ARMOR May-June 2001

Mission to Boljevce: The Check Was in the Mail... See Page 7

PB 17-01-3 May-June 2001 Saddle Up... Tonight We Ride

“Behold the brown-faced men, each group, each person away and appeared on the magazine’s back cover for a picture, the negligent rest on the saddles....” from Cav- many years. alry Crossing a Ford by Walt Whitman I’m not sure how Remington’s depiction of John Lannen

became known as “Old Bill.” One theory is that “Old Bill” Our last issue reported the was actually Lannen’s horse. Others argue the horse’s jumping of our TOC, “AR- name was “Scout.” I’m not sure of this either, but that’s a MOR Magazine to Move great name for that particular horse! Not so, says Major Across Post.” Jon Clemens William K. Emerson in his 1978 ARMOR article. Emer- noted that our previous son’s research reveals that John or “Jack” Lannen was an home, the John Lannen alias for Canadian William Carroll, who borrowed his House, was named for the mother’s maiden name when he enlisted in the Army. Em- 3rd Cavalry sergeant who erson adds that the use of an alias to enlist was common posed for Frederic Reming- in the late 19th century when many considered Army ser- ton’s sketch of a mounted vice undesirable and immigrants filled the ranks. Lannen cavalry trooper, circa 1898. was an immigrant, too, having migrated from Prince Ed- However, I suspect most ward Island, where he had been a carpenter. He enlisted mounted warriors know John in New York City. Lannen better by his alias, Most telling about John Lannen/Old Bill are the words of “Old Bill,” and while most of his former commander, Captain Hardie: us know well Old Bill’s vis- age, few know the story behind the famous image, or “Aside from his horsemanship Lannen’s most marked much about the man. characteristics were his loyalty to his organization and his unfailing good humor under trying conditions. Ordinarily a LTC William Gardner Bell, former ARMOR editor and his- stern disciplinarian, he was always ready with a smile and torian, wrote, “Of the fine artists who turned their talents to a jest when roads were muddy, skins damp and cold, and painting the Great American West, Frederic Remington rations low. He accepted hardships as part of his day’s comes perhaps closest to being the United States Cav- work. There are too few of his kind. He was the epitome of alry’s own.” The mounted fraternity recognized this kinship soldier and cavalryman.” and made the artist a life member of the U.S. Cavalry As- sociation, predecessor to the current U.S. Armor Associa- I imagine that Lannen, a.k.a. Old Bill, was both a good tion. Remington was also a close friend of Captain F. H. man to ride with and to share hard times with; certainly he Hardie, who commanded G Troop of the 3rd Cavalry is someone well suited to symbolize our heritage of Regiment. Remington visited Hardie and his troop near mounted warfighting. Like hundreds of other soldiers in Tampa, Florida in 1898, when the troop was preparing for that fight, Sergeant Lannen contracted yellow fever and movement. The Spanish-American War had begun, and G died at Santiago in 1898 after spending almost thirty years Troop was to take part in the Santiago campaign in east- faithfully serving his country. Lannen’s memory and legacy ern Cuba. Also heading that way was Remington, who as a mounted warrior ride on. would draw scenes of the war for Harper’s Weekly. I’m certain others can furnish varying accounts and tales During his visit, Remington was struck by the sight of the of Old Bill, but I’m not certain there will ever be a com- mounted John Lannen, an NCO from G Troop. plete, definitive history, and per- “...Remington noted the ease and grace with which Ser- haps that’s as it should be. Myths geant Lannen rode and selected him as the most perfect and mysteries should not be too type of the American Cavalryman he had ever seen. At specific, after all. this time Sergeant Lannen’s hair and mustache were — D2 white. He had blue eyes and a dark, ruddy complexion. He was a superb horseman. His horse was his friend and Our thanks to several authors comrade,” said Lieutenant Colonel F.H. Hardie in a letter who documented the Old Bill/John to the Editor of the Cavalry Journal in 1911. From Reming- Lannen saga and thus passed on ton’s rough sketches of Lannen in Florida, two finished his legacy over the course of AR- works were produced and presented to the Cavalry Jour- MOR’s 113 years — Colonel C.A nal in 1902. The first, a sketch of a frontier cavalryman, Seoane, William K. Emerson, appeared on the front cover of the Journal in 1903 and Lieutenant Colonel William Bell would ride in that position for another 40 years. The sec- Gardner, and Lieutenant Colonel ond sketch depicted the rear view of a cavalryman riding F.H. Hardie — Ed.

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Official:

ERIC K. SHINSEKI JOEL B. HUDSON General, United States Army Administrative Assistant to the Chief of Staff Secretary of the Army 0105101

The Professional Development Bulletin of the Armor Branch PB 17-01-3

Editor-in-Chief MAJ DAVE DAIGLE Features 7 Mission to Boljevce Managing Editor by CPT Douglas Huber JON T. CLEMENS 11 A Taste of Life at Outpost SAPPER by 1LT Michael Scott Commandant MG B. B. BELL 13 The PT-76 Light Tank in the India-Pakistan Wars by Adam Geibel

17 The Decline of Mars: Change and Its Effect on the Warrior Spirit ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published bi- by MAJ Gregory A. Daddis monthly by the U.S. Army Armor Center, 4401 Vine Grove Road, Fort Knox, KY 40121. 22 The New Chinese Type 98 MBT: A Second Look Reveals More Details by James M. Warford Disclaimer: The information contained in AR- MOR represents the professional opinions of 24 Forging the Red Thunderbolt: Armored Trains Provided the authors and does not necessarily reflect Mobile Firepower During the Russian Revolution and After the official Army or TRADOC position, nor does it change or supersede any information by MAJ Alan R. Koenig presented in other official Army publications. 30 The Military Decision-Making Process: Official distribution is limited to one copy for Applying the OPFOR’s Approach each armored brigade headquarters, armored by CPT David Haines cavalry regiment headquarters, armor battalion headquarters, armored cavalry squadron head- 35 Light Cavalry Table X quarters, reconnaissance squadron headquar- by MAJ Christopher Kolenda, CPT Raymond Zindell and SSG Mark Aide ters, armored cavalry troop, armor company, and motorized brigade headquarters of the 37 CSS and the Battalion Scout Platoon United States Army. In addition, Army libraries, by SFC Harald Jeffery Army and DOD schools, HQ DA and MACOM staff agencies with responsibility for armored, 40 Building the “Perfect” TACSOP direct fire, ground combat systems, organiza- by CPT Brant Guillory tions, and the training of personnel for such organizations may request two copies by 43 Fighting a Hundred Battles: sending a request to the editor-in-chief. Using TacOps to Produce Experienced Captains for the Mounted Force Authorized Content: ARMOR will print only by MAJ Wayne Cherry and MAJ Joseph McLamb those materials for which the U.S. Army Armor Center has proponency. That proponency 47 Tank Panel Set for Armor Conference includes: all armored, direct-fire ground combat systems that do not serve primarily as Back Stridsvagn 122 Swedish Main Battle Tank Poster infantry carriers; all weapons used exclusively Cover Threat Branch, Directorate of Force Development in these systems or by CMF 19-series enlisted soldiers; any miscellaneous items of equipment which armor and armored cavalry or- Departments ganizations use exclusively; training for all SC 12A, 12B, and 12C officers and for all CMF- 2 Points of Contact 19-series enlisted soldiers; and information concerning the training, logistics, history, and 3 Letters leadership of armor and armored cavalry units 5 Commander’s Hatch at the brigade/regiment level and below, to 6 Driver’s Seat include Threat units at those levels. 50 Reviews Material may be reprinted, provided credit is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright is indicated. Periodicals Postage paid at Fort Knox, KY, and additional mailing offices. Postmaster: Send address changes to Editor, ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK-ARM, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. USPS 467-970 May-June 2001, Vol. CX, No. 3

DSN prefix – 464- Points of Contact Commercial prefix– (502) 624-

ARMOR Editorial Offices U.S. Army Armor Center

Editor-in-Chief Commanding General (ATZK-CG) MAJ Dave Daigle 4087 MG B. B. Bell 2121 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected]

Managing Editor Please Deputy Commanding General (ATZK-DCG) Jon T. Clemens Note New 4582 BG Terry Tucker 7555 E-Mail: [email protected] Phone E-Mail: [email protected] Numbers Chief of Staff (ATZK-CS) Editor for ARMOR COL George Edwards 1101 Vivian Oertle Staff 2610 E-Mail: [email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM) Staff Illustrator CSM Carl E. Christian 4952 Mr. Jody Harmon 3923 E-Mail: [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] Directorate of Force Development (ATZK-FD) COL Joe Hughes 5050 E-Mail: [email protected] Mounted Maneuver Battlespace Battle Lab (ATZK-MW) COL Dennis J. Szydloski 7809 ARTICLE SUBMISSIONS: To improve speed and accuracy in E-Mail: [email protected] editing, manuscripts should be originals or clear copies, either typed or printed out double-spaced, with a 3½-inch disk in Microsoft Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR) Word, WordPerfect, WordStar, Rich Text Format, or ASCII (please Aubrey Henley 1272 indicate wordprocessing format on disk or cover letter). Tape E-Mail: [email protected] FAX 7585 captions to any illustrations or photos submitted. Additionally, we can receive articles as e-mail or attachments at: Special Assistant to the CG (ARNG) (ATZK-SA) COL Randal Milling 1315 [email protected] E-Mail: [email protected] TRADOC System Manager for Abrams (ATZK-TS) SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per COL James H. Nunn 7955 issue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and E-Mail: [email protected] accepted for publication by, other Army journals. Please submit your article to only one Army journal at a time. TRADOC System Manager for Force XXI (ATZK-XXI) COL Brett H. Weaver 4009 GRAPHICS AND PHOTOS: We prefer conventional photo prints, E-Mail: [email protected] but will accept electronic graphic and photo files. If you use Assistant TRADOC System Manager PowerPoint, please save each illustration as a separate file. Try to Soldier - Mounted Warrior (ATZK-ATS) avoid the use of excessive color and shading. (Please do not send LTC J. B. Iddins 3519 photos embedded in PowerPoint.) If you have any questions E-Mail: [email protected] concerning electronic art or photo submissions, call Vivian Oertle at the phone number above. Directorate of Training and Doctrine Development (ATZK-TD) TBA 8247 CHANGE OF ADDRESS-PAID SUBSCRIPTIONS AND ST. GEORGE-ST. JOAN AWARDS: For paid subscription service, address changes, and delivery problems, or for awards information, contact Connie Stiggers, United States Armor Association, P.O. Box 607, Fort Knox, KY 40121; E-Mail: U.S. Army Armor School [email protected]; phone (502) 942-8624; or FAX (502) 942- 6219. You can also access the Association through their website at: Director, Armor School (ATSB-DAS) www.usarmor-assn.org. COL Robert T. Gahagan 1050 E-Mail: [email protected] UNIT DISTRIBUTION: To report unit free distribution delivery Armor School Sergeant Major (ATSB-CSM) problems or changes of unit address, phone DSN 464-2249; com- CSM Terrance McWilliams 7091 mercial: (502) 624-2249. Requests to be added to the free dis- E-Mail: [email protected] tribution list should be in the form of a letter to the Editor-in-Chief. NCO Academy (ATSB-NC) EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: ARMOR, ATTN: ATZK- CSM James E. Dale 5150 ARM, 1109A Sixth Ave. Room 371, Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210. E-Mail: [email protected]

ARMOR MAGAZINE ONLINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine 16th Cavalry Regiment (ATSB-SBZ) website at the following address: www.knox.army.mil/armormag. COL John Antal 7848 E-Mail: [email protected] ARMOR HOTLINE — DSN 464-TANK: The Armor Hotline is a 1st Armor Training Brigade (ATSB-BAZ) 24-hour service to provide assistance with questions concerning COL William J. Blankmeyer 8736 doctrine, training, organizations, and equipment of the Armor Force. E-Mail: [email protected]

2 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Book Was a “Rough Draft” of a Much-Needed Capability

Dear Sir: study of tank attacks against integrated U.S. Troops Were Also Attacked anti-tank defenses, we would never have Where GM 100 Met Its Fate We appreciate LTC Eden’s effort in review- formed armored divisions. Air-mech is nothing our book, Air-Mech Strike: 3-Dimensional ing more than continuing the lead of the Dear Sir: Phalanx in the March-April edition of ARMOR. maneuver warfare prophets by integrating Being simple soldiers and not English ma- vertical envelopments into large-scale ma- CPT Luedeke’s article (“Death on the jors, we did the best we could in a very short neuver that includes heavy ground maneu- Highway: The Destruction of Groupement period of time, and we apologize to readers ver forces. Mobile 100,” Jan-Feb 2001 ARMOR – Ed.) for any shortcomings in style and editing. hit home on a very personal basis with this LTC Eden got the important point. Air We encourage the readers of ARMOR to old tanker. I had the good fortune of partici- mechanization is an approach to land war- watch for a series of articles [in Army in April, pating in the history honors program in my fare that we have ignored too long. While we May, June; the March Armed Forces Journal junior and senior years at Western Michigan may not have the ultimate solution for equip- International (“Full Spectrum Transformation University, a program requiring an honors ping, organizing, and fighting the air-mech - Now”); and the April Military Review] by two thesis to graduate. The topic of my paper team, we did collect what we determined to members of our group, BG (Ret.) Wass de was “Vietnam....America’s Future ‘Street be the best ideas available on the topic to- Czege and BG (Ret.) David Grange. BG Without Joy’?” During my research in 1963- day. And we did demonstrate how we could Wass de Czege writes about the future chal- 64, I had the distinct honor of interviewing achieve this capability in the short run. lenges of power-projection, offensive com- and befriending Bernard B. Fall, renowned bat, and force protection. This trilogy dis- author of perhaps the most descriptive and At the time we wrote the book, many issues cusses operational maneuver from strategic accurate tomes on the French Indochina regarding the interim force were still unset- distances and the challenges of non-linear War: Street Without Joy; Hell in a Very Small tled and there may still be enough flexibility operations. He places air-mech operations in Place; Last Reflections on a War, and oth- to influence the interim force approaches to a larger joint and operational context. BG ers. Then a professor of International Stud- the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions. We Grange describes how the Army can have ies at Howard University, Mr. Fall kindly definitely would like to influence decisions an air-mech capability now using existing afforded this fledgling historian some gritty, about the “objective force” and the Future equipment to overcome the tyranny of re- eye-opening visions of the war in Vietnam, Combat System (FCS). We felt it was impor- strictive terrain like he faced recently as what was and was to be. My thesis was a tant to gather the air-mech history and back- commander of the 1st Infantry Division pre- critical historical analysis of French strategy ground in one book. We looked at how other paring to invade Kosovo. Further, in the April and tactics, especially as they involved small armies have approached the concept, and issue of Military Review, BG Grange ex- unit actions and the evolving Maoist ap- we have laid out some thoughts on how to plains how a 3D air/ground maneuver force proach to ‘Revolutionary War’ or guerrilla proceed in the near term. can combine the synergy of combat systems warfare. (Bernard Fall was killed on QL 1 in to provide capabilities to commanders. Much has happened since we wrote the February, 1967.) book. The Army has been experimenting A key point of our book was to advocate. with air mechanization in its futures war We believe that the U.S. Army needs to Little did I know that some three years games. Objective Force brigades and divi- begin working on air-mech concepts soon. hence, I would find myself explaining the sions in the Army’s up-coming VIGILANT And we believe that an important transforma- tall, stark, white obelisks along what was WARRIORS 01 exercise, set in 2015, have tion goal should be to the ability to insert one known in 1967 as QL 19, dedicated to air mechanized capabilities. They will deploy air mechanized division to operational some unit called Groupement Mobile 100, rapidly by C-17 and wide-bodied jets as well depths in one night by 2020. Our views will to my tank crews. As I read the bronze as high-speed, shallow-draft shipping and mature as more join in the discussion of plaques and described to them the actions vessels. The Future Combat System will whether, when and how we pursue this goal. in that place, the hair on my neck literally have air-mech capabilities and will conduct There will be other army priorities, but air stood on end. Here, I was responsible for vertical envelopments with brigade and divi- mechanization will never be a reality until a the relative security of this road on the sion-sized forces. There is a growing accep- consensus forms within the Army itself. Ar- same bloody ground where GM 100 bled its tance of the fundamental reason for air mor branch emerged during the 1930s. This last. My tank platoon, 1st Platoon, A Com- mechanization. Future interventions will be- was a period of miniscule army budgets, but pany, 1st Battalion, 69th Armor, had been gin with offensive operations and operational concerned army personnel made enough given the mission of securing the section of maneuver from a continent away. Entry will conceptual progress that when the funds National Highway 19 between Mang Giang be difficult, but it will need to be rapid and became available, the leaders of Army had a (Yang) pass (or old PK 22) and what was not limited to predictable points of entry and blueprint. We don’t claim to have the blue- known as Bridge Check Point 25, beginning terrain choke points. Those in the Army and print. We have a rough draft (and a very 7 December, as a lead-on force for the outside who have war-gamed and analyzed rough draft, according to your reviewer). We ultimate displacement of A Company and the tactics and concepts of employment of need your help to improve it. Better yet, the the battalion forward element to LZ Schuller the Interim Brigade Combat Teams in a Ko- Army itself needs to improve on it. and An Khe respectively. We provided daily sovo terrain scenario know the challenges of strong points and reaction forces in support limited narrow valley approaches. We be- BG DAVID L. GRANGE, U.S. Army, Ret. of the 60 or so daily convoys running believe we really have no choice but to pursue BG HUBA WASS DE CZEGE, U.S. Army, Ret. tween Pleiku in the Central Highlands and this capability if we are to remain a relevant LTC RICHARD D. LIEBERT, USAR the coastal port of Qui Nhon. We called it force. SSG JOHN RICHARDS, U.S. Army ‘ambush alley,’ because the Viet Cong and LT MICHAEL L. SPARKS, USAR North Vietnamese Army forces who cohab- We know that there will be challenges. Ar- MAJ CHARLES A. JARNOT, U.S. Army ited the area with us chose to impede the mored warfare also faced challenges. The LTC LESTER W. GRAU, U.S. Army, Ret. progress of at least one convoy daily. The officers of Armor branch solved those over JACOB W. KIPP, Professor and Sr. Analyst importance and need for our mission was time. There are many who will point to the EMERY E. NELSON, Warfighting constantly reinforced to my crews as they cost and dangers of air-mech operations. If, Concepts Analyst passed by the shattered hulks of the M24 in the late 1930s the U.S. had conducted a CAROL A. MURPHY, Computer Specialist tank platoon from GM 100. ARMOR — May-June 2001 3

The 95B Battalion of the NVA 95th Regi- ret” would be a more accurate descriptor) The USASMA Sergeants Major Course and ment attempted to repeat the events of 1954 was previously rejected by the Army be- the Command Sergeants Major Course are with an attack on a U.S. Ordnance convoy cause half of the vehicle commander’s field developed for the entire Army, and I believe on 10 April 1968, at almost the same loca- of view is blocked by the main gun. This this essay is only applicable for mounted tion where GM 100 was destroyed. At that design flaw was unacceptable a decade ago maneuver outfits. Saying that, I would not point in time, the entire force of A Company, — why is it now okay? recommend training the entire Noncommis- with two additional tank companies within sioned Officer Corps. I would recommend calling distance, was available to react to At last report, the first brigade is not ex- that division and brigade CSMs use this or any road contingency in the area, indeed a pected to be fully equipped with LAV IIIs until something of their own design to train the far cry from the poor state of affairs facing mid-2003. Had the M113 family been cho- battalion CSMs until there is an appropriate GM 100, without air or artillery support, or sen, the medium brigades could have been doctrine developed. Their comments on any form of ground reinforcement. As A formed immediately, from the existing inven- leader books as a training management tool Company XO, I couldn’t help but again re- tory, ready to serve without delay. Why are a breath of fresh air. We all should reflect on those long past events, making it adopt an “off-the-shelf” system that will take read FM 25-101. years to get into service? real scary at the time the action unfolded. JOHN BECK However, A Company, 1/69 Armor was not It is true that the LAV III offers better ballis- GM 100 and all but destroyed the 95B Bat- CSM, U.S. Army tic protection than does the M113, but the talion as a fighting force, leaving nearly 300 greatest threat in urban combat is not from enemy dead near PK 18 and 19. Indeed, I 14.5mm machine guns, it is from antiarmor Three-Tank Platoons Raise and many others had done a lot of hard weapons like the RPG-7, which can easily Control, Deployment Questions swallowing during those months we worked punch through the LAV’s applique armor that AO. The Stars and Stripes reporter who (both LAV III and M113 require bolt-on armor was in the area on 10 April asked me if I to defeat the RPG threat). Is the LAV’s heav- Dear Sir: knew of the French GM destroyed there. ier standard armor incurring a substantial I must respond to the article “The Three That was some real heart-in-throat time for weight penalty with minimal practical bene- Tank Platoon, A Consideration For Army us all... but history did not repeat.... fit? XXI.” (See March-April 2001 ARMOR. –Ed.) Speed and Power! Because the M113 (even with anti-RPG I must admit, I was trying to be objective when reading the article. The gentlemen who JIM WALKER armor attached) weighs less than the standard LAV III, more M113s can be trans- wrote the article make a compelling argu- President ment if you are a logistician, but as an Armor 69th Armor Association ported by each C-5 or C-17, thereby greatly increasing the ground combat power deliv- officer I find a couple of faults with their arti- LTC, AUS (Ret.) cle. The first is the argument that armor pla- ered per aircraft sortie. And isn’t the whole idea behind the medium brigade concept to toon leaders will have an easier time control- Why Choose the LAV, When M113s “get there fustest, with the mostest”? ling three tanks as opposed to four. I feel that there was no credible evidence to this Are Already “On the Shelf”? When the Abrams was developed, fuel argument. I have been a tank platoon leader consumption was sacrificed in order to cre- with four tanks and a scout platoon leader Dear Sir: ate the best possible tank for defending with six Bradley CFVs, and I never had any against an anticipated Soviet attack through problems controlling them. A greater prob- Roll on!? I find it mind-boggling that the the Fulda Gap. The decision to not use a lem, as I see it, is over-reliance on the digital LAV III has been selected to equip the new fuel-efficient diesel engine later resulted in a suite on the M1A2, which cripples the pla- “medium” brigades (See “Roll On! Army severe strain on logistics during the large- toon leaders when it goes down. In my opin- Selects LAV III Variants to Equip New In- scale ground offensive of Desert Storm. ion, we seem to be selling short the splendid terim Brigades, Jan-Feb 2001 ARMOR. – Today, the LAV III has been selected (at armor lieutenants that we are producing. I Ed.) While the LAV III family does provide least in part) because it delivers excellent have yet to have the opportunity to com- some quite desirable characteristics — such fuel economy, but at the expense of off-road mand M1A2s, but I do know how to track as higher road speed, better fuel economy, capability. Will this decision also prove to be and control all the tanks I had as a platoon and simplified maintenance requirements — somewhat shortsighted and costly? leader. it is also notably deficient in some traits that would seem vital to what is supposed to be a STANLEY C. CRIST The next issue I had is deployability. When “full-spectrum” force. Lancaster, Calif. deploying an M1A2 on a C-5, you can fit only two on the airframe. Hmmm, something tells Perhaps the most glaring deficiency is the me that either way you will not have much relatively poor off-road capability exhibited Essay on Redefining CSM’s Role capability in the event of separation on the by armored cars throughout the history of Relates Best to Maneuver Units airfield. You will have two tanks from one mechanized warfare, and — more impor- platoon together and the third one landing on tantly — by the LAV III during the evaluation Dear Sir: the same bird with a tank from another pla- process. A cavalry squadron commander toon. I smell confusion in consolidation, es- was quoted in Jane’s Defense Weekly as CSM Jim DePriest’s and COL Randy pecially if the airfield is compromised in any saying, “We’ve been surprised with the LAV Anderson’s essay, “Redefining the Role of way. With the four-tank platoon you have two IIIs where they’ve got stuck ... We thought it the Command Sergeant Major in a Tactical sections; at least they can defend much could go anywhere. [But] you’ve got to be Environment” in the March-April 2001 issue easier than two crews that have never func- very selective with where it goes.” Does that is a “must read” for mounted maneuver tioned together before. sound like acceptable mobility for full-spec- commanders and noncommissioned officers. trum operations? They have clearly identified a hole in “How- My last point is about the successful implementation of the three-tank platoon by the The LAV III Mobile Gun System employs to-Fight” doctrine, and have then recom- Swiss Army. When did they go to war with a the so-called “Low Profile Turret” developed mended a solution. I believe that battalion three-tank platoon? I must have been sleep- for the XM8 program, not the conventional commanders and their wingmen could use ing during that one. Successful implementa- turret created for the USMC LAV Assault this as a guide to train and fight their formation comes from combat experience, not Gun. The Low Profile Turret (a misnomer, tions. The authors’ critical sites and leader since the profile is actually taller than con- tasks have been proven by their personal ventional turrets — “Small Frontal Area Tur- execution at numerous NTC rotations. Continued on Page 46 4 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Mounted Force Initial Entry Training Update

by Major General B. B. Bell, Commanding General, U.S. Army Armor Center

While we are deeply engaged in Army addition of the state-of-the-art GUARD- Transformation, the most crucial ele- FIST simulation system. These im- ment of Fort Knox and the Armor Cen- provements ensure that as the number ter’s mission remains the preparation of of scouts trained by 5-15 Cavalry in- mounted force warriors for full- creases, so does the quality of training. spectrum combat operations. The First Armored Training Brigade (1ATB), Tankers. The requirement for every armor crewman to qualify with the M- 01 with 4ID and 1CAV. Additionally, “America’s Iron,” does a really out- 16 rifle in addition to the 9mm pistol is mechanics receive training on the standing job preparing our initial entry M88A2 Hercules and the Forward Re- scouts, tankers, and mechanics for ser- the most notable recent change to 19K OSUT training. Many armor soldiers pair System (FRS). The FRS is loaded vice with field units. We should all be now serve as peacekeepers and peace- on a Palletized Load System (PLS) very proud of the job they do. This truck and has a 30 KW generator, an month’s Commander’s Hatch will up- makers throughout the world and carry the M-16 rifle. Successful completion improved air compressor with air tools, date you on the exciting work going on of M16 Basic Rifle Marksmanship and complete welding support. The these days in 1ATB. (BRM) training gives today’s tanker Hercules offers improved survivability, Scouts. To say the least, 19D One the competence and confidence neces- a more powerful engine for better tow- Station Unit Training (OSUT) is a sary to complete all missions. This is ing capacity and greater lifting ability, growth industry! First, we expanded the also a soldierization issue which en- and a stronger main winch. We have 5th Squadron, 15th United States Cav- sures our great tankers have the same also reinvented our 63A/M end-of- alry from five to seven Cavalry troops basic combat skills as their infantry course Field Training Exercise. It is this past year to provide enough scouts counterparts. Additionally, we recently now a four-day, scenario-driven, all- to man TO&E units at 100% strength completed a TRADOC review of our weather, mounted FTX. Soldiers grad- as well as to support the growing In- tank driver’s training program that uating from MCM Advanced Individ- terim Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) combines live driving experience with ual Training now get the full experi- mission. rigorous virtual training in our Tank ence of troubleshooting and repairing Driving Simulators (TDS). Poole Hall, real Bradleys and Abrams under diffi- Second, we created a 19K to 19D re- cult field conditions. When possible, classification program to support the our TDS facility, is the only one of its kind in the world and continues to help BNCOC students are given leadership first IBCT at Fort Lewis. This redistri- us produce skilled drivers cost effec- positions during these FTXs, making bution effort will provide critical NCO this a true multi-echelon training event. leadership as we form the new Recon- tively. While we do not license our graduates, our program of instruction All these initiatives help ensure we naissance, Surveillance, and Target Ac- ensures the field receives a highly send the best-trained mechanics possi- quisition (RSTA) Squadrons. qualified apprentice driver who can ble to the field. Third, we continue to update our Pro- quickly be trained and licensed. The 1ATB’s primary focus is to de- gram of Instruction (POI) to include the Mechanics. Not only has the way we velop skilled, highly motivated, physi- latest equipment. In the near future, train our scouts and tankers improved, cally fit, and well-disciplined warriors scouts going to units equipped with the for the mounted force. Over the last new M3A3 Bradley Cavalry Fighting but we’ve updated our mechanic training as well. We no longer train separate two months, we have analyzed feed- Vehicle will receive a six-day block of turret and hull mechanics for the back from the field on how well our instruction on the vehicle upon comple- graduates are performing. A compila- tion of their initial entry training. Addi- Abrams and the Bradley (MOSs 63E, 45E, 63T, and 45T). Instead, we now tion of this feedback, as well as the tionally, we’ve developed a training produce Multi-Capable Mechanics complementary adjustments to our plan for the Long Range Advanced training programs, can be found at the Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3), a (MCMs), MOS 63A for the Abrams and MOS 63M for the Bradley. In addi- Fort Knox web site at http://knox- super system now coming on line. tion to both hull and turret instruction, www.army.mil/. After reading the re- Currently, we provide intensive train- MCM graduates are also trained in se- sults of the survey, I urge you to ex- ing on the Army’s latest technology, lected direct support tasks that the Ar- plore 1ATB’s webpage to gain a fuller including the Javelin anti-tank weapon mor Force requested. We are also con- appreciation of the hard work and dedi- system and the Advanced System Im- ducting MCM transition training for cation it takes to turn a civilian into a provement Program (ASIP) SINC- Skill Level 1 63/45Es and 63/45Ts. soldier. GARS radio. We’ve also greatly up- MCM transition training began in FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT graded call-for-fire training with the FY00 with the 4ID and continues in FY AND STRIKE FIRST! ARMOR — May-June 2001 5

TRADOC Assignments Can Broaden a Career by CSM Carl E. Christian, Command Sergeant Major, U.S. Army Armor Center

In this issue’s article, I’d like to share ments, schools, promotions, and train- developing what the future combat some insights about TRADOC assign- ing. Both the promotion board guidance fighting systems will look like and how ments and how my impressions of them and the Career Map are on the Office of they will perform. Others work on what have changed since I arrived at Fort the Chief of Armor (OCOA) web site future soldiers will wear or some of the Knox. Many soldiers and NCOs feel on the Fort Knox Home Page. When equipment that integrates with the cur- cold chills running down their spines making assignments, the branch en- rent and future platforms. Still others when they receive orders sending them sures that a soldier’s assignment is are working at modernizing current to a TRADOC assignment at a post like complementary to the potential for ad- combat systems. At the Mounted Ma- Fort Knox, Kentucky. I was even one vancement in accordance with the neuver Battle Lab (MMBL), NCOs are of them! documents stated above. helping model and work simulations for future ideas. In the Directorate of I asked myself many questions: “What Most of us feel we need to stay with Training Development (DTDD), NCOs had I done? Why did I have to be the troops if we want to be competitive for one to go? Did my records look so bad advancement. The map also recom- are writing the doctrine we are currently using, as well as writing the doc- that the assignment personnel at Armor mends seeking and working in tough trine for the future. Also, NCOs are key Branch decided that I was already ALL assignments. But the guidance also says I WAS GOING TO BE in this Army, that the Army needs soldiers who have advisors with industry in the development of new simulator training sys- so they sent me here?” When I received performed well in varied types of as- tems. And still others are developing a phone call from my sponsor telling signments, read TO&E to TDA to me that I was a valued asset, and that I TO&E. Tough assignments exist all new training methodologies that are helping to revolutionize the way we can had many good things to offer to the over the Army, to include TRADOC. do training and evaluations. TRADOC Training System, I thought TRADOC assignments are good career to myself, that must be the standard builders, provided you do not do back- I can go on, and there are many more party line, code for, “Gotcha! Another to-back TDA assignments. things that are going on here, but the one bites the dust.” bottom line is that being assigned to But why are TRADOC assignments TRADOC here at Fort Knox provides After being here now for two years good career builders? Most soldiers and and being very involved in the TRA- leaders know that TRADOC installa- you the chance to have an impact on what will happen to our Army in the DOC Training System, I can say I was tions do training because we all went years to come. If you have been in the as wrong as wrong could be about through these posts in Basic, Advanced branch assignment personnel trying to Training, One Station Training, the line units, I need you to share your experience with the whole force, seek an end careers. In fact, it is exactly the Officer Basic or Advance courses, and assignment to Fort Knox or to other opposite. I can only speak about what I training in the NCOES system. But did have observed from the foxhole here at you also know that NCOs assigned to TDA positions. They will be both challenging and rewarding. If you are com- Fort Knox, but I believe that much of TRADOC also work in the Total Army pleting a TDA assignment, then get back what you are about to read holds true at Training System (TATS)? They work most any TRADOC assignment. to ensure that reserve and active train- to a TO&E organization to empower your troops with the knowledge you ing supports our One Army. And Army have gained working a TDA position. The Armor Branch NCOs manage the transformation? TRADOC has the lead force in accordance with set guidelines. in laying out the Army’s new path. Wherever you are, continue to make These guidelines can be found in the There are many challenging assign- this the best Army in the world and promotion board guidance that guides ments in TRADOC that are extremely remember to: selection of the senior Armor NCOs, vital to our Army. In the directorate and the Armor Enlisted Career Map that deals with future developments, the “FORGE THE THUNDERBOLT, that shows all enlisted grades ‘a way’ Directorate of Force Development BECAUSE TODAY IS THE BEST to manage their career’s in assign- (DFD), NCOs are directly involved in DAY TO BE A SOLDIER.” 6 ARMOR — May-June 2001

