Why Culture Matters Leonidas Donskis, Janusz Makuch, Géza Kovács

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No 3(VIII)/2013 Price 19 PLN (w tym 5% VAT) 10 EUR 12 USD 7 GBP ISSN: 2083-7372 quarterly July-September www.neweasterneurope.eu Why Culture Matters Leonidas Donskis, Janusz Makuch, Géza Kovács

Katyń: The Baltic States: A Portrait of A Painful 25 Years after the Janusz Case Singing Revolution Korczak Ireneusz Andres Kasekamp Kamiński Jonathan Bousfield Paweł Śpiewak

Books & Reviews: Ben Judah, Leslie Woodhead, Anton Ponizovsky, Jerzy Pilch, & József Faragó

Is Armenia Jerzy Pomianowski a Strategic Satellite of Russia? On the European Endowment for Ilgar Gurbanov Democracy

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Dear Reader, The Polish poet Czesław Miłosz once wrote: “The purpose of poetry is to remind us how difficult it is to remain just one person.” In these and many other words Miłosz echoed the centuries-old voices of literary men and women who had taught us the importance of culture and its role in binding societies through joy and suffering. In this issue we present three different voices on the importance of culture in today’s Central and Eastern Europe. In an opening essay on the art of difficult dialogue, Lithuanian philosopher and Member of European Parliament, Leonidas Donskis, firmly states that despite regional differences European culture and values are universal throughout the continent and asks those who disagree to look at Europe’s history. Géza Kovács, the director of the Hungarian National Philharmonic Orchestra illustrates the importance culture has played in the political transformation of the region, writing: “Central and Eastern Europe is brimming with examples of links between the performing arts and political change.” In a personal confession, Janusz Makuch, passionately describes his commitment and determination to commemorate Jewish culture and heritage through the Jewish Culture Festival in Kraków, which he has been directing for the last 25 years. Unfortunately these and many other inspiring examples do not entirely overshadow the still painful cases which haunt the region as a result of its complicated past. Ireneusz Kamiński poignantly analyses the case of the 1940 massacre of Polish citizens in the Katyń Forest and the question as to whether Russia thoroughly investigated the massacre after the fall of the Soviet Union, which is now being heard before the European Court of Human Rights. Similarly, Ana Dabrundashvili explores the controversy surrounding the Georgian villagers who commemorate Joseph Stalin. Additionally, this issue provides political analyses focusing on today’s international relations, including Poland’s leadership role in the Visegrad Group, Russia’s use of religion in its foreign policy, the lack of a comprehensive approach to this region by the Obama administration and the potential of the newly established European Endowment for Democracy to become a new tool for promoting democracy in Eastern Europe. Lastly, as a journal of dialogue, we would like to hear your voice and encourage you to share your opinion with us via our online readership survey which can be found at: www.nee24.eu. We look forward to hearing your opinions and of course hope to hear from you online via our website, Facebook and Twitter pages!

The Editors 4

Contents

Opinion and Analysis

7 The Art of Difficult Dialogue predecessor. As a result, both the United Leonidas Donskis States and the region are losing out on the The art of dialogue is always difficult. The potential for strong economic cooperation ability to listen and hear is accompanied and democracy promotion. by a sincere wish to check one’s own premises and to examine one’s own life. 68 V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency An unexamined life is not worth living, in the Visegrad Group while an unlived life is not worth Wojciech Przybylski examining. 75 Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy 21 Katyń before the European Alicja Curanović Court of Human Rights Religious diplomacy allows a state to use Ireneusz Kamiński certain aspects of religion and religious symbols in international affairs. The 28 A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture instrumentalisation of religion for political Janusz Makuch aims has a long and rich tradition in Russia, which is evidenced in Russia’s 37 Political Change and the Performing foreign policy today. Arts in Central and Eastern Europe Géza Kovács 82 Armenia as a Strategic Satellite The performing arts have been an essential of Russia in the South Caucasus part of the whirlwind of historic change Ilgar Gurbanov in Central and Eastern Europe. While they have not been completely removed from 90 A Bull in a China Shop the social and political change in Western Kamil Całus Europe and America, the difference in how much they have been involved 96 All Quiet on the Southern Front? is remarkable. Ida Orzechowska Fourteen years after the 1999 NATO 44 Shadows of Joseph Stalin bombings of the Balkans, the political Ana Dabrundashvili leaders in Belgrade and Pristina are heading towards the normalisation 50 The Spectre of Berehynia of mutual relations and integration Harriet Salem with the European Union. The April 19th 2013 agreement leaves 61 Obama’s Wasted Potential? the past behind and opens a new Filip Mazurczak chapter in Balkan history. Despite being widely revered across Europe, US President Barack Obama’s 104 Fearing the East? European Foreign Policy in Central and Eastern immigration in the UK Europe is much less engaged than his Kelly Hignett 5

Interviews People, Ideas, Inspiration

112 Filling in the Gaps of Democracy 155 “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski a beautiful, rich and exalted one” “Having this role of a gap filler means that Paweł Śpiewak the European Endowment for Democracy A portrait of Janusz Korczak can be flexible and even a little risky with our funding choices. If there is a group 162 Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland? that an EU financial instrument cannot Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek provide funding for, the Endowment will find a way to provide such support.” 172 Stranger than Fiction Łukasz Wojtusik 122 Rebranding the Baltics A conversation with Andres Kasekamp Books and Reviews

178 Josh Black – Back in the USSR Reports On Leslie Woodhead’s How The Beatles Rocked the Kremlin. The untold story 128 The Dumping Ground of the Steppe of a noisy revolution. Zbigniew Rokita Kazakhstan is a country with a history 181 Annabelle Chapman – A Journey of mixed nationalities and exemplifies the to Russia’s Heartland Soviet ethnic experiment. But it is also a On Oliver Bullough’s The Last Man country that has inherited the demographic in Russia: And The Struggle To Save mess left by the Soviet Empire. A Dying Nation 183 Alex Gabuev – Watching the Throne 138 Three Hours on a Train to Ternopil On Ben Judah’s Fragile Empire: Annabelle Chapman How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin History 185 Daniel Wańczyk – Listening to the Russian Soul (from the laptop) On Anton Ponizovsky’s Обращение 142 Songs of Freedom в слух (I Am All Ears) Jonathan Bousfield It is 25 years since the Estonian artists 188 Zośka Papużańka – Homo Ludens and activist Heinz Valk coined the phrase On Jerzy Pilch’s Wiele demonów “Singing Revolution” to describe the (Many Demons) wave of patriotic gatherings sweeping the country, which then spread to the other 191 Dorota Sieroń-Gałusek – Rethinking Baltic republics. Of all the things that Heritage, the Polish lesson happened during the Singing Revolution, On Monika Murzyn-Kupisz’s however, it is the singing that is the least Dziedzictwo kulturowe a rozwój lokalny remembered. (Cultural Heritage and Local Development)

149 A Nation of Cossacks 193 Maia Lazar – A Hungarian Roman Kabachiy Lost to the 20th Century On the Exhibition The Way We Are. Cartoons and Prints of József Faragó (1866-1906) www.neweasterneurope.eu Content with the notation (CC) is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. EDITOR AND PUBLISHER All attempts are made to give proper The Jan Nowak-Jeziorański College of Eastern Europe and appropriate attribution [email protected] to the author and source. www.kew.org.pl The Editors do not return submitted texts unless requested. CO-EDITOR The Editors reserve the right to edit and shorten submitted texts. European Solidarity Centre [email protected] www.ecs.gda.pl New Easter Europe is co-financed by the Polish Ministry EDITORIAL BOARD of Science and Higher Education Leonidas Donskis, Yaroslav Hrytsak, Ivan Krastev, Georges Mink, Zdzisław Najder, Cornelius Ochmann, Eugeniusz Smolar, Lilia Shevtsova, The project is co-financed by the Department Roman Szporluk, Jan Zielonka. of Public and Cultural Diplomacy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the framework EDITORIAL TEAM of the grant programme – Cooperation Adam Reichardt, Editor-in-Chief in the Area of Public Diplomacy 2013 Hayden Berry, Editor, Web Manager Iwona Reichardt, Editor, Lead Translator All works published with grant funded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are published under the Creative Commons Attribution EDITORIAL INTERNS 3.0 Unported license (CC by 3.0). Any republication of materials Maia Lazar, Giacomo Manca funded under this grant must be attributed in the manner Radosław Ocłoń, Lana Ravel specified by the author or licensor.

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European Solidarity Centre ul. Doki 1 80-958 Gdańsk tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 [email protected] The Art of Difficult Dialogue

Leonidas donskis

The art of dialogue is always difficult. The ability to listen and hear is accompanied by a sincere wish to check one’s own premises and to examine one’s own life. An unexamined life is not worth living, while an unlived life is not worth examining.

I have recently had the privilege of launching a new book conjointly written with one of the greatest thinkers of our times – Zygmunt Bauman. The book Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity is a high point of my life. Such an opportunity can occur only once in a lifetime. For this, I am immensely grateful to Zygmunt Bauman – a major influence, a great inspiration, and a beloved friend. This book is a dialogue on the possibility of a rediscovery of the sense of belonging as a viable alternative to fragmentation, atomisation, and the resulting loss of sensitivity. It is also a dialogue on the new ethical perspective as the only way out of the trap and multiple threats posed by adiaphorisation of present humanity and its moral imagination. This book of warning also serves as a reminder of the art of life and the life of art, as it is shaped as an epistolary theoretical dialogue between friends. Elaborating on my thoughts, wrapping up, and summing up my hints and questions into a coherent form of discourse, Zygmunt Bauman, in this book, sounds as intimately and friendly as a Renaissance humanist addressing his fellow humanist elsewhere – be this an allusion to Thomas More and Erasmus of Rotterdam, or Thomas More and Peter Giles, or Thomas More and Raphael Hythloday. Such a form allows us to work out a sociological and philosophical dialogue on the sad piece of news contrary to Utopia – namely, that, as I put it in one of my aphorisms penned as a variation on Milan Kundera: globalisation is the last failed hope that, somewhere, there still exists a land where one can escape and find happiness. Or the last failed hope that, somewhere, there still exists a land different 8 Opinion and Analysis Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue

from yours in terms of being able to oppose the sense of meaninglessness, the loss of criteria, and, ultimately, moral blindness and the loss of sensitivity.

Dialogue: Always difficult and unpredictable

The art of dialogue is always difficult. Dialogue, if properly understood, is an art of listening to and hearing each other, instead of simply exchanging two mutually opposing and exclusive discourses, or even worse, disconnected monologues. It was obvious for Plato that simple truths and truisms do not need a dialogue. It is only when you do not know where you would end up with the trajectory of your own or someone else’s thought that you can engage in a real dialogue. The ability to listen and hear is accompanied by a sincere wish, if not theoretical or even existential urge, to check one’s own premises and to examine one’s own life. An unexamined life is not worth living, as Socrates or Plato would have had it. Or an unlived life is not worth examining, as I would add myself. Dialogue does not signify the necessity to prevail over your opponent at whatever cost. Instead, it appears as our capacity to arrest our aggressive and agonistic wish to prevail and dominate at the expense of someone else’s dignity, not to mention the truth itself. Renaissance writers and thinkers knew it so well when they emphasised empathy as a crucial element of the art of dialogue. For how can we understand our opponent without accepting – at least temporarily – his or her premises and vocabulary, and then critically examining and rethinking our own concepts and points of departure? Dialogue appears as an exciting venture and as a difficult art in Thomas More’s Utopia where all references to Plato/Socrates are of little help for the narrator in his attempt to understand the fictitious Portuguese sailor Raphael Hythloday’s incredible story. I can only reiterate this obvious truth: the art of dialogue is always difficult. Was it easy for Martin Luther to address Erasmus of Rotterdam in their famous correspondence on Christianity and its fate in Europe? Was it easy for Erasmus to respond to the rebellious German monk who split the Church on the grounds of his fierce opposition to earthly and political, rather than deeply religious, as Erasmus thought, problems of the Church? Or was it easy for Martin Luther to engage in an intense correspondence with Erasmus’s close friend Thomas More? Is the art of European dialogue a fantasy? Is European culture a fantasy? Is it more or less so than European politics? These are the questions that cross my mind over and over again when I try to think of how to reverse the ongoing tragedy of the European Union – namely, its silent and slow demise, which is a fact of reality, to my dismay. European culture sometimes is dismissed as a fantasy or fiction inasmuch as it is argued that there Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue Opinion and Analysis 9

is no such a phenomenon as an all-embracing and all-encompassing European culture. Is this assumption correct? No, it is profoundly wrong, misplaced, and misguided. Only those who are out of touch with the cultural history of Europe can claim Europe to have never been an entity deeply permeated by a unifying and controlling principle, be it the legacy of classical antiquity and Judeo-Christian spiritual trajectories, or be it the value-and-idea system that revolves around liberty and equality, these two heralds and promises of modernity. Pyotr Chaadayev’s Philosophical Letters appear as a profound intellectual testimony to this truth. The Russian philosopher wrote with pain that his country never experienced the great dramas of modernity; nor did it have an historic opportunity to be moulded by the greatest historical-cultural epochs of Europe, such as the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, Baroque, or the Enlightenment. As Chaadayev argued, Russia had none of these. Therefore, European history did not speak to Russia the language of its great cravings for liberty, emancipation of the human soul, and individual self-fulfilment. For Europe is more than merely an economic and political reality, according to Chaadayev. It is an idea, a religion, a dream, and a trajectory of the soul. In fact, modernity and freedom appear to Russia as something alien, imposed, emulated, or otherwise adopted from without; yet in Europe they became part of the psychology 10 Opinion and Analysis Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue

and even physiology of human individuals. Europe is inconceivable without a certain modern faith, which has become brother to liberty, instead of a tool of oppression. Such were the ideas for which poor Pyotr Chaadayev was pronounced a madman and confined to house arrest. Today they are on the agenda of every mediocre mainstream politician, instead of shaping a dissenting theory of an intellectual naysayer.

Culture of openness and dialogue

That European culture of openness and dialogue is a fantasy can claim only those who have never understood the fact that the foundations for the art of portrait in England were laid by a Fleming, Sir Anthony van Dyck; that the Flemish Primitives greatly influenced their peers in Venice and elsewhere in Italy; that Caravaggio was behind not only Rembrandt but the group of Caravaggisti in Utrecht as well; that Baroque music was an interplay of Italian, German and French genius (think about Bach vis-à-vis Vivaldi or Italian opera composers vis-à-vis Handel); that the greatest Elizabethan dramatists in England were under the spell of Spanish literature coming from the political foe, the country they hated as a political archrival. The dialectic of politics and culture is just as much about Europe as is the dialectic of war and peace. For me, the very symbol of Europe is the great Flemish Primitive Hugo van der Goes’ work of genius, The Triptych of Tommaso Portinari, which hangs at Dialogue is the art of listening the Galleria degli Uffizi in Florence. The to and hearing each other head of the Medici bank branch in Bruges, instead of simply exchanging Tommaso Portinari, was a patron of Hugo disconnected monologues. van der Goes; his family also supported a German-born genius of Bruges, Hans Memling. This economic, political, aesthetic, mental and existential knot of Italian, Dutch, Flemish, French, and German genius from the Middle Ages onward reveals what I would call the “Soul of Europe”. Europe starts where we fail to classify and categorise a human individual. Europe emerged repeatedly where the philosopher of dialogue par excellence Martin Buber, born in Vienna, who had his Austrian and German upbringing, and who spent much of his time in Lviv, adopted Eastern European sensibilities by committing himself to Hassidic tales and by converting spiritually to Ostjuden, that is, Eastern European Jews at who German Jews used to look down on as regrettable people. Europe emerges where we adopt a common destiny, and a silent and joint dedication to our history and political legacy. Ironically, we fail to see that the only sphere where Europe as our common home became a fact of life, rather than a manifestation of wishful thinking, is education Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue Opinion and Analysis 11 and culture. The future of Europe is unthinkable without the art of translation. It was with sound reason that Milan Kundera made a joke about the role of the work of interpreters in the European Parliament clearly suggesting that it is far more important for the future of the EU than the labour of members of the EP. We will inexorably fail in our EU policies if we keep relegating literature, culture, and the art of translation – that is, the crucial instruments of dialogue – to the margins of European life. If there is a chance that the EU can survive the 21st century as a club of democratic nations or even as a federal state able to blaze the trail to other nations seeking the rule of law and democracy, it will occur only on the condition that we give justice to education and culture. Most importantly, intellectual and cultural dialogue always serves as an anticipation of more just and coherent politics – suffice to mention utopias, dystopias, social criticism in the form of humour, and similar forms of dissent, moral imagination and alternative, which are pivotal for politics. This is far from a detached and politically naive wish; in fact, this is a matter of fact. What is the role of a difficult dialogue in Polish-Lithuanian relations? The role is crucial, and the example of some of the most eminent Polish writers and culture personalities shows how culture can anticipate and pave the way for better politics. Ths is certainly the case with, first and foremost, Czesław Miłosz.

Searching for the Europe of Czesław Miłosz

The year 2011 was the year of Czesław Miłosz (1911-2004). The centenary of the greatest modern Polish poet allows us a glimpse of Central and Eastern Europe at the beginning of the 21st century. An eminent and cosmopolitan, albeit deeply rooted in the Lithuanian and Polish historical and cultural sensibilities, European who felt at home in several European languages and cultures, and who spent much of his time in the United States, Miłosz anticipated the crucial dilemmas of European identity and memory which we started tackling immediately after the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The paradox of Miłosz is that it was through the fame of his eye-opening and captivating political essays on the mindset of the Eastern European intelligentsia, rather than his superb poetry and literary essays, that he became a central figure among Central and Eastern Europe’s émigrés in the US and all over the world. The Captive Mind came as a shock to the West. The same applies to Joseph Brodsky and other great Central and Eastern Europeans who captivated the West as public intellectuals and social critics, rather as brilliant writers or living classics of literature. 12 Opinion and Analysis Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue

He stripped much of Western Europe and the US of their political myopia and naiveté concerning the nature of the communist regime. He did so by showing that not only coercion and violent politics, but also the vanity and fear of Eastern European intellectuals played a pivotal role in the emergence of what Miłosz described, with the stroke of genius, as Ketman – the art to act in the public concealing one’s true political views or even religious and cultural identity. As the recently deceased British-American intellectual historian and public intellectual Tony Judt (1948-2010), who, among his other areas of competence, was knowledgeable of Central and Eastern Europe is more than merely an Europe’s intellectual dramas and history economic and political reality – of ideas, subtly noted reviewing Miłosz’s it is an idea, a dream, and The Captive Mind and commenting on the phenomenon of Ketman, “writing for a trajectory of the soul. the desk drawer becomes a sign of inner liberty,” which is a sad lot of an Eastern European intellectual frequently bound to choose between his country and his conscience. In the pivotal part of his perceptive review, Judt reveals fear of the indifference as a primary moving force behind mental acrobatics and immoral manoeuvring described by Miłosz as Ketman. Judt quotes from The Captive Mind: “Fear of the indifference with which the economic system of the West treats its artists and scholars is widespread among Eastern intellectuals. They say it is better to deal with an intelligent devil than with a good-natured idiot.” In fact, it is not infrequent in Central and Eastern Europe that culture precedes and shapes politics. In the case of Lithuania, it was through the words of two most eminent Polish men of letters, people of multiple identities, such as Miłosz himself and the Parisian Polish émigré Jerzy Giedroyc (1906-2000), a highly respected editor of a leading Polish-émigré literary-political journal, Kultura (1947-2000), that it became possible to confront some worn-out clichés concerning the clashes of memory that occurred between 20th century Lithuania and Poland. From the Lithuanian side, Tomas Venclova, a Lithuanian poet and literary scholar, who also acts as Professor of Slavic Literature at Yale, was in the lead from the very beginning of the debate on Poland vis-à-vis Lithuania. In his essays and poetry, Venclova easily and naturally migrates between Lithuanian, Russian, Polish, and Jewish sensibilities bridging these cultures and identities. In this, Venclova remains unique among Lithuanian writers and thinkers. Born in Klaipeda and raised in Kaunas, Venclova, in his essays and poetry, comes to project his worldview onto Vilnius, a characteristically Central European city around whose poetic vision revolves the entire map of his thought. This is, perhaps, best revealed in A Dialogue about a City, a masterpiece of the epistolary genre Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue Opinion and Analysis 13 written by Venclova and Miłosz. Two perspectives on Vilnius, Lithuanian and Polish, not only complement one another; they reveal how human memory and sentiment work to re-enact history, bridging it with the present. A Dialogue about a City was written in the late 1970s, yet it took quite a while for both countries to put behind their mutual animosities, which was achieved nearly overnight when Poland and Lithuania signed, in 1994, a historic treaty of friendship and cooperation. It recognised Vilnius once and for all as the unquestionable capital of Lithuania. This cleared the air and paved the way for a friendship, a natural outcome of the centuries of a common state and shared culture. A happy combination of liberal patriotism, multiple and communicating identities, and the readiness to criticise one’s own country, instead of searching for the devil elsewhere and, first and foremost, in an opponent, best exemplified by Miłosz, still stands as his invitation to us to search for the Europe as an extended motherland, or the native Europe, to put it in his words. Local sensibility combined with sensitivity and attentiveness to other cultures and identities could become a clue to present dilemmas of the troubled European identity. We should search for the Europe of Czesław Miłosz, instead of returning to the hibernated and frozen dramas of memory and identity, which appear as the unholy legacy of the 20th century.

The treason of intellectuals?

On the Lithuanian side, Tomas Venclova appears as arguably the most eminent figure in the art of a difficult dialogue, especially in trying to restore historically formed relations between Lithuania and Poland. Venclova is regarded as one of the most accomplished and noted Lithuanian humanists in the world, and rightly so. An eminent Lithuanian poet, literary scholar and translator, Venclova had long acted as a conscious and dedicated dissident opposed to the entire project of the former Soviet Union with its crimes against humanity, severe human rights violations, brutal suppression of all fundamental rights and civil liberties, and violent politics. Having spent a good part of his life in Lithuania, he was exiled to the West in 1977 where he built his academic career, eventually becoming Professor of Slavic Literatures at Yale University. Far from a conservative nationalist, Venclova has always spoken out in favour of liberal values. This could be a clue to his deeply moving and sensitive essay on the tragedy of Lithuania, the Holocaust that claimed the lives of more than 220,000 Lithuanian Jews. The essay in question, The Jews and the Lithuanians written in the 1970s, revealed Tomas Venclova as the first Lithuanian writer who showed the real scope of the 14 Opinion and Analysis Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue

tragedy admitting the guilt and responsibility of those Lithuanians who collaborated with the Nazis and actively participated in the massacre of Lithuanian Jews. Deeply embedded in the best intellectual traditions of Central and Eastern Europe, his collection of essays, Forms of Hope, reads like a moral map of a great European public intellectual and political thinker. Not long ago, Venclova made a strong and effective comeback to the public domain of Lithuania publishing, in July 2010, an elegantly written and caustic essay It Suffocates Me Here. Wittily referring to the clash of the character Europe emerges where Strepsiades, a staunch defender of the ancient Greek tradition, and its challenger Socrates, both we adopt a common destiny depicted in Aristophanes’ comedy The Clouds, and a joint dedication to our Venclova described some of the ongoing political history and political legacy. and moral debates in Lithuania as a backlash of parochialism and moral provincialism, and as a fear of modernity, applying harsh words and judging his country from a critical perspective. Without the shadow of a doubt, the essay became a landmark in the area of public debate. Small wonder that a dozen angry and noisy reactions to Venclova’s essay appeared over the following two months, as this piece of polemical writing dealt a blow to conservative and nationalistic writers of the country. The bitter response would not be long, though. Adding insult to injury, Venclova’s critics came to describe him as an arrogant and rootless cosmopolitan, whereas the opposing camp, the supporters of the aforementioned essay, implied that Venclova came up with a timely and principled call upon his country to take a close look at itself at the beginning of the 21st century to be able to rethink its past and present. Moreover, much in the spirit of Julien Benda’s manifesto on the intellectual’s responsibility, La trahison des clercs (The Treason of Intellectuals), Venclova’s essay became an attack against those who regard the nation-state as the end in itself, and who see the paramount mission of the intellectual in the defence of that nation-state at any price against the supposed evils of modernity and globalisation. To his credit, Venclova was correct in raising this issue, as the Lithuanian media has been peppered over the past months with a number of sceptical comments on the loss of Lithuanian identity and even independence after the country’s accession to the EU. More than that, some of the former political activists and heroes of Lithuania who fought for its independence in the national liberation movement Sąjūdis in the late 1980s, had gone so far as to suggest that the European Union is hardly any different from the Soviet Union, and that both these political formations were, and continue to be, the gravediggers of the European peoples and of their independence and liberty. Leonidas Donskis, The Art of Difficult Dialogue Opinion and Analysis 15

What can be said in this regard? No matter how critical or sceptical we could be of European bureaucracy or the new managerial class that ignore local sensibilities and cultural differences, such a comparison does not merit serious attention. Yet this new sort of rhetoric sent a clear message that part of the former political and intellectual elite of Lithuania found themselves deeply alienated from the new political reality of Europe. In ancient Athens, writes Venclova, Socrates died for his freedom of thought, doubt, and the right to question everything around. As we learn from Socrates, uncertainty is not the enemy of a wise man, and an unexamined life is not worth living – these pieces of perennial wisdom became an inescapable part of critical European thought. For Strepsiades and his modern followers, everything has to be certain and easily predictable. Therefore, one’s little garden becomes more important than universal humanity. Whatever the case, says Venclova, it is Strepsiades, rather than the greatest cultural hero of Western Europe and the patron saint of the art of dialogue Socrates, who is alive and well in present Lithuania. According to Venclova, to defend the pattern of identity and statehood of the 19th century, instead of modern moral and political sensibilities, is nothing other than a betrayal of the mission that intellectuals must carry. The question remains quite timely and serious: what is the pattern of identity that Lithuania and the two other Baltic states could maintain as a bridge between their precious cultural legacy and the world? In fact, an identity crisis is part of the search for identity. The Baltic states that surfaced to the world restoring their existence and securing their place in the political, mental and intellectual maps of the world, know it better than any other country or region on the globe. Whatever the case, dialogue – this happy combination of curiosity, courage and empathy – would be unthinkable nowadays without what Vytautas Kavolis, an émigré Lithuanian sociologist in the US, described as Miłosz-like pattern of identity – dedication to one’s language and culture combined with attentiveness and openness to other cultures and their sensitivities. Without this remarkable ability to reconcile fact and value bridging sensibilities, languages and cultures, the art of difficult dialogue does not exist.

Leonidas Donskis is a member of New Eastern Europe’s editorial board. He is also a member of the European Parliament from Lithuania. He is a philosopher, writer, political theorist, commentator and historian of ideas. His most recent book Moral Blindness: The Loss of Sensitivity in Liquid Modernity, co-written with Zygmunt Bauman, is available from Polity Press. ADVERTISEMENT The European Solidarity Centre in numbers 1 ﬁrst ever national sociological survey in Poland aimed at answering the question ‘what do Poles really think about Solidarność?’ 16 documentaries produced 18 special exhibitions

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13 500 European Solidarity Centre ECS publications in library resources ul. Doki 1 80-958 Gdańsk Poland 36 000 e-mail: [email protected] archival pictures tel.: +48 58 767 79 71 www.ecs.gda.pl 80 000 facebook.com/solidaritycentre archival documents, leaflets, posters 200 000 visitors to the ‘Roads to Freedom’ Exhibition ADVERTISEMENT THE EUROPEAN SOLIDARITY CENTRE The European Solidarity Centre (ECS) is an institution of a new form: it is not only a museum, but also an educational and scientific establishment aimed at providing a greater understanding of Solidarność and the anti-communist movements in Poland and Europe. The objective of its founders was to create a Central European agora, a meeting place for citizens, who feel responsible for the development of democracy in Europe. The European Solidarity Centre supports reflection on the state of an open society, the role of a country, the identity of democratic communities and the issue of social justice.

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ADVERTISEMENT THE MISSION of the European Solidarity Centre We aspire to ensure the ideals of Solidarność – democracy, an open solidary society and the culture of dialogue – maintain a modern perspective and appeal. We want to preserve, in the memory of Poles and Europeans, the experience of Solidarność as a peaceful revolution, so that Solidarność, throughout European democracies, is remembered as a key part of the story of the establishment of Europe. We want Solidarność to be a source of inspiration and hope for those who do not live in open and democratic societies. THE WEIGHT of responisbility Iryna Sheiko-Ivankiv, 25 years old, works at the American Bar Association Rule of Law Initiative in Kiev in the Ukraine. She is writing her PHD thesis on solidarity and is also a social activist. - The Solidarity Academy in Gdańsk uncovered some very important details of the Polish road to real freedom, which I was previously unaware of. Having taken part in the workshop dedicated to leadership, I have begun to feel the weight of responsibility of a social leader. Thanks to the Solidarity Academy my understanding of Solidarność has broadened not only theoretically, but also with a view to its practical application.

THIS IS WHAT IT IS ALL ABOUT Adam Pypan, an 12 year-old pupil from primary school No 12 in Elbląg, last year winner of the ‘My Little Solidarity’ competition. Solidary means that everyone gets together To clean, play and help, With the diﬃculties we do not tackle on our own. Because when people love each other, they give solidary support to each other, And this is what it is all about, that solidary are the old and the young.

UNIVERSAL EXPERIENCE of Solidarność Basil Kerski, director of ECS -For the past ﬁve years ECS has carried out an extensive programme promoting the heritage of Solidarność throughout Poland and Europe. I feel that the most important task of ECS is to work with the young generation. We will not reach this generation through forceful monologue; instead we need to undertake arduous educational work. ADVERTISEMENT 2014 ECS moves into the new building The building is currently under construction close to the Monument to the Fallen Shipyard Workers, the historical gate No 2 of the Gdańsk Shipyard and the BHP Hall where on 31 August 1980, the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee signed an agreement with the communist government in Poland (PRL). The heart of the building will house a permanent exhibition, dedicated to the phenomenon of Solidarność and the changes which it inﬂuenced in the Central and Eastern Europe.

ADVERTISEMENT Katyń before the European Court of Human Rights

Ireneusz C. KamIńsKI

On September 21st 2004, Russia officially closed its investigation into the 1940 Katyń massacre without any official result or admission. The case as to whether Russia investigated the massacre thoroughly has now been brought before the European Court of Human Rights – the results of which could have far-reaching consequences.

In the spring of 1940, the Soviet People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) executed almost 22,000 Polish citizens held as prisoners-of-war and prisoners after the Soviet Union had marched in September 1939 into the eastern provinces of pre-war Poland following the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact signed between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. The shooting followed a decision taken on March 5th 1940 by the Politburo of the Soviet Union’s Communist Party, the highest organ of the Soviet Union. A proposal to approve the executions was submitted by Lavrentiy Beria, head of the NKVD. He specified that Polish prisoners were “enemies of the Soviet authorities and full of hatred towards the Soviet system”. The mass killings of Polish citizens are commonly known as the Katyń massacre after the forest near Smolensk where the graves of the victims were discovered and excavated by Germans in 1943. In fact, the Katyń forest was only one of the execution and burial sites. Bodies of 4,421 people, prisoners-of-war from the Kozelsk POW camp, are laid there. Prisoners-of-war from the Starobelsk (3,820) and Ostashkov camps (6,311) are buried in Pyatikhatki (near Kharkiv) and Mednoye (near Tver) respectively. The circumstances of the executions of the prisoners from the prisons of western Ukraine and Belarus (7,305) have remained unknown to date. 22 Opinion and Analysis Ireneusz C. Kamiński, Katyń before the European Court of Human Rights

Package number one The precise numbers of murdered prisoners were given in a note which Alexander Shelepin, Chairman of the State Security Committee (KGB), wrote on March 3rd 1959 to Nikita Khrushchev, Secretary General of the USSR Communist Party. It specified that a total of 21,857 people had been executed in 1940. Shelepin also recommended the destruction of On April 13th 1990, the Soviet Union all personal records of the persons affirmed that the murders at Katyń had shot by the NKVD. The remaining documents were to be put into a been perpetrated by the NKVD. special file, known as “Package Number One”, and sealed. In Soviet times, this package was one of the strictest secrets of the USSR and only the Secretary General of the USSR Communist Party had the right of access to the file. The Politburo’s decision to kill Polish citizens was accompanied by a mass deportation to the remote regions of the Soviet Union of the families of the prisoners. About 59,000 people were sent off, a significant percentage of them being children.1 Following excavations of the graves in Katyń Forest in 1943, the Soviet authorities put the blame for the massacre on the Germans. In the course of the trial of German war criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunal, the Soviet prosecutor even attempted to charge the German forces with the shooting of “up to 11,000 Polish prisoners in the autumn of 1941 at Katyń”. The tribunal did not refer to this charge in its judgement. Only on April 13th 1990 did the Soviet Union affirm (a communiqué of the TASS official news agency) that the murder had been perpetrated by the NKVD. Several sets of criminal cases were subsequently started which eventually became investigation no. 159 conducted by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office in Moscow. In 1992 the contents of “Package Number One” was made public and the following year copies of the documents were handed over to the Polish side (including Beria’s motion on March 5th 1940, the Politburo’s decision of the same date, and the pages removed from the minutes of the Politburo’s meeting and Shelepin’s notes from March 3rd 1959). On June 13th 1994, Anatoly Yablokov, head of the prosecutors conducting the Katyń investigation, filed a motion for a decision to discontinue the investigation due to the death of persons responsible for the crime. He proposed that Stalin and the other members of the Politburo be considered guilty of the Katyń massacre on the basis of Articles 6a and 6b of the Charter of the Nürnberg International Military Tribunal, (i.e. guilty of crimes against peace, against humanity, war crimes,

1 A directive on the deportation was issued by Lavrentiy Beria on March 7th 1940, two days after the Politburo’s decision on the executions. During the Soviet occupation of eastern Poland there were four waves of forced deportations. Relying only on Soviet data, about 330,00-340,00 were deported. Ireneusz C. Kamiński, Katyń before the European Court of Human Rights Opinion and Analysis 23 and the crime of genocide aimed at Polish citizens). He also argued that those who had carried out illegal orders were subject to harsh penalties (the death penalty included) according to the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and that the Katyń massacre was not subject to the statute of limitation. Yablokov’s motion was rejected by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office. Yablokov himself was then dismissed and the Katyń case was assigned to another investigator. Criminal case number 159 was eventually closed on September 21st 2004. On December 22nd 2004 the Interagency Commission for the Protection of State Secrets classified 36 volumes of the case file – out of a total of 183 volumes – as “top secret” and a further eight volumes as “for internal use only”. The decision to discontinue the investigation was given a “top-secret” classification and its existence was only revealed on March 11th 2005 at a press conference given by the chief military prosecutor. Legal preparations

Following the first unofficial news (August 2004) that the Russian investigation on the Katyń massacre was to be closed I published an article in the Polish daily newspaper Rzeczpospolita suggesting that if the information was true, then the relatives of the victims could bring a case against Russia to the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) and rely on several provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). After this publication I was contacted by Ms. Witomiła Wołk-Jezierska, daughter of an officer executed at Katyń, who asked me to turn the hypothesis I had written about into reality. As any application to the Court at Strasbourg must be preceded by legal steps taken at the national level (the requirement is to first exhaust all national legal measures), we initiated, having found Russian advocates, two sets of legal proceedings: for questioning the decision to discontinue Russian case no. 159 and for the rehabilitation of the massacre victims under the statute on rehabilitation of victims of political persecutions (Law no. 1761-I of October 18th 1991). Our requests were rejected by the Chief Military Prosecutor’s Office and the Russian courts. They held that no evidence that the Polish citizens had been executed in 1940 existed. What they could only establish was that some Poles had been kept in POW camps in spring 1940, but then they “had disappeared”. In the rehabilitation proceedings the Russian courts stated that if “hypothetically” Polish POWs might have been killed it was not possible to determine the legal basis for the repressions against them. All of these decisions were taken despite the fact that memorials had been erected on the burial sites (with personal commemorative plaques for each victim) and the Russian authorities had on several occasions paid tribute there to those killed. 24 Opinion and Analysis Ireneusz C. Kamiński, Katyń before the European Court of Human Rights

The content of the “Katyń complaint” evolved. The core question was whether it is feasible to rely on Article 2 of the Convention that protects right to life. As the Convention entered into legal force on September 3rd 1953 and the Russian Federation only ratified it on May 5th 1998, it was clear that the Convention could not apply to the killings committed in 1940. But right to life is not limited only to the prohibition to take someone’s life (unless a few rigorously construed exceptions apply) but also requires member states to conduct an efficient investigation (procedural obligation) in all cases of violent death. Although the Strasbourg Court treated the procedural obligation as autonomous and detachable from the prohibition,2 it was not certain if the obligation to investigate under the Convention could be invoked once a killing (suspicious death) occurred before the ratification of this treaty by a given state. Actually, the Strasbourg case law was contradictory as the relevant decisions of the Court gave different answers.3 At last, to solve the matter, the Court had to set a clear standard. This was on April 9th 2009 in Šilih v. Slovenia, a fatal medical error case decided by the Grand Chamber, a group of 17 judges reserved for the most important and difficult cases. Happily for us this judgement coincided with getting our final decisions in Russia (two sets of proceedings were finished on November 25th 2008 and January 29th 2009). In the Šilih judgement, the Court pointed out that it would be competent to adjudicate on the efficacy of a national investigation if there exists “a genuine connection” between the death and the entry into force of the Convention for a particular state. This genuine connection is meant to exist when “a significant proportion” of procedural steps have been or ought to have been carried out after the ratification date. But the Court also added that it would not exclude that “in certain circumstances” the required connection could be based “on the need to ensure that the guarantees and the underlying values of the Convention are protected in a real and effective manner”. The judgement of the Grand Chamber was rendered by a huge majority of 15 votes to two.

Priority status

The “Katyń complaint”, which was lodged with the Court as a preliminary application in May and as a final one in August 2009,4 has made use of the Šilih

2 Therefore, even though a state (its functionaries) is not responsible for a given killing (death), that state can be found in violation of Article 2 if there was no required investigation into the killing. 3 All those answers took the form of decisions on admissibility/non-admissibility of the case. They were not judgements on merits. 4 Wołk-Jezierska and Others v. Russia, application no. 29520/09 that later became the case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia, applications nos. 55508/07 and 29520/09. Ireneusz C. Kamiński, Katyń before the European Court of Human Rights Opinion and Analysis 25 narrative. But first of all I referred to the need of protecting the fundamental Convention values as the justification for the Court’s competence to hear the allegations under the right to life. If, as the Court specified in its case law on hate speech, expressions denying the reality of crimes against humanity and war crimes contravened the core values of the Convention,5 all the more the same rationale should apply to such crimes. The Court’s attention was drawn to the The “Katyń complaint” was lodged fact that the Katyń massacre constituted with the European Court of Human a crime under international law, not subject to a statutory limitation. But Rights in August 2009. it was also submitted that, alternatively, the Court could adjudicate by relying on “the rule of proportion of procedural steps”. Some new important activity must have taken place after May 5th 1998 if the Russian authorities had so radically departed from the established historical facts (the murder of Polish citizens) and had accepted the “disappearance version” as the final one. The applicants also complained that the Russian Federation had violated Article 3, which prohibits degrading and inhuman treatment (among others, by denial of the crime, contradictory information on the fate of the applicants’ relatives). In November 2009 the application was granted priority status6 and the case was communicated to the Russian government for comments. In January 2010 the Polish government decided to join the case as a third party. In principle, the proceedings before the Court are written, with an oral hearing reserved only for the most difficult cases. In its submissions, the Russian government has never called Katyń a massacre or a crime but referred to it as “Katyń events”. It insisted that neither under national legislation nor international law has there existed any obligation to conduct the Katyń investigation which, actually, was started, but as a political “goodwill gesture” to the Polish side. Moreover, Russia refused to provide the Court with a copy of the decision to discontinue Katyń investigation no. 159, referring to its core security reasons. In July 2011 the Court declared the application admissible as to the claim under Article 3 (degrading and inhuman treatment). It further decided to join the issue of the applicability of Article 2 (right to life in its procedural aspect) with the analysis on merits. Additionally, in August the Court asked the parties whether Russia complied, by not producing a copy of the decision the Court had asked for, with the obligation to cooperate (Article 38).

5 Garaudy v. France, application no. 65831/01, decision of 24 June 2003, ECHR 2003-IX. 6 This status was important as there were almost 150,000 cases awaiting examination by the Court. 26 Opinion and Analysis Ireneusz C. Kamiński, Katyń before the European Court of Human Rights

The Court decided to hold a hearing on October 6th 2011 in Strasbourg. From the questions for the hearing it clearly transpired that the Court was ready for the first time to make use of the clause of the core values of the Convention as a justification for its competence to examine allegations concerning the lack of an efficient investigation. The parties were asked if “the mass murder of Polish prisoners can be characterised as a war crime”.7 The chamber that examined the case was composed of the following judges: Dean Spielmann, (President, Luxembourg), Karel Jungwiert (Czech Republic), Boštjan M. Zupančič (Slovenia), Anatoly Kovler (Russia), Mark Villiger (Swiss representing Liechtenstein), Ganna Yudkivska (Ukraine) and Angelika Nußberger (Germany).

The judgement

The Court’s judgement was delivered on April 16th 2012 at a public hearing in Strasbourg.8 Russia was found guilty of violations of Article 3 (inhuman and degrading treatment of the applicants) and Article 38 (lack of due cooperation with the Court). On the other hand the Court decided by a narrow majority of 4 votes to 3 that it was “unable to take cognisance of the merits of the complaint” under Article 2 (right to life). Although all the judges agreed that the Katyń massacre was, as a war crime, an imprescriptible crime under international law that contradicted the underlying Convention values, the majority held Russia refused to provide the that this feature alone did not suffice to Court with a copy of its decision to make the Court competent to verify if there had been an effective investigation discontinue the Katyń investigation. carried out domestically. A second element must additionally occur. Information casting new light on the crime’s circumstances must come into the public domain in the post-ratification period. The majority (judges from Russia, Ukraine, Slovenia and the Czech Republic) concluded that in the period after May 5th 1998 no such piece of evidence had been produced or discovered. This approach has been criticised by the minority of three judges (Luxembourg, Liechtenstein and Germany). They wrote in their joint dissenting opinion appended to the judgement that the Court’s position resulted in narrowing the reference of the underlying Convention values. Due to the scale and magnitude of the Katyń

7 Answers to the questions submitted on behalf of the applicants were published in Polish Yearbook of International Law 2012, vol. XXXI, p. 409-446. 8 Again, it is a rare practice as the Court’s judgements are usually sent by mail to the parties and posted on the Court’s website. Ireneusz C. Kamiński, Katyń before the European Court of Human Rights Opinion and Analysis 27 massacre, coupled with the attitude of the Russian authorities after the entry into force of the Convention, the Court should have found the complaint under Article 2 admissible and then should have decided that there was a violation of that provision. But the three dissenting judges further stressed that even if they had adopted the logic of the majority by introducing a second element (sufficiently important material casting new light on the crime and emerging in the post-ratification period) they would still be satisfied that the Court had jurisdiction to examine the complaint. Sudden swings in the Russian investigation should be interpreted as a new element relevant for the Court. What next?

Chamber judgements are not final. Each party may ask a panel of five judges to refer the case to the Grand Chamber for a re-hearing. Panels accept requests sporadically and only when particularly convincing reasons are enunciated. I lodged such a request in July and it was allowed in September 2012. A public hearing before the Grand Chamber took place on February 13th 2013. The parties repeated their legal positions. In my submissions on behalf of the applicants I have broadly referred to the case of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights which in cases of gross human rights violations committed in the pre-ratification period (massacres perpetrated by the armed forces) did not require any additional element to find itself competent for hearing the case. What’s more, in December 2012 the Court allowed six non-governmental organisations to join the case. They all presentedamicus curiae briefs that supported the applicants’ claims. These organisations are: Amnesty International (London), Open Society Justice Initiative (New York), Public International Law & Policy Group (The Hague), and acting jointly Human Rights Centre “Memorial” (Moscow), European Human Rights Advocacy Centre (London) and Essex Transitional Justice Network, School of Law, University of Essex, UK. When the Court holds a hearing, the judgement is usually rendered within nine months. It means that the final Katyń verdict will be known at the end of this year or at the beginning of 2014. And what then? If a Strasbourg judgement is in favour of the applicant it must be duly executed under the control of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe. The real life of such a judgement begins after it is delivered. If the Katyń judgement is successful for the applicants, then the real work will commence on the day it is pronounced.

Ireneusz C. Kamiński is a professor of law at the Institute of Legal Studies with the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw and at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. He masterminded the “Katyń complaint” before the European Court of Human Rights, and is the legal representative before the Court. A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture

Janusz Makuch

We, as Poles, must admit that Jews have made and still continue to make a fundamental contribution to the development of Polish – and more broadly European – culture. Thus, we are especially obliged to take care of this Jewish heritage, and to constantly commemorate it.

