B. CUBA The facts with respect to Cuba are divided into three broad sections. The first describes the plots against Fidel Castro’s life without ad- dressing the question of authorization. The second deals with whether or not the successive Directors of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles and John &Cone, authorized or knew about the various plots. (Although we have separated the evi- dence relating to the DC13 from that relating to other high adminis- tration officials, it is important to remember that the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters and a member of major administrative policy- making councils, ,as well as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.) The third section covers the evidence concerning whether or not other high officials-including the various Presidents-authorized or knew about the plots. This section also considers the evidence relating to whether or not the CIA officials involved believed the plots to be con- sistent with the general policy objectives of the various administra- tions even if those officials had no personal knowledge as to whether the plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority. 1. !PHE ASSASSINATION PLOTS We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965.l Although some of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stage of planning and prepa.ration, one plot, involving the use of underworld figures, re- portedly twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved fur- nishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident. The proposed assassination devices ran the gamut from high-pow- ered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which strain the imagination. 1 In August 1975, Fldel Castro gave Senator George McGovern a list of twenty-four alleged attempts to assassinate him in which Castro claimed the CIA had been involved. The Committee forwarded this list to the CIA and requested it to respond to those allega- tions. The CIA’s fourteen-page response concluded : “In summary, of the l * l incidents described in Castro’s report, the tiles reviewed indicate that CIA had no involvement in Bfteen of the CBSPS : i.e., never had any contact with the individuals mentoned or was not in contact with them at the time of the alleged incidents. In the remaining nine cases, CIA had operational relationships with some of the individuals mentioned but not for the purpose of assassination. * * * Of the cases reviewed, nothing has been found to substantiate the charges that CIA directed its agents to assassinate Castro. The Committee has found no evidence that the CIA was involved in the attempts on Castro’s life enumerated in the allegations that Castro gave to Senator McGovern. The CIA’s involvement in other plots against Castro and the top figures in his Government are set forth below. 72 The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22,1963-the I-erv day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas-when a CIA official offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy was meet- ing with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations. The following narrative sets forth the facts of assassination plots against Castro as established before the Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. The question of the level and degree of authori- zation of the plots is considered in the sections that follow. (a) Plots : Early 1960 (i) Plots to Destroy Castro’s Public Zmage Efforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts. From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro’s charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According to the 196’7 Report of the CIA’s Inspector General, an official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled discussing a scheme to spray Castro’s broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but the scheme was rejected because the chemi- cal was unreliable. During this period, TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General also reported a plan to destroy Castro’s image as “The Beard” by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The depilatory was to be administered during a trip outside Cuba, when it was anticipated Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals, but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip. (I.G. Report, pp. 10-13) (ii) Accident PZot The first action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in 1960. A Cuban who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelligence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably be in contact with R.aul Castro. (,Memo to Inspector General, l/17/75) CIA Headquar- ters and field stat,ions were requested to inform the Havana Station of any. intelligence needs that the Cuban might fulfill. The case officer testified that he and the Cuban contemplated only acquiring intelli- gence information and that assassination was not proposed by them.’ The cable from the Havana Station was received at Headquarters on the night of ,July 20. The duty officer, who was summoned to Head- quarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to Richard Bissell, CIA’s Deputy Director for Pl,ans and the man in charge of 1 A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs supports this account. 73 CIA’s covert action directorate. The duty officer also cont.acted J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division within the Director- ate for Plans.’ Following their instructions, he sent a oable to the Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: “Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS.” The cable in- quired whether the Cuban was sufficiently motivated to risk ‘Larranging an accident” involving Raul Castro and *advised that the station could “at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details”. Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment “after successful completion,” but no advance payment was permitted because of the possi,bility that the Cuban was a double agent. According to the case officer, this cable represented “quite a departure from the conventional activities we’d been asked to handle.” (Case Officer interview, 8/4/Z, p. 2) * The case officer contacted the Cuban and told him of the proposal. The case officer avoided the word “assassinate” but made it clear that the CIA contemplated an “accident to neutralize this leader’s [ Raul’s] influence.” (Case Oflicer interview, 8/4/75, p. 2) After being assured that his sons would be given a college education in the event of his death, the Cuban agreed to take a “calculated risk,” limited to possibili- ties that might pass as accidental. (Cable, Havana to Director, 7/22/60) Immediately after returning to the station the case officer was told that a cable had just arrived stating : “Do not pursue ref. Would like to drop matter.” (Cable, Director to Havana, 7/22/60 ; Memo to I. G., l/17/75) This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes. It was, of course, too late to “drop the matter” since the Cuban had already left to contact Raul Castro. When the Cuban returned, he told the case officer that he had not had an opportunity to ‘arrange an accident. (iii) Poison Cigars A notation in the records of the Operations Division, CIA’s Office of Medical Services, indicates that on August 16, 1960, an official was given a box of Castro’s favorite cigars with instructions to treat them with lethal poison. (I. G. Report, p. 21) The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so potent t,hat a person would die after putting one in his mouth. (I. G. Report, p. 22) The official reported that the cigars were ready on October 7, 1960 ; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to an unidentified person on February 13,196l. (I. G. Report, p. 22) The record does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass the cigars to Castro. ‘The duty 06icer testified that he must have spoken with Ring because he would not otherwise have signed the cable “by direction, J. C. Kin .” (Duty Officer, 8/U/75, p. 16) He also would “very definitely” have read the cable to % arnes before sending it, because “Barnes was the man to whom we went . for our authority and for work connected with the [Cuban] project.” (Duty OWcer, pp. 4, 25) Since King at that time was gfving only “nominal attention” to Cuban affairs, the o5cer concluded that a pro osal of the gravity of an assassination could only have “come from Mr. Barnes”. ( 8 uty Officer, B/11/75, p. 24) 2 The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surrounding facts for precisely that reason : “[II t was an unusual type of [cable], and I say this because I can remember it 15 year8 later.” (Duty 05icer. 8/11/75, p. 14.) The case officer recalled that when he saw the cable, he “swallowed hard.” (Case 05icer interview, B/4/75, p.