The Check Was in the Mail... Mission to Boljevce

by Captain Douglas Huber

As members of Tactical Support looked up a branch in Team 5, the Civil Affairs team that Dayton, Ohio. Again, it supports 1-35 Armor in Kosovo, we was the same damn 1- went up to the village of Novo Brdo to 800-number! Moral: a meeting with the local “municipal don’t go to .gov sites if coordinator” and representatives of you want info. So, I some non-governmental organizations turned to yahoo.com and that are working there. We talked about went right to the yellow some of the projects that were under- pages, typing in ‘social way to improve life in this village, a security administration.’ tiny spot north of Gnjilane and east of Once there, it asked me Pristina. Before the meeting was over, for a city, so I typed in we asked Ed Tawil, the municipal co- Washington, D.C. and hit ordinator, if he had any further prob- ‘Enter.’ Ten listings lems to discuss. came up, all for ‘US So- Tawil brought up the case of Desanka cial Security Adm.’ I now had a real phone Milenkovic, a 91-year-old woman who number, not 1-800-blow- had not been receiving the Social Secu- Me: Sure, its.... rity checks she was due. She had be- you-off. The first listing was in Balti- more. That seemed close enough to come eligible for the monthly payments Washington, close being a relative SW: Yeah, I don’t think this is my because her husband had worked in the lane, let me transfer you to Interna- United States before he passed away in term. I called directly. Here are some excerpts of the phone call: tional Claims. the late 1970s. Me: Thank you. (I don’t know if she Among the casualties of the Allied Commissioner (at least, that’s how heard me, either.) bombing and the internal conflict in he introduced himself): “Commis- Kosovo, there was a breakdown in the sioner.” (See, I told you.) Some Guy: Hello? province’s postal service. Mrs. Milenk- Me: Hello sir, my name is Lieutenant Me: (Once again, I mentioned the ovic had not received a payment since meeting, the woman, the memo, the around May 1999. After I volunteered Huber and I am calling from Kosovo. I am the civil military affairs officer for transfers …) to try to help her, Tawil gave me her my battalion and I am calling about a form, a “Social Security Award Certifi- SG: I know I am going to have to cate” dated October 1979. situation we have here in Kosovo. (At transfer you, but stay on the line so I this point, I explained everything about can get you to a real person. Once back at Camp Monteith, my first the meeting, and the woman, and the stop was the Information Superhigh- memo). Me: Thank you. (At this point I hear way, where I looked up www.ssa.gov. ringing, then voice mail; ringing, voice How I remembered that this address Commissioner: Let me have the claim number. mail; ringing, voice mail.) was the Social Security Administration Web Page, I will never know. Anyway, Me: Sure, its... (I read him the num- SG: Hold on, I am still trying to find I got on the web site, found a 1-800- ber.) someone for you. number, and called on a DSN line. It Commissioner: Uh, yes. I see. I don’t Me: Thank you. (At this point I hear took me the better part of 15 minutes to ringing, then voice mail; ringing, voice get an operator, but once I did, Opera- think I can help you with this. Let me transfer you. Stand by. mail; ringing, voice mail.) tor 2 from MacDill Air Force Base patched me through. Finally, on the Me: Thank you (I said to a ringing SG: Still trying …. other end, I caught the last three sec- phone). Me: Thank you. (At this point I hear onds of an English recording that Some Woman (She also did not in- ringing, then voice mail; ringing, voice quickly morphed into Spanish. The mail; ringing, voice mail.) only part of the recording I understood troduce herself): Hello? was the dial tone at the end, just before Me: Hello, my name is Lieutenant C.P.: (I am using her initials here to it hung up on me. Huber …. (I explained about the meet- protect her. I will explain why later.) ing, and the woman, and the memo, and Hello? Back to the Web! I looked up the local offices in Washington D.C. I found a 1- how I was transferred). Me: (One more time: me, Kosovo, 800-number. But it was the same as the SW: Okay, can I have the case num- meeting, woman, memo, transfers, other one that I’d found earlier! So, I ber? voice mail …) Can you help me? ARMOR — May-June 2001 7

C.P.: I think so, what is the claim more office in 1979! Amazing. I don’t account. The poor woman could not number? know if any other branch would have just cash the check. I asked how much Me: (Thinking, “Here we go again.”) been able to help me. But I do know this “service” might cost, and the that they wouldn’t have treated me like woman said they had just done this The number is …. C.P. did. same type of transaction for someone C.P.: Okay, what is the problem? else and there was a DM 580 fee on the Civil Affairs in Kosovo $600 check. Doing the math, it added Me: This woman hasn’t gotten Social up to almost half the check! We de- Security in over a year and a half. Is While Mrs. Milenkovic’s check there any way you can send money by wends its way to our unit’s mailroom in cided to look elsewhere. wire. Believe it or not, there is a West- Kosovo, let me tell you what an S5 Next, MAJ Hermsen, the Tactical ern Union in downtown Gnjilane. does. My job is unique in that I work with, or for, four field grade officers. I Support Team officer in charge asked C.P.: Let me check. our finance office if they could cash it. report to the battalion executive officer, SSG Lizardi, the noncommissioned (Muzak playing ...) but I work with the S3 in order to execute the battalion commander’s intent. officer in charge, said he would have to C.P.: I just checked with the claims make a phone call to confirm. Later, he manager and we don’t wire money. We Finally, the tactical support team (Civil called back with two enthusiastic Affairs) OIC is a major and I work with can set up an EFT (electronic funds her to manage, supervise, coordinate, thumbs up. We were ready! transfer) to a neighboring country, but we don’t do that in Serbia or Kosovo. and execute humanitarian assistance in We all met in the Civil Affairs office. sector. (That may sound pretty ethereal, It was me, MAJ Hermsen, SSG Selby, Me: That is going to be tough (At this but the less you understand, the more SGT Indra, SPC Zolle (all from CA), point, I was trying to visualize how this leeway I have. Nice.) Anyway, I do SSG Lizardi and SPC Delgato (of Fi- 91-year-old woman would get to Ma- everything from act as the Task Force nance, complete with locked briefcase), cedonia or Greece). Falcon Contracting Officer’s Represen- SSG Schafer of Public Affairs (because C.P.: And there is no mail there? tative on humanitarian projects that the the Army likes good press more than U.S. Government funds, to getting God hates a coward). Then there was Me: The only way that mail comes in sheet plastic from non-governmental Mario, the Serb interpreter, who is ac- and out of this country is by U.S. Army organizations for farmers who want to tually from Macedonia (but, then again, airplane or U.S. Army helicopter. cover their barns. There is no such none of the Albanians in this country thing as a typical day for an S5. are from Albania, either) and Val, our C.P.: What is your address? The whole KFOR effort rests upon the Albanian interpreter. We were ready to Me: (I gave her my address). go. After a quick briefing by the major, success of the humanitarian mission. we saddled up and rolled out the gate. C.P.: I guess I could send it to you We can stand guard on checkpoints all and you could give it to her. day, (“On point for the nation,” as we We traveled 40 minutes to Novo Brdo are fond of saying here in USAREUR), where we were to meet Ed Tawil and The conversation continued and C.P. but until these people can get (and his interpreter. We got there 20 minutes said that she would send the check out keep) jobs, and have a sustainable early (that’s just what the Army does) right away. (I’m calling her by her ini- economy with a quality of life above and waited for Ed. He arrived promptly tials here because I fear she might be that of most American street cats, then at 10 a.m., but said he wanted to pick fired if her bosses actually knew that we are never going to leave because up Mrs. Milenkovic’s cousin on the she was extremely helpful and very there will always be problems. way. No problemo. As we pulled away patient with me and was one of the from the building, I was thinking that I most sincere, caring, government em- About two weeks later, I got the check was about 5 minutes away from mis- from the Social Security Administra- ployees I have ever dealt with over the tion. Mrs. Milenkovic was owed 14,082 sion accomplishment, handing off the phone, and — for those of you who money and making one little old lady know that I can be sarcastic — I really big ones in back SSA payments. Not very rich indeed. Well.... bad for a country that has an average do mean all of that. annual income of around $900! Five minutes later, we approached a She even asked how it was that I We coordinated with Ed Tawil to turnoff that didn’t look too inviting. ended up talking to her. I explained the cruel game of pass the buck in which I meet him in Novo Brdo. We planned to We were traveling in two regular cash the check and take the woman her HMMWVs, one “up-armored” Hum- was the buck. She said that it was sad money; the only problem was that we vee, and Ed’s four-wheel drive Range how people would do whatever they could to get out of work. I again had no way of cashing the check. First, Rover. Leading the way, Ed struggled I decided to check out MicroBank, one to get up the hill, as the road was cut thanked her for her work, help, and of Gnjilane’s more upscale businesses. deep with ruts. SSG Selby tried next, trust in a man she had never met and claimed to be calling from Kosovo. She The woman behind the (bulletproof?) and her heavy HMMWV could not glass said that if we wanted to cash a make it. We dismounted, found a by- did ask me to confirm the woman’s age check from the U.S. Treasury it would pass through someone’s garden, and (following the Reagan mantra of “Trust, but verify.”). But once I did take a while. Because (and this is how got back on the road. The road began to she explained it), the bank would have climb and turn, not a great combo when that, it was a done deal. to send the check back through a clear- dealing with a vehicle that is almost After getting off the phone, I hap- ing house which, in turn, sends it back 5,000 pounds and over 6 feet wide. pened to look at the Award Certificate to the Treasury Department, which then “The road clears up ahead. The only that I had gotten from Ed and noticed blesses off on the check. Then, once the bad part is this first kilometer,” Ed as- that it had come from the same Balti- money is released, it has to stay in an sured us. Right! 8 ARMOR — May-June 2001

After the first kilometer, the road still arm signals) that SSG Selby would the mountains, although at one point sucked. As we approached a bend, Ed’s keep driving and that we would push. the road seemed to smooth out and we vehicle and the two light HMMWVs MAJ Hermsen did a quick risk assess- saw a village on the next hilltop. We made it with no problem, but then came ment that consisted of little more than a drove up to the village, then through it, the heavier up-armored vehicle. It genuflect and a silent prayer. We and continued down the other side of started to slide, finally coming to a stop pushed and the HMMWV slowly the mountain before encountering an- in the clearing that was below the road. moved up the hill until it got to the top! other one. I would have to say that the road got worse at this point. Soup As we were jockeying the HMMWV around in the clearing, we saw some The Russians were ready to leave, but would be a good word to describe the not before I got a picture. We all hud- consistency of the top six inches of soil. people about 2 kilometers out and Mario said, almost to himself, “It looks like they are in uniform. Maybe TMK?” TMK (or KPC, depending on your ethnicity), used to be the UCK, a group of Albanian insurgents that gained the upper hand after the allies began the bombing campaign that forced the Serbs to leave. We didn’t pay much A souvenir snapshot re- attention to them as we struggled to get cords the unexpected meet- the HMMWV back up on the road, but ing with Russian troops then Mario said, “I think they have who helped push the up- weapons.” armored HMMWV back onto this muddy Kosovo road. Uh-oh. Ed Tawil is at far left, and Mrs. Milenkovic’s cousin is As they got closer, I saw that these kneeling beside the author, unidentified people in uniform did, who is standing at far right. indeed, have rifles slung across their backs. I was really, really wishing that I’d carried binoculars. As they got dled around the Humvee that we res- Once again, the heavier HMMWV closer, we discerned their nationality... cued and about 16 cameras (both Rus- slipped off the road, but this was a tad they were Russian! Why would there sian and American) appeared to capture more precarious than before, consider- be Russian soldiers in our sector? Ten this Kodak moment. So, after the pic- ing the aforementioned cliff. She man- or 15 years ago, I might have been a tures and another round of hearty hand- aged to drive the vehicle back onto the little worried (my grandfather still has a shakes, the Russians set off on foot and road without loss of life or limb. Slog- hard time digesting that we run joint we were ready to roll. ging along at the top of a ridge line, we operations with the Russkies) but, hav- As we traveled higher into the moun- finally saw the small village of Bol- ing worked with the Russians in Bosnia jevce. For those of you without a map, at Camp Ugjlivic, I greeted the three tains, we were making pretty good time don’t bother looking in an atlas. For soldiers with a hearty handshake and a until we got to another rough spot. The first three vehicles made it up around those of you with a map, if you are loud “Hello.” looking for Boljevce, start in the Rus- the bend with no problems. I told SPC sian sector, because that is where we They spoke more English that I do Zolle to stop at the top of the hill to Russian, so they said “Hello” back and ensure that SSG Selby and MAJ Herm- ended up. asked, in Russian, what the problem sen made it up behind us. As I was As we got out of the HMMWVs in was. Ed Tawil started speaking with about to get out of the Humvee, a voice front of the woman’s house, Ed men- them in their native tongue. They came across the radio, “We’re stuck.” I tioned that she lives with some of her helped us get the HMMWV back on walked back down around the curve to family. In fact, she lived with her the road, but then we faced another hill. see the Humvee with its left rear tire daughter, her son, her granddaughter, SSG Selby started up the hill, but again hanging off the edge of the road. After and a couple of great grandsons and slid back off the side of the road and checking out the situation, all we had to daughters. To be perfectly honest, I lost got stuck. do was keep it in first gear and creep count at the second or third generation. forward, then straighten out the wheel. At this point, one of the Russian sol- In what is typical of Kosovar hospital- diers tapped me on the soldier and said, Only I pushed this time. ity, all 11 of us were invited into their “Man!” as he held out his hands in We were back on the road, but the small house. We dropped our boots off closed fists, as if he was driving. I road was still not good. Only four more in the first room, proceeded to the din- couldn’t wipe the smile off my face as I kilometers to go, Ed assured us. So we ing room, and all sat around a big table. told SSG Selby that the Russian sug- continued up. Then we went down. After brief introductions, we explained gested that a male driver might be bet- Then we went up again. Now, most of the purpose of our visit. There were a ter able to get up the hill. Her reply? the road had a near-vertical drop of lot of flashbulbs going off (God bless “Sir, do you know how to say ‘f___ about 150 to 200 meters on the right PAO), coffee was brewed, and glasses off’ in Russian?” side, so I suggested to SPC Zolle that it of Rakia were poured. Rakia is similar On that note, I explained to the Rus- might be good to keep left. Just a to grain alcohol. (In America, we sians (through very eloquent hand and thought. We were now, officially, in would call this moonshine, Everclear, ARMOR — May-June 2001 9 Above, Mrs. Milenkovic’s cousin helps her endorse the Social Security check with an “X” and a fingerprint. Above right, SP Delgado cashes the benefits check and stacks the bills on the living room table. At right, Desanka, her Deutsche Marks, and the author. Below right, Mrs. Milenkovic’s extended family, NGO representatives, and LT Huber’s party pose for a snapshot before returning to Camp Montieth, mission accomplished.

or jet fuel.) According to Ed, the vil- some more before we lage of Boljevce makes the best Rakia got one final group in all of Kosovo. Of course, I wouldn’t shot of all of us out know, since KFOR guys and gals front. shrugged off the hard stuff in favor of We asked if there an orange drink and coffee, but Ed and was an easier way the family did no such shrugging and consumed their Rakia with glee. out of this place and, of course, there was. We We asked Desanka to sign the check, headed east (over some but it turned out that she is illiterate. better roads and, admit- So, she did what any illiterate person tedly, we did ford a river) might do to endorse a check. She put a until we hit the “hardball” big ‘X’ on the back and used a stamp road that runs through pad to put her fingerprint next to it. Kamenica. We broke south You can’t really forge a fingerprint, can through Kamenica and you? I didn’t think so. then west on Route Stag until we ended up back at I am sure I heard the finance sergeant Camp Monteith. let out a sigh but, what the hell can you do? Since we’d already humped over Just another day … 29,000 Deutsche Marks half-way across Kosovo, there wasn’t any turning back now. The finance people took the check CPT Doug Huber grad- and filled out some more paperwork. I uated from Ohio State gave them my DD Form 2 ID card and University with a BA in then signed something to show I was journalism. After graduat- exchanging the dollars for Deutsche ing AOB in March 1998, Marks (I am sure that I will be hearing he served as a platoon from the IRS next year). Then, SPC leader in Bosnia, then as Delgado began putting the stacks of DMs on the table. Three six-inch piles a line company XO. He later, all of the money was neatly has completed 7 training stacked in front of Desanka. All she deployments (4 Hohen- could say was “falla” (spelled phoneti- fels, 3 Grafs). Currently cally for those of you trying to learn the S5 in Kosovo, he Serbian), or “thank you.” We talked begins ACCC in May. 10 ARMOR — May-June 2001

A Taste of Life at Outpost SAPPER Supporting Peace on a Volatile Border

by First Lieutenant Michael Scott

The main effort of Task Force Falcon in KFOR is a small outpost that sits on a saddle 300 meters from the provincial boundary separating Kosovo from the rest of Serbia. Outpost Sapper, named by the engineer company that first manned it, overlooks the tiny ethnic Albanian town of Dobrosin, located in the Ground Safety Zone established by UN Resolution 1034. Dobrosin is the headquarters for the UCPMB, a small guerrilla force determined to achieve independence for Kosovo. Twenty-four Overwatching Do- hours a day, seven days a week, four brosin, on the Ser- M1A1 tanks, four M2A2 Bradley bia-Kosovo border, Fighting Vehicles, two Avengers, a is this M1A1 from Task Force Falcon’s FIST-V, and approximately 45 U.S. B 1-35 Armor. soldiers overwatch this town. The unit’s activities here give some good examples of the complex challenges the outpost, conduct physical training, People traveling to and from Stublina today’s junior leaders face during peace and take some down time to relax, are permitted free access through the support operations. playing cards or watching a movie. checkpoint. All residents in Kosovo have an identification card that shows OP Sapper is now in the sector con- OP Sapper controls the only access their hometown, and this is our verifi- road to Dobrosin from Kosovo. The trolled by A/2-6 IN, commanded by cation for their destination. CPT Mark Jackson. The company is dismounts operate a traffic control augmented by a tank platoon from B/1- point for all traffic passing through. The soldiers operating the checkpoint 35 AR. However, the task organization Since November 28, the boundary has conduct a thorough search of every for this mission does not end at the been closed to all traffic except for person and vehicle passing through, company level; two of the platoons are those providing humanitarian aid. That regardless of origin or destination. We task organized to the platoon level. would include anyone requiring imme- look for contraband items such as Each of these platoons contains one diate medical attention or families go- weapons, grenades, mines, explosives, tank section, one Bradley section, two ing to buy food. Those passing through military equipment and clothing, and dismount squads, two Avenger teams, a must explain their reasons for leaving other supplies. If they discover any FIST team, and up to three medics. The or returning to Dobrosin. OP Sapper contraband, the soldiers seize it and two platoons rotate between OP Sapper has three medics on site, one belonging detain the personnel involved. We have and Camp Monteith, spending five days to the platoon and two from the support two options for dealing with people we at each location. I am the tank platoon battalion for MEDEVAC. One of the detain. One is to send them directly to leader assigned to OP Sapper with my medics screens anyone claiming to re- Camp Bondsteel for confinement. The platoon sergeant, SFC Frank French. quire medical attention from a doctor in other option is to dispatch a Mobile Our infantry counterparts are 1LT one of the bigger towns in Kosovo. The Interrogation Team to question these Steve Gutierrez and SFC John Bennett. medic makes an assessment and gives a individuals. We also attempt to im- recommendation to the leader on site. If prove our understanding of the situa- OP Sapper serves two purposes: to the leader decides to let the individual tion in Dobrosin by running an infor- observe activity in the town, particu- pass, we notify them that they must mation-gathering campaign. The sol- larly regarding the UCPMB, and to have a diagnosis in writing signed by a diers at the checkpoint have talking control movement through the town. doctor in order to return to Dobrosin. points and questions prepared for resi- The operators of the vehicles work in Likewise, families going to purchase dents in the village that help us learn two-man teams and rotate shifts food must have food when they return, about the disposition of the UCPMB in throughout the day. One tank, one but only enough for the family. If they addition to conditions of the civilians in Bradley, one Avenger, and the FIST-V have an extraordinary amount of food, the area. The information we gather are always scanning into the Ground we turn them back or confiscate suspi- helps the chain of command decide Safety Zone at any given time. When cious items. policy for the area. not operating the vehicles in the battle positions, the soldiers will conduct The road bisecting OP Sapper also The platoon leader and platoon ser- maintenance on the vehicles not scan- provides access to Stublina, a village geant on site are responsible for the ning, improve their living conditions at that lies in the province of Kosovo. operations at OP Sapper. The platoon ARMOR — May-June 2001 11

leader is responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen at the site. I have established several areas of emphasis to ensure that the outpost operates to standard. The first area is the command post. The CP is the heart and brain of OP Sapper. The primary functions of the CP are communications and information-gathering. All SALUTE reports and reports of both boundary crossings and Stublina traffic are col- lected here and passed on to higher. This information goes into a database At the traffic control so it can be analyzed for consistencies, point, NCOs make trends, or other observations to help most of the routine intelligence personnel make interpreta- decisions. tions and recommendations. The next area of emphasis is supervising the traffic control point. The re- the site to ensure force protection. He responsible for approximately 70 square sponsibility for permitting people to inspects the concertina wire and early kilometers is eastern Kosovo, to in- cross the boundary lies with the platoon warning devices that surround the site, clude 16 kilometers of the provincial leader. After training the dismount establishes a 24-hour security plan, boundary. The task of the majority of NCOs who operate the checkpoint on both within the wire and the surround- the patrols is border interdiction. The the basic rules for allowing people to ing area, and inspects soldiers, vehicles, mounted soldiers patrol routes in sector cross, they make all routine decisions. equipment, weapons, and fighting posi- and the dismounts walk through terrain However, anything out of the ordinary tions. The platoon sergeant also estab- that can’t be covered with a vehicle. requires platoon leader involvement. lishes and supervises a maintenance The purpose is to apprehend individu- plan for all vehicles. als bypassing our checkpoints and pos- Another important role of the platoon sibly smuggling arms and supplies into leader is that he is the KFOR represen- Another important concern for the senior NCO at OP Sapper is the health the GSZ. The day prior to return to OP tative to the people of Dobrosin. Often, Sapper is another day reserved for the elected leadership of the town, one and welfare of the soldiers. He estab- maintenance and vehicle dispatching. of whom is the village defense leader lishes the detail schedule which ensures the cleanliness of all common areas, to The section sergeants also conduct and a member of the UCPMB, will troop-leading procedures to prepare for come to the checkpoint to complain include the mess tent, latrine, living the five days at Sapper. about the boundary closure. They want area, and the grounds. The platoon ser- us to allow all civilian villagers to geant also implements, through his The patrols from Camp Monteith and cross, regardless of reason. The platoon junior NCOs, a solid physical fitness operations at OP Sapper are interde- leader at Sapper must meet with these plan run at the section/squad level to pendent. The patrols detain anyone people and explain our situation while maintain the ability to accomplish war- crossing the boundary at any location maintaining as friendly relations as fighting missions. SFC French has also other than Sapper, with the threat of possible to avoid unnecessary confron- created a cross-training plan so all the sending them to Camp Bondsteel. The tation. The platoon leader also gives the soldiers can learn from each other. The intent is to influence people to either go platoon sergeant his guidance and stan- tank crews give classes on their equip- through Sapper or not cross the bound- dards to be met in accomplishing his ment to the Bradley crewmen, dis- ary at all. OP Sapper acts as a detainee duties. mounts, artillerymen, and air defense collection point for the patrols, so they soldiers. Then each other section does can drop off any suspects and then con- Another of the platoon leader’s areas the same. This fosters teamwork within tinue their mission. of emphasis is hosting and briefing the platoon and prepares young soldiers VIPs that visit the site in the absence of Another duty of the platoon leader is to be a part of a combined arms team that he is responsible for three small the commander. Since December, visi- later in their careers. tors have included the Chief of Staff of villages in the company sector, Lovce, the Army, the Supreme Allied Com- The five days the platoon spends back Slubica, and Inatovce. They all lie mander Europe, The Fifth Corps com- at Camp Montieth are far from rest within a few kilometers of the provin- mander, the deputy commandant of the days. The day we return from OP Sap- cial boundary. During the war, most of Marine Corps, and various senators and per is a maintenance and recovery day the people who lived there fled to Al- congressmen. The company command- for the two HMMWVs the tank section bania and Macedonia, and returned er gives them a tour of the site and uses, along with the infantry company’s only after stabilization by KFOR. The briefs them on the situation from a hill 5-ton. The section leaders and squad platoon leader attends town meetings overlooking Dobrosin. When the com- leaders use this time to have their sol- and finds out what KFOR can do to mander is not available to conduct the diers clean weapons and inventory am- help provide a more safe and secure brief, the platoon leader must execute munition. environment for the residents of these towns. Mostly, they want assistance in this operation, often with little notice. For the next three days, the platoon improving infrastructure, such as elec- The platoon sergeant essentially runs conducts five patrols per day, two day-to-day operations at OP Sapper. mounted and three dismounted, within His primary responsibility is security of the company sector. The company is Continued on Page 39 12 ARMOR — May-June 2001 The PT-76 Concept...Firepower That Floats This battle-weary PT-76, which has been used for Introduced by the Soviet Army in 1952, the PT-76 light tank is very lightly armored, with a instructional purposes at large hull because of the volume required to maintain its buoyancy. Two water jets at the the NTC, is seen with its rear propel the vehicle during amphibious operations, which only require that a trim vane be trim vane up and turret erected at the front of the hull and that the hull bilge pumps be turned on before entering the hatches open, at left. The water. Opening and closing the water jet ports on either side allow the vehicle to change rear view, at right, clearly shows the two paddle- direction while afloat. The crew of three includes a driver in the hull center front, and a shaped water jet vents at loader and vehicle commander in the turret, where the TC also acts as gunner. The 76mm the rear of the hull and the main gun dates back to the early T-34 cannon of WWII, but similar tanks built in China util- boxy configuration of the ized a different turret and mount 85mm guns. The tank has been employed by the Soviet hull itself, needed to pro- Army and marines and about 25 other countries. vide sufficient flotation.