The older I get the more distant, calm but also curious I am in my observations of people’s daily struggles with life. I am fascinated by the arch of energy that stretches between the day of birth and death – its growing build-up, the intensity of light, the geometry of human fate in which the axis of symmetry is marked by the middle, between moments of going up and falling down, until that final flash, before darkness comes irrevocably. I also look at myself as what I have been doing in the last 25 years as nothing more than an attempt to also manage my own life. Would I ever, 25 years ago, have predicted where I would be today? No. At that time I had no idea what the Festival of Jewish Culture, which I have directed in Kraków since then, would become, for me and for others. I was just following the voice of my conscience and intuition, staying away from any form of speculations, business plans and long-term goals. I was just enjoying every day and every book I read, as well as the newly discovered beauty of Klezmer, Sephardic, Chasidic, and Cantorial, or to put it simply Jewish, music. Step by step, I became more knowledgeable and the thread that was connecting me with this world slowly became my life line. I eventually realised that this was my world. Since that moment, which can’t be marked in a calendar, I became part of it, and this land of milk, honey and blood, fertilised with the ashes of millions, became my land. Janusz Makuch, A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture Opinion and Analysis 29

Destiny When I left my home town, at the age of 20, I knew that I would never come back. There was a kind of certainness that took the form of destiny. And Kraków was my destiny. Is there any other city in the world where I could be doing what I am doing? I am under the impression, I am certain, that our festival is one of the very few festivals in the world which would die if it was moved somewhere else. We are like the old trees – deeply rooted in this land, in this city, in these walls, in this Despite how difficult my history, in the everyday life. We have been Polish heritage is, I am doomed rooted here for centuries and, for centuries, will remain rooted here. We can create and to constantly confront it. develop only here, absorbing juices from the hidden sources, branching out and going higher. When I left my family house and closed its door I threw, as the saying goes, the key into the river. I came to Kraków and found myself in a new house; in Kazimierz (the Jewish district of Kraków – editor’s note). This was the year 1980. The 1980s was the beginning of a search for the buried foundations of the world which had passed. This process included many Jews and non-Jews alike. If I were to give a name to the interest young Poles were then showing towards Jewish culture, I would call it a “syndrome of searching for the sunken Atlantis”. It was as though there was a revelation that this mysterious and beautiful world was irreversibly lost. In turn, while giving a name to the interest of young Jews in their own culture, I would say it was “a syndrome of a destroyed Jerusalem”. Both groups experienced a revelation and a sense of sadness at the same time. These feelings generated fascination, longing, love and a new form of awareness. Such was the atmosphere of the first Jewish Culture Festival, which took place in 1988 in Kraków. The 1990s was a period of “archaeology”. We realised that we lived in a world of ashes and started to rediscover what was hidden beneath them. We gradually uncovered different parts, trying to piece them together. When we weren’t successful – and we quite often weren’t – we relied on what we had built as an imagined picture and projection of our own dreams and visions. Then the wise and insightful men arrived and told some of us that we were creating a virtual Jewish world. A world without Jews. They told us that we had no right to it, as if the sphere of love was only limited for the selected ones. For some, “Jewry” became a great business opportunity, a true cash cow. This is why quite soon pseudo-Jewish restaurants popped up everywhere. This increasingly virtual Jewish world was shrouded by the pall of kitsch, while the ghost of a Jewish Disneyland rose above Kazimierz. At the same time, others were deepening their love and fascination with Jewish culture, leading them to a completely new level of awareness, namely to the point where the borders that divide the Jewish and Polish worlds were becoming blurred. 30 Opinion and Analysis Janusz Makuch, A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture

Photo: Wojciech Karliński

2013 marks the 25th year since the first Jewish Culture Festival was held in Kraków Poland.

This was our common world; a world where nobody would ask who you were, where you came from, or why. It was enough to be present and belong to the rebirth of the Polish-Jewish community. Here my observations can be put simply stated: following the emergence of Jewish culture in Kazimierz, something more important has also emerged – Jewish life – in its whole diversity, contradictions and never-ending desire to express its own rebuilt status quo. Of course the scale of this new Jewish life can’t be compared to what it was before the Shoah. This would be a useless comparison. But there is a point in discussing what this new world is like.

A subject in history

I have been directing the Festival of Jewish Culture for 25 years. What does this time mean? Everything. And nothing still It might sound strange, but I have become an actor in Poland’s history. My gob is very Polish and no matter how hard I try to change it, it will always be my face! So how is it possible that a goy, born in eastern Poland to a family which is just like any other Polish family, transformed into a Jew? Was it simple coincidence or destiny? Neither. Ever since it happened, I have carried a dybbuk in me, this daimonion of everyday life, leads my mind and my Janusz Makuch, A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture Opinion and Analysis 31 heart. I do this because this is my choice; because this is my life and this is how I want to live it. There is nothing unusual in it except the fact that it is unusual in itself. However, it is also not enough to say “I have made a choice”. And although I am under the impression that this choice was made somewhat for me, or even against me, that moment, that murky moment of my life during which this choice was made was also a beginning of a difficult yet bright and beautiful road which led me to good even if, at times, it took the form of evil. Since then I have found the meaning of the words History can be of Rabbi Nachman of Bracław who once said: “A man goes through life on very narrow stepping stones. The confronted and its most important is not to be afraid.” And: “You are absolute determinism there, where your thoughts are. Make sure that your can be questioned. thoughts are where you would want them to be.” I direct this festival because I was very lucky. I was born in Poland. In fact, this is one of the very few things that I have had no influence on. I was born in Poland, a strange country with a complex history and a nation which is at one time noble and another time wicked. Or both at the same time. And since I realised how difficult this Polish heritage is, I have also realised that I am doomed to constantly confront it. In this unequal confrontation with history, myths, stereotypes, prejudices and the whole plethora of Polish vices and weaknesses in my succours there are the Polish writers: Cyprian Kamil Norwid, Czesław Miłosz, Witold Gombrowicz and Aleksander Wat. I come from a country of rabbis and tzadiks, geonims and melameds, a country of Jewish thinkers, writers, bankers, architects, painters, doctors, shoemakers, tailors, directors, film producers, politicians, scientists and Jewish soldiers, from a country of pious and good people. I come from in a country of anti-Semites and people of good and pure hearts, a country of blackmailers, and with the biggest number of the Righteous Among the Nations. It is a country where the anti-Semites would sacrifice their life for the life of others and a country where the Jewish police killed its own brethren. I come from a country of the belligerent Father Tadeusz Rydzyk (a controversial Polish Catholic priest – editor’s note) and the country of John Paul II, from a country where anti-Jewish graffiti is painted on the walls of synagogues and a country where thousands of non-Jews study Jewish history, culture and religion , from the country of German death camps and the country of Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, from the country of Szmul Zygielbojm, Mordechaj Anielewicz and Marek Edelman; as well as Jan Karski, Jan Nowak-Jeziorański and Władysław Bartoszewski. I come from the country of the Jewish Parliament – the Council of Four Lands (Va’ad Arba’ Aratzo), from the country of countless shtetls, yeshivas, Chasidic courts, in a country of Jewish autonomy and pluralism, but also a country of numerus 32 Opinion and Analysis Janusz Makuch, A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture

clausus, bench ghettos, pogroms and mass murder. I come from a country of anti- Semitic madness where Jews were burnt alive in rural barns. And I come from a country of Christian mercy where Jews were hidden in rural barns. I come from a country of blood and ashes, with the shade of synagogues and churches, from the a country where, in one night, Germans gassed, burned and murdered almost six million people. What I have found here is my heritage – mixed languages, the same God in different forms, memory of the past, pride and shame, painful love, and sturdy faith that no matter what happens, life goes on and is worth living. It is the life of here and now which is one of the most beautiful gifts.

Only in Poland

I was born in Poland. I am a gentile and for the last 25 years I have been the creator and director of probably the biggest Festival of Jewish Culture in the world. And this is possible only here – in Poland! Why do I do it? Because I have a sense of responsibility for the good and evil which has Anti-Semitism been present in our community in its almost 1000- is omnipresent, year history. regardless of the I am doing it because we were born here and we are the heirs to history, not just parts of it but all of geographical longitude. it. And yet it does not mean that we are the slaves of history. History can be confronted and its absolute determinism can be questioned. It just happened that history seems to be the absolute area of the devil’s work with whom we may, indeed be, powerless but not necessarily incapacitated. I do this through the Festival of Jewish Culture. I have been organising this festival because, with all my powers, I am trying to prove that being a Pole in this country may also mean being a Jew and being a Jew may mean in this country being a Pole. Just as it was centuries ago (and for centuries) this country was inhabited by those whom we call “Polish Jews”. As someone who has been living here for 52 years, I am a “Jewish Pole” – and this completes this historical image. I know that there are more like me out there. For me there is no contradiction here. In a sense my festival revives memory – a common memory. And it blesses the future – a common future. And in this sense, for me – a Pole – the heritage of Jewish culture is my own heritage. It may be worth reminding that the first festival was organised in 1988, a year before the collapse of communism. It was organised by two gentiles, non-Jews. It is worth bearing in mind that the majority of the countless cultural initiatives undertaken to commemorate the Jewish presence in Poland, but also to commemorate the Shoah of the Jewish Nation, are non-Jewish initiatives. For me this is completely natural, Janusz Makuch, A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture Opinion and Analysis 33 logical, justified and necessary. Yes, as we, Poles, admit that Jews have made and still continue to make a fundamental contribution to the development of Polish – and more broadly European – culture, they have always been an integral and organic part of Poland’s history and culture, then, after the Shoah, we are especially obliged to take care of this Jewish heritage, and to constantly commemorate it. I do not do it to brood over death! Civilisations blossom and civilisations fall. As Kohelet (also known as Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament) says: “One generation passeth away, and another generation cometh: but the earth abideth forever,” (Kohelet 1.4); and further: “Cast thy bread upon the waters, for thou shalt find it after many days,” (Kohelet 11.1). I know this and out of this knowledge comes my hope that life always wins over death. Of course, I can see the most horrid uniqueness of the Holocaust. My heart is embossed with Kaddish and El Malei Rachamim, and I pray for all those who were gassed to death, killed and burned. I still carry with me the roll of poems written by Paul Celan, and don’t believe that I will even be able to rebuild my faith in man’s goodness as I believe that man is inherently evil, and I avoid, like the plague, visits to German death camps. I avoid the kitschy nostalgia, lamenting over the lost world, conferences about killings when every day, worldwide, thousands of people die. I am constantly fascinated with the energy of Jewish life, the one before and after the Shoah. I know that six years of the Shoah does not mean and cannot mean the demise of the Jewish civilisation. Six terrible years cannot overshadow a thousand years of life! I have been doing the festival because I believe it is a relatively smart way to fight anti-Semitism. Its effectiveness may not be the greatest, but nobody else has yet come up with anything spectacular in this area. Anti-Semitism is omnipresent, regardless of the geographical longitude, as it is a state of mind which cannot cope with its own self and the world around. I have been trying to create, for Jews and non-Jews alike, an opportunity for an intellectual, spiritual, emotional, and historical discovery; to build good every day. I have also been doing this because I love Israel. I love its air, soil, sky, water and the desert. And people whom I love. I am a Polish Zionist. And out of all the cities I have been to, the dearest one to my heart is Jerusalem. I have been doing this because I still love Kazimierz. Kazimierz has been changing; the owners have changed and the ones who are here today tend to be more focused on daily profit than Jewish heritage – it is what it is. I have stopped complaining; because in Kazimierz, history still provokes a reflection of the past. Indeed it is an impressive past and worth preserving. But much more is the future – one which I cannot foresee. As nobody could foresee that Jewish life would be reborn in 34 Opinion and Analysis Janusz Makuch, A Festival of Jewish (Polish) Culture

Kazimierz and prophecies were once made that Kazimierz would remain a symbol of Jewish absence, how could we foresee what will happen in ten or fifty years…? I do it, because I believe in God. I love, desire and pray that this will last until my breath and heart stops. I believe that it is worth it and that this is the way it should be. Ani maamin!

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Janusz Makuch is the founder of the Jewish Culture Festival in Kraków, Poland. He is the recipient of the Order of Polonia Restituta (Order Odrodzenia Polski), one of the highest orders awarded in Poland, for his work in reviving Jewish culture.

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ADVERTISEMENT Political Change and the Performing Arts in Central and Eastern Europe

Géza kovács

The performing arts have been an essential part of the whirlwind of historic change in Central and Eastern Europe. While they have not been completely removed from the social and political change in Western Europe and America, the difference in how much they have been involved is remarkable.

A well-known, popular actor in a white shirt, with a short coat thrown over his shoulders, his hair blowing in the wind, reads out the “demands of the people” to a crowd of 10,000 on the steps of the Hungarian Television building. By his side is a bearded poet with a fiery face. It is March 15th 1989, a year before the first independent and free elections in Hungary. Like so many times before in Central and Eastern Europe, the role that poetry, literature, art, theatre and music has played is “leaven” in the “dough of history”. This is something of a tradition in this deplorably tempestuous corner of the world. Chopin was forced into emigration for standing up for Polish independence. Ferenc Liszt created a virtuoso transcription of a march composed in memory of a Hungarian nobleman, Francis II Rákóczi, who had headed an anti-Habsburg uprising a century and a half earlier, only to play it provocatively throughout Europe. Modern day history, too, keeps drawing performers to the stage here – where country borders are redrawn within the span of not decades but years. History has not usually left performing artists alone in more peaceful parts of the world either; but here, involving other fields of art, artistic movements and performances have always been a direct means of expressing suppressed emotions and passions. They are a romantic brand of patriotism and a yearning for liberty, 38 Opinion and Analysis Géza Kovács, Political Change and the Performing Arts in Central and Eastern Europe

frequently paving the way for historic moments. In March 1848, in the Habsburg- ruled Pest, one poet by the name of Sándor Petőfi called his vast audience to a war of independence with the first printed poem to bypass censorship. On the eve of the outbreak of the revolution, a patriotic piece was staged at the National Theatre, one that apparently dwelt on the past but afforded poignant criticism of the present, only for the poet to die after a year and a half of bitter fighting for independence and the struggle to fail.

Coded speech

Like in so many countries in the region in situations like this, “coded speech” invariably becomes the norm on stage, in books, newspapers and public discourse. The censor cannot be allowed to find fault with the performance, but the real message must come through loud and clear. In In Central and Eastern 1960s Wrocław, Jerzy Grotowski experimented with “poor and cruel” theatre in a truly poor Europe, the performing arts and cruel age, and a world order whose official frequently paved the way ideology could only offer old-fashioned, heroic for historic moments. and clichéd romanticism or operetta. Pilgrims flocked to Wrocław from the experimental theatres of the Communist Bloc to study the cruelty of truth and the unbearableness of self-delusion. I recall my older brother enthusing over Grotowski’s theatre, having returned home from there as a member of Péter Halász’s theatre company, Hungary’s most avant-garde theatre, and recounted to me, a young teenager then, his main experience: “Imagine a theatre completely lacking lies!” Which was quite a feat in an age interwoven with lies. Not so long ago, Dmitri Shostakovich had to pay tribute to the “great idea” (of communism), with works such as Encounter at the Elbe and Song of the Forests, to allow him to create his brilliant string quartets and symphonies. And also not long ago, the musical committee of the Hungarian Workers’ Party “weeded out” works from Béla Bartók’s oeuvre, which it considered to be “formalist”, deeming only “folk-inspired” arrangements and works as appropriate. Consequently, epochal masterpieces like Duke Bluebeard’s Castle and The Miraculous Mandarin would not be played on Hungarian soil for many years to come. While Central and Eastern Europe is brimming with examples of links between the performing arts and audiences, history and music, perhaps understandably the most inspiring one for me is the image which emerges – with colourful and subtle details filled in by living witnesses – from the workbooks and documents of the symphony orchestra I have served as director general for almost two decades. Géza Kovács, Political Change and the Performing Arts in Central and Eastern Europe Opinion and Analysis 39

Photo: Hungarian News Agency MTI, Courtesy of the Hungarian National Philharmonic Orchestra and Choir.

On March 15th 1989, a crowd of 10,000 gathered on the steps of the Hungarian Television building to peacefully present the “demands of the people”.

On December 16th 1944 what was then called the Budapest Municipal Orchestra gave its last concert that year. At that time, the city had been bombed to bits, the country had for the past two months been run by Hungarian Nazis put into power by the Germans, and the Red Army was coming closer day-by-day. What else could have been on the programme that night but Lehár’s operetta, The Land of Smiles? A month and a half later the cannons were still roaring on the western bank of the Danube, when the surviving members of the orchestra gathered in the half-bombed, unheated City Theatre to play Beethoven, Tchaikovsky and Bartók under the baton of László Somogyi who had just escaped from Budapest’s Jewish ghetto. During the days of the country’s next big upheaval, in the autumn of 1956, Beethoven’s Egmont Overture would be the emblematic piece of the uprising against the Communist regime. By a strange twist of fate it was this very work – so profoundly capturing the dramatic atmosphere of the uprising – that ended up in the bag of the radio technician who, in addition to essential broadcasting equipment and a lacquer disc containing the Hungarian national anthem, fled the shelled building of the Hungarian Radio. The Egmont Overture was broadcast from the temporary studio set up in parliament when at dawn on November 4th, Hungary’s prime minister, Imre Nagy (who would be executed later), addressed a global public as Soviet tanks shot at insurgents in the streets of Budapest. Two months of silence followed, and at a concert (beginning at 4 p.m. because of the curfew) on December 31st, the newly renamed State Concert Orchestra played the same Egmont Overture, with the legendary János Ferencsik conducting, to a 40 Opinion and Analysis Géza Kovács, Political Change and the Performing Arts in Central and Eastern Europe

moved audience. The Violin Concerto came next, followed by Beethoven’s Third, Eroica. At the start of the second movement, Funeral March, the audience stood and listened in silence to the music in mourning for the suppressed uprising, the murdered and disappeared relatives.

Dissatisfaction and distress

Scholarly literature has produced some major studies into why art and the performing arts in this part of the world keep getting thrown into the whirlwind of historic change. While it cannot be said that the performing arts in Western Europe and America have been completely removed from social and political change, the difference in how much they have been involved has been remarkable. Time and again, the frequently redrawn borders have broken up peoples and nations. Perhaps nowhere more so than here did the cataclysms of the 20th century (and the peace treaties that followed) cause so much dissatisfaction and distressful change. Wrocław is a case in point, where the German population of the town was forcefully resettled, making room for the Poles fleeing Soviet-occupied cities and seeking a new home. Shakespeare came to the aid There are countless similar stories. One might perhaps mention the Hungarian of the Muscovites, allowing village that was quite literally cut in half by the critical mind to hide the border redrawn on a distant drawing behind his unassailable name. board. The siblings of one family still recall not being allowed to cross the border to the funeral of their mother in the 1950s. They were allowed to bid her a final farewell from one end of their street over the shoulders of armed guards, with her coffin displayed across the barrier. History’s utterly absurd, bizarre and inadmissible changes have been rendered somewhat more palatable with the help of art. Hašek’s Švejk sums it up nicely, as the Czech soldiers are dragged to the eastern front in the uniform of an empire that has oppressed their people for centuries, and were subsequently expected to put up an enthusiastic fight. Or one might cite Ionesco’s farcical and wacky reactions to the contagious dictatorships of the 1920s and 1930s, where herds of rhinoceroses marching in the streets become a matter of course. Going further East, Pushkin with his Decembrist leanings comes to mind – suffice to consider his poem Siberia – or Chekhov with his ever topical, scorching dramas about social hopelessness. Bypassing Proletkult, avoiding the period marked by Gorki and giving Dunayevsky’s brand of “syrup” a wide berth, I come to a personal memory. Led by Yuri Lyubimov, the Taganka Theatre visited Budapest for the first time in 1976. Géza Kovács, Political Change and the Performing Arts in Central and Eastern Europe Opinion and Analysis 41

Their reputation came well before them. As a student I sneaked into a jam-packed audience, and relatively familiar with the text, barely listening to the interpreters, watched their performance of Hamlet in awe. Vladimir Vysotsky, himself, played the leading role. Without any reference whatsoever, we were aware the play could have been set in Moscow or Budapest, Prague, Bucharest, Sofia, or any other centre of the “Empire” for that matter. Shakespeare’s hero declines the patronage of the ruling powers, knowing it has been The democratic system offered to him by hands sullied by murder. Listening to the famous monologue from of distributing public funds behind a curtain, dozens of shifty eavesdroppers to the arts which evolved reported every word to the members of the in Western Europe has yet “political committee”, demonstrating their to be adopted here. loyalty and substantiating the unreliability of anti-regime intellectuals. In this case Shakespeare came to help the Muscovites, allowing the critical mind to hide behind his unassailable name. It was a Shakespearean idea that came to assume new meaning centuries later. In 1956 the Hungarian uprising had been preceded by some heated months. In a regime seeming to be on the verge of collapse – the “headless” Soviet empire – facts emerging about the atrocious show trials led to an incident a few weeks before the outbreak of the uprising. During what began as an innocent performance of Richard III, Scrivener’s monologue about pre-written judgements sparked a mass demonstration in the given historical moment.

Facing reality

The various areas of art cannot be denied their role in the political and social change. However, the sudden eruption of freedom and the change that took a different form in every country gave rise not only to the natural heroic attitude, but also to issues of survival. One of the basic tenets in the theory and practice of the communist system and its wielding of power was the superiority of the state. It immediately follows that the official establishments of the performing arts enjoyed relative financial security, in return for which the ruling powers expected loyalty and certain standards of quality. Inebriated from the whiff of freedom in the early 1990s, but quickly sobered up after facing up to reality, post-communist countries had to deal with the previously unheard-of issues of survival and maintenance. With the radical decline of the state’s role, financial hardships, the emergence of the system of local governments, countries frequently sought to remedy their economic woes by cutting back considerably on funding for the performing arts. 42 Opinion and Analysis Géza Kovács, Political Change and the Performing Arts in Central and Eastern Europe

Actors, musicians, ballet dancers and entire companies lost their permanent jobs to the strange and unpredictable system of the free market. At the same time, a great many artistic achievements and works of art became weightless in the eyes of the ruling powers in comparison with the previous decades and centuries. While previously the publication of a single poem or a single concert programme might raise eyebrows and lead to the convocation of the Political Committee, today, essentially anything can be written and performed without any major political consequence. Of course, the distribution of public funds often involves some not-so- subtle distinctions, and theatre companies or orchestras favoured by the authorities might receive significantly more money than a company that voices criticism. The democratic systems of distributing public funds that have evolved over many decades in Western Europe are yet to be adopted here. Rather than applying the “arm’s length principle”, the system of “hand-feeding” has greater currency in many post-communist countries. Seeking to address this problem, the independent theatrical system wishes to preserve its free critical and free spirit vis-à-vis the official companies through more modest financing but without the political constraints. As this article is being written, the row in Budapest continues over the change of director of the National Theatre, the outcome of an otherwise lawfully conducted procedure. The outgoing liberal director bids farewell with Klaus Mann’s Mephisto, making no attempt to deny the fact that Hendrik Höfgen’s figure can be seen as his successor, the incoming director, who is on good terms with the government. Thus Goethe and a playwright from 1930s Germany make a comeback in a national theatre of a country in Central and Eastern Europe.

Grip of power

It would seem, then, that the curse afflicting our countries for centuries has not been lifted. The performing arts are left the choice of either participating in political and historical processes or, failing to do so, of being in disgrace with the ruling powers. Or worse still, of losing the interest of their audiences. History has taught us that Dmitri Shostakovich and many others could not escape the grip of power without giving in. Béla Bartók, Krzysztof Penderecki and Witold Lutosławski managed. Will the day ever come when the performing arts in Central and Eastern Europe rid themselves of the burden and responsibility of daily politics? This would of course require more serene historical and social conditions. A prolonged crisis does little to help in that respect. The borders of the European Union in the East are with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine – finally an achievement that has occurred within a generation and has not brought blood, sweat and tears to Central and Eastern Europe! The unlimited Géza Kovács, Political Change and the Performing Arts in Central and Eastern Europe Opinion and Analysis 43 opportunities arising from the free movement of workers are there for all citizens of the EU. The Performing Arts Employers Associations League Europe (PEARLE) guarantees that Central and Eastern Europe has its voice heard in European-level regulatory and legislative processes and exchange experiences. However, the issues that time and again force the performing arts to take a stance forever lie in ambush: corruption, poverty, social inequality, lust for power and populism surround us. Excitedly we gaze to the future: which Shakespeare play will take on the next unexpected topicality? We would prefer the relevance of the historical plays to be replaced by As You Like It or A Midsummer Night’s Dream.

Géza Kovács is the Director General of the Hungarian National Philharmonic Orchestra and Choir. He is also a member of the Board of Directors of the International Society for the Performing Arts (ISPA). Shadows of Joseph Stalin

ana dabrundashviLi

Georgian sympathies towards Stalin have strong nationalistic roots, but they are not in line with the image Georgia strives to create internationally. De-Sovietisation is part of Georgia’s efforts to join the European Union, but is Georgian society typically European?

In the Eastern Georgian village of Zemo Alvani stands a pink statute of Joseph Stalin. The local authorities demolished the original monument to Stalin in the summer of 2011 as part of a disagreement with some of the local people. The following year, on December 21st 2012, Stalin’s birthday, the villagers erected a new statue back in its place. Within a month of its return, a group of unknown vandals, apparently those who opposed its return, painted Joseph Stalin pink, enraging his admirers. According to a recent survey by the Caucasus Research Resource Centers, more than a quarter of Georgians still respect Stalin, while 15 per cent are sympathetic towards him. Such positive emotions are significantly lower for the population in neighbouring Armenia, Azerbaijan and even Russia. In all four countries, however, 15-25 per cent of the population would have liked to live and work in a country governed by a person “like Stalin”.

A strong and wise leader

According to the survey, Stalin is widely perceived as a strong and wise leader among the Georgian population, who, despite anything else, won the Great Patriotic War and deserves the credit. Some people also see the repressions that were undertaken during the Stalin regime as necessary. The positive attitudes to Stalin are lower among the younger generation residing in Tbilisi, who have a good knowledge of English and access to the internet, although they are not altogether absent. Ana Dabrundashvili, Shadows of Joseph Stalin Opinion and Analysis 45

Georgian historian Lasha Bakradze explains the positive emotions that Georgians feel towards Stalin as a result of Georgia’s small size. Georgia has never had any influence in global politics or world affairs, so it cannot resist idolising perhaps the only Georgian who did. It is hard not to admire Joseph Jughashvili (his Georgian name); a poor boy from the poor town of Gori who not only ruled the Soviet Empire but also defeated Nazi Germany. For the Georgian nation, A recent survey shows which has been a political outsider for most of its that more than 25 per long history, the glory of a single Georgian person cent of Georgians say they means the glory of the whole nation, and a success respect Joseph Stalin. story which appeals to national pride. Georgians have never forgotten that the ousted president, Eduard Shevardnadze, when serving as the Soviet Union’s foreign minister, negotiated German unification (and some would even say he single-handedly broke down the Berlin Wall). Georgia’s current prime minister Bidzina Ivanishvili is another example of a village boy who made it big in Russia. The Kakheti Information Center, a local media outlet, reported on the reconstruction of the Stalin statue in the village. In the media report, elderly villagers reminisced on how much Stalin did for the region, sending doctors and teachers; and mentioned how little, in comparison, the current government does for them. Another man read out loud from an unnamed book that referred to Stalin as a “saint”. Supporters in the village argue that Stalin’s statute doesn’t disturb anyone: “It does not ask for food and drink, does it?” Georgia’s sympathies to Stalin have strong nationalistic roots and are not related to any sort of nostalgia for Soviet rule, nor do they reveal Georgia’s support for a dictatorship. Paradoxically enough, Georgians also agree that Stalin was a tyrant responsible for countless deaths. However, Georgians generally do prefer wise and strong leadership and this might also be one of the reasons why they automatically perceive Stalin as wise. The Soviet Union is a controversial era for Georgians, who loath it for suppressing the Georgian nationality, although some still remember that it guaranteed a decent life for many of them, something that independent Georgia is still unable to provide. Soviet history is that of both bloodshed and stability. Even if the Georgian people are gradually outgrowing Soviet nostalgia, Joseph Stalin, a native Georgian, is a different case. The Soviet leader is not a forgotten page of history but a peculiar player in the political and public life of the country – a state which is the most passionate aspirer in the whole of the post-Soviet space to join the European Union and NATO. 46 Opinion and Analysis Ana Dabrundashvili, Shadows of Joseph Stalin

No place for Stalin in European Georgia President Mikheil Saakashvili has repeatedly claimed that Europe is a natural habitat for Georgia and detaching the country from its Soviet past and all of its attributes has become part of state policy of bringing Georgia “back into Europe”. In 2010, when legislative and executive powers were under President Saakashvili’s party, the United National Movement, the Georgian parliament passed legislative proposals under the name of the “Liberty Charter”, aimed at preventing Soviet propaganda and restricting the publicity of Soviet symbols. A statue of Joseph Stalin in the centre of Gori disappeared over night and the five-pointed stars disappeared from some of the buildings in Tbilisi. In their place, EU flags fly next to national Georgian ones. Before the Rose Revolution in 2003, which brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power, Georgia’s foreign policy oscillated between Russia and the West. The rather impatient government that followed the Rose Revolution not only shifted its policy totally towards the West. In 2006 the Museum of Occupation was opened in Tbilisi depicting the illicit practices of Soviet rule. Museums under the same name are common in Eastern Europe. Georgia, in its attempts to pursue the same path towards European integration, also tried to copy the how to address the Soviet past (in a similar vein to the approach of the Baltic states – the only other post-Soviet states to join the EU and NATO). At times, governmental efforts have crossed societal will, in spite of representing it. There has been little public concern about the Soviet symbols and some locals were angered at the removal of Stalin’s monument in Gori, although the government did address their concerns very seriously. President Mikheil Saakashvili and his government managed to convince large parts of society that the path to Europe is the right path, with more than half of Georgians supporting Georgia’s integration with the EU and NATO. Georgians generally like and trust the EU. However, the indication of trust of the EU among them is somewhat confusing, with 25 per cent of respondents in a recent survey saying that they don’t know whether they trust the EU or not. Georgia’s efforts to integrate with Europe have not brought tangible results for most of the population, and their understanding of Europe remains blurred. Although associated with a higher standard of living, positive emotions towards Europe are more artificially created rather than substantiated by experience. The Georgian ruling elite pushed the country into the European Union and the Soviet Union has become its antonym, a shameful and fearsome phenomenon, along with Joseph Stalin – the quintessential Soviet symbol. While the political will of the government was an important breaking point in Georgian-EU relations and helped to intensify relations, the policy was too harsh on a national level and Ana Dabrundashvili, Shadows of Joseph Stalin Opinion and Analysis 47 some sectors of the public were unprepared for it. This might have created a certain gap between the elite and society.

New government, new approach

The new government, under Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili, which is slowly stripping Saakashvili of his powers since winning the parliamentary elections in October 2012, takes a softer attitude towards the Europeanisation of Georgia. Although the policy is generally upheld, there are fewer efforts made to enshrine it into the daily lives of Georgian citizens. The new local authorities in the village of Zemo Alvani, for instance, The new government do not see a problem with keeping the statue of Joseph Stalin, although they deny any official involvement in allows more freedom its reconstruction. Despite being a Soviet symbolic, the of opinion on the law is not harsh enough to directly ban it; thus, pink subject of Stalin. or not, the monument remains. Stalin’s bust has also returned to Akura, another village in the neighbouring Telavi municipality. But with respect to the statue of Stalin in Gori, the new minister of culture, Guram Odisharia, mentioned that the local citizens have the right to decide what they want and what they do not want in their cities and villages. But as yet, there are no discussions about the return of the monument to Stalin’s birthplace. The new government has shown that it is reluctant to irritate the public, being much less firm as opposed to the previous government. Ivanishvili is often accused of promoting Russian interests in Georgia by the opposition of the United National Movement (UNM). The topic of Stalin and the Soviet Union was generally only brought up by the previous government as an example of evil. Now it has an additional flavour, as the topic of the Stalin statues have become a political tool and another reason for the mutual mud-throwing between the former and the new governments. Nevertheless, Georgians did not start liking Joseph Stalin more after the parliamentary elections, so why now? The change in government has permitted more freedom of opinion on Stalin, and as the policy became softer and the Soviet Union less demonised, people rushed to bring back some of their old habits. The outburst of sympathy towards Joseph Stalin is partly the revenge of Georgian society on Saakashvili’s government, which, in its efforts to make Georgia a European democracy, at times bordered on autocracy; and people hit him in the most painful place – attacking his most beloved national project – a European Georgia. Previous governments never made enough effort to bring content into the policy of de-Sovietisation and Europeanisation – public debates about Georgia’s past 48 Opinion and Analysis Ana Dabrundashvili, Shadows of Joseph Stalin

and future have never been initiated, research into the Soviet past has never been promoted, and people have never been encouraged to speak openly about their feelings and experiences. The few events held by civil society organisations or projects funded by international donors failed to reach people in great numbers. A real discussion around the topic of Joseph Stalin could unveil an unpleasant dualism in Georgian society and this might be a necessary step to the final resolution of the conflict. Dualistic emotions about the recent past are a heavy burden on the already crowded history of Georgia, and continue to pop up in modern politics and public life in somewhat surprising ways, yet again becoming a headache for the Georgian government and its citizens.

It’s not only about Stalin and the Soviet Union

In a BBC series, The World’s Most Dangerous Roads – Georgia, two British actors visit the Joseph Stalin Museum in his native town of Gori and are enraged by the way the museum seemed to worship the Soviet leader. Perhaps many Georgians would say that positive attitudes towards Stalin are embarrassing for Georgia, but it is unclear how much of a European democracy Georgia appears to the outside world, praising one of the most vicious political figures in the history of humanity. And here it becomes understandable why no one likes talking about these issues. Georgia’s prospects of EU integration are vague enough the way it is, and the country cannot afford to show that there is such a high demand for monuments to Stalin around the Historically speaking, country. During the different periods in its history, Georgia is not really Georgia has been the part of the Persian and Ottoman a European state. Empires, the Mongolian and Russian Empires, and the Soviet Union; but Europe has hardly ever been involved. Thus, saying that Europe is a natural habitat for Georgia and that its people aspire to go “back” to Europe, is only loosely related to the actual course of Georgian history. Georgia has made few efforts to reach out to Europe in times of hardship, and couldn’t interest any European empire. In its pursuit of European integration, Georgia has tried to pretend it holds all the values promoted by its western partners, hoping it can easily walk along the road already paved by other Eastern European states, although it doesn’t have the same traditions of democratic rule and lifestyle. Stalin is only one case when Georgians have not opted for the same values upheld by most European democracies. Cases of intolerance towards minorities and sharply nationalistic outbursts are not unknown to Georgian society. The Georgian government have preferred to ignore unpopular popular attitudes towards Ana Dabrundashvili, Shadows of Joseph Stalin Opinion and Analysis 49 sexual or religious minorities, refusing to admit they constitute a tendency, rather than single acts. Ignoring the embarrassing flaws has hardly made Georgia a better democratic society. Nevertheless, European integration might be the best policy option Georgia currently has, and the question of whether Georgia belongs to Europe or not might be solved by political will. Apart from the political and military dimensions, however, Georgia’s prospects of EU integration has a social problem: the Georgian people have failed to become the true driving force of its European integration. It seems that the Georgian government and its citizens spend more time and energy on the debate about monumentalising the legacy of its most famous son, Joseph Stalin.

Ana Dabrundashvili is a researcher with Transparency International Georgia focusing on issues related to media freedom. She is a graduate of international relations from Tallinn University and holds a BA degree in journalism from Tbilisi State University. The Spectre of Berehynia

harriet saLeM

Sixty metres above Kyiv’s Independence Square stands a garish copper green and gold plated statue. Known to locals as Baba (woman), the female figure of Berehynia has its origins in Slavic pagan mythology, later emerging as a symbol of Ukrainian matriarchy. Berehynia’s mythology, however, no longer lives up to the reality of women’s issues in Ukraine today.

Originally a water nymph, Berehynia (beher means riverbank in Ukrainian) was also represented as the goddess of fertility and hunting in later pre-Christian societies. However, following the formal adoption of Christianity in Ukraine under the Grand Prince of Kyiv, Vladimir the Great, in 988 AD she fell into relative obscurity for several centuries. Her revival in the late 20th century came from an unlikely source. References to Berehynia first re-surfaced in the works of patriotic male Ukrainian authors. Writing during the 1980s, when Ukraine’s independence movement began to gain serious momentum, Berehynia was invoked and reinvented as a political figure. No longer a river deity but the Hearth Mother, a guardian of Ukrainian culture and the archetypal matriarchal female, her transformation was facilitated by a linguistic sleight of hand; berehty means “to protect” in Ukrainian. The metamorphosis passed largely unquestioned and Berehynia quickly became a central figure in the Ukrainian imagination during the struggle for independence. Yet, it was Berehynia’s capacity to both resonate with, and depart from, Soviet era narratives on womanhood that made her such a compelling figure. Under Russian rule, women’s rights were dictated by the state under the auspices of the ideology of “equality”. In reality, however, an economic rationale was always the driving force behind the concern for women’s rights. Thus, during the drive for growth in the early years of the Soviet Union, state-provided childcare, maternity leave and other female-orientated policies were not aimed at improving the position Harriet Salem, The Spectre of Berehynia Opinion and Analysis 51 of women per se, but rather achieving economic growth and securing full labour force participation. The opportunity structure for women remained limited, resulting in a dual burden of both poorly paid labour outside the home, and unpaid labour inside the home. Yet the Soviet myth of equality closed down any possibility of discussing gender oppression, and whilst women’s movements existed, like many civil society organisations Women played a key under Soviet rule, they were tokenistic. As the role in the independence Soviet Union was hit by economic stagnation and movement during decline in its later years, women were the first to be pushed out of the workplace. Linking problems the 1980s. of the state to the absence of women in the home, Mikhail Gorbachev declared it was time “to help make it possible for women to return to their purely womanly mission [as wives and mothers]”. Released from the burdens of work and utilising the relaxation of state- authoritarianism under Gorbachev, many women (particularly in Western Ukraine the bastion of separatist sentiment) quickly abandoned state-run women’s organisations; instead finding traction in the independence movement Rukh. The women in the movement became known as “Berehyni”, organising cultural events and mobilising popular support

Mothers and nation builders

Whilst the matriarchal narrative of Berehynia tended to echo the policies of the Soviet state confining women to the spheres of politics associated with femininity (such as health, education and childcare), there was an important difference. The role of women was no longer tokenistic or driven by economic needs; rather it played a central and genuine part in a revolution that was equally cultural and political in orientation. Alexandra Hrycak, an expert on gender in Eastern Europe explains: Taking on the symbol of Berehynia, “women were viewed as mothers and nation builders, transmitters of culture and the guarantors of Ukrainian nationhood”. By the late 1980s, suffering from severe economic stagnation and inter-ethnic conflict, the Soviet Union was under growing pressure from separatist sentiment, not only in Ukraine, but across its territory. The restructuring policies of Gorbachev had exposed a decaying system, which was falling apart piece by piece. In August 1991, following an attempted coup in Moscow, a tense extraordinary eleven-hour session in the Supreme Soviet Parliament of the Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic resulted in the overwhelming approval of Ukraine’s declaration of independence, 52 Opinion and Analysis Harriet Salem, The Spectre of Berehynia

and in December a referendum gave the act a public mandate with 90 per cent voting in favour. The new leaders proclaimed their intention to develop democratic governance and a civic society based on principles of universal equality of all Ukrainian citizens in their rights and opportunities. Combined with

Photo: NympheCarna (CC) commons.wikimedia.org NympheCarna (CC) Photo: a flood of international funding seeking to aid the transition of post-Soviet states into Western style democracies it was a time filled with promise for the advancement of not only women’s rights but also civil rights more broadly. In 1990 Solomiya Pavlychko, an esteemed literary critic, scholar and translator, held the first feminist conference of its The statue of Berehynia sits atop a column kind in Kyiv. Two years later she watching over Kyiv’s Independence Square. established the Osnovy Publishing House translating for the first time into Ukrainian important feminist literature such as, Simone De Beauvoir’s “The Second Sex” and Kate Millet’s “Sexual Politics”. President of La Strada Ukraine, Kateryna Levchenko, one of the few scholars to cross the divide into activism during the 1990s, turned to feminism after reading Michel Foucault, Betty Friedan and Julia Kristeva at university. “Those were the times we first became acquainted with Western philosophy [after decades of intellectual isolation],” she explains. However, despite advancements in intellectual circles, the progress of women’s rights groups remained limited, and a gulf began to emerge between academic feminism and matriarchal activism. The latter born out of the myth of Berehynia focused on empowering women within the traditional spheres of femininity; an anathema to models of feminism dominating Western thought at the time, which were preoccupied with the deconstructing sex-gender. www.herito.pl

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Lost momentum According to research by Hyrcak the disjuncture between international feminist models and those present in Ukraine often led to international efforts being detached from grassroots activism. Nonetheless, she notes that international funding undoubtedly pushed new issues onto Ukraine’s women’s rights agenda, including domestic violence and human trafficking. Yet whilst foreign funding had some positive impacts, the competitive market that emerged around funding also served to severely fracture the movement and led to the adoption of purely populist issues. But even more damaging was the close ties between Berehyni and the state. Born out of During the Orange Revolution, the independence movement, many women’s rights groups lost momentum after the central Yulia Tymoshenko resonated aim of separation from the Soviet Union was powerfully with the narrative realised. Those that remained had to contend of Berehynia. with an increasingly authoritarian state. Like many transition countries, Ukraine was woefully ill-prepared for independence. Years of oppression had stifled civil society to the point of non-existence, a weakness that was quickly exploited by the old communist elite who were rebranded as capitalists and returned to prominent positions in politics. Echoing the Soviet-era, the state began to shut down channels for the genuine participation of civil society in politics. Again, women’s rights movements were increasingly made subservient to political agendas. On the eve of the tenth anniversary of independence in 2001, President Leonid Kuchma grandly opened the Oranta-Berehynia statue. However, for women’s rights movements there was little to celebrate. Despite a promising start Berehynia’s installation on the throne of Kyiv’s skyline came at the end of a decade of disappointment. By the early 21st century, less then a decade after gaining independence, Ukraine was descending into political crisis. The Cassette Scandal in 2000, implicating pro-Russia Kuchma in the murder of Georgiy Gongadze, a journalist critical of the regime, massively undermined the legitimacy of the government. In November 2004 widespread corruption, voter intimidation and electoral fraud surrounding the presidential election proved the catalyst for mass civil unrest. Under the watchful gaze of Berehynia an estimated one million people gathered in Kyiv’s Independence Square donning orange, the campaign colour of Viktor Yushchenko, Kuchma’s main opposition. In December 2004 a revote, forced by the protests, took place; monitored by national and international officials. Renne Traicova was working as an election 58 Opinion and Analysis Harriet Salem, The Spectre of Berehynia

observer for the National Democratic Institute. “Despite the freezing weather there were hundreds of thousands of people, many camping, in Kyiv’s Independence Square,” she remembers. “The atmosphere was tense, and incredible. I attended a briefing where [Yulia] Tymoshenko was due to talk. Nearly everyone there was a man but when she walked in, the room fell silent. Click… click… click… you could hear the sound of her heels on the floor as she walked up to the platform. She was wearing a black jacket, down the side of the sleeves the word ‘revolution’ was emblazoned in orange letters. Her hair was woven into a traditional Ukrainian braid across her head. It was impressive how this petite woman commanded such presence. She was very beautiful, yet very determined and strong. I think this was the combination that made her so powerful, that brought her respect. You could not help but be impressed.”

