MASTER THESIS

Titel der Master Thesis / Title of the Master‘s Thesis „The Prospects of Durable Solutions for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Focusing on Local Integration“

verfasst von / submitted by Yara Chdid

angestrebter akademischer Grad / in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts (MA)

Wien, 2019 / Vienna 2019

Studienkennzahl lt. Studienblatt / UA 992 884 Postgraduate programme code as it appears on the student record sheet: Universitätslehrgang lt. Studienblatt / Master of Arts in Human Rights Postgraduate programme as it appears on the student record sheet: Betreut von / Supervisor Dr. Margit Ammer Table of Content

List of Abbreviations ...... iv Chapter One: Introduction ...... 1

a) Background ...... 1 b) Research Question ...... 4 c) Methodology ...... 6 i) Structure ...... 6 ii) Research methods: interviews in refugee camps ...... 8 iii) Interviews with experts ...... 9 iv) Limitations of the study ...... 10 Chapter Two: Historical, Political and Sectarian Tensions ...... 11

a) Different Political Views on Syrian Refugees ...... 11 i) Significance of the demographic balance in Lebanon ...... 12 b) Demography Concerns and Historical Tensions...... 15 i) Fear of altering the demographic balance of the Lebanese sectarian system ...... 15 ii) 1976 to 2005 tutelage ...... 17 iii) Palestinian refugees influencing the Lebanese response to Syrian refugees ...... 18 c) Significant Policies Adopted Since 2011 and the Rise of Xenophobia ...... 19 i) The October Policy and new residency requirements...... 19 ii) Closing borders ...... 22 iii) Curfews and evictions ...... 24 iv) Employment restrictions ...... 27 d) Conclusion ...... 30

Chapter Three: Legal and Policy Framework Applying to Lebanon ...... 31

a) 1962 Law Regulating Entry, Stay and Exit of Foreigners ...... 31 i) The provisions applying to ‘political refugees’ in the 1962 Law: articles 26, 27, 31 and 32 ...... 32

b) The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNHCR and the government of Lebanon...... 34 i) Is an updated MoU needed? ...... 34 ii) MoU terminology disagreements ...... 36 iii) RSD and UNHCR’s registration certificate for Syrian refugees ...... 38 iv) Revoking the UNHCR registration certificate ...... 40 c) The Refugee Response Framework: Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) ...... 41

ii i) The 3RP ...... 42 ii) Effectiveness of the 3RP and the LCRP ...... 42 d) Conclusion ...... 44

Chapter Four: Do Syrian Refugees in Lebanon have Local Integration as a Durable Solution? ...... 44 a) International Standards relating to local integration ...... 45 i) The relationship between local integration and self-reliance ...... 45 ii) The economic, legal, and socio-cultural dimensions of local integration ...... 46 b) Lebanon State Obligations under International Human Rights Law ...... 48 i) ICESCR...... 51 ii) ICCPR ...... 58 iii) CRC...... 62 c) Challenges to a Dignified Stay ...... 67 i) Legal Status: civil documentation and restriction of ‘Freedom of Movement’ ..... 67 ii) Lack of employment opportunities ...... 71 iii) Low enrollment of Syrian refugees in schools and child labour ...... 76 iv) Dire living conditions ...... 81 v) Discrimination and harassment ...... 86 d) Conclusion...... 89 Chapter Five: Conclusion ...... 90 Annex 1: Expert Interviews ...... 109 Annex 2: Field Research interview ...... 110 Annex 3: List of tables, images and figures ...... 111 Annex 4: List of interviews ...... 112 Abstract (English and German) ...... 113

iii List of Abbreviations

Art. – Article AUB – American University of Beirut ALEF – Act for Human Rights ALP – Accelerated Learning Programme BIA – Best Interest Assessment CRC – Convention on the Rights of the Child EU – European Union GSO – General Security Office HRW – Human Rights Watch ICESCR – International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights ICCPR – International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ILO – International Labour Organisation ILO ROAS – International Labour Organisation Regional Office for the Arab States ISIS – The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham LBP – Lebanese Pound LCRP – Lebanese Crisis Response Plan MoU – Memorandum of Understanding NGO(s) – Non-Governmental Organisation(s) NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council P. – Page Para. – Paragraph PRS – Palestinian Refugees from Syria PLO – Palestinian Liberation Organisation RACE – Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) RST – Resettlement 3RP – Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan SOHR – Syrian Observatory for Human Rights UDHR – Universal Declaration of Human Rights UNDP – United Nations Development Programme UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

iv UNICEF – United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund UNRWA – United Nations Relief and Works Agency VASYR – Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees WASH – Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation WFP – World Food Programme YPG – Yekineyen Parastina Gel translating to People’s Protection Units

v CH1: Introduction

a) Background: the three durable solutions in Lebanon: local integration, voluntary repatriation and resettlement The Syrian Civil War has impacted many lives since the outset of the conflict in 2011. Many families and individuals were forced to seek refuge and safety in neighboring countries such as Lebanon. The demographic and economic situation of this first asylum country makes it extremely difficult to provide basic needs for refugees. As of February 2019, there were approximately one million Syrian refugees registered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) currently residing in Lebanon.1 Apart from the one million Syrian refugees who are registered by UNHCR, there are also unregistered Syrian refugees. The number of unregistered Syrian refugees is estimated by the Lebanese government to be around 500,000, however, it is not confirmed.2 Employment, housing, education, health and legal status have been the primary struggle that refugees deal with on a daily basis.3 From government budgets to infrastructure, Lebanese communities have been hampered by the lack of basic resources in public sectors. This has consequently created tensions between the Syrian refugee population and nationals of Lebanon.4

There are three durable solutions that are promoted by UNHCR as part of its mandate.5 Voluntary repatriation, local integration and resettlement are initiatives to extend protection to refugees ensuring them life in dignity. UNHCR in Lebanon deals with all refugees including Syrian refugees, while the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) is responsible for Palestinian refugees. In some cases, refugees do not have the option to return to their country for a protracted period. Resettlement has been slow

1 UNHCR, Operational Portal; Refugee Situations, UNHCR, last updated 28 February 2019, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71. 2 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 (2019 update), LCRP, UNHCR and Government of Lebanon, p.8, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf 3 UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Inter-Agency Coordination, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees 2018, p.2, available at https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2018/12/VASyR-2018.pdf. 4 M. Yahya, Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan, Carnegie Middle East Centre, 16 April 2018, p.7, available at https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for- refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058. 5 UNHCR, Chapter 7: Solutions for Refugees, p.186, available at https://www.unhcr.org/50a4c17f9.pdf.

1 in recent years6 and voluntary repatriation might not be available as an option to some refugees.7 Therefore, a large number of refugees are obliged to remain in the host country they sought refuge in. I will briefly explain the two durable solutions in this section; however, the focus of this thesis is solely on local integration.

Resettlement numbers from Lebanon have largely decreased in the past couple of years and the number in 2019 has become really low in comparison to how it was in 2015. The total number of UNHCR submissions in 2015 was 19,516 and the departures amounted to 7,109 and has decreased in 2019 to 2,049 and 1,016 respectively.8 UNHCR is urging more countries to enter the resettlement scheme and is appealing to nations to welcome more refugees into their countries.9 Many refugees who face various difficulties and challenges still do not get the opportunity to be resettled to a third country because of the declining quotas from states. During interviews conducted with Syrian refugees, I gathered data regarding resettlement presented in the graphs below.10 In the two figures below, only 11 participants stated that they have tried to ask about resettlement, and some of those participants applied for it. Furthermore, 8 participants said that they are interested in resettlement but they lack awareness of the responsible authority to communicate with. In figure two, 3 of the 11 participants that have tried asking about and/or applying for resettlement stated that their applications for resettlement were rejected. The remainder of the participants said that UNHCR did not get back to them on the status of their file. Additionally, some of the participants said that UNHCR told them resettlement is not available currently.

6 UNHCR, UNHCR projected Global Resettlement Needs 2019, 24th Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlements, Geneva, 25-26 June 2018, p.9, available at https://www.unhcr.org/5b28a7df4.pdf. 7 K. Jacobsen, ‘The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries,’ new issues in refugee research: Working Paper No.45, UNHCR, July 2001, p.1, available at https://www.unhcr.org/research/working/3b7d24059/forgotten-solution-local-integration-refugees- developing-countries-karen.html. 8 UNHCR, Resettlement Data, UNHCR, January 2019, Lebanon, available at https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-data.html. 9 UNHCR, UNHCR Projected Global Resettlement Needs 2019, p.10. 10 Refer to chapter 1b (ii) on p.9 for information on the interviews; refer to annex 2 for list of questions.

2 RST option Application status

11 11

Rejected application

8 8

Applied/asked about RST Interested in RST but does not know how No RST/ no response Not interested in RST

Does not know about RST 0 2 4 6 8 10

Figure 1: Syrian refugee participants: Figure 2: Resettlement application status Resettlement options

Most Syrian refugees are holding in to the hope of one day going back to their home country but conflict and insecurity remain to be an issue in Syria. As reported by UNHCR, their main fears of return revolve around factors such as protection and security, shelter, legal status and access to basic needs and services.11 However, repatriation of Syrian refugees has been encouraged by most Lebanese politicians12 even though the main reasons preventing them from going back are the existing violence and fear of the regime.13 There has been an increased pressure and wide political support for refugee returns. The Lebanese government and Hezbollah, a political party and militant group, have been coordinating in opening registration offices to facilitate their returns.14 During interviews conducted with Syrian refugees, I gathered data regarding voluntary repatriation presented in the graphs below.15 35 out of 38 participants informed me that they think about returns constantly, however, there are

11 UNHCR, ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees calls for continued support for Lebanon’, UNHCR, 9 March 2019, available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/3/5c83e0664/un-high-commissioner- refugees-calls-continued-support-lebanon.html. 12 L. Bassam, ‘Fifty thousand Syrian returned to Syria from Lebanon this year: official’, Reuters, 25 September 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon- refugees/fifty-thousand-syrians-returned-to-syria-from-lebanon-this-year-official-idUSKCN1M51OM. 13 UNHCR, ‘A Longing to Go Home in Safety and Dignity: Intentions and Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon About Their Future’, UNHCR Lebanon, January 2018, p.16, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63310. 14 C. Geha and J. Talhouk, Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon: Political Brief on the Return of Syrian Refugees, AUB, August 2018, p.2, available at https://www.aub.edu.lb/Documents/Politics-and-the-Plight-of-Syrian-Refugees-in-Lebanon.pdf. 15 Refer to chapter 1b (ii) on p.9 for information on the interviews; refer to annex 2 for list of questions.

3 hurdles that stop them from returning. The main reason stopping them from return is the lack of safety since there are still some terrorists and armed groups in some areas in Syria. A 22-year-old male living in Al Wazzani camp informed me that he thinks of return all the time but if they returned, they would lack safety, water, electricity and accommodation.16 He also believes that terrorists and armed groups are still there; he is from the Darayya district. Another 50-year-old female living in Marj el Khokh camp said, ‘The situation is bad here but it is still better than how it is in Idlib.’17

3 No safey and resources

No resources 35

No safety Does not think of return

Thinks of return but is not able to 0 5 10 15 20 25

Figure 3: Syrian refugee participants: Figure 4: reasons for not returning voluntary repatriation options

b) Research Question

In some cases, refugees do not have the option to return to their country for a protracted period. As mentioned above, resettlement has been slow in recent years18 and voluntary repatriation might not be available as an option to some refugees.19 Therefore, a large number of refugees are obliged to remain in the host country they sought refuge in. Local integration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is highly needed especially to those who are unable to go back to Syria because of fear of persecution. Even though resettlement and voluntary repatriation are extremely important durable solutions, this thesis will solely focus on one of the durable solutions, namely local integration. This thesis seeks to investigate how local integration is being implemented in the context of

16 Interview with refugee 1, Al Wazzani camp in the South of Lebanon, 3 May 2019. 17 Interview with refugee 23, Marj el Khokh camp in the South of Lebanon, 4 May 2019. 18 UNHCR, UNHCR projected Global Resettlement Needs 2019, p.9. 19 K. Jacobsen, p.1.

4 Lebanon in order to understand whether this durable solution is an option that Syrian refugees are left with in the present, and if this solution is viable.

The Syrian war has been occurring for eight years now and local integration is still facing challenges. Neighboring countries have been extremely generous in opening up their borders during this difficult time and have been coordinating with non- governmental organisations (NGOs) to provide refugees with necessary needs and services. Nonetheless, certain actors have argued that local integration has not been successful in Lebanon because of several factors including; the absence of legal residency for refugees, strict government policies, and lack of sufficient funding.20 There are numerous hurdles that restrict Syrian refugees’ accessibility to their basic needs, services, and rights. The main obstacle they face is a legal status that 74% of Syrian refugees lack.21 Lebanon is acknowledged to be a very small country with a land area of 10,230 km² and a population size of approximately six million persons residing in Lebanon.22 The continued presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has created a fear of altering the demographic balance of the fragile Lebanese sectarian system. Focusing their efforts on integration mechanisms for Syrian refugees is not encouraged by the government due to the fear of Syrian refugees becoming permanent on Lebanese territory. For that reason, Syrian refugees have been looked upon as a burden for many years. Refugees in this part of the world are caught in a dilemma between staying in a place where they feel unwelcome and going back to a place that is filled with uncertainty.23 During the eight-year conflict in Syria, Lebanon has adopted numerous policies that have negatively impacted Syrian refugees’ accessibility to legal status, and for instance employment and education. Having not ratified the 1951 Convention

20 11.11.11, ‘Long Road to Return: Towards a Durable Solutions Deal for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, 11.11.11 Report, November 2018, p.19, available at https://www.11.be/en/news/item/long-road-to-return ; UNHCR, ‘A longing to go home in safety and dignity: Intentions and Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon About Their Future,’ UNHCR Lebanon, January 2018, p.8, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/63310.pdf 21 HRW, Lebanon: Events of 2018, 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country- chapters/lebanon 22 Worldmeters, Population, Lebanon Population Live, available at http://www.worldometers.info/world- population/lebanon-population/ 23 UNHCR, ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees calls for continued support for Lebanon’.

5 Relating to the Status of Refugees, Lebanon does not have national legislation pertaining to refugees in the sense of the refugee definition under the refugee convention, and considers them as ‘temporary’. This thesis highlights the importance of local integration as a durable solution for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and investigates whether this durable solution is considered to be an option for them currently. Chapter two aims at exploring the political and sociological situation in Lebanon to understand the response that was taken by the Lebanese government. This chapter explains the policies that were adopted by the Lebanese government, and how that affected the well- being of Syrian refugees. Chapter three elaborates on the 1962 law regulating the entry, stay and exit of foreigners, and the relationship between UNHCR and the Lebanese government. This is done in order to assess the level of protection Syrian refugees have in Lebanon. Lastly, chapter four assesses whether the situation of Syrian refugees is in conformity with international Human Rights standards, and it answers the main research question of this thesis.

Research Question(s): - Main question: Is local integration considered to be a durable solution for Syrian refugees under the current climate in Lebanon? Which human rights are connected to local integration? - Sub-question: What are the hurdles impeding Syrian refugees’ access to their human rights? - Sub-question: What has shaped the response that was taken by the Lebanese government on Syrian refugees?

c) Methodology

i) Structure In this section, the research methods that were used to develop the chapters will be demonstrated. The second chapter of this thesis explores the political, historical and sectarian tensions that exist in Lebanon. In order to fully understand the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, the political and sociological aspects are examined in this

6 chapter. Chapter two also analyzes policies that have been adopted by Lebanon throughout the eight years of the conflict. In order to answer the sub-question of this thesis, this chapter includes numerous policies that have been adopted by the Lebanese government affecting the well-being of Syrian refugees in Lebanon since 2011. As for the sociological aspect, this thesis explores in chapter two how social factors have inclined the perceptions of Lebanese host communities towards Syrian refugees. This is done through the collation and the analysis of data from surveys.

This thesis analyzes whether local integration is considered to be a durable solution for Syrian refugees. In this context, the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is assessed in order to see whether it is in conformity with international human rights standards. Firstly, it will be significant to explore Lebanon’s national legal framework relating to refugees. Chapter three of this thesis examines the Lebanese legal and policy framework relating to refugees. The 1962 law regulating the entry, stay and exit of foreigners is the fundamental law governing the status of refugees in Lebanon.24 Therefore, this law is the focus of chapter three. Secondly, the relationship between UNHCR and the Lebanese government is analyzed in order to look at the refugee response framework that was established, which helps in answering the second sub-question. Finally, documents such as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) are explored in the third chapter.

The fourth chapter answers the main research question of this thesis. It analyzes Lebanon’s obligations under international human rights law and assesses whether the situation of Syrian refugees is in conformity with international Human Rights standards. Firstly, the definition of local integration as a durable solution under international law is discussed. Secondly, this chapter explores Lebanon’s international human rights obligations pertaining to local integration. The main instruments that this thesis focuses on are the following documents: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and

24 Order No.319 Regulating the Status of Foreign Nationals in Lebanon (entry into force: 2 August 1962), p.4, art.17 & 18, available at https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/lbn/1962/order_no__319_regulating_the_status_of_foreign_nati onals_in_lebanon_en_html/Order_no_319_EN_excerpts.pdf

7 Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Thirdly, the main challenges Syrian refugees face in Lebanon are assessed through academic literature, data and reports by international institutions, and a field research done by myself. The data obtained from the sources above is utilized to support the findings from my field research. Furthermore, this data is used to give an overall description of their situation on the ground since my field research has limitations.

ii) Research methods: interviews in refugee camps

Assessing the main hurdles that impede Syrian refugees’ integration into the Lebanese society is also done through interviews conducted by myself. The data collection method used for the field research is qualitative design. I picked qualitative design because I wanted to conduct interviews and understand the perceptions and experiences of the refugees I was interviewing. Furthermore, the sample size was small which aligns with qualitative design. The data collected from the interviews conducted with Syrian refugees in the two camps are discussed in the fourth chapter. In the course of my interviews in Lebanon that were done on the third and fourth of May 2019, I gathered primary data and conducted field research on the situation of Syrian refugees on the ground. Anonymous interviews were done with 38 Syrian refugees and families aged 20 to 65 in the Wazzani camp and Marj el-Khokh camp in the South of Lebanon. The interviews were anonymous and names were not taken during the interviews in order for refugees to remain comfortable. The qualitative data that was collected is analyzed in the form of figures and graphs using excel tables.25 The interview questions conducted are structured and tackle the main challenges Syrian refugees face in providing their basic needs. The participants interviewed were mostly female as shown in the graph below. The reason for that is during the morning time when the interviews were being conducted, male Syrian refugees are either at work or looking for employment. 32 of the Syrian refugees interviewed are married with their husbands/wives living with them inside the camp. One Syrian refugee is separated from her husband. Three women lost

25 Refer to annex 2 for list of questions and to the memory stick for the complete data collected.

8 their husbands during the war in Syria and are widows. Lastly, one Syrian refugee is divorced and one is not married.

35 30 Male 25 26% 20 15 10 Female 5 74% 0 Male Female Single Married Seperated Divorced Widowed

Figure 5: Gender of participants Figure 6: Relationship status of participants in field in field research research

The two camps where I conducted the interviews in the South of Lebanon:

Image 1: Wazzani Camp Image 2: Marj El Khokh Camp

iii) Interviews with experts An interview was conducted with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian; Assistant Professor of Political Studies and Conflict Resolution in the Political Studies and Public Administration Department at the American University of Beirut (AUB). Dr. Geukjian has published several books such as ‘Lebanon after the Syrian Withdrawal: External Intervention, Power Sharing and Political Instability’. The interview was done on the sixth of May and is merged into chapter two. The questions asked are structured and the topic of the interview focused on how the political atmosphere in Lebanon has

9 negatively impacted the local integration of Syrian refugees into the Lebanese society. 26

The second expert interview was conducted with Sally Salem; the previous principal of ‘Jusoor Program’. The Jusoor Program is an education program that aims to provide Syrian refugees with a good quality primary education that allows them to integrate properly once they have the chance to enter formal schools in Lebanon.27 The questions asked are structured and the interview was conducted on 12 June 2019.28 The topic of the interview focused on the barriers Syrian refugee children face in accessing the Lebanese education system, and the main reasons for the low enrollment of Syrian refugee children in schools.

iv) Limitations of the study

One of the main challenges experienced was getting access to the field and to the camps. The biggest refugee camp in the South of Lebanon is Marj el Khokh camp. Before conducting interviews with Syrian refugees in the camps, I had to take permission from the intelligence agency. The intelligence agency in the South of Lebanon had to check and approve the questions I wanted to ask Syrian refugees. I was not allowed to ask any sensitive questions. Therefore, a limitation of the study was that I could not ask about anything related to discrimination and/or harassment. The reason for that was because; recently, a Syrian refugee boy was found hanged in Marj El Khokh camp located in the South of Lebanon.29 Consequently, the authorities have increased security measures regarding who enters the camps in the South and what kind of questions are asked. Another limitation is not being able to conduct more interviews in other camps in Lebanon due to the time constraint. As for the interviews with experts, there was a limitation on the number of expert interviews conducted. Several staff members from UNHCR responded to me on Linked in and on my email agreeing to

26 Refer to annex 1 for list of questions. 27 Jusoor, Refugee Education Program, Program Overview: Jusoor in Lebanon, available at https://jusoorsyria.com/programs/refugee-education-program/ 28 Refer to annex 1 for list of questions. 29 S. Houri, ‘Eleven-year-old boy found hanged in refugee camp’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 9 February 2019, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2019/Feb-09/476261-eleven-year- old-boy-found-hanged-in-refugee-camp.ashx

10 respond to my questionnaire. However, they did not respond in the time agreed upon after numerous reminders were sent. Regarding the analysis of human rights treaties in chapter four, I try to give an overview of the human rights that are relevant to local integration. Considering the limited space and time, I was not able to go into depth about all the articles.

CH2: Historical, Political and Sectarian Tensions

The Syrian conflict is a phenomenon that is recognized to be one of the worst humanitarian and refugee crisis. Numerous wars are being fought in this conflict that has left around 13.1 million persons in dire need of aid.30 Additionally, it has led to the destruction of infrastructure that provides the basic needs and services for its citizens, such as schools and hospitals. Since the beginning of the war in 2011, there has been an extraordinary amount of human rights violations that have been committed against civilians.31 The number of deaths that were projected by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) amounted to 511,000 as of March 2018.32 Section (a) of this chapter discusses the importance of the maintaining the demographic balance in Lebanon due to its confessional system. Section (b) explores the political, historical, and sectarian tensions that exist in Lebanon. Finally, section (c) introduces the fundamental policies that have affected the well-being of Syrian refugees in Lebanon since their arrival.

a) Different Political Views on Syrian Refugees This section provides a summary on the two opposing political parties in Lebanon. This background is important to understand how sectarianism in the Middle East is a feature that is prevalent in politics. Tense relations between Syrian refugees and Lebanese communities are a result of the political landscape, and the fear of altering the fragile

30 World Vision, Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs and how to help, World Vision Staff, 15 March 2019, available at https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian-refugee-crisis-facts 31 Human Rights Watch, Syria: Events of 2018, HRW World Report, 2019, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria 32 Ibid.

11 demographic balance of the Lebanese system.33 The Sunni population in Syria were oppressed by the Alawite government and they were the majority that went to Lebanon. The high number of Sunni Syrian refugees in Lebanon raises concerns for the Shia and Christian communities who rely on the Lebanese confessional system to maintain order and balance of power.34

i) Significance of the demographic balance in Lebanon This section of the thesis aims to portray the significance of a demographic balance in Lebanon. Since Lebanon’s independence from the French colonization in 1943, political leaders have put efforts into establishing an effective agreement to avoid sectarian strife. Therefore, this section will provide a summary of the confessional system that was established. Additionally, a brief explanation of the two major political parties and their polarized opinion on the Syrian conflict is provided. The conflict in Syria has a direct impact on the relationship between the two opposing political parties and on Lebanon’s politics. Consequently, this affects the successful local integration of Syrian refugees into Lebanese society due to the policies adopted by the Lebanese government.

The agreement between two Lebanese Political leaders, a Christian Maronite and a Sunni Muslim, to end the French mandate is recognized as the National Pact of 1943;35in accordance with the census of 1932.36 In order to avoid any religious tensions between Muslims and Christians, it was arranged that government representation and power would be distributed proportionately amongst the three largest religious groups.37 The presidential role is reserved for a Maronite Christian, the prime minister for a Sunni

33 A. Betts, A. Ali, F. Memisoglu, Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, Oxford Department of International Development, Refugee Studies Centre, 24 November 2017, p.15, available at https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/local-politics-and-the-syrian- refugee-crisis-exploring-responses-in-turkey-lebanon-and-jordan 34 Ibid. 35 I. Saliba, ‘Lebanon: Constitutional Law and the Political Rights of Religious Communities,’ The Law Library of Congress, December 2010, available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/lebanon-constitutional- law.php 36 Lebanese Information Centre, The Lebanese Demographic Reality, LIC,14 January 2013, p.1, available at https://www.lstatic.org/PDF/demographenglish.pdf 37 I. Saliba, ‘Lebanon: Constitutional Law and the Political Rights of Religious Communities.’

