereafter, he each successive wave pushed the Ma- was placed on indefinite inactive status rines closer and closer to Edson’s CP, until Japan’s imminent invasion in 1945 Red Mike walked the artillery back to- wards his “Alamo” position despite his brought him out of retirement. forward artillery observers’ safety con- Once again, Marine combined cerns. Bullets ripped at Edson’s cloth- arms, individual courage, and inspired ing as he stood erect directing fire on leadership overcame Japanese Bushi- his field telephone until the lines were do and unimaginative direction. Had cut either by artillery or the infiltrating Kawaguchi been able to gather his en- Japanese. With all communications lost tire Brigade, it is unlikely Edson could and his command in the final extreme, have held the ridge. Or, had the General Edson and Major Kenneth D. Bai- chosen to attack on a two, rather than a ley chanted, “BILL WHALING! BILL three-battalion front, his reserve battal- WHALING!” until the 2nd Battalion ion could have exploited the significant 5th Marines commander Bill Whaling penetrations made by the II/124 and

219 The Saber and Scroll

II/4 battalions, forcing a breakthrough Santo and arrived just in time for the to the airfield. A small group of Japa- battle still wearing his hospital tennis nese penetrated so far north that they shoes. Bailey’s MOH was awarded post- wandered into the 1st Division CP and humously, as he was killed in fighting bayoneted a Marine before being cut on the Matanikau less than two weeks down. later. Thirteen Raiders received the During these two nights, the Ma- Navy Cross, the nation’s second-high- rines achieved a significant victory over est decoration. One Raider received his a superior Japanese force, which un- second Navy Cross in as many weeks. doubtedly saved Henderson Field from An impressive number, no doubt, but capture. Edson’s casualties are difficult disproportionately low considering the to validate and range from between 133 countless acts of individual bravery dis- and 166. However, the most accurate played during the battle. Also confusing is that of the 24 U.S. Navy ships named estimates come from Edson’s definitive after Raider heroes and alumni; only the biography, which reports 34 Raiders USS Edson (DD-946) was named for a dead and 129 wounded (a total of 163), veteran of the battle for “The Ridge.” or one-quarter of Edson’s command. Nine Raiders are listed as missing in action. The Parachutist casualties were Visiting the Battlefield proportional. he Battle of Bloody Ridge took After the war, Kawaguchi report- place in one of the most remote ed his losses as 41 officers and 1,092 locations in the world. In 1942, enlisted men killed or wounded, a little Tother than a few British government less than twenty percent of the Brigade’s officials and Australian coconut planta- 6,700-man compliment. The number tion owners, few had ever heard of the was undoubtedly higher. The 2nd Bat- Solomon Islands and fewer reasons to talion 5th Marines, who replaced the go there. Likewise, nobody in the Unit- Raiders, reported burying six hundred ed States had ever heard of Guadalcanal; slain Japanese. Richard Frank estimates however, by 1943, every American knew Japanese losses on the ridge could have the name and what happened there. been as high as 800 killed or missing. Almost eight decades later, the The jungle certainly took the seriously Solomon Islands are still very much wounded as they trekked east to relative off the beaten track, but with careful safety west of the Matanikau River. [See planning, one can arrange a visit to the Image E] island. Before the COVID pandemic, The “Battle of Bloody Ridge,” several United States and Australian alternatively “Edson’s Ridge,” or just tour companies offered multi-day tour “The Ridge,” instantly became a Ma- packages to explore the Bloody Ridge rine Corps legend. Edson and Bailey National Peace Park. The number of received the Medal of Honor. The latter tours that will survive is unknown, but was AWOL from a hospital on Espiritu interested parties should begin plan-

220 Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park

Marine disposition on the second night of the battle. Author’s collection.

221 The Saber and Scroll

Merritt A (“Red Mike”) Edson, (25 April 1897–14 August 1955) as a Brigadier General in the field 1946. ning their visit by visiting http://www. tion’s Google Earth coordinates to facil- guadalcanal.com. itate independent exploration. Peter, an This virtual battlefield tour in- Australian who made ten visits to Gua- tends to demonstrate that technology dalcanal between 1995 and 2013 (http:// has made Guadalcanal and all its bat- www.guadalcanal.homestead.com), has tlefields accessible to everyone. In the bound hundreds of more photos into “Bloody Ridge—Then and Now” sec- a book titled, not surprisingly, Gua- tion that follows, readers will find a se- dalcanal Then and Now, available for ries of images that show the battlefield purchase at https://au.blurb.com/b/954 as it looks today beside a photo of how 3395-guadalcanal. it looked in the 1940s. Each image, re- Other famous Guadalcanal bat- printed with the permission of Peter tlefields are worth a virtual visit because Flahavin, is annotated with the loca- their names loom just as large in the