The PT-76 Light Tank In the India-Pakistan Wars:

The Amphibious Armor Advantage

by Adam Geibel

Sharp-eyed readers might have no- was during the 1971 India-Pakistani On the day the regiment was to take ticed the venerable PT-76 amphibious conflict that the PT-76 came closest to their new tanks to the range to zero the light tank during the 1999/2000 news being employed as the Soviets had main guns, they were ordered to con- coverage of the battle of Grozny. At foreseen. front the Pakistanis crossing the border. about the same time, the PT-76 was Without enough familiarization and also active half a world away, during Setting The Stage — The 1965 War without properly boresighted main Indonesia’s period of civil unrest, as guns, the Indians went to war. The sud- The Indian 7th Light Cavalry was the Indonesian Marines patrolled the streets first Indian Army unit to receive PT- den introduction of the new tank also of Ambon in four of the amphibious caused considerable confusion among tanks. 76s, in late August 1965. The 7th had other Indian units that had not even turned in ancient Stuart M-3 light While still useful as a patrol vehicle tanks. By the beginning of September, seen the PT-76 and mistook them for Patton tanks. some fifty years after its introduction, conversion training for the crews had the PT-76’s heyday was at the peak of started, supervised by three regimental As ‘C’ Squadron was advancing on the Cold War. It saw action during the officers who had been taught in the Chattanwala on September 17th, seven Vietnam and Arab-Israeli Wars, but it Soviet Union. PT-76s (including the tank of the ARMOR — May-June 2001 13

squadron commander, Major Chopra) The East Pakistanis were primarily vided armor support. The town was became bogged down in deceptively equipped with M24 Chaffees; one defended by the Pakistani 12th Field solid-looking ground. The recovery squadron was attached to the 9th ID, Force battalion (27th Inf Bde) sup- operation took all day and Chopra’s three squadrons of the 29th Cavalry ported by one troop of PT-76s, two tank had to be left behind. A patrol Regiment to the 16th ID, and one ad companies of EPCAF irregulars, and a destroyed the tank with demolition hoc squadron of two troops to the 36th. field artillery battery. charges at 0200 hrs the next morning. Both the 39th ID and 56th Infantry Bri- (The Pakistani East Bengal Rifles re- gade had ad hoc squadrons (two On the night of 1-2 December, a di- covered the hulk and kept it as a souve- troops). The 27th Infantry Brigade had versionary attack of eight PT-76s nir at their training center. The 7th re- a troop of PT-76s that had been raised bogged down in a small marsh and covered it at Chittagong in the ’71 War from four captured from India in 1965 were attacked by Pakistani aircraft the and took it back to their cantonment and the 39th ID had an ad hoc squadron next day, but the planes scored no hits after the fighting. Later, the Indian of two troops. and the tanks were self-recovered by Ordnance Corps came to collect it, so all that remains is the Pakistani’s brass capture plaque, now in the 7th’s Offi- cer’s Mess.) On September 21st, ‘C’ Squadron skirmished with a troop of Shermans and another of Pattons near Thatti Jai- mal Singh, until a troop of Indian Cen- turions came up to chase off the Paki- stanis. Despite exchanging rounds at 600m, only one Sherman, one Patton, and one PT-76 were damaged by gun- fire that day. After the 1965 conflict, the Indian army stationed two PT-76 regiments and two armored car squadrons under XXXIII Corps control in the Nagaland- Mozoram area for COIN operations. In 1969, they concentrated all three PT-76 regiments in the east (45th Cav, 63rd Cav, and 69th Armor) and by the This Indian Army PT-76 is typical of those used in the fighting against Pakistan. first week of August, 1970, they were under the control of the newly-raised HQ 3rd Independent Light Armored For the invasion of East Pakistan that their crews on the night of 2-3 Decem- Brigade. began on 4 December 1971, the Indian ber. The squadron then attempted to Army had hoped to use their PT-76s. support the attack on the town, but had After that, the 69th was converted to The Indian II Corps had the 45th Cav- trouble crossing the Titas River. Two T-55s and its PT-76s were passed on to alry and ‘B’ Squadron, 63rd Cavalry. Pakistani PT-76s were added to the two armored car squadrons. XXXIII Corps had the rest of the 63rd, squadron stable and the advance con- The 1971 War along with the 69th Armored Regiment. tinued. As the 27th Pak Infantry Bri- The 63rd had T-55s, while both the gade was withdrawing, the 57th at- In 1971, relations between Pakistan 45th and 69th had PT-76s. This combi- tempted to cut them off. On the night of and India deteriorated again. In East nation would prove extremely useful in 8-9 December, the 5th was ordered up Pakistan (Bangladesh), bordered on overwhelming the Pakistani defenses. to support the pinned-down 18th Raj- three sides by Indian states and divided IV Corps had the 1st and 5th Inde- puts, outside of Ashuganj. Stopped by by three large rivers, the land was par- an impassable nala (washout), they ticularly marshy and impassable from pendent Armored Squadrons. The 5th fired at maximum range and allowed May to October. This strongly favored had a HQ, three troops, each with 11 PT-76s, and four troops, each with 14 the Rajputs to withdraw. Two Indian the defense. PT-76s were hit by RCL fire before the Ferret armored cars. The PT-76 troops gun was knocked out. Other fire de- The Pakistanis’ strategy was to with- of the 5th were to support the 57th draw into prepared defenses and for- Mountain Division. The entire 1st stroyed a third, and a fourth was aban- tresses, stocked with 45 days rations doned when it became bogged down. Squadron was PT-76-equipped and The Pakistani actions allowed their and 60 days ammunition, to delay the assigned to the 23rd Mountain Divi- Indians as long as possible. Dug-in sion. Its critical supplies had arrived 27th Brigade to cross the Meghna relatively intact. units were not to pull out unless they just in time, including HEAT rounds had suffered 75 percent casualties, and for the 76mm guns. The track links of By the 9th, the 14th Pakistani Divi- fortresses were to be defended to the the PT-76 fleet had worn out and had sion had withdrawn to the dead end at last man. The Pakistani theory was that just been replaced as well. Bhairab Bazar. The bulk of the 57th the Indians would have to devote so Mountain Division was heli-lifted many resources to reducing the for- Fighting Begins in East Pakistan across the Mengha River, but armor tresses that they wouldn’t have any- As the 57th Mountain Division ad- support was needed to face the two thing left to make a decisive move. vanced on Ahkaura, 5th Squadron pro- troops of M24s. The PT-76 squadron 14 ARMOR — May-June 2001 Like Soviet ground troops during World War II, these Indian infantrymen sometimes rode into combat on the decks of their their tanks, although this photo looks like it portrays a quieter moment after the battle.

was ordered to attempt a river crossing. of the most interesting engagements of The main body assaulted through the and extensive reconnaissance com- this war occurred on the 9th, as the 1st objective after artillery preparation, menced, but during the crossing on the Squadron approached the docks at overran the Pak cannon, and forced the 12th, the tanks’ hull seals were found to Chandpur. Three Pakistani gunboats defenders to retreat — right into the be defective. Only two tanks had with 450 troops on board were sailing blocking force. One Chaffee tank and crossed by the time the operation was down the Megha towards Dacca when two RCL guns were destroyed, and 55 cancelled. The squadron moved over- the squadron opened fire. All three three-ton trucks captured. land and linked up late on the 14th. boats were sunk and 180 survivors The advance continued on to Bogra, were taken prisoner, but the Pakistani With the 21st Mountain Division 39th Division’s HQ did escape in a launching a similar attack on the town during the night of 11 December. The On 4 December, 1st Squadron sup- gunboat. results were similar — Bogra fell by ported the 301st Mountain Brigade’s advance on the Lalgarh-Bangalmuri- On the 11th, another gunboat foolishly mid-morning of the 12th. opened fire with machine guns on a Mian Bazar area. This was defended by PT-76. It took 54 rounds to ground the In the West elements of the 25th Pakistani Field Force Regiment. When infantry got gunboat on an islet 1,000 yards away. Prior to the start of the war, the Indi- Then a platoon of ‘D’ Co., 1/11th ans crossed the Kabadak river and hung up on the Pakistani defenses at Gurkha Rifles went out to take their moved their 42nd Brigade up to Lalgarh, 1st Squadron was ordered to take Mian Bazar, which was held by a surrender, but the Pakistanis opened Graribpur in order to overwatch the fire. Between the fire of the Gurkhas Chaugacha-Jessore road. rifle company and the 25th FF HQ. and the tanks’ 76mm fire, 83 Pakistani On 20 November, the 14th Punjab and Despite shelling and direct fire from infantrymen were killed and 33 cap- ‘C’ Squadron, 45th Cavalry were in 500m, the Pakistani troops hung on to tured. their position. Then the four troops position, though one tank was posi- tioned too far forward. The Pakistanis rushed the defenses at 1130 and by In the Northwest started their response around 0000 hrs, 1200 the Pakistanis had been over- whelmed. By 1205 the Indian forces By 10 December, XXXIII Corps sat 21 November. Two companies of the across the Karatoya River from Go- 6th Punjab (Pak) started from one di- had secured the town. Four tanks were bindganj, which was defended by a rection, two companies of the 21st Pun- knocked out by recoilless rifle fire and mines. Personnel losses were four Pakistani infantry battalion (32nd jab (Pak) with a tank squadron from Baluch, less two companies, one com- another. wounded, one killed. pany 30th Punjab, and one engineer The 21st was within earshot of the In- As a result of the squadron’s actions, company) with a 105mm field battery dians by 0400, but heavy fog limited the defenders retreated right into a and three tanks in support. The Indian roadblock that had been set up by the plan was to cross the river to the east visibility to 30m. Pakistani artillery support fell wide and the Indians 1/11th Gurkhas. The Pakistani com- and flank 55km around to take the waited until the Pakistanis were at point mander, six officers, and 202 soldiers town. surrendered. blank range. Two troops were leading. At ranges of 30 to 50m, six Chaffees Along with their recoilless rifles, the Elements of the 340th Mountain Bri- and one PT-76 were destroyed. After gade (69th Armored less one squadron, Pakistanis had laid 250 AT mines. Un- with ‘A’ Squadron, 63rd added and hesitating, the remaining two troops til the arrival of the tanks, the Pakistani and eight tanks of the squadron head- commander had been confident that his 5/11th Gurkhas, less one company rid- quarters continued their assault. The ing the PT-76 decks) were committed men could delay the Indians for 48 to take the town. As the Indians ap- Indians engaged them again. hours. proached their objective around 1500 By morning light, there were nine By the 6th, the 1st Squadron was on hrs, a squadron of PT-76s with a com- damaged tanks and two abandoned, the road again, carrying ‘D’ Company, pany of Gurkhas peeled off to form a apparently the squadron HQ tanks. In 1/11th Gurkha on their rear decks. One block behind the town. the days that followed, there were more ARMOR — May-June 2001 15

engagements, though none of conse- abandoned town with two brigades, M24 Chaffee gun tubes were worn out, quence. who were forced to backtrack. How- so that accuracy beyond 1,000 meters ever, the town was found to be clear on was impossible. The 106mm recoilless 11 December. rifle’s maximum range against station- Tank Ambush at Kushtia ary targets at the time was 800m, the On 9 December, the 7th Brigade was The Advance Continues M20 bazooka under 300. advancing on Kushtia. The vanguard of the advance was ‘A’ Company, 22 Raj- It wasn’t until the 12th that ‘A’ While the M24’s obsolete 75mm Squadron reached the Hardinge bridge made short work of the PT-76, the put, with two troops of ‘A’ Squadron, over the Ganges River. The Pakistanis Pakistani 106mm RCL HEAT rounds 45th Cavalry attached. had abandoned their elaborate defense didn’t cause the havoc that might have The 57th Pakistani Brigade had left a works, many vehicles, and even an been expected, probably due to poor delaying force — an infantry company M24 on the bridge itself. Pakistani handling. There were also equipped with recoilless rifles and two When the 9th (Indian) Division pre- rumors that these guns were delivered tank troops, along with a small unit of without manuals. Another factor was irregulars (“Razakars”). Pakistani Ma- pared to assault Daulatpur, they forced that the war was fought in the era be- a crossing of the Bhairab River on 13- jors Zahid (18 Punjab) and Sher ur 14 December. One objective was to fore wide-spread Pakistani issue of the Rahman (29 Cavalry) set up an ambush RPG-7. While Pakistan had U.S.-made in or just beyond Kushtia where a road take the ferry at Syamganj. The 45 3.5-inch M20 bazookas, these appeared Cavalry’s tanks floated down the river passed over a high embankment and engaged targets while other tanks to have not been used much. flanked by a marshy area. Beyond the open spaces were trees and buildings. supported the infantry on the river The Indians married their infantry banks. The town was captured by that closely with their tanks, which allowed To retreat, an Indian force would have afternoon. The 107th Paki Brigade sur- rapid exploitation of any gaps they to skyline itself. rendered with 3,700 men on the 15th. punched in Pakistani lines. The wide Before the Indians had cleared the deck of the 76 could easily accommo- town, a helicopter landed near the 22 By the 13th, an ad hoc force from the date a 12-man squad, and even a pla- 9th Pakistani Division was defending a Rajput Battalion HQ. Generals Raina line along the 400m wide Madhumati toon could be crammed aboard if the and Brar dismounted, then chided the crossing was uncontested. This allowed commanders for their caution as the River. On the night of 14-15, two foot-mobile infantry companies to be troops of ‘A’ Squadron, 45th Cavalry Pakistanis were obviously on the run. crossed to the north of the Pakistanis piggy-backed on ten-tank squadrons. The Indian advance continued, far less (securing the Kumarkhali ferry site by The Indian Army’s repeated use of vigilant than before. Six tanks entered first light). The two troops crossing to their amphibious capability allowed the Pak killing zone only 30m apart, the south had trouble with the river them to bypass soft ground and water and the infantry walked alongside with approaches, so that only two tanks were obstacles that would have checkmated slung arms. The first shot from an M24 across by 1030 the next morning. T-55-equipped armor units. Even in took out the fifth PT-76 in line and 1971, the PT-76 was approaching tech- However, the tanks — along with the every Pakistani weapon joined in. The infantry carried on their decks — set up nological obsolescence but, “In the land last tank neutral steered about and ex- of the blind, the one-eyed man is king.” ited the kill zone at high speed. The roadblocks north and south of the Paki- stani positions. This eventually forced two leading tanks returned fire and the surrender of 50 officers and 343 destroyed a Chaffee before being hit References themselves. soldiers. I SERVE, The Eighteenth Cavalry, MG Gurharn The retreating tank and heavy fire Lessons Learned Singh Sandhu, Lancer International, 1991. panicked the following companies of Though the India-Pakistan War of ’71 the 22 Rajput. Within minutes the bat- 7th Light Cavalry 1784-1990, LTC C.L. Proud- talion ceased to be a viable fighting was one of the Cold War’s underre- foot (Ret’d), Lancer International. ported conflicts, the Indian Army light force. Apparently, the two remaining armor squadrons executed many of The Indian Armour, History of the Indian Ar- tanks — though trapped — kept up a moured Corps (1941-1971), MG Gurcharn Singh sharp and effective fire for a while, but their missions with surprising ingenu- Sandhu, PVSM (Ret’d), Vision Books. ity. It was a ‘war on a budget,’ but the later that day, the crews were found Indians made textbook ideals and theo- Maj. (Ret’d) Agha Humayun Amin, Defence shot, with their arms and legs bound. ries work for them. The poor logistical Journal, November 2000. All that the Indian 7 Brigade com- standing of the PT-76 units at the be- “TNI Chief Orders Troops in Ambon to be Neu- mander could do was to organize a de- ginning of hostility would come back to tral,” Bali Post, 11 Jan 00. fensive position with his second battal- haunt the Indians time and again during ion behind a canal close to Kushtia. At that short war, but they persevered with last light, the Pakistanis blew up the aggressive tactics. (Thanks to Professor Paul Walsh, for the loan of his personal library.) canal bridge and withdrew to Paksay The Indian PT-76s were usually de- (under the beginning of a two-day straf- ing by the Indian Air Force). The am- ployed in squadron strength (the Paki- stanis were usually deployed only by bush created a minor panic in the In- troops of three) and engaged targets at CPT Adam Geibel is the S2, dian command and the 4th Mountain 5/117th Cavalry, 42ID (NJARNG). Division’s advance came to a halt. ranges under 1,000m. While this brought the Indians dangerously close In civilian life, he is the Associate Valuable time was lost while elabo- to Pakistani AT weapons, the threat Editor of the Journal of Military rate plans were laid to assault the now was less than it seemed: the WWII-era Ordnance and a freelance writer. 16 ARMOR — May-June 2001

The Decline of Mars: Change and Its Effect on the Warrior Spirit

by Major Gregory A. Daddis

Recent trends suggest that Patton’s concerns are still “I see many soldiers; could I but see quite valid today in regard to as many warriors!” developing warriors able to - F.W. Nietzche survive and win on the mod-

ern battlefield. At a time In late January, 1944, as the Second when societal, technological, World War was entering its fifth and and strategic changes are all most critical year, an ecstatic George S. exerting immense pressures Patton Jr. was notified of his selection on the very organizational to command the Third United States structure and outlook of the Army in the upcoming battle for United States Army, espe- France. While Patton had performed cially in the combat arms, admirably at the head of the Seventh perhaps it is fitting to re- Army in Sicily, the notorious “slapping evaluate how we develop a incidents” had led many to question his warrior class in our military. emotional stability and capacity for This article attempts to de- continued command. While not tagged lineate how historical evolu- to be included in the initial invasion tion has affected the devel- forces of Normandy, Patton could at opment of a fighting spirit in least find comfort in the fact that he our combat soldiers and, still possessed a grand opportunity to more importantly, the need to fulfill his self-proclaimed destiny as continue stressing the value one of history’s great military com- of such a spirit in an era of manders. turbulent change. As the ex-cavalryman set about to Societal Change form the Third Army into a unit capa- The sheer brutality of the Civil War broke down tradi- ble of besting Hitler’s legions on the On the eve of the American tional concepts of a warrior’s courage. Rebel General European continent, he was dismayed Civil War, most professional Stonewall Jackson, scouting his own front after a at the fighting spirit of his men, who soldiers and officers had rela- great victory at Chancellorsville, died of wounds after were soon to be grappling with experi- tively minor experience with being shot by his own men. enced Wehrmacht troops. “He found combat. The war with Mex- everyone too complacent, ‘willing to ico (1846-48) was the bap- die but not anxious to kill’.”1 tism of fire for young captains and sub- impacted all aspects of society, non- combatant and military alike. Patton tirelessly made the rounds to alterns who would less than two decades later command armies, and there divisional units and staffs — instruct- seemed little to alter their ideas of bat- One of the soldiers who would usher ing, motivating, and often berating with in such changes was William Tecum- colorful, if not downright vulgar, lan- tle garnered from studying Napoleon’s campaigns or Baron Antoine H. seh Sherman. His admonition that “War guage. “As in all my talks,” he noted, Jomini’s analysis of the great battle is cruelty, and you cannot refine it” “I stressed fighting and killing.”2 captain. Ulysses S. Grant, suggesting took a nation by horrid surprise. Men Patton’s emphasis on killing certainly the worth of the lessons learned in like Sherman, Grant, and Philip H. shocked many a citizen-soldier who Mexico, would later note: “The Mexi- Sheridan were among the few Union had never before been in battle. But the can army of that day was hardly an generals who advocated a relentless Third Army commander realized, both organization.”3 Conversely, the Civil style of warfare in which the enemy from personal experience and a pas- War changed almost all of the partici- was awarded no respite. But such a sionate ardor for military history, that pants’ views on armed conflict. Within strategy could prove expensive. Grant’s untested troops required hardening be- two years, soldiers once patriotic and frontal assaults at Cold Harbor in June fore their initial taste of combat. While willing to sacrifice all for their cause, of 1864 cost the Federal Army over Patton may have held an anachronistic came to view war as nothing more than 7,000 dead and wounded in less than an view of what it meant to be a warrior, a destructive abnormality. The totality hour. Though criticized by many for his focus never wavered from preparing of the combat, where civilian life and being an unimaginative butcher, the fu- men to succeed on the field of battle. property were no longer safeguarded, ture President was able to see beyond ARMOR — May-June 2001 17

the casualty lists and remain focused on poses for which it fights, and the way it combat has decreased dramatically. his goal of defeating Robert E. Lee’s does so, will therefore be determined in Could the United States public watch- Army of Northern Virginia. His dog- large measure by what a society wants ing the Gulf War on television ever ged pursuit of victory would not be from a war and how far it expects its have accepted the 7,000 dead that thwarted, for he felt that after any hard- army to go in dealing with the out- Grant’s army suffered in a single day at fought battle, the side which “first re- come.”7 Cold Harbor? The uproar would have news the fight, is sure to win.”4 been instantaneous and damning. It seems a societal paradox that we are Grant’s perseverance, as noted, found censure in many quarters of the day. In willing to acquiesce to the ever-increasing violence in our daily lives (the large part, this was due to the change in present debate in entertainment and how society defined a warrior’s cour- “When Grant became age. Early in the war, soldiers in gen- General in Chief of the video games an example of this), yet we are far less inclined to condone any eral, and officers in particular, were Union Armies in 1864, loss of human life associated with most required to exhibit their fearlessness in battle to prove they were worthy of the society had altered its any military operation. uniform they wore. In fact, many “sol- outlook on what it Nor should we ever be complacent diers called combat the test of man- meant to be a warrior. about loss of life, in training or in bat- hood…. A failure of courage in war Death, which had be- tle. The American public would never was a failure in manhood.”5 By 1863, consent to, and rightly so, the casualty this unquestioning ideal was being come so commonplace rate sustained in German Waffen SS challenged as casualties ravaged units in homes throughout training, which sometimes reached ten to mere skeletons of the original regi- the Union and the Con- percent during World War II.8 But as ments that marched to war. When professionals, we cannot afford to lose Grant became General in Chief of the federacy, had lost its sight of our raison d’être. As historian Union Armies in 1864, society had gallant significance.” Samuel P. Huntington aptly noted: “It altered its outlook on what it meant to must be remembered that the peculiar be a warrior. Death, which had become skill of the officer is the management so commonplace in homes throughout of violence.”9 Managing violence in- the Union and the Confederacy, had There seems little argument that soci- volves risk, and as such, we must en- lost its gallant significance. There no ety’s expectations of the soldier have sure that we develop leaders and sol- longer seemed to be any honor is dying changed dramatically since the days of diers who can scrupulously assume risk on the battlefield simply to display Grant and Sherman. The basis of such in the pursuit of becoming better warri- one’s courage. change is far more debatable. Many ors. These societal changes — perhaps de- would contend that technology, which Societal changes have historically af- scribed plainly as war weariness — had has made war universally more destruc- fected how the military approaches its a tremendous impact on what were con- tive, has raised general fear regarding profession and the overall management sidered acceptable losses on the battle- the application of force. More to the of violence. It will no doubt continue to field. Eighty years after Cold Harbor, point of developing warriors, technol- have such an impact in the future, for American military leadership defined ogy, in its course of improving our na- society itself is affected by technologi- courage in quite different terms than tional quality of life and making our cal innovations that in turn influence their Civil War ancestors. “For Dwight lives easier, has in the process made the military. There are many pundits, Eisenhower, perseverance became cour- ours a less hardy society than that of for instance, who blame the military age; heroism, he declared, was ‘the our Civil War ancestors. Have we not failure in Vietnam on the vociferous uncomplaining acceptance of unendur- become more “soft” as a nation? Still anti-war sentiment exacerbated by the able conditions’.”6 The warrior spirit others would assert that, in our quest to coming of age of television. They ar- had changed dramatically in less than a create a more civilized society, we are gue that the media was swayed by en- century. less willing to use force to solve inter- emy propaganda that led to the erosion national impasses. of American public support for the war This is not to say that the soldiers of effort. World War II were any less heroic than The Clausewitzean principle that war their ancestors in the Civil War. Any- is an extension of politics is often chal- Yet one historian believes that most one reading the exploits of the 1st In- lenged with the conviction that war is reporters honestly portrayed what they fantry Division on Omaha Beach or of instead the bankruptcy of politics. In saw in Southeast Asia. “Much of what the 101st at Bastogne will easily com- such light, it is better to define the mili- they saw was horrible, for that is the prehend the hardships and terror ex- tary profession not as warfighters, but true nature of war. It was this horror, perienced by those who fought. But by rather as peacekeepers. not the reporting that so influenced the the middle of the 20th century, Ameri- American democracy has historically American people.”10 Technology was can society was not as willing to accept been uncomfortable with the existence making a certain impact on the way such losses as Grant had sustained in and development of a warrior class. Americans viewed the battlefield. the Wilderness of Virginia in 1864. While today’s military is one of the This acceptance, as John Keegan notes, most trusted professions in the public’s Technological Change has an unequivocal impact on a na- eye, martial endeavors have lived a tion’s armed forces. “For an army is, to tenuous existence inside the American “When you’re well drilled and trained resort to cliché, an expression of the way of life. And with society evolving, in your profession, you don’t like society from which it issues. The pur- tolerance of human loss associated with something to come along that makes 18 ARMOR — May-June 2001

you have to learn all over again, and the older you are in your profession, the more you resist change.”11 So com- mented General Carl Spaatz, the first chief of staff of the Air Force, in his testimony at the Billy Mitchell court- martial trial in 1925. Mitchell’s scorn- ful condemnation of the War and Navy Departments — charges of negligence, incompetence, and even treason — was spurred by two separate tragedies involving naval aviators. The technological advent of the airplane had thus ne- cessitated a debate, a very public one thanks to Mitchell, on the establishment of a separate air force, the development “Patton tirelessly made the rounds to divisional units and staffs — instructing, motivating, of combat aircraft, and the role of air and often berating with colorful, if not downright vulgar, language. “As in all my talks,” he power in future wars. But senior army noted, ‘I stressed fighting and killing’.” officials of the time strongly opposed Mitchell’s views and even intimated to younger officers like Spaatz and Henry from the wall created ‘the most fearful On several accounts they were right. H. “Hap” Arnold that testifying on the carnage,’” while a Federal division On the last they were wrong.”13 commander exclaimed “that his ranks defendant’s behalf could seriously Skill as a warrior on the modern bat- jeopardize their military careers. ‘melted like snow coming down on tlefield is not guaranteed by apprecia- warm ground.’”12 Yet costly frontal Spaatz’s courage in testifying not only attacks, with officers bludgeoning their tion for technology alone. A balance exemplified the importance of character must be achieved in capably wielding troops against well-prepared defensive the implements of war while also being in the development of a warrior spirit, works, continued throughout the course but also illustrated the difficulties new of the war. able to train, motivate, and lead the technology imposes on the relatively human beings who will use those implements. Patton himself was fond of conservative military mind. In their Why did Civil War generals not ap- management of violence, professional preciate the technological revolution of saying that wars may be fought with officers are required to be proficient in weapons, but they are won by soldiers. the rifle? Why did they continue to lose The Army appeared to garner such les- the use and coordination of the most massive numbers of soldiers in head- advanced weaponry. Yet throughout long, sometimes reckless, assaults that sons coming out of the Second World history those same professionals have War. Prior to the war, training often now seemed to have offered little focused on small unit leadership in been wary of, if not entirely resistant chance of success? While commanders to, new technology. Take for instance in the Civil War had no precedents to battle. “Combat confirmed the need for the impact of the rifle on the Civil War competent, inspirational leaders and guide them — the Crimean War (1854- showed that the outcome of engage- generation of American officers. 1856) saw the first use of rifles, but not to the extent used a decade later — ments often hinged on the actions of a Thanks to the transition from the few influential leaders. Drawing from smoothbore to the rifled musket, which even with historical illustrations, mili- its leadership experiences in battle, the essentially doubled the effective range tary leaders have often failed to grasp the importance and potential of new Army identified three essential qualities of the infantryman’s basic arm, the necessary for successful leadership: Civil War included countless battles technology. Generals in World War I initiative, responsibility, and resource- took no heed of the lessons of the Civil where the tactical defense was more fulness.”14 than simply practical; it was essential to War or of the Russo-Japanese War only success. During the battle of Freder- ten years before, though the promi- With World War II being such a piv- icksburg in December of 1862, Lee’s nence of rifles, trenches and machine otal experience in the first half of the Army of Northern Virginia entrenched guns are only now too evident. Young 20th century, it would seem that such themselves along the Rappahannock officers in the interwar period, such as battlefield lessons would become a River, with Lieutenant General James Patton and Dwight D. Eisenhower, focal point for training warriors of the Longstreet’s First Corps positioning realized at least the potential use of future. But the most frightening of all themselves along a sunken road and be- tanks in the next war, yet resistance to technological innovations, the atomic hind a stone wall on Marye’s Heights. such ideas was widely prevalent. Eisen- bomb, changed everything. For over a Armed with rifles, it was an almost hower, commander of the wartime U.S. decade after its successful introduction, impregnable position. The 12,600 Un- Tank Corps Training Center at Camp the bomb dominated military thought in ion dead and wounded (the Confeder- Colt, Pennsylvania, noted: “The future the United States. As Lieutenant Gen- ates lost fewer than 5,400 casualties) of the tank corps was uncertain. Many eral James M. Gavin, wartime com- reflected the fact that the battle was experienced officers thought tanks mander of the 82nd Airborne Division, never in serious question. Longstreet clumsy and slow, mechanically unreli- noted: “To some extent, military think- himself noted that the “unending flame able, expensive and tactically useless. ing seemed to be paralyzed by the ARMOR — May-June 2001 19

bomb, and the lessons of World War II may not always have been available to riod, the United States Army fell into were ignored or quickly forgotten…. execute such a strategy, there always such disrepair that it actually ranked Little that we learned in World War II, loomed the preference for annihilation eighteenth in the world behind such it was said, would have meaningful over attrition. countries as Spain, Sweden, and Portu- application in the future.”15 A slight gal. Officers like J. Lawton “Fighting In his significant work, On War, Carl twenty years after the end of the Sec- von Clausewitz defined strategy as “the Joe” Collins spent 17 years as a lieuten- ond World War, a renewed importance ant and grew so discouraged he pon- on small unit leadership would surface use of engagements for the object of dered resignation. Luckily, George C. war” and in essence, strategy can be in Southeast Asia. To those who be- divided into two distinct forms — an- Marshall was then deputy commandant lieved there would be no true role for 17 at Fort Benning and he “taught profes- the Army to play in the nuclear age, the nihilation and attrition. Annihilation sionalism, inspired hard work, and en- aims at using battlefield engagements war in Vietnam harshly proved other- in a decisive manner to quickly and couraged the brilliant, promising officers wise. to be patient.”20 effectively destroy an enemy’s armed The doctrinal debate between the end forces, while attrition can be likened to That core of officers committed to of World War II and the Vietnam War a form of erosion where an opponent’s their profession would later lead the clearly illustrates the impact technology army is worn down through continuous United States Army to victory in has on the development of a warrior assaults over an extended period of Europe and the Pacific. As improve- class in our military. And while tech- time. One of the central themes that ments in motorization, weaponry, and nology has been an important factor in runs throughout historian Russell F. communications prompted constant America’s military dominance over the Weigley’s books on the American mili- changes in tactics and even strategy, last quarter century, unfortunately its tary, for example, is that the prevailing men like Eisenhower, Marshall and impact has not always been a positive strategic preference has always been Bradley persevered through the transi- one. With scientific advances creating a first and foremost that of annihilation. tions, sometimes even at the risk of global interconnectivity unprecedented From the conception of the nation’s their careers. As a young officer, Ei- in the history of mankind, sophisticated first army, leaders have sought destruc- senhower was at odds with senior in- technology has paradoxically caused a tion of the enemy through climactic fantry officials on the proper utilization fragmentation in the officer corps. Spe- battle even when they had not the of the fledgling tank corps. Ike was cialization, an apparent outgrowth of means to achieve such ambitions. called before the Chief of Infantry and technology and evidenced by the While George Washington, who highly threatened with possible court-martial. OPMS XXI career field designations regarded the professional British army “I was told that my ideas were not only for officers, has arguably done little to and sought to fashion his own force wrong but dangerous and that hence- increase cohesion among professional upon a similar model, employed a forth I would keep them to myself. Par- warfighters.16 While mastering techni- strategy of attrition throughout most of ticularly, I was not to publish anything cal skills is an important aspect of sol- the Revolutionary War, his “was a gen- incompatible with solid infantry doc- diering, it should never be considered eralship shaped by military poverty.”18 trine.”21 Even with this riposte, Eisen- an end unto itself. Instead, the skilful Weigley contends that Douglas MacAr- hower resolved to continue studying warrior utilizes technology to his ad- thur’s indirect, leapfrogging approach doctrinal and tactical problems that vantage as a means to improving profi- in the Pacific theater of World War II were not advocated by senior Army ciency in the management of violence. was also influenced by limited re- officials. It no doubt made him a better sources, while Eisenhower was no less officer. Strategic Change troubled by continuous supply problems in the European theater. What In this current time of strategic transition and uncertainty, it is well that war- We are in the midst of a strategically appears is an officer corps that seemed riors follow in the footsteps of Eisen- amorphous time. There are those who continually frustrated by insufficient would argue that the Army has lost its means to achieve the desired goal of hower and Patton. While societal and technological changes may drive stra- collective mission focus, perhaps its complete destruction of an adversary’s tegic reformations, there remain certain strategic vision, and emphasis is no army in battle. longer placed on managing violence. Is universal principles and functions Current frustration in the officer corps which are time-honored in war. There our mission to fight and win our na- seems now focused less on materiel are those who see future conflict “em- tion’s wars, or is it to keep the peace in trouble spots around the globe? Can we means than on overall purpose. And phasizing aerospace power or ships at here is where study of the past is impor- sea to threaten precision strikes from effectively do both as an organization tant, for as Patton was also fond of say- long range, with small, stealthy un- without blunting the tip of the sword? ing, war, as history, is cyclical. As an manned vehicles to collect information While changes in strategy have been a example, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and deliver firepower, and they will be common thread running through the “by which nations renounced war as a controlled by distant leaders using vir- history of our nation’s armed forces, so means of policy” left the American mili- tual command technologies.”22 But too has been the American penchant for tary in a strategic dilemma.19 If the even with these dramatic changes, mili- annihilating its adversaries on the bat- army’s purpose was to fight and win the tary axioms of striking, protecting, tlefield. Since George Washington first nation’s wars, how would such an or- moving, and supplying will still be es- clashed with the professional troops of ganization fit into national policy if war sential to success. And to properly exe- 18th century Great Britain, Americans itself had been officially forsaken? Offi- cute these functions, victory will still have invariably sought decisiveness on cer promotions slowed to a snail’s pace, be dependent on competent, profes- the battlefield through destruction of training was listless and funding was a sional soldiers. Leadership is ageless. the enemy’s army. While the means continual problem. In the inter-war pe- Its study is imperative. 20 ARMOR — May-June 2001

“Resistance to change, especially in the military, can be terribly damaging. Those conservative minds who discounted the importance of such weapons as the rifle, tank, or airplane most probably never led their soldiers in battle to their fullest potential.”

