BERKELSy LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OP CALIFORNIA ^ jL Jr^ r M^ /^-M >^ LOAN STACK IpjJLIc D3- ' THE PATHAN REVOLT TN- NORTH WEST INDIA. CHAPTER L INTRODUCTORY. INCE the return of tie Chitral Relief Expedition tLiere bad been peace in North-West India, and it scemod probable that the present year was to pass without any disturbances amongst the turbulent tribesmen on our Frontier. The political horizon to the or- dinary observer seemed to be without a cloud. There was po Umra Khan with ambitions of sovereignty, prepared to plunge through murder, rapine and the displeasure of the (SiVAar to gain his ends. True there were pestilential fellows (who were known to be preaching discontent to the tribesmen jbut there was little if any thing to show that these firebrands Iwere sowing with more marked success than usual the seeds of •discord and fanaticism. If there was anything which caused joncern to Indian observers of political phenomena beyond pur far flung frontier battle line it was to be found in certain rvenfs which had happened in Afghanistan, and which revived ome of the old fears with regard to the Durani Chit f who ccupioa the gaMi of that country. Our friend and ally had )oen devoting himself with much persistency to the religious lature of sovereignty wbich he wields over the followers of 251 I j the Prophet in North-West ludia and beyoud, aud the means employed to solidify bis supreme headship a3 the light of re- ligion were such as to be considered antagonistic to the preser- Tation of harmonious relations between the tribesmen and the Indian Government. There was the book, Twakim-ud-din, inspired by the Amir himself and written to his commancl, -which impressed upon true Muhammadans the essential and all important character of the Jehad—that war of religious fanaticism laid down by the Koran as the duty of the follower of Islam to wage against the intidel. The book was certainly a remarkable production and even assuming that the greater part of it was merely a rehearsal and exposition of doctrines laid down in the Muhammadan gospels, it was none the less singular that Abdur Rahman should feel the necessity to pro- pagate afresh its doctrines, and give to them his own imperial impress at such a time. Fanatical Mussalmaus realise only too completely at present that the Jehad is, under given circum- stances, a part of their creed, and it was with reason argued that to have its meaning newly interpreted in times of peace by a Muhammadan ruler was in itself more or less of an incite- ment to spread out the green flag of Islam and to smite the infidel wherever found. The other acts of the Amir increased rather than diminished this uneasy feeling, and, to give topiciil significance to the book, which is not itself of very recent date, be a<:sen.bled at his Coiivt the religious men of infiaeuce from all parts of his country, and in a manner held conference with them as a monarch might with his counsellors. These religious men — mullahs as they are known in India— are the levers by which the fanaticism of a frontier tribe is set in motion, as the Britisli Government has over and over again found to its cost. Why did Abdur Rahman hold a conference of these men r If it wa.s| to enjoin them to preserve peace on the frontier, where wa:^ the necessity ? Was not the frontier in peace ? These were the pertinent questions asked. It is foreign to the purpose of this narrative to deal at length with the causes- supposed or real— of the most general tribal conflagration which the annals of Britain in India record but it is neces.sary to refer to some of the principal ones in pass-j ing. UndoubtSLUy when the Malakand riffair supervened out Tochi, and the other developments followed with a suddenness which was appalling, both press and public in lieu of othei adequate explanatiou pointed to Kabul and its Amir. Had uo< 3 ills Mullabs incited the people in the Swat, Mohmand, Afridi and Orakzai countries torise and overthrow with murder and piUage the authority of the British Raj ? It was a holj war, with Abdur Rahman in the back ground, and it meant the final culmination of ?. tribal revolt into another armed meeting of the troops of Amir and Queen-Empress beyond the Khyber Pass. The Indian Government shared so far the suspicions of the public mind—suspicions which received confirmation from Shabkadaraud later at Bedmani where the Amir's soldiers were known to have fought against us — that a strong remonstrance was sent to his Highness. From Kabul came a denial of responsibility, and a disavowal of the tribesmen and their actions. From Ibis point the Amir