DOCSLIB.ORG

View Annual Report

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
View Annual Report CRAFTING A GREEN FUTURE RUSAL ANNUAL REPORT 2019 REPORT ANNUAL RUSAL ANNUAL REPORT 2019 Contents CONTENTS Financial and Operational Highlights 3 Corporate Profile 7 Chairman’s Statement 15 CEO’s Review 18 Business Overview 21 Management Discussion and Analysis 45 Profiles of Directors and Senior Management 77 Directors’ Report 95 Corporate Governance Report 129 Financial Statements 145 Glossary 236 Appendix A 247 Principal terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement with the Company Appendix B 251 Principal terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement among Major Shareholders only Corporate Information 258 1 Annual Report RUSAL 2019 01 FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS Financial and Operational Highlights FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS USD million (unless otherwise 2019 2018 2017 2016 2015 specified) Revenue 9,711 10,280 9,969 7,983 8,680 Adjusted EBITDA 966 2,163 2,120 1,489 2,015 Adjusted EBITDA Margin 9.9% 21.0% 21.3% 18.7% 23.2% EBIT 87 1,481 1,523 1,068 1,409 Share of Profits from Associates and 1,669 955 620 848 368 joint ventures Pre Tax Profit 1,054 1,953 1,288 1,354 763 Profit 960 1,698 1,222 1,179 558 Profit Margin 9.9% 16.5% 12.3% 14.8% 6.4% Adjusted Net(Loss)/ Profit (270) 856 1,077 292 671 Adjusted Net Profit (Loss)/Margin (2.8%) 8.3% 10.8% 3.7% 7.7% Recurring Net Profit 1,273 1,695 1,573 959 1,097 Basic Earnings Per Share 0.063 0.112 0.080 0.078 0.037 (in USD) Total Assets 17,814 15,777 15,774 14,452 12,809 Equity Attributable to Shareholders of 6,747 5,209 4,444 3,299 1,391 the Company Net Debt 6,466 7,442 7,648 8,421 8,372 Annual Report RUSAL 2019 4 Financial and Operational Highlights 5 Annual Report RUSAL 2019 02 CORPORATE PROFILE Corporate Profile CORPORATE PROFILE RUSAL is a low-cost, vertically integrated aluminium producer with core smelting operations located in Siberia, Russia. In 2019, RUSAL remained among the largest producers of primary aluminium and alloys globally. million tonnes 2018 2019 8 6.6 6.1 6 5.7 4.2 3.8 3.8 4 3.5 3.5 3.2 3.2 2.6 2.6 2.5 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.0 2.0 2 0 Chinalco* Hongqiao RUSALXinfa Rio TintoEGA SPICAlcoa Norsk Group Hydro * Up to 2018, Chinalco was consolidating production of Chalco. Since 2019, Chinalco is consolidating production of Chalco and Yunnan Aluminum Co., Ltd Source: Based on RUSAL’s internal company report and peer companies’ publicly available results, announcements, reports, and other information. RUSAL’s production chain includes bauxite and nepheline ore mines, alumina refineries, aluminium smelters and casting houses, foil mills, packaging and wheels production centers. Using renewable and environmentally friendly SECURED ACCESS TO GREEN, hydro-generated RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY electricity, RUSAL is Electricity is a key component of the aluminium production process. RUSAL’s core smelting targeting the lowest CO2 operations are favorably located close to the Siberian hydropower plants sourcing approximately footprint in the industry. 93% of the Group’s total electricity needs. The Company has long-term agreements with the region’s hydropower energy suppliers. Annual Report RUSAL 2019 8 Corporate Profile CAPTIVE RAW MATERIAL DIVERSIFIED SALES GEOGRAPHY SUPPLIES RUSAL’s sales mix is represented by a diversified portfolio RUSAL alumina production capacities are located in of regions. The Company delivers aluminium products Russia and abroad. They cover approximately 100% of to the domestic market and to all key global consuming the Group’s total alumina needs. regions (Europe, America and South East Asia). Our alumina refineries bauxite needs are covered by up to 75% with supplies from the Group’s bauxite mining operations. Our existing bauxite resource base GROWTH POTENTIAL OF THE is sufficient to supply for over 100 years of operations. RUSAL PLATFORM The BEMO Project (RUSAL and RusHydro JV) includes the 3,000 