Goddess of the Orange Revolution

Tymoshenko quickly became a leader of the Orange Revolution, appearing several times on Independence Square to rally crowds. Standing beneath the Oranta-Berehynia statue a saviour of the Ukrainian people in their hour of need, Tymoshenko a feminine, yet strong, figure undoubtedly resonated powerfully with the narrative of Berehynia. The guardian of Ukrainian nationhood had appeared; this time no longer a figure of folklore, or a statue but made of flesh and blood. In her study of Tymoshenko’s rise to power, Oksana Kis from the Ukrainian Catholic University documents how the Goddess of the Orange Revolution repeatedly invoked Berehynia throughout her political career, with speeches and electoral campaigns emphasising her role as the caring nurturer of the Ukrainian nation. Yet despite her position as a high-profile female politician, Tymoshenko never advocated women’s rights and rarely discussed them. Indeed her party often blocked attempts at progressive legislation. However, a telling interview with Luidmyla Taran, a feminist journalist suggests Tymoshenko acted out of political necessity rather than ideology. “Women have to help each other and to develop solidarity. We have to overcome the barriers which mentally separate us ... Women [should start] supporting worthy female candidates who run for parliament or for positions in local government,” Tymoshenko told Taran. Thus, whilst the narrative of Berehynia, and its popular appeal amongst Ukrainians carved out space within highly patriarchal structures for female participation in politics, it was not enough to push a genuine discussion of women’s rights onto the political agenda. Berehynia could bring a woman to power, but it appeared she could not be a force for empowerment. Harriet Salem, The Spectre of Berehynia Opinion and Analysis 59

Later exposed for her role in dubious dealings whilst prime minister, Tymoshenko was not the only disappointment of the Orange Revolution. Hopes for a new era of democratic rule quickly dissolved as the old power elite once again began to dominate politics. “This trend toward authoritarianism has increased even more rapidly since the election of Viktor Yanukovych in 2006,” explains Hyrcak. “There has been a massive reversal of the democratic processes.” Historically these trends, away from or towards democracy have been really influential on the women’s rights movement in Ukraine. In the last few years Yanukovych has reversed most of the positive progressions made for women’s rights over the last decade. In this environment the controversial Femen movement emerged. “Growing up I became Viktor Yanukovych has acutely aware of the inequalities experienced by reversed most of the positive women in Ukraine, but when I looked around progressions made for for a women’s rights movement to join there were none,” explains Ana Hutsol, founder of the women’s rights in Ukraine. Femen movement. “I could think of no option other than to start my own.” “In many ways Femen can be seen as a reaction to the growing authoritarianism in Ukraine’s politics,” says Hyrcak. “This kind of regime tends to encourage radicalism as a reaction because there is no space for participation in the political process.” Unlike their predecessors, Femen are cautious of a close relationship with the state, clearly positioning their movement outside formal politics. “In the first years we wanted to make a political party to help Ukrainian women,” explains Alexandra Shevchenko, a long-time activist for the movement. “But now we see that this political system in Ukraine is so dirty and corrupt. If you want to be in parliament you must be part of this political system … Real opposition can only be in streets where you are truly independent, not just protecting political goals or acting for money.” Berehynia inverted

Wearing traditional Ukrainian wreathes of innocence on their heads whilst baring their breasts in theatrical displays, Femen are Berehynia inverted – a parody of traditional notions of femininity in Ukraine. The style resonates with other radical feminist movements such as “Slutwalk”. However, unlike their new- wave counterparts, Femen acknowledge they have failed to find popular support in their home country. “We are from Ukraine, a poor country where women are not emancipated, where women don’t want to be leaders, don’t want to be equal to men. They are more interested in dressing to please men in high heels and a fur coat,” explains Shevchenko. “But this is a form of Stockholm syndrome, when women say they 60 Opinion and Analysis Harriet Salem, The Spectre of Berehynia

want to act, to dress like this. The idea women make this ‘choice’ is an illusion of patriarchy. In this way women become some of the biggest of supporters of patriarchy.” According to Oksana Kis, the growing popularity of the so-called “Barbie phenomenon” is derived from Ukraine’s increased exposure to market ideology and consumer culture. Kis asserts that Barbie, like Berehynia, is based on notions of women as subservient to men and the patriarchal state; but with a shift in emphasis away from a matriarchal guardian of the hearth towards women as objects of sexual appeal and erotic pleasure. Yet, Barbie culture has found popular appeal. Valeria Lukyanova, a human Barbie doll from Odessa, receives thousands of adoring messages on her Facebook and Vkontakt pages. Many are from young Ukrainian women and girls seeking to emulate her doll-like looks. “The world now has a deficit of truly feminine girls. Fewer and fewer wear high heels, clothes to emphasise their shape, and do their hair nicely,” says Lukyanova. “Women have become like men and this is not correct. Women are born to shine and inspire. If women learn to enjoy their femininity, divorce rates will be greatly reduced.” Commenting on the actions of Femen, the human-doll described them as “perverted”. Femen are dismissive: “The work of Femen will only be done when the world is no longer shocked by our topless protests,” says Hutsol. However, despite their fighting talk, Femen appear to be turning their backs on an increasingly hostile Ukraine. Several activists now reside overseas due to fears for their safety, most recent protests have been held in Western European countries and slogans are increasingly written in English for a global audience. “We want to be more focused on our development as an international movement,” states Shevchenko. “We are not just about Ukrainian women.” Popular or not, a gulf will be left by Femen’s departure from Ukraine’s feminist scene, where they undoubtedly drew much needed media attention. Whilst several organisations operate on an international level in the country, few grassroots movements exist. One notable exception is the anarchist Feminist Offensive, although the loose confederation attracted fewer than 200 participants to a recent Women’s Day protest. Undoubtedly the cyclical nature of state authoritarianism has done much to suppress the progression of women’s rights and civil rights more broadly. However, at the core of Ukraine’s feminist movement lies an identity crisis. Bare breasts have done little to exorcise the spectre of Berehynia.

Harriet Salem is a freelance journalist based in Belgrade covering the Balkans and Eastern Europe. Obama’s Wasted Potential?

FiLip Mazurczak

Despite being widely revered across Europe, US President Barack Obama’s Foreign Policy in Central and Eastern Europe is much less engaged than his predecessor. As a result, both the United States and the region are losing out on the potential for strong economic cooperation and democracy promotion.

It is a great irony that although George W. Bush is widely reviled in Europe and his successor Barack Obama’s popularity among Europeans rivals that of no American president in recent memory, Bush’s commitment to fostering transatlantic relations was significantly greater than that of Obama. Evidence of Bush’s extreme unpopularity in the Old Continent can be seen in the fact that although Spain’s former prime minister José Maria Aznar remained a staunch ally of the United States, his decision to send Spanish troops to Iraq in 2003 met with huge protests and, according to public opinion polls, up to 90 per cent of Spaniards opposed the decision. Meanwhile, Obama is widely revered across Europe. Much of what many Europeans (and Americans) found irritating about the Bush administration has not changed since Obama’s inauguration in 2009 – after all, Obama has still not closed Guantanamo Bay, where gross acts of torture were committed; he continues the war in Afghanistan; and has greatly increased the scope of the United States’ counterterrorist drone war previously inaugurated under the Bush administration. Yet according to a 2012 opinion poll study by Pew Global Research, an astonishing 80 per cent of Europeans expressed “confidence in Obama”.

Without hesitation

This undeniable European unpopularity of Bush coupled with widespread veneration for Obama is much truer of Western Europe than of the countries that make up Central and Eastern Europe. Despite Bush’s extreme unpopularity west 62 Opinion and Analysis Filip Mazurczak, Obama’s Wasted Potential?

of the Elbe, he was more liked in Central Europe. His most controversial decision – to use military force to depose of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq – received widespread support in the former Eastern Bloc. Although in 2003 Poland was ruled by a leftist, ex-communist government headed by Leszek Miller, it participated in the invasion of Iraq alongside the United States, Great Britain and Australia without hesitation, and with the blessing of Out of all the European Union President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, a loyal states, the citizens of Poland United States ally. Other post-communist express the lowest approval states – including the Czech Republic, the Baltic states, and Ukraine – sent significant of Obama’s foreign policy. numbers of troops. Interestingly, many prominent intellectuals – some of them of a leftist persuasion – across Central Europe endorsed the invasion of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, comparing the plight of the Iraqi people living under a dictatorship, including the veteran dissident intellectuals Adam Michnik of Poland and the late Václav Havel of the Czech Republic, respectively. Meanwhile, the late Marek Edelman – a Polish-Jewish doctor, the last surviving commander of the 1943 Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, and a Solidarity activist – declared the need to liberate the Iraqis from Saddam Hussein, drawing parallels between Nazism and Islamic fundamentalism. In addition to collaborating closely with Central and Eastern European governments in the Iraq War, Bush gained the respect of many in the region for his courageous stand in defending the historical truth about that part of the world, drawing the ire of Vladimir Putin’s Russia. During the 2005 celebrations of the 60th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, Bush apologised for his predecessor Franklin D. Roosevelt’s accommodating politics towards the Soviet Union at the Yalta conference which ended the Second World War. He also explicitly condemned the 50-year occupation of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union, much to the irritation of Moscow, which still considers itself the “liberator” of these three countries. If Bush’s foreign policy was not as harshly criticised in Central Europe as it was in the “Old Europe”, neither do the ex-communist European societies share their western neighbours’ adulation of Obama. This is especially true of Poland, until recently one of the United States’ closest European allies. The 2010 Transatlantic Trends report from the German Marshall Fund found that of all the members of the European Union, the citizens of Poland have the lowest approval of Obama’s foreign policy. Meanwhile, both Poland and its neighbours have oriented their foreign policy away from the United States and instead are focusing on Brussels. In the words of Nicholas Siegel of the German Marshall Fund: “There’s a big role for Central and Eastern Europeans to play in promoting democracy, and Washington should work to find better ways of utilising their experience and skills in doing so.” Filip Mazurczak, Obama’s Wasted Potential? Opinion and Analysis 63

Photo: Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland (CC) commons.wikimedia.org

Polish President Bronisław Komorowski and US President Barack Obama meet to discuss many issues relating to Central and Eastern Europe, including adding Poland to the US visa waiver programme.

This is all related to the declining importance the Obama administration places on Central and Eastern Europe. Luke Coffey, a scholar at the Heritage Foundation and a senior adviser to former-British Defence Secretary Liam Fox, notes that Bush, unlike Obama, was committed to East Central Europe. Whereas during his first term Bush visited Eastern Europe seven times, a total of 21 times during his eight years in office, Obama visited the region three times in his first term. Additionally, Coffey notes that during his first trip to Europe, Obama’s new secretary of state John Kerry did not visit a single Central or Eastern European country.

Drift

Perhaps the single situation most emblematic of East Central Europe’s drift away from Washington is an open letter to Barack Obama published in the New York Times in 2009 by prominent Central European politicians. Among the signatories are Havel and Lech Wałęsa, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning former head of Solidarity and former Polish president, as well as Valdas Adamkus, the Lithuanian-American former president of Lithuania, who spent most of his life in the United States and thus was naturally one of the most pro-American European leaders in Europe. In this open letter, these Central European heads of state asked Obama to not neglect their region and pursue a realistic policy towards Russia. 64 Opinion and Analysis Filip Mazurczak, Obama’s Wasted Potential?

The criticism of the new administration’s foreign policy is candid and direct. Among other things, the authors of the open letter write: “As the new Obama Administration sets its foreign-policy priorities, our region is one part of the world that Americans have largely stopped worrying about. Indeed, at times we have the impression that US policy was so successful [here] that many American officials have now concluded that our region is fixed once and for all and that they could ‘check the box’ and move on to other more pressing strategic issues.” If Obama read this letter, which as a self-confessed devoted reader of the Times he almost certainly has, he seems to have ignored its pleas. In 2009 Obama showed perhaps more emblematically than ever before he does not consider East Central Europe to be strategically important by deciding to cancel a proposed anti-missile defence shield in the Czech Republic and Poland, whose governments signed an agreement the previous year on the matter with former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in order to placate Russia. Of all the Central European allies of the United States, undoubtedly Poland has been most alienated by the United States. Until August 2008, most Poles, public opinion surveys revealed, were against the localisation of an American anti-missile defence shield in their country. However, the Russian invasion of Georgia that year caused political support for anti-missile defence in Poland to grow rapidly. Consequently, many Poles were disappointed by Obama’s decision. Evidence of the importance of the anti-missile defence shield for Poland can be seen by the fact that in 2012 Polish president Bronisław Komorowski declared that Poland’s security could be threatened at any moment and thus would like to build a Polish anti-missile defence shield. Coffey states: “The second Obama administration… doesn’t care much about Eastern Europe.” According to Coffey, a very emblematic example of this is “pulling the carpet from the Poles and the Czechs over the third site [of the defence shield] and the inconsiderate manner in which that was done, without advance warning and on the 70th anniversary of the Soviet Union’s invasion of Poland.”

Sour relations

Compounding Poland’s dissatisfaction with the Obama administration has been the issue of visas. Of all the 27 countries in the EU, only Poles along with Bulgarians, Cypriots and Romanians need a visa to travel to the United States. Many Poles have family in the United States, and as Polish society grows wealthier more people travel to the United States for business and tourism. Obama cannot be fairly blamed for the continuation of visas for Poles to travel to the United States, as the president himself has promised to end this visa regime, and for this policy to be changed Filip Mazurczak, Obama’s Wasted Potential? Opinion and Analysis 65 it requires not only the president’s verbal support but must also pass Congress. However, the fact that despite Obama’s promises Poles still must pay hefty fees for visas to travel across the Atlantic, has caused enthusiasm for the United States to wane across Poland. Finally, Obama’s relations with Poland Of the 27 EU countries, only soured even more than before in May 2012, during a ceremony to posthumously decorate Poles, Bulgarians, Cypriots, Jan Karski, a Second World War hero of the and Romanians need a visa Polish underground, who unsuccessfully tried to travel to the United States. to persuade the governments of the United States and Great Britain to intervene to stop the genocide of Europe’s Jews. Speaking of Karski’s heroism, Obama claimed that Karski witnessed the horrors of a “Polish concentration camp”. Obama’s faux pas was condemned by Polish and Jewish organisations, as well as by prominent Polish politicians, including Komorowski and Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski, who criticised Obama for “ignorance and incompetence”. Although Obama’s gaffe did not result from malicious intent, it caused many Poles to view him as insensitive to their history. In light of all this, can we say that under Obama has the United States lost Poland? Coffey says that many Central Europeans feel Washington cares less and less about them, and consequently are trading the transatlantic alliance for closer ties to Brussels. This is a geopolitical mistake on Washington’s part. Poland, as well as other countries in East Central Europe, has the potential of being some of the United States’ closest allies. Poland’s importance cannot be overstated. With a population of 38 million, Poland is the sixth-largest country in the EU. In addition to its size, however, Poland could be a crucial economic and political ally of the United States. Although Poland’s GDP growth is expected to halt to 1.3 per cent this year, it is the only country in the EU to have avoided recession since 2008. More importantly, it is catching up to the West rapidly. If the predictions of Eurostat prove true, Poland will be on par with Portugal, the poorest country in Western Europe, in terms of GDP per head in two or three years at the latest. Perhaps the best evidence of Poland’s economic success is the fact that Italy’s La Repubblicca recently wrote an article that one of the most vibrant immigrant populations in Wrocław, Poland’s fourth largest city, is that of Italians. As the current financial crisis continues to devastate the Apennine Peninsula, 2,500 young Italians have moved to Wrocław from Italy, a textbook example of the postwar prosperity of Western Europe. Undoubtedly, Washington could greatly benefit economically by fostering stronger ties with one of Europe’s most robust economies. In addition to wasting potential for bilateral economic cooperation, Washington is also losing out by its increasing indifference to Warsaw in terms of the promotion 66 Opinion and Analysis Filip Mazurczak, Obama’s Wasted Potential?

of democracy. In 2009, the governments of Poland and Sweden launched the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, intended to bring six post-Soviet republics in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine – closer to the EU. That Poland has undertaken such an initiative demonstrates that it is a leader in bolstering civil society, democracy, and western values in the post-Soviet sphere. The United States’ traditional commitment to supporting these very factors could make Poland a crucial ally in making the world safe for democracy, to paraphrase Woodrow Wilson.

Not entirely successful

If Poland is an example of a crucial potential collaborator on democracy relations and a lucrative trade market that the United States is losing because of Obama’s friendly relations with Putin, Belarus is a perfect example of a nation the United States could help bring towards the West if not for the “reset” of Washington’s stance towards Moscow. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, many of the post-Soviet republics have The Obama administration’s embraced an ambitiously pro-Western foreign policy towards Belarus policy. The three Baltic states are both in has been mixed. NATO and the EU, while Georgia – led by the US-educated Mikhail Saakashvili – has persistently oriented towards the West despite the threat of Russian retaliation, which ultimately materialised in 2008. However, by contrast, Belarus remains an outpost of authoritarianism. Ruled by Alyaksandr Lukashenka since 1994, Belarus’s government has done everything possible to strangle civil society. It is the only European country to still use the death penalty, and outspoken intellectuals and oppositionists – including Ales Bialiatski, Lukashenka’s most famous dissident – have been jailed. The country’s Polish minority is constantly harassed. The Obama administration’s policy towards Belarus has been mixed, and the more appeasing aspects of this policy are unquestionably motivated by the desire for warm relations with Russia. On the one hand, Obama lifted many of the sanctions put on Minsk; on the other, last year Obama signed the Belarus Democracy and Human Rights Act of 2011, which increases the number of Belarusian politicians facing visa restrictions in the United States and calls for the International Ice Hockey Federation to suspend the 2014 world championship until Belarus’s political prisoners are released. However, Obama has failed to meet with even one Belarusian dissident and in 2010 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met with Belarusian Foreign Minister Filip Mazurczak, Obama’s Wasted Potential? Opinion and Analysis 67

Siarhei Martynau to usher in a “new era of close American-Belarusian collaboration”. Finally, a couple years ago the governments of Poland and Slovakia supported the bid for Bialatski to win the Nobel Peace Prize. Because Obama himself is a Nobel laureate – although he received the award nine months after his inauguration, seen by many as controversial and politicised – his backing of such a nomination would have had great weight and would have greatly helped Belarus’s burgeoning civil society. Siegel acknowledges that Obama’s relations with Minsk are not entirely successful: “At one point we thought Belarus was going to be the next Rose or Orange revolution, but Lukashenka turned out to be a much smarter autocrat. Unfortunately, now there’s a sense among many democracy experts that there is a shrinking constituency for democracy promotion in Washington. There is great concern among advocates that we’re seeing stability put ahead of values in many areas, including Belarus.” In the 1990s, it seemed that those Central Europe liberated from Soviet hegemony could become strategically significant for the United States. Throughout the 1990s, most of these countries made NATO membership a priority of their foreign policy, and by 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland joined NATO in no small part thanks to Bill Clinton’s secretary of state Madeleine Albright, a native of Prague and the daughter of a high-ranking official of Czechoslovakia’s wartime government-in-exile in London. Later, following the invasion of Iraq, many of these countries proved their loyal commitment to the United States. Whereas the Clinton and Bush administrations recognised the strategic importance of these Central European states, President Obama has marginalised the importance of this region, largely to appease Moscow. Unfortunately, both Washington and the capitals of Central Europe are losing out on this, as the potential for economic cooperation and the promotion of democracy is being wasted.

Filip Mazurczak is a graduate of international relations and European studies at the George Washington University in Washington DC and a regular contributor to New Eastern Europe. V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group

WoJciech przybyLski

The Polish presidency of the Visegrad Group concluded on June 30th 2013 and has brought a number of unprecedented results. Out of the four members, none has emphasised the importance of the V4 more over the last 20 years as Poland did during its last term. Was this just a hangover effect of Poland’s European Union Presidency of 2011? Or a completely new foreign policy direction altogether?

In 2011 the Polish administration mobilised itself for the task of taking on the European Union presidency. This basically meant hosting a series of multinational meetings, events and negotiations, for which The EU is infamous. The task was bureaucratic and tested the Polish administration’s capacity to handle big international events continuously for six months. However, the government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk has sold it to the Polish public as proof of Europe’s confidence in Poland, as well as an opportunity to gain international recognition. It was one of those major steps, next to Euro 2012, that was to prove that the transformation, which begun in 1989, is complete, and that Poland has now taken its well-earned position among its equals on the continent.

Added significance

Almost two years later, Poland’s presidency of the Visegrad Group (V4) while just as bureaucratic has been far more political. A series of typical regular ministerial and working group meetings, which take place each year, has been accompanied by Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski and Donald Tusk representing the V4 interests beyond the usual intra-group annual meetings. The presidency was visually branded with a distinctive sign and accompanied by the significant effort Wojciech Przybylski, V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group Opinion and Analysis 69 of diplomatic missions orchestrated from the headquarters of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its significance has been also recognised in Europe with visits by both Angela Merkel and François Hollande at the V4 summit in Warsaw on March 6th 2013. Never before has the V4 received so much attention and been given so much political significance. This added significance is especially intriguing since the original role of the V4 was not supposed to be a tool in EU politics and diplomacy, but a means for the V4 countries to join the European project. Back in 1991, when it was set up and the group was only V3, with the Czech Republic and Slovakia as one state, the basic Originally set up to show joint rationale was to demonstrate joint political commitment to enlarge NATO and the EU. political commitment to the The task has been a tough challenge, but West, the role of the Visegrad has been considered a top priority across Group has changed since 1991. the region. From the very beginning the V4 cooperation was seen as a threat. In his infamous remarks in 2003, French president, Jacques Chirac, reprimanded the 13 “New Europe” states, including the V4 members, on their backing of the United States’ decision to invade Iraq on the eve of the EU enlargement, saying that these countries have “lost a good opportunity to keep quiet”. Years later, after the EU expansion, this attitude was echoed in Nicolas Sarkozy’s words on intra-V4 consultations before EU-summit meetings in 2009. “If they have to meet regularly before each Council, it could raise questions.” The comment was met with fierce criticism by Polish diplomats in the press calling it “double-standard”, since France and Germany hold such meetings with generally accepted regularity; as do Benelux, Nordic and other countries in order to coordinate their political positions. This demonstrated that the V4 as a group is gaining political weight within the EU. This change has been long awaited in the region, but is still underway and requires continuous effort. “The combined voting power of the Visegrad Group in the EU equals that of France and Germany together. But we have been unable to fully utilise the potential that Visegrad cooperation offers. Attendance of the Polish chief of diplomacy, Radosław Sikorski, is seen as a signal of Polish seriousness about the Visegrad region,” stated Rastislav Káčer, the President of the Slovak Atlantic Commission during the 2013 regional security conference in Bratislava. His remarks have genuinely underlined the unusual activity of the head of Polish diplomacy that opened the 2012-2013 V4 Presidency by a series of visits to capitals in the region with public addresses. It was the first time in V4 history that such a tour by the presiding country’s foreign minister has taken place. 70 Opinion and Analysis Wojciech Przybylski, V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group

In Budapest, Sikorski spoke at the Central European University next to János Martini, his Hungarian counterpart. In Prague and Bratislava, along with meetings with the respective ministers of foreign affairs, he gave lengthy interviews for public television. But although this was a Visegrad novelty in terms of method, it was not a surprise as to the content. Apart from remarks or gestures specific for the current bilateral affairs – promoting the quality of Polish food products in Prague or advocating for growth-oriented EU structural funds in Budapest – the key message has not altered from the widely commented on Berlin speech in November 2012, where he called on Germany to lead the reform of the European project: “You may not fail to lead. Not dominate, but to lead in reform. Provided that you include us in the decision-making, Poland will support you.” The message behind this call for taking action against political impasse in the EU was clear, and was subsequently repeated and echoed in later V4 addresses. Although Central Europe differs in terms of short-term interest, they share strategic goals: to increase influence in the EU decision-making process, to bring cooperation with the Eastern Partnership and Western Balkans closer in the framework of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, to develop common energy security instruments, to increase the defence capability of Europe, and to improve cohesion, for instance, by developing communication infrastructure to develop economic exchange which is growing significantly within the group.

Differing approaches

The political backing of the V4 cooperation is in fact crucial for its effectiveness. The group lacks any secretariat or other permanent body to set up its agenda except for the International Visegrad Fund, the only institution of the V4, which has a different mission: to develop cultural, civil society and academic cooperation Wojciech Przybylski, V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group Opinion and Analysis 71 between the four countries. Moreover, each of the four countries differs in their national approaches towards current European affairs. The Czechs, with the leading Civil Democratic Party (ODS) forming a Eurosceptic coalition in the European Parliament with the British conservatives and Polish Law and Justice (PiS), have been reluctant towards further political and monetary integration. Only the other coalition partner in the Czech parliament, TOP09 (from which Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg hails), along with the newly-elected president Miroslav Zeman are supporters of further EU integration. Despite this, the reluctance towards the EU in the Czech Republic may perhaps even reinforce V4 cooperation. Czech Prime Minister Petr Nečas declared during the V4+Weimar meeting in March that: “The EU summit in Brussels where the long-term budget was agreed on has proved a strong ‘political potential’ of the V4 group, especially in the past two years.” Eurozone member Slovakia, after declining to contribute to the Greek bailout, has had its right-wing coalition government replaced by the left-wing Smer party of Robert Fico. Smer has since showed its support for the European Financial Stability Fund. The Hungarian government under Viktor Orbán, on the other hand, has distanced itself from the European project in order to conduct further internal reforms regardless of their reception in the EU. During the 2013 V4 Summit Orbán said that: “Hungary’s problems are not the same as those of Sweden or Great Britain, and so it does not seem reasonable to require the same economic policy.” He justified his involvement in the EU and V4 meetings by adding that: “Hungary participates in such negotiations in the name of common sense,” therefore, stressing that it is enough for his country to commit to the ritual and the status quo, but nothing more. Polish willingness to support As noted by Jacques Rupnik in an article on European institutions is the four strategies towards the Eurozone crisis first published in Visegrad Insight 1/2012, the warmly received in Berlin. Polish approach towards the European question is not only positive, but can even be seen as overzealous. Surprisingly, it has already been embraced by some of its Central European partners, mostly because the future strong position of Poland in the EU lies in the best interest of its regional partners. Firstly, despite several differences, Poland represents the interests of those countries on common issues like limits on carbon dioxide emissions, defence and the EU Neighbourhood Policy. Secondly, considering the proportions of voting power in the Council of the European Union, Poland needs the other V4 countries as much as they need Poland in order to balance the 58 votes of Germany and France. Finally, without the political involvement in the V4 group, the Visegrad would remain a nice but not very useful instrument of foreign policy; and now is the time to have a toolbox with as many foreign policy instruments as possible! 72 Opinion and Analysis Wojciech Przybylski, V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group

This may explain the recent change in Sikorski’s rhetoric, who is now stressing the role of the Visegrad Group and Polish attachment to it. In the May/June 2013 issue of Foreign Affairs he responded to a question on the EU and the eurozone by referring to the voting power of the V4 – a blunt but impressive demonstration of its importance for Polish diplomacy. However, the firmness of those declarations and the political initiative of Poland beyond the term of its presidency – which will require some effort – are yet to be proven. Although Poland has so far escaped the financial crisis it may yet suffer greatly from its aftermath. The main challenge to the country is not the economy. Although Polish GDP growth has recently decreased, it is still higher than other EU countries. It is rather the unknown future of the eurozone and the European project, where Poland wants to assume a leading position, that determine today’s diplomatic efforts led out of Warsaw. In achieving this aim, any grouping, which also includes the Weimar Triangle, the Baltic states and the Nordic council countries (a joint V4, Nordic and Baltic states meeting was held in Gdańsk on February 20th 2013) will serve this purpose. Nonetheless, Poland has so far best acclimatised to the Central European format, and the adoption of the V4+ format, which allows compatibility of the group with others, is proving to be working well.

New France

This is being noted in Germany, whose growing economic exchange with Poland and in general with its neighbours to the East may balance or perhaps even overtake the usual French-German tandem. Today, Polish willingness to support European institutions is being received in Berlin with warmth. Since 2011, the German and Polish governments have coordinated their positions on affairs with Russia. As Andrzej Turkowski from the Carnegie Moscow Center noted: “On November 8th, the Polish and German foreign ministers, Radosław Sikorski and Guido Westerwelle, issued a joint letter to EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton and representatives of other member states, calling on the EU to revamp its relationship with Russia. While hard to imagine just a few years ago, the joint penning of the letter represents a milestone in the two countries’ common policy towards Moscow.” In the outlook on European fiscal and economic policy, Germany needs other allies than France. As Ulrike Guérot and Konstanty Gebert have recently observed in an article on the web portal OpenDemocracy.net under the much telling title “Why Poland is the New France for Germany” stating: “France is, for many in Germany these days, falling behind. It is not doing enough on the dossier of structural reforms in the economy and adapting to global markets; whereas Poland still has substantial growth and ideologically also buys more into the ‘liberal’ German economic Wojciech Przybylski, V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group Opinion and Analysis 73 philosophy.” Kai-Olaf Lang, an analyst at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs in an article for Bloomberg, added: “Germany’s allies in the sovereign-debt crisis are not too numerous.” In contrast, Central Europe is “mainly like-minded in economic and financial matters”. Prospects for an alliance on economic policy are promising since even regional post- The V4 coalition has proved communists have embraced the free-market to be a particularly effective ideas allowing for a rare bi-partisan consensus tool in increasing the soft in all of the V4. The same applies to defence cooperation but also with chances of France power of Poland. being more involved. After President François Hollande, together with Angela Merkel, witnessed the formal establishment of the Visegrad Battle Group in March 2013, he was later invited by the Polish president, Bronisław Komorowski, for bilateral talks on the French and Polish defence industry. Both events have symbolic significance but may be considered a part of creating an image rather than real change. What comes out of such initiatives, however, could be a real test of the capability of France to redefine its position towards Central Europe. Meanwhile, other ways to involve Paris in Central European affairs remain vague while the V4 also receives attention beyond the continent. During the China- V4 seminar, held in Beijing in September 2012, Sikorski referred extensively to V4 cooperation and promoted Poland’s capacity in the context of the whole region. While the diplomatic efforts of Poland in Central Europe remains only one of several geopolitical directions, the V4 coalition proves to be a particularly effective tool in increasing the soft power of Poland. This is mostly due to the ability to combine different geopolitical coalitions and initiatives that Poland is involved in. This strategy has finally come after two decades when even during previous presidencies of Poland in the V4, it refrained from leadership and declared “self- imposed restraint resulting in lower than expected activity by partners in Central European issues”, as noted out by Mateusz Gniazdowski in his article “Polish politics in the Visegrad Group: Paradoxes of scale” (“Polska polityka w Grupie Wyszehradzkiej: paradoksy skali, in Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny, 2/2012). With no political backing for the V4, the usual critic of Visegrad cooperation, Edward Lucas, would be quite right when concluding his recent commentary for the Center for European Policy Analysis (titled “Visegrad: Nice but Not Necessary”) that: “Visegrad, in so far as it matters, is about contributing to and facilitating such meetings. In contrast, it has only vestigial institutions. The secretariat is virtual, run by which ever country is in charge. The website has a neglected look about it ... the news from the region could be politely described as miscellany (I enjoyed a recent item about golden plovers in Moravia). The Visegrad Fund is perhaps the 74 Opinion and Analysis Wojciech Przybylski, V4 Upgrade: Polish presidency in the Visegrad Group

most practical example of action … But even its greatest fans would not regard it as pivotal.” But Lucas’s conclusion ignores the recent changes in Polish foreign policy. It has taken a while for the current government of Poland to understand the benefits of coalitions with weaker countries in order to upgrade its own position to a stronger one. The outcome of this direction has already strengthened the position of Poland but has not weakened the V4 Group; quite the opposite. So far, the Visegrad presidency is a culmination of Polish efforts in this respect and their effectiveness will be put to test after its rotation in July 2013. While it is unlikely that Poland will drop the Visegrad priority, it is yet unknown what direction will be taken by Hungary, with the no-less ambitious Viktor Orbán in charge. Hungary has announced 2013 to be the Year of Central Europe – building on the joint presidency in Central European Initiatives and the Presidency in the V4, but the priorities and the level of commitment will only be known later this year. With the difficult position of Hungary internationally, the Visegrad Group may require further political involvement of Poland, as well as the Czech Republic and Slovakia, to keep up momentum. Will this take place and therefore confirm the new path assumed by the V4 under the Polish presidency? If so, this may still raise eyebrows of some well-known sceptics.

Wojciech Przybylski is editor-in-chief of Res Publica Nowa and Visegrad Insight. He is a research assistant at the University of Warsaw and a 2013 junior research fellow at Centre Français de Recherche en Sciences Sociales in Prague. Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy

alICja CuranovIć

Religious diplomacy allows a state to use certain aspects of religion and religious symbols in international affairs. The instrumentalisation of religion for political aims has a long and rich tradition in Russia, which is evidenced in Russia’s foreign policy today.

In April 2012 a scandal broke out surrounding a photo of the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church – Patriarch Kirill – wearing a gold Swiss Breguet watch worth 30,000 dollars. The Church had altered the photograph using Photoshop in an attempt to hide this luxurious accessory, until some sharp-eyed bloggers were quick to point out the reflection on the table, sparking a public debate about the role of the Church and its influence in the public sphere. Contrary to feelings which may arise as a result of news collected by the Russian media, the significance of the Patriarchate of Moscow in the Russian public sphere should not be reduced to the luxuries of its leader, nor this 30,000-dollar watch. Nor should it be reduced to the Pussy Riot issue or even the declaration of commitment to the Orthodox Church by key Russian politicians, including Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedev.

Let’s be partners

The growing activity of the Orthodox Church is a part of a wider phenomenon – beginning with the mid-1990s rapprochement between the state and selected religious institutions in Russia, and the majority of the former Soviet republics. Gradually, cooperation mechanisms (called social partnership) were created in the public sphere, primarily in education and welfare. This social partnership was meant to give a stronger role to Russia’s “traditional” religions – those religious 76 Opinion and Analysis Alicja Curanović, Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy

institutions granted a privileged status by the authorities in Russia: the Orthodox Church (represented by the Russian Orthodox Church – ROC), Islam, Buddhism (only the Gelug school) and Judaism. The intensity of cooperation of the Kremlin with a given “traditional” religion depends on the number of its followers. Therefore, the Russian Orthodox Church (41 per cent of Russians) holds the most powerful position; while Muslim institutions, the muftiates (6.5 per cent), Buddhists living mostly in Buryatia and Kalmykia (0.5 per cent), and Jewish organisations play a much smaller role. This trend of the growing presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the state has led researchers such as Sergey Filatov and Dmitry Furman to write about the phenomenon of the politicisation of religion or even the “orthodoxisation” of the public sphere in Russia. The dominance of one religious tradition is not only undesirable but also dangerous for the multi-ethnic and multi-faith state, struggling with growing xenophobia and going through a national identity crisis. However, it should be admitted that so far, the Kremlin has been pulling all the strings regarding the conditions of participation of “traditional” religions in public life, and basically controlling the scope of this potential orthodoxisation.

Roots of Russian religious diplomacy

Religious diplomacy is made up of a set of mechanisms which allows a state to use aspects of religion, such as ideas, slogans, symbols and even religious organisations in international affairs. The instrumentalisation of religion for political aims has a long and rich tradition in Russia. As a result of reforms by Peter the Great, the clergy was de facto transformed into civil servants educated at public universities and paid salaries by the state. In return they were obliged to serve Russia. The clergy would take the oath of loyalty to the tsar and religious institutions were assigned specific targets, for example, cultural assimilation of conquered territories. The significance of the Russian Orthodox Church in this field is plainly visible by the absorption of a separate Kyiv metropolis by ROC structures, and the elimination of the Uniate Church. This facilitated the strengthening of Russian influence throughout the region. A similar tactic was applied in the case of orthodoxy in Georgia. Several years after its annexation in 1801, the autocephaly of that Orthodox Church was eliminated. During the second half of the 18th century, Russian rulers would more often activate the Muslim minority in politics. An ukaz (an imperial imposition) from 1773 prohibited the Orthodox Church from interfering in internal affairs of Islamic communities. Hence, cooperation with the authorities was perceived by Muslims as a chance to gain some autonomy from the Church. Among the followers of Islam, Tatars were Alicja Curanović, Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy Opinion and Analysis 77 the most loyal, and were often used for persuading fellow believers from Central Asia to the benefits resulting from being subjects of the Russian Empire. The activities of the Russian Orthodox Church outside the empire facilitated the creation of a positive image of Russia (for instance, as a defender of the nations of the Orthodox Church), as well as broadening its influence. Additionally, the clergy carried out diplomatic activities and became messengers for the rulers in The activities of the Russian Moscow. Missionary centres became places that would strengthen the Russian presence Orthodox Church outside in a given region. The rulers would acquire Russia facilitate the creation property for the Church and facilitate the of a positive image of Russia. promotion of a positive image and create a system of precious contacts, in countries such as China, Japan, North America and the Middle East. It must be strongly emphasised that the religious aspect was a tool used by Russian rulers for the realisation of pragmatically defined interests. An example of such behaviour might be the wars with Turkey, which were justified by the need to protect Orthodoxy. On the other hand, Russia supported Turkey twice in the 1830s against the Egyptian Mamluks. During the 20th century, the Soviet Union also took advantage of the Russian tradition of religious diplomacy, despite conducting forceful atheisation inside the country. It is no coincidence that under the Soviet Union, the Department for External Affairs was established in the Patriarchate of Moscow in 1946. This department contributed to the development and professionalisation of the Orthodox Church’s diplomacy. The Soviet Union would use the Church for propaganda purposes (it claimed that the Soviet Union was a state respecting religious freedom), and as an additional informal diplomatic channel including relations with other Orthodox countries, primarily with NATO member Greece and Middle Eastern countries. The ROC’s activity in international religious circles (including the World Council of Churches) was also vital for the Soviet Union. In the rapprochement of the state with the “traditional” religions, which took place after the fall of the Soviet Union, both parties expected mutual benefits. Boris Yeltsin, struggling with the State Duma opposition, wished to improve his image and strengthen legitimacy with the support of institutions that had social trust. Likewise, the traditional religions sought state support as they faced the growing activity of non-traditional religious movements (for example, Pentecostals and Jehovah Witnesses). This was the origins of the social partnership, while a key moment in the development of Russia’s contemporary religious diplomacy took place in 2003, when Patriarch Alexey II paid a visit to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Following that meeting, a joint Church and foreign affairs working group 78 Opinion and Analysis Alicja Curanović, Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy

was established, which continues to meet regularly even today (Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has been an outspoken advocate of strengthening ties between the Russian Orthodox Church and diplomacy, as well as using the Orthodox Church in Russian foreign policy).

The potential of Russia’s religious diplomacy

The instrumentalisation of religion for political reasons is not specific to Russia. It is a universal phenomenon. Nevertheless, the Russian case deserves special attention for three reasons: first, the rich Russian tradition of using religion in promoting its image abroad; second, the wide-ranging potential of Russian diplomacy; and third, the presence of religious institutions capable of conducting their activities outside the country. It is this third reason that determines the state’s ability to perform religious diplomacy. The transnational potential of the Russian Orthodox Church is significant. The canonical territory The Orthodox Church has the of the Church (i.e. the territory over which jurisdiction is exercised) spreads over the image of being a representative entire post-Soviet area – except for Georgia of the Russian authorities. and Armenia; and the Church has a physical presence on all inhabited continents. In the context of Russian religious diplomacy, it is crucial that the Orthodox Church, unlike the Catholic Church, is not subject to any non-Russian structure. There is no Orthodox equivalent of the Vatican; the ROC is therefore independent in its international activity. The Patriarchate of Moscow participates in international organisations, including the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and UNESCO. The Church is effective thanks to support from Russian diplomacy. Joint lobbying of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ROC led to tangible results in the form of a consultative group named “Dialogue and Peace of Cultures” under the auspices of UNESCO, created in 2009, with a mandate to bring together representatives of world religions. No other “traditional” religion of the Russian Federation may claim international activities on the level as that of the Orthodox Church. Such a significant advantage of the ROC in the international arena makes it a dominant force in Russian religious diplomacy. Nevertheless, the muftiates’ efforts to build their transnational potential (taking their inspiration from the ROC) should not be overlooked. The biggest progress has been made by the clergy of the Russian Council of Muftis (RCM), especially Ravil Gaynutdin, the Grand Mufti of Russia, who aims to represent the whole of the Russian ummah (the nation of Russian Muslims) globally. Thus, in order to professionalise its activities the Russian Council of Muftis established its own Department of International Relations. Alicja Curanović, Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy Opinion and Analysis 79

Functions of religious diplomacy It is the Orthodox Church, however, that has the image of being a specific representative of the Russian authorities, which plays the largest role in Russian diplomacy. But the starting point of religious diplomacy is not faith, but rather national interests. In Russia, the religious aspect is used for strengthening cultural sovereignty and religious security. It is also understood as the state’s ability to maintain cultural “resistance” towards foreign influence from both the West, and the East or South (i.e. Islamic extremism). The religious factor also plays a role when designating a zone of Russia’s cultural influence, more and more often called russkiy mir. Outside the territory of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), religious diplomacy seeks to strengthen Russian soft power through the promotion of a positive image of Russia and its new international identity – promoting the image of the Russian Federation as an incarnation of Russian civilisation that for hundreds of years has been an example of a peaceful coexistence among different religions for centuries. The image also argues that Russia is the country that can prevent the fulfilment of Samuel Huntington’s vision regarding the clash of civilisations, as well as a country which for centuries has been a stabilising and balancing the global order. Religious diplomacy is also used by Moscow in relations with Muslim countries. Following the footsteps of the Kremlin, the Russian Orthodox Church maintains good relationships with Iran, Syria, Lebanon and Palestinian Hamas; whereas Russian muftis focus on building cooperation with states that symbolise so-called moderate Islam (Turkey, Malaysia and Indonesia). A joint success of Russian diplomats, muftis, and the Orthodox Church has been Russia gaining observer status at the Organization of the Islamic Conference (now known as the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, OIC). Religious diplomacy is an effective instrument of the Kremlin’s policy, particularly in the post-Soviet area. It is in line with the concept of Russia’s “near abroad”, and assumes strengthening the Russian presence, for instance through maintaining the dominance of Russian culture, easing religious tensions and fighting religious extremism. A priority of the joint projects of the Russian ministry of foreign affairs and the Orthodox Church is the integration of the Russian diaspora and keeping them in touch with the homeland. The flagship initiative of the Church and state diplomacy is the Russkiy Mir Foundation, established in 2007, which supports projects that promote Russian culture, “values and spiritual foundations”. Another important part of the Church’s activities in the CIS, especially since Kirill became patriarch in 2009, has been emphasising the role of the Russian 80 Opinion and Analysis Alicja Curanović, Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy

Orthodox Church as a trustee of the legacy shared by all post-Soviet nations. It is the depositary of shared memory concerning the glory (victory in the Second World War), as well as that relating to persecutions by the Soviet authorities. A good example is the attitude of the Patriarchate of Moscow towards Holodomor (the Ukrainian famine of 1932-1933), a subject which strongly separates Kyiv and Moscow. The Orthodox Church honours the memory of the Ukrainian famine victims but places it in the wider framework of sufferings which include other nations from different parts of the Soviet Union such as the Volga Region, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. In this way, the ROC avoids classifying Holodomor as a Bolshevik genocide of the Ukrainian nation, but acts as a patron of the all post-Soviet nations – forming a kind of “fellowship of suffering peoples”.

Can the altar influence the throne?

Despite religion being a tool in Russian diplomacy, it does not necessarily indicate that religious institutions are being forced to cooperate with the state. “Traditional” Russian religions perceive supporting the state as their obligation. This attitude is strongest within the Orthodox Church whose opinions are strikingly parallel to Kremlin policy. Both the state and the Church share the same view on the post- Soviet space (the near-abroad equals canonical territory), identity and Russia’s role (a separate civilisation supporting dialogue among cultures), a desirable international order (multi-polarity), potential alliances (strategic partnership with China and India), as well as sources of threat (US domination and westernisation). Support for the Church by the Russian authorities, The lack of the Kremlin’s on the other hand, does not change the fact that it flexibility in its policy is the state that is the dominant party in foreign policy. In the latest official policy (the “Concept of concerning Syria is an the Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy”) published indication of the growing in February 2013, there are several phrases which impact of the Church. could indicate the impact of the Orthodox Church on Russian foreign policy discourse. The policy concept provides specific examples of how the Russian Orthodox Church, as well as other main religions, play a role in Russia’s foreign affairs. The authors state that the Church can help “facilitate dialogue and partnership between cultures, religions and civilisations” and “support relevant initiatives”. Explicitly mentioning the Russian Orthodox Church in the official policy document strengthens the Church’s image as an institution closely cooperating with the Kremlin. In the context of religious diplomacy, however, the most striking is the following phrase: “A true consolidation of efforts of the international community Alicja Curanović, Religion in Russia’s Foreign Policy Opinion and Analysis 81 requires a set of common values as a foundation for joint action, a common moral denominator, which major world religions have always shared, including such principles and concepts as the pursuit of peace and justice, dignity, freedom and responsibility, honesty, compassion and work ethic.” Combining common values with the teachings of world religions might be explained by the fact that the Kremlin has copied the rhetoric of the Church and included it in its foreign policy conceptualisation.

The long view

This explicit approach, however, will make the use of religion as a foreign policy tool more complex in the long run. It may in fact weaken the pragmatism as well as the effectiveness of Russian religious diplomacy. The lack of the Kremlin’s flexibility thus far in its policy concerning Syria is an indication of the growing impact of the Church not only in the Russian ministry of foreign affairs but among political elites in general. There are numerous factors that might explain the Kremlin’s approach to Syria. Dmitri Trenin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace believes, however, that one of the reasons behind the Russian position on Syria is the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church perceives Bashir Assad as an assurance of safety of the Christians living in Syria. Since the US intervention in Iraq in 2003, the Patriarchate of Moscow has been trying to convince the Russian authorities to play a greater role as protector of Christians living in the Middle East (in Syria’s case, Sergey Lavrov has already demanded security guarantees for Christians several times). Thus, it really is not about the Patriarch Kirill’s 30,000-dollar Swiss watch. The watch is a mere triviality. Religion in contemporary Russian politics is deeply rooted in centuries of Russian politics. What’s more, religion touches on the foundations of Russian policy: identity, security, stability and development. Understanding its role in both Russian domestic and, in particular, foreign affairs will help better understand the motivations and rationality behind Russian diplomacy – which can sometimes be extremely hard to decipher.