12 Muslim, and lastly the speaker of parliament for a Shia Muslim.38 The demographics have been altered significantly and Shia Muslims increased to 27% of the population, Sunni Muslims remained around 27%, while the Christians decreased to 36%.39 The percentages mentioned are merely estimates as there has not been a census since 1932.40 Intertwining religion with politics has caused sectarian disparities to arise between the different religious groups and militias in Lebanon.41 The Lebanese civil war took place from 1975 to 1990. The Taif agreement of 1989, agreed on by Muslims and Christians, played a crucial role in ending the 15-year civil war in Lebanon and replaced the national pact of 1943.42 It was initially stated that confessionalism would eventually be eliminated in hopes of a secular Lebanon, but reforms have not been made yet.43

Lebanon is a country that contains within it 18 recognized religious groups.44 The two major political alliances in Lebanon in the past were known as March 8 comprised mainly by Shia Muslims and March 14 comprised mostly by Sunni Muslims. March 8 is directed by Hezbollah and the Amal movement, and is supported by the Free Patriotic Movement headed by General Aoun, a Christian Maronite. Alternatively, March 14 was led by the Future Movement party headed by Saad Hariri, Lebanese forces headed by Samir Geagea and the Phalange headed by Amin Gemayel.45 During 2016 and 2017, the

38 K. Vaughan, ‘Who Benefits from Consociationalism? Religion Disparities in Lebanon’s Political System’, MDPI, 2018, p.1, available at https://www.mdpi.com/2077-1444/9/2/51/htm#B48-religions-09- 00051 39 United States Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 2011, p.1, available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/193107.pdf 40 A. Lyon, ‘Lebanon Muslims outnumber Christians 2 to 1 Survey,’ Thomson Reuters, 20 January 2007, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-population/lebanon-muslims-outnumber- christians-2-to-1-survey-idUSL132108820061113 41 Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, ‘Lebanon: The Persistence of a Sectarian Conflict,’ Religion and Conflict Case Study Series, August 2013, p.4, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkley-centre/130801BCLebanonPersistenceSectarianConflict.pdf 42 H. Krayem, ‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement,’AUB, p.2, available at http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html 43 S. Nelson, ‘Is Lebanon’s Confessional System Sustainable,’ Journal of Politics and International Studies, 2013, p.333, available at http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/sum- 13/130930-sum13-nelson.pdf 44 United States Department of State, International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, p.2. 45 L. Khatib, ‘Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict,’ Carnegie Middle East Centre, 9 June 2014, available at https://carnegie-mec.org/2014/06/09/regional-spillover-lebanon-and-syrian-conflict- pub-55829

13 political alliances were changed significantly, and March 8 and March 14 are no longer as present as they used to be. However, their perception and attitudes towards the Syrian conflict and the Syrian regime remain relatively the same.46 In this section, the political groups will still be referred to as March 8 and March 14 to avoid confusion. The Syrian conflict that sparked a sectarian divide in Syria directly worsened the sectarian disagreements within the Lebanese political groups.47 The March 14 alliance was keen to support the uprising that was occurring, and their interests lied in the ideology that the Assad regime would finally collapse.48 Another benefit in mind was the potential decrease of Hezbollah’s influence and power in Lebanon. Since Hezbollah has solid relations with the Assad regime, the collapse of the regime would directly weaken Hezbollah’s position.49 On the contrary, Hezbollah and his supporters continually highlight the significance of Lebanese-Syrian relations.50 Hezbollah has and still intervenes in the Syrian conflict to preserve the rule of the Assad regime. In addition to that, he has advocated for the Lebanese government to organize efforts and coordinate with Damascus, the capital of Syria, to find a solution for the refugee crisis and trafficking of rebels into Lebanon.51Therefore, tensions began to build up between the different political parties regarding their views on the actions to be done. It is also important to mention that Lebanon remained without a president for two years and a half, and it took a toll on the political deadlock that was present during the time that Syrian refugees were seeking refuge in Lebanon.52 The conflict would later expand to an eight-year civil war that continues to exist in 2019 with the involvement of several internal and external actors who have played a significant role in this conflict.

46 B. Ajami, ‘The Mother of The Child: How Lebanon’s March 14 alliance collapsed’, Annahar, 8 March 2019, available at https://en.annahar.com/article/945834-the-mother-of-the-child-how-lebanons-march- 14-alliance-collapsed 47 P. Salem, ‘Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis,’ The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Middle East Centre, December 2012, p.3, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/lebanon_syrian_crisis.pdf 48L. Khatib, Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian conflict, p.1. 49 Ibid. 50 A. Assi, ‘The Sectarian Dimension of the Syrian Civil War and Lebanese-Syrian Relations,’ Middle East Institute, 16 July 2018, p.2, available at https://www.mei.edu/publications/sectarian-dimension- syrian-civil-war-and-lebanese-syrian-relations 51 Ibid. 52 A. Betts, A. Ali, F. Memisoglu, p.15.

14 b) Demography Concerns and Historical Tensions This section explores the political, historical, and sectarian tensions that exist in Lebanon. The rise of the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon created a fear of altering the demographic balance of the Lebanese sectarian system. Historical events, such as the arrival of a large number of Palestinian refugees in 1948, and the Syrian tutelage on Lebanon in 1976 are events that have affected Lebanon. The sectarian, political, and historical atmosphere that exists within the structure of this state might have influenced some of the policies that have been adopted by certain politicians.53 Section (i) provides further details on the fear of altering the Lebanese demographic system. Additionally, sections (ii) and (iii) explore details on two historical events that have affected the Lebanese perspective on Syrian refugees.

i) Fear of altering the demographic balance of the Lebanese sectarian system The presence of Syrian refugees in Lebanon has presented a threat in terms of their fragile sectarian balance.54 The confessional system explained above has been operating for years and has been relatively successful in avoiding any sectarian conflicts between the different religious, political, and ethnic groups in the country.55 The majority of the Syrian refugees that have migrated into Lebanon are Sunni Muslims.56 Concerns are now leaning towards whether these Syrian Sunni Muslims will remain permanently inside Lebanon.57 For that reason, the stance of the Lebanese government in 2011 was ‘disassociation’, to avoid the consequences of naturalizing Syrian refugees.58 The consequences that could occur include an imbalance of power between the different

53 A. Betts, A. Ali, F. Memisoglu, pg.15-16. 54 Minority Rights Group International, an uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: the challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return, p.3, February 2019, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/uncertain-future-syrian-refugees-lebanon-challenges-life-exile-and- barriers-return 55 Ibid, p.3. 56 Ibid, p.4. 57 A. Betts, A. Ali, F. Memisoglu, p.15. 58 Z. El-Helou and L. Antara, ‘Political Participation of Refugees: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018, p.10 available at https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/political-participation-of-refugees-the-case-of-syrian- refugees-in-lebanon.pdf

15 political groups, and a threat to the political structure.59 In the interview conducted with Dr. Geukjian, he said ‘The Syrian civil war created more sectarian tensions in Lebanon. Some Lebanese groups interfered in Syria and the borders were not controlled properly. Hezbollah defended the regime and sent troops into Syria.’60 The risk of naturalizing Sunni Syrian refugees is ultimately heightened at this stage. Dr Geukjian stated, ‘If the Syrian refugees were naturalized, the peaceful co-existence and sectarian balance will be changed. Lebanon is not a country that can host refugees and integrate them into its society.’ Furthermore, relations with Syria is diverging the two political alliances with March 8 reflecting a cooperation, and March 14 reflecting the opposite.61 President of the Republic of Lebanon Michel Aoun , and Lebanese Foreign Minister Gebran Bassil have stated in multiple occasions the urgency of Syrian refugees to begin returning to Syria.62 During a meeting in Rome, Lebanese president Aoun mentioned that returns to some areas in Syria are now considered to be safe by Lebanon, and waiting for a political solution is not the right direction.63 When asked about the factors preventing Syrian refugees from returning to Syria, Dr. Ohannes answered, ‘One internal factor is that many refugees have lost their homes in Syria and everything was destroyed. The regime is not providing aid; they could make temporary settlements inside Syria but they are not. The regime is also using refugees as a political weapon to extract political concession from the United States. Another factor is that some Syrian refugees do not even want to go back to Syria. In Lebanon, they are receiving benefits from UNHCR and other

59 D. Eldawy, ‘A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge,’ Migration Policy Institute, 21 February 2019, p.4, available at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/syrian-refugee-swell-push-lebanon-over-edge 60 Interview with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian, Beirut, 6 May 2019. 61 L. Khatib, Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian conflict, p.2. 62 E. Francis, ‘Arab economic summit in Beirut urges Syrian refugee returns’, Thomson Reuters, 20 January 2019, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arabs-summit-syria-refugees/arab- economic-summit-in-beirut-urges-syrian-refugee-returns-idUSKCN1PE08W 63 L. Barrington, ‘Lebanon’s president says phased return of Syrian refugee now possible’, Thomson Reuters, 14 June 2018, available at https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFKBN1JA1QH

16 organisations. There is also a fear of returning since Idlib still has armed groups and there are still attacks occurring.’64

ii) 1976 to 2005 Syrian tutelage Lebanon and Syria’s relationship at present has been inherently affected by the history of these two neighboring countries.65 When the civil war in Lebanon was occurring, Syria sent military troops to intervene in 1976. The Syrian tutelage in Lebanon remained until 2005, and the intention of the Syrian government is still to this day controversial between Lebanese communities.66 As Dr. Geukjian indicated in the interview, ‘the Syrian tutelage on Lebanon has definitely left a negative impact on many Lebanese nationals.’67 Some remain to believe that the intention of sending Syrian military troops into Lebanon was to extend protection for the Christians. In contrast, others state that Syria’s intervention in Lebanon’s civil war exacerbated the situation and turned into an army occupation.68 The assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri in 2005 was the prime reason for Syria removing its troops from Lebanese land.69 His assassination raised many alarms and speculation, and there were numerous accusations regarding Syria’s involvement in the killing.70 Since the assassination and the withdrawal of military troops in 2005, March 8 and March 14 took opposing positions towards their relations with Syria and the Assad regime.71 Therefore, the eruption of the conflict in 2011 raised concerns in Lebanon given the history they share. The complexity of their relationship in the past has encouraged less tolerance in the mind-set of some Lebanese citizens.72 A survey conducted by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and ARK group found that this historical event still affects the perception that Lebanese nationals have on Syrian refugees in the present. The

64 Interview with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian, Beirut, 6 May 2019. 65 Minority Rights Group International, an uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: the challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return p.4. 66 Ibid, p.4. 67 Interview with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian, Beirut, 6 May 2019. 68 Minority Rights Group International, an uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: the challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return p.4. 69 A. Assi, ‘The Sectarian Dimension of the Syrian Civil War and Lebanese-Syrian Relations,’ p.1. 70 Ibid p.1. 71 P. Salem, Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis, p.3. 72 Ibid, p.3.

17 Lebanese nationals who still remember the tutelage of Syrian military troops into Lebanon reported feeling that Syrian refugees are increasing issues in Lebanon.73

iii) Palestinian refugees influencing the Lebanese response to Syrian refugees Up until March 2014, Lebanon kept an open border policy with Syria. Lately, the government of Lebanon has been adopting restrictive policies based on multiple reasons. First, they want to maintain the sectarian demographic balance to avoid religious tensions. Secondly, there have been historical tensions between the relations of Syria and Lebanon, and the polarized opinion of the two main political parties operating in the country at the time. Thirdly, the historical migration of Palestinian refugees, explained further below, might have influenced the mind-set of the Lebanese communities and encouraged the policies adopted towards Syrian refugees.

Around 100,000 Palestinian refugees came into Lebanon after the formation of Israel in 1948.74 Since then, approximately 450,000 refugees have been registered with UNRWA.75 It is estimated that 270,000 Palestinian refugees are now living in Lebanon,76including the 50,000 Palestinian refugees from Syria (PRS) who have migrated to Lebanon as a result of the civil war.77 Only a small number of Christian Palestinian refugees were naturalized, while the rest remained in camps for years.78 There have been numerous claims that the presence of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was the primary stimulus for the civil war of 1975-1990. The right-wing Christian political party known as the Phalange, headed by Pierre Gemayel, began an attack on a bus filled with Palestinians and that fueled tensions with the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) that was supported by certain Muslim factions in Lebanon at the

73 UNDP and ARK Group, Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II, January 2018, p.65, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/document_41.pdf 74 Minority Rights Group International, an uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: the challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return p.3. 75 United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Protection in Lebanon, last updated February 2019, available at https://www.unrwa.org/activity/protection-lebanon 76 Ibid. 77 D. Eldawy, ‘A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge,’ p.7. 78 Minority Rights Group International, an uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: the challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return p.3.

18 time.79 Beirut became split to East and West Beirut, and the Lebanese Civil war took place from 1975 to 1990.80 In this context, there have been numerous political disputes surrounding the presence of Palestinian refugees for decades. The concerns raised also revolve around the delicate sectarian balance since the majority of the Palestinian population in Lebanon are Sunni Muslims.81

Some of the Palestinian refugees residing in Lebanon are still living in refugee camps. They have minimal rights and have been marginalized from the Lebanese society and economy.82 Similar to the challenges Syrian refugees are facing at present, most Palestinian refugees have not been naturalized nor integrated successfully in Lebanon. They still suffer from barriers impeding their access to employment, travel, and property tenure, among others. Almost 70 years later, Palestinian refugees are still dependent on UNRWA for education and health services.83

c) Significant Policies Adopted Since 2011and the Rise of Xenophobia This section of the thesis introduces the fundamental policies that have affected the well-being of Syrian refugees in Lebanon since their arrival. During the eight years of conflict in Syria, Lebanese host communities have somewhat grown tiresome of the expanding number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. This section also introduces surveys from primary data in order to study the changed perception of the Lebanese host communities towards Syrian refugees. This will offer a better understanding of the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon and how they are perceived and treated by Lebanese nationals.

i) The October policy and new residency requirements Syrian refugees in Lebanon are facing numerous challenges due to the policies that have been adopted by the Lebanese government.84 The policies adopted by Lebanon were a

79 Ibid, p.5. 80 Ibid, p.6. 81 Minority Rights Group International, an uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: the challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return p.3. 82 D. Eldawy, ‘A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge,’ p.5. 83 Ibid, p.5. 84 C. Geha, J. Talhouk, ‘Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ p.2.

19 result of the following concerns: Lebanon being a small country with an area of 10,452 square km², negative past experiences with refugees, the fear of altering the sectarian demographic balance, and lastly the notion that Syrian refugees are a political threat in Lebanon.85 Lebanon kept its borders open from 2011 to 2014 and welcomed refugees from Syria. However, the number of Syrian refugees that began migrating to Lebanon in 2011 started expanding. Lebanon still did not have a consistent refugee policy plan.86 The Lebanese government began to adopt policies as the conflict was escalating, and the numbers of refugees were increasing. The policies affected Syrian refugees’ accessibility to a legal status. Accordingly, the absence of a legal status affected their access to employment, education, housing, and healthcare.87

Syrian refugees in 2019 have become an extremely vulnerable and marginalized group as a consequence of the policies that were adopted. On 23 October 2014, the Council of Ministers in Lebanon adopted what is known as the October policy. The October policy was a concise policy document defining Syrian refugees as ‘displaced’ persons.88 With the concern of Syrian refugees becoming permanent refugees just like Palestinians have in the past, this document aimed at ensuring that everyone understood that they are just temporary. The main three items highlighted in this document include; decreasing the high number of Syrian refugees coming into Lebanon, reducing the pressure on infrastructure, and strengthening security procedures.89 Approximately two months after this policy was introduced, the general security carried through and initiated new requirements for the entry and renewal of residence permits of Syrian refugees on January 2015.90 The requirements consisted of: a payment of $200 to renew or apply for a residence permit for individuals above the age of 15, a Lebanese sponsor, and a valid

85 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ Carnegie Middle East Centre, 16 April 2018, p.3, available at https://carnegie-mec.org/2018/04/16/policy- framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058 86 C. Geha, J. Talhouk, ‘Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ p.1. 87 Ibid, p.2. 88 M. Janmyr, ‘Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.30, Issue 4, 29 November 2016, p.62, available at https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/35/4/58/2609281 89 Ibid, p.62. 90 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.4.

20 passport.91 The barriers that this policy presents include: lack of a legal status, absence of employment, and a decrease in the number of Syrian refugee children enrolled in schools.92 In addition to that, the inaccessibility to a legal status presented Syrian refugees with a risk of being arrested at checkpoints by the General Security.93 Furthermore, the registration of births and marriages was also impeded by the adoption of this policy.94 This policy caused a direct impact on Syrian refugees. UNHCR informed that from January to March 2015, registration of Syrian refugees decreased by 80 percent.95 Fast forward to two years after this policy was introduced, there are 74% of Syrian refugees aged above 15 who lacked a legal status in 2017.96

After realizing the high number of Syrian refugees who were left without a legal status due to the expensive renewal of residency permits, the general security renounced the $200 fee only for Syrian refugees who were registered with UNHCR before 1 January 2015.97 It is estimated that around 500,000 Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not registered by UNHCR and they are left excluded from this exemption.98 It is important to mention that the Lebanese government ordered UNHCR to stop official registration of Syrian refugees entirely on 6 May 2015.99 Lama Fakih, Human Rights Watch Deputy Middle East Director, found the decision to renounce the $200 fee to be a positive step, but still had some concerns regarding the exclusions that came with it. She commented, ‘If it’s carried out, the decision to waive residency fees for some refugees will have a real and positive impact for many Syrian families living in Lebanon, yet excluding large parts of the refugee population only serves to further marginalize already vulnerable people.’100

91 Ibid, p.4. 92 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: ‘New Refugee Policy a Step Forward’, Relief Web, 14 February 2017, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-new-refugee-policy-step-forward 93 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.4. 94 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: New Refugee Policy a Step Forward’. 95 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.4. 96 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Events of 2018. 97 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: New Refugee Policy a Step Forward’. 98 T. Perry, ‘Lebanon Near ‘Breaking Point’ Over Syrian Refugee Crisis: PM Hariri’, Reuters, 31 March 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon/lebanon-near- breaking-point-over-syrian-refugee-crisis-pm-hariri-idUSKBN1722JM 99 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: New Refugee Policy a Step Forward.’ 100 Ibid.

21

A survey was done by UNHCR to study the perception of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.101 A total of 1800 questionnaires were conducted with 1200 Syrians refugees and 600 Lebanese participants from all 26 districts in Lebanon.102 70% of Syrian refugees stated that they lack a legal status because of the expensive $200 payment and the challenges in finding a Lebanese sponsor.103 Furthermore, more than 50% of Syrian refugees felt unwelcome in Lebanon, and 45% reported that it is slowly worsening over time.104 From the Lebanese participants’ side, 53% of Lebanese respondents reported feeling threatened by what they heard about Syrian refugees.105 It is significant to reference an incident that took place in 2017 in Miziara in Northern Lebanon that fueled anger all across Lebanon. A Lebanese girl was raped and killed by a Syrian man. The municipality of Miziara directly took action and expelled all the Syrians who do not have a legal residency in that town.106 This incident has encouraged the xenophobia surrounding Syrian refugees in Lebanon. It has also exacerbated scapegoating of Syrian refugees whenever a crime or a threat happens.107 In June 2018, Foreign Minister of Lebanon, Gebran Bassil, demanded a freeze on the residency permit renewals of UNHCR employees.108 Bassil accused UNHCR of encouraging Syrian refugees to stay in Lebanon because they were asking them numerous questions concerning their safe return back to Syria.109

ii) Closing borders

101 C. Alsharabati and J. Nammour, Survey on Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, UNHCR, RDPP, Institut Des Sciences Politiques, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/45083 102 Ibid, p.7. 103 Ibid p.12. 104 Ibid p.18. 105 Ibid p.22. 106 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.7 107 Ibid, p.7. 108 The Daily Star Lebanon, ‘Lebanon News: Bassil freezes UNHCR staff residency permits’, The Daily Star, 8 June 2018, available at https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Jun-08/452537- bassil-says-steps-to-be-taken-against-unhcr.ashx 109S. Nebehay, A. McDowall, ‘UN refugee agency hopes Lebanon will reverse residency freeze,’ Reuters, 12 June 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-syria-refugees/un- refugee-agency-hopes-lebanon-will-reverse-residency-freeze-idUSKBN1J818I

22 After having an open border policy with Syria from 2011 until 2014, there was a deep concern over the expanding number of the refugee population because of the limited resources in Lebanon.110 The Ministry of Interior and the General security of Lebanon adopted border measures with Syria in 2015. This decision was first implemented on the Northern border between Lebanon and Syria in August, and then in the main border between the two countries known as Masnaa.111 Before these restrictive measures were taken on 5 January 2015, Syrians were free to enter Lebanon for a minimum of six months.112 Any Syrian who wishes to enter Lebanon as of 2015 has several procedures to follow. He/she has to provide valid reasons concerning his/her visit to Lebanon along with relevant accompanying documents such as a passport and a family book.113

There are several types of visa categories allowing entry into Lebanon, such as education, medical care, business purposes, and tourism. Most of these categories only include a short-term stay in the country and require specific documents that have to be approved by the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of Interior.114 One of the categories that include a long-term stay in the country is the ‘displaced immigrants’ category.115 Syrian refugees applying for this type of visa have to prove that they require humanitarian assistance in Lebanon, and have to fulfill the ‘Humanitarian Exception Criteria’ introduced by the Lebanese government.116 They should be recognized as,

110 C. Geha and J. Talhouk, ‘Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, p.2. 111 Fanack, Refugees: Lebanon and Jordan Close Their Borders to Syrian Refugees, 22 December 2014, Fanack, available at https://fanack.com/refugees/lebanon-and-jordan-close-their-borders-to-syrian- refugees/ 112 BBC News, ‘Syrians entering Lebanon face new restrictions’, BBC, 1 January 2015, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30657003 113 Refugees Lebanon, Procedures for Syrians entering Lebanon, 2015, available at https://www.refugees- lebanon.org/uploads/poster/poster_149865898340.pdf 114 Amnesty International, ‘Lebanon: New entry requirements for Syrians likely to block would-be refugees,’ Relief Web, 6 January 2015, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-new- entry-requirements-syrians-likely-block-would-be-refugees 115 Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, Legal Challenges Faced by Syrian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, 2016, p.14, available at http://rdpp-me.org/RDPP/files/legal_1499124284.pdf 116 Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon, p.11, 2015, available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2417852015ENGLISH.PDF

23 ‘displaced, unaccompanied and/or separated children with a parent already registered in Lebanon; persons living with disabilities with a relative already registered in Lebanon; persons with urgent medical needs for whom treatment in Syria is unavailable; persons who will be resettled to third countries.’117 Even within this category, a Syrian refugee is expected to make a payment of $200 for every individual above the age of 15 to attain a valid residence permit in Lebanon. This category is for refugees who are entering Lebanon after 2015 and they have probably not been registered by UNHCR prior to 2015. Therefore, the $200 payment applies to them. Additionally, consent from the Ministry of Social Affairs and the General Security General Director is required.118 Another option available to Syrian refugees is applying as a worker which comes with its own set of requirements. They must have a Lebanese sponsor, a rental contract, and a payment of $200 for the residence permit.119 The Syrian ambassador to Lebanon, Ali Abdul Karim Ali, announced in a televised interview that the new border measures that were adopted in 2015 were not discussed beforehand and he described the new measures as ‘not appropriate.’120 During the interview with Dr. Geukjian, he discussed the restricted borders and mentioned, ‘There are 136 illegal crossing points between Syria and Lebanon. The Lebanese authorities are aware of these illegal crossing points, but they are unable or unwilling to close them. The Lebanese government is also complicit to what happened in Lebanon, but everything is always blamed on Syrian refugees.’121

iii) Curfews and evictions In 2017, it was found that approximately 142 municipalities in Lebanon enacted policies regarding curfews against Syrian refugees.122 The curfews placed restricted the

117 Ibid, p.11. 118 Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, Legal Challenges Faced by Syrian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, p.14. 119 Refugees Lebanon, Procedures for Syrians entering Lebanon, 2015, available at https://www.refugees- lebanon.org/uploads/poster/poster_149865898340.pdf 120 M. Hennessy-Fiske and N. Bulos, ‘Lebanon’s new visa rules for Syrians aim to curb refugee influx’, Los Angeles Times, 5 January 2015, available at https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg- lebanon-syria-visas-20150105-story.html 121 Interview with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian, Beirut, 6 May 2019. 122 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.3.

24 movement of Syria refugees outside of their homes during the night time.123 Curfews are rare measures taken in cases of a security threat in a country.124 According to officials of municipalities, the purpose of the curfews was to enforce security measures and maintain public order. Municipalities also justified the implementation of these curfews as a means to avoid additional tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.125 The curfews would typically begin at 7:00 pm or 8:00 pm and come to an end at around 6:00 am. This measure affected Syrian refugees’ freedom of movement. Some Syrian refugees were unable to go to their work when they have night shifts.126 Nadim Houry, Human Rights Watch deputy Middle East Director, stated that ‘The authorities have presented no evidence that curfews for Syrian refugees are necessary for public order or security in Lebanon, these curfews are just contributing to an increasingly hostile environment for Syrian refugees in the country.’127 If Syrian refugees do not comply with the curfew after receiving a warning the first time, they violated the curfew measure and are at risk of arrest. Some exceptions that allow the infringement of the curfew include medical emergencies.128Human Rights Watch stated that between 2016 and 2018, there have been around 3,664 Syrian refugees that were coercively evicted from their homes by 13 municipalities.129 Human Rights Watch reported that the justifications the municipalities gave for these evictions

123 L. Mourad, ‘Inaction as Policy-Making: Understanding Lebanon’s Early Response to the Refugee Influx,’ Project on Middle East Political Science, University of Toronto, p.53, available at https://pomeps.org/2017/03/29/inaction-as-policy-making-understanding-lebanons-early-response-to-the- refugee-influx/ 124 P. Taslakian, ‘Curfews and human rights within the Syrian context in Lebanon,’ Peace Building in Lebanon, UNDP, 12 June 2016, available at https://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Governance/Publications/PEACE%20BUILDING%201 2th%20web%20p11.pdf 125 Ibid. 126 J. Davidson, ‘Syrians in Lebanon hit by arrests, curfews and hostility after bombings’, Reuters, 25 July 2016, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-lebanon/syrians-in-lebanon-hit- by-arrests-curfews-and-hostility-after-bombings-idUSKCN1051KO 127 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugees,’ HRW, 3 October 2014, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/lebanon-least-45-local-curfews- imposed-syrian-refugees 128 P. Taslakian, Curfews and human rights within the Syrian context in Lebanon. 129 Human Rights Watch, ‘Our Homes are not for Strangers: Mass Evictions of Syrian Refugees by Lebanese Municipalities,’ HRW, 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/20/our-homes- are-not-strangers/mass-evictions-syrian-refugees-lebanese-municipalities

25 were not consistent and discriminatory. The reasons the municipalities stated for implementing those evictions concerned violations of housing regulations. However, it was found that these measures were taken because of the nationality and religion of Syrian refugees, since Lebanese and other foreign nationals were not targeted.130 Some Syrian refugees are feeling insecure about these evictions and the discriminatory atmosphere. They feel that Lebanese politicians, who are publicly encouraging the return of Syrian refugees back to their countries, are sparking the discrimination and harassment from some municipalities.131 When asked whether discrimination against Syrian refugees is prevalent in Lebanon, Dr. Geukjian responded: ‘There is discrimination and there is ‘Syria-Phobia’ in Lebanon, and it has increased throughout the years. Syrian refugees are competing in the market with the Lebanese, and they provide cheap labour. They are creating an economic problem in addition to the political issue. However, some Syrian refugees have licenses and are paying taxes to the state. Some are contributing to the economic development in the country, but Lebanese do not talk about this. There were many tensions in some areas in Lebanon between Lebanese and Syrian refugees. In Sin El Fil, municipalities established curfews for Syrian refugees not allowing them to go out after 6:00 pm. This is a violation of their freedom of movement.’132 Syrian refugees are often blamed for the deteriorating social, political, and economic environment.133 Some Syrian refugees have also documented that the pressure for their returns is continuously rising because of the politicians, including the president of Lebanon’s public statements. In a survey conducted by UNDP and ARK group, 64% of the Lebanese respondents in Beirut mentioned that the media and the political situation in Lebanon are also sources of tension between Lebanese communities and Syrian refugees.134 In some areas in Lebanon such as Zahle and the Beqaa, the eviction

130 Ibid. 131 Ibid. 132 Interview with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian, Beirut, 6 May 2019. 133 C. Geha, ‘Political Complexities of Return: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ Middle East Institute, 14 May 2019, available at https://mei.edu/publications/political-complexities-return-syrian-refugees-lebanon 134 UNDP and ARK Group, Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II, p.20.