megawatt BEMO HPP (the construction EFFICIENT MIDSTREAM, of which was completed in 2014) and Boguchansky PROPRIETARY R&D AND aluminium smelter in the Krasnoyarsk region of Russia. In March 2019, the launch of the second part of the INTERNAL EPCM EXPERTISE first stage brought the total production capacity to RUSAL aluminium smelting operations go through almost 300 thousand tonnes per annum. regular upgrades. RUSAL has developed its own One of RUSAL’s other major projects is Taishet in-house R&D, design and engineering centers and aluminium smelter in the Irkutsk region. The operates RA-300, RA-400 and Green Soederberg production capacity of the first line is 428.5 thousand smelting technologies. A new energy efficient and tonnes. During 2019, the Company continued to environmentally friendly RA-500 and RA-550 smelting finance this smelter’s construction using its own funds. technology has been designed, and currently RUSAL is testing it, targeting the best energy efficiency yields in the industry. IMPLEMENTING RUSAL is actively developing a groundbreaking inert anode technology. Introducing this state-of-art ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES technology into the production process will lead RUSAL was one of the first Russian companies to complete elimination of greenhouse gas and that joined UN Global Compact. By following its polyaromatic hydrocarbon emissions coupled with 10% environmental policy and undertaking to regularly cut in operational costs through reducing anode and review and update its provisions, the Company is energy consumption and over a 30% cut in Greenfield constantly developing and improving its environmental projects expenditure costs. management system and implementing its principles at all production facilities. COST EFFICIENCY The efficient smelting technologies together with DIVERSIFICATION low-cost input material and utilities mix secure the OPPORTUNITIES THROUGH Company’s global leadership on the cost curve. INVESTMENTS — As at the Latest Practicable Date, RUSAL owns FOCUS ON HIGHER MARGIN an effective 27.82% interest in Norilsk Nickel, the world’s largest palladium producer, the largest DOWNSTREAM BUSINESS high-grade nickel producer and one of the leading producers of platinum, copper and cobalt1. RUSAL has a diversified product mix with a strong share of VAP in the portfolio (1.55 million tonnes per — RUSAL’s 50/50 LLP Bogatyr Komir coal joint venture annum out of 4.16 million tonnes of total sales). in the Ekibastuz coal basin, one of the largest coal basins in the CIS, provides RUSAL with a natural energy hedge. 1 Source: www.nornickel.ru 9 Annual Report RUSAL 2019 Key Facts in 2019 Key Facts in 2019 APPROXIMATELY KEY FACTS % 5.9OF THE WORLD’S IN 2019 ALUMINIUM OUTPUT RUSAL ACCOUNTED FOR ABOUT 9aluminium smelters 8alumina refineries of which of which 8 are 3 are in Russia, 1 in Ireland, in Russia and 1 in Ukraine, 1 in Jamaica, % 1 in Sweden; 1 in Italy and 1 in Guinea; 6.3OF THE WORLD’S ALUMINA PRODUCTION 7 1 bauxite mines nepheline mine of which 2 are in Russia, in Russia; 1 in Jamaica, 3 in Guinea and 1 in Guyana; 3MLN TONNES.8 7MLN TONNES.9 4foil mills, of which 2silicon factories, 2 wheels factories OF ALUMINIUM OF ALUMINA 3 are in Russia and all of which are situated in 1 in Armenia; in Russia; Russia. RUSAL’s ordinary shares are listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the Moscow Exchange. 11 Annual Report RUSAL 2019 Map of Operations Map of Operations MAP OF OPERATIONS ARMENIA ITALY 19 01 Armenal 08 Eurallumina 24 AUSTRALIA JAMAICA 40 02 QAL 09 WindalcO 25 16 22 21 14 34 32 27 13 GUINEA KAZAKHSTAN 07 38 03 Compagnie des 10 LLP Bogatyr Komir 35 37 15 36 23 Bauxites de Kindia 41 39 12 33 NIGERIA 08 26 28 10 BAUXITES DE KINDIA (CBK) 11 ALSCON 01 17 04 Dian Dian Project 29 20 05 Friguia Bauxite & Alumina Complex 18 GUYANA 31 06 Bauxite Company of Guyana (BCGI) 30 IRELAND 03 05 11 07 Aughinish Alumina Refinery 04 06 09 RUSSIA SWEDEN 12 Aughinish Alumina Refinery 26 Novokuznetsk Aluminium Smelter 40 KUBAL 13 Bogoslovsky Alumina Refinery 27 Sayana Foil 14 