Perestroika and Glasnost in the Soviet Armed Forces

Natalie A. Gross*

Perestrojka and glasnost in the Soviet armed forces**

During the year of the INF Treaty, Mikhail Gor- suggests that in the past civilian reform leaders re- bachev's buzzwords perestroika (restructuring) lied on the military to support their programs. For and glasnost (public openness) have become part their part, the military establishment usually ap- of our political vocabulary, but we are still puzzled proved economie changes when it could anticipate and confused about their meaning. Does the So- from them the long-term growth of its own capa- viet leader harbor a plot to deceive the gullible bilities. Conforming with this historical pattern, Western public, or is hè genuinely interested in the current Soviet military has appreciated the ur- liberalizing Soviet society? To explore possible gency of Gorbachev's economie reforms for de- answers to these questions, this essay will examine veloping sophisticated military technologies and how Soviet generals have been implementing Gor- weapon systems2, but has a hard time understand- bachev's policies in the armed forces.1 ing the link between enhanced military power and a more open society. Initially, officers at different levels of command, from the defense minister Perestrojka: changing the leadership and command down to platoon leaders, resisted the restructuring concepts policy.3 They we re naturally confused about ways of implementing perestroika in the armed forces: Shortly af ter Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the very idea of granting more autonomy to subor- hè outlined the policy of perestroika, which dinates ran counter to the core premise of the cen- stressed the role of the individual in revitalizing tralized Soviet military system, which is rooted in the sluggish Soviet economy and ossified party bu- deference to authority and unquestioned obe- reaucracy. To restore trust and confidence in the dience to the commander. As the new defense system and make Soviet citizens responsible for minister, Army general Dimitri Yazov, admitted: their work, Gorbachev claimed, corruption should be eradicated, the public should enjoy more free- Generals, admirals and officers have no profound understanding of re- dom, and party leadership should respond to the structuring, they have not identified their role and place in it and have not public's needs. The leader made it clear that hè ex- come to understand that they have to start restructuring with themselves. pected restructuring to be implemented in all So- They do not serve as models in enforcing discipline, upgrading pro/es- viet institutions, including the military. sionalism, and ideological tempering of troops* The USSR's history of experiments with reform It was only after June 1987, when Gorbachev had * The author is a professor of political-military studies at the reshuffled the Soviet high command following the US Army Russian Institute, Garmisch (BRD). Born in the So- viet Union, she received her undergraduate degree and reserve Cessna aircraft incident in Red Square, that re- officer commission from Moscow State University. She holds structuring of the armed forces got off the ground. an M. A. in Russian area studies from Georgetown University and is a Ph. D. candidate at the University of California, Los 2 For a perceptive analysis of Gorbachev's economie reforms Angeles. During 1987-88 she has been a visiting research fellow and the military see: P. Petersen and N. Trullock — Gorbachev at the Soviet army studies office, Combined arms center, Fort and the Soviet force development process (unpubl. manuscript). Leavenworth, Kansas, and at the Rand/UCLA Center for the US Dept of Defense, Washington DC. study of Soviet international behavior. 3 The military's initial response to restructuring is discussed in ** Met toestemming van de auteur overgenomen uit Para- great detail in: D. Herspring — On perestroika: Gorbachev, meters 18(1988)(9)68. {©1988 Natalie A. Cross] Yazov and the military. Problems of Communism 36(1987) 1 A version of this paper was presented in January 1988 at the (7/8)99-107. conference 'Gorbachev and the Soviet military' at the French 4 D. T. Yazov — Restructuring in the work of the military National foundation for political sciences in Paris. cadres. Voyenno-Istoricheski Zhurnal (1987)(7)3-12.

