Promoting Salafi Political Participation

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Promoting Salafi Political Participation CSS Policy Perspectives ETH Zurich Vol. 4/5, April 2016 Promoting Salafi Political Participation Equating Salafism with jihadism overlooks the growth of non-violent Salafi political groups in North Africa, the Middle East and the Sahel. Supporting their political inclusion can promote democracy and undermine violent jihadism. By Jean-Nicolas Bitter and Owen Frazer or many observers, Salafism is a rather nebulous move- Salafism. A very simple typology, which picks out four ment generally associated with a conservative strain of general trends, can be helpful for those interested in de- F 1 Islam and with jihadi violence and terrorism. As a result, it mocracy promotion and the prevention of violence. has been ostracized and treated indiscriminately as a prob- The “quietest” tendency in Salafism eschews any lem, particularly by those concerned with countering ter- participation in politics and is focused on preaching and rorism and preventing violent extremism. But, Salafism is promoting Islam. The “Jammi/Madkhali” limit their en- not a homogenous movement. This paper presents a simple typology of trends within Salafism to highlight that impor- tant opportunities exist for engaging with Salafi groups to promote democracy Key Points and prevent violence. Salafism is too often wrongly equated with violent jihadism and Salafism explained terrorism. Salafism is concerned with promoting a pure form of Sunni Islam as it was prac- There are four broad trends in Salafism: quietist (non-political), ticed by the first three generations of Jammi/Madkhali (conservative, loyal to existing Islamic authoritar- Muslims referred to as as-Salaf as Sālih ian regimes), Haraki (politically participative), and jihadi (violent, (the righteous predecessors). It first revolutionary). emerged in the 9th century CE and is based on the belief, that many non-Is- Allowing Haraki groups to participate in politics can help promote lamic innovations and practices have en- democracy and prevent violence. tered the religion and there is a need to return to the original teachings and prac- Promoting Salafi political participation involves both increasing their tices. It therefore places a strong empha- know-how of the functioning of democratic politics and addressing sis on the primacy of the central texts of the prejudices of other groups. Islam and their interpretation. A number of typologies have been Haraki Salafi groups can play a role in the prevention of violent proposed which distinguish between dif- jihadism. ferent tendencies and groupings within Promoting Salafi Political Participation 2 gagement in politics to supporting exist- ing authoritarian regimes claiming to be Examples of Haraki Salafi Political Parties and Movements Islamic, as found for example in Saudi in the Arab region Arabia. They believe that loyalty is owed Based on information provided by the Cordoba Foundation of Geneva to regimes that impose themselves and Country Party/Movement show strong authority (the principle of 2 Name in Arabic Name in English ghalaba), regardless of their politics. The Mauritania Jabhat al-Asala wat-Tajdid* Front of Authenticity and “jihadi” groups are committed to the use Revival of violence to bring about their revolu- Morocco Hizb an-Nahdha wal Fadhila** Renaissance and Virtue Party tionary political goals, notably the estab- Tunisia Hizb Al-Asala Authenticity Party lishment of an Islamic state. Finally, the Jabhat Al-Islah Front of Reform participative “Haraki” groups are com- mitted to achieving their political aims Libya Hizb Al-Oumma Al-Wasat The Nation of the Middle through participation in democratic poli- Party tics. It is the recent growth of this ten- Hizb Al-Risala The Message Party dency that is of particular significance. Hizb Al-Watan The Homeland Party Egypt Hizb Al-Asala Authenticity Party Salafism and the “Arab Spring” Hizb Al-Binaa wat-Tanmiya Construction et Develop- Before 2011, most Salafi groups believed ment Party that there was no space for them to pur- Hizb An-Nur The Light Party sue their agenda through politics.3 Be- Hizb Al-Watan The Homeland Party ginning with the revolution in Egypt in Hizb Al-Islah The Reform Party 2011, a number of new Salafi political Sudan Ittihad Qiwa al-Umma* Union of the Forces of the parties emerged in order to participate in Nation the democratic transformations that were Syria Hiz Yusr*** Party of Moderation taking place from Yemen to Mauritania Lebanon Tayyar Ahl as-Sunna Sunna Followers Current and to prevent a return to authoritarian- Kuwait Hizb Al-Umma* The Nation Party ism. These groups accepted that they Yemen Ittihad ar-Rashad al-Yamani Yemeni Union of Good would need to cooperate with other po- Guidance litical actors and to work within a plural- As-Silm