Boguchanskaya HPP (BEMO) 28 SAYANAL UKRAINE 15 Boguchansky Aluminium Smelter (BEMO) 29 Sayanogorsk Aluminium Smelter 41 Nikolaev Alumina Refinery 16 Boksitogorsk Alumina Refinery 30 Shelekhov Powder Metallurgy 17 Bratsk Aluminium Smelter 31 Silicon (ZAO Kremniy), Shelekhov 18 Irkutsk Aluminium Smelter 32 SKAD wheels factory 19 Kandalaksha Aluminium Smelter 33 Taishet Aluminium Smelter (project) 20 Khakas Aluminium Smelter 34 Timan Bauxite 21 Kia-Shaltyr Nepheline Mine 35 Urals Alumina Refinery 02 22 Krasnoturyinsk Powder Metallurgy 36 Urals Foil Aluminium Alumina Bauxite Foil Powders 23 Krasnoyarsk Aluminium Smelter 37 Urals Silicon 24 Nadvoitsy Aluminium Smelter 38 Volgograd Aluminium Smelter Silicon Nepheline ore Other business Wheels 25 North Urals Bauxite Mine 39 Volgograd Powder Metallurgy Annual Report RUSAL 2019 12 13 Annual Report RUSAL 2019 03 CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT Chairman’s Statement CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT Bernard Zonneveld Chairman of the Board Dear Shareholders, It is my pleasure to welcome you to our 2019 Annual This year, RUSAL's headquarters and three production Report. Despite the high level of uncertainty we have sites obtained a certification by ASI (the Aluminium witnessed following the OFAC sanctions, RUSAL has Stewardship Initiative). Meeting various criteria ranging maintained its position as a market leader. Not only from business ethics and governance, environmental have we become the first company in corporate history performance, human rights and social practices is to get the sanctions lifted, but we have also remained an important milestone for RUSAL and reinforces committed to maintaining the high level for best ESG its commitment to being a responsible aluminium practices. producer. RUSAL's compliance with the highest level of ESG RUSAL continues to implement large-scale standards has reinforced its listing among the top 100 environmental projects, raising the bar for the sector.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Overlap Issues Consent Order
    IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE CHANCERY DIVISION The Honourable Mrs Justice Gloster DBE 12 October 2012 BETWEEN:- HCO8C03549 BORIS BEREZOVSICY Claimant - and - INNA GUDAVADZE & OTHERS Defendants HCO9C00494 BORIS BEREZOVSKY Claimant - and - VASILY ANISIMOV & OTHERS Defendants HCO9C00711 BORIS BEREZOVSICY Claimant - and - SALFORD CAPITAL PARTNERS INC & OTHERS Defendants 1),D 1147 (f) MEEK ORDER UPON the Order of Mr Justice Mann and Mrs Justice Gloster DBE dated 16 August 2010, ordering the trial of the issues set out in paragraph 1 of that Order (the Overlap Issues) as preliminary issues in proceedings number HC08C03549 (the Main Action), HC09C00494 (the Metalloinvest Action) and HCO9C00711 (the Salford Action); AND UPON the trial of the Overlap Issues (as amended by subsequent Orders) together with the trial of the Claimant's claims in Commercial Court proceedings number 2007 Folio 942 (the Joint Trial); AND UPON the Court having heard oral evidence and having read the written evidence filed; AND UPON hearing Leading Counsel for the Claimant, Counsel for the Second to Fifth Defendants in the Main Action (the Family Defendants), Leading Counsel for the Third to Fifth and Tenth Defendants in the Metalloinvest Action (the Anisimov Defendants), and Counsel for the Fourth to Ninth and Eleventh Defendants in the Salford Action (the Salford Defendants); AND UPON the Court having given judgment on the Overlap Issues on 31 August 2012; AND UPON the parties having agreed the orders as to costs set out in paragraphs 2 to 5 of this Order below; IT IS ORDERED THAT:- Determination of the Overlap Issues 1. The Overlap Issues are determined as follows:- (1) The Claimant did not acquire any interest in any Russian aluminium industry assets prior to the alleged meeting at the Dorchester Hotel in March 2000 (other than as a result of the alleged overarching joint venture agreement alleged by the Claimant in the Main Action, in relation to which no findings are made).