26 warnings were placed on the doors of the Syrian refugees. However, the landlords commanded Syrian refugees to leave their homes verbally in some areas like Mizyara in Northern Lebanon.135 It was reported by Syrian refugees that the manner used to implement the eviction notices was often violent and forceful.136 The procedures taken regarding the time the refugees had to leave the house, and the documents required also differed by each municipality.137

iv) Employment restrictions In 1991, the President of Lebanon at the time, Elias Hrawi, and the President of the Syrian Arab Republic, Hafez Al-Assad established an agreement that acknowledged the freedom of movement of Lebanese and Syrian nationals amongst these two states.138 The agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination, signed in 1993, also provided Lebanese and Syrians the right to work.139 Lebanon lacked labourers in certain sectors with low wages that Syrians can potentially fill; this agreement benefitted both sides.140

This agreement was forgotten about in 2014 when the Ministry of Labour in Lebanon announced that the only sectors that Syrian refugees are allowed to work in are: agriculture, construction, and the environment.141 Limiting their employment options, the Ministry of Labour continued to introduce further restrictions. In order to work, a Syrian refugee had to find a Lebanese sponsor that would sign a ‘pledge of responsibility.’142 In addition to that, the Syrian refugees who are registered by UNHCR

135 Human Rights Watch, ‘Our Homes are not for Strangers: Mass Evictions of Syrian Refugees by Lebanese Municipalities.’ 136 Ibid. 137 Ibid. 138 I. A. Hijazi, ‘Syria-Lebanon Cooperation Pact Signed’, The New York Times, 23 May 1991, available at https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/23/world/syria-lebanon-cooperation-pact-signed.html 139 Syrian Lebanese Higher Council, Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination between the Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic, 16 September 1993, available at http://www.syrleb.org/SD08/msf/1507751474_.pdf 140 Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, ‘Syrian Workers in Lebanon: An Assessment of Their Rights and Reality,’ 18 December 2013, p.8, available at http://www.rightsobserver.org/files/Report_Syrian_Workers__ENG_final_(2).pdf 141 Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, ‘Legal Challenges Faced by Syrian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon,’ p.14. 142 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.4.

27 and are regularly renewing their registration are not allowed to work in the sectors stated above, because they are taking aid from UNHCR.143 Lebanese employers who choose to employ Syrian refugees also had several conditions to fulfill. Firstly, they had to provide evidence that they tried to find a Lebanese national to fill the job position, but they could not find one. Secondly, employers have to maintain a specific ratio; for every foreign worker, there had to be 10 Lebanese workers in their business.144 A survey conducted by the International Labour Organisation (ILO) found that 92% of Syrian refugee workers lack legal employment contracts in Lebanon.145 The employment restrictions imposed created an additional deterrence for Syrian refugees. In 2017, Syrian refugees in Lebanon who are earning $3.84 per working day and are living below poverty amounted to 76%.146 It was also estimated that a male Syrian refugee gets a monthly income of $206 on average, while a female Syrian refugee earns $159.147 It is vital to mention that the Lebanese minimum wage is $450.148

Focus group discussions conducted by the American University of Beirut (AUB) and Save the Children found that the employment of Syrian refugees threatens Lebanese nationals. The main reason is that Syrian refugees work for cheap labour and also get humanitarian aid. Some mentioned that they were welcoming at the start but now realize the economic threat that Syrian refugees are causing.149 Syrian refugees in Sahel Akkar150stated that they are suffering from physical and verbal harassment, while

143 Ibid. 144 Ibid. 145 ILO, Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Their Employment Profile, Regional Office for the Arab States, 2013, p.9, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@arabstates/@ro- beirut/documents/publication/wcms_240134.pdf 146 World Food Programme, UNHCR, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 2017, p.60, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/VASyR%202017.compressed.pdf 147 Ibid, p.4. 148 Minimum Wage International, Lebanon Minimum Wage Rate 2019, available at https://www.minimum-wage.org/international/lebanon 149 C. Harb and R. Saab, Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in the Beqaa and Akkar, Save the Children, AUB, 2014, p.17, available at https://lebanon.savethechildren.net/sites/lebanon.savethechildren.net/files/library/AUB%20SCI%20Social %20cohesion%20final%20report%20May%202014.pdf 150 A district in the Akkar governorate of Lebanon

28 refugees in the Beqaa151did not report any difficulties.152 However, Syrian refugees in all the locations where the focus groups were conducted mentioned concerns from eviction threats, and insecurities regarding their housing. The number of Lebanese participants that view Syrian refugees to be a threat to their economic opportunities amounted to 90%.153 Similarly, a survey was conducted by UNDP and ARK Group to study the social tensions that exist throughout Lebanon. Over 10,000 interviews were done between May and August 2017 in all 26 districts of Lebanon.154 The main source of tension derived from the employment of Syrian refugees. The survey results found that 64% complained of the competition for jobs.155 However, the results also found that barely 15% of Lebanese nationals work in the same sectors that Syrian refugees are allowed to work in.156 In addition to that, the participants stated that the lack of resources and services was a reason for the mounting tensions.157 UNDP conducted a qualitative survey in Bar Elias and Qaraoun located in the Beqaa governorate of Lebanon. They are both known to be generous areas that accepted and welcomed refugees even after evictions from certain municipalities. The data obtained from Bar Elias was more distressing than the data collected in Qaraoun, and therefore will be focused on.158 It was found that segregation was perceived to be a solution in Bar Elias to avoid tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.159 Lebanese complained of cultural differences they cannot ignore.160 Syrian refugees reported that access to aid, jobs, legal status, and accommodation has been challenging, and depends on the social networks you have with Lebanese people. Syrian refugees reported feeling like ‘aliens’ in Lebanon.161 ‘The Lebanese people believe that the Syrians are inferior,

151 The Beqaa valley is in the Beqaa governorate of Lebanon 152 C. Harb and R. Saab, Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in the Beqaa and Akkar, p.18. 153 Ibid, p.5 154 UNDP and ARK Group, Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II, January 2018, p.5. 155 Ibid, Executive Summary, p.ii. 156 Ibid. 157 Ibid, p.18. 158 UNDP, Below the Surface: Results of a WhatsApp Survey of Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon, 2018, p.4, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67579.pdf 159 Ibid, p.4. 160 Ibid, p.6. 161 Ibid, p.15.

29 and the Syrian doesn’t have any rights or dignity,’ as one Syrian respondent stated.162 As mentioned previously, the historical occupation of the Syrian army in Lebanon is a factor causing tensions. In this context, some Lebanese still feel like Syrians are occupying them as one Lebanese participant stated, ‘Syrians have occupied the whole country, and nothing is left for the Lebanese. The future of the Syrians is excellent, while it’s expected that we might go to Zimbabwe or the island of Hannibal or look for a country that will host the Lebanese because Syrians have left nothing for them, for they have possessed everything.’163

d) Conclusion The economic conditions in Lebanon continue to worsen, and the discourse on the return of Syrian refugees back to their country continues to increase.164 Social tensions between the Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees in some areas in Lebanon are evident and have risen throughout the years. Lebanese politicians are very public with their thoughts about Syrian refugees who have remained in Lebanon for eight years now.165 The anti-refugee political discourse has largely affected the public’s perception of refugees, and increased the xenophobia against refugees. On 9 May 2019, President of Lebanon, Michel Aoun, made it clear how important that Syrian refugees begin returning to Syria for the sake of Lebanon to survive.166 He stated, ‘If half a million Palestinian refugees and 1.6 million displaced Syrians remain in Lebanon, the country will cease to exist because its demographics will be completely altered.’167 Syrian refugees in Lebanon have become scapegoats in numerous circumstances, and are usually the ones to blame for unemployment, security threats, and lack of resources.168 In the survey conducted by UNDP and ARK group, 81% of the Lebanese participants

162 Ibid, p.15. 163 Ibid, p.17 164 C. Geha, ‘Political complexities of Return: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon.’ 165 Ibid. 166Middle East Monitor, ‘Lebanon won’t survive with Palestine, Syria refugees, says Aoun’, Middle East Monitor, 10 May 2019, available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190510-lebanon-wont- survive-with-palestinian-syrian-refugees-says-aoun/ 167 W. Saif al-Din, ‘Refugee influx threatens Lebanon’s existence: President’, AA, 9 May 2019, available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/refugee-influx-threatens-lebanon-s-existence-president/1474601 168 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.7.

30 said they supported the restrictive and discriminatory policies that have been adopted by municipalities against Syrian refugees.169

CH3: Legal and Policy Framework Applying to Lebanon

Lebanon continues to be the country that has the highest number of refugees per capita in the world. Nevertheless, coherent domestic legislation on the protection of refugees is lacking.170 There are limited provisions in Lebanon’s domestic legislation that deal with refugees. Lebanon refuses to be a ‘country of asylum’ and is not a State Party to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, nor the 1967 Protocol.171 However, Lebanon is a State Party to other international human rights treaties which are of relevance to the situation of Syrian refugees. The human rights treaties Lebanon is a State Party to are dealt with in chapter four. The fundamental law governing the status of refugees in Lebanon is known as the 1962 Law Regulating the Entry and Stay of Foreigners in Lebanon and their exit from the country.172 This law only regulates certain aspects with regards to refugee protection. Section (a) of this chapter provides an overview of the 1962 Law, and the selected provisions relevant to Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Furthermore, section (b) discusses the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNHCR and the Government of Lebanon. Lastly, section (c) explores the Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP).

a) 1962 Law Regulating Entry, Stay and Exit of Foreigners

169 UNDP and ARK Group, Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II, p.40. 170 B. Immenkamp, ‘Syrian crisis: Impact on Lebanon, European Parliamentary Research Service,’ Briefing, European Parliament, 30 March 2017, p.4, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2017)599379 171 M. Janmyr, ‘No Country of Asylum: ‘Legitimizing’ Lebanon’s Rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Oxford University Press, 5 October 2017, p.440, available at https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article/29/3/438/4345649 172 Law of 10 July 1962: Concerning the entry and stay in Lebanon as well as the exit (entered into force 10 July 1962), available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/39234/97115/F1369890137/LBN-39234.pdf

31 The 1962 law is the primary law that regulates the residency of asylum seekers and refugees in Lebanon.173 While the Lebanese government states that Syrian refugees are ‘displaced persons,’ UNHCR refers to them as refugees escaping persecution and uses the term ‘refugee movement’.174 In Lebanon, UNHCR has been disinclined to announce ‘Prima Facie refugee status’ to Syrian refugees.175 The UNHCR defines ‘Prima Facie refugee status’ as the acknowledgement of UNHCR or a state that these are asylum seekers who have faced obvious and objective conditions in their home countries, and are in danger if they do not seek asylum elsewhere.176 Under the 1962 Law of Entry and Exit, the legal status of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is determined by the same provisions that are applied to foreigners.177 That has increased their marginalization in Lebanese society.178 UNHCR urged the Lebanese government to establish clear domestic legislation that would provide coherent guidelines on the treatment of refugees in Lebanon. Furthermore, UNHCR advocated for Lebanon to develop a legal framework that defines and protects the rights of refugees in Lebanon.179 The Lebanese government fears the obligations that come with the term ‘refugee’ and continues to refer to Syrian refugees as ‘temporarily displaced.’180

i) The provisions applying to ‘political refugees’ in the 1962 Law: articles 26, 27, 31 and 32

173 UNHCR, Universal Periodic Review: 2nd Cycle: 23rd Session, Lebanon, p.3, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5638627ad.html 174 M. Janmyr, ‘The fragile legal order facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon’, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, University of Oslo, 24 July 2018, available at https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-fragile- legal-order-facing-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/ 175 Ibid. 176 UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No.11: Prima Facie Recognition of Refugee Status, p.4, 5 June 2015, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines-international-protection-no-11- prima-facie-recognition-refugee-status 177 A. Klein, ‘The Right to Belong to a Political Community at the Example of the Legal Situation of Refugees in Lebanon,’ Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Beirut, 11 July 2018, available at https://lb.boell.org/en/2018/07/11/right-belong-political-community-example-legal-situation-refu-gees- lebanon 178 M. Janmyr, ‘No Country of Asylum: ‘Legitimizing’ Lebanon’s Rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention’, p.440. 179 UNHCR, Universal Periodic Review, 2nd Cycle: 23rd Session, Lebanon, p.4. 180 F. Dionigi, ‘The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience,’ Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 25 February 2016, p.23, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/syrian-refugee-crisis-lebanon-state-fragility-and-social-resilience

32 As mentioned previously, the 1962 Law of Entry and Exit is an immigration law that only regulates certain aspects with regards to refugee protection.181 There is one title on political asylum in the document which comprises six articles, however, only the most important articles will be mentioned in this section. In Title VIII: The Right of Political Asylum of the 1962 law, Article 26 states ‘Any alien who may be under pursuit or under sentence from a non-Lebanese authority as a result of a political crime, or whose life or freedom are threatened, equally for political reasons, may apply for political asylum in Lebanon.’182 The right of political asylum is included in this law and allows asylum seekers to enter Lebanon as a consequence of persecution solely on political grounds. However, it has been stated that this right of political asylum is redundant and has only been practiced once.183 Moreover, the function of this article is restricted and only includes ‘aliens’ who are seeking political asylum.184 In addition to that, the 1962 Law of Entry and Exit includes an article regarding the customary international law principle of non- refoulement. Article 31 states that ‘former political refugees’ cannot be obligated to return to a country where their right to life and freedom could be in danger. 185 Article 32 states that any ‘alien’ crossing the borders into Lebanon in an illegal manner is at risk of imprisonment.186 This law also includes consequences for illegal entry or lack of legal status. The consequences may vary from a fine to an imprisonment or deportation.187

This law has established a committee that is responsible for asylum decisions. Under article 27 of the 1962 law, it is stated that the committee includes: the General Director of the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Interior, Foreign affairs and finally the General Security.188 The provisions mentioned above have been perceived as

181 Law of 10 July 1962: Concerning the entry and stay in Lebanon as well as the exit. 182 Ibid, art.26. 183 A. Klein, ‘The Right to Belong to a Political Community at the Example of the Legal Situation of Refugees in Lebanon.’ 184 F. Dionigi, ‘The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience,’ p.23. 185 Law of 10 July 1962: Concerning the entry and stay in Lebanon as well as the exit, art.31. 186 Ibid, p.6. 187 UNHCR, Universal Periodic Review, 2nd Cycle: 23rd Session, Lebanon, p.5. 188 Law of 10 July 1962: Concerning the entry and stay in Lebanon as well as the exit, art.27.

33 ‘redundant’ and other practices have been adopted.189 The government of Lebanon has given the responsibility of dealing with refugees to UNHCR.190 The MoU, an agreement established between the Lebanese government and UNHCR, is discussed in more details in section (b).

b) The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between UNHCR and the government of Lebanon The UNHCR and the government of Lebanon established an MoU that allows UNHCR to conduct refugee status determination (RSD) to register refugees. As mentioned above, Syrian refugees in Lebanon are not registered on a prima facie basis. The RSD process that is done by UNHCR, for Syrian refugees specifically, is a shortened process based on conditions agreed upon with the Government of Lebanon.191 UNHCR follows the definition of refugee in the Geneva Refugee Convention during the registration of refugees.192The MoU was signed in 2003 by UNHCR and the General Security Office (GSO).193 This section of the thesis provides an explanation of the MoU and the RSD process. Part (i) explores whether the MoU is an outdated document that requires reform. Additionally, part (ii) discusses the disagreements between the Lebanese government and UNHCR. Lastly part (iii) and (iv) explore the RSD process of Syrian refugees, and the cancellation of the UNHCR registration certificate respectively.

i) Is an updated MoU needed?

189 D. Stevens, ‘Shifting Conceptions of Refugee Identity and Protection: European and Middle Eastern Approaches,’ Warwick Law School, 2014, Ch.5, p.18, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475132 190 M. Janmyr, ‘Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, Refugee Survey Quarterly Oxford Academic, 29 November 2016, available at https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/35/4/58/2609281 191 Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF), Background Paper on Unregistered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 15 July 2015, p.5, available at http://lhif.org/uploaded/News/d92fe3a1b1dd46f2a281254fa551bd09LHIF%20Background%20Paper%20 on%20Unregistered%20Syrian%20Refugees%20(FINAL).pdf 192 UNHCR, Country Operations Plan, UNHCR Regional Office in Lebanon, 2004, p.2, available at https://www.unhcr.org/3fd9c6a14.pdf 193 UNHCR, UNHCR, Universal Periodic Review: The Republic of Lebanon, Human Rights Liaison Unit: Division of International Protection, April 2010, p.1, available at https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session9/LB/UNHCR_HighCommissionerforRefugees. pdf

34 UNHCR has been working and cooperating with the Lebanese government for 50 years now. The Lebanese government found UNHCR to be beneficial, especially with tasks such as RSD, education, and other types of assistance concerning non-Palestinian refugees.194 In order to safeguard refugees’ rights and ensure the host state fulfills its obligations, the Geneva Refugee Convention defines refugee as, ‘someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.’195 In the MoU, Lebanon puts forward a clear stance that it is not an asylum country. However, it accepts RSD through UNHCR.196 In addition to that, UNHCR is able to provide protection services to recognized refugees as long as they are resettled to third countries in a period of six months.197 After the refugee completes the registration process with UNHCR, the refugee receives a ‘circulation permit’ from the government that is valid for around six months and could be extended once to nine months. UNHCR is expected to resettle registered refugees within a period of 6 months.198 In reality, the Lebanese government does not give any legal effect to recognized Syrian refugees registered by UNHCR.199 Moreover, the Lebanese government does not have an agreement with UNHCR to provide an official legal status for Syrian refugees, in contrast to the MoU guidelines above for other refugees.200 Therefore, the guidelines in the MoU on RSD are not implemented on Syrian refugees. The RSD process for Syrian refugees specifically is explained further in section (iii).

After new measures were imposed in 2013 and further in 2015,201 Syrian refugees were obliged to adhere to the new restrictions and most of them were not able to obtain a

194 UNRWA is responsible for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, refer to Chapter 1a. 195 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Geneva (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954), Resolution 429 (V), art1A(2), p.14, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/refugees.pdf 196 UNHCR, Country Operations Plan, p.1. 197 Ibid. 198M. Janmyr, ‘The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, p.10. 199 Ibid. 200 Ibid. 201 Refer to chapter 2d for more details.

35 legal status. Furthermore, the Lebanese government announced that Syrian refugees are administered through governmental decisions and not by law.202 Syrian refugees are seen and treated as illegal migrants regardless of the MoU and the registration certificate they receive through UNHCR.203 Numerous human rights organisations have continuously criticized the MoU for accepting the Lebanese view on refugees being a security risk on Lebanon instead of combatting it.204 Additionally, it lacks vital principles that safeguard refugees’ rights, such as the principle of non-refoulment.205 Some UNHCR staff have even admitted that the MoU was a ‘mistake’ and did not achieve the requirements needed to protect refugees.206 For that reason, there was some speculation on drafting a new MoU in 2011. UNHCR handed the Lebanese government a draft which was instantly rejected. It was rejected because it resembled the 1951 Convention and included key points such as the right to work, detention of refugees, and the principle of non-refoulment, among others.207

ii) MoU terminology disagreements In Lebanon, UNHCR and the Lebanese Government have had several disagreements on the appropriate terminology to be used when addressing Syrian refugees. As mentioned above, Lebanon does not consider itself to be an asylum country, and refers to all Syrian refugees who have entered Lebanon as ‘displaced.’208 In contrast, UNHCR has used the term ‘refugee movement’ for the one million Syrian citizens who have sought refuge in Lebanon.209 The term ‘temporarily displaced’ means that refugees are expected to be resettled as soon as possible, and are not Lebanon’s responsibility. This term leaves Syrian refugees struggling to obtain a legal status due to the restrictions imposed by the

202 M. Janmyr, ‘The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, p.11. 203 Ibid, p.10. 204 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 17 November 2017, p.395, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13642987.2017.1371140?needAccess=true 205 Ibid. 206 Ibid. 207 Ibid. 208 M. Janmyr, ‘The fragile legal order facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon’. 209 UNHCR, Refugee Response in Lebanon, Briefing Documents, March 2015, p.2, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/95_finalbriefingkit_/95_finalbrie fingkit_en.pdf

36 Lebanese government in 2015. Since the Lebanese government refuses the ‘refugee’ terminology altogether,210 Syrian refugees are not given the same protection and rights afforded to someone that fits the refugee definition. It has been a challenge for UNHCR to fulfill its mandate on the protection of refugees. However, it has not taken the necessary steps to pressure the Lebanese government to ratify the 1951 Convention.211 Referring to refugees as ‘displaced’ leaves significant impacts on their lives in a host country. In Lebanon, the lack of a legal status encourages various consequences and leaves refugees at risk of imprisonment, deportation, and uninformed arrest.212 Lebanon was very persistent on not using the term ‘refugee’ for multiple reasons such as the concern that they would become permanent refugees such as the Palestinians have in the past, as well as, the denial of its state obligations towards refugees.213 UNHCR initially accepted the refusal of using the refugee terminology to keep a good atmosphere with the Lebanese government.214 It ,later on, found itself stuck between international refugee law and the Lebanese national view on refugees. UNHCR began to use refugee terminology, which increased the tension with the Lebanese government.215 As a UNHCR employee recalls, ‘I regret myself ... sometimes I think I miscalculated our advocacy by not taking into account the heritage of the Palestinian issue in how people were discussing the Syrian question.’216

As Syrian refugee numbers entering into Lebanon began increasing from 2012 to 2014, UNHCR took the lead role in handling the responsibility of registration and assistance.217 The government of Lebanon started being alarmed by the increasing number when it reached one million Syrian refugees. The government adopted numerous restrictive policies such as the October policy mentioned in chapter two, with

210 M. Janmyr, ‘The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’ p.10. 211 M. Janmyr, ‘No Country of Asylum: ‘Legitimizing’ Lebanon’s Rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention’, p.444. 212 A. Klein, ‘The Right to Belong to a Political Community at the Example of the Legal Situation of Refugees in Lebanon,’ p.4. 213 M. Janmyr, ‘No Country of Asylum: ‘Legitimizing’ Lebanon’s Rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention,’ p.398. 214 Ibid. 215 Ibid. 216 Ibid, p.399. 217 M. Janmyr, ‘The fragile legal order facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon’, p.2.

37 the aim of decreasing the large number of Syrian refugees.218 The government began to take action regarding refugees and took control from UNHCR. A public official claimed that UNHCR became ‘more important than the President of the Republic ... [it became a] major decision-maker in the country.’219 Furthermore, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon known as Gebran Bassil was displeased by UNHCR’s actions and stated, ‘from now on, Lebanon will be making refugee policies while others, including the UNHCR, will work according to them and not the other way around.’220 Additional restrictions were adopted by the government in 2015 when they demanded UNHCR to halt the registration of Syrian refugees.221

iii) RSD and UNHCR’s registration certificate for Syrian refugees This paragraph will focus on the procedures undertaken by UNHCR to register Syrian refugees in Lebanon. The number of refugees registered by UNHCR amounted to approximately one million in 2016. However, it is agreed upon and written in the LCRP that the number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is approximately 1.5 million, including the non-registered refugees.222 A number that the Lebanese government does not agree so much on is the number of Syrian refugees who require protection. The Lebanese government argues that a lot of the Syrian refugees are choosing to flee into Lebanon because of economic hardships rather than the war.223 Rashid Derbas, Minister of Social Affairs, stated ‘the only refugees that Lebanon is willing to accept are those coming from areas close to the fighting, in line with the Geneva Convention of 1951.’224

218 Ibid, p.2. 219 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, p.395. 220 H. Lakkis, ‘Bassil: Lebanon, not UN, Sets Refugee Policies’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 11 November 2014, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Nov-11/277234-bassil- lebanon-not-un-sets-refugee-policies.ashx 221 Human Rights Watch, ‘The Gaps in Lebanon’s New Refugee Policy’, News Deeply, 14 March 2017, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/14/gaps-lebanons-new-refugee-policy 222 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020, LCRP, UNHCR and Government of Lebanon, 2019 update, p.5, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67780.pdf 223 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, p.406. 224 S. Kullab, ‘Lebanon Revises Open-Door Refugee Policy’, Al Jazeera, 6 June 2014, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/lebanon-revises-open-door-refugee-policy- 201466744881995.html

38 As mentioned above, the RSD process specifically for Syrian refugees is different and shortened. The refugee is expected to book an appointment with UNHCR in any of the registration centres closest to them, and then attend an interview.225 During the interview, procedures such as an iris scan and the gathering of bio data are done.226 After that, the interview will proceed with standard questions regarding their arrival to Lebanon and their protection needs. This is done to check whether they fit the refugee definition under the Refugee Convention. In addition to that, UNHCR asks the refugee questions regarding any military involvement to ensure that they do not fit any exclusion criteria.227 Once their registration process is completed, Syrian refugees receive a registration certificate effective for two years from UNHCR.228 The UNHCR registration certificate provides refugees with essentials such as food, emergency healthcare, education, and psychosocial support. However, it cannot be used as an exemption from obtaining an actual residency in Lebanon.229 As mentioned previously, the Lebanese government ordered UNHCR to stop registering refugees in 2015. After 2015, Syrian refugees had two alternative options to acquire a legal status. Firstly, they can find a Lebanese national that would sponsor them. Secondly, they must have a UNHCR registration certificate to prove that they were registered before 2015.230 Syrian refugees who obtained a registration certificate before 2015 have ‘a semi-recognition of a refugee status.’231 The UNHCR registration certificate is not lawfully assigned by the Lebanese government. However, it is one of the criteria of renewing a residency permit after 2015. Therefore, the registration certificate in 2015 became extremely important as it provides a semi-legal status for Syrian refugees.232 However, it is important to

225 Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF), Background Paper on Unregistered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, p.5. 226 Ibid. 227 Ibid; The exclusion criteria refer to Syrian refugees who are active combatants and have not renounced their weapons. If a refugee fits the exclusion criteria, he/she does not receive a registration certificate. 228 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, p.406. 229 Ibid. 230 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, p.407. 231 M. Gebeily, ‘A refugee on paper: Running from war, bureaucracy could be Syrian’s greatest obstacle,’ Executive Magazine, 11 March 2015, available at https://www.executive-magazine.com/economics- policy/refugee-paper 232 M. Gebeily, ‘A Refugee on Paper: Running from war, bureaucracy could be Syrian’s greatest obstacle.’

