No Will, No Way: US-Funded Security Sector Reform in the Democratic
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No will, no way: US-funded security sector reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo Sustainable“” development is a long-term proposition, and progress depends importantly on the choices of political leaders and the quality of institutions in developing countries. Where leaders govern responsibly, set in place good policies, and make investments conducive to development, sustainable outcomes can be achieved. Where those conditions are absent, it is difficult to engineer sustained progress, no matter how good our intentions or the extent of our engagement. Office of the Press Secretary, US Office of the President “Fact Sheet: U.S. Global Development Policy” (2010) Acknowledgments This paper was written by Colin Thomas-Jensen and Tara R. Gingerich and is based on research conducted by Colin Thomas-Jensen. We would like to thank the following individuals within Oxfam for their feedback on and contributions to the report: Marc Cohen, Scott Stedjan, Krista Riddley, Coco McCabe, Ellie Kemp, Verity Johnson, Nicolas Vercken, Noah Gottschalk, Steven van Damme, and Kirsten Hagon. We would also like to express our appreciation to Anthony Gambino and Thomas Dempsey for reviewing and providing feedback on the report. Photos on pages 13 and 23 courtesy of defenseimagery.mil. Use does not imply or constitute Department of Defense endorsement. Contents Abbreviations… …………………………………………………………………………… 2 Map…of…the…DRC… ………………………………………………………………………… 3 Summary… ………………………………………………………………………………… 4 The…Congolese…security…sector:…A…brief…background… …………………………… 11 The making of FARDC and the PNC …………………………………………… 12 Donors’ initial reform efforts: Little coordination, little pressure ……………… 14 US…experience…with…SSR… …………………………………………………………… 16 US…support…for…SSR…in…DRC…………………………………………………………… 19 Current US bilateral SSR-related programs in DRC …………………………… 21 US support to SSR through MONUC/MONUSCO ……………………………… 26 US…SSR…in…DRC:…Following…best…practices?… ……………………………………… 28 Diminishing…returns:…No…political…will,…no…real…reform… …………………………… 31 Corruption and mismanagement ………………………………………………… 32 Impunity for abuses………………………………………………………………… 33 Training without institutional reform ……………………………………………… 34 Coordination in the absence of political support for SSR …………………… 36 Conclusion…and…recommendations…………………………………………………… 37 Appendix…1:…Detailed descriptions of current US bilateral SSR-related programs in DRC… ……………………………………………………… 41 Appendix…2:…MONUSCO mandate and terms of engagement… ………………… 46 Endnotes… ……………………………………………………………………………… 47 Boxes…and…tables Box 1. What is security sector reform (SSR)? ……………………………………… 4 Box 2. What is protection of civilians and how does it relate to SSR? …………… 5 Table 1. Abbreviated assessment of US programs in support of SSR in DRC … 8 Box 3. Global best practices of SSR …………………………………………… 16 Box 4. SSR and gender …………………………………………………………… 18 Box 5. Who’s who in US SSR programs? ……………………………………… 20 Table 2. State Department and USAID funding related to SSR in DRC, FY 2007–2011 ……………………………………………………………………… 24 Box 6. MONUC and MONUSCO ………………………………………………… 27 Table 3. Assessment of US programs in support of SSR in DRC …………… 28 Abbreviations AFDL Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la FDLR Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda libération du Congo-Zaïre (Alliance of Democratic (Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda) Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire) GESM Groupement des écoles supérieures militaires AF Bureau of African Affairs, US Department of State (Group of Military Universities) AFRICAP Africa Peacekeeping Program GoDRC government of DRC AFRICOM Africa Command, US Department of Defense IDIQ indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity ASF Avocats Sans Frontières (Lawyers Without Borders) IMET International Military Education and Training BDK Bundu Dia Kongo IHL international humanitarian law CIAT Comité international d’accompagnement de la transition INL Bureau of International Narcotics and Law (International Committee to Support Transition) Enforcement Affairs, US Department of State CMO civil-military operations IOM International Organization for Migration CNDP Congrès national pour la défense du peuple LIB light infantry battalion (National Congress for the Defense of the People) MONUC UN Organization Mission in the Congo CRC Civilian Response Corps MONUSCO UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DCAF Geneva Center for the Democratic Control Democratic Republic of the Congo of Armed Forces NGO nongovernmental organization DDR disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration OECD Organization for Economic Co-Operation DFID Department for International Development and Development DGM Direction générale de migration PKO Peacekeeping Operations (General Directorate of Migration) PNC Police nationale congolaise (Congolese National Police) DIILS Defense Institute of International Legal Studies RSA Office of Regional Security Affairs, US