    [Show full text]
  • Treisman Silovarchs 9 10 06
    Putin’s Silovarchs Daniel Treisman October 2006, Forthcoming in Orbis, Winter 2007 In the late 1990s, many Russians believed their government had been captured by a small group of business magnates known as “the oligarchs”. The most flamboyant, Boris Berezovsky, claimed in 1996 that seven bankers controlled fifty percent of the Russian economy. Having acquired massive oil and metals enterprises in rigged privatizations, these tycoons exploited Yeltsin’s ill-health to meddle in politics and lobby their interests. Two served briefly in government. Another, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, summed up the conventional wisdom of the time in a 1997 interview: “Politics is the most lucrative field of business in Russia. And it will be that way forever.”1 A decade later, most of the original oligarchs have been tripping over each other in their haste to leave the political stage, jettisoning properties as they go. From exile in London, Berezovsky announced in February he was liquidating his last Russian assets. A 1 Quoted in Andrei Piontkovsky, “Modern-Day Rasputin,” The Moscow Times, 12 November, 1997. fellow media magnate, Vladimir Gusinsky, long ago surrendered his television station to the state-controlled gas company Gazprom and now divides his time between Israel and the US. Khodorkovsky is in a Siberian jail, serving an eight-year sentence for fraud and tax evasion. Roman Abramovich, Berezovsky’s former partner, spends much of his time in London, where he bought the Chelsea soccer club in 2003. Rather than exile him to Siberia, the Kremlin merely insists he serve as governor of the depressed Arctic outpost of Chukotka—a sign Russia’s leaders have a sense of humor, albeit of a dark kind.
    [Show full text]
  • Oleg Deripaska Has Struggled for Legitimacy in the United States, Where He Has Been Dogged by Civil Lawsuits Questioning the Methods He Used to Build That Empire
    The Globe and Mail (Canada) May 11, 2007 Friday Preferred by the Kremlin, shunned by the States BYLINE: SINCLAIR STEWART, With a report from Greg Keenan in Toronto SECTION: NEWS BUSINESS; STRONACH'S NEW PARTNER: 'ONE OF PUTIN'S FAVOURITE OLIGARCHS'; Pg. A1 LENGTH: 957 words DATELINE: NEW YORK He is perhaps the most powerful of Russia's oligarchs, a precocious - some would say ruthless - billionaire, who built his fortune against the bloody backdrop of that country's "aluminum wars" in the 1990s. He has nurtured close ties to the Kremlin, married the daughter of former president Boris Yeltsin's son-in-law, amassed an estimated $8-billion in personal wealth and built a corporate empire that stretches from metals and automobiles to aircraft and construction. Yet for all his success at home, 39-year-old Oleg Deripaska has struggled for legitimacy in the United States, where he has been dogged by civil lawsuits questioning the methods he used to build that empire. Mr. Deripaska has repeatedly denied allegations levelled against him, and he has not been specifically accused by American authorities of any crime. However, these whispers about shady business dealings may raise concerns about his $1.5-billion investment in Canada's Magna International, not to mention Magna's attempts to win control of DaimlerChrysler, an iconic American company. The United States has recently shown protectionist proclivities, citing national security concerns to quash both a Chinese state-owned oil company's bid for Unocal Ltd. and a planned acquisition of U.S. port service contracts by Dubai Ports World.