39 mention that the UNHCR registration certificate was still not considered to be an official legal status by the Lebanese government.233 UNHCR and its partner organisations recognize their status, however, the Lebanese government still does not.234 Syrian refugees entering Lebanon after 2015 do not receive a UNHCR registration certificate. In order to obtain a residency, their option is to find a Lebanese sponsor and apply as economic migrants. After 2015, UNHCR stopped registering refugees through the RSD process and began to ‘record’ individual Syrian refugees instead.235 It was estimated that around 40,000 Syrian refugees were recorded by June 2016.236 Syrian refugees who are only recorded with UNHCR are at risk. The consequences include restricted freedom of movement, lack of legal protection, and limited accessibility to aid.237

iv) Revoking the UNHCR Registration Certificate Another action introduced by the Lebanese government that affected UNHCR was the de-registration of Syrian refugees. In efforts to limit the number of Syrian refugees that reached one million in 2014, the Lebanese government started to withdraw the registration of some Syrian refugees who were going back to Syria and re-entering Lebanon.238 UNHCR accommodated to the decision of the government and began to de- register refugees who were returning to Syria and were no longer in need of assistance. It was recorded that 12,345 refugees had their UNHCR registration de-activated in 2014.239 A couple of months after that, a total of 68,000 Syrian refugees no longer had their UNHCR registration.240 UNHCR representative Ninette Kelley mentioned that

233 Ibid. 234 Ibid. 235 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, p.411. 236 Ibid. 237 Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF), Background Paper on Unregistered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, p.10. 238 E. Knutsen, ‘Security fears prompted review of Syrian refugees: Machnouk’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 2 June 2014, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jun-02/258507- security-fears-prompted-review-of-syrian-refugees-machnouk.ashx 239 M. Gebeily, ‘A Refugee on Paper: Running from war, bureaucracy could be Syrian’s greatest obstacle.’ 240 S. Kullab, ‘Borders still open to refugees UNHCR says’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 23 October 2014, available at https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Oct-23/275015-borders-still-open- to-refugees-unhcr-says.ashx

40 they were receiving a list of names from the GSO and would interview the individuals. The registrations were revoked from individuals who were returning to Syria and were no longer in need of humanitarian assistance.241 As specified in the UNHCR Handbook for Registration, there are five circumstances in which the registration of a refugee is to be revoked.242 The five circumstances include final asylum claim rejection, refugee status cancellation, refugee status cessation, refugee status revocation, and lastly death.243 Even though Lebanon is not a State Party to the 1951 Convention, an interior ministry source claimed that the Lebanese government justified the action of de- registering Syrian refugees who are returning to Syria and re-entering Lebanon through Article 1C of the 1951 Convention. 244‘Voluntary re-availment’ and ‘Voluntary re- establishment’ are the two main clauses that were used by the government.245 This was recorded to be the first time the government uses the 1951 Convention with the purpose of decreasing the number of Syrian refugees.

c) The Refugee Response Framework: Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) From the outset of the Syrian civil war, Lebanon was the bordering country that had massive debts, limited resources, and a history of sectarian and political conflict.246 Since Lebanon is a weak state that did not have a coherent policy framework on refugees, the existence of a high influx of refugees after 2011 became a challenge for both the Lebanese nationals and the Syrian refugees.247 This section will discuss the shortcomings and ineffectiveness of the response that has been carried out affecting Syrian refugees.

241 Ibid. 242 UNHCR Handbook for Registration, Procedures and Standards for Registration, Population Data Management and Documentation, UNHCR, p.193, September 2003, available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/operations/4a278ea1d/unhcr-handbook-registration-provisional- release-september-2003-complete.html 243 Ibid, p.193. 244 E. Knutsen, S. Kullab, ‘Power to strip refugee status agreed’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 3 June 2014, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2014/Jun-03/258639-power-to-strip- refugee-status-agreed.ashx 245 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, p.408. 246 Refer to Chapter 2c for more details. 247 Z. Cherri, P. Gonzalez, R. Delgado, ‘The Lebanese-Syrian crisis impact of influx of Syrian refugees to an already weak state’, Dove Medical Press Limited, Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, 2016, p.3, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4948691/

41

i) The 3RP The Lebanese government, in association with the Minister of Social Affairs and the United Nations organisation, developed the Regional Refugee and Resilience Plan known as the 3RP for 2015 and 2016.248 The 3RP incorporated the LCRP that was established to respond to the high number of Syrian refugees who have entered into Lebanon.249 The international community wanted to ensure that refugees in Lebanon are being provided with their basic needs and services to live in dignity. The LCRP was created in order to support Lebanon through humanitarian and development programmes for both Lebanese nationals and Syrian refugees.250 The primary goal of the LCRP is to improve the accessibility and quality of public services to the people concerned, which are Syrian refugees and vulnerable Lebanese nationals.251 Another aim is to manage the limited capabilities of the Lebanese government and Lebanese communities. The sectors the LCRP responds to include: basic assistance, shelter, WASH,252 education, food security, social stability, protection, health, and livelihoods.253 ‘Temporarily displaced’ is the terminology used by the Lebanese government in the LCRP. In the government’s perspective, Syrian refugees are considered to be temporary since they believe that Syria has ‘safe zones’ that they could return to.254 In the updated LCRP, the Lebanese government’s position is maintained that it is not a country of asylum, and it ‘reserves its sovereign right to determine their status according to Lebanese laws and regulations.’255

ii) Effectiveness of the 3RP and the LCRP The funding of the international community has been decreasing throughout the years, and the funding gap amounted to almost 48% of the initial amount requested in 2018

248 Ibid, p.4. 249 Ibid, p.4. 250 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016, LCRP, UNHCR and Government of Lebanon, p.1, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015-2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf 251 Ibid, p.4. 252 Water, Hygiene and Sanitation. 253 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016, p.32. 254 C. Geha and J. Talhouk, ‘Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ p.4. 255 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020, p.4.

42 256 There has been some speculation on the effectiveness of the 3RP for two main reasons. Firstly, the needs of refugees continue to increase drastically while the resources continue to decline due to lack of funding. Secondly, the projects that are executed by local, national, and international actors lack stability and sustainability.257 The most recent document pertaining to the 3RP is the second edition of the 2017 LCRP. This policy document advanced to cover a four-year period from 2017 to 2020. The main focus of the 2017-2020 LCRP is to provide protection and humanitarian assistance to refugees.258 In addition to that, it aims to improve the strength of national institutions to achieve stability.259 Rather than establishing long-term solutions for refugees, the focus of the LCRP was on providing short-term solutions such as humanitarian assistance.260 The LCRP is regulated by the Lebanese government along with the cooperation of international organisations. However, the Lebanese government’s support and investment were lacking in reality. The non-existence of a well-defined policy framework exacerbated the tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.261 Many host communities have stated that international aid is only provided to Syrian refugees and that it is unjust.262 In addition to that, there has been a lot of attention and funding going to humanitarian aid leaving social stability programmes neglected.263 Furthermore, Syrian refugees are seen as a security threat in Lebanon, especially due to the political history of the two neighboring countries discussed in chapter two. This has influenced the reaction of Lebanese politicians towards a securitized response that has affected Syrian refugees’ rights and dignity in Lebanon.

256 ‘Minority Rights Group, An uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: The challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return,’ p.9. 257 Z. Cherri, P. Gonzalez, R. Delgado, ‘The Lebanese-Syrian crisis impact of influx of Syrian refugees to an already weak state,’ p.7. 258 Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020, p.8. 259 Ibid, p.9. 260 Safer World and LCPS, Building peace into refugee responses: Syrian refugees in Lebanon, p.3, April 2018, available at https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1172-building-peace-into- refugee-responses-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon 261 Ibid, p.22. 262 Ibid, p.14. 263 Ibid, p.22.

43 d) Conclusion The adequate protection of refugees requires government cooperation and concrete national refugee legislation; it cannot be implemented by UNHCR solely.264 The 1962 law is the only document that provides limited aspects on refugee protection to solely ‘political refugees’ in Lebanon. Consequently, clear domestic legislation providing coherent guidelines on the treatment of refugees in Lebanon is still lacking. The MoU that was established in 2003 has not been updated, and the Lebanese government does not recognize the UNHCR registration certificate of Syrian refugees. It is evident that since the arrival of one million Syrian refugees into Lebanon, UNHCR has faced many challenges in implementing its mandate while also complying with the Lebanese government’s methods and policies.265 Numerous policies were adopted by the Lebanese government such as the new requirements on entry and renewal of residency permits, and the demand for UNHCR to stop registering refugees. Consequently, a large number of Syrian refugees are left without a legal status in Lebanon. Syrian refugees are in an extremely vulnerable situation without access to a legal status in Lebanon. Legal status is a prerequisite to the other human rights of refugees and their integration in a host state. The challenges that are faced by Syrian refugees without a legal status will be discussed further in chapter four.

CH4: Do Syrian refugees in Lebanon have local integration as a durable solution?

The three durable solutions that are promoted by UNHCR for the protection of refugees are voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. This thesis focuses on local integration to assess whether Syrian refugees have this durable solution in Lebanon.266 The local integration of refugees is a process that requires the efforts of the host state and refugees in order to for it to be achieved and implemented. Section (a) analyzes the definition and key components of local integration under international standards. Secondly, section (b) explores Lebanon’s state obligations of relevance to

264 S. Trad and G. Frangieh, ‘Iraqi refugees in Lebanon: continuous lack of protection,’ FMR Iraq Special Issue, p.36, available at https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/iraq/trad- frangieh.pdf 265 M. Janmyr, ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, p.411. 266 Refer to chapter 1b for more details as to why the focus is solely on local integration.

44 local integration. Thirdly, section (c) deals with the situation on the ground of Syrian refugees in Lebanon that is analyzed through secondary data and data collected from my field research.267

a) The Concept of Local Integration Several documents highlight the importance of local integration as a durable solution. In the Global Consultations on International Protection, local integration is ‘based on the assumption that refugees will remain in their country of asylum permanently and find a solution to their plight in that state.’268 Therefore, refugees should have the rights and access to services that nationals enjoy. The title of objective 4 of the Agenda for Protection emphasizes local integration by stating, ‘local integration having its proper place as part of a comprehensive strategy for durable solutions.’269 In addition to that, it promotes the significance for refugees to attain self-reliance.270 The Global Consultations on International Protection assess the relevance of self-reliance for the process of local integration of refugees. Part (i) of this section explores the relationship between local integration and self-reliance. Furthermore, part (ii) explains the three dimensions that define local integration.

i) The relationship between local integration and self-reliance Even though self-reliance is not a durable solution, the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme stated that ‘self-reliance can be a precursor to any of the three durable solutions.’271 Self-reliance is considered to be a part of local integration. Self-reliant refugees are advantageous to a host state because of their contribution to the economic sector.272 In addition to that, self-reliant refugees are also beneficial for the international community. Their self-reliance eventually decreases the

267 Refer to chapter 1c for details on the field research, refer to annex 2 for list of questions. 268 UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection, Local Integration, EC/GC/02/6, 4th meeting, p.4, para.15, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3d6266e17.html 269 UNHCR, Agenda for Protection, Third Edition, October 2003, Goal 5, Objective 4, p.78, https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3e637b194.pdf 270 Ibid, p.80, Goal 5, Objective 7. 271 UNHCR, Local Integration and Self-reliance, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, EC/55/SC/CRP.15, 33rd meeting, 2 June 2005, p.3, para.8, available at https://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom/42a0054f2/local-integration-self-reliance.html 272 Ibid, p.3, para.9.

45 need of humanitarian aid.273 Furthermore, self-reliance allows refugees to live in stability and dignity.274 The gradual attainment of self-reliance specifies the degree of economic and social integration refugees have achieved. Consequently, this leads to a prospect of a sustainable, durable solution for refugees.275 In the Global Consultations on international protection, self-reliance is ‘understood to mean that refugees are able to provide for themselves and their community members in terms of food and other living expenses, including housing, health services, and education; can cope with unexpected events, and are no longer dependent on outside assistance.’276 One of the objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees is to ‘enhance refugee self- reliance.’277 It is very significant for refugees to be able to sustain themselves. Therefore, the inclusion of refugees in the economic sector and the labour market is an essential standard in local integration. Furthermore, this allows the refugee to adapt socially and culturally to the host society.

ii) The economic, legal, and socio-cultural dimensions of local integration Local integration has three interconnected factors that define it; it is an economic, legal and socio-cultural procedure.278 The legal dimension is a process where the host country progressively provides refugees with a broader scope of rights that are enjoyed by their citizens.279 The right to education, employment, freedom of movement, accessibility to healthcare and assistance, the ability to freely travel with their legal documents, and the option to own property are all rights included within the legal process of local integration. The legal dimension of local integration is a process that ‘should lead to permanent residence rights and in some cases the acquisition, in due course, of

273 Ibid. 274 Ibid. 275 Ibid, p.4, para.14. 276 UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection, Local Integration, p.2, para.9. 277 UN, Report of the UNHCR, Part II: Global Compact on Refugees, A/73/12 (Part II), Supplement No.12, 2018, p.2, available at https://www.unhcr.org/gcr/GCR_English.pdf 278 UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection, Local Integration, p.2, para.6-8. 279 Ibid, p.2, para.6.

46 citizenship in the country of asylum.’280 Therefore, it is expected that refugees could have permanent residency rights gradually throughout this process.

In order to achieve effective local integration, the economic and socio-cultural aspects should be taken into consideration.281 In the economic dimension, refugees will steadily be able to sustain themselves to attain an adequate standard of living, and no longer depend on humanitarian assistance. Progressively over time, refugees should have the means and the capability to sustain themselves and their families, and participate in the economic growth of the country they sought asylum in.282 The socio-cultural dimension is the process of ensuring the harmonious interaction between refugees and the host community.283 This process is vital since it gives refugees a sense of acceptance in the society they live in where discrimination and exploitation are prohibited.284 Refugees give efforts to understand and respect the culture and values of the host community, and are treated with respect and dignity by the citizens of the host country.285 Even if the host country is a developing state with limited resources, local integration could be achieved without conflict if prepared for adequately. Funding from donors, establishing a responsibility and burden-sharing approach, and cooperating with development and economic partners are efforts that all of the stakeholders concerned should adhere to.286

Some authors have criticized the conventional durable solutions for multiple reasons. Developing states are often reluctant to implement local integration as a durable solution due to limited resources, and to avoid conflict with the citizens of the host state. A different approach that complements the conventional solution suggests a mobility-centered refugee policy in which local integration is seen as a development issue. In this context, refugees could be provided with regional citizenships which allow

280 Ibid. 281 Ibid, p.2, para.7-8. 282 Ibid, p.2, para.7. 283 Ibid, p.2, para.8. 284 UNHCR, Framework for Durable Solutions for Refugees and Persons of concern, p.24. 285 UNHCR, Local Integration and Self-reliance, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, EC/55/SC/CRP.15, 33rd meeting, p.5, para.23. 286 UNHCR, Local Integration and Self-reliance, EC/55/SC/CRP.15, 33rd meeting, p.8, para.31(f)(g).

47 them to work and move freely in the host state.287 The benefits of the host community could expand if the infrastructure and livelihood of a host country is structured in a way that promotes development and cooperation for both refugees and the host communities.288 By contrast, limiting the rights of refugees and not offering them any durable solution for years will only worsen the tensions between host communities and refugees. In this atmosphere, refugees will continue to rely on humanitarian aid and will not achieve self-reliance. Consequently, this would increase their marginalization in the host society making them more vulnerable to forced labour and exploitation. 289 The host community is responsible for prohibiting discrimination and exploitation against refugees.290 Additionally, the host society must put efforts in encouraging groups and people in their community to welcome refugees.

b) State Obligations of Lebanon under International Human Rights Law In times of war, large numbers of persons are forced to leave their countries of origin in pursuit of safety. Neighboring countries will become host countries to some of the refugees that will be seeking protection. In some cases, a neighboring state is either unwilling or unable to extend protection and assistance to refugees. Consequently, this could cause a clash with the state’s obligations towards refugees. The obligations of a state towards refugees mainly derive from international refugee law and international human rights law. The treatment of refugees is governed by refugee treaties, as well as, broader human rights treaties.291 State obligations relating to the integration of refugees are found in multiple international instruments.292

287 K. Long, ‘Rethinking ‘Durable’ Solutions,’ The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, June 2014, p.6, available at https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb- 9780199652433-e-013 288 Ibid, p.3, para.9. 289 Ibid, p.2, para.6,7. 290 UNHCR, Agenda for Protection, Third Edition, p.36, Goal 1, Objective 8. 291G. S. Goodwin, ‘The International Law of Refugee Protection’, The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, June 2014, p.8, available at https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/oxfordhb- 9780199652433-e-021#oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021-note-20 292 OSCE and ODIHR, Preliminary Comments on the Draft Law on Integration of Foreigners in the Republic of Moldova, MIG-MDA/339/2018, 19 December 2018, p.4, part III, para.10, available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/407465?download=true

48 The main document adopted by the UN concerning refugees is the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; referred to as the Refugee Convention.293 It was adopted on 28 July 1951 and entered into force on 22 April 1954.294 Since Lebanon is not party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons and the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, international human rights law and customary international law are of importance. Lebanon is a state party to a number of international human rights instruments that include relevant articles that apply to all human beings, and therefore refugees. The local integration process for refugees relates to accompanying rights found in the legal, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions.295 The human rights instruments relevant to the local integration rights offer a useful legal framework for guiding the local integration process.296 The international instruments that cover rights included within the three dimensions, and are discussed in this section include: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) discussed in part (i), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) discussed in part (ii), and lastly the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) discussed in part (iii). I have chosen these three instruments, in particular, since my field research focuses on families living with their children in informal settlements. The international instruments relevant to the protection of refugees provide an understanding on the obligations that the Lebanese state has towards Syrian refugees. Furthermore, it facilitates a better understanding about the difficulties and repercussions faced by Syrian refugees in Lebanon, which is discussed in more detail in section (c) of this chapter.

Lebanon was one of the 51 founding members of the UN in 1945. Throughout the years, Lebanon has signed several core human rights treaties, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is referenced in the preamble of the Lebanese

293 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137. 294 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267. 295 Refer to chapter 4a for more details on the rights contained in the three local integration dimensions. 296 Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Conclusion on Local Integration No.104(LVI), 7 October 2005, para.l(i), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4357a91b2.html

49 Constitution.297 The right to seek asylum is enshrined in article 14(1) of the UDHR in which it states that everyone fleeing from persecution has the right to seek and enjoy asylum in host countries.298 This means that the individual has a right leave his/her country of origin in search of a country of asylum. Since Lebanon has enshrined the UDHR in the preamble of its constitution, article 14 has a constitutional value.299 However, article 14(1) of the UDHR concerning the right to seek asylum300 is not enjoyed by a large number of Syrian refugees who are considered to be illegally present in Lebanon.301 There are certain aspects of refugee protection that are binding on a state even if it is non-signatory to the Refugee Convention. The most important standard pertaining to the protection of refugees mentioned in article 33 of the Refugee Convention is the ‘Prohibition of Expulsion or Return’ of refugees to a country that threatens their freedom and/or life.302 Binding under international customary law, the principle of non-refoulement expresses that a state is not allowed to return refugees who have a ‘well-founded fear of persecution’ back to their countries of origin because of their ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.’303 Furthermore, Lebanon has ratified the Arab Charter on Human Rights (ACHR). Although the ACHR is considered problematic with regard to universality of human rights, article 23 of the ACHR provides the right to seek asylum and states that ‘political refugees shall not be extradited.’304 Therefore, if a refugee enters a country that has not ratified the Refugee Convention such as Lebanon, he/she cannot be forcibly

297 The Lebanese Constitution (promulgated May 23, 1926 with its amendments), p.3, 1995, available at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lb/lb018en.pdf 298Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948), UNGA Res 217 A(III) p.4, art.14, available at https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 299 UNDP and UNHCR, Lebanese Republic National Assembly, The National Action Plan for Human Rights in Lebanon 2014-2019, 2013, p.135, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/NHRA/Lebanon_en.pdf 300 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948), UNGA Res 217 A(III). 301 Human Rights Watch, ‘I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person’: How Lebanon’s Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees, HRW, 2016, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i- just-wanted-be-treated-person/how-lebanons-residency-rules-facilitate-abuse 302 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137, p.30, art.33. 303 UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement EC/SCP/2, 23 August 1977, available at https://www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high-commissioner.html 304 Arab Charter on Human Rights (adopted 15 September 1994), League of Arab states, art.23, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38540.html

50 deported to his/her country of origin under international customary law, article 7 of the ICCPR, and article 23 of the ACHR. Similarly, states have an ‘obligation to treat asylum-seekers and refugees in accordance with applicable human rights and refugee law standards as set out in relevant international instruments’ as stated in conclusion No.82 of UNHCR’s Executive committee.305

i) ICESCR

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted by the UN General Assembly on 16 December 1966.306 It entered into force approximately ten years later on 3 January 1976 due to the challenges it faced in getting support from states.307 Lebanon is legally bound to the provisions in the treaty as it acceded to it on 3 November 1972.308 The ICESCR aims to safeguard all persons’ economic, social and cultural rights.309 Furthermore, refugees and asylum seekers should enjoy the rights stipulated in the covenant as well.310

Article 2 of the ICESCR Article 2(1) of the ICESCR mentions that a state party to the covenant has a duty of ‘progressive realization.’311 The term ‘progressive realization’ is used to point out that

305 UNHCR, General Conclusion on International Protection No.102(LVI), Executive Committee: 56th Session, UN General Assembly, 7 October 2005, available at https://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/43575ce3e/general-conclusion-international-protection.html 306International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx 307 R. Beydoun, ‘The Adversarial Impacts of Protracted Refugee Situations on Refugee Protection and Camp Security: a Case for Local Integration in Lebanon,’ Arizona State University, p.56, November 2010, available at https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/56295/content/Beydoun_asu_0010N_10243.pdf 308 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Treaty Body Database, Ratification Status for Lebanon. 309 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation, New York and Geneva, 2014, p.1, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-14-1_en.pdf 310 Economic and Social Council, Duties of States towards refugees and migrants under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2017/1, 13 March 2017, p.1, para.3, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bbe0bc04.html 311 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art.2.

51 the rights stipulated in the covenant will not be attained in a short period of time.312 The state is required to take appropriate and effective steps, in accordance with its resources, in order to reach the ‘full realization’ of the rights stipulated in the ICESCR gradually.313 The committee stated that there are several obligations that require ‘immediate effect’ by the state. The ICESCR affirmed that it is ‘of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State party.’314 Therefore, there are minimum standards that must be fulfilled by any state party to the covenant. Under article 2(1), a state is obligated to take the necessary steps ‘to the maximum of its available resources.’315 Additionally, the state must prove that it has used all of its efforts and resources to implement the minimum standards. Moreover, article 2(2) of the ICESCR enforces a direct obligation on state parties to provide the covenant rights to any individual without discrimination.316

Article 2(3) acknowledges the limited resources of developing countries and states that developing countries ‘may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the present Covenant to non-nationals.’317 Lebanon being a state party has a duty to preserve these rights to nationals as well as non-nationals. However, Lebanon could have some influence on the degree of economic rights it is willing to provide due to its limited economic resources as a developing country.318 Even if Lebanon is a developing country, there are minimum standards it must provide to non-

312 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations,’ UN doc E/1991/23, p.3, para.9, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838e10.pdf 313 Ibid. 314 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations,’ UN doc E/1991/23, p.3, para.10. 315 Ibid, p.3, para.9. 316 Economic and Social Council, Duties of States towards refugees and migrants under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2017/1, p.2, para.5. 317 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art.2, para.3. 318 UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2019, p.170, available at https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/WESP2019_BOOK-ANNEX- en.pdf ; R. da Costa, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, Division of International Protection Services, UNHCR, p.20.

52 nationals. In General Comment No.3, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that minimum standards of the rights in the covenant must be fulfilled regardless of the limited resources of the state concerned.319 The minimum standards that states have an obligation to fulfill relate to: the right to essential nutrition, necessary primary health services, basic housing, and primary education, among others.320 In General Comment No.3, it is stated that,

‘even in times of severe resources constraints whether caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors, the vulnerable members of society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low- cost targeted programmes.’321

Therefore, Lebanon has an obligation under the ICESCR to fulfill the minimum standards to Syrian refugees. Furthermore, the committee makes clear that the lack of official documentation should not limit an individual’s enjoyment to the rights in the covenant.322 Since Lebanon is a developing country with limited resources, the minimum core obligation for each right will be discussed below to understand what are the rights Syrian refugees should have in Lebanon.

Articles 6 and 7 of the ICESCR The right to work included in the ICESCR is inclusive to everyone without distinction.323 In this context, persons being protected under this article have the opportunity to make a living and the freedom to choose their employment.324 Particularly in article 7 of the ICESCR, the working conditions are mentioned. These include: fair wages and equal remuneration, an adequate standard of living for the

319 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations,’ UN doc E/1991/23, p.3, para.10. 320 Ibid. 321 Ibid, p.4, para.12. 322 Economic and Social Council, Duties of States towards refugees and migrants under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2017/1, p.3, para.11. 323 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.18: The Right to Work,’ UN doc E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, p.6, para.19, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4415453b4.html 324 Ibid, p.3, para.4.