Change and the Warrior Spirit ference between teaching hate and A Biography (New York, London, et al: Simon & teaching soldiers to defend themselves Schuster, 1993), 221. Resistance to change, especially in the military, can be terribly damaging. and their country. Patton may have 13Dwight D. Eisenhower, At Ease: Stories I Tell been fond of stressing fighting and kill- to Friends (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Those conservative minds who dis- ing, but he tempered such pedagogy counted the importance of such weap- & Company, Inc., 1967), 156. with an insistence on honor and disci- ons as the rifle, tank, or airplane most 14 pline. Simply stated, warriors must be Michael D. Doubler, Closing with the Enemy: probably never led their soldiers in trained. If it cannot be done on the field How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945 battle to their fullest potential. But total (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1994), acquiescence to change is never the of battle, whether real or simulated, it 22. needs to be supplemented through the right answer either. In our current pe- study of military history. In an era of 15James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space riod of transformation, where the very Age (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1959), 97. definition of war may be in flux, we change, maintaining the warrior spirit must remain a point of stability as we 16For a detailed argument on technology’s im- cannot lose sight of how we define look towards an uncertain future. warriors. Societal, technological, and pact on the professional soldier, see Martin Van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. strategic changes should not be grounds to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1989), for suppressing the warrior spirit in our 225, 231, 314. soldiers and leaders. The profession of Notes 17Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. arms “requires a balance between the 1Quoted in Martin Blumenson, Patton: The three roles of heroic leader, military Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Man Behind the Legend, 1885-1945 (New York: Princeton University Press, 1976), 146. manager, and military technologist.”23 William Morrow and Company, 1985), 220. An honorable and heroic leader is just 18Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of 2Ibid., 222. as critical in a peacekeeping operation War: A History of United States Military Strategy as he is in an attack against an en- 3Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U.S. and Policy (New York: Macmillan Publishing trenched enemy defense. Grant (New York: Charles L. Webster and Com- Co., 1973), 3. pany, 1885; Everitt B. Long, ed. New York: 19 There is, of course, the difficulty in DaCapo Press, 1982), 84. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York, London, et al: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 808- defining the true composition of an 4 effective warrior. Some would argue J.F.C. Fuller, The Generalship of Ulysses S. 809. Grant (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 20 toughness to be the preeminent charac- 1958), 284. Edgar F. Puryear Jr., Nineteen Stars: A Study teristic, others courage, and still others in Military Character and Leadership (Novato: competence. One historian has noted 5Gerald F. Linderman, Embattled Courage: The Presidio Press, 1971), 57. Experience of Combat in the American Civil War the problem of putting such a formula 21Eisenhower, At Ease, 173. on paper. The masters of command, (New York: The Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1987), 8. including Marshal de Saxe, Frederick 22Wesley Clark, “How Will We Fight?” Time, the Great, and Napoleon, believed there 6Ibid., 18. No further citation noted. 22 May 2000, 99. existed something far less structured in 7John Keegan, The Mask of Command (New 23Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A defining a true warrior. “The great York: Viking, 1987), 2. Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois: practitioners spoke of the coup d’oeil or 8 The Free Press, 1960), 21. sense (as we speak of baseball or foot- Lee Kennett, G.I.: The American Soldier in World War II (New York: Charles Scribner’s 24Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World ball ‘sense’) that combined intuition Sons, 1987), 52. and experience.”24 While intuition may (Durham: Duke University Press, 1959), 35. 9 be an inherent trait, experience is Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the gained through doing and reading. And State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military here lies the key to maintaining the Relations (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, MAJ Gregory A. Daddis graduated warrior spirit in times of change and 1957), 13. uncertainty. from the U.S. Military Academy in 10Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical 1989. He has served in the 3rd Ar- Field Marshal Erwin Rommel was Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, California: mored Cavalry Regiment and in the noted for, among other things, his re- Presidio Press, 1982), 39. 2nd and 3rd Infantry Divisions’ cav- mark that the best form of welfare for 11 alry squadrons. He holds a Master’s one’s troops is tough, realistic training. Quoted in Edgar F. Puryear Jr., American As professionals we must remember Generalship, Character is Everything: The Art of Degree in History from Villanova that teaching warriorship is an integral Command (Novato: Presidio Press, 2000), 32. University and is currently assigned part of our responsibilities — to our- 12Jeffrey D. Wert, General James Longstreet: to the staff and faculty at the Mili- selves and to our nation. There is a dif- The Confederacy’s Most Controversial Soldier — tary Academy. ARMOR — May-June 2001 21

The New Chinese Type 98 MBT: A Second Look Reveals More Details

by James M. Warford

Since the first article on the Chinese Type 98 MBT appeared in the May- June 2000 issue of ARMOR (“The Chi- nese Type 98 Main Battle Tank: A New Beast from the East”),1 there has been additional information available regarding the tank’s firepower, armor protection, and production-deployment status. This additional information actually confirms initial assessments and solidifies the serious threat posed by the Type 98. Chinese Type 98 tanks are seen in Since it was first seen during the re- the first three hearsals for the massive 50th Anniver- ranks, followed by sary parade held in Beijing on October earlier Type 88CS 1, 1999, observers have tried to piece in this parade together the small bits of available in- photo. formation concerning the Type 98. Photographs and video footage from the parade confirmed that the tank is armed with a 125mm smoothbore main change in frontal armor, incorporating storage for some kind of removable gun, but very little was known about composite armor arrays and armor composite armor material. Although the ammunition it fires. Now there have cavities on each side of the main gun. the design and configuration of the been a series of unconfirmed reports Similar in many ways to the turret ar- tank’s composite armor remains un- that the Type 98 (and other Chinese mor cavities used on the Russian T- known, published reports continue to 125mm-armed MBTs) use Israeli-de- 80U, T-72B, and T-90S MBTs, the hint at a relationship between the Type signed APFSDS ammunition and that Type 98’s armor cavities are easily 98’s armor and the armor protecting the the Chinese have developed depleted accessible through two cover-plates Russian T-80U and T-80UK. While the uranium (DU) rounds for their tanks. fitted flush with the turret roof and held “closeness” of this relationship is un- As far as the Israelis are concerned, in-place by eight bolts. These two known, it’s clear that the Chinese had they are certainly marketing their M711 composite armor cavities apparently complete knowledge of the armor pro- 125mm APFSDS round to somebody, evolved from a design seen on early tecting these two Russian tanks while and the Chinese are a likely customer. prototypes of the Type 98. Unlike the they were working on the Type 98. The The solution to the DU part of this two large cavities used on the produc- Type 98’s armor configuration also equation was apparently displayed dur- tion Type 98, these prototypes were implies that the Chinese may have re- ing a recent military exhibition in fitted with two small cavities on each ceived assistance from another source China that included Chinese 100mm side of the main gun. According to pub- as well. The Israelis have done exten- DU ammunition. Although not specifi- lished reports, these smaller cavities sive work on updating the armor pro- cally intended for the Type 98, this DU provided access to the mounting bolts tecting their older tanks and the more development clearly indicates that DU that attached the composite armor ar- modern Merkava MBT. The Merkava, ammunition is available to the PLA. rays or modules to the turret base ar- in particular, is known to incorporate Interestingly enough, published reports mor. This would allow damaged or modular armor in its design. Several have also recently confirmed that Paki- obsolete armor arrays to be replaced by recently published photographs have stan is currently marketing at least two the tank crew while in the field. In fact, appeared clearly showing Israeli Mer- DU tank rounds. Pakistan is a close the Type 98 is also fitted with six lift- kava Mk 3s in Lebanon fitted with new Chinese ally and currently employs ing “eyes” which could be used with a modular armor arrays unofficially both the Chinese 125mm-armed Type T-shaped lifting sling to facilitate the called “Lebanon” armor. Published 85-IIAP MBT as well as the new lim- replacement of the turret frontal armor sources have confirmed that this Israeli ited-production Al-Khalid MBT. modules under field conditions. modular armor is designed to be changed in the field. Some of the most heated discussions While the two large armor cavities on relating to the Type 98 involve the the Type 98 may also be used to pro- One of the biggest mysteries sur- tank’s turret frontal armor protection. vide access to these internal mounting rounding the Type 98 is the tank’s cur- External examination confirms a major bolts, they most likely also provide rent production-deployment status. The 22 ARMOR — May-June 2001 Two Type 98s on parade in October, 1999. The tank’s 125mm main gun may be using depleted uranium ammunition, according to some reports. fact that only 18 of the new tanks par- enough information available to piece main gun) is the Ukrainian tank cur- ticipated in the October 1st parade has together what may be next for the Type rently competing in the Turkish tank led to additional speculation that the 98. A model of this next step for the competition. This confirmed tank de- Type 98 may have only been produced Type 98 is actually just starting to roll velopment relationship between China in that quantity to make a point to pa- off the production lines in Pakistan. and Ukraine and the timely announce- rade observers. New information indi- The tank in question is the Al-Khalid ments revealing both the T-84-120 and cates, however, that the Type 98’s role and it could very well represent, not the the Type 98B, point to a relationship in the PLA may be much larger than actual tank, but a critical cooperative between these two designs. In fact, these observers initially believed. The relationship between the Chinese and much of the speculation concerning the Chinese are currently mass producing the Ukrainians. The Al-Khalid is the Type 98B includes its use of a bustle- two MBTs, the 105mm-armed Type result of a three-way development ef- mounted autoloader in a new turret. 88B and the 125mm-armed Type 88C, fort involving China, Pakistan, and The Type 98 is a significant tank for at their primary tank production facil- Ukraine. While the level of Ukrainian ity, Factory No. 617. Published photos participation is unconfirmed, published the Chinese and for their potential adversaries. It represents a modern heavy have confirmed that the Type 98 is in reports have confirmed that the Al- armor threat in an era where some limited production at this same factory. Khalid uses a Ukrainian engine and Reportedly, only about a battalion-set transmission, and that a number of countries seem to be moving away from the proven mobile protected fire- of Type 98s have been produced (31 these same components were recently power offered by the MBT. One thing tanks) to date. When deployment of supplied directly to China. As opposed these new tanks is considered, how- to developing a new tank, the Ukraini- is clear, the Type 98 is a post-Desert Storm tank that incorporates the lessons ever, this small group may actually be ans have been hard at work rebuilding the Chinese learned from that conflict; part of a much larger production and and upgrading their existing MBT de- deployment effort. signs, with the T-72-120, T-72MP, and lessons that will characterize the next battlefield. According to unconfirmed reports, the T-80UD/Object 478BEh clearly showing the results. In fact, the success of 1When the ARMOR article was reprinted in the PLA currently deploys 10 active tank this effort can be seen by the recently February 2001 issue of the Chinese military mag- divisions, each one supporting a Group azine WuChi (WEAPON), the article was re-titled Army (GA). Of these, the 38th and completed delivery of 320 Ukrainian T- 80UD/Object 478BEh MBTs to Paki- from “New Beast from the East” to “Heroic 39th GAs are generally considered the stan, which makes Ukraine the world’s Lions from the East.” – Ed. highest priority and best-equipped organizations in the PLA. The 38th GA’s leading exporter of T-80-series tanks. tank division (the 6th Tank Division) is Interestingly enough, at about the James M. Warford was commis- also known as the “Digital” Tank Divi- same time the Ukrainians announced sioned in Armor in 1979 as a Dis- sion, and is based in the Beijing Mili- the development of their new 120mm- tinguished Military Graduate from tary Region. Conflicting reports place armed T-84-120 MBT, information Type 98s in the 6th “Digital” Tank Di- concerning a new variant of the Chi- the University of Santa Clara, Santa vision, as well as the 8th Tank Division nese Type 98 called the Type 98B be- Clara, California. A frequent con- (of the 26th GA). Additionally, reports gan to appear. The T-84-120 “Oplot” is tributor to ARMOR, Mr. Warford has have associated the Type 98 with the a new variant of the Ukrainian T-84 held a variety of Armor and Cavalry 7th Tank Division, which is reportedly MBT that mounts one of apparently assignments, ranging from tank being reorganized in the Beijing Mili- two or three different 120mm main platoon leader to brigade S3, and tary Region as a “blue tank brigade.” guns in a new turret, fitted with a bus- has served as a tactics instructor All of this information supports the tle-mounted autoloader. The incorpora- both at Fort Knox, Ky. for AOAC, contention that there are more Type 98s tion of a turret bustle-mounted auto- and at CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, being produced and deployed than ini- loader (instead of the Soviet/Russian Kan. Upon retirement in Septem- tially believed. style carousel autoloader) is a huge advance for Ukrainian tank design; and ber, 1996, he was awarded the Sil- The key remaining question is, “Where reaffirms the advantages and maturity ver Medallion of the Order of St. will the Chinese go from here?” The of modern Ukrainian tanks over their George. He is currently an em- secrecy surrounding the future of the Russian competitors. The T-84-120 ployee development analyst in the Type 98 is still fairly intact, but there is (fitted with the Swiss Compact 120mm Kansas City area. ARMOR — May-June 2001 23 Although this train is Swedish, it is typical of those employed by many European armies and factions in the years before and after WWI. This view clearly shows the train’s make-up, with the vulnerable engine in the middle, protected by a leading flatcar that will set off any mines. The cannon is visible in elevation on the armored car at left.

Forging the Red Thunderbolt: Armored Trains Provided Mobile Firepower During the Russian Revolution and After by Major Alan R. Koenig, FA, USAR

Long before there were tanks, armies cars might escort supply or construc- standard feature of armored trains since used railroad rolling stock as armored tion trains, but they might also be cou- the American Civil War. fighting vehicles (AFVs), a practice pled directly to a locomotive to serve as Americans also employed several that became common during the Amer- an independent maneuver unit. These other types of rolling stock for tactical ican Civil War. were known as ironclad or armored trains. missions. To check the tracks for Both Federals and Confederates used breaks or mines, locomotives pushed many of these predecessors to modern The ultimate armored train had rifle loaded flatcars ahead of them. In later AFVs. To ease the employment of cars on both sides of a locomotive and conflicts, a crewman sat on the flatcar’s heavy artillery, commanders simply cannon-bearing railroad monitors on end to look for hazards. In so doing, he mounted artillery pieces on flatcars to the ends. These “combined arms” ar- could monitor the tracks and control the produce the world’s first railroad bat- mored trains proved useful for patrol- progress of the train, hence the terms teries. For defending railways against ling the rails and engaging Confederate “monitor” or “control car” came to de- raiders, Federal forces built ironclad forces. This arrangement of cars, or scribe these expendable flatcars. Con- “railroad monitors,” cars which carried “march order,” exploited train strengths trol cars also protected trains against light field artillery capable of wide while reducing weaknesses. The iron- rams, which were simply rolling stock, fields of fire. Though bound to the clad cars on both ends of the train pro- sometimes mined, unleashed against rails, railroad monitors were similar to tected the locomotive, which was the troops, opposing trains, and railroad modern tanks, though only one appar- Achilles’ heel of a train, and provided facilities. ently had a turret. In addition, there fearsome firepower. The placement of were rifle cars, which were simply ar- the artillery-bearing cars on the ends Control cars added much to a train’s mored boxcars with firing apertures for also gave them excellent fields of fire, survivability, but handcars, a utilitarian riflemen. They could support railroad while the rifle cars had significant self-propelled track maintenance vehi- monitors just as infantry fighting vehi- small arms firepower that discouraged cle, were good tactical vehicles in their cles support tanks today. In some cases, enemy boarders. This mix of weapons own right, being especially useful for individual railroad monitors and rifle and logical march order remained a reconnaissance and maintaining com- 24 ARMOR — May-June 2001 The U.S. Civil War popularized firepower on rails. At left, a 13-inch seacoast mortar. At right, a cannon with armored glacis. munications. After the Civil War, ar- Not total strangers to this new type of bearing machine guns with light and mored trolleys replaced handcars in weapon, the Russians had experi- medium artillery. Units of Russian rail- tactical situations, thereby improving mented with heavy artillery railroad road troops, who constructed and oper- crew survivability. mounts as early as 1885. They mounted ated military railroads, commanded Handcars were good to have, but a gun on a disappearing carriage so it these trains on the Eastern front during would recoil inside an armored hull World War I. The military situation sometimes locomotives could perform after every shot, but since Tsarist Rus- there, far more fluid than that of the some of their jobs faster. Commanders could rarely spare valuable locomotives sia was experiencing the growing pains Western Front, encouraged the use of of industrialization, it could not mass armored trains as maneuver forces. for jobs other than train pulling, how- produce these cars, which cost 50,000 Finally, by 1915, the Russians had also ever, so — as an economy of force measure — the Federals also used rubles per unit. Twenty years later, developed what was called a “track however, during the Japanese siege of wolf,” a device that could separate rails steam passenger cars to patrol the rails Port Arthur, a Russian officer who had from ties at the rate of three to four and deliver pay. been an observer during the Boer War kilometers per hour, thereby freeing Armed versions of these self- built several railroad batteries, and this soldiers from the labor-intensive task of propelled cars were forerunners of an- set the precedent for a Russian tradition destroying railroads.3 other vehicle developed in 1916 by the of using rolling stock for tactical mis- U. S. and Russian armies. This was a sions. By 1917, the St. Petersburg Puti- Such developments set the stage for self-propelled armored railroad car, or lov works and the Izhor works had built the Russian Civil War, as the Reds de- railroad cruiser, as the Russians aptly seven standardized armored trains, all fended their Bolshevik Revolution named it. While railroad cruisers were expensive, they were often more eco- nomical to employ than an entire armored train, and their small and efficient internal combustion engines were sheathed in heavy armor, unlike the large and vulnerable boiler of conventional steam locomotives.1

Having observed these developments, European powers improved on what Americans had wrought. The French introduced breech-loading artillery pieces to ironclad railroad cars, and they also mounted mitrailleuses, a fore- runner of machine guns, on infantry cars, thereby reducing the number of riflemen needed to man the trains. The British also mounted heavy guns, turrets, and searchlights on the trains they used to fight Boers in South Africa. Observing these developments, the Russians realized that the armored trains used on the South African veld This armored train, with turreted guns, was in use by the White Russian factions in the could also serve on the steppes.2 Russian Civil War. Both sides used these weapons, as did neighboring nations. ARMOR — May-June 2001 25

against counter-revolutionaries and opening days of the Russian Civil War, interventionists. Perhaps the single belligerents employed ex-Tsarist ar- most important Bolshevik advantage mored trains and improvised others. was their possession of St. Petersburg Railroad workshops near the scattered and Moscow. The possession of Mos- fronts unsystematically converted exist- cow was especially important because ing locomotives and rolling stock with it was at the center of Russia’s railroad expedient materials and available web. This allowed the Reds to dispatch weaponry. In fact, the Soviet’s first armored trains and troops from front to armored (and that was often a relative front to meet each new menace. term) train simply had field guns and At the vanguard of these forces were howitzers lashed onto flatcars and hop- per cars. As the war progressed, the armored trains, since they were rather Reds built more substantial artillery effective in the fluid tactical conditions of the Russian Civil War. Geographical cars, but many of these carried a motley collection of light and heavy machine factors demanded a long-range weap- guns. Bolshevik commanders naturally ons system capable of operating in virtually all kinds of weather. Powerful, found such improvised trains difficult to employ and supply. Therefore, by reliable, steam-powered railroad trains the fall of 1918 the Reds patterned their were appropriate for fighting a war in a nation united by rails, and combatants factory-built armored trains on vintage 1915 Tsarist models to achieve uni- could construct, employ, and command formity and interoperability. In so do- armored trains with relative ease. In contrast, tanks and aviation, both pow- ing, they built cars to accommodate specific types of armament and mis- ered by internal combustion engines, sions, and these standardized models lacked sufficient power, reliability, and range to pose serious threats to armored ultimately replaced many of the improvised cars.7 trains.4 The challenging task of supervising As one might expect, the best way to the large variety of trains, tanks, and heroes, revolutionary slogans, cities engage an armored train was with an- and geographical areas, natural phe- other armored train. The only other the three hundred armored cars in the Bolshevik arsenal prompted the Reds to nomena, and so forth.10 rival to armored trains was cavalry, establish Tsentrobron’ (Central Armor which did not rely on tracks, thus its For railroad weapons to operate effec- mobility could prove decisive. Even so, Command) in December 1917. To cate- tively, Tsentrobron’ authorized various gorize its railborne assets, Tsentrobron’ devices for communications. For on- cavalry could not win a head-to-head developed a lettering system. Class “A” encounter with an armored train, as board communications, trains had elec- evidenced by the slaughter of cavalry- trains had heavy armor and four 76mm tric bells, a hardened telephone system, guns for close combat. Class “B” trains and speaking trumpets to connect cars men charging armored trains at Tsarit- carried guns of 107 or 122mm caliber, syn’ (Volgograd) in 1918.5 by a switchboard. Crewmen merely thus they were probably considered barked short, pre-designated com- The Reds used about 103 armored railroad artillery. Likewise, class “V” mands, such as “forward,” “halt,” or trains during the war, and their histori- trains (“V” is the third letter of the Cy- “fire” to the recipient, who repeated ans later considered armored trains to rillic alphabet) mounted 152 or 203mm commands back to insure they were be ancestors of their armored forces. At guns. Class “B” and “V” trains used understood. Trains could also contact different times, the Bolsheviks faced their superior range to stay out of other military units or headquarters anywhere from 47 to 79 counter- harm’s way, so they generally had light from isolated areas by radio, telegraph, revolutionary armored trains, all of armor to protect themselves against and telephone connected to established which belonged to a confusing array of small arms and shell fragments. These railroad nets. Signal flags or lanterns, opponents. Some trains belonged to trains usually provided indirect fire for messengers, homing pigeons, and non-Russians, such as the Allied inter- maneuver elements, which included trained dogs worked well if signalmen ventionists or the Central Powers, all of other armored trains.8 could not use the electronic net. In whom opposed Bolshevism and wanted The type of armor varied according to some instances, locomotive whistles to nip it in the bud. Furthermore, nas- blew Morse code, which was audible cent and reconstituted states on Rus- availability, but commanders preferred to use layered steel sheets in a kind of up to five to ten kilometers.11 sia’s periphery, such as Finland, Latvia, sandwich. Each outer sheet was 10 to and Poland, also sent armored trains Tsentrobron’ also had the difficult against the Bolsheviks. Finally, the 15 millimeters thick, and corrugated task of finding effective crews for sheets were placed in the middle to trains, so it first identified preferred Reds faced Russian White (counter- absorb shocks, working much like revolutionary) and Green (anarchist, or train crew skills and character traits. peasant) armored trains. The latter also modern spaced armor arrays. One steel The ideal armored train crewman had sheet could usually stop conventional 6 experience in both railroad operations fought the Whites at times. rifle bullets and shell or bomb frag- and weapons. Personnel officers ac- While the Bolsheviks faced many dif- ments. Several layers would defeat cordingly assigned army or naval armor-piercing bullets and even 76mm artillerymen, as well as railroad and ferent opponents, none of them coordi- shells if they were fired from over one nated their attacks properly. Yet a Red 9 shop workers, to armored train crews. victory was not a foregone conclusion, thousand meters. To reduce crew size, commanders often especially considering the embryonic Besides classifying trains by letters, cross-trained their men. Even so, when condition of the Red Army. During the Tsentrobron’ named their trains for the trains lost men through casualties, 26 ARMOR — May-June 2001 skilled replacements were hard to find, chief, armored railroad car command- train pulled the armored train to reduce and sometimes train commanders ers and their assistants, a landing de- wear on its locomotive. 12 pressed local troops into service. tachment commander, and a mainte- In a country beset by a shortage of nance chief.14 Tsentrobron’ established certain per- rolling stock, the use of base trains to sonnel preferences for the demanding To train this diverse group, Tsentro- support armored trains is proof that the service on armored trains. Since the bron’ established an armored train Bolsheviks considered the latter worth crewman had to work within limited school in Moscow in 1918, and its cur- the allotment of scarce resources. Thus, space, the ideal recruits were well built riculum logically focused on lessons to minimize danger to the prized ar- but not tall. Sighting and operating learned at the front. To insure uniform- mored train, Tsentrobron’ authorized weapons demanded excellent eyesight, ity in training and political reliability, the employment of armored trolleys to steady nerves, and a steadfast character. Tsentrobron’ sent command personnel, reconnoiter the rails ahead of trains. Moreover, mental and physical tough- to include seasoned veterans, to the Better to lose a few troops and one ness were prerequisites for armored school. Establishment of the school was small vehicle to an ambush than an warfare, since shell concussions could a vast improvement over the beginning entire train, the loss of which was eas- damage crewmen’s inner membranes, of the war, when many commanders ily equivalent to the loss of an artillery causing ears and noses to bleed. Exac- and key personnel had to learn through battery. Furthermore, while not exactly erbating these unpleasant conditions on-the-job-training.15 plentiful, rail-adaptable armored cars were acrid gases from weapons and could sometimes serve as trolleys.16 Along with personnel matters and fires that could build up inside the cars training, Tsentrobron’ oversaw the lo- While trolleys were useful adjuncts to and might render crewmen uncon- sciousness. Considering these factors, it gistical needs of its armored trains, a armored trains, two other types of rail- responsibility complicated by the im- road weapons served in roles for which took selective recruiting and on-the-job mense distances over which these units armored trains were ill suited. The first, training to provide skilled armored operated. Tsentrobron’s solution in- an “armored flyer,” was a compara- train crewmen.13 cluded base trains, which supported tively secure vehicle in which Bolshe- The Bolsheviks insured that the chain armored trains just as submarine ten- vik commanders such as Leon Trotsky, of command on armored trains paral- ders support submersibles hundreds of who came to be known as the “Father leled that of regular army companies or miles from their bases. A typical base of the Red Army,” could supervise op- batteries. Tsentrobron’ assigned com- train had an unarmored locomotive and erations on distant fronts. An armored pany grade officers and noncommis- six to twenty cars. A command element flyer typically consisted of an armored sioned officers to armored train com- with a headquarters and staff worked in locomotive, some base cars, an ar- mand staffs. The commander was usu- its cars, which carried ammunition, mored railway car, and one or two flat- ally a captain or senior lieutenant. His supplies, equipment, and accommoda- cars. Trotsky’s flyer, for instance, had a assistant commanded in his absence, tions for one armored train crew. Dur- radio, a map room, a printing press, a but the politruk (commissar) wielded ing combat operations, the base train secretarial staff, his Rolls-Royce, am- considerable influence. Other command waited just out of hostile artillery’s munition, medicine, and a leather-clad personnel served in a range of neces- range, preferably at the closest railroad security platoon. Dashing from front to sary specialties, including a chief of station. When the armored train and the front in the flyer, Trotsky transformed artillery, an adjutant, a communications base train were in rear areas, the base the faltering Red Army into an effec- ARMOR — May-June 2001 27

tive fighting force by coordinating the and searchlights to obtain informa- In some situations the roles were re- war effort from his train, delivering tion.19 versed, as armored trains supported in- fiery speeches, and executing “enemies Once commanders had conducted fantry breakthroughs on enemy flanks. of the revolution.” He believed that his Their guns bombarded key enemy posi- armored flyer was the key to turning their reconnaissance and settled on a tions, and as the breakthrough pro- specific course of action, they used Red Guards into real soldiers: surprise whenever possible to improve gressed, trains displaced to support advancing troops. If the attack suc- “...the flabby, panicky mob would be their chances. Trains often departed ceeded, armored trains pursued enemy transformed in two or three weeks into covered or concealed positions at 23 an efficient fighting force. What was dawn’s first light, burning smokeless forces. needed for this? At once much and lit- coal, maintaining fire discipline, and With trains pursuing it, a force might tle. It needed good commanders, a few refraining from blowing their whistles. tear up the tracks. Sometimes this dozen experienced fighters, a dozen or If the tracks were wrecked, machine worked, but armored trains generally so of Communists ready to make any gun and artillery fire covered repair carried repair materials for such a con- sacrifice, boots for the barefooted, a crews. When available, an armored tingency. In addition, both sides were bathhouse, an energetic propaganda trolley pushed a flatcar one to two loath to tear up tracks they might need campaign, food, underwear, tobacco, kilometers ahead of the train to check later in a counteroffensive.24 and matches. The train took care of all the tracks for mines and guard against this.” rams. Meanwhile, a second trolley fol- Assaulting defensive lines in the field was not the only type of combat a train Before hostilities ceased, Trotsky had lowed one to two kilometers behind the might expect. The fluid nature of the train. The forward trolley was well commanded five million men from his manned, having the headquarters pla- Russian Civil War resulted in both armored flyer, traveling a total of sides holding their ground at key fea- 65,000 miles to supervise the war ef- toon leader, a senior telephonist, a rail- tures along the railroad tracks, conced- 17 road master (specialist), and two fort. scouts. When it unexpectedly arrived at ing much of the vast expanses of the steppe to an opponent willing to oper- Maintaining the morale and motiva- a station, the enemy opened fire on it. ate in a virtual “no-man’s land.” Thus, tion of soldiers was of vital importance, The armored train then let loose with as but it was also desirable to win the many weapons as it could bring to bear, many objectives, such as heavily forti- fied railroad yards, were often fifty or “hearts and minds” of the people. Thus, surprising the enemy who thought the even one hundred kilometers distant. In a key ingredient in the ultimate Bolshe- trolley was reconnoitering alone. To vik victory was an effective propa- insure that the assault was successful, these situations, commanders capital- ized on the mobility of armored trains, ganda and civil affairs campaign. To the train’s guns also supported the at- dispatching groups of two or three to help conduct this campaign, Reds used tack of the landing detachment, infantry a variety of propaganda tools, including or cavalry forces that rode on the train raid an enemy’s rear areas when circumstances permitted. Multiple trains five propaganda trains (Agitpoezda until the commander ordered them to were necessary, since friendly forces [Agitation trains]) to spread the Bol- attack.20 shevik gospel in conquered areas. were one to three days’ march away. Landing detachments projected an During the raid, each train performed a These artistically painted trains bore armored train’s power far beyond the specific task. The first armored train, murals, printing presses, movie projec- tors, theatrical props, and other propa- tracks, and were especially effective usually a class “A,” unleashed its con- where wooded or hilly terrain restricted siderable firepower and drove ahead, ganda tools. Unlike conventional rail- the armored train’s fields of fire. These while the second, probably a class “B,” road weapons, these trains conducted psychological warfare, using the pen detachments normally had a cavalry provided fire support with its railroad reconnaissance platoon and three rifle batteries. Meanwhile, the third train, rather than the sword to present Bol- companies, totaling 321 men. Their possibly a class “C,” protected the rear. shevism as a legitimate ideology. In contrast, the Whites had no such trains, usefulness was obvious by October of This mix of armor and artillery often 1920, when sixteen Red armored trains resulted in the capture of enemy rolling nor did they even attempt propaganda carried these maneuver units. Some stock, since armored trains could still campaigns worthy of note. The Bolshe- viks thus won the war for hearts and armored trains even carried armored tow 10 to 15 freight cars. Sometimes assault cars besides small cavalry or armored trains might even capture their minds virtually by default.18 infantry units to assault enemy posi- own kind in these raids.25 Propaganda trains spread Marxist- tions under the train’s withering cover- Leninism in the hinterlands, but it took ing fire.21 The same qualities that made armored armored trains to serve as the “big trains good offensive weapons — fire- sticks.” The fluid nature of the Russian Besides operating with their landing power and mobility — also worked to Civil War encouraged the employment detachments, armored trains also their advantage in defensive operations. of armored trains in tactical missions worked with other branches of the Red As the Whites advanced, the Bolshe- broader than mere railroad defense. In Army. Infantry and artillery supported viks often set up ambushes on their order for the armored trains to succeed armored train attacks by distracting flanks and likely avenues of approach. in these missions, however, they defenders for three to five minutes as a Their ambush tactics called for two needed to conduct thorough reconnais- train pierced enemy lines. A train usu- armored trains, one for close combat sance beforehand. Along with employ- ally tried to pierce the opponent’s flank and the other for artillery support, to ing trolleys to gain information, ar- just as German panzers spearheaded cooperate with a landing detachment. mored trains used German Parseval attacks in schwerpunkt fashion two The landing detachment assumed a for- balloons, which could attain an altitude decades later. Surprise was needed for ward fighting position, allowing the of 1,000 meters, while the French success, so the crew concealed the Whites to pass by the heavy artillery Caquot type could reach 1,300 meters. train’s approach until it was five hun- train’s extreme range. After the artillery Other trains used aircraft, motorcycles, dred meters from the enemy.22 bombardment, the close combat train 28 ARMOR — May-June 2001