Translated by Justyna Chada

Alicja Curanović, PhD, is an assistant professor at the Institute of International Relations of the University of Warsaw. Armenia as a Strategic Satellite of Russia in the South Caucasus

iLGar Gurbanov

As one of the most landlocked countries in the world, Armenia lacks both natural resources and access to the sea. This has led to the country reinforcing its strategic alliance with Russia. Unless Armenia breaks from its dependence on Russia and makes a constructive step in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it will find itself becoming more isolated from its neighbours.

The South Caucasus is an attractive region for Russia as a place for it to maintain influence. Preserving the frozen conflict in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia can, therefore, be seen to be at the core of Russia’s foreign policy in the South Caucasus. Russia does not, however, openly support either Azerbaijan or Armenia in the Karabakh conflict, mostly because statements such as: “Russia supports Armenia on this issue,” would disrupt its relations with Azerbaijan and vice versa. During Russia’s geopolitical decline during the post-Soviet years, Russia sought to use a policy of separatism in Transnistria (Moldova), Crimea (Ukraine), Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Georgia) and Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan) to prevent further foreign intervention into the former Soviet space. In particular, Russia wanted to maintain the military balance in the region and aimed at using Armenia as a “Russian outpost in the region”. Yerevan assumed this vassal’s role by hosting Russian military bases in Armenia. After Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the Russian-Armenian partnership was transformed into a strategic alliance within the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and through Ilgar Gurbanov, Armenia as a Strategic Satellite of Russia in the South Caucasus Opinion and Analysis 83 this cooperation, Russia has managed to maintain its military bases in Armenia (at Gyumri, Erebuni, and Megri).

Investments and modernisation

In the late 1980s when it was part of the Soviet Union, Armenia’s energy system experienced comprehensive change. Armenia used to be one of the main suppliers of electricity to the Soviet Union; today, it suffers from a lack of serious investment. In 1988 the Soviet Republic of Armenia made a decision to shut down the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant, due mainly to public pressure and the potential environmental risks, as it was geographically located in an earthquake-prone area. The closure of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant was a traumatic blow to the Armenian energy sector, and the Armenian The large diaspora Government has struggled to maintain stability in the energy sector with the Yerevan and Hrazdan community provides Thermal Power Plants – the only other major plants significant financial in the country. assistance to Armenia. The Metsamor plant was brought back into operation in 1995. After the discontinuation of railway communication with Azerbaijan (due to the Karabakh war) and Georgia (after the closure of the Georgia-Abkhazia borders), oil transportation to Armenia was stopped. Today, oil is delivered via the Black Sea to Georgia, then to Armenia via railway. To further complicate matters, the Armenian energy sector was seriously affected by the suspension of natural gas deliveries coming through Azerbaijan. In 1997 the Armenian government adopted a decision to establish ArmRusGazprom, a joint Russian-Armenian company. Since the gas transportation system of Armenia had been almost entirely demolished, huge investment was required and Armenian investors were unable to rebuild it themselves. This led to 80 per cent of the Armenian natural gas transportation system being owned by Russian gas giant Gazprom. Another important success for Armenia in the energy sector was the construction of the Iranian-Armenian natural gas pipeline. In the case of emergencies, the Iranian-Armenian pipeline is able to be used as an alternative. According to Sevak Sarukhanyan, an Armenian expert and deputy director of the “Noravank” Foundation, “The Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline is not an alternative to Russian gas as long as the Russian gas is steadily supplied to Armenia. The gas supplied by the Iran-Armenia pipeline will be used for generating electricity and exporting [the electricity] back to Iran.” 84 Opinion and Analysis Ilgar Gurbanov, Armenia as a Strategic Satellite of Russia in the South Caucasus

The natural gas projects were quite expensive with some of the resources being drawn from irregular natural gas supplies through Georgia. But these projects have been able to provide a more stable energy sector in Armenia. However, the Armenian energy sector still requires vast investment. The modernisation of the Yerevan Thermal Power Plant and the installation of the fifth power generating unit at the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant by ArmRusGazprom are the first and most significant contributions made in the Armenian energy sector thus far. Cooperation in the energy sector with the Iran, however, might have serious consequences. According to Sarukhanyan: “Iran may face the threat of a military strike by the Americans for quite some time. In the case that those threats become real, the Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline is out the question. On the other hand, the normal operation of the Russian-Armenian natural gas pipeline depends much more on Russian-Georgian relations rather than Georgian-Armenian relations.” Armenia now finds itself located in-between two political and economic situations. Relations with Iran are more vital in terms of importing the necessary goods and attracting Iranian investment in the Armenian economy. Furthermore, Armenia considers Iran to be its gateway for the export of electricity to the Middle East. Armenia also plays the role of “gate-keeper” for Russia into the Middle East. Because of this, Armenia has opposed all United Nations Security Council sanctions against Iran. In 2006 Russia and Armenia signed a 25-year energy cooperation agreement. This agreement obliged Russia to construct an oil refinery in the southern Armenian city of Meghri. Moreover, Russia owns a 75 per cent stake in the Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline. By exerting control over the Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline, Russia can protect its pipelines running to Europe and Turkey in the case of normalisation of EU-Iranian relations.

Strongest ally

Although Iran is a strategic partner of Armenia and Iran supports (albeit not openly) Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Armenia is not eager to spoil its relations with western countries (notably the United States). A large American- Armenian diaspora community provides significant financial assistance to Armenia. A recent report by the European Strategic Intelligence Security Center states that the “Armenian lobby plays an important role in keeping Armenian issues on the political agenda of several western countries and it’s very effective in isolating Baku from international assistance (The Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act). More than 10 million Armenians live worldwide, out of which 7 million in diaspora, which means twice as large as the people living in Armenia (3.3 million). Following Ilgar Gurbanov, Armenia as a Strategic Satellite of Russia in the South Caucasus Opinion and Analysis 85 the collapse of the USSR, the Armenian economy has been supported through funds provided mainly by Russian-Armenians and American-Armenians. The Armenian Lobby works to provide funding for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh from international donors and prevent Azerbaijan from receiving similar aid. In 2012, Armenia received 40 million USD, in addition 2 million USD for Nagorno- Karabakh, against the 20.9 million USD of Azerbaijan.”1 Russia continues to be Armenia’s strongest ally in the energy sector. The re-opening of Armenia’s Armenia is the only state Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant in 1995 softened of the Southern Caucasus the energy shortages in Armenia, although the to be landlocked and European Union frequently expresses its concerns and has called for its full closure. In 2007 the without natural resources. European atomic energy agency, Euratom, launched official negotiations with the Armenian Ministry of Energy to consider shutting down the nuclear power plant. The Armenian government, however, sought something in exchange for closure, more than simply addressing the seemingly imminent environmental risks. The clearest signal came from Russia, and after establishing the joint Armenian-Russian company, MetsamorEnergoAtom, Russia seems willing to help Armenia construct a new nuclear power plant to replace Metsamor. The privatisation of the Georgian part of the Armenian-Russian natural gas pipeline (North-South pipeline) by the Georgian government has been one of the most debated issues in relation to Armenia’s energy security. The debate focused heavily on the presence of Azerbaijan in Georgia, mainly by the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR) and its possible interests in buying the Georgian portion of the pipeline. Georgia is dependent on Azerbaijan in terms of energy provision and SOCAR controls a large amount of energy infrastructure in Georgia. What’s more, SOCAR has the financial capacity to buy this pipeline. If Azerbaijan does buy this section, it would have the ability to suspend natural gas transportation at any time for “economic or technical” reasons; indeed the pipeline is quite old and needs urgent modernisation. As one of the most landlocked countries in the world, Armenia has found itself even more isolated since the early 1990s, due to the severance of ties with Azerbaijan and Turkey (because of the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent regions which still under control of Armenian Armed Forces). Armenia has been excluded from the transportation of energy resources and regional energy projects due to hostile relations with Baku and Ankara. Armenia’s geopolitical position looks

1 Moniquet, Claude and Racimora, William (2013). “The Armenian Job: The role of Armenian lobby in the pattern of enmity in South Caucasus”. Report of European Strategic Intelligence Security Center, 2013, pp. 15-26. 86 Opinion and Analysis Ilgar Gurbanov, Armenia as a Strategic Satellite of Russia in the South Caucasus

vulnerable, particularly in light of Azerbaijan’s growing economic development. This isolation provides a heavy blow to the Armenian economy and bypasses the country from any projects intended for transportation of Caspian energy resources (e.g., BTC and BTE pipelines, as well as Southern Gas Corridor). Of the three Southern Caucasus states, Armenia is the one that lacks both natural resources and access to the sea. Therefore, the country is mostly dependent on external factors, which has led to Armenia reinforcing its strategic alliance with Russia.

Military cooperation

Russian-Armenian agreements are mostly signed in relation to military cooperation. Armenia hosts Russian military bases on its territory and Russian officers train Armenian military officers. Furthermore, Russia is known to be the main supplier of arms to Armenia. Moscow has also transferred a huge amount of arms and military equipment from its bases in Batumi and Akhalkali in Georgia to Gyumri, The Armenian government during the evacuation of these military facilities. sold significant stakes in its In particular, since the establishment of the infrastructure to Russia. Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002, Russian-Armenian military cooperation has been strengthened in the multilateral framework. Another sign of Armenia strategic alliance with Russia is the fact that the Russian army still guards Armenia’s borders. In addition, Russia doesn’t pay a fee to Armenia for the Gyumri military base, as Armenia still has a significant financial debt owed to Russia. In 2010 Yerevan stated that Armenia and Russia intended to extend the treaty for the Russian base for up to 49 years. According to AzerNews: “In June 2011, Russia’s Federation Council, the upper house of parliament, ratified a protocol extending the agreement signed on March 16, 1995 on the deployment of the Russian military base in Armenia from 25 to 49 years.” All these factors make Armenia a satellite of Russia in the region, despite its independence. Furthermore, on December 10th 2012, the Russian Federation suspended its use of Azerbaijan’s Gabala Radar Station (GRS) due to the ineffectiveness of the agreement. No agreement was reached between Russia and Azerbaijan on the lease payment of GRS, which was reported to have reached almost 300 million US dollars. This means that the last Russian military presence and leverage in Azerbaijan has ceased to exist. Following the evacuation of Russian military officers from GRS, Moscow then reinforced its military presence in Armenia. According to Zaur Shiriyev, editor-in-chief of Caucasus International, “In 2002, both sides Ilgar Gurbanov, Armenia as a Strategic Satellite of Russia in the South Caucasus Opinion and Analysis 87 signed an agreement whereby the GRS was approved as an ‘analytical information centre’, but Russia wanted to change the status to that of a military base – in fact, to make it part of its anti-ballistic missile system (ABM). Also, the CSTO agreed last December on the creation of collective ABMs on CSTO territories, enabling member countries to use its ABM-type military bases on a mutual basis. In theory, this would have meant that Moscow could have allowed Armenia to use the GRS in Azerbaijan.” Russian-owned

In 2001 the Armenian newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak said that, “Although the Armenian government states that Armenia is just strategic partner of Russia, it is hard to only see strategic patterns in Russian-Armenian relations.” Today, Russia is the main energy supplier of Armenia. It is not hard to prove the energy dependence of Armenia upon Russia, as the Hrazdan Power Plant and other industry infrastructure are controlled by Russia. This monopoly is examined not only in the energy sector, but also in the transport sector. Because of its huge debts, the Armenian government has sold significant stakes of its industrial infrastructure to Russia including: the Armenian cement factory has been sold to the Russian Itera; control of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant was transferred to the Russian United Energy System company; the Armenian section of the Iranian-Armenian gas pipeline now owned by ArmRosGazpom; 90 per cent of the Armenian telecommunications company ArmenTel is owned by the Russian phone operator VimpelCom; 75 per cent of Armenian CallNet and Cornet companies is owned by the Russian Comstar Telesystem company; Armenian Armavia Airlines has been sold to the Russian Siberia Airlines and the Armenian railway system has been sold to the Russian South Caucasus Railway system. What’s more, the Russian Ingosstrakh Company owns 75 per cent of Armenian Efes Insurance Company; the Russian state bank Vneshtorgbank owns 70 per cent of Armenian Armsberbank; the largest chemical factory in Armenia, Nairit, has been bought by the Russian Company Volgaburmarsh, while Armenia’s biggest mining company Ararat Gold Recovery has been bought by the Russian Madneli Resources Company. Moreover, Russian energy giant Gazprom, RAO UES, RusAI and Alrosa have a remarkable control over industry, telecommunications, service, airways and rail infrastructure in Armenia. The Razdan Hydro-Power Plant and defence-related industries such as AOZT Mars and AOZT Yerevan Scientific- Research Institutes have also shifted under the control of Russia. Another Russian leverage over Armenia might be potential membership of the Eurasian Union. Officially, Yerevan has not responded to this suggestion positively, with the main reason perhaps being the fact that Armenia does not have a common 88 Opinion and Analysis Ilgar Gurbanov, Armenia as a Strategic Satellite of Russia in the South Caucasus

border with Russia. Therefore, the indifferent position of both Azerbaijan and Georgia towards a new integration model (i.e. the Eurasian Union) in the post- Soviet space shackles Russia in its relations with Armenia. Unless Armenia breaks from its dependence on Russia and makes a constructive step in the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the country won’t be able to find its place in regional integration and will find itself becoming more isolated from its neighbours. Moreover, Serzh Sargsyan, who was re-elected for a second presidential term equates to a “déjà vu” effect in the current Armenian foreign policy, and along with the continuing freeze in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, this could potentially lead to the isolation of Armenia over the next five years.

Ilgar Gurbanov is an analyst on Russia and Energy Affairs for the Turkey-based think-tank Strategic Outlook. 89

ADVERTISEMENT A Bull in a China Shop KamIl Całus

Elected in late 2011 as “president” of Transnistria, Yevgeny Shevchuk came to power on the promise of bringing order to the political and economic stagnation faced by the breakaway republic. But all the indications are that his policies have neither improved the demographic nor the economic situation.

The tiny breakaway Moldovan Republic of Transnistria has not been in such a bad economic situation since in 2006, when the country lost its opportunity to export products abroad due to a customs blockage by both Moldova and Ukraine. Transnistria’s two main companies, the core of the Transnistrian economy, have at some point generated a considerable amount of the republic’s export revenues. But these companies have practically not been in operation since January 2013. Other firms are doing everything possible to stay afloat, but their profits have also been sinking dramatically. For an economy heavily dependent on exports, and around 70 per cent of Transnistria’s GDP is indeed generated this way, such a situation is seriously dangerous. Contrary to claims made by the Transnistrian authorities, the real reason why the republic’s economy is on the edge is not the fault of Moldova, Ukraine nor any other country. The blame for the current crisis goes to nobody else but President Yevgeny Shevchuk himself and his economic policies.

A story of one company

The Transnistrian economy is an ephemeral system based on four large, industrial companies, inherited from the Soviet Union. For years the gem in this crown was the Moldovan Steel Works (in Russian Молдавский металлургический завод abbreviated as MMZ) in Rîbnița. Established in 1984 it was one of the most modern steel plants not only in the Soviet Union but the whole of Europe. Throughout the period of Transnistria’s unrecognised independence, this company has been Kamil Całus, A Bull in a China Shop Opinion and Analysis 91 providing employment to 3,000 people and generating a large portion of the republic’s budget revenue. The company’s boom years, in terms of profits, were the early 2000s when its steel sales were blooming and heavily watered with petrodollars and Russia’s construction market. In 2006, just like the entire export-oriented Transnistrian economy, MMZ experienced a severe crisis and was forced to cease production for a period of time. At that time, Moldova would allow Transnistrian companies to engage in foreign trade but only on one condition. They had to be registered in Chișinău. Not surprisingly, the authorities of the breakaway territory immediately called this Yevgeny Shevchuk’s energy, condition “a customs blockade”. After a short young age and business past political crisis between Chișinău and Tiraspol, gave voters hope. the majority of Transnistrian firms had no choice but to succumb to Moldovan demands. Both governments even agreed, unofficially, that Moldovan customs officers could enter Transnistrian enterprises to check and seal the goods. There was only one condition – no Moldovan uniforms. Custom officers were, hence, doing their job in civilian clothes. The companies restarted their production, but the golden years of MMZ were long gone: the global economic crisis unavoidably had a negative effect on business. MMZ’s open hearth furnaces, which, even for technical reasons, should have been working ceaselessly, were, more and more frequently, switched off. The plant was kept alive only thanks to the tax breaks granted by the Transnistrian authorities and to the artificially low prices for natural gas for which Transnistrian companies pay. However, in the early months of 2013 MMZ even lost this privilege when, owing to the new government’s decision, the prices of natural gas increased. The plant then halted its production. Its fate, for similar reasons, was shared by another large Transnistrian company – the Rîbnița-based cement factory. Next in line was Moldovskay GRES – the power plant in Dnestrovsc and the main provider of Moldova’s electric energy. Relying on natural gas as an energy source, the power plant had no choice but to frantically start seeking other sources of fuel. For financial reasons, the company also had to halt its exports to Romania.

Radical change

Elected in late 2011 as “president” of the breakaway territory of Transnistria, Yevgeny Shevchuk came to power on the promise of bringing order and introducing radical change to the political and economic stagnation faced by Transnistria. His energy, young age and business past gave voters hope that under Shevchuk’s rule the situation would indeed change and the failing economy could be rebuilt. The 92 Opinion and Analysis Kamil Całus, A Bull in a China Shop

common belief was that mass emigration, which had significantly reduced the population of the republic (by around 250,000) since 1990, would finally stop. The new president’s first steps were quite drastic, although economically justified. Thanks to some significant cuts, a certain degree of control over the budget was regained. The numbers speak for themselves: Sooner or later, Transnistria in 2009 the expenses were almost three times will have to start regulating larger than the revenues, in 2010 twice as large, its gas debt, which is growing while in 2012 the budget was implemented with as much as 70 per cent of the money coming at an alarming rate. from domestic taxes. For a while it seemed that the new leader would be capable of undertaking serious economic reforms and at least partially fix the ineffective model of the Transnistrian economy. However, the changes introduced by the new government only brought a very short-term effect. No cuts were introduced to what is seen as the budget’s greatest burden, namely the pension system, which hasn’t been reformed since the collapse of the Soviet Union. At the moment there is less than one (0.75 per cent) employee for each retiree. In 2012 this unfavourable proportion generated a burden of 172 million dollars, amounting to as much 61 per cent of all state budget expenses. Trimming administrative expenses is probably the only positive thing that can be said about Shevchuk’s economic policy. Otherwise, the majority of Shevchuk’s economic decisions make him look, more and more, like a bull in a china shop. This label can be given, in particular, to two important decisions which Shevchuk made in late 2012, and which put Transnistria in the current dire economic situation: the decision to increase gas prices for businesses, and introducing limitations on transferring cash abroad.

Terrible effects In December 2012 Shevchuk presented his proposal to increase gas prices by about 70 per cent to the Transnistrian High Council. Not surprisingly, both the parliamentarians and owners of the largest companies were enraged. For years they had had a low rate of 137 US dollars per cubic metre; a rate which is practically unheard anywhere else and which obviously, was artificial. The official price that Gazprom charges Transnistria for natural gas, which is distributed by Moldovan operator MoldovaGaz, is currently 391 dollars per 1000 cubic metres. In fact, Transnistria had actually not paid its gas bills for quite some time, something the Kremlin-controlled Gazprom seemed to have turned a blind eye to. Shevchuk, while proposing a radical increase in the price of this resource explained that the price re-evaluation would make the economy more effective. This view was strongly opposed by the entrepreneurs who pointed out that it would result in a decrease in the competitiveness of Transnistrian firms. Kamil Całus, A Bull in a China Shop Opinion and Analysis 93

Eventually, the parliament passed a compromising bill. It introduced a 17 per cent price increase, starting in January 2013. The logic behind the bill was that that the increase would bring bigger revenue from gas sales, while maintaining profitability of production. However, it quickly turned out that even a small increase was enough to halt the activity of half of the industry of Transnistria, leading to a drastic decrease in budget revenues. In early 2013 both MMZ and the cement factory completely stopped production. Not being able to produce and export, they also stopped paying taxes even though before they had paid a guaranteed 15-20 per cent of their revenue to the state budget. In addition, the companies stopped using gas, which generated even more losses for the Transnistrian coffers. Although it is difficult to estimate precisely the scale of the losses, it is safe to say that monthly, it reaches approximately tens of millions of dollars. These numbers may get even bigger as the Dnestrovsc-based power plant, one of the biggest consumers of natural gas, is planning to change its source of energy for economic reasons. However, according to some unofficial and unconfirmed information, the Transnistrian authorities have already been preparing a new law which would force the plant’s management to produce at least some electricity from burning natural gas. Other economic decisions made by Shevchuk have had similar effects. The laws aimed at halting the process of cash transfers have hit the largest Transnistria holding company – Sheriff (which has been transferring large amounts of cash to foreign tax havens).1 Sheriff is a company which, under the rule of Transnistria’s previous president, Igor Smirnov, enjoyed a special status and privilege which allowed it to build a true economic empire. It had the right to trade on the territory of the republic both in Transnistrian roubles and foreign currency. Based on special agreements, Sheriff had no obligation to pay customs, and the company would transfer its profits abroad, mainly to Cyprus, in unlimited amounts. These profits would then be used to buy goods to sell in Transnistria. In late December 2012 Shevchuk issued a decree putting an end to these privileges and forced Sheriff to pay customs on the money that was leaving Transnistria or pay the 25 per cent intermediary fees to the Transnistrian Republican Bank. And even though this decision did not have the same effect on Sheriff’s activity as the increase in gas prices had on MMZ and the cement factory, the company’s revenue, along with it the amount of taxes it pays to the state, have both decreased. Consequently, analysts are already predicting that 2013 will not bring the success

1 As the largest conglomerate in Transnistria, Sheriff owns a chain of petrol stations, supermarkets, media companies, construction companies, and other businesses in Transnistria. 94 Opinion and Analysis Kamil Całus, A Bull in a China Shop

of 2012 in limiting the budget deficit. With a fall in income from taxes in 2012, budget expenses will most likely be twice as much as the expected revenue. Nothing but politics Shevchuk’s economic decisions are nothing but politics. The decree on cash transfers abroad was directed at the Sheriff holding company, which controls and finances the political party – Obnovlenie. Currently having a majority in the Transnistrian High Council, the party is not hiding its opposition to the president. By weakening Sheriff, Shevchuk has weakened his main political opponent, although this is not the only reason for the president’s fight with the company. Shevchuk came to power with significant social support, but without the business and administrative backing that his predecessor, Igor Smirnov, had enjoyed. Since the beginning of his presidency, Shevchuk had to build his own position by placing people he could trust in different state institutions and by building his own budget revenue. This is why, it shouldn’t be excluded that the attack on Sheriff is a part of a greater attempt to take control of the holding company. The increase in gas prices alone cannot harm Sheriff, as the firms which are controlled by the holding company do not use Today, one in every three much of this resource (unlike the large industrial inhabitants of Transnistria enterprises), and are immune to any potential is ready to start a better price fluctuations. Shevchuk has been fully aware of this, which is the reasoning behind life abroad. the cash transfer law – the most sensitive area for companies engaged in trade and services. Thus, Shevchuk has had a double win. First, he has weakened his opponent, Sheriff, by making it very difficult for them to operate; and second, by forcing Sheriff to use a middleman, the government-controlled bank, the president has gained insight into the enterprise’s finances. While the decisions aimed at weakening Sheriff can be explained by Shevchuk’s personal interests, it is difficult to explain why the Transnistrian leader decided to increase the natural gas prices, which has led to a decrease of budget revenue. According to official declarations, this decision was meant to realign the functioning of the Transnistrian economy. It is clear that, sooner or later, the republic will have to start regulating its gas debt, which is growing at a frightening rate. In the first nine months of 2012, the debt increased by 600 million US dollars and is now estimated to be at around 3.7 billion dollars. However, if Shevchuk’s intention was indeed to save the Transnistrian economy from falling into an even greater debt, he has chosen an extremely weak road. The effects of the increased energy prices could have been easily foreseen and it is difficult to believe that the administration was not aware of the consequences of this poor economic decision. Perhaps there was another reason? Kamil Całus, A Bull in a China Shop Opinion and Analysis 95

Perhaps Shevchuk’s intention was to force Moscow to offer some additional help or concessions? Price increases have had the worst effect on businesses owned by Russian oligarchs (both MMZ and cement factory are owned by Alisher Usmanov) and the Russian treasury (the Dnestrovsc power plant is owned by the Russian state energy group Inter RAO UES). By increasing prices, Shevchuk has acquired more strength in negotiations with Moscow and can now build his own position. All in all, Shevchuk’s latest economic decisions are aimed at reaching two goals. First, they have enforced his internal position by weakening the opposition and preparing the foundation for a power struggle within Sheriff. Second, they have put pressure on Moscow, which, in the interests of its entrepreneurs and oligarchs, will probably need to channel some additional financial aid to Transnistria. This is very probable; and Russia’s vice prime minister, Dmitry Rogozin has already promised the support of about 25 million euros during his visit to Tiraspol on May 9th 2013.

Glass half full The economic situation in Transnistria does not give much reason for optimism. The budget revenue is decreasing and the state is more and more willing to use the resources it collects on gas which, in fact, should be used to pay off the Gazprom debt. The chances of people finding a well-paid job in Transnistria are becoming more and more unlikely and have led to even greater emigration. Today, one in every three inhabitants of Transnistria is prepared to leave and start a better life abroad. President Shevchuk, at least for the moment, is concentrated on building his own position internally, although at the high cost of a deteriorating economy; which from his perspective comes across as favourable and advantageous. The social discontent with the president’s policies is growing, although for the moment there seems to be no alternative (support for the president is still at around 50 per cent). Hence, Shevchuk can risk the social discontent and strengthen his position in the government structures without worrying much about how to keep power. In addition, it can’t be expected that even with a further decline in production and exports the Transnistrian budget will completely collapse. Keeping this breakaway territory afloat is in Moscow’s economic and political interest. Quite probably, if needed, Russia would, provide Tiraspol the necessary help. This, however, will not change the negative demographic trend nor halt the republic’s further depopulation.

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Kamil Całus is a Moldovan Affairs Specialist at the Warsaw-based Center for Eastern Studies (OSW) and an author of an OSW Commentary: “An aided economy. The characteristics of the Transnistrian economic model” (available on-line on osw.waw.pl/en/). All Quiet on the Southern Front?

ida orzechoWska

Fourteen years after the 1999 NATO bombings of the Balkans, the political leaders in Belgrade and Pristina are heading towards the normalisation of mutual relations and integration with the European Union. The April 19th 2013 agreement leaves the past behind and opens a new chapter in Balkan history.

“Wherever I may go, I will always return. Nobody can tear Kosovo away from my soul,” begins the Serbian patriotic folk song Vidovdan (the same name given to St. Vitus Day, which takes place on June 28th in the Georgian Calendar, the day of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389). The song was recorded and released in 1989 to commemorate the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, and not only memorialises the battle, but demonstrates the enormous emotional and symbolic importance of Kosovo in Serbian political and social thinking. The importance of which has paralysed any political development over the past two decades resulting in blood, tears and sorrow; and which has, at least to some extent, constituted the Serbian national identity. Kosovo enjoyed the status of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo (of Kosovo and Metohija until 1974) within the federal state of Yugoslavia, and contrary to the six former-Yugoslav republics was not been granted the constitutional right to secession. Until the 1970s the proportion of Albanians in the ethnic structure of the province did not exceed 70 per cent, whereas today it is estimated at some 93 per cent. The proportion of Serbs in Kosovo has declined mainly due to the high birth rate in the Albanian communities in Kosovo and the intense migration of Serbs out of the region. However, Serbs still constitute about 95 per cent of population in North Kosovo which comprises about 11 per cent of Kosovo’s territory. Even more important, in Serbian perception, is that Kosovo still remains the birthplace of Serbian identity Ida Orzechowska, All Quiet on the Southern Front? Opinion and Analysis 97 and statehood, and the loss of the province represents not only a loss of a territory (even though the territory is relatively rich in natural resources and geopolitically important), but a symbolic resignation of the foundation of the Serbian political system and a break from the idea of a powerful Serbia leading the region. The declaration of independence in 2008 was a direct consequence of the 1999 NATO bombing and strong international pressure; and it should have been clear in Belgrade in the 1990s that Kosovo was a finished story, and in order to move forward politicians could not follow Slobodan Milošević’s nationalistic discourse.

Lost decade

It took almost fifteen years, nine prime ministers and four presidents until this was understood in Serbia. Most likely, if Zoran Ðinđić (Prime Minister of Serbia between 2001-2003) had not been assassinated in March 2003 by criminals related to the Serbian special forces and the mafia, the compromise would have been reached much earlier and would probably have been more beneficial for Serbia than it is today, allowing Serbia to have closed several negotiation chapters with the European Union by now. When Tomislav Nikolić (President of Serbia since 2012) and Ivica Dačić (Prime The responsibility to make Minister of Serbia since 2012) won the election in May last year, the majority of analysts sure this agreement has commented that it was a final step backwards substantial results lies with and the end of Serbia’s possible quick return to the international community. Europe. Surprisingly, they were the ones who built the team, together with Milošević’s former spokesman Aleksander Vučić (First Deputy Prime Minister of Serbia and minister of defence since 2012), finally signing the agreement with the EU and making the step through the door to Brussels. On April 19th 2013, after six months of talks between Dačić and Hashim Thaçi (Prime Minister of Kosovo since 2008), mediated by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, an agreement on the normalisation of the Belgrade-Pristina relations was reached and initialled. By April 22nd the agreement had been accepted by the governments in both capitals and the European Commission announced that negotiations for accession to the EU should be opened with Serbia, and a Stabilisation and Association Agreement should be launched with Kosovo. Thus, it seems as though everything is happening extremely easily, quickly and painlessly since the agreement was signed. Even the protests on the streets of Serbia and North Kosovo have not been particularly intense. But does the agreement bring any innovative solutions and compromise the interests of Serbia and Kosovo? Or is the conciliation rather a symptom of exhaustion of 98 Opinion and Analysis Ida Orzechowska, All Quiet on the Southern Front?

Photo: European Commission

Kosovan Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi with José Manuel Barroso, European Commission President. Kosovo hopes that the compromise on the normalisation of the Belgrade-Pristina relations will keep it on its path to the EU.

the generation (to phrase Erich Remarque) “whose business through the years has been killing”, whose “first calling in life was killing”, whose “knowledge of life is limited to death”? Blurry and old

The very first impression when reading the text of the agreement is how vague it is. This does not just result in a massive risk of never-ending negotiations over the interpretation and implementation of the solutions included in the agreement; it creates the possibility that the entire agreement will only remain on paper and will never be implemented, whereas the win-lose relationship has already been established between the parties and will have catastrophic consequences for the processes of regional reconciliation. The great responsibility here lies in the international community which has to supervise the implementation and make sure the agreement will have substantial results. It will otherwise create a danger that Kosovo will turn into a second Bosnia, divided by a temporary agreement with no perspective for the future. This agreement, however, determines that all the international organisations will stay on the ground for many years, and Kosovo itself will remain a quasi-state governed and managed externally, mainly in Washington. Furthermore, as Article 14 of the Agreement Ida Orzechowska, All Quiet on the Southern Front? Opinion and Analysis 99 says: “It is agreed that neither side will block, or encourage others to block, the other side’s progress in their respective EU path.” Not only will talks between Belgrade and Brussels start very soon, but the European way has been clearly opened to Kosovo and should be perceived as a forecast of the planned signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo (both arguments have been confirmed in the report released on April 22nd by the European Commission). Together, this will create an extremely interesting but also challenging Kosovo is the birthplace situation in which the EU integration process will of Serbian identity be strongly influenced by a non-European actor – the United States. and statehood. The second crucial observation made during the reading is on how many of the solutions included in the outline (e.g. the association of municipalities and its competences, the integration of Kosovo Serb judges into the Kosovan judicial system, etc.) resemble the provisions of the Ahtisaari Plan, rejected in Belgrade by Vojslav Koštunica (Prime Minister of Serbia between 2004-2008) and Boris Tadić (President of Serbia between 2004-2012). Why wasn’t this agreement made back then? Is it the disastrous economic situation in Serbia and the hopes for external financial support that has forced the political elites to resolve the Kosovo issue, start negotiation talks with the EU and pursue further negotiations over the IMF Stand-By Arrangement? Obviously yes, but only to some extent. In 2008, Tadić could have still hoped that Kosovo would remain unrecognised on the international arena and would be unable to operate as a state. Moreover, he tried to develop a political concept which would compromise the societal resentments, the idea of a strong state and the pro-European approach. He succeeded in defeating the popular reluctance towards the West, but lacked the courage to act on both the Western and Southern front and resign on Kosovo in order to follow the European path. The current leaders – Nikolić, Dačić and Vučić follow both the European path and the nationalistic narrative. And it seems that it is easier for society – which still loves Kosovo, but is fed up with the stagnation and crisis – to accept the compromise over Kosovo and Metohija (the name of the region covering the south-western part of Kosovo – editor’s note) made by politicians who repeat over and over again that Serbia and Serbs are the leaders of the region and should never comprise their national interests, values and beliefs.

Clash of sovereignties

The agreement is far from a de jure recognition of Kosovo. However, many in Belgrade and throughout the country have commented that the agreement was a 100 Opinion and Analysis Ida Orzechowska, All Quiet on the Southern Front?

de facto recognition of the independence of Kosovo and ask how legitimate it is, to all legal intents and purposes, and particularly the Serbian constitution which clearly states in its preamble that the citizens of Serbia consider that: “The Province of Kosovo and Metohija is an integral part of the territory of Serbia, that it has the status of a substantial autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia and that from such status of the Province of Kosovo and Metohija follow constitutional obligations of all state bodies to uphold and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and foreign political relations.” Moreover, in the text of the agreement (unofficial so far), the name Kosovo has been used without the asterisk and is not followed by the footnote: “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo Declaration of Independence,” as it was supposed to be, according to the agreement between Belgrade and Pristina dating back to February 2012. This might imply confirmation of a state status and is interpreted by many as one, although the Serbian party are expected to insist that the official version of the agreement contains the asterisk. What is sure so far is that Serbia de facto recognises Pristina’s authority over North Kosovo, and the provisions given in the agreement to the Serbian municipalities are very general and will most likely limit the responsibilities of a well-functioning local government in compliance with the European Charter of Local Self-government. The agreement terminates, at least for a few years, the disputes regarding the partition, the far reaching decentralisation or even federalisation of Kosovo. The crucial change is that the local government will operate under Kosovan law and the structures referred to by the Quint and the Albanians as “parallel structures” (the police and local government etc., elected and operating under Serbian law in the territory of North Kosovo) will be liquidated, finally cutting the remaining links between Kosovan Serbs and Serbia. Dačić emphasised that the provision given in Article 14 of the agreement has been amended and the statement that Serbia must not block Kosovo in international organisations has been removed and replaced with a declaration limited to membership of the EU. This small Serbian success refers obviously to the membership of Kosovo in the UN, which would definitively confirm the international recognition of its state status, but doesn’t actually change anything given the fact that Kosovo has been already recommended to sign the Stabilisation and Association Agreement – which can only be signed with a state. The article of the greatest meaning for the Kosovan Serbs is Article 9, which establishes the institution of a Serbian Police Regional Commander, and provides that the composition of the Kosovan Police in the North will reflect the ethnic composition of the population of the four municipalities. However, this should be supported by an assurance that the Kosovan armed forces Ida Orzechowska, All Quiet on the Southern Front? Opinion and Analysis 101 may not enter the northern part without NATO’s authorisation, unless in critical situations such as earthquakes, etc. Dačić claims he has received such provision from NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, although it is still not part of the agreement and remains unclear how the safety of the local Serbs will be secured. Similarly, the agreement does not include any solutions regarding the presence of the Kosovan special police (ROSU) in the north, the activities of Trepca North (an industrial complex in Mitrovica) or the functioning of the divided city of Mitrovica. Moreover, it gives very few responsibilities to the Serbs from the North and does not guarantee their participation in the implementation committee.

Between theory and practice

The month following the signing of the agreement elapsed in a political and societal climate of disputes, pushy expectations and deadlocks. The dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina over the implementation plan was initially announced to be completed by April 26th; however the parties failed to reach an agreement and the deadlines have been shifted again. As the provisions of the agreement remain extremely general, they require further specification included into the implementation plan. “Every comma, every full stop needs to be irreversible,” in order to guarantee a well-functioning implementation of the normalisation process, said the Serbian Minister of Justice Nikola Selaković. The crucial disagreements during the negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo concern Articles 7, 8, 9 and 10 of the agreement (which refer mainly to the provisions on the Kosovo police and Kosovo courts), although the Kosovan delegation have accused Serbia of raising new issues which are not part of the agreement, and have called on the Serbs to “clarify the dilemmas they have”. “A swift implementation of the agreement is of key importance,” underlined Catherine Ashton after the talks on May 8th proved not to bring any positive outcomes. The later visit to the Balkans paid by the German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle confirmed, however, that the key importance refers mainly to Serbia and the European Council’s session which took place on June 27-28th, when the decision will be made on a date for the start of the accession talks, whereas putting the April deal into practice remains a key requirement for the advancement of EU integration. The negotiations over the implementation plan and the proceeding implementation itself represent the most challenging part of the whole process of normalising mutual relations. As far as the initial agreement reflects the political will and readiness to move forward, the way the agreement is put into practice is what will create the biggest threats and opportunities for the governments in Belgrade and Pristina, as 102 Opinion and Analysis Ida Orzechowska, All Quiet on the Southern Front?

well as for the Serbs in the North and the EU. Dačić and Thaçi finally reached the draft agreement on the implementation plan in two days of talks in Brussels on May 22nd and 23rd, but have already announced further high-level dialogue over the specific solutions to be implemented. The draft text of the plan includes three groups of issues. The first concerns the adaptation of the legal systems to The implementation of the the requirements of the agreement that agreement will be the most will be carried on by newly built working groups. The second group of issues includes challenging part of the process the formation of the Community of Serb of normalising relations. majority municipalities in Kosovo to be created after the elections organised with the support of the OSCE; and the third group relates to the way the agreement can be applied in the field of police and justice, which should be specified by the end of the year. The generality of the provisions suggests that the aim of the dialogue was to rather reach a political agreement and confirm the unity of the goals for Serbia and Kosovo, and not to agree on the specifics of the implementation process. As it seems impossible to design the implementation of the somewhat breakthrough April agreement within a month or two, the strong pressure from Brussels to agree on the implementation plan as soon as possible creates a significant risk of dangerous shortcomings, omissions and misunderstandings. Moreover, the consensus over the draft implementation plan from May 22nd proves that both Belgrade and Pristina are willing to pay a price for the integration offer from Brussels.

A win-win solution

Undoubtedly, the provisions of the agreement are far being more beneficial for the Kosovan Albanians; but it is the Serbs who are the real winners. Kosovo remains a place where Balkan security dynamics cross and the conflict over Kosovo itself has not yet been resolved, although the agreement is of a great symbolic meaning and turns on the light at the end of the long Balkan tunnel. Serbia has lost Kosovo, but has won a future – a future which is uncertain due to the very limited enlargement capabilities of the EU, but which has the chance not to be limited anymore to narrow-minded politics. Moreover, the enthusiastic international reaction and the almost automatic response of the European Council give a clear message to the whole region that there is still a common voice in Brussels. This seems particularly important for Macedonia which was granted EU candidate status back in 2005 and whose negotiations, as well as NATO membership, are being blocked by the name dispute with Greece. Ida Orzechowska, All Quiet on the Southern Front? Opinion and Analysis 103

The April 19th agreement is a very small but very important step on the road to regional reconciliation. It shows that there is still courage and will in the Balkans to move forward. Kosovo will remain a symbol for Serbia, but may not only be a symbol of the powerful past, but a symbol of a mighty future.

Ida Orzechowska is a PhD candidate at the Institute of Political Science of the University of Wrocław, Poland, and obtained a degree in political science. Her main research interests relate to international security, the Western Balkans and conflict studies.

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Your opinion matters to us! Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK

keLLy hiGnett

In 2014 restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian immigration will be lifted in the United Kingdom, opening the doors to migrants willing to live and work in the UK. But the current economic and political atmosphere has led to immigration being an extremely contentious subject. Is the rhetoric in the media in line with the reality?

Immigration has long been a subject of controversy and contention in the United Kingdom, garnering strong reactions in both the political and the public sphere. In 1948 the British Nationality Act encouraged citizens of the British Empire to migrate to the UK and contribute to the domestic labour market. However, increasing levels of migration in the decades following the Second World War contributed to rising socio-economic tensions in many areas, resulting in a series of “race riots”. In April 1968, Conservative MP Enoch Powell caused a political storm with his infamous “Rivers of Blood” speech, outlining the dire consequences that he believed would result from unrestricted Commonwealth immigration which led to his dismissal from the Shadow Cabinet. Today, immigration remains an extremely contentious subject in the UK. However, attention has shifted away from the Commonwealth and focused on migration from Central and Eastern Europe. Data from the most recent UK census suggested that in 2011, 2.7 million residents in the UK originated from elsewhere in the European Union, of which 1.1 million came from “new” EU members – countries that had joined the European Union in either 2004 or 2007. Following both EU enlargements, the UK media regularly ran scare stories about increased immigration from the former Eastern Bloc, concerns that appeared to be justified when the levels of immigration to the UK from Central and Eastern Europe (and from Poland in particular) were revealed to have far exceeded the numbers predicted by government organisations. Kelly Hignett, Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK Opinion and Analysis 105

Polish invasion Since the start of this year, a growing tide of negative rhetoric has fuelled concerns about the imminent possibility of a second wave of migration from the East, when existing transitional restrictions on the employment of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals are lifted on January 1st 2014. Increased levels of public concern over migration from the East have fuelled political posturing, as leading politicians compete to reassure the electorate of their commitment to dealing with “the immigration issue”. Much of the negative rhetoric about contemporary migration from Bulgaria and Romania has been influenced by the legacy of the 2004 Eastern EU enlargement. When eight countries joined the EU in May of that year, most existing member states chose to impose transitional controls to regulate levels of migration between 2004-2011. Britain (along with Denmark and Ireland), was one of the few that did not. Labour leader Ed Miliband has since claimed that his party “got it wrong” by allowing unrestricted immigration from new EU member states in 2004, admitting they had “severely underestimated” the potential impact. Figures compiled by the Migration Policy Institute for Equality and Human Rights suggest that between May 2004 to September 2009 around 1.5 million citizens from the new EU member states travelled to the UK, although this figure included temporary migrants, with a permanent increase closer to 700,000, an increase dominated by Polish nationals, that far exceeded official predictions. While the government had predicted a likely increase of around 13,000 per year, the Polish population in the UK actually rose by around 521,000 by 2011. Such a large influx occurring within such a short time span has had a very visible impact in many areas of the UK, particularly as the existence of previously established Polish communities encouraged many new migrants to cluster in certain areas. Data from the 2011 UK census even suggested that Polish had 106 Opinion and Analysis Kelly Hignett, Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK

become the official “second language” in England and Wales, with 546,000 Polish speakers out of a total population of 56.1 million. Many tabloid newspapers responded negatively to this influx, making bad jokes about Polish plumbers and deriding the ubiquitous Polski Sklep that appeared in most British towns and cities. However, after peaking in 2006, numbers of Polish migrants in the UK have since declined with around 63 per cent spending less than a year in the UK before returning to Poland. More recently, this reverse migration has been further exacerbated by the financial downturn, austerity measures and rising unemployment in the UK.