was rehabilated more or less in genenil British good opinion, and as he gave further proofs of his good will — such as the renouncing of the Atridis when they appealed to him as their religious war lord for support, and the closing of his territory to fugitives from the wrath o^ the Sirkar — it was believed in most quarters that bo had not broken his troth plighted in open JDarbar at Rawalpiudi and that he had not been a traitor to the Queen and Empress against whose enemies he had sworn with uplifted sword ever to array himself and his forces. But hard thinkers :ind students of our ever present fron- tier question were not disposed thus to acquit the Durani Chief of complicity, and even yet, whilst some are content to lay all blame for Afghan participation on the unauthorised shouhlers of General Ghulam Hyder Khan, the Red Chief of Asmai-, others still openly maintain that behind the Comiuander-iu- Chief has always loomed Abdur Rahman himself, who )ias his own grievances against the Indian Government, and whilst not anxious to draw upon himself the wrath of the Sirkar — with more than probable forcible abdication of the gaddi— was still not averse to instigating unofficially a policy of vexation and irritation, which it would be difficult to actually bring home to him. The apologists of the Amir are also numerous and they have strong cards as well. There can be no doubt that Abdur Rahman, strong ruler as he admittedly is, oftentimes finds his position as ruler of Afghanistan with its fanatical cabals almost untenable. He has to "pursue a strangely r ugged path, fraught with many dangers, and we are asked to believe that his assump- tion of religious headship over Indian Mussalmans, and his conferences with the religious headmen of the country, eacii of whom is practically a king iu his own sphere of influence, is simp- ly the wise conciliatory move of an astute ruler. Besides, what beyond the satisfying of some petty spite was Abdur Rahman to gain by quarrelling with tho power whose subsidy he is pleased to accept ? However this may be, officially the Amir of Kabul was vindicated by the Viceroy and his Government, and other reasons were put forward to account for the unparalleled con- Tulsion on our North-West Frontier. Let me refer to these incidentally. First and foremost of course came the charge which attribut- ed everything to Britain's aggressive policy north of the Indus. Jhe hatchets which had been buried after the Chitral Campaign were now disinterred, and loud has been the clang of steel as the exponents of the two frontier policies have fonght afresh the old tattle. " is it wise to deprive tribes of the independence which ihey value above all things and to impose an authority v/hich can only be maintained by a large addition both in men and money y ^heir rugged country is of no strategic value to us, and U we are free on the score of justice is it expedient to advance U-om India on Central Asia and so increase our responsibilities r" So main- tained the "masterly inactivity" pp.rty. "What we are doing on the North-West Frontier is necessary " replies those wlio up- hold the existing policy, " anarchy and civilisation cannot march peacefully side by side, we are cst-iblishing our civilising influence gradually all along the Afghan border, and both from strategical reasons and to prevent our territory from being raided we are bound to continue in the course now taken." Both par- ties have fought loudly in the Home press, and in many quar- ters it has been contentedly accepted that the policy pursued "by the Indian Government for so many years past is responsible for the present flare up. "You broke your word in Chitral," shout its opponents, " you retain the country against your pledged word, and you have put the fear of annexation in the heart of every Pathan tribe." Whilst denying that the forward if not aggressive policy has been responsible for the tribal convulsion which spread from Malakand to the Tochi Valley, and regrett- ing that India's almost bankrupt treasury should have to pay crores of rupees on military operations, upholders of the present policy have, nevertheless, welcomed the present disturbances in- " so-much as they have necessitated " the lifting of the purdah from troublesome countries and by forcing us to smite hip and thigh will compel the indolent mind of the tribesmen to realise tlie power and might of the Sirkar and disturb no more iLe peace of the frontier. But other people, and in India much more than at Home where the war has been almost wholly one of shibboleths— have looked elsewhere for an explanation of the tribal risings.