moved forward for the kill while the Fortunately, the same type of weapon 8GVVISE, s.v. “Tsentrobron’” (Central Armor landing detachment enveloped the that performed so admirably in the Command); “Bronepoezd” (Armored Train). Whites from the rear, much like classic Russian Civil War ultimately proved 9Potselyuyev, 22-25. “hammer and anvil” enveloping tac- capable of halting the Red threat to the 10Potselyuyev, 18-31; 48-92. tics.26 West. Armored train effectiveness was nonetheless not lost on the Russian 11Potselyuyev, 22-25. By employing mobility, firepower, a people, who even today are familiar 12Potselyuyev, 22-25. combined arms approach, and special with armored train actions of the 13Potselyuyev, 22-25, 29-32. tactics, armored trains proved valuable bloody conflict. Soviet artists elevated 14 in front line duties. Bolshevik armored armored trains to icons of the revolu- Potselyuyev, 22-25, 29-32. trains also performed the more mun- tion, as several Russian Civil War bat- 15Potselyuyev, 22-25, 29-32. dane task of protecting vital supply and tle portraits include armored trains. 16Potselyuyev, 30; GVVISE, s.v. “Bronedrez- communications lines from partisans Playwright V. Ivanov portrayed an ar- ina.” (Armored Trolley). and isolated enemy troops. Rather than mored train as a potent weapon in his 17Sovetskaya Voyennaya Entsiklopedia (Soviet endlessly cruise the rails, armored play “Armored Train # 14-69.” Firma- Military Encyclopedia), s.v. “Bronepoezda” (Ar- trains with landing detachments kept nov’s Chapayev, a novel about the Rus- mored Trains); Melvin C. Wren, The Course of steam up at depots while maintaining sian Civil War, depicted armored trains Russian History, (New York: Macmillan, l979), contact with posts along the entire de- in battle. Poets even found trains a fit 445; Gwyneth Hughes and Simon Welfare, Red fended line. In this way they saved subject for their work. One of them in- Empire, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, wear-and-tear on the train and kept cluded a veiled threat within his artistry: 1990), 58, 50. crews fresh for action.27 18GVVISE, s.v. “Agitparokhody i Agitpoezda.” Under the burning sun, (Propaganda River Steamers and Propaganda Besides the noteworthy tactics used Under the darkest night, Trains). by the trains, the scope of their use was We have been through much. 19Potselyuyev, 26-41. also remarkable. Several dozen ar- We are a peaceful people, mored trains operated in maneuver 20Potselyuyev, 26-41. but our armored train stands force roles on a greater scale than did 21 (waiting) on the siding. Potselyuyev, 26-41. their American and British predeces- 22 sors. Moreover, they served in several Considering that the Soviets experi- Potselyuyev, 26-41. operations over an area that spanned 11 mented with trains capable of launch- 23Potselyuyev, 26-41; GVVISE, s.v. “Bronevye time zones. The ultimate harvest of ing ICBMs in the 1980s, the last phrase Sily RKKA” (Armored Forces of the Red Army). 29 these rail-borne armored forces was a takes on chilling undertones. 24Potselyuyev, 26-41. Bolshevik victory, an event that had far-reaching implications for world 25Potselyuyev, 12; GVVISE “Bronepoezda” history. Reds were able to establish the Notes (Armored trains); Potselyuyev, 56. 26 USSR, an ill-conceived experiment in 1Alan R. Koenig, Ironclads on Rails: American Potselyuyev, 26-41. social engineering that failed misera- Civil War Railroad Weapons, 1861-65, (Univer- 27Potselyuyev, 41. bly, causing immeasurable suffering sity of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1994), 260-290. and the lives of millions of people. 28Pancerny Pociag “Zygmunt Powstaniec” 2G. Balfour, The Armoured Train: Its Develop- (Armored Train “Sigmund the Rebel”), (Warsaw: At the time of their victory, an imme- ment and Usage, (London: B.T. Batsford, Ltd., Ministerstwo Oborony, [Ministry of Defense] diate result was an attempt to foster 1981), 9-15, 19-21; Denis Bishop and Keith l982). 1-27; Adam Zamoyski, The Battle for the world revolution by spreading Bolshe- Davis, Railways and War before 1918, (New Marchlands, (Boulder: Eastern European Mono- vism to the West. As the Reds fought York: Macmillan, 1972), 107-11; Jay Stone and graphs, 1981), 26. Erwin A. Schmidl, The Boer War and Military 29 for Ukraine, they soon engaged rival Reforms, (New York: University Press of Amer- Potselyuyev, 111. Polish armies intent on re-establishing ica, 1988), 58, 322, 324, 326. ancient Polish territorial claims. Both 3 sides used large numbers of armored Vladimir A. Potselyuyev, Bronenostsy zhelez- MAJ Al Koenig enlisted in the Min- trains in the Russo-Polish conflicts of nykh dorog (Ironclads of the Railroads), (Mos- cow: Molodaya Gvardiya [Young Guards], 1982), nesota National Guard in 1975, and l9l9-21. It was fortuitous that Polish 8; Tirrell J. Ferrenz, Military Engineer, 23, 137 since then has served as an artillery- armored trains were available to fight (September-October, 1932), 471; Grazhdanskaya man, a PSYOP officer, a linguist, the Reds, since the Poles had just built Voyna i voyennaya Interventsiya v SSSR: Entsik- and a historian. He is a 1984 gradu- several trains for the Third Silesian lopedia (Civil War and Military Intervention in ate of the Russian Basic Course at Uprising. Elite Polish troops skilled in the USSR: Encyclopedia [hereafter referred to as construction techniques and weapons GVVISE]), (Moscow: Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya, DLIFLC, and holds a Ph.D. in His- infiltrated through German lands to 1983), “Bronepoezd,” (Armored train); Steven J. tory from the University of Nebraska ethnically Polish areas. These Poles Zaloga, Soviet Armour, (Carrollton, Texas: Squad- – Lincoln. Since 1996, he has com- cadred local units that built armored, or ron/Signal, 1980), 24; GVVISE, s.v. “Brone- pleted three tours of duty in support poezd” (Armored Train), “Zheleznodorozhnye more precisely concrete trains, many of Voyska” (Railroad Troops); Potselyuyev, 27. of the Bosnia and Kosovo opera- which contested more sophisticated 4 tions, having served as a historian German armored trains employed to Zaloga, 24. for V Corps in Heidelberg and at HQ quell the Polish insurgencies in Silesia. 5Potselyuyev, 12; GVVISE “Bronepoezda” U.S. European Command in Stutt- As a result of this building program, 70 (Armored trains), Potselyuyev, 56. gart. He also teaches history for the Polish trains helped repel Red forces 6 from Polish soil; in so doing, the Poles GVVISE, s.v. “Bronevye Sily RKKA,” (Ar- University of Nebraska (Lincoln and mored Forces of the R.K.K.A.), “Bronepoezd.” Omaha), and is completing two cut off and captured Red trains and (Armored Train). perhaps saved Europe from Bolshe- books on the origins of armored war- 7 vism.28 Potselyuyev, 18-27. fare in the American Civil War. ARMOR — May-June 2001 29

The Military Decision-Making Process: Applying the OPFOR’s Approach

by Captain David Haines

Decision-making is the knowing if to decide, then when and what to decide.1

The OPFOR at the National Training Center enjoys many advantages. The OPFOR knows the terrain and it knows how its enemy will fight. To offset this, OPFOR leaders BLUEFOR brigades possess a decided game their approach to a com- advantage in equipment capability in ing NTC battle. all of the battlefield operating systems. They will use a The BLUEFOR brigade’s battlefield shortened deci- capability in equipment alone clearly sion-making proc- outstrips the OPFOR on a vehicle-to- ess and only com- vehicle basis. How does the OPFOR mit to a course of overcome this? action as the battle unfolds. The critical element that is rarely mentioned is the OPFOR’s unique application of the military decision- • making process or MDMP. In fact, the A clear understanding of the com- fessional knowledge to reach a deci- orders process and the OPFOR’s mander’s intent and aggressive, flexi- sion. It is a detailed, sequential and METL proficiency gained from inten- ble, and violent action is the end state time-consuming process used to exam- sive and repetitive training is the cor- of the MDMP for the OPFOR. ine numerous friendly and enemy courses of action (COA). nerstone for the OPFOR’s flexibility • Staffs and sub-units are repetitively and lethality on the NTC battlefield. drilled on the fundamentals of the or- The most detailed estimates cannot How does the OPFOR differ? Con- ders process and their battle drills. anticipate every possible branch or se- trary to some beliefs, the OPFOR has quel, enemy action, unexpected oppor- Is it possible for U.S. Army units to tunities, or changes in mission directed no “playbook” that it uses for opera- plan and fight in this manner? For well- 2 tions. The OPFOR executes a full-up trained units, the answer is “yes.” A from higher headquarters. Command- orders process that is similar to that ers and their staffs must continually unit that is proficient in its METL can analyze the enemy and friendly situa- used by their BLUEFOR counterparts, fight with greater flexibility without but there are a few distinct and impor- sacrificing synchronization by applying tion to identify or create opportunities as the situation develops. tant differences: the techniques that the OPFOR uses. A • The Regiment does not commit to unit that uses this technique will be able to match the OPFOR, or any en- The advantages of using the complete one COA, but is prepared to fight up to MDMP are that: four wargamed COAs. emy for that matter, in flexibility and synchronization, in addition to far ex- • It analyzes and compares multiple • COAs are not eliminated but ceeding the combat capability of that friendly and enemy COAs in an attempt closely connected to the enemy situa- opponent. Imagine a brigade combat to identify the best possible friendly tion and refined as the situation team or task force that could be as COA and the best time and place to changes. flexible in its application of mass as the produce desired effects. • Wargaming is continuous, but it OPFOR regiment — this unique appli- • It produces the greatest integration, cation of the MDMP can get you there. does not drive or derail the process. coordination, and synchronization for an operation and minimizes the risk of • Refinement of the COAs is closely Doctrinal Versus OPFOR Methods linked to the wargame and the com- overlooking any of its critical aspects. bined arms rehearsal conducted by the The goal of the MDMP as defined in • It results in task organization, prior- regiment. FM 101-5 is to produce an order. This order must be flexible, tactically sound, ity intelligence requirements, the re- • The regiment is focused on under- connaissance and surveillance plan, the and fully integrated and synchronized. fire support plan, and operations graph- standing task and purpose in relation to The MDMP gives the commander and terrain, enemy, and friendly situation as staff a structured analytical process to ics. In short, a detailed operation order or operation plan. well as desired end state. In practice, assist them in reaching logical deci- many units emphasize the importance sions. This process uses thoroughness, A disadvantage is that it removes of technique, method, or process. clarity, sound judgment, logic, and pro- flexibility once the COA decision is 30 ARMOR — May-June 2001

The Military Decision-Making Process The Military Decision-Making Process FM 101-5 As Executed by the NTC OPFOR Retaining Multiple COAs made. Instead of commanders and Receipt of Mission Receipt of Mission staffs focusing on the identification and -Issue cdr’s initial guidance -Issue cdr’s guidance exploitation of opportunities on the WARNING WARNINGWARNING battlefield, the focus is on the synchro- ORDER ORDERORDER Mission Analysis Mission Analysis nization and integration of the plan. -Approve restated mission -Approve restated mission The temptation (and often the result) is -State commander’s intent -State commander’s intent -Issue cdr’s guidance -Issue cdr’s guidance fighting the plan and not the enemy. -Approve CCIR -Approve CCIR The Opposing Force (OPFOR) at the WARNING WARNINGWARNING ORDER ORDERORDER National Training Center uses a modi- COA Development COA Development fied technique in applying the MDMP. The OPFOR follows the process as COA Analysis/Wargame COA Analysis/Wargame defined in FM 101-5, with one major exception — the COA decision is re- COA Comparison Orders Production -Approve order tained until the last possible moment on COA Approval OPERATION ORDER the battlefield. All courses of action are -Approve COA ORDER fully integrated and synchronized, and -Refine cdr’s intent COA Comparison -Specify type of rehearsal commanders and staff rehearse at least -Specify type of order Rehearsal two of the COAs. WARNING ORDER Execution There are many advantages to retain- Orders Production -Approve order Contact ing multiple COAs: COA Approval -COA decision • The foremost advantage is the flexi- Rehearsal -Refine cdr’s intent bility that it requires and allows the commanders and staff. Execution and Assessment Contact Continue Execution • In addition to focusing on integra- Assessment tion, commanders and staff will be able to observe and assess what occurs on the battlefield in relation to the friendly Figure 1. and enemy situation to assist in making the best COA decision when the time is This comparison chart tracks differences in the OPFOR and doctrinal orders process. right. The main difference is that the OPFOR decides its final course of action based on contact, while the doctrinal approach leads to a decision before contact with the enemy is • Subordinate commanders and staff made. will be able to assist the commander in making the best decision based on what is really happening, not on a template Disadvantages may be sacrificing fundamental changes in how the staff that is 24 to 48 hours old. some level of detail in the planning and carries out the process, but with some • Rehearsing multiple COAs also al- integration. The key to minimizing this training, it can be accomplished suc- lows the commander to better express is to identify the similarities in the cessfully. Some assumptions are re- his intent through various COAs that COA phases and decision points and quired. The unit must have solid stan- may occur. He will better be able to ensuring the combat multipliers under- dard operating procedures that are read answer the “what if” as it is addressed stand the overall commander’s intent. and understood at all levels; companies by his subordinates. and platoons must be well trained in The commander must ensure that his their basic battle drills; and lastly, the • Multiple COAs act as a forcing staff clearly understands his intent for their particular battlefield operating training needs to be repetitive at both agent, requiring the S2 to continuously the staff level and in the maneuver update and disseminate his situational system (BOS). Giving the combat mul- practiced at the platoon and company tipliers their critical tasks for each template as information becomes avail- level. able to facilitate the decision-making phase does this. Likewise, the staff process. It forces commanders to be must ensure their plans and actions THE OPFOR ORDERS PROCESS looking for conditions on the battlefield support the commander and his subordinate maneuver units. that would indicate a COA decision. Receipt of Mission/Mission Analysis • The combined arms commanders do Commanders will more readily rec- An explanation of the OPFOR orders ognize opportunity, and since there is this during the rehearsal, briefing their process is probably required to under- no single COA determined yet, the com- scheme in detail on the terrain board as the units are executing. This technique stand how and where we adhere to the mander may have the flexibility to cap- doctrinal MDMP and where we stray italize on local opportunity. A unit may is heavily dependent on a strong work- from it. The OPFOR Regiment receives achieve some surprise during this local ing relationship between all the key players in a unit. This is something that combat battlefield instructions from opportunity and the event broadens the Operations Group. This packet is the chances for success for the entire unit. is best developed at home station, not equivalent of an operations order from on the battlefield. • This technique emphasizes the im- the regiment’s division headquarters. portance of commander’s intent over Units can train to use this adaptation The OPFOR’s equivalent of warning adhering to a COA. of the MDMP. It will require some order #1, the mission matrix, is issued ARMOR — May-June 2001 31

OPFOR Rotational Orders Flow as quickly as possible. In this warning order or mission matrix is the combat Combat Battlefield Instructions power, task organization, and missions received from Operations Group WARNING assigned to each motorized rifle battal- ORDER/ ion. The staff and commanders imme- MISSION diately begin their mission analysis. Mission Analysis MATRIX -Approve restated mission The OPFOR’s mission analysis does -State commander’s intent not differ significantly from doctrinal -Issue cdr’s guidance guidelines. The S2 generates three to -Approve CCIR four unique enemy SITTEMPs for the mission analysis and in preparation for COA Development the wargame. WARNING ORDER Pre Rotation The commanders and staff may give (verbal)(verbal) feedback to the S2 on his SITTEMP. COA Analysis/Wargame Mission analysis is completed and COAs are immediately developed fol- Orders Production Staff Synch -Approve order - Done in the field lowing the briefing to the regimental ROTATIONALROTATIONAL immediately commander. The commander’s initial OPERATION following the intent and guidance for wargaming ORDER OPORD. Attended by all constitute warning order #2. CBT Multipliers FRAGMENTARYFRAGMENTARY ORDER Course of Action Development COA Comparison There is one COA developed for each enemy SITTEMP. Normally 3-4 friend- Rehearsal ly COAs are developed using the S2’s Rehearsal initial SITTEMPs and a generic array Execution - Two distinct COAs rehearsed by of forces for the OPFOR. These COAs FRAGMENTARYFRAGMENTARY commander’s and are brief concepts of maneuver for the ORDER staff (1-1/2 to 2 hours regiment that includes the MRBs and COA Comparison duration) key combat multipliers. The regimental Rehearsal staff and commanders then begin Rotation wargaming the COAs. The line be- Execution tween COA development and wargaming blurs in this step as the staff is as- FRAGMENTARYFRAGMENTARY ORDER sessing the feasibility and suitability of COA Comparison each COA. The wargaming further tests these COAs and completes the initial Rehearsal plan. The focus of testing is not on whether or not it is feasible, but identi- Execution fying under what conditions the COA would be feasible and its distinction from other COAs. In the wargame, the Figure 2. commanders and staff identify the critical tasks for each maneuver unit and the combat multipliers. Tentative deci- er and light data, enemy order of battle, Course of Action Comparison sion points for maneuver, fires, and coordination matrices for orders, brief- ings and aviation, combat service sup- Immediately following the back brief, special munitions (chemical and FAS- the staff begins what should be consid- CAM) are identified and recorded in a port, and command and signal informa- ered the COA comparison for the regi- synchronization matrix by the staff. At tion. Specifics on scheme of maneuver are not covered. This would best corre- ment. Normally, it is still too early in this point, the initial integration and the operation for COAs to be elimi- synchronization of the regiment has late to warning order #3. nated. The purpose of this meeting is to been planned and completed. The regi- Fragmentary orders are then published further refine the timeline, decision mental commander is then briefed on prior to the mission that give the mis- points, fires, and special munitions on the results of the wargame and the re- sion, commander’s intent, COA the most recent enemy SITTEMP. The sult of the COAs versus their respective sketches, and scheme of maneuver for staff continually assesses feasibility as enemy SITTEMP. The briefing in- all elements of the regiment. This the enemy situation develops. CCIRs, cludes advantage, disadvantages, de- FRAGO is the basis for the orders brief HPTs, and HVTs are finalized and tar- cision points, and any critical issues in given to the regiment the day prior to geted. relation to the COAs. the mission. The staff briefs commanders on updated enemy situation and The primary focus of this drill is con- Orders scheme of maneuver to include all tinued refinement of all fires. When A rotational operations order is pub- BOS. The commanders then back brief time allows, a decision support matrix lished, which includes the most basic the regimental commander on their task is developed for the commanders that information about the operation. Weath- and purpose and any initial issues. supports all COAs. 32 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Combined Arms Rehearsal basic similarities of all the COAs (i.e., The regiment normally employs two scouts, approach march, and support light infantry companies in the offense. The regiment conducts a terrain model rehearsal that takes about an hour and a scheme for some of the combat multi- The light infantry can have numerous pliers). tasks. Generally they are expected to half. It follows the rehearsal script as destroy one company team each in the outlined in Annex G, FM 101-5. This The regiment completes the rehearsal rehearsal is conducted with all the key and is ready to execute. The S2 con- vicinity of key terrain to create weakness in the enemy formations. This will players in the battle (maneuver, fires, tinually updates the commanders on the cause the enemy to reposition or react to and other combat multipliers). The ve- enemy situation to allow the com- hicle commanders of the regimental mander to refine his guidance or intent. the destruction of the company team. The infantry may also be tasked to clear reconnaissance start the rehearsal on The FRAGO/COA comparison/re- or secure key terrain to allow the unhin- the terrain board, briefing their infiltration routes, positions, and reconnais- hearsal process is repeated throughout dered passage of the regiment. Once in the rotation for every regimental level sector, the infantry also becomes a valu- sance focus. The S2 then briefs the first battle. able reconnaissance asset to the regi- enemy situation. He will integrate whatever is known about the enemy up to ment. The success or failure of these The COA Decision in Contact units plays a large role in the focus of this point into his setup. The players the next element of the regiment — the then follow a fixed agenda that goes Execution through the battle, by critical events, by advance guard or forward detachment. The movement or approach phase of This element is the first MRB-sized unit time once the regiment passes line of execution is similar through all courses to move toward the enemy. It will move departure, and by individual combat multiplier. Once the S2 has finished his of action. There is a direct linkage be- to capitalize on weakness created by the tween the critical events that occur be- infantry or opportunities reported by initial setup, all the players get on the fore the commitment of the regiment. regimental reconnaissance. At this point, terrain board. This includes the maneuver commanders, the fire support offi- These events start with the movement the commander is prepared to begin of division and regimental reconnais- eliminating courses of action, but he has cer, air direction officer, engineers, sance and the regiment’s truck mounted still probably not made a course of ac- electronic warfare, air defense, smoke platoon leader, and signal officer. Hav- and air assault infantry. Division re- tion decision. connaissance enters sector 36 to 48 ing all the players on the board facili- hours ahead of the lead regiment of the The regimental forward detachment tates the understanding of the entire (FD) or advanced guard (AG) is task battle and ensures that the combat mul- division. Regimental reconnaissance organized to be decisive and self- moves into sector with the purpose of tipliers understand the key events in completing the picture for the regimen- sufficient. All the combat multipliers of maneuver that will trigger actions by the regiment are represented. Normal them in support of the regiment. tal commander that was initially devel- task organization consists of one tank oped by divisional reconnaissance as- The executive officer and the S3 are sets. Regimental assets are focused company (+), a BMP I/II equipped motorized rifle battalion (+), 100 organic responsible for managing the agenda based on the success or reconnaissance infantry, an anti-tank company, one to and the time, as well as capturing issues “dead space” of division reconnais- that need to be addressed. The execu- sance. Regimental reconnaissance is two mortar batteries, an SP artillery battery, mobility and counter-mobility tive officer will call off the time and the successful in routinely getting the assets, smoke vehicles, air defense as- maneuver commanders brief their ac- commander a 90-95 percent solution on tions at that specific time. This brief enemy locations. Additionally, regi- sets, reconnaissance, command and control vehicles, and resupply. This includes location, combat power, ac- mental reconnaissance assets clear large, powerful organization is focused tions, and anticipated actions preparing routes, landing zones, and dismount for the next turn. The combat multipli- points in preparation for the infiltration on observed or created weakness. The commander of this organization knows ers briefing their actions will follow of the light infantry. Reconnaissance it is his responsibility to maneuver his them. The fire support officer, air direc- assets establish observation throughout tion officer, and EW commander brief the depth of the battlespace, focusing force to set conditions for deciding which course of action will be taken. their focus of fires. The ADA com- on key terrain, avenues of approach, mander will brief coverage, location, mobility corridors, large (company/ COA at the Decisive Point and anticipated actions similar to the team) enemy formations, high payoff maneuver commanders. The engineers and high value targets. The confidence The conditions that must be set at this will brief any key actions as needed. in the ability of regimental reconnais- point are fairly simple. Regardless of The smoke platoon leader and signal sance to get this level of information is the operation, the commander must officer brief their support focus and a critical factor in allowing the com- have a 90-percent solution on enemy retrans plan respectively. Commanders mander to retain multiple courses of disposition, down to company team and combat multipliers will continue action until the last possible moment. level. A weakness must have been this process through the entire course of Regimental reconnaissance also serves identified or created by the light infan- action. If there is no change for any as the primary “looker” for divisional try, the AG/FD, or fires. In other element, “no change” is briefed. The and regimental indirect fires. These words, the enemy has begun to lose the regimental commander observes and elements stay in sector, continually initiative and is off-balance due to the refines his guidance as needed reporting and refining the enemy dispo- previous actions of the regiment. In a throughout the rehearsal. This is then sition. Near simultaneously, the regi- meeting engagement, it is possible that repeated using another COA that is ment’s light infantry is moving into the lead task force has been neutralized distinctive from the first one rehearsed. sector to create further opportunities for or destroyed. In an attack on a defense, This one is somewhat shorter due to the the regiment. the FD has created a point of penetra- ARMOR — May-June 2001 33

“The U.S. Army will never have the home field advantage against any future enemy. We should stop using it as an excuse for the success of the OPFOR.”

At right, the Krasnovians begin their attack. tion or breach in the enemy defense. proaching main body. Mortar fires sup- This process can be a key to flexibility Another possible condition is the sei- port the MRB and its infantry in the if applied with a thorough understand- zure or control of key terrain in the close fight. Artillery fires focus on de- ing of the terrain and enemy. Army enemy area of operations. struction of forces to the immediate units can train to match the OPFOR’s flank or rear of the fight to expand the flexibility on the battlefield. The U.S. The AG/FD commander makes a rec- breach or disrupt their maneuver. Rotary Army will never have the home field ommendation to the regimental commander based upon his situation and wing close air support will assist in ex- advantage against any future enemy. panding or exploiting the advantage We should stop using it as an excuse how he sees the battlefield. It may or created as well as serving as a mobile for the success of the OPFOR. The U.S. may not be accepted by the regimental commander. Ideally, the commander reserve to protect a vulnerable flank. Army is and will be the best-equipped Fixed wing close air support will destroy force in the world today and the future. will be able to retain his course of ac- forces out of contact or forces reposi- We simply need to be more flexible tion decision until the decisive point of the battle is reached — when the AG tioning on the regiment. Electronic war- and the process the OPFOR has devel- fare focus will switch from collection to oped through years of doing the has destroyed approximately a task jamming to disrupt command and con- MDMP on a monthly basis will make force, or the FD has achieved at least one or possibly two breaches in the trol on identified nets. Air defense assets us the most lethal and flexible com- will focus on coverage of the close fight bined arms force in the world. enemy defense. Meanwhile the main as well as the approach of the main body and main effort monitor the fight and maintain an adequate time or space body. Artillery and ground smoke will be used to obscure the breach as well as Notes distance to allow the fight to develop the approach of the main body. Persis- and be able to commit quickly into the 1 tent chemical agents and FASCAMs are FM 101-5, Staff Organization and Operations, battle. The reconnaissance patrols of May 1997, p. 5-1. employed to isolate identified forces to the MRBs out of contact will move prevent their repositioning against the 2 forward to provide first-hand reports of Ibid., p. 5-27. the situation to allow the main body regiment. Non-persistent chemical agents will be used to disrupt command commanders to start gaining situational and control or maneuver of enemy awareness and assist the commander CPT David W. Haines is a Distin- and staff in recognizing opportunities forces. Simultaneously, the main body of the regiment is closing on the fight, guished Military Graduate from Bry- and recommending COAs. Simultane- committed to exploiting what the AG/ ously, as the AG or FD comes into con- ant College. Commissioned in Armor tact, the S2 and the chief of staff will be FD and regimental combat multipliers in December 1991, he is a graduate have created. utilizing all reconnaissance assets avail- of AOB, AOAC, CAS3, and a distin- able to account for the enemy’s remain- Conclusion guished graduate of the U.S. Air ing combat power. Force’s Joint Firepower Control The process works. After watching this process in action for over two Course. His previous assignments Numerous things occur almost simul- include: tank platoon leader, 2-70 taneously at the course of action deci- years, first as an S3 Air, then as a troop and motorized rifle battalion com- Armor, Erlangen; tank platoon leader sion to support that decision. This is mander, I am convinced that this proc- and liaison officer 4-67 Armor, Fried- where the orchestration of the regiment burg; battalion S4 with 4-67 Armor is at its peak. Many of these assets may ess should not be dismissed as an “NTC-ism” or “OPFOR-ism.” Where it during Operation Joint Endeavor; S3 have gone uncommitted up to this point will fail is if it is implemented without to ensure that they will be committed in air/assistant S3, 1st Sqdn, 11th ACR, support of the course of action decision. the necessary thought, preparation, Ft. Irwin, Calif.; and commander, B training, and rehearsal in its execution. Collection assets continue to develop the Troop, 1/11 ACR and 2nd Motorized enemy picture as the S2 and Chief of Army units can train to use this tech- Rifle Battalion, 125th Guards Tank Staff disseminate a detailed enemy pic- nique. Through outlining the process Regiment. Currently, he is a unit ture to the commanders and staff. In the the OPFOR uses, units should be able trainer with 1st Squadron, 278th close fight the AG/FD has gained a clear to better understand how they can apply ACR in Athens, Tenn. advantage in its area of operations and this adaptation of the process to their has employed its organic infantry to own units. The requirement for units to He would like to thank COL Rosen- destroy remaining enemy forces in the be able to execute this process is fairly area of a breach or on key terrain. Anti- simple to identify and somewhat harder berger, LTC Yarbrough, MAJ Hick- tank assets and counter-mobility assets to achieve. It is a well-trained unit and enbottom, and his fellow command- have been employed to protect a vulner- staff that are proficient in their METL ers in 1st Squadron for their input able flank of the AG/FD or the ap- and battle tasks. and guidance in writing this article. 34 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Light Cavalry Table X Training a scout section in gunnery and other critical tasks

by Major Christopher D. Kolenda, Captain Raymond C. Zindell, and Staff Sergeant Mark A. Aide

For those of us accustomed to the ten- section had an after-action review after had to conduct actions at the obstacle, sion, firepower, and drama of tank and each event and a final AAR the morn- NAI, and set-move and dismount drills Bradley gunnery, light cavalry gunnery ing after the night live-fire. to standard before continuing their mis- — featuring .50-cal machine guns and sion. The sections then ran the same MK-19 grenade launchers — can be a The dismounted reconnaissance patrol lane at night with a slightly different required the scout section to confirm or bit tiresome. Nevertheless, with a little deny enemy presence in two Named OPFOR set. imagination Light Cavalry Table X can be an exciting and demanding event Areas of Interest (NAIs). The patrol The last event was day and night live- was approximately 2500m in length, fire. During the day, the scout sections that will pay huge dividends in enhanc- and the section had four hours to com- conducted a zone reconnaissance, oc- ing the performance of light cavalry sections. This article outlines a way to plete the mission. The first NAI had no cupied an observation post, then dis- enemy presence; the second contained placed and gained contact with a CRP get the most out of light cavalry gun- the squadron field trains. The order and and FSE. During the zone reconnais- nery and some lessons we learned that will increase the proficiency of light the time constraint forced the section sance, the scout sections engaged a leader to conduct a thorough METT-T DRT team, then encountered an obsta- cavalry scouts. analysis to determine when his section cle overwatched by a BTR and dis- The scout section is the base maneu- needed to move rapidly and where he mounted troops. After destroying the ver unit of any cavalry organization. As needed to invest time for a deliberate vehicle and troops, the scouts called for such, the focus of training must be at reconnaissance. The successful section smoke and breached the obstacle with a that level, rather than at the crew level. leaders did the analysis and achieved bangalore torpedo. Since STRAC does not include a re- reconnaissance results; the unsuccess- quirement to shoot section gunnery, we ful ones failed to reach the second ob- The sections continued their reconnaissance to their limit of advance, then had to be a bit creative in allocating jective in time. occupied an observation post. At the ammunition for the event while still meeting the standards for crew qualifi- The next day the sections conducted observation post, the scouts called for day and night mounted reconnaissance and adjusted indirect fire, then engaged cation. Furthermore, FM 17-12-8, Light patrols. The lane was approximately enemy dismounted troops with small Cavalry Gunnery, does not specify any standards for section gunnery, so we 5kms in length. The sections had the arms, M203 grenade launchers and mission to conduct a zone reconnais- claymore mines. The sections then dis- were starting from scratch. As we de- sance in four hours, with specified placed, executed an abatis, and then set signed the training event, we wanted to focus on some critical tasks that we tasks to determine trafficability of a along a phase line to gain contact with route and recon two NAIs, one of the CRP and FSE. The sections reacted expect our scout sections to perform which was enroute while the other was to a chemical attack, then engaged the well. These tasks included dismounted patrolling, mounted reconnaissance, at the limit of advance. The last NAI FSE with indirect fire. contained a suspected Motorized Rifle actions on contact, observation post Platoon. Each lane featured an obstacle We had air scouts during several mis- occupation, call for fire, demolitions, sions, which exercised the platoon lead- and reporting. We also wanted to exer- along the route that was overwatched er’s ability to coordinate the efforts of by direct and indirect fire. The success- cise our troop and squadron command ful sections executed set-move and his scout sections and air scouts during posts, logistics, air-ground integration, the zone reconnaissance. On the night and our indirect fire systems. dismount drills at danger areas to stan- live-fire, the sections remained station- dard, found the obstacle and the overwatch positions, then destroyed the ary and engaged enemy recon with Event Design direct and indirect fire. The design of enemy with indirect fire. The success- this event was to hone the section’s Our Light Cavalry Table X was a de- ful sections also planned enough time manding, 72-hour event. The section to place their vehicles in hide positions surveillance, target acquisition, actions on contact, and reporting skills. began the exercise in an assembly area short of the last NAI and conducted a with the section leader receiving an dismounted reconnaissance patrol to We also had a robust observer control- operations order. After conducting recon the MRP positions. As on the ler package for Table X. Each section troop-leading procedures, the scout dismounted reconnaissance lane, the had an OC, and each platoon had a sen- section executed a night dismounted section leaders who conducted a thor- ior OC who conducted the formal reconnaissance patrol. The next day, ough METT-T analysis and rehearsals AARs. We also had engineer OCs who the section conducted a mounted re- had the best results. Embedded in each ensured the scouts utilized the banga- connaissance patrol, both day and lane was time for a hotwash and re-run lore torpedo and demolitions for the night. On the third day, the section ne- of each critical event. We found this abatis safely. The section OCs came gotiated a day and night live-fire. The method very beneficial. The sections from 2nd Squadron. The senior OCs ARMOR — May-June 2001 35