    [Show full text]
  • Investment from Russia Stabilizes After the Global Crisis 1
    Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of Russian Academy of Sciences Investment from Russia stabilizes after the global crisis 1 Report dated June 23, 2011 EMBARGO: The contents of this report must not be quoted or summarized in the print, broadcast or electronic media before June 23, 2011, 3:00 p.m. Moscow; 11 a.m. GMT; and 7 a.m. New York. Moscow and New York, June 23, 2011 : The Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, and the Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International Investment (VCC), a joint undertaking of the Columbia Law School and the Earth Institute at Columbia University in New York, are releasing the results of their second joint survey of Russian outward investors today 2. The survey is part of a long-term study of the rapid global expansion of multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging markets. The present survey, conducted at the beginning of 2011, covers the period 2007-2009. Highlights Despite the global crisis of the last few years, Russia has remained one of the leading outward investors in the world. The foreign assets of Russian MNEs have grown rapidly and only China and Mexico are further ahead among emerging markets. As the results of our survey show, several non- financial 3 Russian MNEs are significant actors in the world economy. The foreign assets of the 20 leading non-financial MNEs were about USD 107 billion at the end of 2009 (table 1). Their foreign sales 4 were USD 198 billion and they had more than 200,000 employees abroad.
    [Show full text]
  • Pace Through the Race
    annual REPORT 2018 PACE THROUGH THE RACE RUSAL ANNUAL REPORT 2018 REPORT ANNUAL RUSAL CONTENTS FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS 2 CORPORATE PROFILE 5 CHAIRMAN’S STATEMENT 11 CEO’S REVIEW 14 BUSINESS OVERVIEW 17 MANAGEMENT DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 41 PROFILES OF DIRECTORS AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT 81 DIRECTORS’ REPORT 99 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REPORT 177 FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 197 GLOSSARY 343 APPENDIX A 355 - Principal Terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement with the Company APPENDIX B 359 - Principal Terms of the Shareholders’ Agreement among Major Shareholders only CORPORATE INFORMATION 366 1 Financial and Operational Highlights Annual Report RUSAL 2018 FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS 2 Financial and Operational Highlights Annual Report RUSAL 2018 USD million (unless otherwise specified) 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 Revenue 10,280 9,969 7,983 8,680 9,357 Adjusted EBITDA 2,163 2,120 1,489 2,015 1,514 Adjusted EBITDA Margin 21.0% 21.3% 18.7% 23.2% 16.2% EBIT 1,481 1,523 1,068 1,409 942 Share of Profits from Associates and joint ventures 955 620 848 368 536 Pre Tax Profit 1,953 1,288 1,354 763 147 Profit/(Loss) 1,698 1,222 1,179 558 (91) Profit/(Loss) Margin 16.5% 12.3% 14.8% 6.4% (1.0%) Adjusted Net Profit 856 1,077 292 671 17 Adjusted Net Profit Margin 8.3% 10.8% 3.7% 7.7% 0.2% Recurring Net Profit 1,695 1,573 959 1,097 486 Basic Earnings/(Loss) Per Share (in USD) 0.112 0.080 0.078 0.037 (0.006) Total Assets 15,777 15,774 14,452 12,809 14,857 Equity Attributable to Shareholders of the Company 5,209 4,444 3,299 1,391 2,237 Net Debt 7,442 7,648 8,421 8,372 8,837 3 Reduced weight Manoeuvring and speedy CORPORATE 01 PROFILE Corporate Profile Annual Report RUSAL 2018 CORPORATE PROFILE RUSAL is a low-cost, vertically integrated aluminium producer with core smelting operations located in Siberia, Russia.
    [Show full text]
  • The Prospects for Russian Oil and Gas
    Fueling the Future: The Prospects for Russian Oil and Gas By Fiona Hill and Florence Fee1 This article is published in Demokratizatsiya, Volume 10, Number 4, Fall 2002, pp. 462-487 http://www.demokratizatsiya.org Summary In February 2002, Russia briefly overtook Saudi Arabia to become the world’s largest oil producer. With its crude output well in excess of stagnant domestic demand, and ambitious oil industry plans to increase exports, Russia seemed poised to expand into European and other energy markets, potentially displacing Middle East oil suppliers. Russia, however, can not become a long-term replacement for Saudi Arabia or the members of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in global oil markets. It simply does not have the oil reserves or the production capacity. Russia’s future is in gas rather than oil. It is a world class gas producer, with gas fields stretching from Western to Eastern Siberia and particular dominance in Central Asia. Russia is already the primary gas supplier to Europe, and in the next two decades it will likely capture important gas markets in Northeast Asia and South Asia. Russian energy companies will pursue the penetration of these markets on their own with the strong backing of the State. There will be few major prospects for foreign investment in Russian oil and gas, especially for U.S. and other international companies seeking an equity stake in Russian energy reserves. Background Following the terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, growing tensions in American relations with Middle East states coincided with OPEC’s efforts to impose production cuts to shore-up petroleum prices.