53 individual and his/her family, equal opportunities, working hours limitations, and secure working conditions. States that are bound by this covenant should apply the conditions for the right to work to everyone without discrimination. Therefore, this right applies to informal workers and refugee workers, among others. Additionally, the prohibition of forced labour is highlighted in the list of essential factors under article 7 of the ICESCR. As mentioned above, there are minimum standards that state parties should adhere to. The core obligations of the right to work in article 6 include: access to work especially for marginalized groups, prohibiting discrimination and unequal treatment in employment, and to establish a national employment plan encompassing all workers.325 The core obligations for article 7 of the ICESCR include: adoption of legislation regarding minimum wages that are appropriate to the cost of living in the host country, prohibition of harassment in the work place, and establishing minimum standards on working hours and holidays. The right to work is a vital source for refugees to feel welcome and integrated in the country of asylum, and the restrictions imposed could potentially hinder their livelihood and integration opportunities.326 Therefore, there are minimum core obligations on the right to work that a state party such as Lebanon has to fulfill to Syrian refugees.

Article 13 of the ICESCR Some of the guarantees under the right to education include: admission to public education institutions without discrimination, free and essential primary education, the non-interference of the state on matters concerning the choice of education by the parents or legal guardians, and the freedom to choose the language preferred in private institutions.327 In General Comment No.13, it is stated that the factors that ensure the right to education include ‘availability, accessibility, adaptability and acceptability’.328

325 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.18: The Right to Work,’ UN doc E/C.12/GC/18, p.9, para.31. 326 R. da Costa, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, Division of International Protection Services, UNHCR, p.21. 327 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3art.13(2). 328 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.13: The Right to Education,’ UN doc E/C.12/1999/10), p.3, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838c22.pdf

54 These features of education must be implemented by state parties. The monitoring committee of the ICESCR considers the obligation on providing free primary education to be very strict. If any person is charged for primary education, there are no reasons to justify this action.329 As for secondary education, a state party must make effort in ensuring that it is accessible and available to everyone.330 In the Convention against Discrimination in Education (UNESCO), discrimination that could lead to unequal treatment is forbidden.331 Moreover, it also states the importance of primary education being free of charge and compulsory.332 In addition to primary education, this article also supports the continuity of higher education. It ensures the accessibility in space for all individuals.333 Considering the ‘progressive realization’ article mentioned above, there are minimum core obligations for the right to education. These include ‘the most basic forms of education’. Lebanon is obligated to fulfill the minimum standards of the right to education to Syrian refugees. These include: admission to public education institutions without discrimination, free and essential primary education, and to establish a national strategy on education including provisions for secondary and higher education.334

Article 11 of the ICESCR The right to an adequate standard of living, stated in article 11 of the ICESCR, safeguards the right to an adequate housing as well.335 The monitoring committee of this covenant allowed for restrictions within this article, however, the distinctions can only be made under reasonable circumstances.336 The ICESCR declares that states have an

329 Ibid, p.1. 330 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art.13,2(b). 331 Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Paris (adopted 14 December 1960, entered into force 22 May 1962), available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php- URL_ID=12949&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 332 Ibid, Art.14(a). 333 Ibid, Art.14(a). 334 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.13: The Right to Education,’ UN doc E/C.12/1999/10), p.14, para.57. 335 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, Art. 11(1). 336 R. da Costa, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, p.68.

55 obligation to offer aid to any individual who is incapable of sustaining himself/herself.337 Moreover, other significant factors such as the right to adequate food and clothing are also highlighted in this article. As mentioned previously, states are obliged to fulfill the rights in the covenant progressively. However, the right to food applies to everyone and states have a core obligation to eradicate hunger and malnutrition ‘even in times of natural or other disasters.’338 States must provide the minimum necessities of food to persons under its jurisdiction.339 The monitoring committee of the ICESCR issued General Comment No.4 concerning the right to housing. It states that the definition of ‘housing’ should not be taken solely as a simple shelter.340 The adequate nature of the shelter should also be taken into consideration in order for the person concerned to be able to live in peace, dignity, and safety. The committee justifies its stance on the matter by stating that this right is interconnected with other human rights and with the principles of this covenant. Moreover, the term ‘adequate’ is an integral part of the right to housing.341 The committee also includes a list of factors that are significant to fulfill the adequate condition. Some of the factors included in the list are: accessibility, location, availability of services, affordability, habitability and legal security of tenure.342 By ‘habitable’, the committee states that persons in their houses must be protected from rain, wind, cold, heat and other threats to their well-being.343 Vulnerable groups who are living in detrimental conditions must be prioritized. Furthermore, if a state adopts legislation that worsens housing conditions, the state is not adhering to its obligations.344 Vulnerable groups with regard to the right to housing include homeless persons, persons with low income, and persons living in

337 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation, p.61. 338 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.12, The Right to Adequate Food,’ UN doc E/C.12/1999/5, p.2, para.6, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838c11.pdf 339 Ibid, p.4, par.14. 340 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.4: The Right to Adequate Housing,’ UN doc E/1992/23, p.2, para.7, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html 341 Ibid. 342 Ibid, p.3, para.8. 343 Ibid, p.3,para.8(d). 344 Ibid, p.5,para.11.

56 illegal settlements.345 The committee also mentions protection from evictions and discrimination in General Comment No.7.346 Forced eviction is defined as, ‘the permanent or temporary removal against the will of individuals, families, and/or communities from their homes and/or land which they occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection.’347 An individual’s other human rights are affected from forced eviction. The right to life is one of the rights that could be affected.348The state is obligated to refrain from forced evictions. The right to be protected against forced eviction does not have any restrictions relating to the state’s limited resources.349 The committee puts forwards that legislation against the action of forced evictions should be established. Moreover, the legislation should be compatible and encompass all authorities that are implementing forced evictions on behalf of the state.350

Article 12 of the ICESCR

Article 12 of this Covenant recognizes the right of everyone to ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ which includes medical services and attention.351 States are obligated to adopt procedures that eradicate undernourishment and mortality.352 In its General Comment No.14, the committee states that the definition of ‘health’ is understood to comprise other significant factors. These socio-economic elements that states have an obligation to fulfill include nutrition, adequate housing, clean water, and satisfactory sanitation, among others.353 It is also mentioned that signatory states have an obligation to distribute international aid, safe food, water and

345 Ibid, p.5,para.13. 346 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.7, The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions,’ UN doc E/1998/22, p.1 available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/47a70799d.html 347 Ibid, p.2,para.3. 348 Ibid, p.2, para.4. 349 Ibid, p.3, para.8. 350 Ibid, p.3, para.9. 351 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art. 12. 352 Ibid. 353 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health,’ UN doc E/C.12/2000/4, p.3, para.11, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf

57 medical supplies to the most vulnerable groups including refugees and asylum seekers.354 ‘Freedoms’ and ‘entitlements’ are key aspects included in the right to health.355 The ‘freedoms’ aspect provides freedom from torture, medical experiments and any interference the individual does not consent to. As for the ‘entitlement’ aspect, it ensures equal opportunities to health within the state’s health care system. In General Comment No.14, it is stated that the factors that ensure the right to health must ensure ‘availability, physical and economic accessibility, acceptability and quality’ without discrimination.356 If the state does not properly allocate resources to public health institutions or establish a national health plan, individuals including marginalized groups will not able to access their right to health. Consequently, the state has failed to fulfill its obligations on the right to health.357 Pursuant to the minimum core obligations a state party has to fulfill, Lebanon is expected to provide Syrian refugees with primary healthcare, access to healthcare without discrimination, access to essential and nutritious food, and shelter, housing and sanitation.358

ii) ICCPR

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966 and was ratified by Lebanon on 3 November 1972.359 Some of the provisions of the ICCPR can be found in the Lebanese law such as equality before the law mentioned in Article 7 of the Lebanese Constitution.360 The ICCPR is a vital binding document that provides essential rights for persons such as the right to life, equality before the law, and freedom from torture. In General Comment No.15, the Human Rights Committee iterated that the rights in the CCPR cover all persons ‘within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction,’ and do not depend on

354 Ibid, p.15, para.40. 355 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health,’ UN doc E/C.12/2000/4, p.3, para.8. 356 Ibid, p.4, para.12. 357 Ibid, p.18, para.52. 358 Ibid, p.15, para.43. 359 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Treaty Body Database, Ratification Status for Lebanon, available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=96&Lang=EN 360 The Lebanese Constitution (promulgated may 23, 1926 with its amendments), p1995, p.5.

58 nationality or citizenship.361 For that reason, refugees and asylum seekers are included in the provisions of the covenants, and their enjoyment of the rights within the covenants are also guaranteed.

Articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR Article 2 of the ICCPR ensures that the rights in the covenant are provided to all persons without discrimination.362 Under article 2, state parties are free to select the process they prefer in implementing the rights under the covenant, and should ensure that the rights are not just respected but are also enjoyed by all individuals.363 Article 26 of the ICCPR secures all individuals with ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal protection of the law’ without discrimination on the basis of ‘race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status’.364 As mentioned in General Comment No. 18, a state party must take steps in abolishing any policies or situations that violate any individual’s right to non- discrimination.365 Article 26 does not include any restrictions concerning the rights protected against discrimination and the committee perceives it as ‘an autonomous right’.366 Therefore, these articles ensure the non-discrimination in the protection of rights.

Article 6 of the ICCPR ‘Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life,’ as written in article 6 of the ICCPR.367 This implies that states have an obligation to eradicate hunger, and provide access to

361 UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No.15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant,’ para.1, 11 April 1986, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/45139acfc.html 362 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art.2, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx 363 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.3, Article 2 (Implementation at the National Level)’, 29 July 1981, p.1, para.1, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fe0.html 364 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art. 26. 365 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.18: Non-discrimination,’ 10 November 1989, p.2, para.10, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fa8.html 366 Ibid, p.3, para. 12. 367 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171

59 health services.368 Furthermore, the dignity of all persons is protected under this right. People in detention centres also have the right to life and the right to live in dignity.369 States are encouraged to adopt positive measures in order to combat any harms that would violate the right to life of any person; including refugees.370 In general comment No.15, the Human Rights Committee states that torture or any act that contributes to the deprivation of life of any individual including aliens must be prohibited.371 A state’s derogation from the protection of the right to life is completely unacceptable. The right to life overlaps with the right to security of person, since extreme cases of arbitrary detention may lead to the loss of life.372 In order to the protect the right to life of detained persons, a state must provide them with essential medical aid and ensure that they are healthy.373 The right to life of a person is interconnected and is a precondition of other human rights and should be safeguarded even in times of public emergency or war.374 Therefore, the right to life of Syrian refugees in Lebanon must be protected without exceptions.

Article 9 of the ICCPR Article 9 of the ICCPR protects the liberty and security of a person. This entails that state parties should make efforts to prohibit arbitrary detention within its territory. In general comment No.35, the ‘liberty of person’ is understood to relate to the ‘freedom from confinement of the body’375. The cases where a liberty of the person might be at risk include: imprisonment, pre-trial detention, involuntary transport and police custody,

368 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.36: the right to life,’ 30 October 2018, available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23809&LangID=E 369 Ibid, p.1, para.3. 370 R. da Costa, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, p.97. 371 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant,’ 11 April 1986, p.2, para.7, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/45139acfc.html 372 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.36: Article 6 of the ICCPR right to life,’ UN doc CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, p.13, para.57, available at https://www.oursplatform.org/wp- content/uploads/Right-to-Life.pdf 373 Ibid, p.6, para.25. 374 Ibid, p.1, para.2. 375 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of person),’ UN doc CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014, p.1, para.3, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/553e0f984.html

60 among others. Additionally, ‘security of person’ relates to ‘freedom from injury to the body and the mind, or bodily and mental integrity.’376 Under article 9, state parties have an obligation to adopt suitable measures that protect the liberty of any person in its jurisdiction.377 On another note, detention could be interpreted as ‘arbitrary detention’ if the state has not given rational explanations behind the action of detaining.378 Any person being detained should be given full information regarding the charges held against him/her.379 The term ‘arbitrary’ is understood to be an action that is unjust and inappropriate and not just ‘against the law’.380 In regards to refugees and asylum seekers, detention must be the last measure to be taken by a state.381 The mental and physical health of refugees and asylum seekers should also be considered. If an asylum seeker is detained, the place of detention should be hygienic, appropriate and non- punitive.382 Additionally, the reasons for detention must be reasonable, implemented case by case, and the length of the detention must be appropriate.383

Article 12 of the ICCPR Freedom of movement is guaranteed to all persons that are legal in the country. However, this article has some restrictions. A state may exercise limitations on the right to liberty of movement only under circumstances that threaten the ‘national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others’.384 The state is not permitted to discriminate between nationals and foreigners in the restriction of

376 Ibid. 377 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of person),’ UN doc CCPR/C/GC/35, p.2, para.7. 378 S. Persaud, ‘Protecting refugees and asylum seekers under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ Research Paper No.132, UNHCR, p.18, November 2006, available at https://www.unhcr.org/4552f0d82.pdf 379 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art.9, par.2. 380 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of person),’ UN doc CCPR/C/GC/35, p.3, para.12. 381 UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, Geneva, February 1999, p.1, available at https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3bd036a74/unhcr-revised-guidelines-applicable-criteria- standards-relating-detention.html 382 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of person),’ UN doc CCPR/C/GC/35, p.5, para.18. 383 Ibid. 384 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, art.12, para.3.

61 this freedom.385As mentioned above, this article is only guaranteed to persons who are legal in the state. Therefore, this article would only apply to Syrian refugees who are renewing their residency permits, and are perceived to be legal by the Lebanese authorities.

iii) CRC

The first treaty to recognize that a child is an autonomous person was the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).386 It became acknowledged that children have their own set of rights and states are obligated to fulfill those rights. After its adoption as an international treaty by the GA on 20 November 1989, the CRC was the quickest international instrument to be signed and ratified by countries.387 Lebanon ratified the CRC on 14 May 1991 and its duty was to uphold the rights of children enshrined in that document.388 Article 1 of the CRC states that any person under the age of 18 is considered to be a child.389

Article 2 of the CRC Under article 2 of the CRC, a state is required to, ‘respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination of any kind, irrespective of the child’s national, ethnic or social origin or other status.’390 Thereby, every child within the territory of a signatory state is able to enjoy all the rights set forth in the CRC whether they are unaccompanied or separated children,

385 Ibid, art.12. 386 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx 387 Yapi International, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yapi, p.1, available at http://yapi.org/youth-wellbeing/united-nations-convention-on-the-rights-of-the-child-crc/ 388 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Treaty Body Database, Ratification Status for Lebanon, available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=96&Lang=EN 389 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.1. 390 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.2(1).

62 refugee children or asylum seekers.391 Furthermore, asylum seekers who have had their asylum claim rejected also hold the rights set forth in the CRC.392 Children who are refugees face a big threat of being discriminated against, and are possible prey for violent attacks such as hate speech or assaults. In some cases, refugee children are confronted with direct discrimination and are unable to access basic services relating to health, education, and housing. Furthermore, refugee children are also subject to indirect discrimination in some countries.393 Some host countries lack the willingness to apply social inclusion procedures and discourage refugees’ integration into the society.394 For that reason, the CRC stresses the obligation of state parties to adopt proper actions that would provide all children protection from discrimination. It is significant to mention that measures or restrictions taken by states for the purpose of ‘public order’ should always be done on an individual basis rather than a collective one.395

Article 3 of the CRC The best interest of the child is upheld as the main element under article 3 of the CRC.396 When states commit actions that concern the child’s well-being ‘whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies,’397 they have an obligation to keep the best interest of the child as the primary goal under international binding law.398 In addition to that, the child’s protection necessities and vulnerabilities must also be adequately assessed. The committee stated that the rights in the convention are all contributing to the child’s best

391 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin,’ UN doc CRC/GC/2005/6, p.7, para.12, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/42dd174b4.html 392 Ibid. 393 J. Bhabha and M. Dottridge, Child Rights in the Global Compacts, Refugees Migrants UN, 24 June 2017, p.7, available at https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/stocktaking_initiative_on_child_rights_in_the_global_c ompacts.pdf 394 Ibid, p.7. 395 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.10(2). 396 Ibid, Art.3. 397 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.3(1). 398 Ibid, p.10.

63 interest.399 This article along with the right of the child to partake in decisions that could affect him/her also apply to refugees and asylum seekers. The best interest of the refugee child can be done through the best interest assessment (BIA). It is usually used by state authorities to balance the diverse factors the child is in need of such as; health, education, and social services.400 Legal obligations regarding the detention of refugee children are also mentioned. Detaining a child because of their refugee status is never in his/her best interest and cannot be justified.401 Detention harms children in several ways and affects their physical and mental development.402 A state party to the convention has an obligation to ensure that any action taken by a public authority must consider the best interest of the child.403 Other rights included in the convention such as the right to life, survival and development, as well as, the right to non-discrimination are linked with article 3. A state must consider the different vulnerabilities of each child including refugees or asylum seekers.404 Lebanon is obligated to ensure that Syrian refugee children have their best interest as a ‘primary consideration’ and ensure their development. Furthermore, children should have access to primary education, primary health services, and social services.405

Article 6 of the CRC Trafficking and exploitation are violent actions that refugee children and asylum seekers are at risk of. Article 6 of the CRC requires state parties to provide protection mechanisms safeguarding all children from exploitation, violence, or any risk to their right to life, survival and development.406 Survival and development are elements added to the right to life under article 6 of the CRC. This provides a connection between the

399 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.14: the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration,’ UN doc CRC/C/GC/14, 29 May 2013, p.3, para.4, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/51a84b5e4.html 400 J. Bhabha, M. Dottridge, Child Rights in the Global Compacts, p.10. 401 UNHCR, A guide to international refugee protection and building state asylum systems, Handbook for Parliamentarian No.27, 2017, p.108, available at https://www.unhcr.org/3d4aba564.pdf 402 Ibid, p.109. 403 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.14: the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration,’ UN doc CRC/C/GC/14, p.5, para.14 (a). 404 Ibid, p.16, para.75. 405 Ibid, p.16,17, para.77,79. 406 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.6.

64 rights put forward in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Some of the positive measures for the right to life include: abstaining from any practice that could violate the right to life, and decreasing infant mortality, among others.407 The right to survival and development ensures adequate health services, knowledge on hygiene and sanitation, and the complete development of the child in all aspects, among others.408

Article 22 of the CRC Article 22 of the convention references refugee children and obligates states to adopt ‘appropriate measures’ guaranteeing protection to refugee children.409 It also highlights the importance of establishing effective policies and asylum systems.410 A refugee child or a child who is seeking refugee status should receive protection and humanitarian aid. Furthermore, it mentions a state is encouraged to obtain support from UNHCR or the international community in cases where it lacks the needed resources to provide protection to refugee children.411 Therefore, Lebanon must ensure protection for Syrian refugee children against trafficking or exploitation through the establishment of appropriate measures.412

Article 32 of the CRC Article 32 highlights the importance of protecting the child from child labour and economic exploitation.413 The International Labour Organisation (ILO) defines child labour as ‘work that deprives children of their childhood, their potential and their

407UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Manual on Human Rights Reporting Under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, 1997, HR/PUB/91/1 (Rev.1), P.425, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/428085252.html 408 Ibid. 409Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.22. 410 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin,’ UN doc CRC/GC/2005/6, p.18. 411 E. Sutherland, ‘The Child’s Right to Life, Survival and Development: Evolution and Progress,’ ResearchGate, January 2015, p.285, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304784603_The_Child's_Right_to_Life_Survival_and_Develop ment_Evolution_and_Progress 412 UNHCR, Human Rights and Refugee Protection, Self-study Module 5, Vol.II, 15 December 2006, p.30, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4669434c2.pdf 413Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.32.

65 dignity, and is harmful to physical and mental development.’414 The development and health of the child is affected by working in a dangerous environment. Moreover, article 32 provides specific legislative, social and education measures in order to combat child labour such as: policies concerning the minimum age to work, the conditions of work and the length of work.415 Therefore, Lebanon is obligated to ensure that Syrian refugee children are not being subject to work that is hazardous to their development and health.416

Other articles in the CRC relevant to the integration of refugee children and asylum seekers Article 7 highlights the importance of a child to be directly registered after birth and requires state parties to implement this provision because ‘the child would otherwise be stateless.’417 In this context, impediments to obtaining a birth certificate should be abolished. Additionally, the right to education, leisure and cultural activities is mentioned in the CRC in articles 28 to 31.418 Throughout the migration cycle, children should have accessibility to education without discrimination and to free and compulsory primary education. The right to education includes provisions that highlight the importance of refugee children to learn about their own identities and cultures as well in article 29 1(c).419 While article 28 of the CRC ensures the accessibility of children to education, article 29 highlights the importance of a ‘specific quality of

414 ILO, What is child labour: Defining child labour, available at https://www.ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang-- en/index.htm 415 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.32(a),(b). 416 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.7: Implementing child rights in early childhood,’ CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, 20 September 2006, p.17, para.36 (e) available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/460bc5a62.html 417Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, art.7(2). 418 Ibid, art. (28-31). 419 R. da Costa, Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, p.84.

66 education.’420 The goal, under this article, is to take the child’s development, identity and characteristics into consideration.421

Local integration requirements CESCR CCPR CRC

Legal status and residency Articles 3&7&22

Education Article Articles 13 28&29

Freedom of movement Articles 9 and 12 The Legal, Article Articles Health care economic and 12 3&6 socio-cultural Article Articles Adequate standard of living dimensions 11 Article 6 3&6 Articles Employment 6&7 Article 32 Non-discrimination Article 2 Articles 2&26 Article 2

No exploitation/harassment Articles Article 9 6&32 Table 1: Summary of the state obligations of Lebanon that relate to the rights in the three dimensions of local integration

c) Challenges to a Dignified Stay In this section, secondary data from NGO reports, treaty monitoring bodies of international human rights instruments, and data collected from my field research422 will be assessed. The secondary data is mentioned to support the data I collected from my field research. Due to the limitations of the study, the secondary data includes more extensive information on the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Through this data, this part of the thesis aims to reveal the reality of the situation of Syrian refugees living in Lebanon. Furthermore, it explores whether the situation on the ground is in conformity with the rights available to refugees that was discussed in section (b).

420 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.1: The Aims of Education,’ CRC/GC/2001/1, 17 April 200,1 p.4, para.9, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4538834d2.html 421 Ibid. 422 Refer to chapter 1c for more details on the field research and its limitations, refer to annex 2 for list of questions.

67

i) Legal Status: Civil Documentation and Restriction of ‘Freedom of Movement’ This part of the thesis discusses legal status because without an official residency, Syrian refugees’ access to other rights is limited. One of the biggest challenges that is faced by a big number of Syrian refugees in Lebanon is the absence of legal documentation. 74% of Syrian refugees reported not having an official legal residency to Human Rights Watch.423 The 2018 Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASYR) found that the number of families that reported none of its members having a legal status amounted to 62%. The number increased almost by 7% from 2017 to 2018.424 The primary hurdle that did not allow Syrian refugees to renew their residency was the $200 fee policy that was adopted by the Lebanese state.425 Without legal documentation, Syrians are at risk of arrest, statelessness and unemployment. It also limits their access to education, as well as, health services.426 Ammar, a Syrian refugee that was interviewed by Carnegie, expresses the troubles he faces in Lebanon for lacking a legal status. He stated: ‘I am tired of Lebanon but I cannot leave Lebanon. I have been illegal for the past two years. If I want to go to Syria they will ask me for $400 at the border. . . . My wife is also illegal, so I would need to pay another $400 for her. My daughter was born [in Lebanon], her sin is that she was born here and I could not register her. For all of us to have legal residency, I would need to pay another $400, which means I would have to pay $1,200 for all of us. We are not getting any aid. My salary is LL500,000 [$333] per month and I have to pay LL250,000 [$166] in rent every month and I have children. It is winter . . . so if I just want to get fuel for heating, nothing is left. So how are we supposed to survive? This means they’re pressuring us. They tell us you have one of two choices: You

423 Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: Positive Step for Refugee Children,’ HRW, 17 April 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/17/lebanon-positive-step-refugee-children 424 UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Inter-Agency Coordination, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees 2018, Executive Brief, 1 January 2019, p.24, available at https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp- content/uploads/sites/16/2018/12/VASyR-2018.pdf 425 Refer to Chapter 2c (i) for more details. 426 UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Inter-Agency Coordination, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees 2018, p.2.

68 either become terrorists or thieves . . . and these are two things we do not want. We want a solution that will give us back our dignity—no more, no less.’427

In the interviews I conducted with Syrian refugees. 35 out of 38 participants reported that they did not have an official residence permit as displayed in the graph below.

Participants that have an official legal status

Participants without an official legal status

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Figure 7: the legal status of Syrian refugees who participated in the field research It is important to mention that the official legal status for the Lebanese authorities means a residence permit and not a UNHCR registration certificate.428 29 out of the 35 participants that do not have an official residency permit stated that the primary reason was that it was too expensive. Four out of 35 participants stated that the reason they are not able to have an official residency permit is because they could not find a sponsor. The remaining five of the participants did not state reasons for not having a legal status.

A study conducted by the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) found that 73% of Syrian refugees conveyed that the biggest challenge of having an inadequate legal status is freedom of movement.429 A high number of Syrian refugees fear going out of their area, so they do not have to cross checkpoints. The major reason for not being able to renew their legal status is because of the expensive fees as reported by 85% of the participants interviewed by NRC.430 Because of the expensive cost of living for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, they often prefer to spend their earnings on basic needs and services for

427 M.Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.3. 428 Refer to Chapter 3b (iii) for details on the UNHCR registration certificate 429 Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), The Consequences of Limited Legal Status for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, NRC Lebanon Field Assessment, March 2014, p.6, available at https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/the-consequences-of-limited-legal-status-for-syrian-refugees- in-lebanon.pdf 430 Ibid, p.5.

69 survival rather on renewing their legal documents. Syrian refugees are put in a position to choose whether they prioritize food or a residence permit renewal.431 Article 12 of the ICCPR states that freedom of movement is guaranteed to persons that are lawfully residing in the state.432 As mentioned previously, Lebanon has adopted numerous restrictive policies that have affected Syrian refugees’ accessibility to a legal status. Consequently, their enjoyment of the right to freedom of movement is affected.