Department DIRI Defense Institution Reform Initiative of State Bureau of African Affairs DoD Department of Defense S/CRS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, US Department of State DoJ Department of Justice SGVB sexual and gender-based violence DRC Democratic Republic of Congo SJSR Security and Justice Sector Reform DRL Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, US Department of State SOCAF Special Operations Command/Africa, US Department of Defense EU European Union SSR security sector reform EUPOL EU Police Mission for the DRC RD Congo State Department of State EUSEC EU Advisory and Assistance Mission for Security TSC Training Strategy Conference Reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo USAID US Agency for International Development FARDC Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo (Armed Forces of the Democratic USIP United States Institute of Peace Republic of Congo) FCC Formation continue des cadres (Staff Continuing Education Course) 2 Map of the DRC CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC Uban Bangassou Juba SUDAN Bangui gi Zongo DEMOCRATICYaoundé Gbadolite Bondo Faradje U REPUBLIC OF THE Libenge Businga ele Kib Gemena Aketi Buta Isiro Watsa ali C O N G O gala Gulu on Lisala Bumba P ROV I NC E Mungbere Impfondo Imese M National capital o Ituri UGANDA ng OR I EN T AL E i o ori uwim Bunia Lake District capital u op Ar i Lake Ouesso g C L Basoko Albert n Kyoga City, town a ga Basankusu Banalia Bafwasende b lon u Lu Beni Major airport O E QUAT E U R Yangambi Kisangani Kampala Jinja Libreville Bolomba Butembo Kasese International boundary Ekoli S CONGO Boende NORD- District boundary L T Ubundu u Lake Mbandaka sh N Liranga ua L a Peneluta Main road pa o l Edward L m a o a b KIVU Lake L m m a Lubutu I Secondary road u e i l i la a Ikela Goma Victoria ka U Punia Railroad ( A C l Inongo in Lake RWANDA o d i Kivu n Kigali Bolobo g 0 100 200 300 km Lac T o Butare Kutu Mai-Ndombe ) Bukavu KA S A I Kindu N 0 100 200 mi L uk SUD - Bujumbura Bandundu enie Kole Lodja Kilembwe Uvira Kas a U K i ORI E NTA L Kibombo KIV U BURUNDI w Sa Makobola Brazzaville il Ilebo nk u u Kinshasa r MANIEM A O KASAI Bena u SA Bulungu Kasongo HA Kenge Mweka Mamba Pointe-Noire KINS Lusambo Kigoma M Tabora BA S- CONG O Kikwit OCCIDENTAL L Cabinda Mbanza- Lubao Kongolo a Matadi ga k (ANGOLA) Boma u e Ngungu BANDUND U uk Kalemie UNITED Kananga Mbuji-Mayi Kabalo L L REPUBLIC Tshikapa u a ATLANTIC Kabinda l K a Mpala OF K a b T w s A a a a OCEAN a i Moba n TANZANIA N'zeto n Manono g g Mwene-Ditu a o Rukwa Kahemba B Kabamba n L y KATANG A u i Sumbawanga vu Moliro k a a Kapanga M Pweto L Kamina Mbeya u Luanda U l u a Lake ANGOLA T Mweru DEMOCRATIC K a t a n g a REPUBLIC OF THE Saurimo P l a t e a u I CONGO Dilolo Kolwezi M Kasenga ZAMBIA L a M k e e Likasi Lake z A e b Bangweulu M am Lubumbashi Z L a Luena l a Solwezi Kipushi A Lobito w i The boundaries and names shown and the designations used W on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance Sakania by the United Nations. I Ndola Map No. 4007 Rev. 8 UNITED NATIONS Department of Peacekeeping Operations January 2004 Cartographic Section OXFAM AMERICA NO WILL, NO way | 3 Summary The 2006 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) presented the Congolese government and its international partners with a historic opportunity. The interstate wars and internal political struggles that tore DRC apart from the mid 1990s onward had ended. Although the conflict and humanitarian catastrophe in the country’s eastern provinces continued, newly elected President Joseph Kabila had a mandate from the Congolese people—as well as support from key donors and the United Nations’ largest peacekeeping force in history—to enact the reforms necessary to overcome obstacles to lasting peace and stability.1 Box 1. What is security sector SSR: “The set of policies, plans, programs, and activities that a government reform (SSR)? undertakes to improve the way it provides safety, security, and justice. The Source: US Agency for International Development, US Department of Defense, and US Department of State, overall objective is to provide these services in a way that promotes an effec- “Security Sector Reform” (2009). tive and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civilian authority, and responsive to the needs of the public.” SSR programs: “From a donor perspective, SSR is an umbrella term that might include integrated activities in support of: defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice; police; corrections; intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); and/or reduction of armed violence.” President Kabila’s task was daunting. Devastated by decades of misrule and the deadliest war since World War II, DRC was ranked 141 out of 143 countries on the Brookings Institution’s 2008 “Index of State Weakness in the Developing World;” only Afghanistan and Somalia ranked lower.2 Of the myriad challenges facing the new government, many observers identified security sector reform (SSR) as the most pressing. (See Box 1, “What is security sector reform (SSR)?”) This was nothing new.