    [Show full text]
  • Russian Advocacy Coalitions
    Russian Advocacy Coalitions A study in Power Resources This study examines the advocacy coalitions in Russia. Using the Advocacy Coalition Framework, it looks at the power resource distribution amongst the coalitions, and how this distribution affects Russian foreign policy. The power resources examined are: Formal Legal Authority; Public Opinion; Information; Mobilizable Troops; and Financial Resources. In addition to this, the study used quantitative and qualitative methods to identify these resources. There are a couple of conclusions we may draw from this study. The method is useful in identifying power resources. It is not enough to use only the distribution of resources amongst coalitions in order to explain policy changes. It is found that the distribution of resources, coupled with coalition interaction, is enough to explain changes in Russian foreign policy. KEYWORDS: Advocacy Coalition Framework, Russia, Power Resources, Natural Gas WORDS: 24,368 Author: Robert Granlund Supervisor: Fredrik Bynander Contents 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1 1.1 PURPOSE .................................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................................................ 2 1.3 OUTLINE..................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • The Yukos Money Laundering Case: a Never-Ending Story
    Michigan Journal of International Law Volume 28 Issue 4 2007 The Yukos Money Laundering Case: A Never-Ending Story Dmitry Gololobov Gololobov and Co. Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Dmitry Gololobov, The Yukos Money Laundering Case: A Never-Ending Story, 28 MICH. J. INT'L L. 711 (2007). Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mjil/vol28/iss4/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Journal of International Law at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE YUKOS MONEY LAUNDERING CASE: A NEVER-ENDING STORY Dmitry Gololobov* I. A BRIEF STORY OF THE YUKos GROUP ................................... 711 II. THE YUKOS CASE: THE TIMELINE AND THE C ON SEQUEN CES ........................................................................ 7 16 III. THE MONEY LAUNDERING LEGISLATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION .............................................................. 720 IV. PRINCIPLES OF THE KHODORKOVSKYIYUKOS MONEY LAUNDERING C ASE .................................................................. 724 V. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CASE .............................. 726 A . Tim ing ...............................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • HYBRID WARFARE ANALYTICAL GROUP Preface
    Image of the EU and Eastern Partnership countries on Russian TV HYBRID WARFARE ANALYTICAL GROUP Preface • Russia considers itself in a perpetual state of information warfare, while the West does not • Russia’s fake news and troll factories are already notoriously known. However, our research suggests to measure narratives as key elements of Russian propaganda • Russian media fundamentally changed the whole paradigm of news: facts and events are used to support the already prepared narratives • Once established narratives are supported by fake news in smaller part, but mainly by deliberately manipulated interpretation of real events Fake news example On 14 November 2017 Russian Defense Ministry claimed it had “irrefutable evidences” the US is helping ISIS in the Middle East – and back up its claim by posting screenshots from a mobile video game. Narrative example The West tries to overtake Russia, but fails “Musk is breathing down our neck” member of parliament Pavel Dorokhin “Musk failed to outdo heavy rockets of USSR” magazine Vzgliad.ru “Musk’s fall has started: media calculated his loses” state news agency RIA Novosti “It was needed to improve business. It’s widely known that Tesla’s business is doing very bad. It’s a very good trick” Communication director of state agency ROSCOSMOS Agenda 1. Methodology 2. TV landscape in Russia 3. Key findings of the research 4. Description of 6 narratives with quotes 5. Narratives for Baltic states 6. Narratives for countries of Eastern Partnership 7. Conclusions Methodology • Period of the analysis:
    [Show full text]
  • Sanctions and Russia Order in Ukraine, by Resuming Fighting and Taking Over New Towns and Villages, and Russia the West Will Have to Scale-Up Sanctions Significantly