Political posturing and public pressure

Research published by Oxford University’s Department of Social Policy and Intervention in May 2013 indicated that although British attitudes towards immigration had improved slightly during 2002-2010, overall UK attitudes remain more negative than anywhere else in the EU today except for Greece. Opinion polls suggest immigration is one of the greatest public concerns in the UK today, coming second only to the economy. Data compiled Rising public concern over by market research agency YouGov in May immigration has provoked 2013 indicates that over half of those surveyed believed that immigration to the UK should be a strong political response significantly reduced; 21 per cent believed the from all parties. impact of migration from Eastern Europe was “very bad” (an increase of 10 per cent compared with previous surveys), while 51 per cent were worried that they would lose their jobs to foreign workers over the next two years. Rising public concern has provoked a strong political response. The recent surge in support for the far right UK Independence Party (UKIP) has been linked to their hard-line stance on immigration and calls for the UK to leave the European Union. In local elections held in May 2013, UKIP averaged 26 per cent of the vote. With no General Election planned until 2015, it is unclear if UKIP will continue to build on or even maintain their current level of support. Leader Nigel Farage claims that UKIP are offering positive policy alternatives to those of the traditional mainstream UK parties, but critics have suggested UKIP’s current success represents a mid- term protest vote. Nevertheless, the other political parties appear to be taking the threat posed by UKIP seriously. Prime Minister David Cameron recently outlined plans for a new immigration bill designed to “attract people who will contribute but deter those who will not”. The proposed bill including proposals for reciprocal healthcare charges Kelly Hignett, Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK Opinion and Analysis 107 for foreign nationals, a cap on social benefits, introduction of a strict residency test to determine eligibility for state housing, requirements for private landlords to check the immigration status of tenants, are all designed to make the UK a less attractive prospect for citizens of other EU countries. Notably, Cameron has also promised to hold an “in-out” referendum about continued UK membership of the EU if he is re-elected in 2015.

The numbers game

According to the Office for National Statistics, by July 2012 94,000 Romanians and 47,000 Bulgarians were resident in the UK. There has been considerable speculation that the UK will face a further influx of Bulgarian and Romanian migrants from 2014. Some attempts to gauge the likely extent of future East-West migration flows have been made but predictions vary considerably. While UK based anti-immigration group MigrationWatch warn of a substantial increase of up to 500,000 Romanians per year from 2014, Romanian Ambassador Dr Ion Jinga has claimed that the yearly Surveys conducted in February total will be nearer 10,000. Bulgarian 2013 suggest that a large-scale ambassador Konstantin Dimitrov only predicts a small increase in the number influx of migrants from Romania of Bulgarians too, arguing that a loophole and Bulgaria is unlikely. in the transitional restrictions which allows migrants to come to the UK if they are registered as self-employed means that “most of those who wanted to find work in the UK have already done so”. Surveys conducted by Vitosha in February 2013 also suggest that any further large-scale influx is unlikely, as only one per cent of Romanians and four per cent of Bulgarians surveyed said they were actively looking for work in the UK, with over 60 per cent maintaining that they would only travel to the UK if they had a firm offer of employment before arrival. There is always a significant margin for error when calculating immigration statistics and the legacy of the aforementioned post-2004 miscalculations means that despite extensive political posturing, few are willing to make any firm predictions about future immigration levels. Direct comparisons between 2014 and 2004 are unhelpful, however, for a number of reasons. East-West migration depends on a combination of factors. In 2014 the restrictions on Bulgarian and Romanian immigration will also be lifted by eight other EU countries, providing migrants with a wide range of possible destinations. A recent report by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) has calculated that future Bulgarian and Romanian migrants are more likely to head to Spain, Italy, Greece, or Germany than the UK, drawn by the 108 Opinion and Analysis Kelly Hignett, Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK

presence of large existing émigré communities and greater cultural and linguistic similarity. Some analysts have suggested that the relative strength of domestic economic growth and unemployment levels in Bulgaria and Romania compared to many other EU countries (including the UK) at the present time may also reduce the number of those actively seeking employment overseas.

Rhetoric vs. reality

The UK media have acted as a strong driving force in the current immigration debate, shaping and reinforcing negative public opinion and campaigning for political action. Some sections of the UK press have actively encouraged scaremongering, reinforced outdated stereotypes and deliberately A significant degree portrayed Eastern European migrants in a of misinformation has been negative light, depicting them as a burdensome popularised by the UK press. drain on UK resources and as a serious social and economic threat. A significant degree of misinformation has been popularised by the UK press, but on closer inspection much of this negative rhetoric does not stand up to scrutiny. Rhetoric: A high percentage of Eastern European migrants are criminals. Increased immigration leads to increased crime. Reality: The UK media has frequently linked immigration to rising criminality and other forms of social deviance. There have been a flurry of such stories in recent years, including Alexander Boot’s claim in The Telegraph that Eastern European migrants statistically contribute more than their fair share to the UK crime rate, (although he failed to provide any hard evidence to support this hypothesis) and stories published in the Daily Express earlier this year claiming that Britain was suffering a “crime wave” committed by Eastern European migrants. However, a recent study by the UK Association of Chief Police Officers concluded that, contrary to popular opinion, increased levels of immigration from Central and Eastern Europe since 2004 had not fuelled a rise in crime, with criminality among these migrant communities being in line with the rate of offending among the general population. More recently, research undertaken by academics at the London School of Economics highlighted the “paucity of credible empirical evidence” linking immigration to increased crime. Instead, researchers found that levels of criminality, including violent crime and property crime, often declined in areas that had experienced a significant influx of Eastern European migrants. The report concluded that “the view that foreigners commit more crime is not true… just like natives: if they have a good job and a good income they don’t commit crime”. Kelly Hignett, Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK Opinion and Analysis 109

Rhetoric: Much Eastern European immigration is fuelled by “benefit tourism”. Migrants deliberately target the UK to take advantage of generous social security benefits and abuse the National Health Service. The large influx of immigrants in recent years has also put pressure on essential state services including housing, healthcare and schools. Reality: The media myth that migrants come to the UK to engage in “benefit tourism” is problematic in a number of respects. Firstly, migrants from Central and Eastern Europe (and other EU member states) do not have automatic, unrestricted access to social security benefits on their arrival in the UK. EU migrants are required to have held 12 months continuous employment and must pass a “habitual residency test” to prove they are actively seeking work before they are eligible to claim either jobseekers allowance or rental support. The lack of easy access to state welfare services is also evidenced by rising levels of homelessness among Central and Eastern European migrants, many of whom lose their jobs only to discover they are ineligible for welfare support. Data compiled by UK charities in 2010 suggest that Eastern Europeans may now account for around 40 per cent of rough sleepers in London.

No evidence

While cases of welfare abuse do exist, data compiled by the UK Department for Work and Pensions in 2012 suggested that only around 5 per cent of EU migrants of working age resident in the UK were claiming unemployment benefits, compared to 13 per cent of native Britons. The Centre for Research and Analysis of Migration (CReAM) say that Eastern European migrants are also 58 per cent less likely than their British-born counterparts to live in social housing. The London based NGO Medicans du Monde found no evidence of health tourism among migrants who had accessed their services 2004-2007, with many actively preferring to return to their country of origin if they required medical treatment. Demographic data compiled by both NIESR and the Migration Policy Institute indicates that between 2004-2012, 70 per cent of the estimated 1.5 million Eastern Europeans who came to work in the UK were young (aged 18-35), single, childless and economically skilled, with a relatively high level of education and some kind of professional qualification. If this demographic pattern continues beyond 2014 (which seems likely) then future migrants will largely be fit, healthy and economically active, which makes it unlikely that they will prove a significant drain on welfare, healthcare and other social services, although NIESR concede that if more migrants choose to settle in the UK in the longer-term, pressure on lower-range rental properties and schools may increase in certain areas. 110 Opinion and Analysis Kelly Hignett, Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK

Another common claim is that EU migrants are taking jobs that could be done by British nationals, at a time when the unemployment rate is extremely high (UK unemployment was recently estimated to total 2.56 million). The Daily Mail recently cited studies claiming that EU migrants were 7 per cent more likely to be employed than British-born citizens. However, the Daily Mail didn’t mention that the majority of these migrants (over 50 per cent, including those with a high level of professional qualifications) often “down-skill” and are concentrated in low paid, manual labour, compared with just 18 per cent of their British counterparts. Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe often take on positions that UK businesses claim they find it difficult to fill from the domestic labour market and are frequently praised by employers for their hard work ethic. In April 2013, a European Commission report concluded that there was “no evidence” of EU migrants taking jobs away from British workers. A further report by the Migration Policy Institute concluded that the overall impact of post-2004 EU migration on the UK economy has been “small but positive” while CReAM went one step further, stating that EU migrants are actually net contributors to the UK economy, paying 30 per cent more in taxes than they receive from public services on average. Negative implications

The negative (and often misleading) media-fuelled rhetoric that has come to dominate both political and popular discourse on immigration from Central and Eastern Europe in the UK has a number of worrying implications. Rising resentment, suspicion and prejudice have increased discrimination and violence against those immigrants in the UK. As Nils Muiznieks, the Council of Europe’s human rights commissioner, told the Guardian The continuation of negative newspaper in March 2013, “The UK debate rhetoric could damage has taken a worrying turn … it depicts lower- skilled migrants as dangerous foreigners … relations between the UK (and) risks feeding stereotypes and hostility and other European states. towards migrants”. Today, migrants from Central and Eastern Europe frequently report exploitation and discrimination in the workplace, and many have been subjected to racist violence. According to the organisation Human Rights First, attacks on migrants from the newest EU member states have become “a major new component of hate crime violence” in the UK. On a political level, the continuation of negative rhetoric also has the potential to damage relations between the UK and other European states. Several high ranking Bulgarian and Romanian officials have already condemned recent UK Kelly Hignett, Fearing the East? European immigration in the UK Opinion and Analysis 111 media coverage and policy proposals as a “hostile propaganda campaign” directed against their countryman. The available evidence suggests that any population transfer from Bulgaria and Romania to the UK following the lifting on transitional restrictions next year will be small, relatively diffuse and predominantly comprised of young, skilled, economically active migrants. However, the negative rhetoric that has come to dominate significant sections of the media, influencing political posturing and shaping popular opinion here in the UK looks set to continue. While immigration will almost certainly form a key issue in the 2015 UK General Election, it should not be viewed as an isolated issue. Heightened concerns about Eastern European migration intersect with numerous domestic political issues: the handling of the current economic crisis; recent government cuts to social security, healthcare, education and other essential state services; proposals to reform and restructure state welfare and the NHS and Britain’s future relationship with the EU. There is a real danger that immigration will be used as a convenient scapegoat for many of these issues. While there are important questions to be asked about the likely future impact of migration from Central and Eastern Europe on the UK, the current dialogue, fuelled by high degrees of misinformation and prejudice, is counterproductive. Instead, we should encourage the development of a more constructive discourse, shifting away from the focus on the “numbers debate”, acknowledging both positive and negative aspects of immigration, with discussions framed around facts and evidence-based analysis rather than outdated stereotypes, misinformed conjecture and false rhetoric. Unfortunately, at the present time, such a development seems unlikely.

Kelly Hignett is a historian and lecturer at Leeds Metropolitan University in the United Kingdom. She specialises in crime and social deviance in the Central and Eastern European region and the former USSR. She also writes a popular blog, The View East. Filling in the Gaps of Democracy

A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski, Executive Director of the European Endowment for Democracy. Interviewer: Adam Reichardt

ADAM REICHARDT: The European general European approach to democracy Endowment for Democracy has support as a moral concept. emerged as an initiative credited Among the original supporters even to the Polish foreign minister before 2010, I would mention Markus Radosław Sikorski. How would you Meckel from Germany, who on several describe the origins and aims of this occasions brought up such an idea. Some of organisation? this energy is probably what stimulated the JERZY POMIANOWSKI: The initiative European Union to create the European as we see it now and as it has developed Instrument for Democracy and Human during the last two years was brought to Rights (EIDHR) – which is still a relatively the attention of the European Union and new instrument, adopted formally in its members states by Minister Sikorski 2006. The creation of the EIDHR shows just after the collapse of the democratic that the European approach to the ideas process in Belarus on December 19th of democracy support, especially during 2010. But it is important to admit that the last ten years, has been developing this was just the right moment to bring and becoming more and more present in back an idea that had been floated several European debate. Having said that, we can times in the past. Politicians, scholars and now better understand how the political experts at think tanks had been calling impetus of Minister Sikorski reached a on Europe to create a mechanism that certain audience that was already rather is similar to the National Endowment receptive to the idea. Plus, it was a key for Democracy (in the United States) moment in time to do so: the collapse of for quite some time. This mechanism the democratic process in Belarus and needed to be somewhat independent and just two weeks before the revolution in flexible, but at the same represent the Tunisia. Filling in the Gaps of Democracy, A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski Opinion and Analysis 113

What was the reaction to the call take. One suggestion was the form of an for creating a European Endowment international organisation, such as the for Democracy? OECD or OSCE. The second proposition Obviously, the political energy and was that it be established as a private political context gave a lot of support foundation which would make it less to the idea. It became part of one of the dependent on governments and political priorities of the Polish Presidency of the pressure. This second option ended up EU in 2011. This gave us an additionally being chosen and the Endowment became strong position to pursue this idea, using an independent NGO. At the same time formal instruments of the EU which are in the governing structure is very much the hands of every rotating presidency. like an international organisation. All But let’s not forget that at the same time member states represented by their there was a significant degree of criticism appointed representatives. vis-à-vis EU funding for democracy support as over-bureaucratic, slow and So they can change over time? not able to address the complexity of the In fact, they already have been changing, needs of people in a rapidly changing which means that this governing structure political environment. This criticism is very much based on the particular was also present during this initial foreign policy concepts and influence of process of setting up the Endowment. the member states. Some might see this In the beginning we did not have initial as a weakness to the governing structure, overwhelming support. On the contrary, but on the other hand it can also be seen there was a lot of reluctance and debate. as a strength. With representatives of the Many asked “do we need this?” or “is there foreign ministry, we can imagine that any specific reason to create one more the discussions within the Endowment institution that duplicates already existing could provide a political validation to its institutions?” All of these arguments were actions. Nevertheless, the discussion on on the table. We addressed them and issues within the governing body provides at the same time we had to modify our a flavour of political consensus. These concept in order to address the criticism, ideas and debates which may start within much of which was justifiable. the Endowment’s governing council can then be transferred to more formal How will people differentiate political bodies such as the EU foreign between the EED and other EU affairs council, where the very same instruments? Technically, how does actors (ministers of foreign affairs) are it work? debating key EU policies vis-à-vis the Once we achieved political support very same partners. for the project, we had to figure out what form this new institution would 114 Interview Filling in the Gaps of Democracy, A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski

Basically, the Endowment could become Brussels, decide on the procedures and a mechanism to “pre-cook” positions or applications and basically carry out the motions, but limited to specific areas of day-to-day work of the Endowment. support for beneficiaries and priorities of the Endowment. What are the first priorities of the Endowment? It sounds as if the Endowment is Geographically, we are clear. This is a politically governed organisation, the European Neighbourhood. The 15 not particularly independent from states, or rather societies, as they do EU politics... not deal directly with the governments, In order to make this governance less that live around the EU – six from the political, we have additional elements Eastern Partnership and nine from the on the governing board. This includes Middle East and North Africa. The Euro-parliamentarians who represent thematic priorities are basically where themselves by name, as well as three we see a specific niche or need for the representatives from EU-based NGOs Endowment. It’s important to remember who are elected to join. Yes, it is true that the Endowment is not going to that the majority of the governing board replace any existing instruments, so the is made up of the member states, but whole concept of the Endowment is to we do have a strong group from the EU identify and to fill the gaps where other parliament, a group of representatives formal funders cannot reach. So we of NGOs, as well as EU institutional assign ourselves the role of “gap-filler” representatives from the EU commission or “bridging funders”. and the EU external action service. This Of course, the Endowment is political. is a huge a 42-person body, which will So we focus ourselves on the groups debate and decide on the priorities of and projects that are very connected to the Endowment. political activism. For example, groups, The funding decisions, however, are leaders or media that are politically active made in the executive committee, which in the struggle for power, in the struggle is made up of only seven people. Here each to decide and declare strategies for their element is represented: NGO, parliament, nations. Of course the focus must be on and member states. These seven people building a pluralistic democracy in their are the core decision-makers that issue societies. And we are definitely interested decisions on specific grants. The big in supporting everyone who will pursue coordination takes place in the governing this aim non-violently. board which decides on priorities; the Having this role of gap filler means that smaller executive committee decides on we can be flexible and even a little risky with specific grants and finally the executive our funding choices. For example, if there director and the secretariat, based in is a group that an EU financial instrument Filling in the Gaps of Democracy, A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski Interview 115

Photo: Courtesy of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jerzy Pomianowski, Executive Director of the European Endowment for Democracy cannot provide funding for, such as an It is true that institutional funding unregistered group, the Endowment will was abolished some time ago from the find a way to provide such support. Most international donor system and not major funders have a general approach without reason. Organisations and think of project-based financing; while we can tanks can become dependent on this type provide core funding or institutional of funding, especially if they are unable funding to help build capacity. If there is an or unwilling to raise funds for their core organisation which is too weak to produce functions on their own. Having this in a specific project, we will provide funding mind, funding from the Endowment is for for them to strengthen their capacity to capacity building and only temporary: one allow them to exist, to consolidate and then year or two years. Either an organisation be ready to start bidding for big project can build its capacity and fly on its own, money from project-based funders such or it becomes dependent. If the latter is as the EU. the case, then we have taken too much risk in this process. The word “risk” is Do you fear that by providing core very important. Again, in the initial institutional funding you could create political declaration of the Endowment, dependencies? it was clearly stated that this will be a less 116 Interview Filling in the Gaps of Democracy, A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski

risk-averse organisation. If there is a weak organised and consolidated, providing organisation with good promise, we can the necessary assistance to those non- take the risk that other EU institutions registered groups. cannot, and provide them the necessary seed money. But we have to bear in Your appointment as executive mind, taking risks means sometimes director has been a positive signal of we may fail. Poland’s leadership in the Endowment. How has your personal background led How do you plan to react to political you to this point in your career? reactions from governments which Just like 10 million other Poles, I was a might not appreciate the Endowment’s young activist in 1980 and 1981 fighting support of independent organisations against Communism. At that time, I was a in their countries? university student in Warsaw. We formed I have a very clear statement that I am the first independent student association already using and communicating, and chapter at Warsaw University and I was hopefully through this interview will a founding member of the board. Within reach even further: if there is a government this association, I was tasked with setting that has a problem with the democracy up publishing activities. And for a short support that the Endowment is providing, period of time I ran an independent that means that the Endowment is very publishing house. But then Marshall needed. If there is a government that Law in 1981 stopped the whole process has no problem with us, that means we and we became illegal; Solidarity became are welcome. illegal and there were many arrests. We tried to continue our publishing activity One country that specifically sticks for a few years, but then resources dried out, which as you mentioned was the up. We received some help from Sweden impetus for the Endowment, is Belarus. and Denmark, but it wasn’t enough to Do you have any specific plans on maintain our activities. So we decided to how to deal with Belarus, considering pool together our resources with other how difficult it is for NGOs to receive publishers and jointly began distributing foreign-based funding? their publications. Belarus will definitely remain a central During Marshall Law this was all focus of EED actions. I have been in close underground. In 1980-1981, it was semi- contact with many different Belarusian underground as we “unofficially” used activists and organisations fighting for Warsaw University’s facilities. We were the protection of human rights for a able to circumvent rules such as stamping long time. For obvious reasons, I am not each publication with the impression keen to provide more details here. In “For Internal Use Only”, but of course general we will help them become better we distributed these underground Filling in the Gaps of Democracy, A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski Interview 117 publications widely. In 1984 and 1985 I independent, association-based schools. became involved in building what I call This worked very well. In a single year “small pockets of freedom”. If we could we stimulated the creation of more than have an activity that wasn’t necessarily 100 schools to be established, which political, organised around our interests became a very important mechanism in and ideas and governed by ourselves – we the Polish education system, stimulating were able to maintain it relatively free. competition with the public school system In essence, we were building enclaves of – in essence forcing them to reform and civil society. We understood then, that compete. if we weren’t going to get full freedom, I was then transferred to the Ministry we might as well create our own space, of Foreign Affairs, basically because of our own islands of freedom. my Asian interests. The whole process As my studies and academic interests of creating a new Polish foreign policy were in oriental cultures and civilisation, I was extremely exciting. We became created an academic research association members of NATO and later of the EU. which organised meetings and travel Our focus was to re-establish Poland’s abroad on topics of Aikido, Indian position in the world. I have also worked philosophy and music. This was “our” for the OECD advising governments space – we were doing it by ourselves and of countries after military conflict or no one was able to control or even access natural disaster, such as Haiti after the us. In fact, I did try to officially register earthquake. We focused on providing our organisation, but it was denied by the government extra support in key the Ministry of the Interior, explaining public service delivery. Thus, making that we had no social value. I have this democracy work and making people official letter even today as a reminder believe in democracy – but from the of what we were doing back then. government’s point of view. And that is how the Endowment is different. It will How did you find yourself in the support the belief in democracy from Polish civil service after the fall of the people’s point of view. What can Communism? we do to make democracy work? In the At the beginning of the transformation OECD I was advising governments to process I joined the Ministry of Education help show their people that democracy and later the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. works. It was an interesting experience Basically, it was a call to young people, within an international organisation. for them to come to the civil service and This experience has come with me to take ownership of the transformation the Endowment, especially since the processes. So I responded to the call governing structure is so similar to that and joined the Ministry of Education to of an international organisation. help build local parent associations and 118 Interview Filling in the Gaps of Democracy, A conversation with Jerzy Pomianowski

How will you measure the because we are not that naive to believe Endowment’s success? that one organisation with a 25-million- The first success will be a lot of good euro budget can change the course of applications from partners and institutions history in only two or three years. that are not necessarily present in other We need to be active and constantly grant making mechanisms. This will mean consider what we can do better, and how that there is a demand for the Endowment. democracy support can be performed Second, if after some time some of our more efficiently. Definitely, we believe beneficiaries would then successfully that some of our evaluations and ideas apply for long-term financing of big would then feed and contribute to EU projects from other financing instruments policy. As the executive director of the of the EU or from bilateral donors such as Endowment, I am tasked with presenting Sweden, Denmark or Germany, then we an annual report to the European can say: “These were our babies and they Parliament and also to the EU foreign are now able to fly on their own.” This affairs council. We have a formal way would also be a good measure of success to communicate our lessons-learnt, our for the Endowment. We are modest ideas and recommendations for the EU. enough to say that we will not measure And that is definitely the key mechanism our impact by seeing if democracy in on how the Endowment can bring about Belarus will be implemented within two real change. years of the creation of the Endowment,

Jerzy Pomianowski is the Executive Director of the European Endowment for Democracy. He was previously the Undersecretary of State at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs between 2011 and 2013. During the period 2008-2011, he worked at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as the Director of the Partnership for Democratic Governance.

Adam Reichardt is the editor-in-chief of New Eastern Europe. SpoNSoRED CoNTENT

Natasza styczyńska Visegrad Dream? Effective Research and Education Cooperation in Central Europe

Central Europe has a strong common background: shared history and culture, the experience of post-communist transformation and a “return to Europe”. For the last 20 years, countries of the Visegrad Group have been cooperating in the political, economic and cultural spheres.

Education is one of those fields that allows us to not only investigate the past, but to also influence the future of the region and share knowledge and experience with our neighbours. this conviction was the driving force behind the creation of the common educational project which started from the establishment of a consortium that includes leading central European Universities: the Jagiellonian University in kraków, Masaryk University in Brno, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, and the University of Pécs. at the beginning of 2012 these universities started cooperating together under the project: Visegrad Network for Research, Education anda cademic Mobility (VNDREaM). Within the VNDREaM project, we have benefited from working together with a large group of scholars, experts and university officials. From June to October 2012 we managed to organise three meetings held in kraków. this has been a very fruitful and intensive cooperation in which not only the partner universities were involved, but also such institutions as the Polish Ministry of Foreign affairs and the Institute of Easterns tudies in Warsaw. an international conference held as part of the VNDREaM project in June 2012 was granted the Honorary Patronage of the Rector of the Jagiellonian University – Professor karol Musioł. as a result of our cooperation, during the inauguration ceremony at the Jagiellonian University on October 1st 2012, the VNDREaM consortium agreement was signed by the rectors and vice rectors of partner universities.this agreement gave the legal ground for establishing a new joint Ma degree programme – International Relations in the Visegrad Perspective – which we will start in the academic year 2013/2014. the project partners share strong feelings that thanks to this cooperation and the creating of a unique study programme, SpoNSoRED CoNTENT

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we are one step further in helping to understand the Visegrad perspective, as well as promoting this region around the world.

How did it start? the Visegrad Network of Research, Education and Mobility (VNDREaM) project was established in 2012 to create a sustainable network of excellence of the universities of the Visegrad countries devoted to the cooperation and exchange of best practice in the academic field of international relations and European studies as seen from perspective of the Visegrad region. the project partners include: the Faculty of International and Political studies (Institute of European studies) the Jagiellonian University, kraków (network coordinator); the Faculty of Political science and International Relations, Matej Bel University, Banská Bystrica (slovakia); the Faculty of social studies, Masaryk University, Brno (czech Republic); and the Faculty of Humanities, University of Pecs, Pecs (Hungary). this part of the VNDREaM project was generously supported by the Visegrad Found strategic grant. First, an international VNDREaM conference was held in kraków, between June 15th-16th 2012 under the topic Towards a common education area in the Visegrad region. New modalities of co-operation within international relations and European studies programmes. the opening conference was held under the honorary patronage of the Jagiellonian University Rector Magnificus Prof. dr hab. karol Musioł. among the guests who accepted an invitation were not only representatives of the partner universities, but also speakers from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Relations and the Institute of Eastern studies. as a result of the conference we published a volume devoted to Visegrad cooperation and the idea of effective promotion of the central European region, as well as the legal aspect of cooperation in the area of joint master’s programmes. On October 1st, during the ceremony of inauguration of the academic year at the Jagiellonian University, the VNDREaM consortium agreement was signed by rectors of the partner universities, which laid the legal ground for our joined Ma programme, which we plan to open in autumn 2013. Of course establishing a common curriculum has demanded more time and cooperation, which is why representatives of the four partner universities of the VNDREaM consortium met in kraków at the Jagiellonian University in December 2012 to discuss an agreement establishing a joint procedure for the delivery of a joint master’s degree programme in International Relations: Europe from the Visegrad Perspective. the topics discussed included: curriculum, joint diploma, Master’s thesis seminar and Master’s examination, admission, financial matters, accreditation and marketing of the programme. Representatives of sthe tudent association of the Jagiellonian University Faculty of International and Politicals tudies SpoNSoRED CoNTENT

121 introduced the idea of cooperation between student associations within the framework of the VNDREaM consortium, which was acknowledged as an important dimension of the joint study programme.

Visegrad Studies: A joint MA programme as a result of VNDREaM cooperation, a new joint Ma programme “Europe from the Visegrad Perspective” will be offered in 2013/2014. the programme is designed for all students who hold university degrees equivalent to bachelor’s education or higher (Ba, Bsc, Ma, Msc) in humanities, social science, economics and law, and who have an excellent knowledge of English and outstanding motivation.t he programme lasts four semesters. English is the leading language of instruction.t he overall student workload corresponds to a total number of 120 Ects. Upon completion of all requirements of the programme, students obtain a joint master’s degree in international relations, with a specialisation in “Europe from the Visegrad Perspective”, in accordance with national regulations and nomenclature of the partner universities. the programme is designed to build competence in the interdisciplinary area of international relations with emphasis given to economic, political, social and cultural implications of European integration processes for the Visegrad countries. Upon completion of this programme, graduates should demonstrate high competence in theory and praxis of contemporary international relations as exemplified in European integration impact on the Visegrad region. More specifically, graduates of this programme will acquire expert knowledge necessary to better understand the complex nature of an interplay between global and regional phenomena affecting the functioning of international organisations, business and civil society. Graduates of this programme will be well prepared to work in international organisations, the diplomatic service, public administration and mass media.t hey will be encompassed with an analytical ability to carry our individual research as prospective doctoral students. We believe that this initiative will not only help to understand the Visegrad region better, but will also promote central Europe. this would not be possible without the kind financial and institutional support of the International Visegrad Fund and the Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Republic of Poland, which assisted us at every stage of the project.

For more information on the project please visit www.vndreamproject.eu and www.visegradstudies.eu. Rebranding the Baltics

A conversation with Andres Kasekamp, professor at the University of Tartu, Estonia. Interviewer: Giacomo Manca

GIACOMO MANCA: Your most recent motivation in this as it is really useful book combines the history of the Baltic and enlightening to have a comparative states. What motivated you to put approach to the history of these three together a history of Estonia, Latvia countries. Comparative approaches to and Lithuania, and what problems did history and politics always provides new you encounter along the way? perspectives and interesting angles. This ANDRES KASEKAMP: In fact, it is very book has now also been published in frustrating for many scholars from Estonia, Estonia and most Estonian readers have Latvia and Lithuania for these three states given it good feedback. They have been to always be referred to together as one used to only thinking about their own group and not seen individually. But it is country, but now they are able to discover hopeless to try to combat this stereotype, the many differences and similarities they particularly with publishers. The book share with Latvians and Lithuanians, was originally published by Palgrave and this has enabled them to find new Macmillan as a part of their Essential answers to their own history. Lithuanian Histories series. By definition, books in history has been completely new to most the series featured histories of individual Estonians, and I imagine that the same countries. Unfortunately, it was difficult might be true for Lithuanians reading to find an international audience who about Estonian history. wanted to have a separate treatment of these three countries, since they are How much of a challenge was it to commonly presented together. This is present these three histories in one the practical reason why the publisher book? was not interested in a history of Estonia I wrote with an international audience in alone; they thought it would not have mind and aimed at writing these histories been as easy to market. As a historian in a style that was understandable for from Estonia, however, there is a positive American college students, for example. Rebranding the Baltics, A conversation with Andres Kasekamp Interview 123

But of course being Estonian, I naturally European (since their Polish neighbours have my own point of view and bias, which were already in NATO), rather than I tried minimise as much as possible. Baltic. Thus, we could half-jokingly say Another challenge is that traditional that Latvia was the only true Baltic state history is also focused on the history of that remained stuck in the middle. a nation; for instance, the history of the Now being in the EU and having Estonians rather than of just Estonia. I adopted the Baltic Sea strategy since tried to have a geographical approach, 2009, the term Baltic is becoming much and so the book is a history of all the more widely accepted and used. With people who have lived in the three the definition of the “Baltic Sea Region” countries, including Germans, Jews, in terms of economy and cultural Baltic Russians, Poles, Swedes and of course space, the Baltic Sea is becoming a kind of Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians. internal EU lake. Finland, who ten years Even though these last three groups ago would have never used the term Baltic, are the main protagonists of the book, is now more open to the idea of being part they don’t exclusively tell the story of of the region. This will hopefully spread the Baltic states. to the south. If the Poles and Germans will come to see themselves as Baltic Sea The Baltic states don’t often like to be countries, this would enable the region lumped together. Is it better for them to really flourish. to be seen as separate entities? From a contemporary point of view, Can we say that there is such a thing with the European Union and NATO as a “Baltic identity?” accession processes, the three states tried The concept of a Baltic identity is a very hard to differentiate themselves. relatively recent term. A hundred years There was an aversion to being aggregated ago, if you had called someone a “Balt” it together as one single group. In this wouldn’t have been an ethnic Estonian, case, the Baltic states would all have Latvian or Lithuanian; it would have been had to wait until the weakest state was a Baltic German. “Baltic” is a term which ready to join such Western institutions, has changed many times and before the which in the late 1990s was Lithuania Second World War referred to the self- in terms of its free market economy identification of the German elite, the reforms. Thus, Estonia tried very hard dominant social, economic and political to rebrand itself as a Nordic country and class in what is today Estonia and Latvia. not a Baltic country. Amusingly, at the This elite used “Balt” as a label to identify same time the Lithuanians who believed and distinguish themselves. It was only – I think partly justifiably – that they in the 20th century, when the countries had a better outlook for joining NATO, achieved independence from the Soviet promoted themselves as being Central Union, that the label “Baltic” was applied 124 Interview Rebranding the Baltics, A conversation with Andres Kasekamp

Photo: PISM / Polish Institute of International Affairs

Andres Kasekamp, author of A History of the Baltic States and professor at the University of Tartu in Estonia.

to Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians. states. Ironically, this happened at a Of course there is the linguistic marker, point in time when the states themselves Latvian and Lithuanian are Baltic disappeared off the map. languages, but Estonian is a Finno-Ugric It wasn’t until the Gorbachev era that language and actually has nothing at all Baltic solidarity, Baltic cooperation and in common with the other two. Baltic identity emerged with Estonia, Therefore, I would say that the concept Latvia and Lithuania pressing for the of a Baltic identity is really something same goal: to regain their respective that has been in flux. In the first period independence. Now in the EU and NATO, of independence after the First World there is of course less need for a restricted War, for example, Finland could also Baltic identity. have been referred to as a Baltic state in the notorious Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. The history of the fall of Communism Poland might even have occasionally has been well-documented with the been considered Baltic, but it is really stories of Poland’s Solidarity, the fall only the results of the Second World War of the Berlin Wall or the Czechoslovak that consolidated this notion of Estonia, Velvet Revolution. However, one lesser- Latvia and Lithuania as being the “Baltic” known revolution which took place Rebranding the Baltics, A conversation with Andres Kasekamp Interview 125 inside the Soviet Union was the Singing This is very important because singing Revolution. What role did the Singing denotes how peaceful it was. On the other Revolution play in the breakdown of side were the hardliners in the Kremlin, the communist system and the Soviet who not only were against independence Union? for the republics but were also against In my opinion it played a very big role. Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. These Of course, the fall of the Berlin Wall is hardliners tried everything to provoke what everyone knows, but the Singing violence in the Baltic republics in order Revolution actually took place more to give them an excuse to intervene than a year earlier, in mid-1988. The with force. The narrative propagated Baltic states, even though they were still by Moscow shared with international part of the Soviet Union, were already correspondents was that these people freer than East Germany. As a result who were asking for independence of the Singing Revolution in 1988, the were some kind of extremists, bent on hardline communist party leadership was aggravating ethnic conflict. As soon as replaced and a certain level of freedom there had actually been some physical of speech, expression and assembly came clashes, which could have easily been about. The difference between the Baltic provoked, there would have been an transformations and those in Central excuse for Russian troops to come in and Europe is that the events in 1989 were restore order and stability. The remarkable really quick, happening over the space thing is that through that long period of a few months. For the Baltic states, it from 1988 to 1991, Estonians, Latvians took place over a period of several years. and Lithuanians managed to keep a The Singing Revolution happened in 1988, remarkable level of self-restraint. There but independence only came in 1991. So were plenty of occasions when violence there was this period when, de facto, could have happened but didn’t. the people had “sung” themselves free, In addition to hardliners in Moscow, but were still captive within the “Soviet there were also the Soviet loyalists in Empire” – even though they were no the Baltic republics, mostly made up of longer obeying the empire. Achieving ethnic Russians working in the military- independence was a much longer and industrial complex. They were not just demanding process. against the national movement but also The expression “Singing Revolution” Gorbachev and perestroika, and were came from Heinz Valk, a cartoonist who also trying to create some potential participated in the singing and wrote conflict. In fact, there were instances an article called The Singing Revolution, of mysterious bombs being detonated saying that, revolutions throughout history in Riga in December of 1990 (no one have generally been violent and bloody, was killed); but immediately the press but ours began with a smile and a song. in Moscow attributed this to nationalist 126 Interview Rebranding the Baltics, A conversation with Andres Kasekamp

extremists. There were constant attempts The first time I was involved in a related to get some sort of reaction which would project was before the enlargement. We have provided an excuse to clamp down, went to Tbilisi to speak about civil and but it never happened. Therefore, the military relations in Georgia. At that Singing Revolution is not just about that time the Georgian defence minister was one event, but the singing is a very nice still a general. The delegation to Georgia metaphor for the whole process until was headed by a retired British general, 1991, and its harmonious and peaceful but we also had a young guy, Jüri Luik, development. who is now the Estonian ambassador to Moscow. Being our defence minister, he You note in your book that a particular was able to tell the Georgians: “Ten years priority of these countries after joining ago we were in the same position you the EU has been the strengthening are now. I was minister at that time, we of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, came from the same system, spoke the especially in the post-Soviet states same language, had the same structure of Ukraine, Moldova and the Southern and I was faced with these choices; and Caucasus. How would you evaluate these were the choices I made.” This was the progress of this priority from the much more credible, useful and better Baltic states’ perspective? received by the Georgians than having There are two sides to this. One is a retired British or French civil servant that like Poland, we, the Baltic states, lecturing on the ideal model that should needed to have an issue, something to be applied in a Western democracy. contribute to and put our name on. Once Unfortunately, those countries haven’t we became members of the EU in 2004, progressed as much as they could have. we thought we could rest on our laurels, Moldova was looking very hopeful, but but we discovered that once you’re in is in a political mess at the moment. you actually have to keep moving and In Ukraine, we only have to look at contribute, and each state has to find what Viktor Yanukovych is doing to his its niche. The EU Neighbourhood Policy opponents. And Georgia was doing well, was born around the same time as the but suffered a major setback after the enlargement took place and provided a war with Russia in 2008. In addition to great opportunity to explain our values this, the Europeans are struggling with and interests. This was the case for all fatigue, and there is significantly less the Central European countries, but support for pursuing any integration particularly important for the Baltic or enlargement than there was in 2004; states as it could be one area where we not to mention the ongoing economic claim special expertise; our experience situation in Europe. of being inside the Soviet Union, gave us a competitive advantage. Rebranding the Baltics, A conversation with Andres Kasekamp Interview 127

So are the Baltic states the unique Europe. The Estonian president, Toomas exception to the former Soviet Union? Ilves, likes to point out that Estonia is The strategy of Estonia, Latvia and now the most integrated country in Lithuania since independence has been Northern Europe, the only country in the to pursue integration into international, region which has the full combination and particularly Western, organisations of membership in the EU, NATO, the as much as possible. We learned an eurozone and the OECD. important lesson from our history, from the Second World War, that we should Can the Baltic success be replicated by never be isolated or alone without allies other Eastern European countries? again. At the beginning of the Second In 2004 the Baltic states managed to World War, a Polish submarine sought seize the window of opportunity they had; refuge in the “neutral” Tallinn harbour. they could easily have been left behind. However, neutrality didn’t save us. The It was clear that if there was going to Estonians allowed the Polish submarine be enlargement, Poland, for example, to escape, providing an excuse for the would naturally be in the EU. Europeans Soviets to issue an ultimatum and base couldn’t have imagined enlargement their troops on our territory. without Poland. But that was not the Our lesson from history is that we case for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. need to be networked and involved in They were the poorest of the candidate alliances. Estonia was the latest country countries. People used to say, even ten to join the eurozone, and hopefully Latvia years ago, that the former boundaries of will be next. We joined just when things the Soviet Union were a geopolitical “red started to go bad and people might ask line” that couldn’t be crossed. Bringing us if we have regrets. The average salary Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania into the in Estonia is still less than in Greece, EU and NATO appeared dubious. Now, yet we participated in Greece’s rescue of course, it is clear that this was the package (EFSF and ESM). It is not only right decision. about finances for Estonia, it is also a Can we push that “red line” even further question of our security and identity. past the other states of the former Soviet Membership in the eurozone is consistent Union? This is very hard to tell, and I with the long-term strategy of the Baltic honestly don’t know if anyone has the states to embed themselves in the core of answer to this question today.

Andres Kasekamp is a professor at the University of Tartu in Estonia and author of the book A History of the Baltic States published by Palgrave Macmillan.

Giacomo Manca is an editorial intern with New Eastern Europe. The Dumping Ground of the Steppe

zbiGnieW rokita

Kazakhstan is country with a history of mixed nationalities and exemplifies the Soviet ethnic experiment. But it is also a country that has inherited the demographic mess left by the Soviet Empire.

“A Saint? What Saint?! Rasputin was lazy and a slob. He would steal horses from farmers and they would lambast him for it, and it would happen again and again. For days on end he would wander around with Gypsies: it was them who taught him how to stop a haemorrhage and that’s how he later had such a big career at the tsar’s court,” says Igor. Rasputin was not only a horse thief, but also Igor Kucay’s great uncle, or – more precisely – a brother of his great-grandfather. Igor, a journalist from Aktau, has exactly the same eyes as the former advisor to the Romanovs, depicted in the old photographs. “And then there is this bloody combine harvester! All because of Rasputin. When he was a big fish in St. Petersburg, he did not forget his brother. He would make trips to his family; he would send remittances to my great-grandfather and once even brought a machine for thrashing grain. At that time it was a big thing!” says Igor. But Rasputin’s combine harvester turned into a curse for his brother. More than a decade after Rasputin’s death and the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks started repressions towards “wealthy” farmers. Igor’s great-grandfather was one of those labelled “kulak” as he owned the machine. And this is why, in the early 1930s, Igor’s family was deported to Kazakhstan.

Free people

The story of Rasputin’s family is only one of many such stories about deportation and exile to Kazakhstan, which has led to a demographic and identity mess in the steppe; a mess that Kazakhs are dealing with even today. 129

The ethnic makeup of the Kazakh people is complicated by centuries of invasions and conquests.

Photo: Łukasz Kobus/Open Dialog Foundation (Fundacja Otwarty Dialog) 130

The demographics of Kazakhstan today are largely a result of the “incomplete Soviet ethnic experiment”.

Photo: Łukasz Kobus/Open Dialog Foundation (Fundacja Otwarty Dialog)

132

The majority of the Kazakh Steppe is made up of barren land, nearly impossible to harvest.

Photo: Łukasz Kobus/Open Dialog Foundation (Fundacja Otwarty Dialog) Zbigniew Rokita, The Dumping Ground of the Steppe Report 133

The Kazakhs emerged from a large pot of peoples who made up the enormous Asian Steppe, and from which, at various times, other groups of people would arrive to turn the European order upside down. It was from here where, in antiquity, the Huns departed and started their long migration period which contributed to the fall of the Roman Empire. In the Middle Ages, the Great Steppe was left by the Turks who also changed the European continent. By conquering the city of Constantinople in 1453, the Ottoman Turks brought an end to the Roman Kazakhstan is full Empire. The Third Rome, as the Russians like to call of stories about their capital, Moscow, was, from the 13th to the 15th deportations and exiles. centuries under the rule of the Mongols, another people of the Asian Steppe. The Mongols had managed to create the second largest state territorially (only after the British Empire) in human history. The last demon that the emerged from the Steppe was Tamerlane; the lame Asian despot. The Nomadic Kazakhs, a Turkic people related to the Tatars or Uzbeks, did not want to leave their land. However, the early days of this ethnic group disappeared in the depths and chaos of the Great Steppe. Inhabiting a land that is mainly impossible to harvest, they moved from place to place. Away from the main arteries of the Silk Road and away from urban centres, the people in the majority of the Kazakh territories lived their own lives, on the periphery of history. In the early 13th century the steppe was conquered by Genghis Khan’s army. One of the parts which had emerged from the division of his empire was the Golden Horde. The Uzbek Khanate emerged from its collapse two centuries later. In the 15th century some of the Khanate’s clans decided to become independent and headed to East. The trace of this journey can today be seen in the names of the Kazakh nation and state. The clans which had left the Uzbek Khanate, soon started to be called the “free people”, “independent”, which in local, Turkic languages, was translated as “Kazakh” (the word of the same meaning is also the Slavic “Kozak”). This freedom, however, had more in common with madness, recklessness and insubordination than with the beautiful, romantic freedom we associate with the word. This was around the time that Central Asia began to fade into an even greater isolation – the discovery of the sea route to India diminished the importance of the Silk Road and led to the marginalisation of the region. In time, the name “Kazakhstan”, meaning the “the land of free people” or the “land of wanderers”, emerged. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Russia slowly included the Kazakh lands into its empire; first by making alliances, providing a protectorate to Kazakh jüzes (a loose alliance of the Kazakh nomads – editor’s note), until their complete absorption by the Russian Empire. 134 Report Zbigniew Rokita, The Dumping Ground of the Steppe

Civilising the steppe Although ethnic relations in the Kazakh steppe were already complicated in the 18th and 19th centuries, when the Russian Empire was “civilising” the steppe, the real blow to demographics in this land occurred under the Soviet Union. After the collapse of the empire and the victory of the October Revolution, Central Asia was a region that resisted the longest. In the 1920s and 1930s, the Kazakhs struggled not only with the Bolsheviks but also with famine, which in the early post-revolutionary period affected them twice. As a result of the famine and the accompanying mass- scale migration, Kazakhstan became the only Soviet As many as five million republic in which its own people were continuously in the minority, seeing a mass influx of non-Kazakhs: workers and engineers Russians, Germans, Poles or Tatars. migrated to Kazakhstan Kazakhstan’s demographics fell victim to an during the Soviet period. attempt to turn it into, as British travel writer Colin Thubron called it, theLost Heart of Asia, “a dumping ground of unwanted nations”. This land had seen the arrival of such figures as Leon Trotsky, Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn and Taras Shevchenko. When, upon Hitler’s aggression, it was decided to move a significant part of the industrial activities from the West of the Soviet Union to the distant Kazakhstan (far from the front lines), the republic, then inhabited by slightly more than six million people, became quickly flooded with almost half a million workers and engineers (apparently during the war, nine out of ten Russian missiles were made with Kazakh lead). During the entire Soviet period, the number of workers and engineers moving to Kazakhstan would reach as many as five million. This is also where there were Soviet labour camps. One of them was Karlag, which spanned a surface area of 200 by 300 kilometres. Today it is a museum. In fact Karlag is one of the very few places commemorating the Gulag Archipelago, as the majority of the camps are deteriorating. This and other camps were opened in the late 1950s, its prisoners settled in the area, once again complicating the already complex ethnic make-up of the republic. The guide at the Karlag museum said that the camp imprisoned 130 different nationalities. “Almost as many as the entire United Nations,” he stressed.

