Title Items-In-Lnternational Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Ontario

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S-0878-0001-10-00001

Expanded Number S-0878-0001 -10-00001

Title items-in-lnternational Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Ontario

Date Created 28/06/1966

Record Type Archival Item

Container s-0878-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant: Other Countries

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I am sending you. herewith, a short report on the International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons, Scarborough, Ontario, prepared by Mr. W. Epstein who attended the meeting.

CR. 13 (11-64) CONFIDENTIAL 28 June 1966

REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ASSEMBLY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS SCARBOROUGH, ONTARIO JUNE 23-26, 1966

1. The International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons was Jointly co-sponsored by the American Assembly (Columbia University), the Canadian Institute of Inter- national Affairs, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Institute for Strategic Studies (London, England). It was attended by some 65 participants from 25 countries* The participants were of a very high calibre and consisted of top disarmament officials and outstanding scientists and scholars in the field. Except for Bulgaria and Ethiopia, each member of the MDC was represented, including France. As in most of these conferences no participant was considered as representing his government; all were speaking personally and un- officially. The conference had a long agenda which dealt primarily with non- proliferation but in which the question of an underground test ban and other related measures figured prominently. The participants were divided into three discussion groups, each of which dealt with the entire agenda. I acted as Chairman of one of the groups, the one which worked out the proposals on an underground test ban. All of the sessions were held in private except for three public addresses by Sir Solly Zuckerman, Mrs. Alva Myrdal and Prime Minister Lester Pearson. 2. All the sessions were marked by an atmosphere of friendliness and eo-operation and an evident desire to reach as large an area of agreement or consensus as possible. By the time the conference ended there was a distinct feeling amongst the participants that some important progress had been made. The conference was unquestionably the best of its kind that I have ever attended. A copy of the Final Report of the conference containing a list of the participants, is attached hereto. 3. The conference concentrated on the need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. Great stress was placed on the lack of awareness of most of the potential military nuclear Powers of the tremendous economic and social costs of embarking on a nuclear weapons programme. It was felt that the costs of development of one or two nuclear bombs would be a relatively minor expense as compared to the heavy costs of developing delivery systems sufficient to create a credible deterrent. It was also felt that "going nuclear" would not only be harmful to the economic and social interests of the near nuclear Powers, but would also be detrimental to their - 2 - political, military and overall security positions. Since it was felt that these considerations were not sufficiently appreciated, the suggestion was made, and received general support, that "an objective international report on the subject" be made. It was also suggested that such a study might be undertaken by the United Nations, although the Final Report did not refer to this. k» Great concern was also expressed over the fact that peaceful nuclear explosions, intended solely for civilian purposes, might be dangerous as they involved practically the same technology as that for military nuclear explosions. Three suggestions were made for coping with the problem: (a) that only the existing nuclear Powers undertake peaceful nuclear explosions on behalf of non-nuclear countries, as necessary* (l>) that such peaceful explosions be conducted only under international supervision such as by a United Nations body, or (c) that the whole idea of peaceful nuclear explosions be abandoned. Since no general consensus emerged on any of these three suggestions, the Final Report stated merely that "any programme of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes must be safeguarded in a manner consistent with the objectives of a non-proliferation treaty." 5. The conference paid considerable attention to the demands of the potential nuclear Powers and non-nuclear Powers for "equality of obligations" on the part of both the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers. These demands were put forward with greatest insistence by participants from India and Japan. While it was generally felt that the nuclear Powers must make real progress towards limiting and reversing their own arms race, it was also the general view of the conference (although not specifically stated in the report because of the lack of a consensus) that the demands of the non-nuclear Powers should not be made "conditions" for their adherence to a non-proliferation treaty. On the whole the conference favoured a simple treaty, that is, one under which nuclear Powers undertook not to disseminate nuclear weapons and the non-nuclear Powers undertook not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons. It was felt that considerations of security and prestige, (in that order) were the chief factors which might impel potential nuclear Powers to develop nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the conference endeavoured to see what guarantees of their security could give them sufficient reassurance to remove their desire or need to "go nuclear", tittle progress in this direction was made, however, because of the evident skepticism of some non- nuclear Powers as to the effectiveness of such guarantees and the political implications of accepting them. * 3 -

6. The conference stressed four steps which could further the goal of non- proliferation, but which had independent merit and could be taken either con- currently vith or independently of a non-proliferation treaty: (a) nuclear free-zones. The efforts of the Latin American States were "warmly endorsed by the whole Assembly". African and Middle East nuclear-free zones were also supported, although it was felt that they might face greater difficulties. Most of the participants also felt that a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East "is likely to depend upon a limitation of the conventional arms race in the region*'. (b) the strengthening and the extension of the safeguards and inspection functions of the IAEA, to all countries was widely supported* (c) Che cutoff of production of military fissionable material was also generally supported* Some participants were glad to note that this measure appeared to receive the general support of Soviet participants* (d) an underground test ban. High importance was attached to progress on this subject. The final report of the Assembly contained the following: "A constructive discussion took place on the means by which some of the problems which it presents could be solved. It was suggested that there should be an agreement by the military nuclear powers to forego all underground testing for a limited trial period, with a system of verification of seismologically ambiguous events by challenge or invitation; it was hoped that such an experimental suspension of underground tests would provide the necessary assurances that could lead to a treaty banning underground tests. Another suggestion was for a 'threshold treaty* banning all tests above a certain seismic magnitude. It was represented that either approach would be greatly assisted by the creation of the proposed fnuclear detection club1 in which nations #ould co-operate in the collection and exchange of seismological data." 7* There seemed to be less support than at first expected for the idea of a "threshold treaty" whereby nuclear tests above a seismic magnitude of k.75 would be prohibited* Great interest, however, was evoked by the so-called "agreement" on a temporary moratorium on underground tests with verification by challenge. This was worked out in the discussion group by participants from the USA, the USSR and the UK, and was supported by everyone at the conference. The participants from the three to att nuclear Powers stressed the unofficial nature of their support but all agreed/ to s " the idea to their governments. As the US and the UK had, since 1961, very strongly opposed any uninspected moratorium, and as the US had opposed the Swedish proposal for verification by challenge at Geneva $&£& spring, the support which Lord Chalfont and . k -

-Messrs. Fisher and Barber (Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs in the Department of Defense) gave to it attracted vide attention. It was felt that a successful trial period of, say, two years could lead to a treaty banning all underground tests* A number of participants also felt that the approach by way of a moratorium with verification by challenge was preferable to a threshold treaty. The emergence of the unofficial "agreement" on an underground test ban was an entirely unexpected development and led to considerable hopes that progress would be made in this direction.