    Sanctions have so far been the most effective instrument of Western influ- ence on Russia’s policy towards Ukraine, stopping the Kremlin from making a greater military incursion in the country. Restrictions were imposed against more than one hundred members of the Russian political and business elite, as sanctions well as dozens of Russian enterprises and banks. The annexation of Crimea and war in eastern Ukraine transformed assumptions about Russia, from a strategic partner, especially in energy, into a strategic challenge, mainly for regional secu- rity. Should Russia persist in challenging the principles of European cooperative sanctions And Russia order in Ukraine, by resuming fighting and taking over new towns and villages, And Russia the West will have to scale-up sanctions significantly. At the same time, the West should elaborate precise benchmarks against which to measure any potential Russian cooperative behaviour in Ukraine, before deciding to suspend or cancel sanctions. The Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) is a leading Central Europe- an think tank that positions itself between the world of politics and independent analysis. PISM provides analytical support to decision-makers, initiates public debate and disseminates expert knowledge about contemporary international relations. The work of PISM is guided by the conviction that the decision-mak- Edited by ing process in international relations should be based on knowledge that comes from reliable and valid research. The Institute carries out its own research,
    [Show full text]
  • Governors, Oligarchs, and Siloviki: Oil and Power in Russia
    Governors, Oligarchs, and Siloviki: Oil and Power in Russia Ahmed Mehdi, Shamil Yenikeyeff February 2013 Russia/NIS Center Ifri is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non-governmental and a non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debates and research activities. The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ alone and do not reflect the official views of their institutions. Russia/NIS Center © All rights reserved – Ifri – Paris, 2013 ISBN: 978-2-36567-103-3 IFRI IFRI-Bruxelles 27 RUE DE LA PROCESSION RUE MARIE-THERESE, 21 75740 PARIS CEDEX 15 – FRANCE 1000 BRUXELLES TEL. : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 TEL. : 32(2) 238 51 10 FAX : 33 (0)1 40 61 60 60 FAX : 32 (2) 238 51 15 E-MAIL : [email protected] E-MAIL : [email protected] WEBSITE : www.ifri.org Russie.Nei.Visions Russie.Nei.Visions is an online collection of articles dedicated to the study of Russia and other former Soviet states (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan). Written by leading experts, these policy- oriented papers deal with strategic, political and economic issues.
    [Show full text]
  • How Regimes Dictate Oligarchs & Their Football Clubs: Case Studies Comparison of Oligarch Football Club Ownership in Dagest
    HOW REGIMES DICTATE OLIGARCHS & THEIR FOOTBALL CLUBS: CASE STUDIES COMPARISON OF OLIGARCH FOOTBALL CLUB OWNERSHIP IN DAGESTAN, ROMANIA, & TRANSNISTRIA FROM 1993-2014 MELISSA A. McDONALD A thesis submitted to the faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master in the program of Russian and East European Studies in the Graduate School. Chapel Hill 2014 Approved by: Graeme Robertson Robert Jenkins Milada Vachudova © 2014 Melissa A. McDonald ALL RIGHTS RESERVED ABSTRACT Melissa A. McDonald: How Regimes Dictate Oligarchs & Their Football Clubs: Case Studies Comparison of Oligarch Football Club Ownership in Dagestan, Romania, & Transnistria from 1993-2014 (Under the direction of Graeme Robertson) This thesis examines how oligarch football club investments in Central and Eastern Europe face restrictions based on regime type. Oligarchs gained political and economic control of this region following the collapse of communist regimes in the early 1990s. This region also saw great change when athletic institutions fell and football became an avenue for oligarchs to ensure political capital. Although many similarities exist, I argue that oligarchs use different strategies toward clubs to ensure beneficial forms of political capital based on their respective regimes. As a result, I highlight the structure of oligarchs in neo-authoritarian, oligarchical democracy, and de facto state regimes to assess how regimes influence oligarchs’ use of football clubs. I advance this discussion with three case studies of oligarchs and their ownership of local football clubs. My cases include Suleyman Kerimov and FC Anzhi Dagestan, Gigi Becali and FC Steaua București, and Viktor Gushan and FC Sheriff Transnistria.
    [Show full text]