As mentioned previously, Lebanon has not ratified the Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons nor the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. In this context, the Human Rights Committee expressed its concerns regarding the complexities of birth registration for Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Birth registration is a process that includes numerous documents to be submitted and expensive fees.433 In addition to that, Syrian refugees also face numerous burdens when registering their children which leaves them at risk of statelessness. A Syrian refugee must have a legal residence permit in order to register their children born in Lebanon. In the VASYR 2018, it was reported that 79% of Syrian refugee children do not have a complete birth registration.434 A policy adopted in September 2017 aimed to decrease the challenges in attaining a birth registration. The policy stated that only one parent is required to have an official legal status in order to register the birth of their child.435 Nevertheless, the Human Rights Committee iterated that Lebanon must improve birth registration procedures through legislative and administrative measures. Efforts should be done in order to eradicate discrimination concerning birth registration.436 Article 7 of the CRC highlights the importance of every child including refugee children to have access to a birth registration.437 Therefore, the remaining impediments concerning birth registration

431 Ibid, p.13. 432 Refer to chapter 4b (ii) for more details on article 12 of the ICCPR. 433 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CCPR/C/LBN/CO/3, 9 May 2018, p.9, para.47, available at https://undocs.org/en/CCPR/C/LBN/CO/3 434 UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Inter-Agency Coordination, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees 2018, p.2. 435 Ibid. 436 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CCPR/C/LBN/CO/3, p.10, para.48. 437 Refer to Chapter 4b (iii) for more details on article 7 of the CRC.

70 should be abolished by the Lebanese government. As mentioned earlier, a limited legal status affects the other rights of Syrian refugees, and they will be discussed in more detail in the sub-sections below.

ii) Lack of Employment Opportunities In 2015, the World Bank estimated that the unemployment rate in Lebanon doubled and increased to 20%.438 The VASYR estimated that the unemployment rate for Syrian refugees amounted to 40% in 2018. The areas in Lebanon with the largest unemployment percentages are the South of Lebanon, and Akkar located in the far North of Lebanon.439 Most Syrian refugees living in Lebanon have had to think about ways to pay their debts. Borrowing money from neighbors, relatives, or friends to buy food and pay their rent is a struggle faced primarily because of their inabilities to find a job. Approximately 77% of Syrian refugee families conveyed an inability to provide food.440 As mentioned previously, numerous restrictions were placed by the Ministry of Labour on the employment of Syrian refugees.441After 2015, UNHCR registered refugees are excluded from the labour market442 since they receive humanitarian assistance.443 As for unregistered refugees who are not receiving assistance, they are expected to find a Lebanese sponsor and pay the work permit fee. They are viewed as ‘migrant workers’ rather than refugees.444 The sectors they are expected to work in are cleaning services, agriculture, and construction.445Most Syrian refugees are not able to find a sponsor nor pay for the work permit. This led them to become desperate to find employment even if it is informal. The type of employment for Syrian refugees in

438 ILO, ILO Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon, available at https://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/syrian-refugee-crisis/lebanon/lang--en/index.htm 439 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018, p.109. 440 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2017, December 2017, executive summary p.2, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/61312 441 Refer to Chapter 2d (iv) for more details on the employment restrictions adopted. 442 L. Bou Khater, Labour Policy and Practice, Peace building in Lebanon, Issue No.16, August 2017, available at https://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/CrisisPreventionRecovery/SupplementArticles/16Supp/ PEACE%20BUILDING2%2016%20july%202017%20p4.pdf 443 Refer to Chapter 4c (iv) for more details on the humanitarian assistance they receive. 444 L. Errighi and J. Griesse, The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Labour Marker Implications in Jordan and Lebanon, Discussion Paper 029, European Commission, May 2016, p.11, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp029_en.pdf 445 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018, p.110.

71 Lebanon is characterized to be informal.446 Therefore, the type of work discussed in this section is limited to informal work and lacks formal contracts. The ILO has stated that Syrian refugees in the informal market tend to face difficult working conditions, low salaries, no formal contracts, and long working hours, among other difficulties.447 Informal labour is defined as the absence of official work contracts and the lack of social security welfare for workers.448 The payments that informal Syrian refugee workers receive is very minimal in comparison to the payments Lebanese workers receive.449 The monthly salary and working hours differ among governorates. However, it was projected that a male Syrian refugee gets an income of $206 on average, while a female Syrian refugee earns $159.450 The ILO assessed that 92% of Syrian refugees lack an official employment contract and work as informal labourers. Furthermore, Syrian refugees employed informally who are paid a monthly salary on a regular basis amounted to only 23%.451 When the participants were asked about their principal source of income, 52% said that it was unofficial debt. The other sources include: humanitarian assistance, World Food Program (WFP) aid, construction and agriculture.452 Article 6 of the ICESCR points out that the right to work encompasses the opportunity to make a living, and the freedom to choose their employment.453 In Lebanon, the ministry of Labour has restricted the choice of employment for unregistered Syrian refugees to three sectors. Additionally, it has also suspended the right to work for Syrian refugees who are registered with UNHCR and are receiving humanitarian assistance. Furthermore, the minimum obligations for the right to work are: access to work for

446 S. Ajluni, M. Kawar, ‘Towards Decent Work in Lebanon: Issues and Challenges in Light of the Syrian Refugee Crisis,’ ILO Regional Office for Arab States, 2015, p.30, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro- beirut/documents/publication/wcms_374826.pdf 447 Ibid, p.39. 448 The General Conference of the ILO, Resolution concerning decent work and the informal economy, ILO, 90th Sessions, 2002, para.3, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/--- relconf/---reloff/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_080105.pdf 449 ILO, Syrian refugees in Lebanon face harsh working conditions, 2 April 2014, available at https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_240126/lang--en/index.htm 450 Ibid, p.4. 451 ILO, Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Their Employment Profile, ILO Regional Office for the Arab States, 2013, p,29, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/wcms_240134.pdf 452 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018, p.114. 453 Refer to Chapter 4b (i) for more details on article 6 of the ICESCR

72 marginalized groups, and the prohibition of discrimination in employment. The access to formal employment is restricted to Syrian refugees and as discussed above, most of them are working informally. Consequently, their situation of employment in Lebanon does not meet the minimum standards of the right to work.

Due to the increasing informal labour economy in Lebanon, forced labour has become common among Syrian refugees in order to be able to pay for rent, food and their debts.454 Forced labour is defined by the ILO as any work that is imposed on a person under threat and without their consent.455 A Syrian refugee interviewed by Human Rights Watch affirms the vulnerability and economic exploitation experienced by Syrian refugee workers due to the employment restrictions. He stated, ‘My boss makes me work more than 12 hours a day at his shop. Sometimes I complain but then he threatens to cancel my sponsorship. What can I do? I have to do whatever he says. I feel like his slave.’456 The prohibition of forced Labour is highlighted in Article 7 of the ICESCR. However, the inaccessibility to employment in Lebanon has put numerous Syrian refugees at risk of forced labour and exploitation.457 Maya Kawar, Senior Employment Specialist at the ILO Regional Office for the Arab States (ROAS), stated that ‘both Syrian refugees and Lebanese residents are suffering from the effects of an unregulated labour market.’458 She also affirmed that the working conditions of Syrian refugees are worsening and informal employment is rising.459 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights emphasized its distress over the absence of resources and employment prospects for Syrian refugees. In that context, the committee stated that Lebanon should provide

454 The Freedom Fund, Struggling to Survive: Slavery and exploitation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, p.14, available at https://d1r4g0yjvcc7lx.cloudfront.net/uploads/Lebanon-Report-FINAL-8April16.pdf 455 Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (Entry into force 1 May 1932), CO29, ILO, available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_CODE:C029 456 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Residency Rules Put Syrians at Risk, 12 January 2016, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/lebanon-residency-rules-put-syrians-risk 457 UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Concluding observations on the initial report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CAT/C/LBN/CO/1, 20 and 21 April 2017, p.10, para.56, available at http://www.khiamcentre.org/images/UserFiles/Image/INT_CAT_COC_LBN_27466_E.pdf 458 ILO, Syrian refugees in Lebanon face harsh working conditions. 459 Ibid.

73 legal residence permits to Syrian refugees in order for them to find work and sustain themselves and their families without fear of being detained.460

During my interviews that were conducted with Syrian refugees, I found that 71% percent of the participants are unemployed. The graphs below portray the high rate of unemployment among the Syrian refugees I have interviewed. Similar to the information that was analyzed from secondary data, the access to employment for marginalized groups under the right to work of the ICESCR is not guaranteed to Syrian refugees. Consequently, Syrian refugees find employment in the informal labour market. In addition to that, the reasons that were stated for unemployment are also presented in the graph below. The conditions they stated for their inability to be employed include: old age, health problems, injury from the war, back pain, taking care of children461 among other reasons.

18 16

11 14 12 10 8 27 6 4 2 0 Unemployed Employed Inability to work Not finding work

Figure 8: the employment status of Figure 9: the reasons for unemployment voiced by the participants in the field research participants

There were 11 participants that informed that they have work. The type of work is

460 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc E/C.12/LBN/CO/2, 24 October 2016, p.5, para.24, available at https://www.refworld.org/country,,CESCR,,LBN,,5881f4524,0.html 461 This reason was given primarily by women especially divorced or widowed women.

74 informal and provided by the Shawish462 in the camp. In addition to that, they do not have an official employment contract. Their type of employment is either fixed or not fixed. The term ‘fixed’ means that it is informal work but they are receiving a regular monthly or daily salary from the employer on a fixed basis, or the Syrian refugee is employed by himself/herself. The term ‘not fixed’ means that the Syrian refugee is not working on a regular basis, and is not receiving a regular monthly or daily salary from the employer or by himself/herself.

Not Fixed employment

Fixed employment

0 2 4 6 8 10

Figure 10: the type of employment available in the informal settlements the participants are living in

18% from the participants who work stated that their employment is of a fixed nature. The participants who stated that their employment is not fixed amounted to 82%, the salary they receive is not consistent and the two main fields they work in are agriculture and construction. Some participants said they receive 1,000 LBP per hour463 while others stated they receive 9,000 LBP per five hours.464 The income they receive varies on the type of work they undertake, and on the employer. Article 7 of the ICESCR puts forward minimum obligations concerning legislation on minimum wage, and minimum standards on working hours and holidays. Since refugees are more likely to find employment informally, many of them are at risk of exploitation from their employers. Without a formal contract, employers are free to choose the salary they provide to their workers and the length of working hours.

462 A Shawish is characterized to be a male leader in the camp and helps refugee families in finding work and in distributing aid. 463 Interview with refugee 21, Marj el Khokh camp in the South of Lebanon, 4 May 2019. 464 Interview with refugee 4, Al Wazzani camp in the South of Lebanon, 3 May 2019.

75

iii) Low Enrollment of Syrian Refugees in Schools and Child Labour Lebanon is a state party to the convention on the rights of the child and therefore is obligated to always put the best interest of the child as the primary goal. Refugee children must acquire healthcare, education and mostly importantly an official birth registration. Furthermore, Lebanon has an obligation to ensure the accessibility, acceptability, adequacy and adaptability of its education system.465 On the contrary, Lebanon has been facing lack of funding in public schools and the low enrollment of Syrian refugee children in schools persists.466

The education system in Lebanon is split into three parts: private, free private and public schools. The public-school system was known to be weak in Lebanon before 2011, however, it is the main system that refugees depend on for education.467 The schools that Syrian refugees rely on are located in the most underprivileged areas in Lebanon. The high number of refugees arriving into Lebanon certainly put further pressure on the efficiency of public schools in Lebanon. In 2015, an effort was made to increase the availability of spaces in the classrooms but it still did not fit all Syrian refugee children who need an education.468 In this case, second-shift classes may help but usually 20 to 25 students are needed for second-shift classes to take place.469 This is very challenging for the higher levels as some children begin to leave school to work. It is important to mention that Syrian refugee adults in Lebanon are not permitted to be employed as teachers in public schools.470 Numerous initiatives were adopted in order to ensure that education is available to all children, such as the Reaching All Children with Education (RACE) plan which aimed at providing free education to all children

465 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art. 13, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3b00f47924.html 466 W. Carlier, ‘The Widening Educational Gap for Syrian Refugee Children,’ KidsRights Foundation, 2018, p.11, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/widening-educational-gap-syrian-refugee- children 467 Ibid. 468 Ibid. 469 Ibid. 470 Ibid.

76 until grade 12.471 Another initiative is known as the Accelerated Learning Program (ALP) targeting children who did not attend school for months or years. It has been reported that the quality of the ALP is very low and it did not meet the expectations of children.472 An interview was conducted with Sally Salem who previously was a principal in the Jusoor Program.473 When asked how the education level of Syrian refugees differs from Lebanese school children, Salem responded:

‘Due to the forced displacement of children from Syria during the war and the long process for them to settle, there were so many children who did not have the chance to register in school immediately. Therefore, the registration was upon the level of education and not the age. This means that there are children who are 15 years old but have to be registered in the second grade. Adding to this, the language proficiency needs to be developed through the accelerated learning program (ALP). There is a need to implement basic English or French classes for Syrian refugee children. Also, there is a need for multi-level educational programs because of the various ages in the same class. The trauma and psychological issues the children have been through should be addressed. ALP should incorporate psychosocial activity classes within it. It is important to engage the parents to educate and share awareness about how to deal with their and their children’s trauma. All of these above factors played a big role in decreasing the level of education Syrian refugee children have and created a huge gap in matching the age with the right education level. The saddest part is that children after the age of 15 do not have any access to schools because of the lack of availability in classes, as well as, the problem of engaging them in a real education program that would give them a certificate to proceed to high school.’474

471 The World Bank, Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon Support Project, available at http://projects.worldbank.org/P159470?lang=en 472 W. Carlier, ‘The Widening Educational Gap for Syrian Refugee Children,’ p.8. 473 Refer to Chapter 1c (iii) for more details about the Jusoor Programme. 474 Interview with Sally Salem, via WhatsApp messenger, 12 June 2019.

77 There are numerous reasons impeding the access of Syrian refugee children to schools. The VASYR 2018 stated that children aged 3 to 17 could not attend school because of the transportation and education material fees, employment, and the rejection of enrollment by schools.475 Primary education, under article 13 of the ICESCR, should be free. Primary education in Lebanon is free, however, parents of refugee children are struggling to cover the cost of transportation. The cost of transportation is a barrier that is restricting refugee children’s right to free primary education. In the interview conducted with Sally Salem, one of the questions asked was: what are the biggest factors impeding Syrian refugees’ access to education? Salem responded, ‘lack of documentation, legal residency and transportation fees. The difference in educational curriculum as it was mainly in Arabic in Syria for all subjects while in Lebanon most subjects are in French or English. Also, it is overcrowded and there are not enough facility spaces. The need for children to work and support their family and the discrimination that occurs also impede their access to schools.’476 The secondary level barriers Syrian refugees face in accessing schools are found to be higher than in the primary level. Lack of a residency permit, far distances, language difficulties and child labour are all factors contributing to the low number of Syrian refugees in schools. For Syrian refugees aged 17 to 19 in upper secondary levels, the attendance percentage was found to be 5% in 2017 and dropped to 3% in 2018.477 The right to education in the ICESCR encourages the continuity of education and the availability of spaces in classrooms.478 Furthermore, the minimum standards for the right to education in the ICESCR includes, the establishment of an education strategy that includes provisions for secondary and higher education. As mentioned above, the lack of availability of spaces has impeded Syrian refugees’ access to schools. Furthermore, their right to education is restricted due to other factors, such as language barriers and the pressure to work. The most common reason for children aged 15 to 17

475 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018, p.65. 476 Interview with Sally Salem, via WhatsApp messenger, 12 June 2019. 477 Ibid, p.65. 478 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, art.13.

78 was the pressure of work and/or marriage.479 The Committee on the Rights of the Child highlighted the low enrollment of Syrian refugees in schools for reasons such as costs of uniforms, books and transportation.480 In addition to that, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights mentioned its concerns regarding Syrian refugee children who are pressured to avoid education and instead seek work in order to provide for their family.481

UNICEF stated that child labour among Syrian refugees continues to expand throughout the years.482 Syrian refugee children are less prone to being stopped at checkpoints due to legal documents, therefore, they are encouraged by their parents to seek work since they are free to move.483 Article 32 of the CRC states that all children should be protected from economic exploitation and child labour.484 Additionally, article 22 of the CRC states that refugee children should be guaranteed protection by the state. However, Syrian refugee children are often working in dangerous environments,485 and are regularly exposed to bad working conditions such as long working hours and long exposure under the sun. Furthermore, Syrian refugee children often work in agriculture and this puts their health at risk because of fertilizers and pesticides.486 Article 6 of the CRC ensures the protection of child’s right to life, survival and development. Yet, the working environment Syrian refugee children are exposed to affects their health, life, and development since they are also missing school.

479 Ibid. 480 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CRC/C/LBN/CO/4-5, 22 June 2017, p.10, par.34 (b), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/59c912574.html 481 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc E/C.12/LBN/CO/2, p.10, par.62. 482 H. Halldorsson, ‘Syrian refugee children in Lebanon at risk of child labour, missing out on education,’ UNICEF, 30 January 2017, available at https://www.unicef.org/stories/syrian-refugee-children-lebanon- at-risk-of-child-labour 483 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Residency Rules Put Syrians at Risk. 484 Refer to chapter 4b (iii) for more details on article 32 of the CRC. 485 Refer to the ILO definition of child labour in chapter 4b (iii). 486 Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Labour, National Action Plan to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Lebanon by 2016, ILO, p.10, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--- arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_229103.pdf

79 During the interviews I have conducted with refugees, the number of households interviewed were a total of 38 households. Four households do not have any children, ten households have one to two children, nine households have three to five children, eight households have six to eight children and lastly seven households have nine to twelve children. The figure below compares the number of households who have children attending school versus the number of households who do not have any children attending school. I have included the ‘some children going to school’ category since many of the households stated that they can only afford to send some of their kids to school while others are encouraged to work.

2

11

15

No. of households with children going to school No. of households with children not going to school No. of hosueholds with some children going to school

Figure 11: The number of households with children going to school It is concluded that only 2 households have all their children attending school. 15 households stated that none of their children go to school; the number of children affected under this category amount to 81 children. The remaining 11 stated that only some of their children are going to school due to certain factors. The remaining 10 households that are not mentioned in this figure include households that do not have kids, and households with children that are too young to attend school. The figure below portrays the reasons given by the 26 households concerning the non-enrollment of their children in schools.

80 Reason not mentioned

Person with disabilities

Both work and transportation fees

Transportation fees

Work

Young age

0 2 4 6 8 10

Figure 12: reasons for non-enrollment in schools (referring to the number of households) Similar to the secondary data analyzed above, the highest factors resulting in the non- enrollment of their children in schools are work and transportation fees. The ‘both work and transportation fees’ category is for the households that cited both of these reasons as a primary factor for not enrolling their child in school. The cost of transportation and the pressure to work are affecting their accessibility to free primary education which is a guaranteed right under article 13 of the ICESCR. The most common work that these children partake in is agriculture. The consequences of child labour are physical and psychological. When a person’s childhood gets taken away from them, the negative consequences will linger on. Some families often tend to push their children to work on the streets because of the financial difficulties. The lack of employment opportunities they face leads them to resort to child labour in order to make ends meet. Syrian refugee children that were interviewed are working in agriculture and this harms their well- being. Their situation is contrary to the protection against child labour under article 32 of the CRC. A 53-year-old male Syrian refugee living in Wazzani camp who is unable to find fixed work informed me that his 16-year-old daughter is working in agriculture so they can afford food. His 16-year-old daughter mentioned that ‘working in the field is so difficult especially when the sun is so strong.’487 For a child being on the streets during the day and night, he/she is extremely at risk of being exploited.

iv) Dire Living Conditions

487 Interview with refugee 11, Al Wazzani camp in the South of Lebanon, 3 May 2019.

81 Humanitarian organisations and UNHCR have been providing assistance to Syrian refugees to meet their basic needs through the Refugee and Resilience Plan (3RP).488 The aid given to Syrian refugees registered with UNHCR includes a monthly 260,000 LBP cash assistance for them and their families, and it is provided to them through an ATM card.489 Syrian refugees are free to choose how to spend this cash and this provides them with a sense of self-reliance.490 This is beneficial both to Syrian refugees and the Lebanese economy since refugees are able to buy their basic needs from local stores. In addition to that, the World Food Program (WFP) provides them with a monthly $27 food voucher.491 The cash assistance from UNHCR and WFP is given to the most vulnerable refugees.492 UNHCR projected that 2.3 billion dollars is needed in 2018 in order to support Syrian refugees in Lebanon. However, only 38 percent of the funding was provided.493 In Lebanon, the lack of international funding led UNHCR to halt the 260,000 LBP cash assistance to some Syrian refugees. The most vulnerable refugees were assessed and perceived as a priority and given the cash assistance instead. Lisa Abou Khaled, UNHCR spokeswoman stated that UNHCR had to make difficult decisions regarding the cash assistance but that the resources are very limited.494 The cutback in cash assistance has left many Syrian refugees in extreme vulnerability. The 2018 VASYR reported that approximately 69% of Syrian refugees are living under the poverty line. Furthermore, half of Syrian refugees are incapable to provide their basic necessities such as: food, shelter, and health services.495 The average income of refugees

488 World Food Programme (WFP), Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt affect by Conflict in Syria, WFP in Egypt, 2016, p.3, available at https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/8e372b11831043c481f1446189ef33f3/download/ 489 Middle East Monitor, ‘UNHCR suspends aid for 8,000 Syria families in Lebanon,’ Middle East Monitor, 20 September 2018, available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180920-unhcr- suspends-aid-for-8000-syria-families-in-lebanon/ 490 UNHCR, DPSM Key Updates: Cash & Vouchers, 2013, p.2, available at https://www.unhcr.org/ngo- consultations/ngo-consultations-2013/Cashbased_interventions_in_UNHCR_OperationsFlyer.pdf 491 World Food Programme (WFP), Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt affect by Conflict in Syria, p.13. 492 http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Lebanon%20Operational%20Update%20- %20January%20-%20June%202018.pdf p.4 493 D. Eldawy, ‘A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge,’ MPI, 21 February 2019, p.5, available at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/syrian-refugee-swell-push- lebanon-over-edge 494 N. Houssari, ‘UNHCR stops cash aid to 20,000 Syrian families in Lebanon,’ Arab News, 15 September 2017, available at http://www.arabnews.com/node/1161436/middle-east 495 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018, p.153.

82 that are below the poverty line is $3.84 per day.496 Under article 11 of the ICESCR, states are obligated to offer assistance to any person that is unable to provide for himself/herself. Furthermore, the state is obligated to ensure the eradication of hunger by providing minimum essentials of food.497 69% of Syrian refugees earn around $3.84 daily. Consequently, their basic needs such as food is not provided by the state nor humanitarian assistance.

As mentioned previously, article 11 of the ICESCR states that the accommodation of refugees must be ‘habitable’. Therefore, persons living in a shelter must be protected from any rain, wind, or threat to their health. Additionally, a state must prioritize vulnerable groups who are living in informal settlements with bad conditions. The state must ensure not to adopt any legislation that worsens the housing conditions of vulnerable groups.498 Formal refugee camps are non-existent because of the refusal of the government to establish official refugee camps for Syrian refugees.499 The Lebanese government is concerned that if the camps are established, Syrian refugees will settle in Lebanon permanently as the Palestinians did.500 Therefore, accommodation for refugees is restricted and is not affordable nor habitable.501 73% of refugees have to live in informal settlements, cities and villages.502 The houses they live in often lack running water, electricity, toilets, kitchens and windows, among others. A big number of Syrian families have to endure living in overcrowded places.503 Furthermore, 18% live in fragile tents and 9% live in garages, farm constructions, shops, and worksites.504 As mentioned previously, the approximate average income of a Syrian refugee male is

496 Ibid, p.44. 497 Refer to chapter 4b (i) for more details on article 11 of the ICESCR. 498 Refer to chapter 4b (i) for more details on article 11 of the ICESCR 499 ILO, Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Their Employment Profile, ILO Regional Office for the Arab states, 2013, p.16, available athttps://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/--- arabstates/---ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcms_240134.pdf 500 R. Hall, ‘Lebanon doesn’t want Syrian refugees getting too comfortable: even in winter,’ Agence France-Presse, 15 February 2016, available at https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-02-15/lebanon-doesnt- want-syrian-refugees-getting-too-comfortable-even-winter 501 UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner and UNHABITAT, The Right to Adequate Housing, Fact Sheet no. 21 (Rev.1), 2009, p.4, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf . 502 UNHCR, shelter, UNHCR Lebanon, available at https://www.unhcr.org/lb/shelter 503 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018, p.152. 504 UNHCR, shelter, UNHCR Lebanon, available at https://www.unhcr.org/lb/shelter

83 around $209. Usually, the apartments or tents that are rented by refugees cost around $182.505 For that reason, Syrian refugees are obliged to share apartments or tents because of the high cost of rent in comparison to their salary. The temporary settlements/camps in which Syrian refugees are placed in do not meet the humane standards of living. From the absence of sanitation to the over-crowding and the lack of electricity and access to clean water, refugees are living in conditions that deny them their dignity.

In the interviews I conducted with refugees, 14 out of 38 participants informed me that they are not receiving any aid from UNHCR. In some cases, they said that UNHCR used to provide them with aid but stopped. The aid is not enough and they are still barely affording water, electricity, and medicine. Some of the refugees expressed their concerns about living in the camps. A 22-year-old male Syrian refugee living in Wazzani camp informed me that the camp he is living in only has one bathroom that is shared by everyone, none of the organisations are aiding them or hearing them. He stated, ‘ten people are sleeping in the same small tent and there are no beds.’506 They were only given three mattresses regardless of the number of people in the family. Furthermore, a 42-year-old female with four children living in Marj El Khokh camp informed that the camps are really bad because there is no security, and they are always afraid from fire or rain.507 Consequently, the guarantees of the right to housing under article 11 of the ICESCR are not met.

Another major challenge Syrian refugees are faced with is healthcare. A big number of Syrian refugees experience physical injuries and psychological trauma from the war. UNHCR, the Ministry of Social Affairs, and multiple NGOs entered into a partnership in order to ensure that refugees in Lebanon have accessibility to primary healthcare through hospitals and centres.508 As a state party to the ICESCR, Lebanon must ensure

505 UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2018, p.152. 506 Interview with refugee 1, Al-Wazzani camp in the South of Lebanon, 3 May 2019. 507 Interview with refugee 36, Marj El-Khokh camp in the South of Lebanon, 4 May 2019. 508 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’p.6.