“A zone reconnaissance carries myriad implied tasks, such as reconning all lateral routes, key terrain, etc. If we fail to conduct a METT-T analysis and prioritize the efforts of the scouts, then they are likely to spend an inordinate amount of time on less important tasks.”

were troop commanders and squadron analysis also enabled the section leader leader, or a smart driver armed with staff officers. to delegate tasks to his subordinates acetated report formats, can send re- and generate concurrent rather than ports to the platoon leader. The OCs evaluated the sections using sequential activity. score sheets that were specifically tied • Set-move drills improved signifi- to reconnaissance results and proper For instance, the section had two cantly over the course of the exercise. execution of common tasks in order to hours to establish their OP on the day Some sections had two vehicles mov- eliminate the subjectivity often gener- of live-fire. The best section leaders ing simultaneously and paid the price at ated by TE&Os in the MTP manuals. had delegated specific tasks to each the obstacle. Deliberate set-move drills, For instance, the section earned points member of the OP, and had also dele- when accompanied by dismount drills for submitting correct contact, spot, and gated abatis emplacement to another at danger areas, saved lives. obstacle reports. Each line of the report crew. These section leaders also identi- • Surveillance and target acquisition had points attached to it, and the sec- fied the key events in each mission and was another task that we needed to im- tion could earn full points only if the rehearsed them thoroughly. They also location was within 100m and the size explained the reasons behind their deci- prove upon, across the board. Despite having thermal sights on the vehicles, a of the enemy was at least 80% correct. sions so the subordinates could con- number of scouts elected not to use The sections were also scored on tasks tinue to perform in the absence of or- such as establishing the observation ders or when the section leader was them and paid the price. Furthermore, several sections did not have a surveil- post to standard, call for fire, and em- killed or wounded. Unfortunately, only lance SOP to ensure 360-degree secu- placing the charges for the abatis. a handful of section leaders were at this level of proficiency. rity, and missed several targets as a Some Lessons Learned result. Furthermore, many sections did • Table X also highlighted the age- not use the MELIOS to its fullest ca- Our Table X experience highlighted a number of lessons that are useful across old lesson of leadership from the front. pacity. When set in an overwatch posi- A number of section leaders believed tion, the vehicle commander should the cavalry community. that their duty was to remain on the lase TRPs to determine range for the • We had a commander’s conference vehicle to send reports. As a result, gunner. This should also occur at the call at 0700 daily. The senior OCs re- they would send junior soldiers on dis- OP for the range cards on the M60 ma- ported on activities over the past 24 mounted patrols, to recon danger areas, chine gun and M203. hours, sustains and improves for the or to establish the observation post. • Another lesson that became appar- sections, analysis of why the section Such a technique was rarely successful. performed as they did, the training fo- The best sections had the section leader ent during the zone reconnaissance was the importance of clearly articulating cus for the next 24 hours (i.e., what out front on the patrols and at the ob- the priorities of effort for scout pla- specific tasks they wanted to see the servation post. sections improve), and issues with the toons and scout sections. A zone reconnaissance carries myriad implied training event overall. The squadron We tried to drive home several points tasks, such as reconning all lateral commander then outlined some specific here. First, the only purpose of the ve- areas upon which he wanted the OCs to hicles is to bring us rapidly to the next routes, key terrain, etc. If we fail to conduct a METT-T analysis and priori- focus. dismount point. Second, the most im- tize the efforts of the scouts, then they portant thing happening for that section The conference call was a high payoff is forward with the dismounted patrol are likely to spend an inordinate event for us as it allowed us to discuss amount of time on less important tasks. lessons, ideas, and TTPs that helped or the OP. In the case of 2 ACR, these Focusing their efforts will result in scouts are the point men of the XVIII improve the performance of our sec- Airborne Corps. We cannot afford to more time for a thorough reconnais- tions throughout the training event. The sance of the areas the commander de- payoff became even greater as the send our junior soldiers alone and un- termines as most important. afraid without leadership from the sec- commanders had their platoon leaders tion sergeant. That NCO will be pro- • We experimented with liter eavesdrop on the conference call. viding information that affects the (“smurf”) rounds and found them to be • The training event highlighted that troop, squadron, and regiment, and the a great asset. A liter round is a dummy we need to work on mission analysis at most experienced soldier must be for- artillery round that can be fired on most the section leader level. The best sec- ward to make those critical assess- ranges and training areas. The fuse ig- tion leaders conducted a deliberate ments. Furthermore, a quick read of nites on impact and gives off enough METT-T analysis, which enabled them Grossman’s On Killing or Ardant du smoke to produce the visual effect of to determine when they could increase Picq’s Battle Studies reveals with stun- indirect fires. These rounds enable us to the tempo of their reconnaissance, and ning clarity human behavior in combat. integrate indirect fires more effectively when they needed to slow down and Soldiers will only function in the face during training. devote considerable amounts of time to of the enemy when led from the front. the critical events, such as dismounted The duty of the section leader is for- reconnaissance of NAIs. The thorough ward with his soldiers. The squad Continued on Page 49 36 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Tips on Speeding Resupply, Improving Maintenance Responsiveness, and Evacuating Casualties

CSS and the Battalion Scout Platoon by Sergeant First Class Harald Jeffery

Barlesius is awake in an instant. Peo- we handle this problem? By first under- greatest advantage to this method is ple are stirring around the other cars. standing current doctrine and by devel- that the scout platoon has an individual The silhouettes of the soldiers stand out oping supporting techniques. with a vested interest handling the pla- against the sky. All listen intently. Doctrinally, either the task force or toon’s CSS needs. There! They hear it quite plainly. The distant roar of engines; like the drone the scout platoon sergeant facilitates In order to develop a better resupply resupply. If the task force is the pri- system, we must sever the scout pla- of bumblebees. “They’re a long way mary facilitator, they have two meth- toon’s tie to the LOGPAC timeline. off.” Barlesius jumps to the ground and kneels with his ear close to the earth. ods. The battalion can dedicate a logis- The easiest solution is to increase the tics package to the scout platoon. This supplies that the platoon can carry. To There is no doubt about it. “Michel, LOGPAC slice is brought forward by do this, our platoon used the rack de- start up! Bearing 43!” Barlesius swings into the car which starts up the HHC 1SG, the support platoon scribed in the May-June 1999 issue of leader, the HHC XO, or another re- ARMOR.2 This additional space al- noiselessly. The darkness swallows sponsible individual. Doctrinally, this lowed us to carry two extra 5-gallon them up. Compass in hand, the Ober- feldwebel tries in vain to pierce the is the best method for the scout platoon cans of fuel, which increased our but the most difficult for the battalion. operational range by another 150 miles. surrounding blackness. They hear it We also added two extra water cans plainly now — a low rumble mingled Realistically, this does not work due with a high squeaking. “Cars-about!” to the two-hour turn-around time on the and two cases of MREs, giving us the ability to deploy unsupported for three It is 0130 hours when the first radio LOGPAC. In order to meet this time to seven days.3 This still left us enough transmission goes out: “Loud noise of limit, the scout platoon must locate in engines from south and southeast. Ten an area close enough to the LRP to room to carry mission-specific equipment and extra ammunition. kilometers distant.”1 receive resupply, wasting valuable time

that can be better used conducting re- The next step is to eliminate the two- Thus began British General Archi- connaissance. The second method calls hour timeline. A workable technique is bald Wavell’s Operation Battleaxe in for the scout platoon to use the nearest to create an independent push package North Africa during World War II. company team’s CSS assets for resup- for scout resupply. This would consist With the early warning provided by the ply. This method requires the forward of fuel and water cans, MREs, mainte- German armored car outposts, General company’s 1SG to pick up the scouts’ nance parts, and ammunition. This pack- Wavell’s troops lost any element of LOGPAC and the scout platoon to age is loaded on a trailer and brought to surprise, resulting in heavy losses and a move back to that company for resup- the LRP by the HHC 1SG. It is then British reversal. This battle demon- ply. This method permits the scouts to transferred to the 1SG of the forward- strated the need to keep scouts on the resupply at a more forward location. most deployed company team, and he battlefield where they can provide the However, identifying the company moves it to his AA. It can then either be commander with the critical informa- team responsible for resupply and en- pushed forward or left for another scout tion needed for success. To increase the suring that the scouts can link up can element to pick up. Any unused sup- number of scouts available, we must prove difficult. This method also has plies can be used by the scout platoon first develop workable solutions for the problem of the two-hour turn- to establish a cache site. If the scout resupply, maintenance, and casualty around time. platoon cannot make link-up, the push evacuation (CASEVAC). Since the package can be retained with the lead The other doctrinal method is to use introduction of motorized transporta- the scout platoon sergeant to facilitate company or moved to the company tion, scouts have become tied to their team collection point (CTCP) for emer- need for logistical support, and gone the resupply. With this method, the gency resupply. The advantages are PSG coordinates for supplies, picks up are earlier days of foraging for sup- LOGPAC, distributes the supplies, and that this will support the scout platoon plies. We will focus on the logistical with the minimum supplies needed to system and attempt to introduce some returns the LOGPAC to its parent-unit continue operations and the push pack- location. This is the easiest method of useful techniques, used throughout his- resupply for the battalion, but the worst age is not locked into the two-hour tory and relearned during our last NTC timeline. rotation. for the scout platoon. Using this method stretches the platoon’s ability The difficulties with this system are Logistics resupply activities must take to perform reconnaissance missions ensuring the push package gets to place as far forward as possible, and because it must operate without the where it needs to be and is properly ideally during mission transition. Dur- platoon sergeant for extended periods resourced. At a minimum, it must con- ing sustained security operations, when of time. This method reduces the resist of 10 gallons of fuel, 5 gallons of this is not possible, we are faced with connaissance force by one team or water, a two-day supply of MREs per two hard choices. We can pull the pla- forces a vehicle to operate independ- vehicle, and spare batteries. Two trail- toon back for resupply or maintain the ently and creates the danger of opening ers will be needed to support the scout counterreconnaissance screen. How do a hole in the reconnaissance net. The package; one will be deployed with the ARMOR — May-June 2001 37

A Section B Section platoon, and the other brought forward To increase casualty for the next resupply and exchanged for assistance and to speed the empty trailer. By using this tech- up patient preparation nique, the scout platoon remains for- time, each vehicle car- C Section D Section ward of the battalion, allowing all as- ries a combat lifesaver (Provide CASEVAC (Provide CASEVAC sets to stay focused on the reconnais- (CLS) kit and a litter. for A/C Sections) for B/D Sections) sance mission. The PSG’s vehicle also Maintenance carries two to three extra CLS kits. As the 30 minutes 30 minutes Resupply is only one of the logistical PSG collects the ca- challenges facing the scout platoon; sualties, he replaces maintenance is the second. During our used CLS kits and gives deployment to the NTC, we were as- the crew an empty lit- signed a wheeled vehicle mechanic, ter. Once the PSG gets PSG with Medic complete with toolbox, manuals, and a to the Battalion Casu- (PLT CCP) light wheeled tow bar. This permitted alty Collection Point deficiencies to be verified and the part (CCP) he picks up an- number annotated on the 5988-E with- other litter and restocks 30 minutes out bringing the platoon to a central the used CLS kits. This location. Also, it gives the platoon the ensures that there are ability to conduct limited recovery to enough medical sup- LD either a company team or maintenance plies forward to render LD collection point. By ordering the part assistance. on the A&L net, we were able to get it Within the scout pla- Figure 1. with the next LOGPAC. These techniques decreased a vehicle’s down-time toon, the PSG facilitates CASEVAC, and and, in several cases, the mechanic was this forces him to shift able to make repairs and keep the vehi- no further than a 30-minute travel time cle in the fight. The task force also his focus from reconnaissance. Once again, this reduces the platoon’s recon- from the LD, battalion CCP, or he cov- needs to pre-stock common repair naissance platforms by one section or ers the nearest NAI. He then identifies parts. This includes two to three tires the platoon’s CCP. Charlie and Delta mounted on rims, half-shafts, half-shaft forces the PSG to operate independ- ently. While it can be done for limited sections continue forward to a maxi- bolts, and generator belts. These items casualties, one litter and two walking- mum distance of 30 minutes from the can then be quickly pushed forward. wounded per trip, it stretches the PSG’s platoon’s CCP or the next set of NAIs. A second technique is to establish a abilities. The problem escalates if there They then become the primary evacua- Maintenance Contact Team for the are casualties at multiple sites. Sup- tion platform for their teams (Figure 1) scout platoon. This consists of two me- pose, for example, that the PSG begins thus reducing the turn-around time for chanics and a “six-pack” HMMWV. maneuvering to pick up a casualty from CASEVAC. By using the above meth- This team would carry the tools neces- A Section (30-minute travel time) when od, we have cut the evacuation time by sary for larger repairs — an impact B Section reports taking casualties. one hour and are in position to evacuate wrench, air compressor, and a tow bar. Once he has A Section’s casualty any additional casualties. The contact team deploys with the for- loaded, he begins maneuvering to B ward company and, as needed, could be Section (30 minute travel time). He To further increase effectiveness, our escorted to the disabled scout vehicle. then takes all casualties back to the platoon created an internal CASEVAC This gives the platoon a dedicated Battalion CCP (1 hour travel time). report called the “911 Report” (Figure maintenance team and permits repair as Total time used for evacuation: 2 hours. 2). This report can be sent in one far forward as possible. Scouts in the transmission to the PSG giving him BSA provide little intelligence value. To begin fixing the CASEVAC prob- enough information to start formulating his reports to higher and begin deploy- Medical/CASEVAC lem, the platoon must develop an internal plan that is well understood and ing CASEVAC assets. CASEVAC is the most difficult task rehearsed. The plan used by our pla- to accomplish and, historically at the toon began with developing dedicated Another alternative to enhance the CTCs, scout platoons suffer a 70-90 CASEVAC platforms. To start, we platoon’s CASEVAC capabilities is to percent Died of Wounds rate. This crewed the PSG vehicle with a medic augment the scout platoon with a dedi- greatly affects the scouts’ ability to driver, a mechanic gunner, and myself. cated CASEVAC vehicle. This should conduct follow-on missions and cannot The two scouts normally assigned to be either a six-pack HMMWV or a be handled by the scout platoon alone. the PSG’s vehicle were then given to medical M113. The crew for this vehi- Combat lifesavers and assignment of a the Charlie and Delta sections. This cle will consist of the PSG, a medic, medic to the platoon greatly enhances gave these two sections the ability to and a wheeled mechanic. This tech- the ability to provide medical assis- man OPs, guard the vehicles, and still nique would permit the PSG to focus tance but does not get casualties off the left enough personnel to crew CAS- solely on CSS while still providing the battlefield any faster. EVAC vehicles. The PSG then deploys platoon with maximum reconnaissance 38 ARMOR — May-June 2001

911 Report Line 1: Vehicle bumper number and type of ing to commit combat power Notes

damage: to recover scouts or risk going into battle blind. Com- 1Perrett, Bryan, Bruce Culver, and Jim Laurier. Zapped=Destroyed Firepower pany team medic vehicles German Armored Cars and Reconnaissance Maneuver Commo must be prepared to evacuate Half-Tracks 1939-45. Oxford, England: Osprey scout casualties while mov- Publishing Ltd., 1999. Line 2: Location. ing forward of the LD. The 2Johnson, T.J. Captain. “The HMMWV Storage platoon plan must be inte- Rack.” ARMOR. May-Jun 99, Back Cover. Line 3: Crew position and type of casualty: grated into the task force’s CSS plan. CSS operations 3Edwards, John E., Major (Ret.). Combat Ser- T=TC 1=KIA must be rehearsed so all vice Support Guide 2nd Edition. Harrisburg, Pa.: D=Driver 2=Urgent players understand their Stackpole Books, 1993. G=Gunner 3=Priority roles. 4Zumbro, Ralph. The Iron Cavalry. New York: X=Dismount 4=Routine Pocket Books, 1998. Conclusion EXAMPLE: Red 4 this is Red 3, 911 follows, On 17 March 1915, a Brit- Red 2 Firepower grid 123456 T2 G3, over. ish column of 45 vehicles, consisting of 12 armored SFC Harald Jeffery has served as cars, Ford tenders, and a a section sergeant, senior scout, Figure 2 string of ambulances, de- and platoon sergeant with the 2nd parted Sollum. Their mission Battalion, 34th Armor’s scout pla- was to travel 120 miles into toon at Fort Riley for the past five the desert and conduct a raid years. He is a graduate of PLDC, platforms. It would also provide the on Bir Hacheim, rescue the crew of the BNCOC, and ANCOC, as well as scout platoon with a vehicle capable of HMS Tara, and return 120 miles to the Scout Platoon Leader’s Course, 4 carrying multiple casualties and, Sollum. The success of this mission Infantry Leader’s Course, and the equipped with a tow bar, it provides was due to the armored cars’ ability to Observer/Controller Course at Fort recovery capabilities. bring all their CSS needs with them. While we cannot send a fleet of trucks Polk. He is currently assigned to the While these techniques are a good to meet the scout’s logistical needs, we 1st Battalion, 305th Armor (TS) at first step, the task force must be proac- should ensure they have everything Camp Shelby, Miss., to provide tive when supporting or augmenting the necessary to survive away from the task training support for the Mississippi scout’s CASEVAC. They must be will- force. and Alabama National Guard.

SAPPER, from Page 12 tricity, sewage, and water systems, and win our nation’s wars. In order to Soldiers are also expected to conduct sanitation, and road repair. In most of maintain their proficiency for high in- a difficult and complex mission that these situations, the lieutenant passes tensity conflict, we executed a training requires a great deal of intellect and the information to higher. Then the bat- program to maintain their necessary compassion on a daily basis. They are talion refers the problems to a non- skills. During their time back at Mon- required to conduct this mission in an governmental agency that can help the teith, the tank commanders and gunners unfamiliar environment, separated from residents improve their quality of life. will spend time in the MCOFT to main- family and loved ones for long periods As the KFOR representative for these tain gunnery skills. We also established of time, during holidays, working seven towns, the lieutenant must reinforce the a plan to train and test all soldiers on days a week. Each one of the soldiers at fact that KFOR is here to provide a safe the TCGST skills required for all 19Ks, OP Sapper is doing an outstanding job and secure environment, not rebuild the and the Bradley section sergeant exe- representing themselves, their unit, country. cutes similar training for Bradley KFOR and the United States. The per- crews. Dismount squad leaders conduct formance of these soldiers makes the The meetings also provide a platform common skills and EIB training. leader’s job that much easier, and it for information sharing. The lieutenant truly displays the amazing depth of the passes along information from KFOR Peace Support Operations at Outpost U.S. soldier. to help the people understand KFOR’s Sapper reflect the versatility and flexi- needs, and then attempts to obtain in- bility of today’s Army. Leaders must formation critical to the company mis- have the ability to expand their focus to 1LT Michael Scott graduated from sion, primarily concerning people by- ensure that all required tasks are trained the U.S. Military Academy in 1999 passing the checkpoints and transport- and soldiers are capable of executing with a degree in German and Span- ing weapons and supplies. This helps both peace support operations and high ish. After graduation, he completed the company to focus its efforts on cer- intensity conflict to standard. Sergeants AOBC and was assigned to 1-35 tain areas or people that may be of con- and corporals routinely execute tasks cern. that exceed the normal responsibilities Armor Regiment in Baumholder, given to junior leaders, which allows Germany. He has served as a pla- In addition to conducting peace sup- them to gain experience and develop toon leader in Bravo Company since port operations, soldiers in Kosovo can- the leadership skills they will use as March 2000 and has been deployed not forget that American soldiers fight senior NCOs. to Kosovo since December 2000. ARMOR — May-June 2001 39

“My next fight involved what may be the most notable issue surrounding the TACSOP today: doctrinal bloat — regurgitation of doctrinal information from field manuals so that the TACSOP will look all-inclusive when the OC asks to check it on the next NTC rotation.”

Building the “Perfect” TACSOP

by Captain Brant Guillory

Twice now I have been charged with platoon sergeant, or even a tank com- tasks, and these additional ones, if time building a Tactical Standard Operating mander, handy. It wasn’t perfect, but it and resources permit — the assistant S2 Procedure (TACSOP) from scratch. was sufficient. did the map recon for mobility issues The first instance was for my tank pla- while the S2 would check out the en- toon in the Test & Experimentation In early 1999, while a member of the emy situation, either by templating or 1-149 AR staff, the battalion S3 gave Command, an unlikely place to use me a second opportunity to develop a by visual recon; the S3 Air was in much of the same information my charge of terrain management, freeing brethren used in the rest of the Army. TACSOP. As in the first instance, I was the S3 to go forward to look at the bat- one of the few officers who had experi- The second was for 1-149 AR, ence on M1 tanks, but more important tlefield. CAARNG, when the battalion traded in its M60A3 tanks for M1IPs. As one of was my degree in writing and editing, Another challenge was that many my civilian job as a desktop publisher. TACSOPs attempt to deal with every the few officers in the battalion with Remembering the experience at Fort permutation of a situation, instead of any experience with M1 tanks, the S3, Major Mark Malanka, selected me to Hunter Liggett, I searched for every establishing one procedure — a stan- TACSOP I could find, to gain useful dard procedure — and dealing with ensure that our TACSOP was accurate knowledge and borrow as much as pos- case-by-case issues as they arise. “Em- with regards to the (relatively) new world of the Abrams tank. sible. The S3 had provided a copy of ploying ACE/Dozer” specifically ad- the TACSOP of the Vanguard Brigade dressed who within the 1-149 AR was The Approach of the 24th Division. I went straight for responsible for moving engineer assets the 1-149 AR TACSOP from the M60 around the battlefield in the defense. Initially, I went straight to the Fort era, and also rounded up the Fort Knox The Vanguard Brigade TACSOP, for Knox supplemental reference for the BN/TF TACSOP, and at least four oth- example, had left four options for tank platoon, figuring that I shouldn’t ers, both armor and infantry. “CINC Dozer”: BN CSM, BN Master need to reinvent the wheel. I also solic- Challenges – First, the Content Gunner, Engineer Platoon Leader, or ited input from the NCOs in the platoon BN Liaison Officer, and left no provi- based on their experience. Several of My next fight involved what may be sions for determining which order those them were Gulf War veterans; together the most notable issue surrounding the were to be used. The 1-149 AR TAC- with a smart platoon sergeant, they TACSOP today: doctrinal bloat — re- SOP specified that CINC Dozer was provided enormous help with this task. gurgitation of doctrinal information the BN CSM, and if he was unavail- In the end, we used little from the Fort from field manuals so that the TAC- able, the BN MG filled in. Beyond that, Knox SOP, primarily because my SOP will look all-inclusive when the your TACSOP addresses specific sce- NCOs had so much good information OC asks to check it on the next NTC narios that should be handled on a case- already on paper. But I kept it, and its rotation. A BN/TF TACSOP does not by-case basis. In a TACSOP, a unit company-level companion, should it need a sketch of a tank platoon column. cannot account for every instance when ever become handy again down the Hell, a tank platoon TACSOP doesn’t both the CSM and MG are out of the line. need it! We have an army-wide “TAC- loop. SOP” for tank platoon movement for- Developing an SOP for a platoon that Organizing the Document does not often operate within a com- mations. It’s called FM 17-15, Tank Platoon, and since everyone in the pany/team was a challenge, but in army is supposed to use the same FMs, Most TACSOPs I read were simply TEXCOM, platoons often rolled to the confusing. In the Fort Knox sample, too field without other maneuver or support there is no need to put it in a book that many “cards” hiding in the wrong is supposed to be specific to your bat- elements. Occasionally, only parts of talion/task force. places only enhanced confusion. Orga- the platoon deployed and the rest nization by Battlefield Operation Sys- worked on another part of the test, of- What is important is to translate doc- tems (BOS) seemed logical. The “Or- ten at another location. Consequently, trinal information into a relevant tool ganization for Combat” and “Cross-at- our TACSOP was checklist-heavy. The for soldiers to use. For example, spe- tachment Procedures” are under Com- intention was that any member of the cific Troop Leading Procedures were mand and Control. “Tactical Road platoon could pick up the book, and outlined and described through each Marches” are under the Maneuver have the vehicles ready to operate, with step as it related to the 1-149 AR: heading, while “UMCP Operations” are all testing and tactical systems fully “Conduct Recon” involves these spe- in the CSS section. Added to the seven operational, without the platoon leader, cific people conducting these minimum BOSs was a chapter for “Standards” 40 ARMOR — May-June 2001

battle by providing the commander with a specific set of limited information as it actually happens. The battalion now had a TACSOP and a set of TOC charts. Both had been through review by the staff sections and company commanders. It was time for trial by fire. Of course, National Guard units don’t often get a rotation to the NTC, so we had to settle for the next best thing, a Janus exercise scheduled for the next month. Trial by Fire The mission for the Janus simulation was simple — BN/TF defense on the Yakima Training Center terrain. Everyone had their report formats, their TOC charts, their TAC- SOPs well in hand. The plan had been prepared; it was time to fight. The battle unfolded as expected when a regiment of T-80s and BMP- 3s faced down a battalion whose battlefield calculus was predicated on T-72s and BMP-2s. It got ugly fast. Editor’s Note: The Tactical SIT- REPS and CSS Tracking Charts were too large to reproduce here, but they will be available, along with the TEAL and ORANGE Reports, under the “Back Issues” for May-June 2001 on our website: www.knox.army.mil/ armormag/ However, the blessing of that mis- match was that we got a lot of work out of our TEAL and ORANGE reports, as well as finding lots of little things wrong in the TACSOP. For example, we had the wrong basic loads on the ammo trucks; the which dealt with field uniforms, pack- chart for our TOC followed this report TACSOP failed to account for differ- ing lists, and equipment standards, as exactly (see Figure 1). As the compa- ences between offensive and defensive well as PCIs. A final chapter addressed nies called in their TEAL reports, the missions and class V pre-stocks in a reports. RTO simply wrote directly across each mobile defense. The document had no Tie it all together company’s line: slant, location, CSS provision for bringing up a “fifth flag” status, MOPP level, sensitive items, to act as a company HQ and control Having resolved the issue of what to and enemy contact. Anyone receiving a multiple platoons, so the scout platoon include in the TACSOP, and how to report from a company could fill in the leader found himself with the mortars organize it, the next step was to work information directly across the status and a tank platoon under his control. on reporting. The operations sergeant board. A similar report/chart combina- Our TACSOP still needed work, but major, SGM Ernesto Perez, and I were tion for the CSS side mixed Red and the one piece we were most unsure of already in the midst of remaking our Yellow reports to form the ORANGE — the TEAL and ORANGE reports — TOC charts. We intentionally designed report (see Figure 2). We still used our had worked out well for us, allowing both the charts and reports to dovetail. red, yellow, blue, and green reports as every command post to maintain nearly We developed a special report, known required and scheduled, especially identical battle tracking, with over 90 as the TEAL Report, that was mixture when forwarding information to the percent real-time accuracy, information of “Blue” (operations) and “Green” brigade. Our two new reports were de- vital to the commander for making de- (intel) reports. The tactical SITREP signed to minimize air-time during the cisions under the pressure of combat. ARMOR — May-June 2001 41

We had found a way to eliminate the ing “Minimum 1 track/squad per com- where, it shouldn’t be in the TACSOP, lag between company reports coming pany” and allowing each company to unless it identifies specific equipment into the TOC, the map getting updated, specify who their quartering party and/or people to do those tasks (see the and the charts reflecting the tactical and would be. above example of the TLPs). CSS situations. And we were still able • There was no specified medic sup- • Organize the TACSOP logically. to extrapolate the relevant information from our TEAL and ORANGE reports port for the TOC or UMCP. Whatever method you employ should be universal and all-inclusive. The BOS to submit our appropriate red, yellow, If you really want to make your method is not perfect — I still don’t blue, and green reports to the brigade. TACSOP hum in this era of combined- arms operations, have an infantryman know where to put traffic control road- Using Our New TACSOP blocks that involve engineer assets cre- go through it. We updated our quarter- ating tank scrapes — but it was better ing party and assembly area procedures After scrubbing the TACSOP, we based on the advice of a career 11B/ than the annoying “card” method used used it at Yakima Training Center that by Fort Knox that jumps around from summer. We were encouraged when 11M so that when the 1-149 AR gets point to point during the battle. that cross-attached infantry company, our AC/RC advisors asked for a copy the TACSOP is ready for them. • Incorporate your battle tracking of it and their eyes got big, as they were able to flip through it easily and natu- Our TACSOP still wasn’t perfect, but mechanisms. It is vital that the commander and his staff have accurate, rally, and find almost everything they it was improving, and more impor- timely information on the fight. How were looking for. The points they sug- tantly, everyone was helping make it gested, such as an improved casualty better. many of the battalion’s standard reports correlate directly to the battle tracking evacuation procedure, were incorpo- After Yakima, I gathered up all of the charts used in the TOC? Can the RTO rated into subsequent editions of the TACSOP. notes I compiled and started on my fill out the chart without an interpreter revisions. Since the 1-149 AR was so to show him where all the information The single best idea to emerge from close to Silicon Valley, I had jokingly goes? If not, then either the charts or the TACSOP development was the dubbed the Janus copy of the TACSOP the reports need to be redone. brainchild of then-CPT Bill Beane, our the “beta” version, and after Yakima, I • S3 Air. CPT Beane offered numerous distributed “TACSOP 2.0” to the bat- The last issue, training, is both vital and the easiest to rectify. Every officer tidbits of advice from his active-duty talion, along with a complete set of all and senior NCO in the battalion should days with the 11th ACR on the inter- documents, report formats, and charts, German border and his days with the all on disk so subsequent revisions be familiar with the TACSOP contents and should be validated to use the 4th ID at Fort Carson. Every night, the would be easier. I left the 1-149 AR for document by some form of test. CPT battalion held a command and staff South Carolina when my civilian job brief at the TOC, where all the staff pulled me away, but I left knowing that Beane one night jokingly asked as one of his questions, “What’s the third item sections, commanders, and other lead- we, as a battalion, had created a useful in the right column of the ‘A’ bag pack- ers (UMCP, scout platoon, battalion living document that people actually surgeon, etc.) would gather to report on referred to instead of stashing it in their ing list?” Everyone chuckled, but when we all went to look it up, we found the that day’s events and the plans for the rucks in case an OC asks to see a copy MOPP suit in a duffel bag in the com- next day. At the opening of every meet- of it. ing, CPT Beane would hand out a sheet pany 2½-ton truck instead of with the Lessons Learned soldier in his ruck. That was quickly of paper to everyone in the tent and ask fixed. four questions, directly out of the TACSOP. The intention was two-fold: If you really want to learn how a battalion task force is supposed to operate (1) to force the leaders of the battalion in combat, don’t simply read the TAC- to crack the book and examine those CPT Brant Guillory was commis- same things they were asking their sol- SOP, endeavor to write one. The most sioned through ROTC at North Car- important lesson you learn is that the diers to know by heart, and (2) to bring TACSOP changes — constantly. The olina State University and served to light controversial or questionable 3½ years on active duty as a pla- issues so that they could be discussed real challenge is putting those changes in the hands of someone knowledge- toon leader, headquarters company with all the principals present. A few able to update them throughout the executive officer, assistant opera- examples of what we found: unit. An officer or senior NCO who has tions officer, and liaison officer. • The CSS slice accompanying a been in the battalion long enough to see Since joining the National Guard in cross-attached company was too small. it maneuver and understand how it op- 1998, he has served as a tactical • Nowhere did the TACSOP specify erates is essential for TACSOP devel- intelligence officer, battalion S2, opment and updating. who controlled the movement of the and battalion adjutant. He is cur- mortars during the battle and who told The problems found while creating or rently the BMO of 1-263 Armor them when to displace and bound. revising TACSOPs are simple to de- (SCARNG). • The battalion TACSOP gave spe- scribe, but difficult to rectify. cific guidance to each company for the • The most serious issue is the inclu- CPT Guillory would like to thank composition of its quartering party sion of doctrinal information that is MAJ Russell Dewell and COL Ken within the framework of the battalion standard across the Army. A simple Guillory for their help in developing quartering party, instead of simply say- rule of thumb: if it’s in a manual some- this article. 42 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Fighting a Hundred Battles: Using TacOps to Produce Experienced Captains for the Mounted Force