Transplantation

Statistics presenting information about who and when they were sent to Kazakhstan read like a contemporary history book. In 1937, when the Japanese entered China, Stalin ordered Soviet Koreans to be sent to Kazakhstan. He suspected that in the case of war with Japan, they would support the enemy. According to the 1926 census, Zbigniew Rokita, The Dumping Ground of the Steppe Report 135

Kazakhstan was inhabited by 42 Koreans. In 1939 there were as many 96,457 of them. Later, in 1939, when the Soviet Union attacked Poland, a decision was made to send Poles to Kazakhstan. Two years later, when Hitler’s army invaded the Soviet Union, the same fate befell the local Germans who had settled in Russia in the 18th century upon the invitation of Catherine the Great. Their only fault was their remote kinship with the Nazi leader. Soon after, those accused of pro-Hitler attitudes as well as the Chechens, the Ingush people, Crimean Tatars and many other nations arrived at the Kazakh Republic. They were transplanted, like garden flowers. In 1957, when the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, allowed the Chechens to return home, they did so with their relatives’ ashes in suitcases, desiring to bury relatives who had perished in exile in their homeland. In the 1950s when Khrushchev decided to turn the lands of northern Kazakhstan into huge agricultural fields, the republic was again flooded with almost three million people. The local population, at the same time, suffered from a severe lack of water which was re-routed from the Aral Sea to irrigate the fields. Here also, under the supervision of the chief of the Soviet NKVD, Lavrentiy Beria, the first Soviet atomic bomb was exploded. The steppe was again stripped of its resources: in Kazakhstan one can find almost the entire periodic table of elements (there are as many as 99 out of the 110 elements here). It was also in Kazakhstan that the first satellite, from the Baikonur Cosmodrome, was launched into space, as well as the first man and first dog. And each and every one of these great projects required the importation of hundreds of thousands of people. The number of similar events in Kazakhstan’s history is so numerous that from isolated and interesting stories they have turned into an entire process.

A slap in the face

Under the rule of Mikhail Gorbachev, Moscow once again reminded the Kazakhs that they were not the masters of their own domain. In December 1986, the first secretary of the Kazakh communist party was fired – the very popular Dinmukhamed Konayev, who led the republic for 24 years. It was also Konayev who spotted a young engineer named Nursultan Nazarbayev and facilitated his path to the top. It is even said that he chose him as his successor. Hence, when the first secretary Konayev was deprived of power, Nazarbayev had hoped that he would be the one take the place of his patron. But things turned out differently. Moscow awarded Konayev’s position to Gennady Kolbin – a completely unknown middle-level apparatchik. Hence, at a time when nationalism was growing throughout the Soviet Republics, the decision to replace Konayev with Kolbin was unprecedented. Kazakhstan became the only republic that was not led by a representative of its native people. 136 Report Zbigniew Rokita, The Dumping Ground of the Steppe

For the Kazakhs, the removal of Konayev and the nomination of Kolbin was a slap in the face. The idea that somebody else would govern them, somebody who could not even enumerate his predecessors to seven generations before, was unacceptable, which is why the Kazakhs could The Kazakhs entered the not accept it. The morning after Konayev’s last period of independence as a day in power, the people gathered in the capital at the Brezhnev Square (Leonid Brezhnev had minority in their own state. also been a leader of the Kazakh republic). The demonstration attracted a few thousand people, mainly students and young workers. And although perestroika was just making its way through the high Ural Mountains, it was clear that something new was in the air allowing the Kazakhs to do things that would have been unimaginable before. The army pacified the demonstration and there were victims. In fact, these were the first examples of serious social discontent in Gorbachev’s Soviet Union. Kolbin governed the republic for three more years until he was replaced by a true Kazakh – Nazarbayev. With the passage of time, Nazarbayev’s position only got stronger. When the Soviet Empire started heading towards its eventual collapse, numerous alliances emerged within the communist nomenclatura. Nazerbayev supported Gorbachev. When Gorbachev decided to start talks about the shape of a “new and reformed” Soviet Union, Nazarbayev played a significant role during negotiations. At one point he was even mentioned as a candidate for the leader of this new USSR. However, the August 1991 coup d’etat definitely cleared out any doubt of whether Moscow was able to keep control over the situation and put an end to any dreams of a repeat of the Soviet Union. This event also had its effect on the republics. Nazarbayev was one of those who, until the very end, waited before proclaiming independence and who, for a long time, did not see a personal interest in the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Kazakhs, themselves, did not aspire for a speedy separation. The Kazakhs then entered an uncertain period of independence as a minority in their own state. Five years after the removal of Konayev, on December 16th 1991, Kazakhstan declared its independence, as the last of the republics to leave the Soviet Union. Nazarbayev, seen as a unifying figure, was elected its president with almost 100 per cent of the vote. Orphans

Igor’s genealogy is as complicated as the life of his great uncle, Grigori Rasputin. His grandmother, from his father’s side, was Ukrainian, and the grandmother from his mother’s side was Greek. His grandfather, from his father’s side, was a Russian, while from his mother’s side a Pole. Igor was born in 1962 in Chelyabinsk, in Russia. He Zbigniew Rokita, The Dumping Ground of the Steppe Report 137 now, lives on the Caspian Sea, in Kazakhstan. He sees himself as Russian as he speaks Russian and is a Russian Orthodox. He calls himself an orphan of the Soviet Union. However, Igor doesn’t identify with the Russian Federation. His night’s sleep is not bothered by the images of the Kremlin or Vladimir Putin. He has never even been tempted to go to Russia. Even though Igor regards himself as Russian, the word “Russian” is not an ethnic category in his mind. His understanding of the word “Russian” is more about being a part of the greater russkiy mir – the Russian world: an imaginary community referring more to a civilisational identity than to an ethnic one. There are many people here who have such feelings as Igor. Many of them have made a more or less conscious decision to “become Russians” even though in official censuses they could easily qualify as Poles or Armenians. They wanted to become Russians as the Russian-Soviet culture was the one to which they belonged. This culture was, for them, more attractive then belonging to the Kazakh culture. There is, however, a new shift in mentality among the younger generation of Kazakhstan. What differs among the inhabitants of Kazakhstan who were born before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union is the way in which “Kazakhness” is perceived. The Kazakh culture has, since the republic’s independence, become more attractive, something which is starting to influence the demographic statistics. Today, fewer and fewer people in Kazakhstan, unlike Igor, declare themselves as Russians. The Soviet ethnic experiment has brought mixed results for Kazakhstan. On the one hand, there has been some success in the mixing of the nations and creating a situation where many people were not (and still aren’t) able to trace themselves back to one nationality. On the other hand, the experiment was not fully completed. Instead, Kazakhs inherited the demographic mess left by the Soviet Empire. I find myself at a joint Muslim-Orthodox cemetery in Ust-Kamenogorsk, in eastern Kazakhstan. Next to me is Rufa, a young Tatar who, despite the fact that his predecessors had been deported and sent here by Joseph Stalin, talks about the Soviet dictator with much respect and admiration. I am looking at the grave in front of me. A married couple are buried here: Mr and Mrs Tereshchenko, both born in 1912. Ukrainian last names. Maybe they were in exile? She passed away in 1999. He lived for only a few more months before dying in 2000. An Orthodox cross has been painted above her name; a red Soviet star above his name. Standing in this place makes me reflect upon what Stalin did for the Kazakhs. Was it more more for the better or for the worse; for those who are buried here like Mr and Mrs Tereshchenko, for those who were transplanted here like Igor, and for the new generation of Kazakhs like Rufa? Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Zbigniew Rokita is an editor with the Polish bimonthly Nowa Europa Wschodnia. Three Hours on a Train to Ternopil

annabeLLe chapMan

There is nothing exceptional about the three-hour train journey from Lviv to Ternopil, in western Ukraine. It is a routine journey between two cities, home and work, past and future. It is not even a train, in the strict sense of the word; just an elektrychka, a local train linking villages to the city like an umbilical cord.

One day in late September, I decided to stop in Ternopil for a piece I was writing. That article is (literally) another story. But, in the end, the short journey turned out to be as vivid as its destination. The station guards laughed at me when I went to board the train. “You! What are you going to do in Ternopil?” one scoffed as he checked my ticket. The carriage is almost full when I sit down. In the rows of benches, women sit mainly with women, and men with men, unless they are travelling together. The sun reaches in through the dusty windows. Next to me sits a thin woman with a boyish haircut, a string of prayer beads in her palm. Opposite, by the window, a comfortable-looking woman with flamboyant blonde curls is enjoying a bag of chocolate-covered nuts. The passengers sit in silence, as if awaiting a transatlantic journey, or some terrible fate. The woman with the prayer beads clutches them tighter still, her gaze far away. Behind me, a wrinkled peasant takes out the newspaper distributed by the far-right party Svoboda (“Freedom”). But, instead of reading it, he crumples it up and places it under his head as a pillow. Further down the carriage, a voice mumbles: “The sewers must have broken.” Off we go.

Indian summer

This is Ukraine’s Indian Summer; those last fiery days before autumn creeps in. They call it babye lito. The scenery is half-interesting; with snapshots of a horse Annabelle Chapman, Three Hours on a Train to Ternopil Report 139 and its foal, or the metallic domes of an Eastern Orthodox Church glinting in the distance. Huge, red Disneyland apples hang from old apple trees, twisted like a withered hand. But the real action is inside the train. Here, too, the faces are somewhere between summer and winter. Sunburned, rural faces protruding from itchy woollen jumpers or, on one woman, a padded lilac coat. Across some of the benches, men have draped their leather jackets. But back to this open carriage, where each passenger can see everything and everyone. The narrow aisle between the rows of benches is the stage, and the audience is seated and waiting. A sacral procession begins. One by one, salespeople appear in the carriage as if their entrances and exits had been orchestrated. The On this train, there is no carriage is their catwalk. They parade along, Yanukovych, no imprisoned showing off their goods, before disappearing Tymoshenko, and still less, into the next carriage. First, a woman selling no Vladimir Putin. stockings. After her, a toothless old man wanders through, brandishing a sheaf of newspapers. “Is it fresh?” a passenger asks, sniffing the paper as if it were fish at the market. Then a slim girl selling plastic toys and stationery. On each bench that she passes, she leaves a tiny paper pouch of sewing needles; walking back again, she collects the untouched packets – just like the Little Match Girl in the story by Hans Christian Andersen. As stomachs start to rumble, a woman arrives with wafers and varenyki, pillow-like Ukrainian dumplings filled with meat, cheese or stewed fruit. Who has choreographed their performance? And for whom? Then another woman, this one selling religious-themed calendars and pastel cards with baby angels on them. With her dark, free locks and flowing green skirt, she looks more like a fortune teller (or a Turkish belly-dancer), except for the small wooden cross around her neck. Again, she places an angel card on each bench, for sale. “Madam bought one from me yesterday,” she says merrily, nodding at my curly-haired neighbour. Most of the passengers must have seen the war. Seen, felt and smelt. Western Ukraine found itself, in the middle of the last century, at the centre of what American historian Timothy Snyder called the “Bloodlands”, in his 2011 book of the same name. Occupied from East and West, and East again. Of those that survived, some were sent on, in the massive population transfers after the war. Last summer, one of my Polish uncles discovered that he has a cousin in Odessa called Lyudmila. Their family had been split down the middle several decades ago, somewhere here in Western Ukraine. But, in the end, painful memories are not always the strongest. There are fragments of weddings, religious feasts, and pulsating summer nights. Some of the elderly women on this train would not look out of place in the film Zemlya (Earth). Directed by Alexander Dovzhenko, a Ukrainian, in 1930, it showed 140 Report Annabelle Chapman, Three Hours on a Train to Ternopil

mouth-watering scenes of apples and endless fields of grain, as the Communist Party begins the collectivisation of the land. All in dazzling black and white. Sadly, it was Soviet propaganda. In fact, Soviet Ukraine was on the verge of a vast famine, now commemorated as the Holodomor (Admittedly, these episodes took place further east; Ternopil and its surroundings were not incorporated into the USSR until after the Second World War).

Perspective

The silence is broken by a squat man with an accordion. He trails through the carriage, singing in a language that is definitely not Slavic. Not Slavic, until a string of sounds forms itself into a coherent Ukrainian sentence. I zori svetily... “And the stars were shining,” he pines. What other Today, the main force which words can an old man sing, except of long- gone love? The passengers ignore him. But splits up families is the ebb surely they hear his words. The train stops and of migrant workers from these two elderly women with flowered headscarves western regions of Ukraine. sit down opposite me. One of them is big, with thick lips and thick fingers; the other sparrow-like and meek, gazing up at her larger companion with the admiration of a schoolgirl. They compare the pumpkins that they are taking into town to sell, split in half with the orange flesh gaping out, almost like raw meat. But the conversation soon turns to local gossip. “I haven’t seen your Olenka for two years,” the larger woman begins enthusiastically. “Is she still in Italy, working?” Sixty, seventy years after the Second World War, the main force splitting families is the ebb of migrant workers from these western regions of Ukraine. The Ternopil region has the lowest average income in the country. Many people have left to find work in Poland, Italy, and beyond, and most of those who leave are women. Sometimes mothers, sometimes wives; always daughters. “Yes, those who need to go, go,” explains the curly-haired woman matter-of-factly. “In Ternopil, you absolutely must visit the lake,” she says. There is a theatre, museums (“Do you like history?”), and many green spaces. By now, we are drawing into the last station. The show is over, and the audience steps out into the sunshine. Welcome to Ternopil. There is no President Viktor Yanukovych, no imprisoned Yulia Tymoshenko, still less, no Vladimir Putin on that train. There is no endless tug-of-war between East and West, between Russia and “Europe”, and – even more confusingly, for many foreigners – no Orange Revolution. There are only pumpkin seeds, dreamt- up bottles of vodka, and beloved grandchildren. That train journey is not Ukraine; it is a sleepy corner of countryside, which rumbles on for three hours, back and Annabelle Chapman, Three Hours on a Train to Ternopil Report 141 forth. Would I have written the same commentary on a train in rural Poland, in provincial France? In these places, time slows down – and taking a slower train, a more round-about route, puts this in perspective That evening, I catch a different train back to Lviv. Because it is faster, and because the three-euro ticket is all right (unlike for many of the locals on the cheaper elektrychka). It is a proper, long-distance train returning from Simferopol in seaside Crimea. My seat is in the open carriage, lined with sleeping berths. Here and there, feet stick out from under the sheets. These weary beach-goers are still far away, still dressed in white, with their problems left at home, in Lviv. Opposite me, a bored girl in flip-flops, traveling with her boyfriend, eats a half-melted ice- cream bought from a salesman in the carriage. “You said it was Lviv ice-cream. The packet says ‘Lutsk’ region,” she grumbles. The summer is over.

This report won first prize in the 2012 “East to West” report competition on the New Eastern Europe website.

Annabelle Chapman is a journalist writing from Poland and Ukraine. Songs of Freedom

Jonathan bousFieLd

It is 25 years since the Estonian artists and activist Heinz Valk coined the phrase “Singing Revolution” to describe the wave of patriotic gatherings sweeping the country, which then spread to the other Baltic republics. Of all the things that happened during the Singing Revolution, however, it is the singing that is the least remembered.

Although the term “Singing Revolution” was first used to describe the events unfolding in Estonia, as far as international usage is concerned, it remains the accepted term for what happened in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania between 1987 and 1991.1 Of all the things that happened during the Singing Revolution, however, the singing is the bit that is least well remembered. Historians of the period – both in the Baltic States and beyond – have largely concentrated on the “hard” narrative of committees, elections and legislation, rather than the softer questions of who sung what and when. The musical background to the revolution is often treated as if it was an extension of the mass folk-choir festivals that had been part of the Baltic tradition since the 19th century. While this is partially true, many of the songs that were sung in the summer of 1988 owe much more to the world of rock and pop than to any folk tradition. While the revolution may well have marched off into the collective memory dressed in embroidered blouses and lacy bonnets, it actually arrived on the historical stage wearing tight trousers, black leather jackets and big hair.

1 Although the Latvians call it the “Third Awakening”, while the Lithuanians refer to it as the “Sajudis Time” – a reference to Sajudis, the popular front-style organisation that cleared the way for independence. Jonathan Bousfield, Songs of Freedom History 143

No land is alone For anyone mounting a pop-cultural investigation into the Baltic revolutions, the Tartu Pop Music Days of 1987 would be a good place to start. Initiated in 1979, this three-day event brought Estonia’s best rock bands to the country’s second city, attracting an increasingly independent-minded following as the years progressed. A university scientist who was subsequently to serve as Estonian ambassador to Latvia and Sweden, Toomas Tiivel was a regular member of the Tartu public. “Tartu was simply the kind of place where you could hold such a festival,” Tiivel says. “It was smaller The 1980s in Estonia than Tallinn, and was a university town. The groups who performed at Tartu were usually involved an unorthodox a bit intellectual, and also a little bit political. mix of bohemian artists and The security forces were of course present. The serious anti-Soviet activists. organisers just ignored them. It was understood that there was a game going on, and the organisers wanted to push the boundaries of what was allowed.” One frequent Tartu performer was Alo Mattiisen (1961-1996), a classically trained musician who had taken over the lead of the progressive rock band In Spe following the departure of Erkki Sven Tüür – now a highly regarded composer of contemporary classical music. Mattiisen took the group in an avant-jazz-rock direction: pieces like 1985’s Typewriter Concerto in D1 Allegro Vivace betrayed few signs that he would be penning patriotic pop anthems two years later. Mattiisen was to become very famous as a result of his role in the revolution, but was dead by the age of 35. “Very often he was drunk, he lived a very intensive life, he just burned out,” his friend Toomas Tiivel explains. The social circle in which both Mattiisen and Tiivel moved during the 1980s involved an unorthodox mix of bohemian artists and serious anti-Soviet activists – one of their best mutual friends was future prime minister Mart Laar. In Tiivel’s opinion, it was this milieu that transformed Mattiisen from progressive-rock musician to socially-engaged songsmith. Plans to build new phosphorite mines in north eastern Estonia was one of the issues that drew anti-establishment figures together in 1987. Mattiisen asked poet and school-friend Jüri Leesment to write lyrics for an environmental protest song. Leesment came up with something much more poetic; a roll call of Estonia’s regions, their beauty described in almost mystical terms. Mattiisen and Leesment’s Ei ole üksi üksi maa (No Land is Alone), was first aired at the Tartu Pop Music Days in May 1987. The overwhelming public response to the song encouraged Mattiisen and Leesment to write more. The resulting Five Patriotic Songs were performed in Tartu the following year. 144 History Jonathan Bousfield, Songs of Freedom

The Tartu Pop Music Days of May 1988 took place in a much more highly charged atmosphere than before. The Tartu Heritage Days, held barely a month previously, had been one of the first gatherings at which Estonian flags had been publicly brandished in defiance of Soviet rule. During a meeting in front of Tartu town hall on May 1st, Jüri Leesment somehow found himself on stage and blurted out a call for outright Estonian independence. The Singing Revolution was Mattiisen was horrified, fearing that their songs would now be dropped from the festival not something that happened programme. He was wrong, and within days suddenly. It had been a state everyone in Estonia knew the tunes. Nowadays of mind for years. Mattiisen’s compositions sound calculating and over-worked, rather like charity records or Eurovision Song Contest entries. However it would be a mistake to underestimate the feelings they generated at the time. Mattiisen’s aim was to formulate one-nation power ballads that would induce complete strangers to join hands and sing along. And in this he succeeded.

Pushing away

Krista Mits, a translator from English to Estonian and also course director of Tallinn University’s creative writing summer schools, went to the Tartu Music Days in 1988, motivated by a desire to see headline attraction Ultima Thule. It soon became clear that there was more going on in Tartu than rock music. “I was sitting near the front and looked back to see Estonian flags borne by Tartu students. It provoked a sudden sense of elation, freedom, a removal of the feeling of dread.” The Estonian colours of blue, black and white were once again in evidence during the Tallinn Old Town Days in June 1988, when many of the songs played at Tartu were reprised. Running parallel to the Old Town Days was the so-called Night Song Festival, a semi-organised, semi-spontaneous affair that involved crowds of people heading off to the Song Grounds (the open-air auditorium built to accommodate the national song festival) to carry on singing after the Old Town programme had ended. It was the night singing in Tallinn that inspired Valk to coin his immortal phrase, in an article written (such are the ironies of history) for a cultural weekly entitled Sirp ja Vasar (or Hammer and Sickle). The periodical still thrives, albeit under the abbreviated title of Sickle. According to Toomas Tiivel: “Valk had a talent for coming out with phrases that nobody ever forgot. Others in the independence movement were responsible for ideology, but Valk was the man who had the voice.” Jonathan Bousfield, Songs of Freedom History 145

And throughout the summer, Tallinn kept on singing. Krista Mits remembers attending sessions at the Old Town Music House (a cultural centre with a strong commitment to folk traditions), where people would play music through the night. “People of all ages were there, there was always this kind of very special feeling.” One of the principal luminaries of the Music House scene was Jaak Johanson, whose song The marriage of music and Pushing Away (in which Estonia becomes an island, drifts off through the Baltic and into politics was fully consummated the open seas) was another of those songs at the Song of Estonia festival that everyone in Estonia seemed to suddenly in September 1988. know by heart. Johanson is still based at the Old Town Music House, where he is leader of the folklore programme. “We never actually recorded Pushing Away at the time, but it somehow became very popular very quickly. A lot of people think it’s a traditional song but it’s not, which of course makes me very proud!”

To my people

Of all the songs that defined the Singing Revolution, few had the galvanising impact of Manai Tautai (To My People), a Joan Baez-like piece of acoustic-folk activism performed by Latvian singer Ieva Akurātere. The song’s main refrain, “God help the Latvian people, to lay down our roots in the Earth of a Free Latvia”, would have earned its singer a prison sentence in the pre-glasnost Soviet Union. People who heard these words in the summer of 1988 were stunned, moved to tears, or simply stood up and joined the revolution. Akurātere remains an elegant, active and widely admired figure on the Latvian cultural scene, as well as serving as a right-of-centre deputy on the Riga City Council. “I learned this underground song at a hippy wedding,” she now recalls. “At the reception, people played records they had received from friends in Los Angeles. One of them was an album by the Latvian-American Ritmanis Family, and it included To My People.” Akurātere was no stranger to the political power of pop music, and her biography is well worth recounting, not least because it reveals how the Singing Revolution was not just something that happened suddenly in 1988 – for Latvian musicians it had been a state of mind for years. “My mother was a drama specialist in the Academy of Arts and Sciences, and people at the Academy had much broader access to western music than ordinary people. As teenagers we sat at home listening to Deep Purple, Pink Floyd, Black Sabbath and King Crimson at full volume. I was just a sponge sucking up all this 146 History Jonathan Bousfield, Songs of Freedom

rock music. And it seemed to carry humane ideas within it, however aggressive the music might have sounded at first.” Akurātere went on to study drama and music in It is hard to imagine the the coastal city of Liepāja, a place that was famous political rallies without for its non-conformist atmosphere. Significantly it the emotional unity that was the home base of Imants Kalniņš, a classical composer and master of the well-crafted pop song the music provided. who bestowed Latvian popular music with hitherto unknown breadth. Kalniņš frequently set his music to words by contemporary poets, and it is thanks to him that the metaphorical, subtly anti-Soviet nature of Latvian poetry became an integral part of the Latvian pop world too. Kalniņš played godfather to a generation of subversive musicians including Pērkons (“Thunder”), a massively popular rock band that featured Ieva Akurātere on vocals. Driving the spirit behind Pērkons was keyboard player Juris Kolakovs, another classically-trained musician who grew his hair long and spent all his parents’ money on amplifiers. Kolakovs collaborated with poet Māris Melgalvs to produce songs like The Ballad of the Swan (Balāde par gulbi), a morbid tale of dying birds that was widely interpreted as a reference to the near-death status of the Soviet leadership.

Anti-establishment

Now an elder statesman of Latvian pop as well as a respected orchestral composer, Juris Kolakovs still likes to play the bohemian. He talks to me in a flat so crammed with musical instruments, unwashed cups and scribbled scores that it is impossible to find any furniture. While he’s happy to fill me in about the group’s past, he’s equally eager to tell me about the kilt he decided to wear at the previous evening’s Latvian Music Awards. A ceremony he didn’t get home from until breakfast time. “I offered to show people what was underneath it but nobody took me up on it.” Pērkons were first banned in 1983, after a series of concerts at the Railway Workers’ House of Culture. “We were supposed to be playing six concerts over three days,” Kolakovs remembers. “All were sold out, but the last two were cancelled due to rowdy audience behaviour. At the last shows there were members of the militia in every row. The House’s director, a Russian communist woman, had called the transport police to help her keep order and they told her that concert security was not their responsibility. She then called the city militia and was told the same thing. Finally she called the communist party – and all the militias came at once. Every punk, everyone who looked suspicious, was taken away.” Jonathan Bousfield, Songs of Freedom History 147

Undeterred, Pērkons recorded two albums in Ieva Akurātere’s mother’s flat. Distributed unofficially by tape, they spread like wildfire. “In other circumstances we would have been millionaires,” laments Kolakovs. Returning to live performance (not under their own name but as the official group of the “Soviet Latvia” collective farm), Pērkons played a huge outdoor concert at Ogre in the summer of 1985. Scenes of the concert form the opening sequences of Juris Podnieks celebrated 1986 documentary film Is it Easy to be Young? Podnieks’ camera doesn’t focus on the band, but on the wild, uninhibited dancing of the teenage audience. After the concert, over-excited fans smashed up a train on the way back to Riga. Pērkons were banned again, and stiff sentences were handed out to the perpetrators. Akurātere continued to perform as a solo singer. It was her first husband, the dissident activist Sergejs Akuraters, who prompted the first ever public airing of To My People. It took place in 1986 at the Bildes (“Pictures”) festival in Riga’s Anglican Church – which at that time served as a student cultural centre. “The concert took place quite soon after the Chernobyl disaster and there was a rumour that dissidents would be sent there to clean up. Sergejs was sitting in the front row, ashen-faced, and he asked me to sing something against the system. It wasn’t until I reached the second verse of To My People that I realised it was the most anti- establishment song I could have possibly chosen.” The most famous performance of To My People came in August 1988 at Liepāja Amber, a pop-rock festival founded in 1964. Akurātere was not on the official programme, but some film-crew friends had arranged for her to deliver a short address, knowing full well that she would probably end up singing a song. “When I sang it for the first time the public was basically in shock. Then in the VIP section an older lady in a bright red dress stood up and looked towards the stage with eyes full of hope and courage, and that was the moment I started crying. After she stood up, it was like a dam breaking, everybody started applauding. I ended up singing the song three times; by the third time fathers were standing up with children on their shoulders,” recalls Akurātere.

The dawn

Back in Tallinn, it was at the Song of Estonia festival, organised by the Popular Front in September 1988, that the marriage of music and politics was fully consummated. It was here that the traditional Baltic folk festival – complete with its choirs, costumes and community singing – became a mass pro-independence rally. Trivimi Velliste, chairman of the Estonian Heritage Society, used the occasion to make the first public call for Estonian independence. And the former lead singer of 148 History Jonathan Bousfield, Songs of Freedom

Ultima Thule, Tõnis Mägi, premiered his song Kõit (The Dawn), a swelling patriotic marching tune that was equal to anything that Mattiisen had written in terms of emotional impact. Even today, Kõit is the song that most frequently tops the best- Estonian-song-of-all-time polls. According to Krista Mits: “The September gathering was a very deep moment. People went to the Song Grounds, not just from Tallinn but from all over the country; people say there were as many as 300,000 there. It was a sea of people, and you felt as if you were just a drop in the sea. This was the point at which we suddenly felt as if we were in the middle of a revolution.” In October 1988 it was Riga’s turn, with a 100,000-strong rally filling the Latvian national Song Grounds. Akurātere was on hand to perform To My People. “We still hadn’t got round to recording the song,” she recalls, “but somehow everybody knew it by heart already. It was overwhelming to hear the massed choirs behind me singing along to a song that had not actually been released.” These patriotic pop-rock anthems arguably became less important to the Singing Revolution after the autumn of 1988, and the practical politics of rallies and resolutions took over. However, it is hard to imagine many of the mass events that followed – the Baltic Chain in August 1989, or the manning of barricades in Vilnius and Riga in January 1991 – without the emotional unity the music provided. Pērkons’s presence at the Riga barricades is something of which Juris Kolakovs remains table-thumpingly proud: “We are the most decorated Latvian band! All of us have medals for being veterans of the barricades, and two of us hold the Order of Three Stars, the highest honour that a citizen can receive!” At the end of my Tallinn conversation with Toomas Tiivel, he adds as an afterthought (my recorder was switched off by this time, so I hope I am paraphrasing him correctly) that the people who are in the thick of revolutions don’t always profit from its aftermath. It may be the artists and poets who enjoy the anarchy of changing times, but it is the career-minded and organisationally competent who build the society that follows. And, one might add, end up writing the history. Which is why it will always be the Mart Laars, rather than the Alo Mattiisens, who make the most impression on the historical record.

Jonathan Bousfield is a freelance writer specialising in Central European culture and author of The Rough Guide to the Baltic States. A Nation of Cossacks

roMan kabachiy

The Cossack myth is the backbone of the Ukrainian nation. Over the centuries the myth has passed into history, but has recently seen a revival as Ukrainians seek to strengthen their nation and brand.

In the middle of the 17th century, French traveller and engineer Guillaume le Vasseur de Beauplan visited the territories of modern Ukraine. He is credited for creating one of the first maps of Ukraine in its entirety:A General Map of Ukraine. There are several known versions of this map, one of which was titled Delineatio Generalis Camporum Desertorum vulgo Ukraina (A General Depiction of the Empty Plains, commonly called Ukraine). Although the name “Ukraine” was used earlier, it was Beauplan’s cartographic work that popularised its usage in describing the lands between the Don and the San rivers (these two rivers limit Ukraine according to its present national anthem). Beauplan called Ukraine “the land of the Cossacks”. Apparently the Polish Crown treated it similarly, seeing no other distinction in Ukraine except for the Cossacks as a special social/military class. Therefore even today, Polish historiography refers to the war against the Polish Crown, under the command of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as “the Cossack rebellion”, seeing no other national or cultural grounds for these “rebellion”.

Ukrainian myth

In his work Description d’Ukranie we can find detailed descriptions of Cossack appearance, their customs and traditions. The fact that Beauplan lived in Ukraine for around 20 years gives a lot of weight to the authenticity of his descriptions. He described the Cossacks as “extremely strong, can easily overcome cold and heat, hunger and thirst, they do not become tired during war, they are brave and courageous and so daring that they do not value their lives”. The Cossacks are people who 150 History Roman Kabachiy, A Nation of Cossacks

escaped from the corvée (in Ukrainian panshchyna, referring to the taxes and fees imposed by the Polish- Lithuanian Commonwealth – editor’s note) to the wild steppes and founded their own settlements and social structures. These settlements became known as zymivnyky (from zyma, meaning winter), homesteads for two or three hosts (a Cossack host was a unit or administrative division). The Zaporizhian Sich became the military organisation (there have been nine Sichs in different places throughout history – including in present-day Zaporizhia, Dnepropetrovsk and Kherson oblasts). Palankas – the territorial districts of the Zaporizian Sich, were the economic and administrative structures of the Cossacks. Apart from Ukrainian Cossacks, who were the most Western in the whole Cossack phenomenon, there were also unions of Russian Cossacks (Don, Orenburg, Terek and Transbaikal). The distinction between Russian and Ukrainian Cossacks was that despite their liberties and privileged status granted by the tsars, the former still served the tsars and defended the southern borders of the Russian Empire. The Ukrainian Cossacks, on the other hand, defended Ukraine as well as themselves, although not necessarily the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of which Ukraine was then an integral part. Thus, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had to continuously renegotiate the cooperation with the Sich on various matters, including when Warsaw needed the support of Cossack troops in times of war. Eventually, in order not to torture themselves with negotiations with the Sich, the kings of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth allowed the Cossacks to create divisions of registered settlements, the number of which was strictly regulated, and located not in the “wild steppe” but in the small towns of present-day Central Ukraine. At that time, this area was the eastern frontier. Paradoxically, this very decision, after the majority of the Sich were destroyed by Catherine the Great, later contributed to the conservation of the Cossack class in Central Ukraine, preserving their freedom as opposed to the serfs, as well as the formation of the new Ukrainian myth of the origin of the Cossacks. What was so special about the Cossacks that made them the heroes of almost half of all Ukrainian folk songs, enticed adult men Roman Kabachiy, A Nation of Cossacks History 151

“to join the Cossacks”, while boys were taught about the “Cossack” character and “being a Cossack” from childhood? Not only did the Cossacks defend Ukrainian settlements from Tatar raids and were skilful warriors, they also spoke several languages, had a strong musical tradition and some of them, the Kharakternyky, knew the basics of magic and hypnosis. And of course, they were unrivalled lovers and adulterers. The Cossack myth In the songs, the girls see the Cossacks off to war and ask to be taken them along. In war, a Cossack has was reinforced a sabre for his girl, a nosohriika pipe (a kind of tobacco in Ukrainian folk songs. pipe with a short cigarette holder; the word means “something that keeps the nose warm” – translator’s note) for his mother, and a black horse for his brother. The Cossacks treated peasants condescendingly, labelling them with the disrespectful nickname “grechkosii”. The songs refer to the Grechkosii as “lying on a stove bench” while the Cossack fight. In fact, in the 19th-century reality, the Cossacks differed very little from the peasants. The only difference being that the Cossacks maintained a free status, although both had the same occupations. Rostyslav Jendyk, the author of the Encyclopedia of Ukrainian Studies, suggests that Ukrainians are divided into two basic races – the dominating “Dinarics” (Adriatic type), and the partially “Nordics” (in north of the country on the border with Belarus). Thus, the Cossack ideal is easily recognisable in the “Dinarics”. Jendyk described Ukrainians in the following manner: “People of the Dinaric race are particularly known for their belligerency and courage. There is much evidence of this, from Sultanic chancelleries to Viennese generals, some trembling before the Zaporozhians; while others praised the Tyroleans of the East [the nickname of Ukrainians from Galicia – editor’s note] … bloody vengeance and vendetta has been maintained the longest among the ‘Dinarics’, and one can doubt whether it is irrevocable.”

Passing into history

The Zaporozhian Sich were disbanded by Russian troops in 1775, the remainders of the formations were resettled under the name of the Black Sea Cossack Host at Kuban, where the Cossacks became as loyal to the tsar as the Russian Don or Terek Cossacks, although they remained Ukrainian-speaking. Thus, the Cossack myth in Ukraine passed into history. Of course, this myth had no room for the negative chapters of history, such as the slaughter of the population of the Belarusian city of Mogilev by Severyn Nalyvayko’s rebels in 1595; or the 1654 ethnocide of Jews during the Khmelnytsky Uprising in 1648-1654, and the Haidamak rebellion in 1768. The greatest admirer and myth-creator of the Cossacks, attributed as being one of the founders of the Ukrainian nation, was the great poet Taras Shevchenko (1814- 152 History Roman Kabachiy, A Nation of Cossacks

1861). In Shevchenko’s time, the word “Ukrainian” did not exist (the origination of this term is ascribed to the Galician Poles). Instead, Shevchenko, when using the word Ukraine, referred to its inhabitants as “our people”, “fellow countrymen” and “Cossacks”, using these words as synonyms. In his poem To the Poles, a quote from which adorns the monument to Shevchenko in Warsaw opens with the verse “As we were the Cossacks”. Appealing to “friend-brother” Pole, Shevchenko writes: “So give thy hand to the Cossack / And give thy clear heart!” The fact of the existence of the Cossack nation was obvious to Shevchenko. Some of Shevchenko’s works were turned Ukrainian folk tales and songs into folk songs, cropping up in dozens of of Cossack origin posed a direct versions, with their performers unsuspecting of the fact that their author was none other threat to the Soviet mythology. than “Father Taras”. For instance, he cleverly weaves together a song performed by a Kobzar (or bard) at the city market in his poem Haydamaky. The song is about the failure of the Cossacks at Berestechko in 1651. If you hear a Kuban Cossack singing this song and ask about the author, you will get a surprised stare – as it is so proficiently written in a folk style. The author of the poem asks the battlefield at Berestechko why it changed from green to black. The field replies that it turned black because of the blood shed for liberty; and inside a four-mile radius lay the corpses of Zaporozhians, with ravens pecking out their eyes. The field is also sure that it “will be green again”, but “you”, i.e. the Cossacks, would never. The loss of Cossack freedom and Cossack liberty is a common thread of many Ukrainian folk songs. One of the most popular lines in folks songs is: “And for about two hundred years a Cossack is in bondage.” This line can even be heard in a folk song reproduced in a modern rock version by the band, of the same name as Shevchenko’s poem, Haydamaky. At the time of the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian Empires, when Ukraine attempted to revive its independence for the first time in a long period, military formations of the Ukrainian People’s Republic tried to affiliate themselves with the Cossack tradition. There were regiments named after Khmelnytsky, and famous hetmans Doroshenko and Polubotok. One of the regiments, which were quite successful in their fight against the Bolsheviks, was named “Black Zaporozhians”. Their clothes imitated the Cossacks, even though 150 years had passed since the Sich disappeared. The Sirozhupannyky (greycoats) regiment also had attire of Cossack origin.

Lost lifestyle and revival

Ukraine lost its war of independence in 1921. Its lands were divided between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania and the Soviet Union, which created the sham Roman Kabachiy, A Nation of Cossacks History 153

Ukrainian Soviet Socialistic Republic. Through collectivisation, the Holodomor famine and the repression of Ukrainians, the Soviet authorities demonstrated that they were not willing to hear any reference to its previous national life. People’s choirs had to open their performances with songs about Stalin and Lenin, and only later perhaps a song about a Cossack or viburnum (a plant and one of the national symbols of Ukraine). The costumes for such choirs had to be primitive, in order to revolt against the intellectuals and city dwellers. Musical instruments that were alien to Ukrainians were introduced, with the kobza being replaced by the bandura. Wandering folk bards posed a direct danger to the Soviet authorities and mythology as they were the carriers of Ukraine’s historical memory. When they performed their ballads about the glorious Cossack past in the streets and squares, it was a denial of the communist “better tomorrow”. Thus, in 1934 the remaining Kobzars were shot during a specially organised congress in Kharkiv. They were replaced with girls playing the bandura, singing about love in stylised voices. A new Many Ukrainians see the term emerged among conscious Ukrainian attempt to connect with intellectuals: sharovarshchyna, referring to the the Cossack past as kitsch. victory of form over substance (the term is a reference to the wide Turkish-style pants worn by the Cossacks). Only the symbols, a primitive national costume à la Cossack and a girl in a plastic wreath with ribbons remained, but the lifestyle, namely the beliefs and faith, was lost. Some revival did occur with Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika. Between September 1st-5th 1990, the first party in opposition to the communists, the People’s Movement of Ukraine, and the Shevchenko Association of Ukrainian Language, organised a massive celebration of the 500th anniversary of Ukrainian Cossacks. The festivities took place in the village of Kapulivka, where Ivan Sirko, one of the most famous of the Sich, was buried, and in the city of Zaporizhia, in the middle of which, on the river Dnieper, lies the island of Khortytsia, the cradle of the first Sich. About 500,000 participants gathered at the festivities – and Ukrainians again realised that they should not be afraid of the authorities. After these events, a Cossack revival took place, which moved in several directions. Many Cossack associations sprung up, which were often described with the Russian expression “disguised clowns”. These were funny assemblies with their own “otamans”, or generals, which awarded each other with orders and medals invented by themselves. The other movement took the form of paramilitary formations in Ukraine. These were pro-Russian Cossacks, with their main bases located in Crimea and Donbas. Their ideology is anti-Ukraine, anti-Muslim, anti-American and anti- NATO. They block Crimean Tatars from building new mosques, erect “memorial 154 History Roman Kabachiy, A Nation of Cossacks

crosses” without official approval, and protest against military training with Western countries (for example the Sea Breeze exercise jointly conducted with NATO). Their representatives fought in Abkhazia on the side of the Abkhazians against Georgia, and in Transnistria on the side of the Transnistrians against Moldovans. In fact, they are not Cossacks, they are “kazaki” (a Russian version of the word “Cossacks”, different from the Ukrainian word “kozaky” – translator’s note). Recently, Vitaly Khramov, one of the leaders of the Crimean Cossacks from Sobol, was deported from Ukraine to Russia. Connecting with the past

From the modern perspective, the most adequate and justified movement is that of Cossack education, aimed at building an individual who is sound both mentally and physically. The Ukrainian non-profit foundation “Spas” is involved in such activities. It organises outdoor camps for children (including girls), and gives lessons in both Cossack martial arts and the “hopak”, a famous Cossack dance style. Participants in the camps perform with weapons, five-metre-long whips, horseback riding and acrobatics. These camps can be viewed as a kind of scouting, but with a strong national element. Quite a number of modern Ukrainians treat the attempt to connect with the Cossack past and Cossack spirit as kitsch, with many seeing it as related to the policy of creating a primitive ethnic component and reducing it to sharovarshchyna, as was done during Soviet times. Today, however, associations with Cossacks are used to popularise Ukrainians as a people, creating a stronger Ukrainian nation and brand, and allowing it to distinguish itself in the world. Modern Kyiv artist Andriy Yermolenko considers the maiden wreathes worn by girls and oseledtsi, the typical male Cossack haircut, to be no worse than the Viking horns and braids worn by the Swedes and Danes. An interesting example of a modern imitation of Cossack-style was shown to the world by Ukrainian boxing champion Oleksandr Usyk at the London 2012 Olympics. Not only did he wear the characteristic “oseledets” hairstyle, but also danced the hopak after he won. Such examples demonstrate the promise “to show the enemies” that Ukrainians are “of the Cossack nation” is the reason why the reference to Cossacks is also in the Ukrainian national anthem – not to mention the Ukrainians from the all-male dancing group Kazaky, with their trademark of dancing on high heels.

Translated by Olena Shynkarenko

Roman Kabachiy is a Ukrainian historian and journalist based in Kyiv. “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one”

Paweł ŚPIewaK

He was a Jew who adored light, who blessed the world. He was a Jew, but went to the ghetto in the uniform of a Polish officer. He was a Polish writer and an individual. He neither looked for nor needed straightforward answers to the question of who he was.