84 the accessibility of primary health care to Syrian refugees.509 However, Syrian refugees seeking health services are obligated to cover 25% of the cost of service while UNHCR supports the remaining 75%. Syrian refugees are also expected to cover the cost of medication. A large number of refugees are unable to meet the 25% fee and are unable to access any healthcare.510 In addition to that, there are some centres and hospitals that refuse to welcome Syrian refugees. The resentment is growing towards refugees especially that some perceive that refugees have put a large strain on Lebanese resources, and the Lebanese healthcare system.511 Some refugees do not have an option to seek medical help and instead go back to Syria for treatment or remain untreated.512 The eradication of undernourishment and mortality is an obligation Lebanon has to adhere to under article 12 of the ICESCR.513 However, the Committee on the Rights of the Child highlighted the high number of infant mortalities among Syrian refugees. The committee asked the state of Lebanon to offer prenatal and postnatal healthcare services that are accessible to Syrian refugees.514 As a state party to the ICESCR, Lebanon has an obligation to provide health services to individuals and ensure their ‘availability, accessibility, acceptability and adequacy without discrimination.’515 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed its concerns on the second periodic report of Lebanon regarding health services. Lebanon, as a state party to the ICESCR, has an obligation to properly and equally allocated public resources to health institutions. Nevertheless, the committee stated that the limited resources have led to low quality in health services. Furthermore, the unequal distribution of health facilities in the region have led to inaccessibility of health services by marginalized groups.516

509 Refer to chapter 4b (i) for more details on article 12 of the ICESCR. 510 APIS Health Consulting Group, Syrian Refugees Crisis Impact on Lebanese Public Hospitals: Financial Impact Analysis: Generated Problems and Possible Solutions, July 2016, p.4, available at https://www.moph.gov.lb/DynamicPages/download_file/1396 511 M. Yahya, ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ p.6. 512 Ibid. 513 Refer to chapter 4b (i) for more details on article 12 of the ICESCR. 514 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CRC/C/LBN/CO/4-5, p.9, par.30 (b). 515 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health,’, UN doc E/C.12/2000/4, p.4, para.12. 516 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Lebanon,’ E/C.12/LBN/CO/2, p.10, par.57.

85 v) Discrimination and Harassment Tensions between Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees have been continuously increasing.517 As mentioned in Chapter two, numerous studies established by organisations have shown the increase in social tensions. Act for Human Rights (ALEF) found out that 85% of Lebanese participants believe that their employment opportunities are being affected by Syrian refugees.518 Discrimination faced by Syrian refugees in Lebanon is often due to their status and nationality.519 Furthermore, the fragile sectarian balance mentioned in chapter two also contributes to the rising tensions between the Lebanese host communities and Syrian refugees.520 A study done by WFP found that most of the discrimination Syrian refugees face in Lebanon is from their neighbors, bullying in the streets, and racist statements.521 Executive Director of the Lebanese Human Rights Group ALEF, Georges Ghali, commented ‘The rigid policies implemented on Syrian nationals in Lebanon, in addition to curfews, raids, arrests, and violations to the presumption of innocence, have generated a strong perception among Lebanese [seeing] refugees as a security threat. The latter perception generates further segregation of communities and discrimination, leading to weaker social cohesion.’522 The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights indicated that Lebanon lacks any policies regarding legal remedies for victims of discrimination and torture. It also advised Lebanon to include the principle of non-discrimination in its constitution and judicial procedures.523

517 UNDP and UNHCR, 3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2018 – 2019: in Response to the Syria Crisis, Regional Strategic Overview, p 7 available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3RP-Regional-Strategic-Overview-2018-19.pdf 518 ALEF act for human rights, Perceptions of Security Among Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Community in Marj- West Beqaa, p 23, available at https://alefliban.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/01/ALEF_Perceptions-of-Security_Lebanon-1.pdf 519 Minority Rights Group International, An uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: The challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return, p.6 & 7. 520 Ibid. 521 WFP, UNICEF, UNHCR, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2017, p.15. 522 Safer World, Building Peace into Refugee Responses: Syrian refugees in Lebanon, April 2018, p.33, available at https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1172-building-peace-into-refugee- responses-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon 523 UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc E/C.12/LBN/CO/2, p.4, par.18.

86 Eviction orders are a factor that plant fear and unsafety in most refugees’ households. The Beqaa in Lebanon hosts informal settlements where a large number of refugees have been living in for years. In March 2017, the Lebanese army ordered evictions on these informal settlements due to security reasons. Almost 10,000 refugees were left confused and lost as to where to move next.524 If these refugees do not act upon the eviction orders they were given, they would have to face arrests or detention. At the start of 2016, there has been around 13 municipalities that ordered evictions of 3,664 Syrian refugees.525 Amnesty international conducted interviews with women who stated that the threatening eviction orders they received were without notice or warning.526According to Lebanese law, a property owner is unable to evict any individual without a warrant from the court.527 The UN reported that many Syrian refugees were evicted due to the inability to pay rent. Under article 11 of the ICESCR, General Comment No.7 iterates that states are obligated to refrain from forced evictions and adopt legislation against it. Furthermore, the legislation should be consistent among all the authorities representing the state.528 The forced evictions that were committed against Syrian refugees lacked consistency, and were implemented differently across the municipalities.529 The UN states that some of the eviction orders carried out could be ‘justifiable’, however, they do not fulfill national or international standards.530

A large number of Syrian refugees are at risk of detention and deportation because of

524 H. Kanso, ‘Evictions could force out 10,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley: UN,’ Reuters, 10 April 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-refugees- idUSKBN17C24K 525 Human Rights Watch, ‘Our Homes Are Not for Strangers: Mass Evictions of Syrian Refugees by Lebanese Municipalities,’ 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/20/our-homes-are-not- strangers/mass-evictions-syrian-refugees-lebanese-municipalities# 526 Amnesty International, ‘I want a safe place: Refugee women from Syria uprooted and unprotected in Lebanon,’ February 2016, p.40, available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1832102016ENGLISH.PDF 527 UNHCR and UN Habitat, Housing, Land and Property Issues in Lebanon, August 2014, p.25, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/41590 528 Refer to chapter 4b (i) for more details on article 11 of the ICESCR. 529 Human Rights Watch, ‘Our Homes Are Not for Strangers: Mass Evictions of Syrian Refugees by Lebanese Municipalities.’ 530 Ibid, p.48.

87 the absence of appropriate documents for a legal entry and stay.531 There have been several reports discussing the lengthy detentions of refugees and asylum seekers, including children. Articles 17 and 18 of the 1962 law on entry and exit of foreigners allows the GSO to imprison individuals without an official warrant.532 The detention of asylum seekers and refugees in Lebanon should be used as ‘a measure of last resort’.533 Under article 9 of the ICCPR, arbitrary detention is prohibited and the liberty of any individual in a state’s jurisdiction must be protected.534 Moreover, the reasons and length of detention must be reasonable, and the detention should be done on an individual basis. On 30 June 2017, more than 350 individuals were taken from refugee camps and imprisoned.535 The reasons for imprisonment were not disclosed to the detainees.536 The individuals were taken together on the same day and imprisoned collectively, which is incompatible to Article 9 of the ICCPR. Furthermore, detainees were not given the reasons for their imprisonment which opposes article 9 of the ICCPR.537 The Lebanese army responsible for their arrest announced that four Syrian refugees lost their life during their detention.538 The bodies of the Syrian refugees were examined after a forensic analysis was done, and signs of physical torture on three of the bodies were revealed.539 However, the Lebanese authorities announced that their death was caused by illness.540 Article 9 of the ICCPR states the place of detention must be appropriate and hygienic. Furthermore, the mental and physical health of the detainee must be monitored, and medical care must be provided under article 6 of the

531 The Freedom Fund, Struggling to Survive: Slavery and exploitation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, p.2. 532 Order No.319 Regulating the Status of Foreign Nationals in Lebanon (entry into force: 2 August 1962), p.4, art.17 & 18. 533 UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Concluding observations on the initial report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CAT/C/LBN/CO/1, 30 May 2017, p.10, par.55, available at http://www.khiamcentre.org/images/UserFiles/Image/INT_CAT_COC_LBN_27466_E.pdf 534 Refer to chapter 4b (ii) for more details on article 9 of the ICCPR. 535 L. Maalouf, ‘Lebanon: Further investigation needed into deaths of Syrian refugees in military custody’, Amnesty International, 25 July 2017. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/lebanon- further-investigation-needed-into-deaths-of-syrian-refugees-in-military-custody/ 536 Ibid. 537 Refer to chapter 4b (ii) for more details on article 9 of the ICCPR. 538 L. Maalouf, ‘Lebanon: Further investigation needed into deaths of Syrian refugees in military custody’. 539 Ibid. 540 Ibid.

88 ICCPR. The right to life in article 6 of the ICCPR prohibits any act of torture on aliens that might violate their right to life. The right to life is non-derogable and should be protected even in times of emergency.541

d) Conclusion This chapter explored the significant components that cover the definition of local integration. The legal, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions are three processes gradually achieved during the integration of refugees in a host country. The accompanying rights within these three dimensions, discussed above, are reflected in international human rights instruments since Lebanon is non-signatory to the 1951 convention. The ICESCR, CCPR, and CRC were assessed and the rights relevant to the local integration of refugees were explored. The last section of the thesis found that the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon seems to contravene certain human rights obligation that were assessed in section (b) such as the right to work, the right to health, and the right to education, among others. The primary concern is the restrictions adopted on the residency requirements on Syrian refugees. The number one obstacle to their rights in Lebanon is the absence of a legal status, and this has affected the other rights that Syrian refugees need for a successful local integration. Legal status is the pre-requisite for all the other rights. Human rights and protections that should be guaranteed to non-nationals under the minimum core obligations of the ICESCR were also not fulfilled. There are still so many challenges and impediments for Syrian refugees in Lebanon to attain their rights that would integrate them into Lebanon. Therefore, this chapter has concluded that Lebanon is not adhering to some of its obligations under international law, and the situation on the ground is not in conformity with the rights relevant to the three dimensions of local integration.

541 Refer to chapter 4b (ii) for more details on article 6 of the ICCPR.

89 CH5: Conclusion The Syrian Civil War has impacted many lives since the outset of the conflict in 2011. Many families and individuals were forced to seek refuge and safety in neighboring countries such as Lebanon. In Lebanon, there are numerous impediments that restrict Syrian refugees’ accessibility to their basic needs, services and rights and the main obstacle is a legal status that 74% of Syrian refugees lack. This thesis highlights the importance of local integration as a durable solution for Syrian refugees in Lebanon, and investigates whether this durable solution is considered to be an option for them currently. An important aspect that was addressed in this thesis was the response that was taken by the Lebanese government on Syrian refugees. Chapter two of this thesis provided a political and sociological analysis and assessed policies taken by the Lebanese authorities towards Syrian refugees. Chapter two found that the policies adopted by the Lebanese government towards Syrian refugees affected their well-being, dignity, and human rights. Chapter three of the thesis provided a national legal framework analysis, and explored the relationship between UNHCR and the Lebanese government. It was found that Lebanon’s domestic legislation lacked significant provisions regarding the treatment of refugees. Furthermore, it is a challenge for UNHCR to implement its mandate due to the restrictive policies that the Lebanese government was adopting. Lebanon refers to Syrian refugees as ‘temporarily displaced’ and does not give legal effect to UNHCR’s refugee recognition. Therefore, even Syrian refugees who were registered with UNHCR prior to 2015 were perceived as ‘displaced’ by the Lebanese authorities. The response Lebanon took on Syrian refugees was not just due to its low economic resources, but also due to the political, historical and sectarian tensions that exist within its demography. Chapter two provides a summary of the historical tensions that have led to the response that the Lebanese government has taken. Chapter Four of this thesis explored the definition of local integration and the three dimensions. Moreover, it put forward the human rights that are relevant to the local integration of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. Chapter four found that the situation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon seems to contravene certain human rights obligations that were assessed in section (b) such as the right to work, the right to health, and the right to education. Furthermore, the situation on the ground of Syrian refugees is not in

90 conformity with the standards set out in international human rights law. Syrian refugees are lacking the basic rights included in the legal, economic and socio-cultural dimensions that define local integration. From the lack of employment opportunities to the inaccessibility of an education, Syrian refugees are in an extremely vulnerable situation in Lebanon. It is understood that local integration of Syrian refugees is not part of the equation in Lebanon. Syrian refugees are expected to return and are not expected to settle in Lebanon. The political and sociological aspect along with the legal analysis clarifies that local integration is not considered to be a durable solution for Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

91 Bibliography

11.11.11, ‘Long Road to Return: Towards a Durable Solutions Deal for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon’, 11.11.11 Report, November 2018, available at https://www.11.be/en/news/item/long-road-to-return

Ajami, B., ‘The Mother of The Child: How Lebanon’s March 14 alliance collapsed’, Annahar, 8 March 2019, available at https://en.annahar.com/article/945834-the-mother- of-the-child-how-lebanons-march-14-alliance-collapsed

Ajluni, S. and Kawar, M., ‘Towards Decent Work in Lebanon: Issues and Challenges in Light of the Syrian Refugee Crisis,’ ILO Regional Office for Arab States, 2015, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro- beirut/documents/publication/wcms_374826.pdf

ALEF act for human rights, Perceptions of Security Among Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Community in Marj- West Beqaa, available at https://alefliban.org/wp- content/uploads/2017/01/ALEF_Perceptions-of-Security_Lebanon-1.pdf

Alsharabati, C. and Nammour, J., Survey on Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, UNHCR, RDPP, Institut Des Sciences Politiques, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/45083

Amnesty International, ‘Lebanon: New entry requirements for Syrians likely to block would-be refugees,’ Relief Web, 6 January 2015, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-new-entry-requirements-syrians-likely- block-would-be-refugees

Amnesty International, Pushed to the Edge: Syrian Refugees Face Increased Restrictions in Lebanon, 2015, available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE2417852015ENGLISH.PDF

Amnesty International, ‘I want a safe place: Refugee women from Syria uprooted and unprotected in Lebanon,’ February 2016, available at https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/MDE1832102016ENGLISH.PDF

APIS Health Consulting Group, Syrian Refugees Crisis Impact on Lebanese Public Hospitals: Financial Impact Analysis: Generated Problems and Possible Solutions, July 2016, available at https://www.moph.gov.lb/DynamicPages/download_file/1396

Assi, A., ‘The Sectarian Dimension of the Syrian Civil War and Lebanese-Syrian Relations,’ Middle East Institute, 16 July 2018, available at https://www.mei.edu/publications/sectarian-dimension-syrian-civil-war-and-lebanese- syrian-relations

92 Bassam, L., ‘Fifty thousand Syrian returned to Syria from Lebanon this year: official’, Reuters, 25 September 2018, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- crisis-syria-lebanon-refugees/fifty-thousand-syrians-returned-to-syria-from-lebanon- this-year-official-idUSKCN1M51OM

Barrington, L., ‘Lebanon’s president says phased return of Syrian refugee now possible’, Thomson Reuters, 14 June 2018, available at https://af.reuters.com/article/idAFKBN1JA1QH

BBC News, ‘Syrians entering Lebanon face new restrictions’, BBC, 1 January 2015, available at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30657003

Betts, A., Ali, A., Memisoglu, F., Local Politics and the Syrian Refugee Crisis: Exploring Responses in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, Oxford Department of International Development, Refugee Studies Centre, 24 November 2017, available at https://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/publications/local-politics-and-the-syrian-refugee-crisis- exploring-responses-in-turkey-lebanon-and-jordan

Beydoun, R., ‘The Adversarial Impacts of Protracted Refugee Situations on Refugee Protection and Camp Security: a Case for Local Integration in Lebanon,’ Arizona State University, November 2010, available at https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/56295/content/Beydoun_asu_0010N_10243.pdf

Bhabha, J. and Dottridge, M., Child Rights in the Global Compacts, Refugees Migrants UN, 24 June 2017, available at https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/stocktaking_initiative_on_child_rights _in_the_global_compacts.pdf

Boed, R., ‘The State of the Right of Asylum in International Law’, Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, Vol.5:1, 1994, available at https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1342&context=djcil

Bou Khater, L., Labour Policy and Practice, Peace building in Lebanon, Issue No.16, August 2017, available at https://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/CrisisPreventionRecovery/Supplement Articles/16Supp/PEACE%20BUILDING2%2016%20july%202017%20p4.pdf

Carlier, W., ‘The Widening Educational Gap for Syrian Refugee Children,’ KidsRights Foundation, 2018, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/turkey/widening-educational- gap-syrian-refugee-children

Cherri, Z., Gonzalez, P., Delgado, R., ‘‘The Lebanese-Syrian crisis impact of influx of Syrian refugees to an already weak state’, Dove Medical Press Limited, Risk Management and Healthcare Policy, 2016, available at https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4948691/

93 Davidson, J., ‘Syrians in Lebanon hit by arrests, curfews and hostility after bombings’, Reuters, 25 July 2016, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- syria-lebanon/syrians-in-lebanon-hit-by-arrests-curfews-and-hostility-after-bombings- idUSKCN1051KO

Da Costa, R., Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, Rights of Refugees in the Context of Integration: Legal Standards and Recommendations, Division of International Protection Services, UNHCR, available at https://www.unhcr.org/44bb90882.pdf

Dionigi, F., ‘The Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon: State Fragility and Social Resilience,’ Middle East Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science, 25 February 2016, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/syrian-refugee-crisis- lebanon-state-fragility-and-social-resilience

El-Helou, Z. and Antara, L., ‘Political Participation of Refugees: The Case of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2018, available at https://www.idea.int/sites/default/files/publications/political- participation-of-refugees-the-case-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.pdf

Eldawy, D., ‘A Fragile Situation: Will the Syrian Refugee Swell Push Lebanon Over the Edge,’ Migration Policy Institute, 21 February 2019, available at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/syrian-refugee-swell-push-lebanon-over-edge

Errighi, L., and Griesse, J., The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Labour Marker Implications in Jordan and Lebanon, Discussion Paper 029, European Commission, May 2016, available at https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/dp029_en.pdf

Fanack, Refugees: Lebanon and Jordan Close Their Borders to Syrian Refugees, 22 December 2014, Fanack, available at https://fanack.com/refugees/lebanon-and-jordan- close-their-borders-to-syrian-refugees/

Francis, E., ‘Arab economic summit in Beirut urges Syrian refugee returns’, Thomson Reuters, 20 January 2019, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-arabs- summit-syria-refugees/arab-economic-summit-in-beirut-urges-syrian-refugee-returns- idUSKCN1PE08W

Geha, C. and Talhouk, J., ‘Politics and the Plight of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ AUB, August 2018, available at https://www.aub.edu.lb/Documents/Politics-and-the-Plight- of-Syrian-Refugees-in-Lebanon.pdf

Geha, C., ‘Political Complexities of Return: Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ Middle East Institute, 14 May 2019, available at https://mei.edu/publications/political-complexities- return-syrian-refugees-lebanon

94 Gebeily, M., ‘A refugee on paper: Running from war, bureaucracy could be Syrian’s greatest obstacle,’ Executive Magazine, 11 March 2015, available at https://www.executive-magazine.com/economics-policy/refugee-paper

Goodwin, G., S., ‘The International Law of Refugee Protection’, The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, June 2014, available at https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/ oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021#oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-021-note-20

Order No.319 Regulating the Status of Foreign Nationals in Lebanon (entry into force: 2 August 1962), 1962, available at https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/lbn/1962/order_no__319_regulating_the_statu s_of_foreign_nationals_in_lebanon_en_html/Order_no_319_EN_excerpts.pdf

Harb, C., and Saab, R., Social Cohesion and Intergroup Relations: Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Nationals in the Beqaa and Akkar, Save the Children, AUB, 2014, available at https://lebanon.savethechildren.net/sites/lebanon.savethechildren.net/files/library/AUB %20SCI%20Social%20cohesion%20final%20report%20May%202014.pdf

Halldorsson, H., ‘Syrian refugee children in Lebanon at risk of child labour, missing out on education,’ UNICEF, 30 January 2017, available at https://www.unicef.org/stories/syrian-refugee-children-lebanon-at-risk-of-child-labour

Hall, R., ‘Lebanon doesn’t want Syrian refugees getting too comfortable: even in winter,’ Agence France-Presse, 15 February 2016, available at https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-02-15/lebanon-doesnt-want-syrian-refugees-getting- too-comfortable-even-winter

Hennessy-Fiske, M. and Bulos, N., ‘‘Lebanon’s new visa rules for Syrians aim to curb refugee influx’, Los Angeles Times, 5 January 2015, available at https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-lebanon-syria-visas-20150105- story.html

Hijazi, I.A., ‘Syria-Lebanon Cooperation Pact Signed’, The New York Times, 23 May 1991, available at https://www.nytimes.com/1991/05/23/world/syria-lebanon- cooperation-pact-signed.html

Houri, S., ‘Eleven-year-old boy found hanged in refugee camp’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 9 February 2019, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon- News/2019/Feb-09/476261-eleven-year-old-boy-found-hanged-in-refugee-camp.ashx

Houssari, N., ‘UNHCR stops cash aid to 20,000 Syrian families in Lebanon,’ Arab News, 15 September 2017, available at http://www.arabnews.com/node/1161436/middle-east

95 Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Events of 2018, 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/lebanon

Human Rights Watch, Syria: Events of 2018, HRW World Report, 2019, available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/syria

Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: ‘New Refugee Policy a Step Forward’, Relief Web, 14 February 2017, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/lebanon-new-refugee- policy-step-forward

Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: At Least 45 Local Curfews Imposed on Syrian Refugees,’ HRW, 3 October 2014, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/03/lebanon-least-45-local-curfews-imposed-syrian- refugees

Human Rights Watch, ‘Our Homes are not for Strangers: Mass Evictions of Syrian Refugees by Lebanese Municipalities,’ HRW, 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/04/20/our-homes-are-not-strangers/mass-evictions- syrian-refugees-lebanese-municipalities

Human Rights Watch, ‘The Gaps in Lebanon’s New Refugee Policy’, News Deeply, 14 March 2017, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/03/14/gaps-lebanons-new- refugee-policy

Human Rights Watch, ‘I Just Wanted to be Treated like a Person’: How Lebanon’s Residency Rules Facilitate Abuse of Syrian Refugees, HRW, 2016, available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/01/12/i-just-wanted-be-treated-person/how-lebanons- residency-rules-facilitate-abuse

Human Rights Watch, ‘Lebanon: Positive Step for Refugee Children,’ HRW, 17 April 2018, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/17/lebanon-positive-step-refugee- children

Human Rights Watch, Lebanon: Residency Rules Put Syrians at Risk, 12 January 2016, available at https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/01/12/lebanon-residency-rules-put- syrians-risk

ILO, Assessment of the Impact of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon and Their Employment Profile, Regional Office for the Arab States, 2013, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro- beirut/documents/publication/wcms_240134.pdf

ILO, ILO Response to Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon, available at https://www.ilo.org/beirut/areasofwork/syrian-refugee-crisis/lebanon/lang-- en/index.htm

96 ILO, Syrian refugees in Lebanon face harsh working conditions, 2 April 2014, available at https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_240126/lang-- en/index.htm

Immenkamp, B., ‘Syrian crisis: Impact on Lebanon, European Parliamentary Research Service,’ Briefing, European Parliament, 30 March 2017, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.html?reference=EPRS_BRI(201 7)599379

Jacobsen, K., The forgotten solution: local integration for refugees in developing countries,’ new issues in refugee research: Working Paper No.45, UNHCR, July 2001, available at https://www.unhcr.org/research/working/3b7d24059/forgotten-solution- local-integration-refugees-developing-countries-karen.html

Janmyr, M., ‘Precarity in Exile: The Legal Status of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon,’ Refugee Survey Quarterly, vol.30, Issue 4, 29 November 2016, pp.58-78, available at https://academic.oup.com/rsq/article/35/4/58/2609281

Janmyr, M., ‘No Country of Asylum: ‘Legitimizing’ Lebanon’s Rejection of the 1951 Refugee Convention’, International Journal of Refugee Law, Oxford University Press, 5 October 2017, pp. 438-465, available at https://academic.oup.com/ijrl/article/29/3/438/4345649

Janmyr, M., ‘The fragile legal order facing Syrian refugees in Lebanon’, EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy, University of Oslo, 24 July 2018, available at https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-fragile-legal-order-facing-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon/

Janmyr, M., ‘UNHCR and the Syrian refugee response: negotiating status and registration in Lebanon’, The International Journal of Human Rights, 17 November 2017, pp.393-419, available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/13642987.2017.1371140?needAccess=tr ue

Jusoor, Refugee Education Program, Program Overview: Jusoor in Lebanon, available at https://jusoorsyria.com/programs/refugee-education-program/

Kanso, H., ‘Evictions could force out 10,000 Syrian refugees from Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley: UN,’ Reuters, 10 April 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us- mideast-crisis-lebanon-refugees-idUSKBN17C24K

Khatib, L., ‘Regional Spillover: Lebanon and the Syrian Conflict,’ Carnegie Middle East Centre, 9 June 2014, available at https://carnegie-mec.org/2014/06/09/regional- spillover-lebanon-and-syrian-conflict-pub-55829

Klein, A., ‘The Right to Belong to a Political Community at the Example of the Legal Situation of Refugees in Lebanon,’ Heinrich Boll Stiftung, Beirut, 11 July 2018,

97 available at https://lb.boell.org/en/2018/07/11/right-belong-political-community- example-legal-situation-refu-gees-lebanon

Knutsen, E., ‘Security fears prompted review of Syrian refugees: Machnouk’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 2 June 2014, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon- News/2014/Jun-02/258507-security-fears-prompted-review-of-syrian-refugees- machnouk.ashx

Knutsen, E. and Kullab, S., ‘Power to strip refugee status agreed’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 3 June 2014, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon- News/2014/Jun-03/258639-power-to-strip-refugee-status-agreed.ashx

Krayem, H., ‘The Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement,’ AUB, available at http://ddc.aub.edu.lb/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html

Kullab, S., ‘Lebanon Revises Open-Door Refugee Policy’, Al Jazeera, 6 June 2014, available at www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/06/lebanon-revises-open-door- refugee-policy- 201466744881995.html