Major Wayne Cherry and Major Joseph McLamb

At 0700, the commander of the forward security element crosses Bicycle Lake, heading north toward his battalion’s objective of Granite Pass. The situation is extremely unclear; he has no report of enemy contact. Shaking himself to overcome the fatigue of continuous operations, he looks at his digital map and sees that the CRP is moving north of the western entrance to Hidden Valley. He di- rects the remainder of the FSE to follow. The battalion command net crackles, and the company commander receives a FRAGO: seize Hill 876. He forwards the order to the CRP, mentally wondering if the enemy is already on the objective. Suddenly, a flank platoon reports contact to the east. An icon showing two enemy HMMWVs appears on the commander’s digital map at the western end of Hidden Valley. The platoon in contact is engaging with ATGMs, but the commander’s mind races to far more important conclusions. If the enemy has scouts in Hidden Valley... Almost frantically, the commander reorients his force to the east, but already the digital map shows two enemy tank platoons emerging from Hidden Valley, at- tacking into the FSE’s open flank. At 1300, the same commander looks at his digital map again. This time he sees that his friendly forces include a RSTA squadron recce troop, a platoon of MGSs, 6 OH- 58D Kiowa Warriors, and four UAVs. As he mentally adjusts to this new task organization, he inspects the terrain on the map. The open spaces of the Mojave Desert have given way to the swampy lowlands of Camp Lejeune. As he tries to think through the effects of the change in terrain, the radio crackles: “FRAGO, enemy MIBN de- tected at AB123456, moving east...” No, this poor commander is not trapped in the twilight zone or in a tactician’s purgatory. In fact, both of these battles, and many others like them, occur within the walls of Skidgel Hall, home of the Armor Captains Course at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Using an off-the-shelf computer simulation and standard laptop computers, the course requires student officers to quickly adapt to a changing environment, assess the situation, make decisions quickly, and learn from the results. in an environment marked by uncertainty and limited time. He is knowledgeable, but inexperienced; educated, but not Background confident. If you’ve ever given any thought to training captains, then Recently, the Armor Captains Course has taken a number of you’ve probably concluded that the long pole in the tent is steps in an attempt to overcome this deficiency. Our goal is experience. While it is relatively easy to give a young cap- to place student officers into multiple tactical and leadership tain all the information he needs to be successful, making scenarios, in an environment of uncertainty, little time, and him an experienced leader is much more difficult. It is so limited resources, and require the student to make decisions. difficult, in fact, that we rely almost completely on “on-the- If we force a student officer to do this once, we’ve made job training” to provide the necessary experience. In the vast some progress. But if we can get him to do it one hundred majority of cases, when a young captain arrives at his first times — each time with feedback within the scenario and unit he has never had to put all his new knowledge to work from his small group instructor — against an enemy that is ARMOR — May-June 2001 43 The responses from both small group instructors and student officers have been very positive. TacOps is easy to use, can be loaded on any standard laptop computer, provides visual and audio feedback, and is frequently described by student officers as “fun.”

trying hard to win, then we are well on our way to providing organization. You will also find that certain pieces of equip- experienced captains to the force. Constructive simulations ment are missing (the AVLM, for example), but that this is allow us to put a student into a hundred battles at almost no fairly easy to work around. In fact, the whole order of battle cost. issue is overcome very simply by designing your own scenarios. Constructive simulations have long been a part of officer training. In the Captains Course, we use Janus and BBS for The third and most significant shortfall of TacOps is terrain large-scale CPXs and for one-on-one adaptive decision- modeling. The terrain in the program has only two levels — making exercises. But such simulations are resource- ground level and high terrain. The designer attempts to over- intensive, require extensive coordination, and are not easy to come this oversimplification by applying an abstraction to use. For that reason, we recently bought the site license for the problem. All terrain in TacOps is labeled by level of TacOps. “roughness” – Rough0 through Rough4. These levels affect the mobility of the terrain, but have a much more important TacOps 3.0 is a constructive simulation of modern tactical effect on line of sight. The level of roughness indicates the combat that can run on a standard PC. It was designed by a retired Marine officer, MAJ I. L. Holdridge, and has been availability of intervisibility lines, small clumps of trees, etc., that would allow a stationary unit to find cover and conceal- purchased as a training device by the United States Marine ment. A unit moving across Rough4 terrain, for example, Corps, and the armies of Australia, New Zealand, and recently Canada. The University of Mounted Warfare version, might easily drop “out of sight” once it stopped moving. This abstraction isn’t always exactly right for a given piece of called TacOpsCav, should be available to all Army units terrain, but proves surprisingly accurate in most situations. within the next few months. Our experience so far has been that TacOps comes close The responses from both small group instructors and stu- enough to getting it right that you can conduct a TEWT in dent officers have been very positive. TacOps is easy to use, the morning on actual terrain, then fight that piece of terrain can be loaded on any standard laptop computer, provides on TacOps in the afternoon with little loss of fidelity, as long visual and audio feedback, and is frequently described by as you accept the inability of the program to accurately re- student officers as “fun.” It has tremendous potential for flect that individual IV line that you saw on the TEWT. training captains, and can easily be used to train officers and NCOs within units. Making the Most of the Resource First, the Shortfalls At the Armor Captains Course, we use TacOps for a great number of activities, ranging from quick and simple to very TacOps has a lot to offer the trainer, but it has three major complex. As you can see, some or most of these can easily shortfalls that you must understand and accept from the be adapted to operational unit training. beginning. 1. Demonstrations of simple tactical concepts: Small group First, it requires some knowledge of the computer com- instructors use TacOps to reach the visual learners in the mands to get the results that you want. Before you can effec- classroom. A common demonstration involves the use of tively use the program as a training tool, you must first be intervisibility lines. The SGI places a single M2 platoon in a proficient with the program yourself. The program comes defensive posture, then launches an enemy tank company at with a built-in tutorial, as well as a 200+ page on-line man- it. The M2 platoon usually destroys three of four tanks be- ual, so all the necessary information is easy to get. By spend- fore it is itself destroyed. In a second iteration, the SGI ing some time working with the program in advance, you places the platoon at the crest of an IV line, with orders to shorten the amount of time spent inputting orders to the fire, employ the vehicles’ smoke grenades, and back off the units. Before trying to use TacOps for unit training, start IV line 200 meters. In this second scenario, the M2 platoon with the tutorial. Small group instructors at the Captains kills three or four tanks, then withdraws safely, usually with- Course report that they achieved a reasonable level of profi- out loss. This simple demonstration, which normally takes ciency in 4-8 hours. less than ten minutes, often clears up the mystery of intervisibility lines for the visual learners in the small group. The second major shortcoming is that the Blue order of battle doesn’t exactly match any current U.S. unit. The reason is 2. Tactical decision games: These short, relatively simple very simple — since the Army doesn’t a have single organi- tactical problems have long been a part of leader training. zation for all of our units, the game designer used a hybrid TacOps allows SGIs to take the TDG one step further. In- 44 ARMOR — May-June 2001

tician over the length of the course. In the past, we selected this officer by means of a formal board. Appear- ing before a group of senior instructors, candidates for the award answered questions on doctrine and tactics, then prepared a verbal FRAGO for a company operation. Based on the collective input of the board members, one student officer was selected for the Tactics Award. Recently, we changed the methodology. Now, candidates for the Tactics Award face each other in short tactical engagements fought on TacOps. A candi- date may find himself required to attack or defend, using U.S. or other equipment, on terrain that is extremely varied. The most recent winner of the Tactics Award was undefeated as a U.S. tank company, an OPFOR reinforced motorized infantry company, and a reinforced U.S. recce troop from a RISTA squadron. stead of debating student solutions, now small groups actu- Looking Down the Road ally fight the battle. Learning is vastly enhanced because the The site license purchased by 16th Cavalry Regiment in- student sees the results of his decisions played out on the cludes several upgrades in the software that should be com- battlefield, rather than simply discussed with his peers and plete by early summer of 2001. The major improvements instructor. Building a simple TDG on TacOps requires little include: overhead, and can usually be conducted and AAR’ed within • an hour. The inclusion of the M1A2 SEP in the unit database; • 3. Force-on-force engagements: Using the local area net- Significant refinement in the ability of the simulation to work, two computers can fight the same TacOps battle si- replicate urban terrain, to include both major cities and multaneously, one as the Blue force and one as the Red. Of urban sprawl; all the uses of TacOps, this seems to generate the greatest • The inclusion of various forces other than the Blue and level of student enthusiasm. Putting students in a head-to- the Red force, to replicate civilians, non-governmental head engagement verifies the old adage: Americans play to organizations, criminals, refugees, etc.; and win! We’ve found that students try harder and learn more • when we place them in direct tactical competition. These Expansion of the LAN capability to allow more than two scenarios tend to be more involved, often taking two to three work stations in a given fight. hours to conduct and AAR. Even with these upgrades, TacOps will not match the bat- 4. Rehearsals: Students have adapted TacOps to their own tlefield fidelity of our better known constructive and virtual needs in several ways. One of the most successful has been simulations. Its ease of use, minimal computer requirements, in conducting rehearsals. Prior to conducting a company and extreme portability, however, make TacOps a valuable mission in CCTT, some small groups rehearse the operation training tool in the hands of innovative and aggressive train- in the classroom using TacOps. Across the board, the result ers within our training institutions and our units. has a company operation that was markedly better than those that did not include a TacOps rehearsal. At the task force level, small groups sometimes use TacOps as a tool during MAJ Joseph McLamb is an infantryman currently serv- the course of action analysis to validate courses of action, ing as the commander of O Troop, 3rd Squadron, 16th access casualties as part of the wargame, etc. Several small Cavalry Regiment. His previous assignments include groups have found TacOps to be particularly useful for plan- observer/controller at the Joint Readiness Training ning and rehearsing reconnaissance and security operations. Center, company commander in the 101st Airborne Finally, small groups often use TacOps to introduce addi- Division (Air Assault), and tours at the National Training tional enemy forces or courses of action into a scenario, ex- ploring new options for friendly branch plans. Center and in Korea.

5. Command post exercise: This is definitely the most re- MAJ Wayne G. Cherry Jr. was commissioned a Dis- source-intensive use of TacOps in the Captains Course. To tinguished Military Graduate from Mount Saint Mary’s exercise students as a task force staff, we place the company College, Md., in 1987. He served as tank platoon lead- commanders in one location with the TacOps computer, and place the staff elsewhere with radios and TOC facilities. The er, scout platoon leader, adjutant, and Delta Company staff receives only that information provided by the company commander in 1-35 AR, Erlangen, Germany. Following commanders. Typically, we have both a Blue and a Red staff Desert Storm, he was assistant S3, 1ATB, Ft. Knox, fighting each other. Again, student involvement and enthusi- Ky. After AOAC, he served as S3 air and commander asm is remarkable. A standard task force exercise can run of Charlie Company and HHC/3-69 AR, 24th ID (M), Ft. from four hours to a full day, and requires a TOC facility of Stewart, Ga. Additional assignments include observer some sort as well as radios. We often use handheld commer- controller at the NTC, Ft. Irwin, Calif; AOBC Division cial radios for these exercises. Chief, Ft. Knox, Ky.; and small group instructor, Armor 6. Tactics Award: Our course has for many years recog- Captains Career Course. MAJ Cherry is currently the nized the student officer who distinguished himself as a tac- Nomad Troop Commander for ACCC. ARMOR — May-June 2001 45 LETTERS from Page 4 from training exclusively. To quell any argu- infantry can disembark in relative safety modeled after the CIB to enhance its pres- ment, look at the three-tank platoon opera- when compared to the Centurion-based tige. For the past fifty years, the CIB and the tions by the Russians in Afghanistan... it was heavy APCs. EIB have become two of the most prestig- abysmal. ious awards to adorn the American soldier’s • The Centurion-based Puma combat en- uniform. It seems that we question the wis- ERIC D. SCHULTZE gineer vehicle was overlooked in the article. dom of our forebears by advancing the no- CPT, Armor, NYARNG Although heavily protected, the Puma is less tion of both a Combat Armor Badge and/or S1, 1st Battalion, 108th Infantry cumbersome than the other Centurion-based an Expert Armor Badge. carriers. It is a hybrid design, part combat engineer vehicle, and part kangaroo carrier. Do we really need an expert qualification or Some Additional Information According to IDF tactical doctrine, the Puma combat recognition badge in the armor and On Israel’s “Heavy APCs” would be used alongside the Achzarit in cavalry community? Since the dawn of combined operations. mounted warfare, military leaders — and the empires they represented — viewed the Dear Sir: The enormous efforts the U.S. is making in cavalry forces as their elite troops. The cav- developing light armored forces suitable for alry was (and still is) the most expensive As an avid reader of ARMOR magazine, I rapid deployment is perfectly understand- enjoyed the interesting article in the March- armed ground service to maintain. For this able. It matches perceived political needs reason, only the best troops and leaders April issue, Deployable Versus Survivable, and real logistical constraints. It may prove by SFC Ira L. Partridge. I agree with most were considered for positions in the cavalry. to be a costly mistake. Even the most ad- As a result, the mounted arm has always aspects of SFC Partridge’s analysis, but as vanced LAV can be outfaced by some de- the author of a recent book on IDF tank- been imbued with a sense of élan. “We are crepit T-55 “Warlord Special.” Perhaps it is the best. Give us the toughest missions, and based carriers, I do have some disagree- too soon to write off heavy armor and, in ments with his description of these heavy we will not let you down.” The mission of the particular, heavy APCs for peace enforce- cavalry is the toughest in the army. The cav- APCs. (See Military Briefs 2. Israeli Tank ment missions. The Israeli (and Russian) Based Carriers, by Marsh Gelbart, Mouse alry covers greater frontages and distances, development of heavy, survivable, infantry operates over longer periods of time with House Enterprises, Woden, Australia. 2000. carriers flies in the face of current orthodoxy. ISBN 0-9577586-1-8) little or no rest, providing security for the Yet is the current orthodoxy a false doctrine? commander’s scheme of maneuver. The re- I do not believe that the IDF would classify I hope I am wrong, but I can foresee a situa- ward of having such a mission is sublime. the M113 with reactive armor, known as the tion in which Western forces may “fly light, Being a part of the cavalry is its own reward. Classical, as a heavy APC. Their heavy but die early.” No other branch, to include the infantry, can APCs are all tank-based and fall into three MARSH GELBART claim such distinction. This is why I became main categories. an armor officer.

• Those APCs based on the Centurion hull, Historically, no one can say that being in the Nagmashot, Nagmachon, and most re- Correction the infantry is its own reward. There is no cently the Nakpadon. glamour or élan inherent in the world’s oldest Editor’s Note: SFC Ira Partridge’s article branch of arms. Therefore, to enhance the These Centurion-based carriers are opti- included an illustration of the Israeli Achzarit prestige of infantry service, the élan has to mized for use in high threat, counter-insur- APC that neglected to credit the photogra- be created artificially. This is why our infantry gency operations in rough terrain. They are pher, Marsh Gelbart, who holds the copyright brethren are notoriously “badge happy.” not suitable for combined operations, being on the photo. We apologize for the error. Mr. too slow and unwieldy. In addition, these Gelbart is the author of a recently-published After my unit (4-7 Cav, 3AD) was rede- AFVs do not have adequate provision for book on heavy Israeli personnel carriers ployed back to Germany in my younger lieu- infantry to disembark under fire. SFC Par- developed from obsolete tanks. This book is tenant days, we heard the rumors of a CAB tridge’s statement that “A modification allows currently under review for the magazine’s being created. Like everyone else, I thought troops to exit from the rear” is misleading. In book column. it was a good idea. “Boy...that’ll look good on fact, infantry have to clamber, one by one, our uniforms!” We were all disappointed out of a rather awkward and narrow hatch, when the promise never came to fruition. onto the engine decking of the machine’s Over time, it was forgotten. This recent de- hull and then disembark by jumping to the No Badges Needed for Esprit: bate has caused me to reflect on the ques- ground. Although special ballistic side-skirts Armor-Cav Is Elite Enough tion of why the proposal is being partially can be hinged upwards, offering some pro- revisited. There are good intentions on both tection whilst infantry are debussing, they Dear Sir: sides of the issue. The problem is that we remain terribly vulnerable to artillery air- seem to have forgotten why the CIB (and to bursts. In this whole EAB/CAB debate, it seems a lesser extent, the EIB) was created and • The T-55 tank-based carrier, the Ach- we’re putting the cart before the horse. Ac- what it represents to a branch that deserves zarit, is designed for combined arms opera- cording to the Army Officer’s Guide, 48th special recognition. Like Congresswoman tions. It is intended to function as a heavy Edition, the Combat Infantryman’s Badge Patricia Schroeder, who wanted to award the assault carrier. Rather than simply being “was created at the behest of Lieutenant CIB to female MPs who participated in Pa- used to “protect and deliver a squad of dis- General Leslie McNair, CG, Army Ground nama, we are missing the point. It’s not mounted infantry to the battlefield” the Ach- Forces during World War II. It was created about participation in minor firefights, or zarit is intended to traverse that battlefield. It for the formal recognition of the unique dan- about being sucked into the vortex of an is capable, thanks to 14 tons of appliqué gers and conditions of infantry duty in com- intense tank battle. It’s about recognizing the passive armor added to the baseline protec- bat. The contributions made and hardships burden we place on the infantry grunt, most tion offered by its hull, of crossing through sustained by the other branches were con- of whom did not choose to be where they the fire-zone to deliver its infantry onto an sidered but were deemed to be sufficiently were. The CIB/EIB seeks to (and succeeds objective. It can accomplish this journey with recognizable by existing awards.” (p. 569) in) recognizing the thankless and dirty chore at least the same chance of survival as a The Infantry Board at Fort Benning created of infantry duty. I tip my Stetson to my infan- top-of-the-range MBT. the Expert Infantry Badge after World War II try brethren. But we do not need their to establish a criterion of standards that re- badges or cords. For we have jined the cav- As SFC Partridge points out, the Achzarit warded those who proved they could pass a alry. And that has made all the difference in has a clamshell rear hatch. By virtue of this, rigorous qualification test. The award was the world. 46 ARMOR — May-June 2001

The intent of the EAB is noteworthy. Test ing the controversy over an Expert Armor Mr. Hilmes really built up the M-48, but the skills of tankers and scouts. It is a right Badge and the latest demoralizing decision failed to compare the original early M-48 with and good thing. But the creation of a qualifi- on berets, and also “Modern German Tank later models. The A2 was still a big, fat awk- cation or a combat recognition badge is Development” by Rolf Hilmes. ward boat, but handled like a different tank. completely unnecessary. The Israelis threw away the M1 TC cupola If anyone is counting, chalk up a big yes in and installed their Urdan cupola, which I ROBERT E. RICKS, III favor of the Badge. Since the infantry guys wish we had done. In Vietnam, many M-1 CPT, Armor have been sporting their award for years, it’s cupolas had a cal .50 pintle welded on so the O Troop/3-16 Cav about time that tankers, who draw more fire TC could have a functional machine gun. I

than those guys in the grass, are authorized disagree with his writing that the 48 sur- to wear something equal in rank and honor. “World’s Champion Tanker” passed the 47 in dependability and mobility. As for the beret... bummer of a decision! It The 48A1s in Germany had to have racks Didn’t Want an Armor Badge was bad enough to shed the venerable and installed behind the back deck to carry four super sharp ODs, where one could ID a 55-gal. fuel drums, copied from the Soviets, Dear Sir: tanker from the gold (earlier green) cap like the M-48 design was copied from the braid, and the fact that we wore our over- Soviet JS-3. I doubt that Mr. Hilmes is very As seems to happen every time we get a seas cap on the left. Now we all wear the new Chief of Staff, certain parties have re- familiar with either the M-47 or 48. Reading same generic “bus driver’s” AG44 uniform, historical figures and books is not the same cently begun clamoring for an “Armor Badge” where no branch esprit is allowed. Now the similar to the “Combat Infantryman’s Badge.” as being out there in the mud, ice, and dust, COS is knocking morale in the head once working with the artifact in question. It is useful to know how General Creighton more by degrading the value of the beret. Abrams felt about the issue, one he had Thanks for an outstanding publication. good credentials for addressing. In regards to the article on German armor development, I was quite taken back by the 1SG W. CAMPBELL Abrams led the 37th Tank Battalion across way Mr. Hilmes put down the M-47. He via email

Europe during the battles of World War II, makes it sound as if that tank was a poor earning a reputation as one of the Army’s top performer. In my many years working with (Editor’s Note: Author Hilmes personal ex- young leaders. Said General George S. M-46s, 47s, and 48s, I would have to say perience as a German tanker goes back to Patton: “I’m supposed to be the best tank that the M-47 was an outstanding tank in the M-48 days.) commander in the Army, but I have one peer regards to maneuverability and dependabil- — Abe Abrams. He’s the world’s champion.” ity. He hit on two major deficiencies in the poor rangefinder system and the high sil- Later, serving as Vice Chief of Staff of the houette. The stereo RF was not very good, The Fight for Information Army during one of the periodic efforts on but the only thing we had at the time. And at Persisted Through the Ages someone’s part to get a badge for non- 11 ft. high, it did pose a good target. The infantrymen, Abrams wrote that “we have not most devastating deficiency, however, which Dear Sir: only kept the infantry badge pure but have he did not mention, was the totally absurd, thwarted every attempt at another badge for I wish to comment on the Commander’s idiotic ammo stowage. There were 11 ready other people so that the significance of the Hatch article, “Is Information Superiority All rack rounds and 60 under the turret basket infantry badge would continue undiluted.” He It’s Cracked Up to Be?” (March-April 2001 which, in a combat situation, were almost was not going to change that policy, Abrams ARMOR – Ed.) unavailable. A later development did away said, a stance he continued during his later service as Chief of Staff. with the basket and totally revised the ammo Thinking of information superiority as system, but the M-47 was then on the way though it is some new 21st century warfight- That position was entirely congruent with out. Outside of these deficiencies, the M-47 ing concept reveals a very shallow under- the original objective of General George C. was an extremely maneuverable and de- standing of the history of warfare. Of course, Marshall in approving a CIB for the infantry- pendable tank. The Israelis greatly modified information is important. Sun Tzu spelled it man. “I want his role made clear and exit with the M-60’s 105 and fire control, diesel out 2,500 years ago. About 1,200 B.C., alted,” said Marshall. That is still a good engine, and modified ammo stowage. It was Odysseus disguised himself in order to enter policy, one that tankers and other soldiers of known as the M-47RKM and did exception- and collect intel on Troy. The Bible tells us all arms should support. ally well against modern Soviet tanks at that about Moses sending spies into the Prom- time. ised Land in advance of the main body. LEWIS SORLEY

Editor’s Note: Lewis Sorley spent twenty years as an officer in tank and armored cavalry units, and is the author of “Thunderbolt: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of Tank Panel Set for Armor Conference His Times.” As part of this year’s Armor Conference, there will be an International Tank Panel at Haszard Auditorium, Gaffey Hall, beginning at 1230 on May 22. Experts will make a Comments on Uniform Items brief presentation on each of five major main battle tanks, including the Abrams, the Past and Present British Challenger II, German Leopard 2A5, French LeClerc, and the Russian T-90. Following the presentations, there will be an audience discussion period that will cover future tank requirements in the areas of lethality, survivability, mobility, command and Dear Sir: control, and sustainability. The panel and discussion will be unclassified. My ARMOR Magazine is very instrumental The subject matter experts will include LTC Ulf Bartels of Germany, LTC Shaun Wil- in keeping me abreast of the mind-boggling son of the UK, LTC Martin Klotz speaking on the French LeClerc, COL James H. technical advances we are making in my Nunn on the Abrams, and U.S. LTC John Paulson, who will do the presentation on the former combat field. It also makes me feel as Russian T-90. if I am still “with the program.” Although I retired in 1980 after 25 years, I am very ac- Sponsoring the event is TSM Abrams, Fort Knox. tive as a 1SG in the South Carolina State Guard... I enjoyed reading the letters regard- ARMOR — May-June 2001 47

Information correlates to security. The bet- While I may not have always agreed with dying, he must recognize that combat- ter the information the better the security. some of his assertions, I could not criticize effective vehicles with combat-effective The problems come with the accuracy of the his work on the basis of a flawed or incom- crews must get to the fight. In order to information and capability to act on it. Inac- plete foundation of facts. In my opinion, his achieve “mission accomplishment,” armored curate reports, failure to detect, misidentifica- most recent contribution to ARMOR com- vehicles and their crews must survive. tion, disorientation, delayed or lost reports, pletely departs from this sterling record of Therefore, the dynamic of survivability — in decoys, disinformation, camouflage, coun- well-grounded observations. the modern sense of the term — is perhaps terreconnaissance patrols, and spoiling at- an issue that should mean “jack****” to him. tacks have hamstrung “information opera- The “famous triad of armor” cited by Major tions” throughout history. And as our techni- Bateman is actually “firepower, mobility, and Major Bateman would have us believe that cal capabilities improve, so do the enemy’s shock effect.” The triad is represented by the the dynamic of survivability is solely a con- countercapabilities. That’s why commanders cannon, the track, and the lighting bolt as cern of the Armor community. If he is correct, can never blindly trust their information and seen on the unit patch of the first mecha- how does he explain the M2A3 Bradley must plan contingencies and anticipate sur- nized brigade at Fort Knox in the late 1930s Fighting Vehicle and “Land Warrior?” Were prises and reversals. Likewise, time and and the unit patches currently worn by the no improvements made to the Bradley which distance limit options. If the enemy can re- 1st and 49th Armored Divisions and the U.S. make the A3 more “survivable” than the A2? deploy or reinforce faster than you can ma- Army Armor Center. In his article, Major Again, let’s look at the modern understand- neuver and strike, even perfect information Bateman frames his thoughts under the ing of survivability. The M2A3 Bradley is helps little other than to suggest aborting the words “armor,” “firepower,” and “maneuver.” equipped with second-generation FLIR, al- operation. Hence, the timeless need for se- His choice of these terms confuses the is- lowing it to acquire targets at a greater range quential operations to set the secure base sue. Having read his remarks carefully, I than the A2. Does this capability increase from which simultaneous strikes can be believe Major Bateman is attempting to ad- not only the lethality, but also the survivabil- launched. dress what would more accurately be de- ity of the A3 Bradley and its crew? If the A3 scribed as the dynamics of armored fighting crew can engage outside the effective range To suggest that there was an alternative to vehicles: survivability, lethality, and mobility. of the enemy’s weapons systems, are they the “sequential” operations in Tunisia, Sicily, Using this terminology for the sake of clarity, better “protected” than before? Of course and Italy in WWII ignores real world limita- several problems with Major Bateman’s they are. Is a “more lethal” soldier a better- tions and the scale of the operation. The piece become readily apparent. protected one? If a soldier equipped with the Allies could strike in any one of many places, “Land Warrior” suite can observe targets but lacked the assets to launch and sustain around the corner of a building, this repre- 1. Survivability. Equating survivability (or simultaneous decisive attacks. By compari- sents an increase in the dynamics of lethality “protection” in Major Bateman’s words) son, though Ia Drang in Vietnam was a and survivability. As I understand it, both the solely in terms of armor thickness is a long- small-scale operation, it plainly demonstrates A3 and the “Land Warrior” do not fall under outdated practice. Survivability of an ar- the risk of trusting information and ignoring proponent agencies of the “Armor commu- mored fighting vehicle is more commonly sequential operations. The initial airmobile nity.” It would appear then, that “other peo- regarded as a synergistic result of several (simultaneous) strike was successful, but ple” besides the “Armor community” are factors. Among these factors are: protection was followed by a disastrous ambush due to indeed “worrying about Force Protection.” inadequate security during the return to the against direct and indirect fire, the ability to destroy the enemy outside the effective landing zone. 2. Lethality. To a large degree, as has range of his weapons system and the capa- been previously mentioned, the line between Sequential and simultaneous operations bility to quickly reposition one’s own system the dynamics of survivability and lethality is are interdependent, not alternatives. Strate- from a position of vulnerability to one which blurred. A relative advantage gained in one gic and operational level warfare is sequen- offers the optimal angle of fire. Most profes- of these dynamics generally results in a tial, while tactical operations can be simulta- sionals who fight from an armored vehicle residual advantage in the other. On the sub- neous, and historic examples are countless. address survivability in regard to these fac- ject of lethality (addressed in the article as The key is to mass overwhelming combat tors. When Major Bateman asserts that he “FIREPOWER”), Major Bateman seems to power. The first step in massing is to deter- hears his “armored brethren” speak solely in have a shortsighted view of what armored mine enemy strength. That requires informa- terms of rolled homogeneous armor when vehicles can do for him. “Terminal effects” tion that is accurate and reliable, and hence discussing “protection,” we can only wonder: are measured not only in terms of hitting the challenge. who are these anonymous people and how “that fourth floor window,” but also in terms current is their experience in the arena of So what’s new? of that convoy of trucks carrying dismounts armored warfare? I know of no tanker or to reinforce that “fourth floor window” and all CHESTER A. KOJRO mechanized infantryman who takes such an the other windows around it. If an armored LTC, AR, USAR (Ret.) outmoded and simplistic view of survivability. vehicle “can accurately ID and hit” those According to Major Bateman, our survivabil- trucks “at 5 km, or 15 km” outside Major “An Infantryman’s Thoughts...”: ity (or “protection” in his parlance) means Bateman’s city or town, isn’t that a greater A Point-by-Point Critique “jack****” to him “as an infantry soldier.” He terminal effect for him and his infantry than the ability to elevate and blast the 4th floor at contends that survivability is “a ‘nice to have’ 250 meters? We need to ensure we’re using Dear Sir: that slips in right behind ‘mission accomplishment’” and adds that the Armor commu- the right tools for the right job. Have the Consider this letter a “tanker’s response” to nity should “focus” on the latter. Further on in mortars tackled that building yet? Where are “An Infantryman’s Thoughts on Armor” as his article, he states the following: “Without the M203s? Have they been apportioned appeared in the January-February issue of you and your armor, more of my boys will against that window? These avenues need ARMOR. Being personally acquainted with die.” How does he reconcile these two to be explored and exhausted before bring- Major Robert Bateman for over 13 years, I statements? An armored vehicle without a ing any armored vehicle in to deal with the never counted myself among his detractors crew is useless. A destroyed armored vehi- problem. Additionally, Major Bateman seems — those individuals he proudly characterizes cle with a dead crew is equally useless. In to forget that there are already weapons on as “annoyed” readers. On the contrary, I’ve light of this, survivability is more than “a nice certain armored vehicles that can achieve found the majority of Major Bateman’s arti- to have.” If Major Bateman is counting on the the necessary elevation at the range he cites cles to be interesting and thought-provoking. Armor community to prevent his “boys” from (i.e., the 25mm on the Bradley). 48 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Table X from Page 36 Cavalry Table X was a great training event for our squadron, and the methodology and insights we hope will be A final note on lethality. Contrary to Major are we so resistant to this potential necessity useful across the Armor and Cavalry Bateman’s inferences, the current main bat- now? Obsolete armor? Light armor? Theo- community. Most importantly, the ex- tle tank of the United States Army can in- retically, defeating such a threat should be ercise highlighted once again the fun- deed “shoot through walls, or knock down within the capabilities of the intermediate damentals of METT-T analysis, PCIs, walls or buildings.” In the near future, the force; bridging is not an issue in this sce- rehearsals, battle drills, and noncom- Armor community will also be fielding a can- nario. missioned officers leading from the ister round, which, if used correctly, can Major Bateman gives considerable shrift to front. The focus on scout sections, the facilitate the operations of a combined arms logistical support for an armored force. fundamental maneuver unit in the team in numerous tactical environments. We Unless someone develops a solar-powered can indeed “remodel” a building for you, if squadron, and the level at which infor- armored fighting vehicle, any mechanized that is how you choose to “maximize” our mation is won or lost, also enabled the force (tank, Bradley or LAV-equipped) is go- capabilities. No mounted soldier I know squadron leadership to get a first-hand ing to require fuel. That being said, is Major “whines” about the use of armor in cities and assessment of the quality of training at Bateman aware of the various measures built-up areas. If anything we may, as that level. currently being implemented by the “Armor thoughtful professionals who are fully aware community” in order to decrease the length of the advantages our vehicle brings to the of our logistical tail? One of these initiatives battlefield, question the wisdom of expending is the Abrams-Crusader Common Engine such a valuable asset in the pursuit of a MAJ Christopher D. Kolenda is cur- Program. Through this program, every tank “home improvement project.” rently the regimental S3, 2nd Ar- in the fleet will be retrofitted with a new turbine engine. The newer engines have a mored Cavalry Regiment, after serv- 3. Mobility. In the subsection entitled higher rate of reliability and fuel-efficiency ing as the S3 of 3rd Squadron. A “MANEUVER,” Major Bateman is actually (resulting in reduced CLIX demands and 1987 graduate of the Military Acad- discussing mobility, not maneuver. He talks lower fuel consumption rates for a deployed exclusively about getting from Point A to emy, his assignments include tank force). Point B, mentioning nothing about fires (sup- platoon leader, scout platoon leader, porting or otherwise); his use of the opera- As a final comment on “An Infantryman’s and troop XO in 3rd Squadron, 11th tional term “maneuver” is therefore inappro- Thoughts on Armor,” I should like to roundly ACR. After the Advanced Course, priate. He limits his discussion of mobility to reject Major Bateman’s characterization of the strategic and operational levels of war the Armor community’s response to trans- he was the squadron motor officer of and I will do the same. Major Bateman as- formation. As an Armor officer I take excep- 1-7 Cavalry, then commander of A sures us the “either the Navy or the Air Force tion to his accusation that we, “as a branch,” Troop, 1-7 Cavalry at Fort Hood, will take us to the dance.” Will they really? are not supporting transformation “100 per- Texas. He holds a Master’s Degree Do they have the requisite number of lift cent.” He would do well to avoid sweeping in History from the University of Wis- aircraft or roll-on/roll-off ships to carry a generalizations, particularly those pregnant sizeable force to any dance, anywhere at with inferences of recalcitrance (at best) and consin-Madison, and taught History anytime? Ignoring the subject of heavy ar- disloyalty (at worst). I believe that the Armor at the United States Military Acad- mor for a minute, what can they do? How community has embraced the idea of a force emy. many light armored vehicles can they carry that would bridge the current gap between at this exact moment? What size force does light and heavy units. Has there been pro- CPT Raymond C. Zindell is com- that translate into? I purposely used the word fessional discussion and debate on the mander, K Troop, 3/2 ACR, after “can” and not “could.” I’m not interested in topic? Absolutely. Most of this discussion what “could” be accomplished, as that gen- revolves around system platforms for the recently serving as the assistant S3 erally entails prerequisites that are infeasible force and is framed in the dynamics of sur- of the squadron. He is a 1995 grad- (i.e. if we used every aircraft in the fleet we vivability, lethality, and mobility. Is such dis- uate of Gannon University in Erie, could....). I want to know what they can do cussion healthy and appropriate? Absolutely. Pa., with a BA in Criminal Justice. right now. I suspect that the answer would Among professional soldiers, constructive cause Major Bateman to be a little less con- discourse is always healthy and should not His assignments include tank pla- fident in transportation to “the dance.” My be confused with recalcitrance. I would think, toon, task force scout platoon lead- point is not to cast aspersions on our sister that given his long history of (frequently con- er, and battalion liaison officer for 1st services. I do believe, however, that strategic troversial) literary contributions to the profes- Battalion, 63rd Armor in Vilseck, mobility is not simply the responsibility or sion, Major Bateman, above all others, would Germany. purview of the “Armor community.” Maybe understand the difference. the Army is not the only service that should explore force structure transformation. RONALD J. BASHISTA SSG Mark A. Aide is the senior MAJ, Armor small group instructor for 1st Pla- Regarding operational mobility, what threat Fort Hood, Texas toon, 19D BNCOC at Fort Knox, Ky. is Major Bateman’s force facing? Heavy, modern, world class armor? Then bridges He recently was the master gunner are not a problem; the enemy must be able Correction of 3/2 ACR. He served in Desert to cross them as well. Granted, if he’s Storm with HHT, 1st Squadron, 4th equipped with former Warsaw Pact equip- Armored Cavalry (Division Cavalry) ment, those bridges will require some im- An article in the March-April issue of provement to accommodate our armor. It ARMOR (“Armor, Cavalry, and Transforma- out of Ft. Riley; as a section ser- should be noted, however, that this was the tion...”) stated that the new Long Range Ad- geant with B Troop, 3rd Squadron, same problem we faced in Central Europe vanced Scout Surveillance System (LRAS3) 4th Armored Cavalry (Division Cav- for years outside of the Federal Republic of could be used to designate targets for laser alry) in Schweinfurt, Germany; and Germany during the Cold War. Had a limited spot-homing weapons like the Copperhead as a section sergeant and platoon counterattack been necessary into the Ger- artillery round and Hellfire missile. This is not man Democratic Republic back then, we correct, as the present version of the LRAS3 sergeant with I Troop, 3rd Squadron, were prepared to reinforce the bridges. Why does not have this capability. 2nd ACR at Ft. Polk. ARMOR — May-June 2001 49