The last entry in Janusz Korczak’s Ghetto Diary is dated August 4th 1942. There is nothing explicitly written about the deportations from the ghetto. The word “holocaust”, as we refer to it 70 years later, is not used. Only one short sentence in his entry from July 27th contains a reference: “Jews go East. No bargaining… You say you cannot go East – you will die there. So choose something else,” (he did not write about his own three detentions during Grossaktion Warsaw). Like the other inhabitants of the ghetto, Korczak did not know exactly what “deportation” meant. All of the orphanages in the ghetto, along with their staff, had been rounded up on August 5th or 6th. This means that Korczak or a member of his staff had managed to type up the journal’s final pages (the form in which the diary survived) and Korczak then gave the entire typescript to someone on the “Aryan side”. The final entry could also have found its way to Maryna Falska, the head of Nasz Dom (Our Home) in the Bielany district of Warsaw after Korczak’s deportation, thanks to the efforts of his surviving staff, three of whom were then working outside the ghetto. Old doctor

We do know that August 5th and 6th 1942 were scorching hot. Emanuel Ringelblum, the leader of the clandestine archival-documentation organisation Oyneg Shabbos (the Joy of Shabbat) wrote: “As befits Dr Korczak, he provided his children with 156 People, Ideas, Inspiration Paweł Śpiewak, “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one”

several bottles of water for the journey.” He was known to be a perfectionist. He definitely saw to the orphans’ baggage. They set off in the early afternoon from 16 Sienna Street (today the north frontage of the Palace of Culture and home to a children’s theatre; the building itself survived the war and was torn down in the early 1950s). We know their destination was the Umschlagplatz, but there is no way of determining their exact route or how long it took them to get there. Perhaps two hours, maybe four. The streets were Janusz Korczak, the pen-name of blocked, and the mass of deportees was forced on towards the transports. Henryk Goldszmit, was a Polish- Andrzej Wajda’s film Korczak and many Jewish doctor, educator, writer, other accounts depict four orderly columns journalist and activist. of children walking through the city with Korczak at their head carrying the orphans’ flag. There are witnesses who saw the Old Doctor leading one child by the hand whilst holding a second in his arms. This is how he was depicted in his cenotaph in the Jewish cemetery in Warsaw. This heroisation, the elevation of this march to death (how beautifully they went, with such courage and cheerfulness!) reeks of kitsch. One of the women who witnessed these events saw Korczak on Plac Grzybowski: “We came upon the marching orphans with Korczak at their head. We were rendered speechless with astonishment and terror.” This same woman was saved from the roundups in the nick of time and witnessed many more horrific events during the deportations. This sight, however, was for her the most harrowing. The word “terror”, heavenly vengeance, is repeated in many of the accounts of those who witnessed the orphans being led to their deaths. They walked surrounded by German soldiers holding rifles with bayonets. Marek Rudnicki, a witness to those days, wrote: “There was a terrible, exhausted silence. Korczak dragged [himself] along step by step, hunched over, mumbling something to himself from time to time. Initially, the children walked in fours, but then fell into a ragged line, like goslings. One of the children held onto Korczak’s sleeve, perhaps his hand, walking as though in a trance.” Another witness recounted: “That procession was terribly sad, Korczak was in a depression, he walked with a cane.” In his Diary, he portrayed himself as an old man. He was, at most, 64 years old. On July 21st he wrote: “Tomorrow I shall be 63 or 64 years old. For some years, my father did not complete my birth certificate. Mother called it gross negligence…” He suffered from water in the lungs, he coughed a lot and smoked a lot. He was emaciated and had trouble breathing. His legs and feet were swollen. In one of his letters from 1942, he explained his absence from a Passover Seder: “I could not come, because I am old, tired, weak and ill.” He was constantly sleep-deprived. His nights were devoted to writing, and his days to the orphanage and administrative matters. Paweł Śpiewak, “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one” People, Ideas, Inspiration 157

The last hours They soon reached the Umschlagplatz. The group sat against one of the walls. There, the mass of deportees, crazed with fear, surged around them. A survivor who was at the Umschlagplatz wrote: “I suggested to Korczak that he accompany me to the community offices to persuade them to intervene. He replied that he did not want to leave the children, not even for a minute.” They were probably loaded into the cattle cars sometime in the afternoon or evening. One hundred people were packed into wagons meant for only 40. Two hundred children and 20 caretakers came from the orphanage. They had to be crammed into two wagons. They practically had to stand on top of one another. They had to leave their belongings behind. We do not know how long the transport took. The commandant of Treblinka recalled that the trains usually arrived around eight o’clock in the morning. Twenty wagons rolled onto the platform. They were quickly unloaded, and the next 20 were brought in. We can estimate that by noon on August 6th Korczak and his children had been asphyxiated in the gas chambers by the Germans. This, however, is only speculation. The process of gassing lasted between 15 to 30 minutes, but only if the diesel engine that produced the fumes pumped into the gas chambers did not break down. Children, the sick and the elderly were shot to death in the so-called hospital. A sheet with a red cross painted on it was hung above the mass grave. Did Korczak know that he was going to his death when he left Sienna 16? We do not know. He probably did not. It was only in September 1942 that an escapee from Treblinka survived the attempt and gave his account to Emanuel Ringelblum’s group. The camp’s layout became known somewhat later. After that, there was no doubt. Did Korczak realise his fate upon seeing the cattle cars with lime scattered on the floor? Did everything become clear when the Germans, Ukrainians and Jewish policemen forced the terrified people into the wagons with kicks and beatings? He knew that he would not survive this journey to the East, and he only prayed that he would die consciously and lucidly. “I do not know what I should say to the children as a means of farewell. I should want to only make this clear to them: that the road is theirs to choose, freely.” This was Korczak’s unfulfilled dream. What could he tell them in the Umschlagplatz, on the train, in the camp? “It is a difficult thing to be born and learn to live. Ahead of me is a much easier task: to die.”

The diary

Janusz Korczak wrote his Ghetto Diary over the three months before his deportation. However, his entire life is present within it. He mentions his childhood many times. He used to play by himself, most often with wooden blocks. His father 158 People, Ideas, Inspiration Paweł Śpiewak, “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one”

considered him “a dunce and an idiot”, his grandmother a “philosopher”. It was she to whom he entrusted his first plan to remake the world: “It was – no more, no less – to throw away all money… I was only five then, and the problem was perplexingly difficult: what to do so there wouldn’t be any dirty, ragged, hungry children with whom one was not allowed to play with in the courtyard.” When his father was well (eventually his father was hospitalised for mental illness) his family was relatively affluent. After her husband’s death, Korczak’s mother ran a dormitory and they managed to scrape together a living. His father’s mental illness haunted Korczak. He feared he would come to the same end. “I am the son of a madman. A hereditary affliction.” He tells a story from his childhood about a canary that was buried in an empty candy box under a chestnut tree in the courtyard. Its death, he wrote, led him to confront the complex question of faith for the first time. “I had wanted to put a cross over its grave. The housemaid said no, because it was just a bird, something much lower than a man… But, what was worst was that the janitor’s son decided that the canary was Jewish. “And so was I,” wrote Korczak. “I too was a Jew, and he – a Pole, a Catholic. It was certain paradise for him, but as for me… I would end up, when I died, in a place which, although not hell, was nevertheless dark. And I was scared of dark rooms.”

Wicked, shameful and destructive

Korczak’s great-grandfather was a secularist from Hrubieszów, which he missed terribly, even though he never returned there. From this side, he received the names Hersz and Henryk. He was a Jew who adored light, who blessed the world, who wrote in his Diary about Indian gods and dreamed of building a children’s home in northern Palestine, near Kfar Giladi, after the war. The roof would be his private retreat; with glass walls so that when he was writing at night he could look at the stars from time to time. He was a Jew, but he went to the ghetto in the uniform of a Polish officer. He did not speak Yiddish. Even in the ghetto, he continued to study Hebrew. He was a Polish writer. He felt responsible for Jewish children. He was an individual. He did not look for and did not need straightforward answers to the question of who he was. Maybe he never even asked himself this question. He knew Polish anti-Semitism well. He described the last years of the Second Republic as wicked, shameful and destructive. At the same time, he felt “hatred and revulsion toward Jewish street peddlers”. He knew that the rogues and scoundrels of different nationalities would quickly find common ground. He was extremely outraged by the Jewish ghetto police, Paweł Śpiewak, “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one” People, Ideas, Inspiration 159 and he hated the ghetto’s nouveau riche and administrators, and the rampant corruption. He was a Varsovian through and through. “Warsaw is mine and I am hers. I’ll say more: I am her.” He came from an epoch in which there was no need to choose and label oneself with an ideological or political identity. He never longed for the unambiguous. He did not want to build boundaries around himself that could not be crossed. He was religious and believed in the power of prayer, but the concept of confession was alien to him. He was not a socialist, but often spoke Korczak wrote his Ghetto Diary of them. He declared that he did not belong during the three months before to political parties. If any, he belonged to his deportation. the generation of social activists. Death touched his whole life. He wanted to commit suicide. He proposed a suicide pact to his sister (she was also killed in the Great Action). He always kept mercury chloride poison and morphine capsules with him. He wrote: “If I kept on postponing my otherwise fully thought out plan (suicide – author’s note), it was because always at the very last moment some new daydream would sweep me away.” Years of working in a hospital meant that he saw how children recovered or died. “The hospital showed me how dignified, maturely and intelligently children faced death.” He served on the front lines in both the 1905 Russo-Japanese War and as a military doctor with the rank of lieutenant during the First World War. Death did not trouble him. It was easier than life, and was his constant companion. He often encountered it in the streets of the ghetto. It paralysed him when it was turned into a package, a corpse thrown into the street or something that only hindered other children’s games. An average of 300 to 400 people died in the ghetto every day. There were many children included in that number. They died “of starvation, cold, disease”. He volunteered to be the head of the ward for sick and dying children. He wrote about “the horrific erosion of the will to live in many of the children”.

Two Corpses

His composition Two Corpses, perhaps the greatest of his wartime writings, is full of compassion not for the deceased, but for those still alive. One of the corpses he encountered was that of a young boy, maybe 13 years old. He lay in the white snow. His mother stood over him and begged for someone to save him, but “nobody was helping him. But they weren’t at fault. He didn’t need help anymore. Here he lies, so quiet and so bright, on the white snow.” The second was a baby wrapped in grey paper. The paper had been carefully tied round with string. Only a mother 160 People, Ideas, Inspiration Paweł Śpiewak, “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one”

could have done that. However, its bare foot was exposed. “How could it happen that she left those five little toes and the foot up to the ankle to stick out?” Korczak understood that the mother wrapped her child like that intentionally. Janusz Korczak reflected on his time in Harbin (a city in north-east China – editor’s note), in wartime Kyiv and on the front somewhere in Belarus. He recalled his time in hospital and evening house calls to the rich and poor. He would go to the rich after being paid a few roubles; he gave the poor money for medicines. However, he charged 20 kopeks according to Talmudic rules. An unpaid doctor could not heal the sick. He most often wrote about the children. It was for them that he gave up being a doctor. He felt guilty about that. “I was carried away by false ambition: to become a doctor and a sculptor of the child’s soul.” He returns time and again to descriptions of the children and their illnesses. He slept in the isolation ward and listened for their voices.

An analyst, not an inventor

Much has already been written about how Korczak discovered the importance of child and his teachings on how to love him or her. At times, I have an overabundance of these passions and declarations of the greatness of Korczak the educator. He saved many, guiding them to modest, ordinary lives. None of his children became outstanding figures. They never completed higher education. He did not foster any of their exceptional talents. He met alumni of the orphanage on the streets only rarely, and often only by accident. He gave a few straightforward recommendations for teachers to impose upon themselves. The first was to observe. In a professional survey filled out during the occupation, he replied affirmatively to the question about scientific research, completing the sentence on what that work relied upon as “observing the children”. He said about himself: “I have an analytical, not Korczak’s notes reveal a person an inventive, mind … [I] analyse in order consumed by sadness and filled to ask further and further questions.” His with a sense of loneliness. second recommendation: put yourself in the child’s place. Look at the world from his or her perspective. Do not impose supposedly adult knowledge onto them and let them live in their own way. He or she does not need to fulfil adults’ expectations and demands. This is not a treatise on education, but an informal statement on the self. His writings teem with the names of ghetto functionaries, doctors, acquaintances he ran into unexpectedly on the street. They are often judged harshly, perhaps unfairly. Something is always missing. He does not blame the Germans for the Paweł Śpiewak, “Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one” People, Ideas, Inspiration 161 children’s hunger, but rather Jewish dignitaries, as he encountered them every day. He sent them abusive letters. He fought for his orphanage. From these troubled notes, carefully written at night, emerges a person consumed by sadness, filled with a sense of loneliness, at times defeated (such as in his long dilogy on King Matt); a sick, weary man devoted only to children. He protected them from other adults. He lived for them, but at the same time apart from them. He observed them, helped them, taught them, but had his own life. He wrote: “My life has been hard, but interesting. In my younger years, I asked God for precisely that – ‘Give me, oh God, a hard life, but a beautiful, rich and exalted one.’” He did not allow anyone to get close to him or learn his secrets. He confided in no one. “I talk when I am alone,” he wrote. He separated himself and his life and accorded each their own sphere of influence. You do not see any impatience when he dealt with the many children, wrote them letters or settled their fights. He shared his love with them. This problematic, worn word is definitely appropriate here. In a letter to his beloved Halutzim (members of the kibbutz on 34 Dzielna Street), he wrote: “My love, my knowledge, my strength and my faith – in faithful service to you…” But it seems that he did not give so completely that he had nothing left for himself. He always maintained a certain distance, and this distance meant independent judgement. He chose this, and this “matter” did not choose him. He was aware of himself and did not completely take care of himself, but to him the self was the point from which he had to start and to where he always returned. It was a matter of spiritual order. In that, he was a religious man. And this is how I wish to see him.

Translated by Gina Kuhn

Paweł Śpiewak is a historian of ideas, a sociologist and the director of the Jewish Historical Institute in Warsaw. His most recent works are: Pamięć po Komunizmie (Memory after Communism) 2005, Pięć Ksiąg Tory. Komentarze. (The Five Books of the Torah: A Commentary) 2012, and Żydokomuna (Judeo-Communism) 2012.

This article originally appeared in Dialog (nr 103) – A Polish-German Bilingual Quarterly Magazine. We are grateful for the publisher’s permission to reprint this article. Learn more about Dialog at: www.dialogonline.org. Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland?

annaMaria orL a-bukoWska and krzysztoF toManek

For nearly 25 years, Kraków, Poland, has been host to the largest Jewish cultural festival in Europe. Remarkably enough, no one has holistically investigated this spectacle and the “community” incorporated by it. The data presented here is the first attempt to answer the questions as to who, what and why, regarding the festival’s participants.

Although the 2013 edition of Krakow’s Jewish Culture Festival will be its 23rd, there are still people around the world completely oblivious to its existence. Each year one meets tourists who have fortuitously stumbled upon this fête, expressing delight at their discovery. Yet this sentiment is also usually accompanied by disbelief that such a ten-day celebration can be found in Poland. After all, “street wisdom” declares this country devoid of Jews, so who would organise and who would come to this kind of festival here? In fact, the history of Poland is utterly entwined with the history of Jews (whether at different times identifying themselves as Polish, Lithuanian, Galician, Austrian, German, Czech, or Zionist) from the territories within the various political borders the state has had in the past. Correspondingly, the history of Jews is likewise entangled with the history of Polish lands, which has been home to the largest number and the highest percentage of European (mostly Ashkenazi but also Sephardic) Jews for centuries. It is an often-cited figure, corroborated by those involved in Jewish genealogy, that three-quarters of the world’s Jewry can trace their ancestry back to Poland’s Golden Age between the 16th and 18th centuries. Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland? People, Ideas, Inspiration 163

Undermining monoculturism By 1939, there were more Jews living in Warsaw alone than in the whole of France (let alone Germany). The roughly 3.6-million-strong Polish Jewish community was then the largest in Europe (second in the world only to the community in the United States) and – making interconnections more certain – it comprised 10 per cent of the general population. This was actually not the most numerous or densest of the interwar cultural minorities (Ukrainians comprised 15 per cent), but its diasporic settlement nationwide meant that, before the Second World War, there was hardly a Polish non-Jew who had not met a Polish Jew. Centuries of cohabitation came to an abrupt and agonising close with the Shoah during which some 90 per cent of Poland’s pre-war Jewish citizens were murdered. Subsequently, it was in the interest of the Soviet totalitarian-style state, which continued until 1989, to deal with a monoculture. The anti-communist Although specified minority faiths and cultures opposition included Polish were permitted to function institutionally, all Christians and Polish Jews – were sternly restricted and controlled by the all united by a single cause. government. With time, Polish society seemed to forget that its country had once represented the epitome of multiculturalism – a mix which had especially given rise to the flourishing of many a Jewish religious, political, or cultural movement. The dateline year of 1989 is unilaterally applied as the starting point, but, in fact, breakthrough changes had begun to occur as of the early 1980s – and this included shifts in Polish Christian-Polish Jewish relations. The anti-communist opposition included people coming from environments which were Polish Christian or Polish Jewish or both – all united at this point by their single cause. More importantly, both the average Polish non-Jews as well as the Roman Catholic Church in Poland understood that not only via solidarity with everybody, but specifically by active assertion of minority cultures, the reigning monoculturalism would be undermined. And hence, at a time when any and all grassroots initiatives were illegitimate if not illegal, the director of an art cinema in Kraków decided to offer a series of Jewish films in 1986; later, in 1988, Krzysztof Gierat joined by Janusz Makuch expanded the offerings to lectures and music. As of 1988, the Jewish Culture Festival was held every other year; starting in 1994 it was held annually. Originally centred around a movie theatre west of the Old City of Kraków, it moved to Kazimierz – the traditional Jewish quarter – in 1992. Remarkably enough, in the 20 odd years of its presence on the cultural map of Kraków and Poland, no one has holistically investigated this spectacle and the 164 People, Ideas, Inspiration Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland?

“community” incorporated by it: that is, the staff, volunteers, performers and spectators. Yet a small band of activists supporting a cause can always be found. The point which is truly fascinating is the throngs of people actually coming, purchasing tickets and partaking in festival The image of the Jewish Culture events. The fact that they appear in droves – year in and year out, rain Festival has always been associated or shine – puzzles many observers. with music, but entails so much more. Although annual guesses regarding audience size appear in the mass media, the participants’ demographic makeup, their perceptions of the Jewish Festival, and their opinions about Jews, Jewish culture and Judaism, as well as other cultures and religions have been completely unknown. The data presented here is drawn from a 2009-2013 research project, funded by a grant awarded to the authors by Poland’s Ministry of Research and Higher Education to study the Jewish Culture Festival (JCF) in Kraków and its audience. The study has been conducted with much cooperation and assistance from the JCF, its staff as well as volunteers. The research team has mostly been composed of students from the Institute of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University. Naturally, investigating a social phenomenon as complex as this one has entailed all manner of social science methodology. Among these was the design and employment of a four-page, 35-question survey encompassing both open and closed queries. We present below the rough quantitative elements, results drawn from surveys collected (in person and online) among the attending public in 2010-2012. So – here and now in the 21st century – who in Poland is attending a Jewish-themed celebration? After two decades of transition from communism to democracy, for whom is the Jewish Culture Festival held?

Participant profiling

After a pilot study in 2009, our team collected a total of 3,711 surveys. Due to the nature of the written questionnaire, the target of necessity constituted people aged 18 and over, although we did gain a few younger participants as young as 12. As is the case in such surveys, not all respondents answered all the questions. In spite of this, considering the ample database which we have and noting insignificant variation between the years of the study, the percentages are trustworthy. All qualifications taken into consideration – of the people who did indeed respond to the pertinent questions – we gained the following general demographics: Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland? People, Ideas, Inspiration 165

Gender: Women 65.8 per cent

Men 34.2 per cent

Age by Generation-Defined Cohorts: Seniors (born 1945 or earlier) 4.9 per cent

Baby boomers (1946-64) 25.8 per cent

Generation X (1965-1979) 22.9 per cent

Generation Y (1980-2000) 46.4 per cent

Place of Residence: Poland 77.8 per cent

Other 22.2 per cent

Nationality: Polish 78.8 per cent

Non-Polish 21.2 per cent

Religion (of the less than 50 per cent providing an answer): Roman Catholic 58.1 per cent

All other beliefs declared 41.9 per cent

Amazingly enough, the bulk of the audience is made up of “repeat offenders.” Over half (54.4 per cent) have attended the JCF before, and an incredible 13.4 per cent have attended six or more times! With these inspiring percentages in mind, it is no surprise that of the 45.6 per cent which is, finally, attending for the first time, 77.8 per cent say they plan a return visit. Of no small significance for local and other governmental sponsors, 76.1 per cent of the tourists coming from beyond the metropolitan vicinity declare that they will visit the rest of Kraków, beyond the Kazimierz neighbourhood. The image of the Jewish Culture Festival has always been associated with music, hence many newcomers assume that concerts comprise the whole of the programme, but this is far from being true. Over the course of nearly ten days, 166 People, Ideas, Inspiration Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland?

there are culinary, photographic, dance, calligraphic, singing, linguistic (Hebrew and Yiddish), and children’s workshops, meetings with authors and genealogists, lectures on everything from religious to secular aspects of Jewish culture, informative tours of Kazimierz, synagogues, and cemeteries, as well as films, art exhibits, book promotions and panel discussions. Once the activities are inaugurated over the first Shabbat (because two Shabbats roughly serve as the “bookends” for the Festival), most days offer over 30 different events, starting from 9 a.m. sightseeing and ending well after midnight at a DJ party.

Shalom on Szeroka

Naturally, the single most popular event attended in the past and planned in the future is the free dancing-in-the-street concert known as Szalom na Szerokiej (Shalom on Szeroka Street). Held on the JCF’s last Saturday, it draws 18.5 per cent of the participants on this one night alone. Surprisingly, the other musical concerts draw the attention of 15.6 The Jewish Culture Festival per cent of the festival audience, but here we should take into consideration that these are fosters engagement and fairly (some say “too”) expensive ticketed events has set the cornerstone for which require more of an investment. Yet a mutual respect in Poland. more intriguing outcome of the analysis is the next three close-running and top-drawing attractions: tours which cost both time and money (11.7 per cent), just ahead of the free and educational exhibitions (10.7 per cent) and lectures (10.5 per cent) statistically tied. Nevertheless, these choices suggest but do not verify motivations for attendance. The top three reasons for attending the JCF given by the participants as a whole are: returning after a good first experience (29.5 per cent), a personal interest in Jewish culture (27.1 per cent), and recommendations from family and friends (12.5 per cent). But differences in the incentives manifest themselves between the Polish and non-Polish attendees. The Poles, so to speak, come back for more (33.2 per cent), while a close second is an interest in Jewish culture (28.2 per cent), with recommendations from family and friends further down (12.2 per cent). In comparison, for non-Poles – recalling that most arrive unaware – the number one reason for non-Poles attending is fortuitous accident (23.2 per cent), but only a narrow margin separates this reason from the runner-up interest in Jewish culture (23.1 per cent), and third is the 16.4 per cent who are re-attending. Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland? People, Ideas, Inspiration 167

Of relevance to nearly all discussions about a Jewish festival in Poland successfully held for over two decades is the percentage of “stereotypical” Poles represented amidst the spectators. Tallying proportions only among the approximately one-third which provided answers to all three of the crucial questions (i.e., nationality, religion, and place of residence), people of Polish nationality who declared their faith as Roman Catholic and dwell in Poland comprise 64.1 per cent. It is with regards to this (albeit substantial) subset of our database that we evaluated another element of the “stereotype”: are these “standard definition” Poles open or closed towards other cultures, and do they bear anti-Jewish opinions and attitudes?

Measuring anti-Semitism

Whenever people discuss post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, and anything to do with Jews, the question of anti-Semitism inevitably arises. Unsurprisingly, whenever Jews and Poland are mentioned in the same breath, questions about levels of anti-Semitism immediately come into play. Undeniably, measuring forms and intensity of The study of anti-Semitism antipathy towards any group has been forever in Poland has itself aroused an elusive venture in the social sciences, and controversy. increasingly more difficult in the era of political correctness with xenophobes learning to disguise their deep-felt attitudes. This multifaceted issue cannot be properly addressed in this brief review, and hence, for a nuanced and in-depth analysis of social trends in Poland and Europe over the past three decades, we refer interested readers to an article by Antoni Sułek.1 Particularly intriguing is the author’s comparison of disparate responses elicited by differently phrased questions. Nevertheless, social science instruments need to be relatively stable in order to facilitate cross-country and cross-temporal comparisons. In early 1944 (even before the Shoah had come to a close), R. Nevitt Sanford and Daniel Levinson at the University of California-Berkeley invented what has served as the basis for all studies thereafter. Among others, the American Jewish Committee as well as other Jewish agencies have commissioned surveys applying variations of the Levinson and Sanford scale in different countries at different times.

1 See Sułek, Antoni. 2011. “Ordinary Poles Look at the Jews”. East European Politics and Societies. Also Gross, Magdalena H., “Do Polish Kids Hate Jews?” www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/131489 /do-polish- kids-hate-jews. May 7th 2013. 168 People, Ideas, Inspiration Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland?

All admonitions considered, we could not ignore the fact that this type of information would be anticipated from a study of a Jewish festival in Poland. Therefore (bearing in mind the length and breadth of the whole questionnaire), we applied a modified set of five statements focusing on the most traditional and persistent stereotypes;2 only four selections were provided, from completely to rather agreeing or disagreeing (no neutral option). Additionally, a few questions later, we ask how the respondent would feel if someone of Jewish origin became a next door neighbour, or a member of their own family. True to form in the 21st century, the appearance of an anti-Semitism scale on a questionnaire in Poland itself aroused controversy. Apart from the fact that a few students on our research team expressed concern that negative prejudices might inadvertently be inculcated, several respondents took the appearance of such items as an outright offence and abomination. The Jewish Culture Festival office also fielded reproachful calls, visits and internet commentary. Some grilled our research team, some ceased to fill out the questionnaire, and others destroyed it upon reaching this point on the second page. After the first year, our students were expressly instructed how to handle such cases: respondents were told they could refuse to answer any item and to pen remarks in the margin. Among all the questionnaires collected, a total of 1,346 (36.3 per cent) people did not answer any parts of this item, but among them less than 20 documented their disdain. In order to provide the clearest distinctions in this article, we compared Polish Roman Catholics living in Poland against all other categories (including Polish non-Catholics and foreign tourists, etc.). Firstly, responses to the anti-Semitism scale were assigned point values which were tallied and categorised into none (checking strongly disagree on all statements), low, moderate, and high reflecting the strongest level of Judeo-phobia (checking strongly agree on all or nearly all the statements).3 Below is a graph illustrating the differences between Polish Roman Catholics living here and all other respondents. Note that the attitudes of the former skew more in the direction of the low and moderate levels but do not meaningfully vary from the latter when we reach the highest level of anti-Semitism (5.1 per cent vs. 4.2 per cent).

2 These include beliefs that Jews comprise an exclusive, self-serving group, controlling global finances, mass media, and the world itself, and that they bear excessive influence in one’s country. 3 The limits of this article do not permit detailed elucidation of our methodology and statistical analysis. For answers regarding specific issues, please contact the authors. Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland? People, Ideas, Inspiration 169

Surprisingly, despite the low to moderate agreement with old stereotypes, this seems not to correlate with declared closeness to people of Jewish descent. Drawing on the two statements mentioned earlier and the five options provided ranging from “I’d even like it” to “It would definitely bother me” (no neutral option), we gained the following graph below. Here the “standard” Poles peak at moderate openness rather than high, but certainly do not exhibit revulsion with respect to Jews.

170 People, Ideas, Inspiration Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland?

As a final point, we took the answers to five questions scattered throughout the questionnaire (“Have you attended any other minority culture festivals or events in the past two years,” “Are you interested in cultures other than your own,” “Would you attend a religious service of a faith other than your own,” “In your opinion does any of the following [faiths] constitute a global threat,” and “In your opinion, does one of the following [faiths] offer the best path to God”) as a basis upon which to assess cultural and religious openness. Here, too, the Polish Roman Catholics living in Poland were less open than their counterparts in this study, but certainly far from being closed-minded.

Universalistic

On the one hand, not a soul is surprised to hear that the audience of a festival centred on a minority group culture is reasonably and more generally “tolerant” (however one defines the word these days). On the other hand, any evidence of heightened anti-Semitism, distancing, and closed-mindedness becomes, correspondingly, quite unexpected. Intriguing indeed would be the reasons for such individuals coming at all, but noteworthy is the fact that they (including non-Poles) declared their opinions with no regard for political correctness. Moreover, the percentages of those agreeing with statements associated with anti-Semitism do not match the extremes on the social distance or openness scales. Perhaps possession of a social stereotype does not reflect attitudes. In any case, the Jewish Culture Festival is seen as not only “Jewish” but humanistic, universalistic. In the words of its attendees, it sends certain communiqués. There Annamaria Orla-Bukowska and Krzysztof Tomanek, Who is Doing Jewishness in Poland? People, Ideas, Inspiration 171 is the more specific: “[A] variety of events, opportunities to meet people from everywhere & to learn more about Jewish culture & roots, to celebrate.” And there is the more general: “There’s a way of thinking here about the coexistence of various cultures.” Two years from now the Jewish Culture Festival in Kraków will celebrate its “silver anniversary” – its 25th edition. All of us who have had the pleasure of enjoying the JCF for the past 20-odd years know that it has changed, developed and evolved – and will keep doing so in the future. It is shaping the post-communist society around it which is learning about the depth and breadth of Jewish history and culture through festival events – and raising society’s children, who first come as youthful participants, then as volunteers, to then go on to work for NGOs. The research presented here constitutes a light sampling, a review of some impressions and mostly rough quantitative data gathered during the last three festivals. We have offered but a taste of a highly complex sociocultural phenomenon initiated in a Poland still under communism and now rooted in its democracy. This grassroots initiative, fostering direct and indirect engagement by Jewish and non- Jewish Poles, has set a cornerstone for mutual respect. It also provides a foundation for relationships between the majority and all minorities in contemporary Poland. The participants perceive this; it is what makes them return: “The fact is it unifies people of different religions and cultures. I like the possibility of broadening my knowledge about Jewish culture and history. I enjoy meeting interesting people, participating in this.”

Annamaria Orla-Bukowska is a social anthropologist at the Jagiellonian University Institute of Sociology. Her general field of research is majority-minority relations but specialises in Polish Christian-Polish Jewish relations.

Krzysztof Tomanek is a methodologist and data analyst at the Jagiellonian University Institute of Sociology. Stranger than Fiction

łuKasz wojtusIK

They don’t write for money nor fame. Their debut books rarely make bestseller lists, and they won’t lead to a revolution in literature. So why do they write? Because they want to. The stories of their literary debuts are as different as the stories they pen.

Jaroslav Žváček’s first novel literally brought him out of nowhere. This young Czech writer openly talks about his previous jobs as a security guard, a fast food server and a supermarket cashier. When he decided to do something with his life he started studying script writing at the FAMU Academy in Prague and wrote a book with the telling title Lístek na cestu z pekla (Return Ticket from Hell). Today, Žváček’s portfolio includes film scripts and television programmes, and when asked about his success and fame, he jokes that his main indicator of success was his grandmother’s joy at recently seeing her grandson’s name in a crossword puzzle. For a long time Aki Ollikainen wrote articles for a local newspaper. It took a friend to discover his literary talent, when Aki gave his friend some of his notes to read at an informal gathering. It did not take long before Nälkävuosi (A Year of Famine), for which he received the Helsingin Sonomat Prize for literary debut in November 2012, made it to the bookshops; and that’s how Aki became an author. For this Finnish writer, publishing his first book meant “finishing” his previous lifestyle. After receiving the award, Aki decided to make a living from writing and seems to be on his way to success. This rather shy man already has an idea for his next book; the state has awarded him with a scholarship and, for a while at least, his only worry will be the pressure of writing something as good as his first book.

Not easy

But that was in Finland, where the rules of the literary business are not the same as elsewhere. Noémi Szécsi has good memories of her literary debut, a novel titled Finnugor vámpír (The Finno-Ugrian Vampire), published 11 years ago in her native Łukasz Wojtusik, Stranger than Fiction People, Ideas, Inspiration 173

Hungary. However, the beginning of her career wasn’t easy: “It took me two years to find a publisher for my first book. At that time it was the very early years of the publishing boom in Hungary. There were still the remains of the old communist system, and there were no new publishers. Hence, it was quite difficult to find a publisher for a manuscript written by an unknown author,” she confides honestly. The book is about a young vampire, Jarne Volta Ampere, who, together with her grandmother, also a vampire, lives in the attic of one of Budapest’s old buildings. The book was received very warmly by its readers. Her second novel,Kommunista Monte Cristo (The Communist Monte Cristo), was awarded the European Union Prize for Literature in 2009. However, receiving one of the most prestigious European awards has not translated into any spectacular success. Despite having written four books, among them Utolsó Kentaur (The Last Centaur) in 2009, and Nyughatatlanok (The Restless) in 2011, and receiving positive reviews, Szécsi is still searching for her place in literature. She has also been trying to find her ideal publisher. Receiving a prestigious Each of the novels she has written has been European award doesn’t always published by a different publishing house. “Hungary is a very small market and translate into success. everything is sold in small quantities. That’s why it’s impossible to make a living only from writing. Writers work in schools, in publishing houses or they take part-time jobs. Even the very best writers have to do something beyond writing to make a living. Only very, very few can just write books,” she says, explaining why she, too, has been taking on all kinds of different gigs just to make ends meet. She reviews other authors’ books, edits, and teaches at the School of Creative Writing. Clearly, the biggest problem for the publishing market she has been operating in is the promotion of already published books. Or, at least this is what the translators of Hungarian literature say, and Szécsi confirms: “People think good books sell themselves – but it’s not true!” The lack of promotion, a disease that can kill a big name, let alone a debutant who needs even more support. And even though Szécsi meets all the necessary criteria to succeed and has all the communication skills necessary in the industry (she has a degree in English and classical language, and has completed a course in journalism) as well as numerous awards and honours, she hasn’t yet managed to get through to Europe’s literary circles. Eleven years since her debut, she admits that she has grown not only as a person: “I’ve grown up as a writer. Topic, style and disciplined language are very important in my books. Now I’m writing a novel with a deaf narrator and this requires a special world of words and, of course, discipline,” she confides. Szécsi admits that she does not want to give up writing. It gives her a lot of satisfaction and she continues to be what she calls her way of living. 174 People, Ideas, Inspiration Łukasz Wojtusik, Stranger than Fiction

Photo: Paweł Karnowski

From the left: Jaroslav Žváček, Zośka Papużanka, Arnaud Dudek

In Europe, it is never too late for a literary debut. Or at least this is the case for 44-year old Radostina A. Angelova, an associate professor at the Textile Department of the Technical University of Sofia, Bulgaria. When she’s not teaching, professor Angelova writes short stories and poetry. Her favourite form is Haiku. Her name was listed among the top European haiku authors in 2010-2011, and she also won the Second European Competition for Poetry Books in English. She admits that to write in longer form she needs an impetus. For her first novel, this came from one of her trips to Vienna. Inspired by the capital of Austria, she made it one of the protagonists of her first book.Виенски апартамент (Vienna Apartment) is a story about Dr Bianca Stefanov and her short stay in Vienna. The plot of the book was created from small dialogues and meetings with the Viennese. Angelova does not feel that she is a late debutant. She does things when the right time comes. However, there is also a different model for that very first book – just write it. In Poland, Zośka Papużanka’s book, Szopka (A Domestic Charade), was almost immediately recognised by critics and readers, even though the Polish market is densely saturated by large numbers of publications and it is very difficult to get attention. What Papużanka did was plain and simple. She sent her manuscript to a few publishers and, as a primary school teacher, carried on with life. After some time one publisher responded. Months later, her book could be found in bookshops and received many positive reviews. Despite being the end of the year, which in Poland is the time when many literary events take place, it created a great deal of attention. In 2012, Papużanka was nominated for Paszporty Polityki, an award for young, gifted artists. In 2013, her book, along with the works of other respected contemporary Polish writers, was nominated for the Nike Award – the most prestigious literary Łukasz Wojtusik, Stranger than Fiction People, Ideas, Inspiration 175 award in Poland. Despite all the success, Papużanka carries on with the life she led before; and even though the literary world can be tempting and seducing, she does not know if she will, in fact, write another book. She admits on the cover of Szopka that she is happy and fulfilled.

Debutants got talent?

Debutants return to old stories, tackle topics that literature has already known for many years. In addition to identity issues, they like to write about family relations, localities, cities and communities. In many ways Szopka is an atypical family saga. The book is composed of short stories describing a few decades in the life of a Polish family. It is full of unhealed wounds, unuttered words and unsolved conflicts. And although many readers are tempted to ask questions about the relations between the book’s plot and the author’s family story, Papużanka clearly draws a demarcation line: “In literature, all I am interested in is literature. There is no point in examining its relations with the real world. A good novel will defend itself, even without context,” she responds. However, not all writers make this distinction. Many debutants, just like renowned authors, base First time authors in Central their stories on their personal life and experiences. Europe operate in a very Such was the case of Anne-Cathrine Riebnitzky. difficult publishing market. In 2007, as an employee of the Danish Embassy in Moscow, Riebnitzky travelled to Afghanistan, where she found the topic and inspiration for her first book which presents the story of a famous mullah and the women trapped in a world of traditional values. The central theme of the book is the story of Khana, an engineer kidnapped by the Taliban who want to prevent him from building a road between Kandahar and Gereshk. This story, which Riebnitzky brought out of Afghanistan, became her ticket into the world of literature. Clearly, there is no recipe on how to become an author quickly. In the same way as there is no such thing as a model writer, or a model reader. Everyone has their own school, their own style of work. During the European First Novel Festival in Budapest, one debutant confessed that listening to loud music helps her to write, while a different debutant, from a different country, said that for her, such music would be distracting. For her, external stimuli are disturbing as they break her train of thought and impede her thinking; in the writing process, silence is golden. Out of the ten panellists who came together at an event organised for debutants, only one admitted using a traditional pen. The rest put their ideas (even in bits and pieces) straight onto electronic format. Contemporary writers in Central Europe can’t live without their laptops, iPads, or other electronic devices. Some of them 176 People, Ideas, Inspiration Łukasz Wojtusik, Stranger than Fiction

have Facebook or other social media fan pages. When communicating with readers, they take the example of the more established authors. But, just like them, they are also divided into those who talk to everybody and those who only agree to the most interesting invitations. More than anything else, they are all trying to operate in a very difficult publishing market. They fight with different means but they all have the feeling that this is their moment; and they can write.

A very European initiative The most interesting debuts sometimes get the chance to get promoted abroad. One such place is the European First Novel Festival, which, for the last 13 years, has been continuously organised in Budapest. “This festival is a very European initiative,” says its director, Eva Karadi. “In 2000, in Hungary, we had a young and very dynamic director of the French Institute and it was his idea to create this space for young debuts in the framework of the Budapest International Book Festival; it is also a common project of other European cultural institutes in Hungary. The common practice is to invite writers who have won a prize for a debut in their own country. Coming to the festival is a very good experience for these writers as they can meet their peers from other countries.” It is also a good opportunity for Hungarian publishers to meet young writers from all over Europe, as well as an opportunity to learn about new trends in literature; the topics that these new authors are now taking up. In the festival’s catalogue, excerpts of first novels are published in three languages: Hungarian, English, and the author’s native language. Among the festival’s youngest writers is the Polish author Dorota Masłowska, who has admitted that the festival was her first experience of being on a panel with other, international, authors. After the festival, her book, Wojna polsko – ruska pod flagą biało czerwoną (Snow White and Russian Red) was translated into Hungarian almost immediately. A few years later, in 2010, her play Dwoje biednych rumunów mówiących po Polsku (A Couple of Poor, Polish-Speaking Romanians), was staged in a Budapest theatre. Another Polish author, Ignacy Karpowicz, also a guest of the European First Novel Festival a few years ago, visited the International Book Festival in relation to the first publication of his book in Hungary. As a debutant heading to Budapest a few years before, it had never crossed his mind that one day people would be reading his book in Hungarian. Today, Karpowicz has a stable position on the Polish publishing market. He received the prestigious Paszporty Polityki award for his Ballady i Romanse (Ballads and Romances), and his book has been published in Hungarian. He holds very fond memories of the European First Novel Festival, and even jokes that his work in Hungarian is better by about 100 pages (due to language differences, his book in Hungarian is larger by 100 pages). Łukasz Wojtusik, Stranger than Fiction People, Ideas, Inspiration 177

Eva Karadi, commonly known as the mother of European debuts, stresses that 15 different books, by authors who were guests of the festival, have been translated into Hungarian. From the perspective of 13 years of working with young authors she notices changing literary trends and believes that today’s linguistic Tower of Babel doesn’t lack a common thread. “I always try to see a bigger connection between the debutants’ novels. I remember that in the first years of the festival I was under the impression that authors from Western Europe wrote more about their private lives and problems, while those from the Eastern part of the continent focused more on historical For new authors, the most traumas. Now everything is mixed up! We have important book is not their authors who don’t live in their home countries and write about it, and this also generates very first, but their second. interesting texts from Western Europe seen from an Eastern perspective.” Karadi admits that she is not the only one who is trying to help young authors. In Hungary, there is an active Young Writers Association, as well as opportunities for writers to work with publishers or write commissioned texts for newspapers and literary magazines. These young men and women of letters usually don’t make much money, but enough. In addition to the meetings that take place annually in Budapest, the young authors can also participate in other events – namely the European Festival of the First Novel, which takes place in Kiel, Germany. At this year’s festival, as many as 11 novelists and their editors talked about writing and publishing in Europe. Such festivals are, indeed, a great opportunity for authors to exchange experiences, but also to get a broader perspective of different ways of promoting and transferring literature across Europe. Lastly it is important to stress that the most important book is not the first but the second. This is especially true in cases where the success of the first has truly stirred up the appetite of both readers and publishers. “Anyone can write one book, especially when it is a story about a family issue or something the writer bases on life experience,” says Karadi. “The second book is a different story. But the modern world is full of all kinds of problems and this is probably an advantage for young writers! There are plenty of conflicts they have to deal with. What I’ve been seeing over the last few years is that it is harder to live your life as an individual, which is why we have no choice but to reflect on what happens to others.”

