Codebook for the EMU Formation Dataset Interview Summaries
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Codebook for the EMU Formation Dataset Interview summaries Horizon 2020 Project EMU Choices June 2018 Background information The EMU Formation data has been collected as part of the Horizon 2020 research project EMU Choices with funding from the Research Executive Agency of the European Commission (Grant # 649532). The data was collected in a joint effort by Stefanie Bailer, Katharina Barsch, Xavier Coller, Robert Csehi, Hanno Degner, Lisa Dellmuth, Clement Fontan, Niamh Hardiman, Shaun Hargreaves Heap, Hussein Kassim, Yiannos Katsourides, Zdenek Kudrna, Simona Kukovic, Thomas Lehner, Dirk Leuffen, Marco Lisi, Josip Lucev, Magnus Lundgren, Leonardo Morlino, Gisella Orsini, Rod- erick Pace, Sonja Puntscher Riekmann, Uwe P¨utter,Jakob Redl, Sabine Saurugger, James Scott, Dimitrios Sotiropoulos, Cecilia Emma Sottilotta,Jonas Tallberg, Silvana Tarlea, Noemi Trino, Ana- Sofia Valderas, and Fabio Wasserfallen. This dataset covers the process of the domestic preference formation through 141 interviews con- ducted in all 28 EU member states. This documents provides qualitative data gathered through these interviews. Quantitative data in the form of position and influence scores for up to 23 national and external actors that participated in the formation of positions related to four contested policy issues are reported in a separate document EMU Formation dataset: Aggregated scores. Citation and further information For more information on the EMU Formation data, please refer to: [ADD] All data outputs of the EMU Choices project are available at www.EMUchoices.eu/data. 1 1 Introduction This document provides easy access to qualitative data gathered in 141 interviews conducted in 28 member states by the EMU Choices consortium. The interviews were carried out with 3 to 8 experts in each member state. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their involvement in the national and EU-level decision- making during 2010 to 2015. All interviews are based on standardised questionnaire that combined open questions and structured questions (see attachment). They were conducted on the basis of a detailed proce- dural manual (see attachment). The individual country reports listed in this document contain summarised transcripts of answers to open, prompted and ranking questions. This document is published as a complement to the full data file, which is available for download in CSV format: EMUf qualitaitive data.csv. This file is available at the www.EMUchoices.eu and from www.zenodo.org open archive. 1.1 Structure of the country summaries Each country summary contains nine sections, starting with the list of interviews and their quality rating.1 The next section provides summary observation on all country interviews by the interviewer. The third section lists open answers for the four contested issues selected as proxies for the fiscal redistribution (GRC and ESM) and fiscal discipline (FCO and SPA) dimensions of the EMU reform debate.2 The aggregated position scores for these four issues are provided in the quantitative part of the EMU Formation dataset. Sections four and five list open answers on the role of governments, national parliaments and political parties in the policy formation process. The sixth section summarises dominant policy ideas on monetary and fiscal policy in each member state. Sections seven and eight contain answers to open and prompted questions on the vision for the EU, while section nine covers government's negotiation strategy during the euro crisis. 1.2 The list of questions Each section includes definitions of questions and prompts. The codes used in question titles can be used to call the question from the EMUf qualitaitive data.csv file, where each row is identifiable by a QQQ.ZZZ code. The QQQ is the question code (e.g. GV1) and ZZZ is a numbered indicator (e.g. O01), whereby the letter also indicates a question type: o = open answer; m = prompted answer; a = ranked answer. Available questions are listed below. GRC: Willingness to support Greece in early 2010 Greece was nearing a sovereign default. As the EU and Eurozone searched for solutions, some member states expressed preparedness to support Greece, while others resisted such proposals. The EuroGroup agreed to on March 15, 2010 to make support available, if requested (Greek authorities made the request on May 2, 2010). 1The interview rating is an indicator of the quality of the interview based on the judgment of the interviewer who conducted all interviews in the given member state. It can be found at the beginning of every country report. The Codes/weights are: 100/100% = all best-rated interviews; 75/75% = excellent interview, 50/50% = average interview; 25/25% = acceptable interview. All unacceptable interviews were excluded. 