Dunkirk Defeat Was a Factor in Final Victory

Dunkirk: From Disaster to Deliver- circumstances, many officers and men rose the things that went right and wrong with ance, Battleground Europe Series, by to the challenge, as the mythology of Dun- the particular implementation of armored Patrick Wilson, Combined Publishing, kirk has long held, but others — not all of tactics. The reader must refer to other Conshohocken, Pa., 1999, 192 pages, them French or Belgian — “lost it.” In nu- sources for examples of these tactics in merous cases, officers averted mass panic actual use. maps, photographs, bibliography, index, only by shooting disobedient troops and, as ISBN 1-58097-046-X, $16.95 (paper). the BEF boarded ships for home, beach The highlights of this book are the numer- masters sometimes shot combat arms offi- ous photographs at the end of each chap- On 5 June 1940, as the last of 338,226 ter. They show German tanks and soldiers defeated British and Allied soldiers escaped cers who attempted to rush the gangplanks ahead of their men. in action, with a caption describing what is continental Europe through the French port right or wrong with the scene displayed. For of Dunkirk, Winston Churchill held no illu- Readers wishing to track down the au- example, a photo of a tank column ap- sions. “We must be very careful not to as- thor’s sources will have trouble with his proaching a burning village includes in the sign to this the attributes of a victory,” he partial citations. Also, because this history caption “Tanks have no business there!” (p. warned. “Wars are not won on evacua- book is also a guidebook, a few current full- 53) The author does not, however, consis- tions.” True enough, yet because it made page color maps would have helped. Those tently identify the equipment, unit, or opera- further resistance to Hitler possible, the shortcomings aside, however, Wilson has tion shown in each photo. The foreword “Miracle of Dunkirk” — Operation Dynamo provided a brief but well-balanced history, does state that the book assumes that the — quickly assumed some of those attrib- and one that makes the wages of poor reader understands German ranks and utes and has retained them. In this latest of discipline and poor planning abundantly vehicle terminology. the Battleground Europe series, Patrick clear. Wilson not only demythologizes the Dunkirk This book provides an excellent back- experience but provides an up-to-date, well JOHN DALEY ground on German armor tactics at battal- illustrated, and easy-to-follow battlefield Assistant Professor of History ion level and below. It adds a valuable the- guidebook. Pittsburg State University oretical background to the existing works Pittsburg, Kan. describing specific battles or units. The Readers not already familiar with the many photographs of tanks and soldiers in events of May and June 1940 will find action also make this book worthwhile to enough historical background on the Phony Panzertaktik: German Small-Unit Ar- modelers and anyone interested in a close- War and Case Yellow in the opening chap- mor Tactics by Wolfgang Schneider, up look at the German Army in World War II ter. Here, Wilson’s myth-busting sometimes translated by Fred Steinhardt, J.J. Fe- . relies on German commentaries, for exam- dorowicz Publishing, Inc., Winnepeg, ple, Heinz Guderian’s view of the much MAJ MONROE HARDEN heralded British stand at Calais as irrele- Canada, 2000, 512 pages, 600+ black PEO-GCSS Field Office vant to the action at Dunkirk. Next comes a and white photographs, with maps and Aberdeen Proving Grounds, Md. diagrams, $85.00 (hardback), ISBN 0- three-chapter recapitulation of the fighting along the escape corridor and on the pe- 921991-52-5. rimeter, in which Imperial War Museum Men of Steel, I SS Panzer Corps, The Panzertaktik is a large book covering a Sound Archives interviews of Dunkirk vet- Ardennes and Eastern Front, 1944-45 broad topic — German armor tactics at erans figure prominently. Only with the by Michael Reynolds, Sarpedon, New battalion level and below during World War strategic and operational contexts set do II. The author organized the book along the York, 1999. Maps, Acknowledgments, we see the Dynamo evacuation, first from same lines as our FM 71-series of tactics Preface, Guide to Abbreviations and the beaches east of Dunkirk and then from manuals, with chapters covering the of- German Words, Author’s Note, Appendi- the eastern mole at Dunkirk harbor. A sepa- fense, defense, unit movements, and re- ces, Bibliography, Index, 354 pages, rate chapter focusing on the Royal Navy’s connaissance, as well as command and $27.50. perspective emphasizes the immense logis- control, logistics, and training topics. tical problems. Men of Steel, by Michael Reynolds, is the Each chapter contains a brief introduction second in a series of books about the 1st Although Dunkirk was not a tanker’s fight, of the topic, followed by a detailed descrip- SS Panzer Corps and its subordinate units, ARMOR readers will appreciate this book’s tion of formations, tactical principles, and the 1st and 12th SS Panzer Divisions. The numerous glimpses of leaders under stress. common phases of that type of mission. book focuses from the Battle of the Bulge Lord Gort made the “miracle” possible in Several maps or sketches of German battle until the end of the war. Reynolds also the first place by withdrawing his British plans reinforce the tactical doctrine de- dedicates a chapter to the leaders of the Expeditionary Force to the coast on his own scribed in the text. The sketches are anno- units after the war, to include captivity and authority rather than reinforce a doomed tated in German, with English captions. war crimes trials. As both books have re- French army. Over the next two weeks, as Numerous photographs follow each chap- lated subjects, Reynolds covers some of infantry platoons along the escape corridor ter, again with English captions describing the same topics from the previous book. fought from encirclement and depleted a tactical point of emphasis. With this book, Reynolds completes, within battalions hunkered down on the perimeter, limits, the history of the 1st SS Panzer few expected a successful evacuation; The book accomplishes its mission of de- Corps. when the BEF deployed to France, there scribing German small unit armor tactics. It had been no contingency plan for one. clearly explains the “how-to” of small unit Reynolds draws on Allied and German Once the need became apparent, Churchill operations. But it does not back up the accounts to detail the actions of the corps predicted that only 30,000 soldiers would textbook-style descriptions with examples from the Bulge to the end of the war. He escape. And if many of those soldiers of these tactics in use. Each sketch de- includes a guide to abbreviations and Ger- hoped that they would be the lucky ones, all scribes a tactical plan, but does not show man names to assist the reader. In the knew the defeat was a certainty. In these the results of the execution of that plan, or second half of the book, which concerns 50 ARMOR — May-June 2001

combat against the Soviets, he uses com- tion to provide a detailed account compara- ate a threat to their lines of communica- parable unit size designations to provide a ble to the Bulge portion of the book. tions. General Wavell approved Bagnold’s clear force comparison. For example, the ideas in June 1940 and directed that he be Soviet First Guards Tank Army (Corps) I recommend this book to all readers. Rey- given full support and a free hand in the relates the size of Soviet units to German nolds provides great insight into a unit fight- formation of the units for this mission. units. There are numerous maps and pho- ing in terrible conditions. He manages to tos throughout the book. Many of the pho- take the unit strengths and weaknesses Bagnold developed four fundamentals for tos are from the author’s personal collection and presents them in such a way that read- the formation and operations of the LRDG and show most of the senior leadership ers can feel the desperate situation of the units: the most careful and detailed plan- mentioned in the book. The maps are more 1st SS Panzer Corps at the end of World ning, first class equipment, a sound and like illustrations, consolidated at the end of War II. Despite the stated shortcomings, his simple communication system, and se- the book. This arrangement makes for history still opens up new facts about the lected high quality personnel. The total awkward reading, if one refers to the maps last months of the war outside of Germany. authorized strength was 25 officers and 278 as they apply to the text. Reynolds also Men of Steel completes his series on the other ranks. Approved in June 1940, the uses official unit histories, personal diaries, 1st SS Panzer Corps, not by breaking new first reconnaissance patrols departed in and other historical references to complete ground, but by completing the story he September 1940. The patrol structure — this work. started in his first book. personnel, equipment, and general operating techniques — are covered in the inter- MAJ CURTIS B. HUDSON JR. The strengths of this book are obvious. esting Chapter 2 of the book. Phantom Troop Commander Reynolds has done an excellent job of re- 3d Sqdn,16th Cav Regt Operational patrols are covered in Chap- counting the history of not only the 1st SS Fort Knox, Ky. ters 3 through 11. Their wide-ranging trav- Panzer Corps, but the two subordinate els covered areas of Egypt, the Sudan, divisions as well. He meticulously details Libya, Chad, Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, and the unit strengths and activities by cross Tunisia. Operating initially from Egypt, for- checking his sources and getting the right Providence Their Guide, The Long ward bases were established at various information. Along with this attention to Range Desert Group, 1940-45 by Ma- times at Fayoum and Siwa (Egypt), Kufra detail, Reynolds sorts through the sources jor-General David Lloyd Owen, CB, (with Free French help) and Jalo in Libya, and determines what actually may have DSO, OBE, MC; Leo Cooper, Barnsley, and Zella and Hon in Tripolitania. At times occurred if events are unclear or informa- South Yorkshire, Great Britain; 2000; the patrols operated as far as 800 miles tion conflicting. He also corrects any mis- 238 pages, $36.95 (hardback). behind enemy lines. In fact, the base at takes in his sources or personal accounts, Kufra was 800 miles from Cairo. Record revealing a much more realistic account First published in Great Britain in 1980 by patrols were one of 2,500 miles and an- than most previous works. While sorting George G. Harrap & Co., this is a revised other of 3,500 miles total travel. through these sources, limited more so on edition 2000 imprint of Pen & Sword Books, the Eastern Front, he maintains fairness 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South York- With the end of German resistance in toward the units. He mentions the atrocities shire, S70 2AS, Great Britain. North Africa in 1943, the original role of the of individuals or leaders. He does not ig- As the title indicates, the Long Range De- LRDG was no longer valid. The change in nore the war crimes committed by the lead- sert Group (LRDG) existed from June 1940 role was a major one. The unit was to be ers and units. This approach leads to a until August 1945. The book covers the reorganized in small elements capable of stark, telling account of the awesome chal- organization and operations of the LRDG operating on foot for a distance of 100 lenges faced by a unit in continuous combat during its limited life span in the Mediterra- miles behind enemy lines while accomplish- on two fronts in the final months of World nean theater during World War II. A very ing their reconnaissance mission. They War II. special force, its very specialization led to would carry a ten-day food supply and their communications equipment on their backs. The only real shortcomings in this book its short history. This story of its life, almost New training was required, including moun- stem from the arrangement and use of the a legend, tells in a straightforward manner tain crafts, skiing, parachuting, and the maps and some speculation forced by the invaluable, often heroic, seldom widely German and Greek languages. Numerous source limitations. The maps, despite an recognized, service rendered to the British changes in personnel were required by this apology from the author, are all at the end commands that it served. mode of operation. The LRDG adventures of the book. This forces the reader to flip The book also tells of the fate that can be- and misfortunes in the new role are covered from his reading to reference a map. Also, fall such a specialized organization. Once it in Chapters 12 through 20. the maps are numbered and arranged fulfilled its original mission, as the LRDG chronologically. However, in some in- The first operational missions were in- certainly did in a superb manner, to radi- stances the references in the text do not volved with the Aegean Campaign of cally change its basic organization and follow the numerical or chronological se- September-November 1943. The LRDG mission was not an easy task. Particularly if quence, making visualization even harder now started moving by sea rather than the higher command echelons fail to under- sand. Island hopping from Castellarosso to for the reader. The other shortcoming stand its capabilities and limitations. comes from the nature of the book itself. Leros to Calinos, the unit there received, on The author had already covered the corps’ The concept for such an organization was 3 October, orders to attack, using locally Ardennes history in a separate work. Yet, that of Major (later Brigadier) Ralph Bag- obtained boats, to recover the island of Cos he dedicates half of the book to this same nold, a British officer with extensive experi- on which the Germans had landed in force. campaign. The only new material that ence and knowledge of the little known Cos was some 30 miles long and the LRDG comes from this effort, are a couple of cor- African deserts. In the Mediterranean thea- numbered less than 300 men. These orders rections from the previous account or new tre of World War II, both friendly and enemy were soon cancelled, and the LRDG resource information. The book at this point land forces operated relatively close to the turned to Leros Island. From here, patrols feels more like a supplement than a new coast of Northern Africa, avoiding the vast- were sent out to various islands to report on work. The second half of the book regard- ness of the deserts to the south. Bagnold’s enemy air and ship movements. Next, the ing the Eastern Front suffers severely from concept, in brief, was that a long-ranging unit was ordered to retake a small island a lack of information from both combatants. reconnaissance force could take advantage called Levita, supposedly held by a few Reynolds works very hard to give as com- of the unused desert areas to travel deep Germans. Limited to a force of 50 men for plete an account as possible, but the lack of into the enemy rear to keep the British this operation, only eight were recovered information leaves the reader wanting more command informed of what the Italians (and with the Germans still holding the island. detail. He does not have enough informa- later on the Germans) were doing and cre- On 12 November the Germans landed on ARMOR — May-June 2001 51

Leros and five days later were in complete Marine Corps Historical Branch. Russ A. Doniphan on campaign, but the story of the control. About 70 LRDG personnel escaped Pritchard, the technical advisor, serves on operations of the 1st Missouri Regiment. from the island after the surrender. the Board of Governors for the Civil War Doniphan led the regiment, to be sure, but Library and Museum and is a consultant for Dawson focuses more on the unit and the In December 1943, the LRDG was reor- the Museum of the Confederacy in Rich- integration of volunteer soldiers into the ganized again as two squadrons, each of mond. Furthermore, there is a substantial regular army apparatus. While there were eight patrols of one officer and ten men. bibliography of solid sources, although problems during the service period of these Unit training began in January 1944, to most of them are not primary in nature. troops, such as lack of discipline and prob- include small boat handling, mountain war- lems with local authorities, Doniphan and fare, and parachuting. These were initially There are 116 color illustrations and 214 his subordinates must be commended for to be employed in Italy. By late February, historical photographs — each one appro- curbing any serious breaches of discipline. 1944, the unit had been moved to Italy. priate and of high quality. The maps are Doniphan’s mutually respectful relationship After a number of operations in support of exceptionally useful and plentiful through- with his immediate commander, Brigadier Eighth Amy had been planned and then out the book as are the historical photo- General Stephen W. Kearny, contributed to cancelled, the LRDG became associated graphs and illustrations. There are also success in maintaining discipline. Kearny with Force 266, an organization coordinat- numerous pictures of individual equipment was quite willing to give his subordinate ing support for the partisans in the Balkans. with a corresponding description; thus, the wide latitude in commanding his troops, The first operational patrol went out in May reader can visualize the appearance of the while Doniphan was eager to learn from his to the Corfu area. Patrol missions ran the soldiers, sailors, and airmen of all belliger- professional superior. Dawson writes that gamut from location and destruction of a ents. As a whole, the graphic aids really Kearny served as Doniphan’s “tutor and make this book. radar site, with Royal Navy assistance, to mentor as well as commanding officer,” and arranging support for partisans. Operations Most one-volume histories are rarely exerted a “positive influence on Doniphan’s continued successfully in Yugoslavia, the worth owning; however, this book is an military service.” Dalmatian Islands, Albania, Istria, and exception. Whether you are unfamiliar with Greece until the Communist influence in the the war against Japan or you want to know Study of the campaign also contributes to partisan units began to interfere with the what the U.S. rifle Model 1903A1 used at the understanding of civil-military affairs at patrols, even to the extent of arresting Guadalcanal looked like, this book is well a time when the concept was unknown. As members under various pretexts. By late worth having in your professional library. Dawson notes, “no one in the 1840s could April 1945, the patrols were all withdrawn, call Doniphan’s experiences textbook ex- except for one in Istria which remained to JONATHAN P. KLUG amples of military government because the end of the war. CPT, Armor they were the earliest of their kind and pre- As the war was about to end in May 1945, Korea dated the textbooks.” The critical impor- Allied Forces Headquarters in Italy recom- tance of a just and fair military government mended the LRDG go as a unit to the Far was apparent as Doniphan led his small Doniphan’s Epic March: The 1st Mis- army through a number of hostile towns, East. On 16 June, the War Office requested souri Volunteers in the Mexican War it be returned to England as a unit, regroup such as Santa Fe, El Paso, and Chihuahua by Joseph G. Dawson III, University of City, which needed to somehow be pacified and have leave. But less than a week later, Kansas Press, Lawrence, Kan., 1999; xii the War Office ordered the unit disbanded. and negated as a potential threat to Ameri- & 325 pages; $35.00. can interests. The best example of Doni- LEO D. JOHNS phan’s work in this regard is his creation of COL, USA, Retired What is so significant about a book that the Kearny Code of military law for occu- Midlothian, Va. focuses on the exploits of one volunteer pied territories, which “formed the founda- colonel and his regiment of Missouri volun- tion for the [New Mexico] territory’s transi- teers during the Mexican War? Colonel tion to democracy.” War in the Pacific: Pearl Harbor to Alexander Doniphan’s campaign through Tokyo Bay, edited by Bernard C. Nalty, Colorado, New Mexico, and Old Mexico is There are few faults in this work, none of Technical Advisor: Russ A. Pritchard, not the most widely known exploit in that which detract from its overall worth. The Salamander Books Limited, London, conflict, and it did not include trials and one map of the entire campaign is very 2000, 304 pages, $27.96 online. tribulations that are exceptional in the an- basic, and has minor discrepancies with nals of military history. But Joseph G. Daw- dates and locations. Also, there is little The attack on Pearl Harbor and VJ Day son, Associate Professor of History at examination of Doniphan’s leadership in are defining dates in American history. This Texas A&M University, is correct in empha- battle. These, however, are tangential is- book acts as a perfect starting point to un- sizing the significance of this small cam- sues to the ultimate importance of this man derstand the importance of these dates and paign. In Doniphan’s Epic March: The 1st and his campaign. Dawson articulates and the intricacies of the battles between them. Missouri Volunteers in the Mexican War, relates the challenges of leading a volun- The authors explain the origins of the Pa- Dawson relates the story of this forgotten teer force, the importance of good civil- cific conflict from an American perspective, campaign. It is not, however, through a military relationships, and the problems of illustrate the battles with some detail, and one-dimensional narrative that the author setting up successful military governments explain Japan’s capitulation. This volume is captivates the reader. The modern military throughout a long military campaign. By also a good reference for those who are officer will find Doniphan’s actions enlight- analyzing Doniphan’s campaign in this light, more familiar with the subject. ening and his ideas relevant to present-day one both arrives “at some conclusions concerns. This campaign not only provides Because the book does not contain any about how America won its first overseas a lesson in the ingenuity and determination form of reference notation, readers may war and how Mexico lost half of his domin- of a committed commander, but, more im- assume that it is not a scholarly work. On ion,” and learns how American professional portantly, demonstrates the importance of a the contrary, the historical basis of this soldiers can work with their counterparts strong relationship between professional book is very sound. The authors of the called up in time of crisis. military leaders and volunteer force com- chapters are reliable and, in most cases, manders in developing a successful civil- MAJ MICHAEL A. BODEN acclaimed military historians. The editor military operation. and author of five chapters, Bernard C. Assistant Professor Nalty, is a member of the Office of Air The title of the book is somewhat mislead- Department of History Force History and a former member of the ing in that this is not solely the story of U.S. Military Academy 52 ARMOR — May-June 2001

Software

Steel Beasts by eSim Games. Price direct fire unless they are themselves en- the beaten zone of artillery strikes (No, I am $39.95 plus shipping. (For more infor- gaged; rather, upon enemy contact, the unit not making this up). Forests consist of indi- mation, a demo, or to order, go to will seek a turret-down position and call vidual trees that can be, well, driven www.esimgames.com). artillery on the enemy unit — all without through, adding a hefty dose of realism to further orders from the player. At long last, the virtual world. Vehicles which skyline System Requirements: 266 Mhz Pentium, computer-controlled units can be trusted to themselves will be more easily spotted by 32 MB RAM, 2MB SVGA card, 220 MB react intelligently and thoroughly according AI gunners. Artillery includes smoke, HE, available hard disk space, Mouse, CD- to the orders you give them. ICM, and FASCAM; players can easily ROM, Microsoft Windows 95 or Windows make fire missions point or area targets. 98 installed, Microsoft DirectX version 7.0 A powerful “triggers” feature further allows Damage modeling is sophisticated and (or better) installed. Joystick recommended, you to pre-plan responses for your units thorough: if you lose your hydraulics, you but not required. Network card or modem based on enemy or friendly actions, loca- must put the FCS into manual and repeat- required for multiplayer. tions, damage levels, composition, disposi- edly tap the arrow keys to move the main tion, or strength. In the rough equivalent of gun, simulating turning the manual cranks. Reviewer’s Platform: Celeron 466 Mhz, sending out a code-word on the FM, you Finally, and you may not have always Windows 98, 128 MB RAM; Voodoo 3 2000 then only need to activate the trigger to dreamed about this one, infantry in Steel Video card; 24x CD-ROM. have your selected units take any of a se- Beasts are both useful and dangerous. For those of you who have been searching ries of actions. The customization available Hard to spot and bearing some dangerous for a realistic, challenging, useful, and de- means that with a little effort, you can prac- weapons, they can really ruin your day. tailed PC-based tank simulator, your search tically give your AI an OPORD — and ex- Multiplayer tanking also reaches new lev- is over. The game is Al Delaney’s Steel pect them to follow your orders effectively. els in Steel Beasts. Not only can you and Beasts, currently available exclusively Gunnery plays out very well and, true to your buddies play as wingmen: one of you online at www.shrapnelgames.com. Buy it form, Steel Beasts gunnery is hyper-realis- can gun while the other plays TC in the now. You will not be disappointed. tic. Round trajectories, ranges, and efficacy same tank. Other options include head-to- Steel Beasts allows the player to com- vary by type, and seem to be accurately head (M1/Leo vs. OPFOR, or M1/Leo vs. mand (and gun) from both the M1A1 and modeled in all respects. One nice feature of M1/Leo) or even “death match” in arena-like the Leopard 2A4. The game accurately the gunnery is a palm switch button: M1A1 maps. By far, I most enjoyed multiplayer models both the obvious and the subtle gunners actually must dump lead between games where one player acted as CO (with differences between the tanks so well that engagements, or accuracy will degrade, his own track, of course) while others com- the in-game differences are not just cos- just as it should. Other subtle touches are manded platoons and sections of that com- metic. The two steel beasts prove to be equally nice: when in the gunner’s seat, you pany/troop/team. Players can even send vastly different, and require different tactics must manually switch between Sabot and graphic control measures to the other play- for success — not to mention different HEAT if the computer-controlled TC desig- ers for some truly realistic interaction. LAN gunnery and threat detection techniques. nates a new ammunition type. and Internet play are possible for a large Both tanks are a joy to play, as each has number of players; and net play is rock- been lovingly detailed by real-world tankers Edward Williams deserves recognition for steady, even over phone lines. who know and love their respective tanks. his work on the Steel Beasts sounds. Inside the tank, you will hear the turbine whine; OK, so it’s not perfect. Players will command either (or both) of the TIS clack; the turret brake squeal with Steel Beasts currently does not support air these types of tank in single missions which sharp maneuvering; the hydraulics kick in units of any type. Frankly, you won’t miss range from platoon- to battalion-size. The appropriately; the breach slamming shut them (I usually pretend that budget restric- simulation models the gunner’s control and open; AFTCAPs clanging around; and tions have grounded all aircraft). Anyway, panel (with working switches), GPS, unity rounds impacting the tank. When the TC future editions of the game may include air sight, and GAS (both sabot and HEAT reti- reloads his .50 after firing a box of ammo units. There is no campaign mode, the cles); and the GPSE (periscope on the Leo) (yes, 100 rounds each), you will clearly inclusion of which might have been nice, and TC’s position (buttoned and unbut- hear each and every step in the reloading but the stand-alone missions are much toned) for each of the tanks. Neither the process, even the box of ammo being more detailed and creative as a conse- driver’s nor loader’s stations are modeled. sprung open. AI gunners and TCs call out quence. Also, some people complain about Exterior views are available for all friendly proper fire commands and procedures: and the graphics and, admittedly, they are a vehicles, the list of which is pretty inclusive, they won’t just say “FIRE!” or “ON THE little blocky. Yet the overall effect looks and and growing steadily with each patch. Ex- WAY!” either. You will hear them announce feels so real that you probably won’t mind cept in certain scenarios, the player can “GUNNER SABOT TANK!” or even at all. All in all, however, the shortcomings command all friendly vehicles, but currently “GUNNER HEAT TANK, FIRE, FIRE of this game are minor in contrast to the the only interior positions modeled are for SABOT!” as well as “CALIBER FIFTY!” and outstanding virtues in gameplay and real- the Abrams and Leo. “TC COMPLETE!” When you are on the ism. move, the TC actually issues abbreviated In practice, players will spend a good deal fire commands. And by the way, there is a In short, Steel Beasts belongs on every of time at the powerful map screen setting delay between the flash of a weapon firing tanker’s PC. Unlike previous civilian tank waypoints and watching the developing and the sound of it going off. As you can simulation offerings, Steel Beasts even has tactical situation as spot reports come in. imagine, all of this makes the immersion solid training value for gunners and TCs When designating routes for friendly units, factor in Steel Beasts go through the roof. (anyone else kind of tired of COFT?) as a variety of command features allows you No tank sim has even come close to this well as for platoon-, company-, and troop- to order units to move at various levels of level of detail and excellence in sound. level tactics training. Add to all of this an aggression; to set default reactions to con- incredible mission editor that allows for tact; and to set speeds, formations, and Steel Beasts includes several features custom map and scenario building, and you spacing. A good example would be a route tankers have always dreamed about in a have the tanker’s dream for a PC tank where you set the unit tactics to SCOUT. In tank sim. For example, the drivers are ac- simulation. this mode, the selected unit (whatever its tually intelligent: they can automatically composition) will move slowly along the seek out hull-down positions; they will 1LT JOHN ALDERMAN route, stopping periodically to scan from the automatically conduct berm drills while you E Troop, 1/108 Cav halt. The unit will not engage enemies with engage enemy vehicles and move out of Griffin, Ga. ARMOR — May-June 2001 53 Threat Branch Threat Branch Fort Knox, Kentucky Stridsvagn 122 Fort Knox, Kentucky Swedish Main Battle Tank*

A color version of this poster appears on the Threat Branch website at: www.knox.army.mil/center/ threat/intel.htm.

Characteristics Crew Size 4 Max Road Range 470km Combat Weight 62,000kg Fuel Capacity 1,200 liters Height (to turret top) 2.64m Max Road Speed 72km/h Length (gun forward) 9.97m Armament (main gun) 120mm Length (gun rear) 8.74m Armament (coaxial) 7.62mm Width (over skirts) 3.81m Armament (anti-aircraft) 7.62mm Using countries: Sweden * Swedish Army designation for Leopard 2-S (Leopard 2A5) Photographs courtesy of 1st Lt Mattias Brehag, Swedish Army

Poster produced by Threat Branch, USAARMC, Fort Knox, Kentucky 40121 19 January 2001

ARMOR The Professional Development Bulletin Periodicals Postage of the Armor Branch Paid at Louisville, KY U.S. Army Armor Center ATTN: ATZK-ARM Fort Knox, KY 40121-5210

PIN: 078883-000