Translated by Iwona Reichardt

Łukasz Wojtusik is a Polish journalist and radio reporter. He is the head of the Kraków office of the radio programme TOK FM. 178 Books and Reviews How The Beatles Rocked the Kremlin, Leslie Woodhead

Back in the USSR of the teenager. In the late 1950s, Moscow was roamed by packs of “style-hunters” (Stilyagi), wearing eccentric outfits and renaming the main thoroughfare through Gorky Park, “Broadway.” How The Beatles Rocked These Stilyagi initiated dance-crazes and went the Kremlin. The untold to see the few Western films available over and story of a noisy revolution. over again, leading Komsomol leaders to fear By: Leslie Woodhead. for their ideological purity. Publisher: Bloomsbury, The so-called “thaw”, initiated under Nikita New York, 2013. Khrushchev, poured oil on these flames. American bands were readmitted for the first What began as the peak of youthful idealism time since the early 1930s. Khrushchev was then collapsed under unprecedented cynicism, long deposed and replaced with a more conservative before outsiders expected. Whether it was group of leaders less sympathetic to diversity. external influences, the corrupting influence But it was too late for the young population of money, or sheer internal opposition, the of the Soviet Union who had already tasted departure of a key member meant that the a more exciting life than the one on offer by rest could not go on. The stab in the back the conservative Soviets. myth continued for many years. Some still Into this combustible mix of fate, we find John, refuse to forgive Paul McCartney for leaving Paul, George and Ringo. Not the individuals, of The Beatles. course, but the music. Soviet citizens, who had Of course, the lifespans of the Soviet Union gone for jazz in a big way in the 1930s, found and the Fab Four were not exactly parallel, nor American rock ‘n’ roll too fast and frenetic for their entirely similar. Yet according to Leslie Woodhead, tastes, but the melodies written by The Beatles a documentary film-maker and former associate caught on. Some went to extreme lengths to of The Beatles, the role of the latter in the decline copy clandestine discs, while others were able and fall of the world’s foremost communist state to listen through Western radio stations. Most deserves more attention. In a series of visits to took considerable risks – Soviet hippies were the former Soviet Union, Woodhead made it his beaten in the streets. Those who sold records mission to track down the Soviet Union’s Beatles could have been charged with profiteering and generation. How The Beatles Rocked the Kremlin in extreme cases treated with electro-shock is the story of their resistance to the norms therapy – but this merely led to greater feats imposed by leaders who, if not omnipotent, of ingenuity in satisfying the burning demand allowed no area of popular culture to survive for the music of The Beatles. independently of the state. Woodhead’s aim in his new book is to As in Europe, the Beatles came at an ideal explain how this reaction against a period time. Postwar austerity was giving way in historians have long referred to as one of the early 1960s to a more dynamic culture, “stagnation” came to define the generation fuelled in no small amount by the invention that oversaw the dismantling of the USSR. How The Beatles Rocked the Kremlin, Leslie Woodhead Books and Reviews 179

His style is anecdotal, allowing the force of his campaigner, perhaps worthy of admiration interviewees to come across without dwelling after all – so long as the American government extensively on the causal link between subtle remained a common enemy. So ridiculous did and outright resistance. Rather, Woodhead these efforts at propaganda become, that parts explains what one fan refers to as the feeling of 1985’s Live Aid were broadcast as a Soviet- of being a stranger in one’s own country: organised concert in support of peace and the feeling that something as innocuous as disarmament in the world. Embarrassingly, this popular music could be contraband limited paved the way for a Chernobyl relief concert the extent to which younger people could shortly afterwards, organised by rock fans identify with the Communist Party and the independently of the state. Soviet state. According to another fan: “After These contradictory approaches to popular The Beatles, the Iron Curtain was like a fence music had many causes. One early factor in with holes. That was our secret. We breathed favour of the Soviet Beatles fans was that they through these holes.” were so often the sons of privilege – the ones What is surprising is not merely that the who had first access to precious records from Communist Party officially considered The abroad. Stas Namin, the improbable eclectic Beatles undesirable, but that their response grandson of Anastas Mikoyan (an Old Bolshevik was so often contradictory. Soviet leaders who briefly served as head of state in the 1960s), would decry the influence of electric guitars, is an instructive example. then they would seek to create ersatz Yet another feature of the Party’s approach alternatives to Western rock groups, such as to popular culture was the conflict between the the American-born troubadour, Dean Reed. internationalist ideals of the October Revolution Unsurprisingly, these were often far behind and the “Socialism in One Country” pioneered by the fashion of the times, while the state Joseph Stalin. As the latter gained ground during also put up obstacles, preventing musicians the 1930s, Soviet consumerism increasingly from publishing their songs. The famous came to revolve around home-produced goods, Mr Tra-la-la was originally a lyricist, whose such as Sovetskoe champagne, and Socialist frustration at having his songs so frequently Realist artworks, while jazz, the “proletarian music rejected, led him to forsake words altogether. of American blacks and Jews”, fell out of favour The Beatles themselves were in an ambiguous as Russian nationalism was emphasised. Several category. While bodies such as the Komsomol attempts under Stalin to stamp out use of the would lead the ridiculing of the Bugs, one saxophone proved not wholly successful, and enterprising soul had the song Girl released as after his death, the regime conspicuously failed “an English folk song” on an album of acceptable to provide continuity. Instead, creeping dissent Western songs published by the then-Soviet was disguised in films such asThe Diamond Melodiya record label. Hand. Khrushchev himself went to the West, As popular music seemed to reach a tipping promising to bury America, but also to exceed point, the state press schizophrenically began their sausage production. Even his entourage to cast John Lennon in the image of a peace remained unconvinced by the rhetoric, and 180 Books and Reviews How The Beatles Rocked the Kremlin, Leslie Woodhead

the nomenklatura used trips abroad to stock culture with religious fervour. Certainly, some up on new suits and consumer goods. attribute their passion to the Soviet Union’s If hatred of The Beatles went as far as the official disavowal of religion, and others dream gerontocracy of Andropov and Chernenko, of building temples to their idols. Gorbachev’s glasnost generation was the Now that Beatles fandom is normal, their generation that knew the Beatles. Indeed, if significance is on the wane. Even in the late Woodhead’s interlocutors are to be believed, Soviet period, the legacy of The Beatles was Gorbachev himself may have been a fan. Paul instrumentalised. McCartney’s “golden disc” was McCartney even recorded an album exclusively often sold to Western collectors, giving Soviet for release in the Soviet Union (1988’s inevitably citizens the opportunity to engage openly in titled Back in the USSR). entrepreneurial activity. For some, that meant You don’t know how lucky you are, boys fulfilling lifelong dreams, yet also undermined Back in the USSR the feeling of loyalty that had been incubated Based on contacts and parallels drawn with over so many years of longing. the use of music in the Orange Revolution in Music was able to sustain the population of Ukraine in 2004, Woodhead links the Beatles the Soviet Union through a long period in which generation to the collapse of the Soviet Union the government appeared to be stagnating, in 1991. While the scope for the public at large but in the new, “normal” post-socialist era, its to influence events was limited, a large turnout significance is diluted. This is not to say that during the August 1991 coup did cause the McCartney’s concerts in Kyiv’s Independence plotters to hesitate. Yet this is not in itself Square and Moscow’s Red Square did not have sufficient to say that The Beatles brought down a tremendous effect on The Beatles generation. communism. Instead, the most that can be said On the contrary, Woodhead describes the many about the freedom Soviet citizens found from who regarded them as a dream come true. official censorship is that The Beatles “prepared Nonetheless, there is a palpable sense that after Soviet kids for a different lifestyle, different so many years of struggle, there is a generational ideologies, different human values”. shift, and that in Russia, at least, the politics of That the majority of Woodhead’s interviewees music no longer has great relevance. When are male is surely significant, but does not Russia’s defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, declares necessarily invalidate the point. Women may his love of The Beatles and Vladimir Putin is seen have had alternative modes of retreat from tapping his foot at a Paul McCartney concert, the oppressive, outmoded public sphere, or the anti-systemic element of rock music is lost, they may simply have been marginalised. as it arguably has been in the West. Woodhead does not attack the subject deeply However, it need not be so forever. With enough for one to say one way or another, Western music no longer so emblematic of but this is surely an important question. Those freedom and there being little need for rejection who professed their undying admiration for of imposed national identities, rock music in The Beatles betray what Woodhead considers countries such as Russia and Belarus has already a peculiarly Russian tendency to approach experienced its own revival. As Evgeny Kaprov The Last Man in Russia: And The Struggle To Save A Dying Nation, Oliver Bullough Books and Reviews 181 reported in New Eastern Europe recently (issue awash with alcoholism. This is the flavour of 2/VII/2013), the Belarusian underground music Last Man in Russia, the second book by British scene is actively subverting the government’s journalist Oliver Bullough. The theme is Russia’s monopoly on culture and politics. demographic decline. Bullough wants to know The story of How The Beatles Rocked the Kremlin why Russians have a low life expectancy and is an exciting one, and will instantly appeal to why they are not having enough children. “The Beatles mythologists. Woodhead’s reminiscences modern world has never had to confront a about his time with the band, as well as his stint situation where a country does not have enough as an intelligence analyst during the Cold War people to support itself anymore,” he writes. allow him to pull together a narrative from a Armed with notebooks and thermal underwear string of quirky encounters. Like other works on he returns to Russia, where he worked as a Soviet rock, including Art Troitsky’s tome, there is reporter for Reuters in the 2000s. plenty of food for thought in this version of the The result, again, is Bullough’s signature history of the late-Soviet period for specialists blend of travel writing and history. In his first and non-specialists alike. Hidden though book, Let Our Fame be Great, Bullough pieced they may be, there are all kinds of diversity in together a strikingly original account of the humankind. Whether diversity will always find North Caucasus, from the 19th century to the ways at undermining attempts to deny human Beslan School Massacre in 2004. His second choice, or whether the USSR was a morass of book takes us to the Russian heartlands, with contradictions susceptible to human culture, the compulsory metallic-domed Orthodox only one thing remains certain. It really is hard churches, vodka and sub-zero temperatures. to find someone who really dislikes The Beatles. Meanwhile, the book weaves through almost a century of Russian history, from the 1920s to Josh Black the protests that rocked Moscow in the winter of 2011-2012. We witness collectivisation, the cancerous growth of the Gulag system and A Journey to Russia’s Heartland the blossoming of the dissident movement. Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev and finally Vladimir Putin all make an appearance, as do The Last Man in Russia: Andrei Sakharov and Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, And The Struggle To Save the best-known Soviet dissidents. But above all, A Dying Nation. it is the story of one man through the decades: By: Oliver Bullough. Father Dmitry Dudko, an Orthodox priest. Publisher: Basic Books A search for “Dudko” on Google immediately / Allen Lane, New York, lists his obituary in newspapers such as The London, 2013. Guardian, The Economist and The New York Times. Dudko was well known to Western journalists A society shattered by seven decades of – first as a hero and later as a disappointment. Communism, an Orthodox priest and a land When he died in 2004 he was still a puzzle. But 182 Books and Reviews The Last Man in Russia: And The Struggle To Save A Dying Nation, Oliver Bullough

Bullough saves these twists for later, starting Bullough’s Dudko is an ambiguous figure; Dudko’s story at the beginning. It moves forward charismatic but never entirely likeable, even chronologically, backed up by Bullough’s travels. in the first half of the book. Yes, he did have a He visits Dudko’s parishes one by one, catching choice, Bullough replies. But those who held sweaty suburban trains and lingering over out to the end were the exception, not the cups of tea with the priest’s former disciples. rule. Most Russians compromised with the He does a great job of finding and meeting system in some way. Dudko’s friends and relatives, many of them Last Man in Russia is not strictly about priests. He seeks out Berezina, the village in demographics, although the theme recurs Western Russia where Dudko was born, and throughout, backed up by figures here and the labour camp where he was sent to after there. The emphasis is more on visual proof, like his first arrest in 1948, in the small town of Inta near-deserted villages, and on conversations in the northerly Komi Republic. with ordinary people. At one point, Bullough Dudko spoke out about alcoholism and pauses in a cemetery, noting down the dates abortion as a priest during the 1960s and 1970s on the tombstones. “Here was the death of (which is what led Bullough to Dudko’s writing Russia, in hard dates, in front of my eyes.” The in the first place, as he tried to understand the root of the problem, he believes, is that the origins of Russia’s alcohol problem). He was Soviet Union deliberately destroyed Russians’ concerned about the future of the Russian trust in each other. “Any totalitarian state is nation. But, significantly, he viewed Russia based on betrayal,” on people informing on their in an inclusive sense. His followers not only neighbours, he writes. It was a way to divide included Orthodox Christians but many Jews. and rule the country. In this narrow sense, he They gathered first in Moscow and then in sees Russia under Putin as a continuation. Yet village churches to talk religion and social Bullough stumbles across snatches of hope issues, to eat and pray together. Dudko was in unexpected places – such as on a visit to forced to change parish several times and his Perm-36, a former labour camp near the Urals services were infiltrated by the KGB. Still, for where locals now organise a lively festival. He many years he held out, creating a community documents, often comically, the minutiae of of trust around itself. travelling in Russia as a foreigner: the inflated But it was too good to last. The KGB was hotel prices, the suspicious officials but, not able to find his weak point too. Here Bullough least, the dozens of Russians who helped him makes a direct parallel to George Orwell’s 1984 along the way. and its “Room 101”, a personalised torture Despite some weaker points, Bullough’s chamber where each prisoner is confronted book reads well. Leaving the subject matter with his greatest fear. In the Lubyanka, the aside, it stands out for the pleasing clarity of its KGB’s notorious Moscow headquarters, Dudko writing. It may well be the only popular book faced similar pressures and ultimately gave in. on Russia’s demography. More importantly, it It was 1980. In the final chapters of the book, is refreshing to read a book in English about Bullough asks: did Dudko have a choice? Russia’s regions, as many do not venture out Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin, Ben Judah Books and Reviews 183 of the shadow of the walls of the Kremlin. With Vladimir Putin which was published in May this book, Bullough has further established 2013 by Yale University Press. himself as one of the leading young voices on Correspondingly, the book concludes with Russia. Read it on a long train journey through another story, which also happened in 2010, Russia this summer. Or, better still, read it if you in Vladivostok, the biggest seaport in eastern are unable to go to Russia yourself. Asia: a band of six teenagers carried out a series of raids on police departments, killing Annabelle Chapman policemen over the course of several months. They were finally encircled by a task force and two of the teenagers shot themselves, while Read an interview with author Oliver Bullough the remaining ones are still awaiting trial. online at: www.neweasterneurope.eu In between these two stories, there are 330 pages of powerfully argued text which covers the entire history of new Russia – from the dissolution of the Soviet Union until the end Watching the Throne of 2012, after Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin. The artistic frame – from the tragedy in Kushchevskaya Stanitsa, to the bloody events in the Far East – is aimed to illustrate the main Fragile Empire: How Russia task of the book: to explain why Putin, despite Fell In and Out of Love with 12 years of increasing prices of hydrocarbons Vladimir Putin. (such as oil and gas) and the solidification of an By: Ben Judah. Publisher: authoritative regime, has failed to turn Russia Yale University Press, New into an effective state. Haven, London, 2013. Ben Judah, the author of the book, is 25 years In November 2010 at Kushchevskaya Stanitsa old. After graduating from Russian studies at the in Krasnodar Krai, one of the richest agricultural University of Oxford, he worked at the Moscow regions of southern Russia, bandits lead by news office of Reuters and spent some time at the district deputy of the pro-Putin party the British office of the European Council for United Russia, annihilated the family of a local Foreign Relations. His book, Fragile Empire, is farmer. The farmer was hindering the deputy’s written in a classic journalist style – eloquent, business, so the bandits killed his family and with rich details and vivid portraits of the lead guests right in front of his eyes. They then characters. And yet it combines an analytical killed him, piled up the corpses, laid the still- view of the events in Russia which have taken living nine-month-old granddaughter on top, place over the last few years. Judah not only doused the pile with gasoline and ignited it. describes the picture he sees, but tries to This is the story that opens the book Fragile explain in numbers why the Russian reality Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with looks this way. 184 Books and Reviews Fragile Empire: How Russia Fell In and Out of Love with Vladimir Putin, Ben Judah

The book is divided into two approximately the participants. At that, the analysis and the equal parts. The first one “The Rise of the narration are hinged not on the theories of a Lieutenant Colonel” features a description of totalitarian society or advocacy rhetoric, as in what has happened in Russia in the last 30 years. many books of this kind, but on the passionless As the title indicates, this part has a protagonist analysis of the struggle for power, money and – Vladimir Putin. Judah’s investigation gives ideas. The jailed oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, answers to several important questions, for example, is far from presented as being a including: how did this second-rate officer, hero and liberal. an unsuccessful KGB agent sent to spy on The second part of Fragile Empire, “Watch the Soviet workers in the East German city the Throne”, is obligatory reading for those of Dresden (not even Berlin), become the wanting to gain an insight into modern Russia. ruler of one of the most powerful states in Judah relies on his journalistic experience at the world? Judah painstakingly reconstructs Reuters and his contacts in Moscow to present Putin’s biography, recounting stories of Putin’s the events of December 2011 and the protest friends from St. Petersburg, and describes the campaign that followed. The range of sources Russian reality of the 1990s. He tries to explain is vast: from the deputies of the ruling United not only Putin’s mindset, but also the reasons Russia to the young opposition activists, as well why the Russian people accepted his leadership as people that are rarely mentioned in narrations so enthusiastically. The author analyses in – ordinary Russian people representing the detail how the young dynamic president, who notorious “Putin majority”. Fragile Empire traces in early 2000, ended the war in Chechnya, how the Russian economic growth from the implemented successful economic reforms middle 2000s (largely due to the boom of and tried to develop good relationships with natural resources) led to the formation of a the West. He describes the evolution of Putin young middle class which initially was not over the years; prior to him becoming president interested in politics; although, the economic through to today, and how he is known to the crisis of 2008-2009 led to an abrupt politicisation West and the rest of the world. of this social group. And then the elections Fragile Empire gives an account of all the to the State Duma in December 2011 which challenges inherited by Russia from the ended with protests of the opposition. 1990s: secessionist sentiments in the regions, Among the most valuable parts of the book criminality, low governability, corruption and are the detailed portraits of the leaders of the abundance of various groups struggling for the protest movement, whom Judah knows influence, power and money. By meeting each personally. From the charismatic blogger of these challenges, Putin strengthened Russia, Alexei Navalny who studied at Yale University but also formed a severe regime which would and pursued a political career with the liberals later cause even graver problems. One of the and the nationalists, to the figures who are less great merits of the book is the fact that Judah known in the West, such as activist Yevgeniya keeps trying to lose himself in the context of Chirikova, who became the face of the ecological the events and tries to understand the logic of opposition. Обращение в слух (I Am All Ears), Anton Ponizovsky Books and Reviews 185

The value of these portraits (even if there city, but from the suburbs, where the people is too much detail about café meetings and seek change but do not even put their faith the descriptions of the food eaten during the in Putin. The author concludes that Russia’s interviews) is that Ben Judah does not allow any problem is not only the lack of democracy and of them to enchant him just because they are fundamental freedoms, but a lack of efficiency Putin’s opponents. The book fairly reveals the and the total degradation of the state. If these opposition’s lack of vision and lack of clear political problems escalate, the consequences could plans and collaboration. Controversies between be grave, and a simple replacement to Putin, Navalny and his teammates is the side of modern with a democratically elected populist such Russian politics that is rarely discussed (and little as Navalny, would not necessarily make Russia known) in the West. Meanwhile, understanding more stable and democratic. the nature of the modern Russian opposition is extremely important for building relationships Alexander Gabuev and planning future strategies in relation to Russia. Translated by Olena Shynkarenko The last three chapters of the book are devoted not to the capital city, whose life is chiefly described by journalists and diplomats in dispatches such as the ones that can be Listening to the Russian Soul read in the WikiLeak archives, but to life in (from the laptop) the regions of Russian. The author travelled around the whole country – from Kaliningrad to Vladivostok, and these chapters should be of interest not only to the western reader, Обращение в слух but also to the learned Russian reader. Judah (I Am All Ears). provides a unique description of what is taking By: Anton Ponizovsky. place in provincial Russia – the citadel of the Publisher: Lenizdat. St. pro-Putin majority – and is very up-to-date. Petersburg, 2013. Judah travelled to Nizhny Tagil, the Ural city that produces tanks and which is considered a bastion of Putinism, and to Primorsky Krai, Reading Anton Ponizovsky’s Обращение в where people are incensed at the influx of слух (I Am All Ears) may give you a feeling of déjà migrants from Central Asia. vu. A group of Russian intellectuals, staying at From these chapters, especially the excellent a Swiss lodge, tries to understand the “Russian last chapter describing the situation on the soul”. There is a religious Slavophile, a liberal border between Russia and China, the title of atheist, a feminist, and a young nihilist. In the the book Fragile Empire becomes clear. The background one can hear the popular quotes fatality of the system, which is sunk in corruption, of Dostoyevsky and Tolstoy; and behind the has no meritocracy and is ruled by nepotism, window a picture-perfect Alpine landscape. All isn’t better seen from the protesting capital of this is very familiar to any reader of Russian 186 Books and Reviews Обращение в слух (I Am All Ears), Anton Ponizovsky

literature. However, despite being so well- unrestricted. They cannot be “forced” on the known, to the point of being predictable, it is speakers, or directed from the very beginning. still difficult to stop reading. Ponizovsky’s book Fyodor, who occasionally vacations at the Alpine fascinates, scares, intrigues but also saddens. lodge, is assigned the task of deciphering all All in all, it brings about extreme emotions and of the collected interviews, translating them, forces continuous reflection. How, one might and preparing some comments. ask? The answer is quite simple. The book is Submerged in this lonely work, he real. It presents real stories. As one of its Russian unexpectedly finds himself in the company of critics wrote: “In this book the whole of Russia three Russians, who, after a volcanic explosion is described in the first person.” in Iceland, also end up at the Swiss lodge. They As always, the idea is the most important. are: Lola – a 19-year old snowboarder and Mr And Anton Ponizovsky, a widely-recognised and Mrs Bielavsky – a middle-aged, married Russian TV journalist, had one. To gather couple. For five days this group of four get to material for the book he rented a stall at one know the material collected for the research and of Moscow’s open air markets, which served as try to examine the Russian soul together. a “studio” for carrying out interviews; not typical Each of the protagonists represents a different interviews, however, as the interviewees were type, and different ways of how Russia can be not celebrities, actors, analysts or specialists – perceived. Fyodor is a typical émigré. He lives they were just ordinary Russians: the unknown, abroad and from there idealises his homeland. anonymous people who we pass every day in Not surprisingly he loves Dostoyevsky and the streets without even noticing their faces. deeply believes in the “myth of Holy Russia” and What mattered to Ponizovsky were their stories, the messianic mission of the Russian nation. He memories, joys and sorrows; and he listened to resembles the Slavophiles who pilgrimage to them patiently, respectfully and modestly. His the Optina Hermitage to discover the mystery listening focused on their voices, their honest of the Orthodox faith. He is quick-tempered, narrations, emotions and the testimonies of their but also full of faith and naivety. In the collected lives. Ponizovsky’s main protagonist, Fyodor, stories he tries to find hidden truths, depth who not by accident shares his name with and metaphysics. In the cries of despair he Dostoyevsky, is preparing his doctoral thesis wants to hear an ideal symphony; he searches in cultural anthropology at the University of for God’s greater plan even when things are Fryeburg. As an assistant to renowned Professor blurred by existing complexities. He says: “You Nicol Chaas, he is involved in research on are only looking at the surface and the essence the national character of Eastern European is hidden in the depth … for you, all Russia is countries, including Russia. According to the about is suffering. And you are right as even theory of his mentor, getting to understand the Orthodox Church prays for Russia which the idiosyncrasies of different nations, that suffers. But it also prays for Russia which is is, understanding the “nation’s soul”, requires protected by God … We need to remember “listening to stories of its people who are the the true reality that will come in the future, carriers of this soul”. These stories must be where there will be no divisions. Everything Обращение в слух (I Am All Ears), Anton Ponizovsky Books and Reviews 187 needs to be accepted humbly: one needs However, with time, her distance, her withdrawal to remember that the whole now, is only a and at the same time her ability to listen to spectre, a projection, a picture, an illusion, a and deeply experience all of the subsequent demon, a stream of existence!” stories, show the sensitivity of this young, A contrary view is expressed by Dmitry somewhat lost, woman. A woman who is also Bielavsky. Bielavsky is a down-to-earth trying to find support in another human being. businessman, a declared atheist and rationalist. The greatest value of Ponizovsky’s novel, which For him Russia is a freak of nature. It is neither proves to be its originality and attractiveness, Europe, nor Asia. Stuck in pathologies, it is a is in the stories collected during the research space deprived of meaning. In fact, Bielavsky’s on the Russian mentality. We follow them, in dilations resemble, in many ways, some of parallel, to the stories of the four characters. And the theses that the Russian philosopher, Petr it is exactly these narrations of ordinary Russians Chaadayev, put forward in his Philosophical which take us into a difficult, tragic, complex Letters. Thus, we hear Bielavsky say: “Russians are and incomprehensible world of human fate. a blind branch. They are spread out between And while these Russian “wise men”, stationed two huge civilisations … Between the civilisation at the Alpine lodge investigating the “Russian of the future and the civilisation of the past. soul” are fictional characters, all made up (and They don’t belong to either.” at times we may even say too schematic), His wife, Anna, is different. She is a feminist, the ordinary Russians, whose stories we read, “a prominent specialist of gender issues”. In depict the real depth of life together with its her “manifesto” she states that: “In Russia, the incomprehensible pathos and suffering. role of a man has been disappearing. Today, Time and again, it turns out that everything Russia is a country without men. It is a country which is alive and true, cannot be captured in which is a woman … and Russian women are rational schemes and is disconnected from solidifying – we’ve already heard it: they work as bricklayers, they drive buses … So where the improbable theories and concepts. How is there a place for a man here? What do we can anyone, stationed in a cosy Alpine lodge, need him for?” enjoying a meal at a lavish table, understand Without a doubt, the most mysterious people who have experienced severe hunger, character in the novel is Lola. Initially, she gives war or imprisonment; or people whose families the impression of being a nihilist who doesn’t have been thinned out by alcoholism and care about anything. The disputes over the murder; people who can’t afford surgery and concepts and ideas, which have engaged Fyodor medicine, or even simple everyday things and Bielavsky so much, are deprived of any such as socks. And these people can still, meaning for her. When asked what the mystery nonetheless, once in a while, claim that they of the Russian soul is, Lola honestly answers: “I have succeeded in life. How can one judge have no clue. I don’t agree with anybody. I don’t a woman who begs for a few potatoes and even understand dividing things into those offers a baby blanket in exchange, and after a that are important, main, or subordinate…” meagre meal burst into tears saying: “Grandma, 188 Books and Reviews Wiele demonów (Many Demons), Jerzy Pilch

I know that you are a believer … please pray are still no answers to the questions posed by for me: I ate my child.” Nikolai Berdyaev: “What role did the Creator Such stories take our breath away, they give assign to Russia?” And it is because of this us goose bumps. Such things are unimaginable; passion, determination, and principality, why seemingly impossible. And yet they are spat we love Russian novels; and why Обращение out by the protagonists as if they were their last в слух, even though written in postmodern confession. A portrait of man, which emerges times, is a traditional Russian novel. from these stories, is – on the one hand – that of a fallen, degraded being drowning in waste, Daniel Wańczyk entangled and imprisoned by the lowest Translated by Iwona Reichardt instincts, and – on the other – that of a super hero, as only a superman can tolerate this much Homo Ludens and continue fighting for dignity. An additional value of the book is its linguistic wealth, as many of the stories are told by people from all over Russia. Each of the storytellers is Wiele demonów a representative of a peculiar microcosm into (Many Demons) which we are introduced by a specific lexicon, By: Jerzy Pilch. syntax and sensitivity. We meet immigrants Publisher: Wielka Litera, from the Caucasus and Siberia, inhabitants of Warsaw, 2013. Moscow, Voronezh and Cheboksary. Somebody who works for the FSB, a sailor, a pilot, a military tank driver, a front-line soldier, a cook, a medical When it comes to books I try not to get doctor, a cleaning lady and a stripper. In his My very personal. I don’t experience them; nor Past and Thoughts, Aleksander Herzen describes try to make personal connections with the how the 19th-century Russian intelligentsia was main protagonist; nor think something was engaged in lengthy (lasting days and nights) written about me, or for me. This would be discussions; how its members disputed great very unprofessional. Books are good or bad, ideas, philosophical works and even specific regardless of my taste and preferences. And phrases. How they would devour illegally yet, at times, I come across a book that I feel purchased books; how, because of ideological is very special. differences, life-long friendships were shattered. A Latin saying memento mori (remember We can see this very same atmosphere two that you will die) has a double meaning. First, centuries later at the little Swiss lodge: “Fyodor it means that as death could happen at any almost didn’t sleep last night (actually he moment, people need to lead a good, pious life almost didn’t sleep at all – maybe he slept for (i.e. go to church, receive the sacraments, and an hour and a half, or two hours), he almost stay away from bad emotions such as anger didn’t eat and now is in a state of a blissful de- or spite). Things should not be left until later, realisation…” How can one sleep when there as later may never come. But it also means Wiele demonów (Many Demons), Jerzy Pilch Books and Reviews 189 that as death may happen at any moment, liberated from the curse of having a beautiful, people need to enjoy life to the fullest. The never ageing, mother. And there’s the passionate well of earthly pleasures needs to be utilised Kornel who exists almost only at the moments as long as possible. of sexual indulgence, and when his beloved Contemporary Polish writer, Jerzy Pilch, in leaves him, he gets pale and fades. his most recent book titled Wiele demonów Another character is a mysterious individual (Many Demons) blends together these two in black overalls. Nobody knows him or anything meanings. The plot of the novel takes place about him, but – for sure – he is the cause in a small Protestant community inhabiting of many misfortunes. And there is also a the small village of Sigła, located in southern grandmother – Zuza. She likes to disappear. Poland, near Cieszyn (a border town with the God knows where. And although she is usually Czech Republic – editor’s note). The residents of later found, nobody knows where she’d been. the village are as colourful as a folk scarf. They There is also the pastor. Mark. An authority in all have some sort of foolishness to them and religious matters who, in a tent left behind by go through life with some kind of demon they the Gypsies, organises Christmas Eve dinners adore. This group of characters includes Fryc for everyone in the village just so he can invite Moitschko – a local prophet and healer who an unexpected guest to the table – a Catholic also works as a postman and has an amazing who, of course, otherwise would never be gift of foreseeing the future. He can see what is invited. A true village fair. inside a closed box or even change the size of Pilch tells many stories and each of them can a coffin, which otherwise would not fit through be read separately. We can open the book at the door. People come to see him or doctor any chapter and start devouring these stories Branny, who, on the other hand, represents of people’s peculiarities, fears, superstitions cool rationalism and is cynical towards the and forces which drive them forward. And yet charlatan Fryc. there is something in the book which links the Another character is the fantastic, passionate stories together. Something which, of course, and very sensual Madame Wzmożek who for goes beyond the place and the characters. This some time has been awaiting the death of her something are the two sisters Ola and Julia – husband. However, when the inevitable finally the amazing, even miraculous, daughters of does happen, she gets so scared that she can’t the pastor. enter his study, ceases to brush her teeth, does The sisters seem to be celebrating a never- not want to wash… She turns down the heaters ending carnival. Everything they do is beyond in the house and follows her son, Juliusz, an the borders of human understanding, or good unfulfilled writer of literature, who, as the owner taste. In any form. They break all the rules, cross of a white coat, is admired and despised at the all the lines. They have dress-up masquerades same time by the entire village. in a church, read books with amazing titles, There is also an organist named weave blood-chilling plots, and run away from Somnambulmeister. In fact, he became an home. They are the best football players, the organist only to have Bach help him become desire of all the boys and the object of hatred 190 Books and Reviews Wiele demonów (Many Demons), Jerzy Pilch

of all mothers. They collect left-turning screws Biblical language, may also be a form of wizardry. and pictures of male knees. They talk about Repeating indeed facilitates memorising, but it death and love clothes with crazy colours. also, especially the obsessive repetition of the When they make love, they do it so loud that same words, helps people become liberated the whole village can hear them. When they from themselves. Hence, the circle of characters know a secret, they won’t tell anybody, even is completed here by the language, closing the if they try to break their ribs. However, their eternal, ceaselessly moving, circle of life and death. fantastic madness, desperate passion and In Poland, Jerzy Pilch has made readers taking life at its fullest, their colour and juicy almost addicted to him. And there are reasons vitality and unstoppable drive to try everything, for this addiction. Since 1989, when he received are all marked with some kind of sorrow – a the Kościelski Foundation Award for his book sorrow with a bottomless source, a spectre Wyznania twórcy pokątnej literatury erotycznej of pain, death and tragedy. A tragedy that (Confessions of an author of illicit erotic literature) eventually does really happen. In mysterious he has published a new book every year, or circumstances, Ola disappears. Nobody can every two years. Nominated seven times to the find her – dead or alive. most prestigious Polish literary award – Nike (he The closest to death are actually those who received it in 2001 for his book Pod Mocnym live to the fullest. In this parade of the strange, Aniołem [The Strong Angel Inn]), Pilch is also funny and wonderfully impossible, but painfully recognised worldwide. In 2010 Kirkus Review realistic characters, also march guilt, evil and called his Tysiąc spokojnych miast (A Thousand death. Among the funny stories about the Peaceful Cities) one of the best novels in the vicissitudes of Sigła’s residents there is also United States. After publishing Marsz Polonia some sort of anxiety. Somebody has been (March Polonia) in 2008, Pilch became silent sending out mysterious letters, full of terror and for a while. Recently, between 2009-2011, the obsession. And the old-fashioned superstitions Polish weekly Przekrój published excerpts of his come true. Just like the one about the rope Dzienniki (Diaries), but there has been no new that cannot be cut through. The dead enter novel. Only readers. Waiting. And now they’ve the world of the living. First, quietly, and with got it; even though it has taken five years of little notice, they start to accompany them waiting for his charmingly twisted plots, vibrant in everyday events. They fill their memories language, wit and nostalgia. and later get so much courage that they start And yes, for me this book, too, has a special talking with those who are alive. The narrator, meaning. I like it, especially because Pilch does suddenly, in the middle of the story, repeats: not distinguish between sacrum and profanum. “They will die. They will die”. He blends them very tightly, to the point of At times Wiele demonów reads like a book being inseparable. And why would one even of spells. The language is extremely flexible. want to separate them when the whole taste Its malleability gives it a feel of the best of life comes from exactly this ability to see picaresque novels or folk songs. Repetitions both of these spheres at the same time. It is and enumerations, which are so characteristic of true that while at one second we laugh loudly Dziedzictwo kulturowe a rozwój lokalny, Monika Murzyn-Kupisz Books and Reviews 191 at an event, a naiveté and eccentricism of a The publication titled Dziedzictwo kulturowe character, at another second, we freeze with a a rozwój lokalny (Cultural Heritage and Local stupid smile on our face as time and again we Development) is in a way a continuation of the feel that we have been duped and realise that research on Central European heritage that the thing we have been laughing at wasn’t really Monika Murzyn-Kupisz earlier presented in her that funny. It was tragic. Or maybe funny? We book Kazimierz. The Central European Experience don’t know. Unquestionably, Pilch is a master of Urban Regeneration (International Cultural of the grotesque. Centre, Kraków 2006). More than anything, the I feel a very close connection to thinking about author is interested in how attitudes towards the world as a pot of human stories, about its heritage have changed in Poland as a result of colour marked with pain, about the language the system transformation. At the core of her as a tool of sacredness and sin at the same analysis she places the problem of heritage time, about life as a procession of characters as an important value in local and regional who, among tears of pain and joy, are going in development. She examines the complexity the same direction. In medieval images, danse and problematic nature that results from the macabre is a skeleton, which represents death participation of the multiple actors which make and dances with everybody: a young girl and an up the heritage market: owners of historical old man, a bishop, a trader, a king and a beggar. buildings, the local community, the public It is ghastly, but fair. It treats everybody in the authorities and local government, as well as non- same way. And it is probably for this reason that local actors such as tourists, scientists, specialists, it shouldn’t be feared; but also not forgotten. media and non-governmental organisations. This large number of actors is often Zośka Papużanka accompanied by different (and sometimes Translated by Iwona Reichardt contradictory) interests and expectations of cultural heritage. As a consequence, heritage Rethinking Heritage, becomes both a field of cooperation and a field the Polish lesson of conflict. Being aware of this problematic nature, Murzyn-Kupisz examines whether Dziedzictwo kulturowe heritage may be seen as a significant resource a rozwój lokalny in local development. First of all, she accepts (Cultural Heritage and the need to consider the qualitative valuing Local Development). of heritage in the economy and image of a By: Monika Murzyn- given place. She proposes the use of qualitative Kupisz. Publisher: research to measure heritage. She then accepts a Wydawnictwo social perspective to describe the influence that Uniwersytetu heritage has on the local population’s quality Ekonomicznego w of life. It is very important for Murzyn-Kupisz to Krakowie (Cracow University of Economics), look at the potential use of heritage not only by Kraków 2012. the current, but also future generations. For this 192 Books and Reviews Dziedzictwo kulturowe a rozwój lokalny, Monika Murzyn-Kupisz

reason she places heritage research in a long- or even an unwillingness to be associated term context. Heritage cannot be perceived with a certain place. Of course the system as a product of ad hoc consumption as it is transformation that took place in Poland as a socially useful value. It can both influence well as the reforms of the local governments the quality of life of a given place, fulfil its have been a chance for the re-evaluation of the residents’ cultural, aesthetic and recreational heritage that is wanted (or unwanted) by a local needs, as well as determining the image of community; and Murzyn-Kupisz points out that a given place and having an impact on its in a deserted and forgotten place, new cultural attractiveness as seen by its residents, tourists institutions began to emerge. Murzyn-Kupisz and investors. According to the author of the also analyses the social aspects of the impact book, however, heritage should also be seen of cultural heritage, its importance in the fight as a potential opportunity, which may not against social exclusion and the role it plays in necessarily condition local development. forming a sense of local belonging and regional With Cultural Heritage and Local Development, identity, as well as building a sense of local pride. Murzyn-Kupisz helps us to understand the She also wonders about the need to include meaning of the term “cultural heritage”. Initially the issue of cultural heritage in the framework referred to historical architectural objects, of social economy. Implementing local and works of art that constitute the canon of a regional heritage projects may integrate many given national culture, the concept of cultural different partners and lead to stronger local heritage has expanded its meaning to start cooperation. Counteracting the destruction or including a wide spectrum of objects: spatial fighting to save a historical object may unify arrangements, works of utilitarian art, industrial people around the same cause. It allows them objects and techniques, cultural landscape to get to know each other and build ties. and historic environment. This term now also The point is that Poland’s new territorial includes the non-material values of places and divisions have created the need to redefine communities as traditions, customs, rituals, (or even create) a new local and regional symbols and historic names. By pointing to identity. The return to the market economy its value, we trespass the meaning of heritage influenced commercialisation, which, in turn, limited to one particular national culture; and has affected the perception of cultural heritage this redefinition of the concept brings about a as a commercial good serving entertainment. change in the existing role of the expert. The author provides Kraków’s industrial district, The book points to the specific features of Nowa Huta, as an example of this phenomenon. Central European cultural heritage. A historically Nowa Huta is an example of a new trend of diverse ethnic system, cultural and religious interest in the communist past, which has diversity and changes of borders have all become a tourist attraction. led to the fact that heritage in this region is In her analysis of the changes which more shared and common. However, this also happened after 1989 the author presents brings about certain problems. There is little the dynamic development in the real estate acceptance to tame heritage without the heirs market, the process of municipalisation of The Way We Are. Cartoons and Prints of József Faragó, Maia Lazar Books and Reviews 193 public properties, and the ongoing process of presented based on the example of the small privatisation (and re-privatisation), including town called Chmielnik; a place that was once the repossessing of property by former owners, home a large community of Sephardi Jews. both private and institutional. Along with The final case is a study of the palace complex system changes, one can see an increase, on in Kotlina Jeleniogórska. the one hand, in offers and opportunities for Reading this book written by Murzyn-Kupisz leisure offered to individuals by commercial and allows us realise how inadequate the quantitative public institutions; but as Murzyn-Kupisz rightly methods are in heritage research. According points out, there is a noticeable disappearance to the author, to increase awareness in the use of once popular forms of entertainment which of heritage, it is necessary to invest in cultural were offered to people by their employers. education: a lack of adequate knowledge and There is also a decline in the Polish tradition of competence weakens the potential, multi- collective tourism, which is represented by in layered influence that heritage has on the the steep decline in the members of the Polish development processes. Tourist and Sightseeing Society (PTTK). In 1990 the membership base of the PTTK numbered Dorota Sieroń-Galusek 485,000, while it collapsed to a mere 61,000 Translated by Iwona Reichardt people in 2009. The last part of the book is a study of a few selected cases. In the first case the author analyses the strategy of the development of A Hungarian Lost to the 20th Century the eight largest cities in the Podkarpackie Voivodship, trying to recognise to what extent The Way We Are. Cartoons and Prints cultural heritage is perceived by local authorities of József Faragó (1866-1906). October 12th as a potential for the development of cities and 2012 to June 23rd 2013. Hungarian communities in Poland. The second case study National Gallery, Budapest. concerns urban areas in the Upper Silesia region, one of the most industrialised areas in Poland, Walking through the exhibition The Way We where the author examines changes in attitude Are is not just a chance to rediscover an artist towards its 19th and 20th-century industrial and essentially lost to history outside Hungary, but is technical heritage. The third example focuses also an enlightening and informative reminder on Niepołomice, a small town outside Kraków. that history and art can repeat itself in trends It boast of a 14-century hunting castle as well and traditions. The works reveal more about as a conservation centre for European Bison. For human nature than an in a newspaper. Since the author, the town represents an exit point the dawn of political editorial cartoons, made for reflection over heritage as an important popular by France’s Honoré Daumier and later factor in a city’s development. In the fourth case by Hungary’s Mór Jókai, the tradition to poke the author looks at the problematic issues of fun at society, and especially politicians, remains heritage among ethnic minorities, which was just as strong today as it did 150 years earlier. 194 Books and Reviews The Way We Are. Cartoons and Prints of József Faragó, Maia Lazar

life of society. Both exhibitions highlighted the imperfections of politics and society just as the satirists and political cartoonists continue today. Daumier and Faragó have more in common than these exhibitions. Both artists were frustrated with their work. Daumier tried to earn a living through his watercolours just as Faragó tried to gain more notoriety through his etchings. Daumier’s work alluded to international concerns at the time: the conflicts of the collapse of the Second Empire and the decline of France. An example of Faragó’s work, which also alludes to significant changes at the time, is present in his Go East Hungarians (1899), which depicts a man carrying a rucksack with a truncheon sticking

Courtesy of The Hungarian National Gallery out of the bag and large future footprints to fill, which contrasts with his small feet. Whether it be France in the 1830s, Hungary Faragó’s political cartoons were published in in the 1890s or today, there will always be a the weekly magazine Borsszem Jankó, and his demand for this type of media and art. To regular subjects were politicians as well as social scrutinise society is to examine ourselves, a attitudes of the time: Wife and Mistress, one of necessity of the human experience. his social commentary pieces, which stood out Jozsef Faragó and his works are no exception. for its timelessness, witnesses this interest in Faragó’s political cartoons are as timeless representing the society. Like his other works, and relevant as they were 120 years ago. The this was executed in China ink, pen and brush National Gallery at Buda Castle recently held as was common in Art Nouveau. In the first an exhibition on the Hungarian artist József panel of the cartoon, the slightly frazzled wife Faragó entitled The Way We Are. The exhibition is at home, a screaming toddler playing with complemented the Honoré Daumier exhibition a doll on the floor. The second panel depicts held simultaneously at the Museum of Fine the mistress seated peacefully and elegantly Arts in Budapest. These two museums will under a blanket on a sunny day in a carriage, soon merge into one institution, with the idea and instead of children to care for, she has the that Hősök tere (Heros Square) will become companionship of a fluffy lapdog. Budapest’s “Museum Island.” One of his other pieces that also has a sense In the 1890s, Faragó gained popularity in of timelessness and universal appeal is We are Hungary for his political and satirical artistic Going to Live Forever from 1900. The message caricatures and was compared to Honoré in it still rings true. Three politicians appear Daumier, the first French satirical caricaturist. to be out of place; they are well dressed and Faragó, like Daumier, mocked the unremarkable look rather stuffy as they passively look on at The Way We Are. Cartoons and Prints of József Faragó, Maia Lazar Books and Reviews 195 people dancing in the background. Faragó’s did his professional dissatisfaction for his career Menagerie (1896), likewise, is comprised of as a cartoonist. political animals, cowboy boots with spurs, Faragó played a big role in the definition of and a baby pinhead beating a drum. It is the Hungarian cultural environment at that time. obvious that Faragó’s imagination is essentially He was one of the founding members of the a political circus. Nagybánya artist colony in Hungary, where he This exhibition not only allows the viewer to felt most artistically at home. His contemporaries experience and see that humour transcends time were renowned Hungarian artists and painters and place. Most remarkable are his caricatures Károly Ferenczy, Bela Grünewald, Adolf Fényes of art in I’m a Widow, a Tiny Little Widow inspired and Simon Hollósy. With Grünewald and Fényes, by Adolf Fényes’s The Widow. The latter is Faragó shared Jewish origins, as well as a part of more serious in tone: a bleak representation his artistic education: Grünewald studied under of a young widow overwhelmed by the dark Simon Hollósy in Munich like Faragó, even though surrounding canvas. In contrast, Faragó’s piece focusing on a different field, preferring “plein- air landscapes” and an affinity for naturalism. is more cheerful. The widow resembles Old The two artists together were known for Mother Hubbard with a gleeful smile. Her their role in the early modernism movement headscarf is a white kerchief instead of the in Hungary. Their style was characterised original black cloak, and she is even smiling by a clear influence by the contemporary as she lifts up the hemline of her skirt. Faragó’s French movements, particularly those of French wealthy patrons enabled him to study painting impressionism, post-impressionism and Fauvism. in Munich, where he studied under Simon But the influences that Faragó took from his Hollósy and was influenced by the growing contemporaries go even further. One particular popularity of caricature art in Germany. After example, Peekaboo, is a satirical caricature of the spending some time in Paris, he moved to portrait by István Csók, depicting a young girl New York where he lived for two years. Upon in a white dress seated on a park bench. In this returning to his home in Hungary, in 1894 case, Faragó’s depiction becomes even Klimt- he found a new creative place for expressing esque. This girl, hidden behind butterfly-like his artistic abilities – the satirical publication sleeves has a smaller frame in proportion. Did Borsszem Jankó, where he became its artistic the painter identify with his subject? After all, he director. He eventually moved to Berlin in too was buried and hidden to history among 1903 where he spent the last years of his life. his friends’ paintings and their success. He committed suicide in 1906, just one year To paraphrase Plato, while an “unexamined after a successful exhibition of his etchings. life” is not worth living, in Faragó’s case, a lived Contemporaries looking for an explanation life, despite it being tragically cut short and for the tragedy considered possible motives troubled, was definitely worth discovering. both in his professional and private life. His wife’s death a few months earlier definitely Maia Lazar contributed to his fatal decision, and perhaps Kraków becomes a centre for Central European heritology cultural heritage is one of the fundamental notions of heritage, but it is also directly linked to the fields of politics and economics, and various other aspects of the life of society. Heritage is more than just a past worth preserving; it is above all a past (not necessarily distant) that we interpret and absorb into our present. a great international discussion on heritage in central Europe – its philosophy, management, protection, politics and economics – has just come to a close in kraków. the 2nd Heritage Forum of central Europe, staged by the International cultural centre, attracted almost eighty speakers from nineteen countries, including some from outside Europe. the huge interest in the event is ample testimony to the fact that there is a need to talk about heritage, and the central Europe is an excellent point of departure for this debate. as the heritage theoreticians Gregory J. ashworth, Brian Graham and J.E. tunbridge point out, heritage is that part of the past that we select in the present for contemporary aims and that we decide to pass on to future generations. In many cases these aims have a political foundation – wartime often sees damage to cultural assets of the adversary (attack on the identity of a nation), while in peacetime awkward elements of past heritage are shifted into oblivion, while conversely, buildings previously razed may be reconstructed to restore a certain area of memory. all this is an expression of current historical policy. “Heritage and politics”, and also the question of reconstruction, were two of the main issues debated at the conference. all the thematic threads were drawn together in the overarching slogan “the Limits of Heritage”, integrating various dimensions of heritage – the temporal, geographical and essential. In each one of these dimensions the answer to the question of where heritage starts and where it ends is immensely difficult and imprecise. If one looks at the panorama of a city, not necessarily a historic city, or a (world) map showing the UNEscO World Heritage sites, places granted the European Heritage Label, and other monuments, sites and places figuring on various local preservation lists, one has the impression that everything today is protected, and everything can be dubbed “heritage”. the discussion on heritage in central Europe continues, and will continue. the next conference in this series will be held in 2015, and its central focus will be the phenomenon of the city and the currently trending concept of creativity.k raków, meanwhile, thanks to initiatives such as the Heritage Forum, the Icc’s quarterly “HERItO” and the many research projects conducted by the is already the heritological capital of central Europe. katarzyna Jagodzińska ADVERTISEMENT