Kullab, S, ‘Borders still open to refugees UNHCR says’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 23 October 2014, available at https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon- News/2014/Oct-23/275015-borders-still-open-to-refugees-unhcr-says.ashx

Lakkis, H., ‘Bassil: Lebanon, not UN, Sets Refugee Policies’, The Daily Star Lebanon, 11 November 2014, available at http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon- News/2014/Nov-11/277234-bassil-lebanon-not-un-sets-refugee-policies.ashx

Lebanese Information Centre, The Lebanese Demographic Reality, LIC,14 January 2013, available at https://www.lstatic.org/PDF/demographenglish.pdf

Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, Legal Challenges Faced by Syrian Refugees from Syria in Lebanon, 2016, available at http://rdpp- me.org/RDPP/files/legal_1499124284.pdf

Lebanese Centre for Human Rights, Syrian Workers in Lebanon: An Assessment of Their Rights and Reality, 18 December 2013, available at http://www.rightsobserver.org/files/Report_Syrian_Workers__ENG_final_(2).pdf

Lebanon Humanitarian INGO Forum (LHIF), Background Paper on Unregistered Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, 15 July 2015, available at http://lhif.org/uploaded/News/d92fe3a1b1dd46f2a281254fa551bd09LHIF%20Backgrou nd%20Paper%20on%20Unregistered%20Syrian%20Refugees%20(FINAL).pdf

Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020, LCRP, UNHCR and Government of Lebanon, 2019 update, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67780.pdf

98

Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2015-2016, LCRP, UNHCR and Government of Lebanon, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/2015- 2016_Lebanon_CRP_EN.pdf

Long, K., ‘Rethinking ‘Durable’ Solutions,’ The Oxford Handbook of Refugee and Forced Migration Studies, June 2014, available at https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199652433.001.0001/ oxfordhb-9780199652433-e-013

Lyon, A., ‘Lebanon Muslims outnumber Christians 2 to 1 Survey,’ Thomson Reuters, 20 January 2007, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon- population/lebanon-muslims-outnumber-christians-2-to-1-survey- idUSL132108820061113

Maalouf, L., ‘Lebanon: Further investigation needed into deaths of Syrian refugees in military custody’, Amnesty International, 25 July 2017. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/07/lebanon-further-investigation-needed- into-deaths-of-syrian-refugees-in-military-custody/

Minority Rights Group International, an uncertain future for Syrian refugees in Lebanon: the challenges of life in exile and the barriers to return, February 2019, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/lebanon/uncertain-future-syrian-refugees- lebanon-challenges-life-exile-and-barriers-return

Minimum Wage International, Lebanon Minimum Wage Rate 2019, available at https://www.minimum-wage.org/international/lebanon

Middle East Monitor, ‘Lebanon won’t survive with Palestine, Syria refugees, says Aoun’, Middle East Monitor, 10 May 2019, available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190510-lebanon-wont-survive-with-palestinian- syrian-refugees-says-aoun/

Middle East Monitor, ‘UNHCR suspends aid for 8,000 Syria families in Lebanon,’ Middle East Monitor, 20 September 2018, available at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20180920-unhcr-suspends-aid-for-8000-syria- families-in-lebanon/

Mourad, L., ‘Inaction as Policy-Making: Understanding Lebanon’s Early Response to the Refugee Influx,’ Project on Middle East Political Science, University of Toronto, available at https://pomeps.org/2017/03/29/inaction-as-policy-making-understanding- lebanons-early-response-to-the-refugee-influx/

Nebehay, S. and McDowall, A., ‘UN refugee agency hopes Lebanon will reverse residency freeze,’ Reuters, 12 June 2018, available at

99 https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-lebanon-syria-refugees/un-refugee- agency-hopes-lebanon-will-reverse-residency-freeze-idUSKBN1J818I

Nelson, S., ‘Is Lebanon’s Confessional System Sustainable,’ Journal of Politics and International Studies, 2013, pp.332-387, available at http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/assets/files/students/student-journal/sum-13/130930- sum13-nelson.pdf

Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), The Consequences of Limited Legal Status for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon, NRC Lebanon Field Assessment, March 2014, available at https://www.nrc.no/globalassets/pdf/reports/the-consequences-of-limited-legal-status- for-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon.pdf

OSCE and ODIHR, Preliminary Comments on the Draft Law on Integration of Foreigners in the Republic of Moldova, MIG-MDA/339/2018, 19 December 2018, available at https://www.osce.org/odihr/407465?download=true

Perry, T., ‘Lebanon Near ‘Breaking Point’ Over Syrian Refugee Crisis: PM Hariri’, Reuters, 31 March 2017, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis- syria-lebanon/lebanon-near-breaking-point-over-syrian-refugee-crisis-pm-hariri- idUSKBN1722JM Persaud, S., ‘Protecting refugees and asylum seekers under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,’ Research Paper No.132, UNHCR, November 2006, available at https://www.unhcr.org/4552f0d82.pdf

Refugees Lebanon, Procedures for Syrians entering Lebanon, 2015, available at https://www.refugees-lebanon.org/uploads/poster/poster_149865898340.pdf

Religion and Conflict Case Study Series, Lebanon: The Persistence of a Sectarian Conflict, Berkley Centre for Religion, Peace, & World Affairs, August 2013, available at https://s3.amazonaws.com/berkley- centre/130801BCLebanonPersistenceSectarianConflict.pdf

Republic of Lebanon Ministry of Labour, National Action Plan to Eliminate the Worst Forms of Child Labour in Lebanon by 2016, ILO, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---arabstates/---ro- beirut/documents/publication/wcms_229103.pdf

Saliba, I., ‘Lebanon: Constitutional Law and the Political Rights of Religious Communities,’ The Law Library of Congress, December 2010, available at https://www.loc.gov/law/help/lebanon-constitutional-law.php

Salem, P., ‘Can Lebanon Survive the Syrian Crisis,’ The Carnegie Papers, Carnegie Middle East Centre, December 2012, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/lebanon_syrian_crisis.pdf

100

Saif al-Din, W., ‘Refugee influx threatens Lebanon’s existence: President’, AA, 9 May 2019, available at https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/refugee-influx-threatens- lebanon-s-existence-president/1474601

Safer World, LCPS, Building peace into refugee responses: Syrian refugees in Lebanon, April 2018, available at https://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/publications/1172- building-peace-into-refugee-responses-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon

Stevens, D., ‘Shifting Conceptions of Refugee Identity and Protection: European and Middle Eastern Approaches,’ Warwick Law School, 2014, Ch.5, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2475132

Sutherland, E., ‘The Child’s Right to Life, Survival and Development: Evolution and Progress,’ ResearchGate, January 2015, pp.272-294, available at https://www.researchgate.net/publication/304784603_The_Child's_Right_to_Life_Survi val_and_Development_Evolution_and_Progress

Syrian Lebanese Higher Council, Agreement for Economic and Social Cooperation and Coordination between the Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic, 16 September 1993, available at http://www.syrleb.org/SD08/msf/1507751474_.pdf

Taslakian, P., ‘Curfews and human rights within the Syrian context in Lebanon,’ Peace Building in Lebanon, UNDP, 12 June 2016, available at https://www.undp.org/content/dam/lebanon/docs/Governance/Publications/PEACE%20 BUILDING%2012th%20web%20p11.pdf

The Daily Star Lebanon, ‘Lebanon News: Bassil freezes UNHCR staff residency permits’, The Daily Star, 8 June 2018, available at https://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Lebanon-News/2018/Jun-08/452537-bassil-says- steps-to-be-taken-against-unhcr.ashx

The General Conference of the ILO, Resolution concerning decent work and the informal economy, ILO, 90th Sessions, 2002, pp.52-61, available at https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/--- reloff/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_080105.pdf

The Freedom Fund, Struggling to Survive: Slavery and exploitation of Syrian refugees in Lebanon, available at https://d1r4g0yjvcc7lx.cloudfront.net/uploads/Lebanon-Report- FINAL-8April16.pdf

The World Bank, Reaching All Children with Education in Lebanon Support Project, available at http://projects.worldbank.org/P159470?lang=en

101 Trad S. and Frangieh, G., ‘Iraqi refugees in Lebanon: continuous lack of protection,’ FMR Iraq Special Issue, pp.35-36, available at https://www.fmreview.org/sites/fmr/files/FMRdownloads/en/iraq/trad-frangieh.pdf

UNHCR, ‘A Longing to Go Home in Safety and Dignity: Intentions and Perceptions of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon About Their Future’, UNHCR Lebanon, January 2018, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/63310.

UNHCR Syria emergency, available at https://www.unhcr.org/syria-emergency.html

UNHCR, Operational Portal; Refugee Situations, UNHCR, last updated 28 February 2019, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/71

UNHCR, Resettlement Data, UNHCR, January 2019, Lebanon, available at https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-data.html

UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, Inter-Agency Coordination, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees 2018, available at https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp- content/uploads/sites/16/2018/12/VASyR-2018.pdf

UNHCR, WFP, UNICEF, Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2017, December 2017, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/61312

UNHCR, Chapter 7: Solutions for Refugees, pp.184-206, available at https://www.unhcr.org/50a4c17f9.pdf

UNHCR, UNHCR projected Global Resettlement Needs 2019, 24th Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlements, Geneva, 25-26 June 2018, available at https://www.unhcr.org/5b28a7df4.pdf

UNHCR, ‘UN High Commissioner for Refugees calls for continued support for Lebanon’, UNHCR, 9 March 2019, available at https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2019/3/5c83e0664/un-high-commissioner-refugees- calls-continued-support-lebanon.html

United States Department of State, , International Religious Freedom Report for 2011, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour, 2011, available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organisation/193107.pdf

UNDP, ARK Group, Regular Perception Surveys on Social Tensions throughout Lebanon: Wave II, January 2018, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/document_41.pdf

United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), Protection in Lebanon, last updated February 2019, available at https://www.unrwa.org/activity/protection-lebanon

102

UNDP, Below the Surface: Results of a WhatsApp Survey of Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon, 2018, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/67579.pdf

UNHCR, Universal Periodic Review: 2nd Cycle: 23rd Session, Lebanon, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5638627ad.html

UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No.11: Prima Facie Recognition of Refugee Status, 5 June 2015, available at https://reliefweb.int/report/world/guidelines- international-protection-no-11-prima-facie-recognition-refugee-status

UNHCR, Country Operations Plan, UNHCR Regional Office in Lebanon, 2004, available at https://www.unhcr.org/3fd9c6a14.pdf

UNHCR, UNHCR, Universal Periodic Review: The Republic of Lebanon, Human Rights Liaison Unit: Division of International Protection, April 2010, available at https://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session9/LB/UNHCR_HighCommissi onerforRefugees.pdf

UNHCR, Refugee Response in Lebanon, Briefing Documents, March 2015, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/droi/dv/95_finalbriefin gkit_/95_finalbriefingkit_en.pdf

UNHCR Handbook for Registration, Procedures and Standards for Registration, Population Data Management and Documentation, UNHCR, September 2003, available at https://www.unhcr.org/publications/operations/4a278ea1d/unhcr-handbook- registration-provisional-release-september-2003-complete.html

UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection, Local Integration, EC/GC/02/6, 4th meeting, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/3d6266e17.html

UNHCR, Agenda for Protection, Third Edition, October 2003, Goal 5, Objective 4, https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3e637b194.pdf

UNHCR, Local Integration and Self-reliance, Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, EC/55/SC/CRP.15, 33rd meeting, 2 June 2005, available at https://www.unhcr.org/excom/standcom/42a0054f2/local-integration-self-reliance.html

UNHCR, Note on Non-Refoulement, EC/SCP/2, 23 August 1977, available at https://www.unhcr.org/excom/scip/3ae68ccd10/note-non-refoulement-submitted-high- commissioner.html

UNHCR, General Conclusion on International Protection No.102(LVI), Executive Committee: 56th Session, UN General Assembly, 7 October 2005, available at

103 https://www.unhcr.org/excom/exconc/43575ce3e/general-conclusion-international- protection.html

UNDP, UNHCR, Lebanese Republic National Assembly, The National Action Plan for Human Rights in Lebanon 2014-2019, 2013, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/NHRA/Lebanon_en.pdf

UN, World Economic Situation and Prospects, 2019, pp.168-206, available at https://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp- content/uploads/sites/45/WESP2019_BOOK-ANNEX-en.pdf

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), Convention Against Discrimination in Education, Paris, 14 December 1960, available at http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php- URL_ID=12949&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

UNHCR Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and Standards Relating to the Detention of Asylum Seekers, Geneva, p.1, February 1999, available at https://www.unhcr.org/protection/globalconsult/3bd036a74/unhcr-revised-guidelines- applicable-criteria-standards-relating-detention.html

UNHCR, Human Rights and Refugee Protection, Self-study Module 5, Vol.II, 15 December 2006, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4669434c2.pdf

UNHCR, DPSM Key Updates: Cash & Vouchers, 2013, available at https://www.unhcr.org/ngo-consultations/ngo-consultations- 2013/Cashbased_interventions_in_UNHCR_OperationsFlyer.pdf

UNHCR, Operational Update: Lebanon (January-June 2018), 2018, available at http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Lebanon%20Operational%20 Update%20-%20January%20-%20June%202018.pdf

UNHCR, shelter, UNHCR Lebanon, available at https://www.unhcr.org/lb/shelter

UNDP, UNHCR, ‘3RP Regional Refugee & Resilience Plan 2018 – 2019: in Response to the Syria Crisis, Regional Strategic Overview, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3RP-Regional-Strategic- Overview-2018-19.pdf

UNDP, Security and Justice Sector Wide Assessment, UNDP Lebanon, March 2016 available at http://www.lb.undp.org/content/lebanon/en/home/library/crisis_prevention_and_recover y/Security-Justice-Sector-Wide-Assessment.html

UNHCR and UN Habitat, Housing, Land and Property Issues in Lebanon, August 2014, available at https://data2.unhcr.org/ar/documents/download/41590

104

UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, UN Treaty Body Database, Ratification Status for Lebanon, available at https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=9 6&Lang=EN

UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, The Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of Migrants in an Irregular Situation, New York and Geneva, 2014, available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/HR-PUB-14-1_en.pdf

UN Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner and UNHABITAT, The Right to Adequate Housing, Fact Sheet no. 21 (Rev.1), 2009, available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf

Vaughan, K., ‘Who Benefits from Consociationalism? Religion Disparities in Lebanon’s Political System’, MDPI, 2018, available at https://www.mdpi.com/2077- 1444/9/2/51/htm#B48-religions-09-00051

World Food Programme (WFP), Food Assistance to Vulnerable Syrian Populations in Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Egypt affect by Conflict in Syria, WFP in Egypt, 2016, available at https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/8e372b11831043c481f1446189ef33f3/download/

Worldmeters, Population, Lebanon Population Live, available at http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/lebanon-population/

World Vision, Syrian refugee crisis: Facts, FAQs and how to help, World Vision Staff, 15 March 2019, available at https://www.worldvision.org/refugees-news-stories/syrian- refugee-crisis-facts

Yahya, M., ‘Unheard Voices: Policy Framework for Refugees in Lebanon and Jordan,’ Carnegie Middle East Centre, 16 April 2018, available at https://carnegie- mec.org/2018/04/16/policy-framework-for-refugees-in-lebanon-and-jordan-pub-76058

Yapi International, United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. Yapi, available at http://yapi.org/youth-wellbeing/united-nations-convention-on-the-rights-of- the-child-crc/

Legal References

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 28 July 1951, entered into force 22 April 1954) 189 UNTS 137; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (adopted 31 January 1967, entered into force 4 October 1967) 606 UNTS 267. https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10

105 Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted 20 November 1989, entered into force 2 September 1990) 1577 UNTS 3, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx

Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (Entry into force 1 May 1932), CO29, ILO, available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO::P12100_ILO_ CODE:C029

Economic and Social Council, Duties of States towards refugees and migrants under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, E/C.12/2017/1, 13 March 2017, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bbe0bc04.html

Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme, Conclusion on Local Integration No.104(LVI), 7 October 2005, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4357a91b2.html

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/cescr.aspx

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171, available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx

Law of 10 July 1962: Concerning the entry and stay in Lebanon as well as the exit (entered into force 10 July 1962), available at https://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/SERIAL/39234/97115/F1369890137/LBN- 39234.pdf

The Lebanese Constitution (promulgated May 23, 1926 with its amendments), 1995, available at https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/lb/lb018en.pdf

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948), UNGA Res 217 A(III), available at https://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Manual on Human Rights Reporting Under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments, 1997, HR/PUB/91/1 (Rev.1), available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/428085252.html

UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the third periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CCPR/C/LBN/CO/3, 9 May 2018, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/1439102/1930_1532434210_g1812984.pdf

UN Committee Against Torture, ‘Concluding observations on the initial report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CAT/C/LBN/CO/1, 20 and 21 April 2017, available at

106 http://www.khiamcentre.org/images/UserFiles/Image/INT_CAT_COC_LBN_27466_E. pdf

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc E/C.12/LBN/CO/2, 24 October 2016, available at https://www.refworld.org/country,,CESCR,,LBN,,5881f4524,0.html

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘Concluding observations on the combined fourth and fifth periodic report of Lebanon,’ UN doc CRC/C/LBN/CO/4-5, 22 June 2017, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/59c912574.html

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.3: The Nature of States Parties’ Obligations,’ UN doc E/1991/23, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838e10.pdf

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.18: The Right to Work,’ UN doc E/C.12/GC/18, 6 February 2006, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4415453b4.html

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.13: The Right to Education,’ UN doc E/C.12/1999/10), available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838c22.pdf

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.12, The Right to Adequate Food,’ UN doc E/C.12/1999/5, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838c11.pdf

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.4: The Right to Adequate Housing,’ UN doc E/1992/23, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/47a7079a1.html

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.7, The Right to Adequate Housing: Forced Evictions,’ UN doc E/1998/22, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/47a70799d.html

UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, ‘General Comment No.14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health,’ UN doc E/C.12/2000/4, available at https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4538838d0.pdf

UN Human Rights Committee ‘General Comment No.15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant,’ para.1, 11 April 1986, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/45139acfc.html

UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.3, Article 2 (Implementation at the National Level)’, 29 July 1981, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fe0.html

107

UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.18: Non-discrimination,’ 10 November 1989, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/453883fa8.html

UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.36: the right to life,’ 30 October 2018, available at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23809&La ngID=E

UN Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No.35: Article 9 (Liberty and Security of person),’ UN doc CCPR/C/GC/35, 16 December 2014, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/553e0f984.html

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin,’ UN doc CRC/GC/2005/6, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/42dd174b4.html

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.14: the right of the child to have his or her best interests taken as a primary consideration,’ UN doc CRC/C/GC/14, 29 May 2013, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/51a84b5e4.html

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, ‘General Comment No.7: Implementing child rights in early childhood,’ CRC/C/GC/7/Rev.1, 20 September 2006, available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/460bc5a62.html%20/

Interview References

Geukjian, O., Interview, Beirut, 6 May 2019.

Refugee, 1, Interview, Al-Wazzani camp in the South of Lebanon, 3 May 2019.

Refugee, 23, Interview, Marj el Khokh camp in the South of Lebanon, 4 May 2019.

Refugee, 36, Interview, Mark El Khokh camp in the South of Lebanon, 4 May 2019.

Salem, S., Interview, via WhatsApp messenger, 12 June 2019

108 Annex 1 Interview Guide: Expert interviews

Interview questions with Dr. Ohannes Geukjian

Question 1: When did the civil war in Syria take the turn and rise from a demonstration against the regime to a full-blown sectarian divide? And why? Question 2: Did Syria’s stay in Lebanon until 2005 affect the way the Lebanese perceive the Syrian refugees who have sought refuge in Lebanon? Question 3: Did the Syrian Civil war impact Lebanon? Question 4: Do the two major political groups (March 8 and March 14) in Lebanon still have the same ideology? Question 5: Is the regime interested in the return of Syrian refugees back to Syria? Question 7: What are the factors preventing Syrian refugees from returning to Syria? Question 8: Do you see local integration as something that has been or could be implemented successfully in a country like Lebanon? Question 9: Will naturalizing Syrian refugees in Lebanon leave a negative impact? Question 10: Is there discrimination against Syrian refugees in Lebanon? Question 11: The borders that refugees used to enter from have been restricted, how are they still entering Lebanon?

Full content of interview is included in the memory stick.

Interview questions with Sally Salem Question 1: What are the biggest factors impeding Syrian refugees’ access to education? Question 2: From your experience working at Jusoor, how was the education level of Syrian refugees different from Lebanese school children? Question 3: Have you encountered direct/indirect discrimination against Syrian refugee children in terms of receiving an education?

Full content of interview is included in the memory stick.

109 Annex 2 Interview Guide: Interview questions for field research (translated from Arabic to English)

Question 1: How old are you? Question 2: are you married? Does your partner live with you in the camp? Question 3: do you have children? How old are they? Do you they go to school? Do they work? What do they work in? Question 4: What was the main reason you left Syria and came to Lebanon? And when? Are you receiving any aid from any organisations in Lebanon? Question 5: What are the main difficulties you are facing in Lebanon? Do you have a legal status/residence permit? Do you or your husband/wife work? Question 6: Do you think of returning to Syria? What are the reasons you are not able to return? Did you try applying for resettlement to a third country?

Full content of interview is included in the memory stick.

110 Annex 3 List of tables, images and figures

Image 1: Wazzani camp...... 9

Image 2: Marj El Khokh camp ...... 9

Table 1: Summary of the state obligations of Lebanon that relate to the rights in the three dimensions of local integration...... 67

Figure 1: Syrian refugee participants: resettlement options ...... 3

Figure 2: Resettlement application status ...... 3

Figure 3: Syrian refugee participants: voluntary repatriation options ...... 4

Figure 4: Reasons for not returning ...... 4

Figure 5: Gender of participants in field research ...... 9

Figure 6: Relationship status of participants in field research ...... 9

Figure 7: The legal status of Syrian refugees who participated in the field research .....69

Figure 8: The employment status of participants in the field research ...... 74

Figure 9: The reasons for unemployment voiced by the participants ...... 74

Figure 10: The type of employment available in the informal settlements the participants are living in ...... 75

Figure 11: The number of households with children going to school ...... 80

Figure 12: Reasons for non-enrollment in schools (referring to the number of households) ...... 81

111 Annex 4 Interview List

Type of Interviewee Profession Place Date interview Assistant Professor of Structured expert Office in the Political Studies & interview on the American Conflict Resolution / Dr. Ohannes Geudjkian political University of 6-May-19 Political Studies & Public landscape of Beirut, Beirut Administration Lebanon Lebanon Department, AUB, Beirut Structured expert Humanitarian Assistance interview on the Coordinator, International education of Via Whatsapp Sally Salem 12-Jun-19 Refugee Assistance Syrian refugee Messenger Project, Beirut. children in Lebanon

Refugee 1, refugee 2, refugee 3, refugee 4, refugee 5, refugee 6, refugee 7, refugee Gender, age and full Structured field Al Wazzani Camp 8, refugee 9, refugee 10, content is included in the research in the South of 3-May-19 refugee 11, refugee 12, memory stick. interview Lebanon refugee 13, refugee 14, refugee 15 Refugee 16, refugee 17, refugee 18, refugee 19, refugee 20, refugee 21, refugee 22, refugee 23, refugee 24, refugee 25, Gender, age and full Structured field Marj El Khokh refugee 26, refugee 27, content is included in the research Camp in the South 4-May-19 refugee 28, refugee 29, memory stick. interview of Lebanon refugee 30, refugee 31, refugee 32, refugee 33, refugee 34, refugee 35, refugee 36, refugee 37, refugee 38

112 Abstract (English and German)

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the conditions that Syrian refugees are facing in Lebanon with a view to understand whether local integration is a sustainable durable solution for them at the present time. In this context, this paper seeks to present Lebanon’s obligations under international human rights law that are relevant to local integration. The main research question was answered though exploring relevant literature, as well as analyzing data from a field research. Furthermore, the political and sociological situation in Lebanon was assessed with a focus on the historical, political and sectarian tensions that exist within the population. This helps explain the response the Lebanese authorities took towards Syrian refugees. Moreover, it is important to note that the Lebanese national framework and the 1962 law contain limited provisions as regards to refugees. Against this background, the Lebanese government took measures that negatively affected Syrian refugees’ access to a legal status, and limited other essential rights which are highly relevant for local integration. Thus, it was concluded in the thesis that the local integration of Syrian refugees cannot be considered a durable solution under the current climate in Lebanon.

Keywords: Syrian Refugees, Local Integration, Durable Solution, Lebanon, Lebanese Government, UNHCR, Human Rights.

Das Ziel dieser Masterarbeit ist es, die Bedingungen syrischer Geflüchteter im Libanon zu untersuchen, um zu eruieren, ob eine Integration vor Ort aus heutiger Sicht eine nachhaltige Lösung sein könnte. Vor diesem Hintergrund soll die Arbeit die Verpflichtungen des Libanons darstellen, die sich aus den Menschenrechten ergeben und die für die lokale Integration von Bedeutung sind. Die primäre Forschungsfrage wurde mit Hilfe relevanter Literatur und auf Basis einer Feldstudie mit anschließender Datenanalyse beantwortet. Überdies wurde die politische und soziologische Lage im Libanon analysiert, wobei der Fokus auf die historischen, politischen und konfessionsbedingten Spannungen in der Bevölkerung gelegt wurde. Diese Auseinandersetzung hilft, das Verhalten der libanesischen Behörden gegenüber

113 den Geflüchteten zu erklären. Überdies ist es wichtig, darauf hinzuweisen, dass der libanesische Rechtsrahmen und das Gesetz von 1962 nur bedingt Bestimmungen enthalten, die sich konkret mit geflüchteten Menschen befassen. Vor diesem Hintergrund hat die libanesische Regierung Maßnahmen ergriffen, die das Erlangen eines Rechtsstatus für syrische Geflüchtete erschwert haben. Auch andere elementare Rechte, die für die lokale Integration von hoher Relevanz sind, wurden eingeschränkt. Folglich liegt der Schluss nahe, dass die lokale Integration syrischer Geflüchteter angesichts der aktuellen Stimmungslage im Libanon nicht als dauerhafte Lösung angesehen werden kann.

Syrische Geflüchtete, Lokale Integration, Dauerhafte Lösung, Libanon, Libanesische Regierung, UNHCR, Menschenrechte

114