2See Wasserfallen, F. and Lehner, T. (2017). Mapping Contestation on Economic and Fiscal Integration: Evidence from New Data. EMU Choices Working Paper 2017. 2 Our assumption is that domestic and international actors shape a government's negotiating position. Which actors - ministries, institutions, parties, or interest groups - were most influential in shaping the negotiating position of the government, and what positions did they advocate? Prompt Open answers and structured prompts: O00 Open answer. ESM: The size of the European Stability Mechanism On 29.10.2010, the European Council agreed on the need to set up a permanent (fiscal) crisis mechanism, the ESM, as a cornerstone of the permanent crisis management framework for the Euro area. It was planned to replace the already existing, but temporary European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF. The size of the ESM (its effective lending capacity) was debated with reference to the size of the existing EFSF. Our assumption is that domestic and international actors shape a government's negotiating position. Which actors - ministries, institutions, parties, or interest groups - were most influential in shaping the negotiating position of the government, and what positions did they advocate? Prompt Open answers and structured prompts: O00 Open answer. FCO: The legal form of the debt break This was a debate about the legal nature of the commitment to the stability and fiscal discipline con- tained in the Fiscal Compact (TSCG). Some member states rejected the TSCG, while others insisted on the constitutional-type of commitment and yet others were reluctant to accept such a hard provision. The early drafts proposed \national binding provisions of a constitutional or equivalent nature", whereas the adopted text refers to \provisions of binding force and permanent character, preferably constitutional". Our assumption is that domestic and international actors shape a government's negotiating position. Which ac- tors - ministries, institutions, parties, or interest groups - were most influential in shaping the negotiating position of the government, and what positions did they advocate? Prompt Open answers and structured prompts: O00 Open answer. SPA: The blocking of SGP sanctions by reversed qualified majority The triggering mechanism for SGP sanctions became a contested issue. Some member states supported the status quo, when the Commission recommends sanctions and the Council approves them by qualified majority. 3 Others favoured sanctions imposed by the Commission, unless the Council blocks them by qualified majority. The final compromise introduced the reverse qualified majority voting (RQMV). Our assumption is that domestic and international actors shape a government's negotiating position. Which actors - ministries, institutions, parties, or interest groups - were most influential in shaping the negotiating position of the government, and what positions did they advocate? Prompt Open answers and structured prompts: O00 Open answer. GV1: The Change of Position and the change of Government According to your expertise, was there a major change in the position of this country in the reform negotia- tions on the two-/six-pack/fiscal compact and EFSF/ESM, or the banking union? If yes, were these position changes linked to changes of the government? Prompt Open answers and structured prompts: O00 Open answer O01 Two-/six-pack/fiscal compact position under initial government O02 Two-/six-pack/fiscal compact position under later government O03 Banking union position under initial government O04 Banking union position under later government O05 EFSF/ESM position under later government O06 EFSF/ESM position under initial government GV2: The Impact of the Eurozone non-membership [in scores] In your view, did the fact that this country is not a member of the Eurozone influence the position that the government took in discussions on reforms of EMU? 4 Prompt Open answers and structured prompts: O00 Open answer M01 The government pushed for reforms within the current Treaties. M02 The government supported mechanisms that ensure participation of Eurozone non- members in the new governance structures. M03 The government pushed for reforms that will not make it more difficult to later adopt the euro. M04 The government pushed for reforms outside of the current Treaties. M05 The government supported mechanisms exclusively designed for member of the Eurozone. M06 The government was not worried about further integration within the Eurozone, as there is little interest in adopting the Euro in the foreseeable future. M07 Other argument. PL1: The role of the National Parliament [in scores] Could you tell us whether the national parliament's (majority party) role in influencing the national govern- ment's position became stronger, weaker