wat-Tanmiya Peace and Development ist political space. (See info box for a list * Exists and acts de facto. Not accredited yet of such groups). ** Moroccan Salafis joined this party with a diverse composition While subsequent events in *** Syrian Salafi party founded in November 2013 Egypt, Syria, Yemen and elsewhere have tempered the enthusiasm and optimism of many who had hoped that 2011 marked a turning point for politics in the region, the growth in the number of Haraki Salafi political political activists to the conclusion that the scope for influ- groups does represent a lasting change in the political encing government through participation in party politics landscape. is severely limited. Nevertheless, there are a number of contexts such as Kuwait, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco and Salafi political participation Niger, where the political space remains more open for all The formation of Salafi political parties, and their declared political actors, including Salafi groups. willingness to abide by democratic principles, is significant In such countries there are two main kinds of ob- because it offers those supportive of Salafi views a legiti- stacles that new groups entering into politics face: their mate means through which to try and influence how soci- own relative ignorance and inexperience of how democrat- ety is governed. ic politics works, and prejudicial and exclusionary attitudes For Salafis (or anyone for that matter) to feel that of other political groupings. they have a reasonable chance of democratic influence, two basic conditions must be met. Firstly, political parties who Strengthening political know-how represent their viewpoint must be capable of actively par- Lack of political know-how and experience can be ad- ticipating in politics. Secondly, democratic politics must be dressed by providing capacity-building on how to engage perceived to be at least partially functioning. in politics: the rules of the game, how to negotiate, how to This second condition is clearly not always met. In build coalitions with different groups, how to communi- Egypt, for example, the return of the military to power, and cate a clear governance program, etc. This can take the the clamp-down on democratic freedoms, has led many form of trainings and forums for exchange with experi- Promoting Salafi Political Participation 3 enced political actors. Salafi parties are often particularly through political participation, rather than violence, as a concerned with how to negotiate their acceptance within means to express their political views. Second, they can the political sphere, without de-legitimizing themselves in credibly challenge the religious justifications for violence the eyes of their followers. Here they may be interested to of the Salafijihadi groups. Third, in certain circumstances, learn from the experiences of other religiously-inspired they may be able to open channels of communication to political movements.4 engage directly in debate and discussion with violent jihadi This support must be offered in a way which avoids groups in an effort to prompt reflection within such groups favoring one particular political viewpoint. It is therefore about the desirability of using violence.5 In order to be able advisable that opportunities are offered not only to Salafi to maintain the credibility to do this Haraki groups must political actors, but to a wide range of political actors. carefully preserve their political independence. Any hint of When appropriate and feasible, these can take the form of instrumentalization by the state or foreign actors will im- joint events where a diversity of political actors have the mediately compromise their credibility and endanger chance to come together and know each other better. This them. will also help address the second obstacle to Salafi political participation: the attitudes of others. Reluctance to promote Salafi political participation Particularly in Western policy circles, there is nervousness Overcoming suspicion and distrust about promoting Salafi political participation. In part this Many political actors are suspicious of Salafi groups. This is linked to a hesitancy to support political viewpoints can translate into an unwillingness to engage with them, which seem to contradict Western values, for example re- or even into policies which actively exclude them. Such garding the status and rights of men and women. However, obstacles can best be overcome by finding ways to promote any actor that is serious about democracy promotion has to contact and dialogue. One way to do this is to initiate dia- accept that a consistent and credible approach must in- logue around a common goal or idea to which all would clude promoting the inclusion of actors with alternative like to practically
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