CHAPTER 3 Creating a Communist Party

On the eve of Voitinsky’s arrival, the situation in was complex to say the least with shifting spheres of influence controlled by feuding warlords and a small but extremely powerful foreign presence. Weaving his way through this environment, Voitinsky provided the stimulus for the founding of the (CCP). Most works by CCP historians still stress the party’s indigenous roots. “Chen in the South and in the North” is the common refrain; the notion that through his contacts was influential in the South and Li Dazhao was instrumental for the development of the small groups in Northern China. In his path-breaking work van de Ven (1991) concludes that the CCP would have come to life irrespective of Soviet involvement. The atmo- sphere did encourage radical intellectuals to look for alternatives such as those provided by a Bolshevik party. However, as we have seen, Soviet agents were actively courting Chinese activists and promoting their views and ideology. We review the question of the origins by examining the communist small groups that formed before the First Party Congress. “Chen in the South and Li in the North” is a myth created by a later jus- tification that has entered the canon of official CCP accounts of the party’s founding. The origins lie with the speech by Gao Yihan at Li Dazhao’s memo- rial service in 1927 (Gao Yihan, 1927, Ishikawa, 2013, pp. 101–03). No original sources confirm the thesis but the debate has continued in China, with those such as Xiao Chaoren still supporting the traditional view, whereas others such as Ren Wuxiong (a head of the Museum for the First Party Congress) adopt- ing a more critical view. This chapter covers the strong role that Soviet Russia played, mainly through the work of Voitinsky, to create the basis for the CCP. Perhaps a CCP might have developed independently but it would have taken far longer and would not have thrived without Russian material and organiza- tional support. The united front tactic was vital to the CCP’s expansion through the 1920s.

1 China on the Eve of and after Voitinsky’s Arrival

While the Comintern was developing policies for China and the Far East, the nation was in a state of flux. The revolution had ended dynastic rule but had created a set of questions to be answered about what kind of government

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004423459_004 Creating a Communist Party 39 was suitable for China and what the relationship of the people should be to the state. Different groups explored rival solutions and advocates of commu- nism had to struggle to find a place on the intellectual and political agendas. Important for work in Shanghai were the actions of the foreign powers, the growth of a new bourgeoisie and the stirrings of a small proletariat. The young and radical intellectuals were profoundly influenced by the nationalist, anti- imperialist sentiment developed during the May Fourth Period (1915–1919). It made for a heady mix and a world full of intrigue, suspicion and betrayal. Nominally, the 1911–12 Revolution had ushered in a Republican Government based in but, in reality, the country was divided internally. Outside of Beijing, real power often rested with an array of warlords. Around the time of the Comintern’s Second Congress and during Voitinsky’s initial visit, two important events were taking place that had an important bearing on Voitinsky’s and Sneevliet’s activities. First, a power shift took place in Beijing, when the and Fengtian Cliques defeated the Anhui Cique. Second, in November 1920 Sun Yat-sen returned to Guangzhou. With these events taking place on the ground and with the Comintern developing its policies, Voitinsky tried to understand the situation, while helping lay the foundations for the CCP. The end of the empire ushered in an incompetent republic with as president. Revolutionaries and monarchists agreed that Yuan was the most suitable candidate as he had been an influential figure in the waning years of the Qing dynasty and in the abdication of the boy Emperor. The revolutionar- ies were severely disappointed as Yuan accumulated more power, leading Sun Yat-sen to flee to Tokyo (November 1913). On December 12, 1915, Yuan declared himself to be the Hongxian Emperor, causing disruption and opposition in several provinces. Before conflict and confusion became worse, Yuan died on June 6, 1916. Not only was parliamentary rule not consolidated but also war- lordism became the norm for much of the country. For many, political survival meant aligning with a military power, which was unreliable at best and life threatening at worst. The nationalists and the communists had to find a path through the shifting sands of warlord alliances and betrayals. Militarism was dominant, with feuding warlords fighting to control ter- ritory and resources (van de Ven, 2003). It left the country vulnerable and many citizens prey to exploitation and banditry (Sheridan, 1977). For political movements such as the Nationalist Party (Guomindang, GMD), it meant that without an independent military force, it had to seek shelter from “friendly” warlords. These alliances were fragile, prone to sudden shifts, often exposing the nationalists to unexpected dangers. For the Soviets, it led to the search for the good “nationalist” or even better a “socialist” warlord. Frequently, they