222 Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park lexicon of American military history as ries about life on the island today and Edson’s Ridge. Virtual visitors wishing during the War. A bonus is that visitors to explore the battlefields at Alligator can chat with the site’s creator David Creek, Coffin Corner, Galloping Horse, Holland, a former Marine. A veteran the Gifu, Matanikau River, and Mount of several deployments to Guadalcanal Austen will find their Google Earth co- while serving with the Australian Fed- ordinates in a book titled Guadalcanal eral Police, Mr. Holland has walked the Battlefields by John Innes. Mr. Innes’s terrain and extensively explored the book is available on Amazon and other fine retailers. battlefields. Other exceptional resources Many thanks to both Mr. Fla- are the Facebook page and YouTube havin and Mr. Holland for their time channel, both titled GUADALCANAL: and insight as this author takes his vir- WALKING A BATTLEFIELD. Both are tual battlefield tour of the Bloody Ridge chock full of photos, videos, and sto- National Peace Park.

References

Edson’s Raiders: The 1st Raider Battalion in World War II by Joseph H. Alexander Guadalcanal Diary by Richard Tregaskis Guadalcanal: The Definitive History of the Landmark Battle by Richard B. Frank The Guide to Guadalcanal Battlefields, 2nd Edition by John Innes

223 The Saber and Scroll

Bloody Ridge—Then and Now

Edson’s forward Command Post on Hill 2, then and now, as viewed from Hill 1. Looking north to- wards the final defensive knoll. On the 2nd night, the Raiders retreated from here to Hill 2. The 1st Division Command Post was behind the trees on the top right. Google Earth: 9o27’02.91” S 160o02’52.78” E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

On the second night, hours after this photo was taken, Japanese soldiers from the I/124 overran this position and advanced down the ridge trail towards Hill 2. Goo- gle Earth: 9o27’10.29 S 160o02’52.78” E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

224 Virtual Battlefield Tour: Bloody Ridge National Peace Park

Col. Edson and Gen. Vande- grift explain the battle to Ma- rine Commandant Holcombe during his visit to Guadalca- nal. The group is standing near Edson’s forward Command Post on Hill 2, now the site of the Battlefield Monument. Google Earth: 9o26’49.28” S 160o02’50.78” E. Photo courte- sy of Peter Flahavin.

Raider defensive position at the foot of Hill 2. On the 2nd night the Marines were forced to fall back to the top of the hill. Google Earth: 9o26’50.33” S 160o02’48.90” E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

Raider observation post at the southern end of Hill 1, 15 September 1942, look- ing southwest, for signs of the retreating enemy. Google Earth: 9o27’11.97” S 160o02’47.15” E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

225 The Saber and Scroll

Barbed wire was strung liber- ally in front of the Raider po- sitions at the southern end of Hill 1. When the grass is tall it can still bite the unwary. Google Earth: 9o27’13.53” S 160o02’46.99” E. Photo courte- sy of Peter Flahavin.

Raider MG position on fi- nal knoll (Hill 2) on Edson’s Ridge, looking south to- wards Hill 1. Peter Flahavin found the two expended rounds (Inset) at the bottom of the slope in 2004. The well-known photo of the four dead Japanese on the ridge trail was taken near the top center Japanese flag. Google Earth: 9o26’49.28” S 160o02’50.78” E. Photo courtesy of Peter Flahavin.

226 Saber & Scroll Historical Journal Submission Guidelines

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International or Local Ownership?: Security Sector Development in Post-Independent Kosovo by Dr. Florian Qehaja International or Local Ownership? contributes to the debate on the concept of local ownership in post-conflict settings, and dis- cussions on international relations, peacebuilding, security and development studies.

Donald J. Trump’s Presidency: International Perspectives Edited by John Dixon and Max J. Skidmore President Donald J. Trump’s foreign policy rhetoric and actions become more understandable by reference to his personality traits, his worldview, and his view of the world. As such, his for- eign policy emphasis was on American isolationism and econom- ic nationalism.

Ongoing Issues in Georgian Policy and Public Administration Edited by Bonnie Stabile and Nino Ghonghadze Thriving democracy and representative government depend upon a well functioning civil service, rich civic life and economic suc- cess. Georgia has been considered a top performer among coun- tries in South Eastern Europe seeking to establish themselves in the post-Soviet era.

Poverty in America: Urban and Rural Inequality and Deprivation in the 21st Century Edited by Max J. Skidmore Poverty in America too often goes unnoticed, and disregarded. This perhaps results from America’s general level of prosperity along with a fairly widespread notion that conditions inevitably are better in the USA than elsewhere. Political rhetoric frequently enforces such an erroneous notion. westphaliapress.org