MS 158(1989)(6) 279 Restructuring the Soviet army meant some decen- breaker techniques, AirLand Battle doctrine, and tralization of decision making to lower levels, re- Follow-on forces attack), which will fundamental- duction of red tape, and a freer exchange of views, ly change the nature of battlegrounds of the fu- especially regarding shortcomings in training and ture. As First deputy minister of defense, Army cadre policies. Initiative and individual sugges- general P. Lushev, has noted: tions are now encouraged, some criticism of com- The main component [in combat readiness] is the human element (. . .) mand decisions is permitted, and closer interper- Achieving high training standards is a difficult mission (.. .) This is due sonal relations between leaders and those being to changes in military af/airs, the conduct of operations under conditions led are sought.5 Not unlike Western military ex- of use by the enemy of high-precision weapons, when de/enses against perts, under perestroika reform-minded Soviet fire, strike and reconnaissance complexes will have to be set up.1 commanders stress realistic and flexible training, 'accessible leadership', and self-motivated com- Gorbachev's new military establishement favors mitment in place of subordination and blind obe- perestroika precisely because it recognizes the po- dience.6 Traditionally, Soviets regarded the highly tential benefit of making the Soviet soldier more centralized senior command authorities which im- effective on the technologically complex modern plemented elaborate operational plans as the battlefield. linchpin of total combat power. Today, Soviet military reformers emphasize smaller combat units, Although the Soviet high command may find per- junior leaders and individual combatants as criti- estroika compatible with the army's military-tech- cal elements of success on the ever-changing mod- nological requirements, Gorbachev's policy has ern battlefield, which is characterized by an accel- not been easily accepted by military bureaucrats erated tempo of operations, unforeseen changes in with vested interests in the old system. As with ci- situation, and massive disruptions in command vilian bureaucracies, groups of senior officers who and control systems. This shift in Soviet thinking owe their careers to the traditional ways obviously has been reflected in the gradual transition to the feel threatened by a more open military where regimental/brigade structure as the building block their performance is subject to greater scrutiny. of the Warsaw Pact armies.7 The right to criticize command decisions granted There is nothing new or surprising about Soviet at- to the lower ranks has provoked angry complaints tention to flexibility and soldiers' initiative; these from seasoned officers that perestroika is eroding discussions have continued in the military press for the sacred unity of command.9 To mitigate the years. What seems new today is that the debate conflict between competing interests within the has evolved into an authoritative, doctrinal reap- military, general Yazov has reassured officers that praisal of the rigid, centralized military system, the marxist dialectical approach can reconcile sub- which is now seen as a potential liability in modern ordinates' criticism with the unity of command. combat. The Soviets have come to recognize the Holding out a carrot to opponents of military per- positive relationship between a more accommo- estroika, Yazov has promised his military im- dating military system in peacetime and a soldier's proved housing and consumer services as part of motivation and initiative on the battlefield during the military restructuring package.10 Again, as in war. In reexamining some of their leadership and the civilian sector, losers in the military restruc- training concepts, the Soviets have responded to turing are the older, less technically competent Western technological as well as doctrinal de- career officers and NCO's, who are entrenched in velopments (e.g. high-precision weapons, assault the military bureaucracy and are used to manipu- 5 Krasnaya Zvezda (1987)(19 Aug); (1988)(23 Jan). lating it for personal gain without having their per- 6 For a perceptive discussion of Western concepts of lea- formance subjected to scrutiny. On the other dership on the modern battlefield see: R. Gal — Military lea- hand, restructuring is more fully supported by the dership for the 1990s: commnmenl-derived leadership (paper 1987 Leadership conference, US Naval Academy, Annapolis younger, motivated, and technically versatile Md). 8 P. Lushev — High military readiness of the Soviet armed 7 Gorbachev and the struggle for the future (memorandum for forces the most important factor in defending socialism. Voyen- the Assistant deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and plans for no-lstoricheski Zhurnal (1987)(6)8. force development). Soviet armed studies office, Fort Leaven- 9 Krasnaya Zvezda (1987)(9 June). worth, Kansas (1987)10. 10 Krasnaya Zvezda (l987)(lSMy).

280 MS 158(1989)(6) combat arms officers, many of whom have grown Chief of the political administration of the Air to maturity in the fighting army in Afghanistan. Force, colonel general L. Batekhin, public openness should be used to discuss possible improvements in training standards, specifically, to intro- Military glasnost ducé higher standards of combat readiness.14 A new deemphasis of indoctrination (vospitanie) in In Russian history, glasnost in the military, as in ci- favor of training (obuchenie) means that the Soviet vilian society, was designed to occasion an ex- military can tailor glasnost to promote perestroika, change of opinions and ideas which was in the best that is, improve training methodologies and the interests of the leadership. In mid-19th-century quality of Soviet military manpower on an indivi- Russia under Nicholas I, the champions of glasnost dual basis, especially within its junior command promoted critical debates to correct the failures of component. the bureaucracy and thwart corruption, which Another aspect of glasnost encourages grass-roots thrived among Russian officers of the time. The initiative in suggesting improvements in military grand duke Konstantin Nikolaevich, who spon- hardware and training procedures; changes in- sored such discussions in the naval establishment, tended to make the military system more cost-ef- believed that an artificially induced debate (is- fective. For instance, within the framework of kusstvennaia glasnost) would promote a con- glasnost Soviet logistics experts are encouraged to structive ferment of opinion about new naval regu- improve the efficiency of resource allocation and lations.n These debates — held within limits strict- cargo transportation, and to promote more exten- ly defined by the central government — contrib- sive incorporation of computer technology.15 Ad- uted to Russian naval professionalism and made miral A. Sorokin, the First deputy chief of the the military system of the time more effective. Main political administration, also recognizes the Not unlike its predecessor in Imperial Russia, role of public debate in facilitating the decision- glasnost in the military today stands for discussions making process, namely, making the military bu- critical of bureaucratie mismanagement and cor- reaucracy more responsive to suggestions from the ruption. During the glasnost campaign in the mili- 16 lower ranks. He has emphasized the need to tary and civilian press, senior military officers and keep the soldier informed about command deci- the ministry of defense as an institution have been sion making; a prerequisite for developing lower- criticized for inefficiency and misappropriation of rank initiative in peace and wartime. funds.12 The Soviet public has learned, for instance, that its highly revered two-star generals The level of glasnost enjoyed today by a profes- have built private saunas and spas at the army's ex- sional soldier in the Soviet Army depends on rank pense, and have made profits on the side by send- and party membership. The Chief of the political ing cadets to work on local farms. By castigating administration of the Ural military district has these activities, Soviet military reformers believe, warned military personnel that unrestricted crit- public openness will assist in correcting some of icism of commanders and their decisions will not the army's present discipline and morale prob- be tolerated, but party members among soldiers lems. and junior officers can use authorized party chan- Glasnost is also used to promote discussions in the nels to criticize their superiors.17 The new policy military on topics ranging from awards and punish- has produced tension, however, in units where ments to shortcomings in training and exercises. low-ranking personnel petition senior authorities Commanders are now requested to solicit recom- to investigate misconduct of their commanders. mendations from junior personnel on issues re- Military personnel reportedly suffer reprisals for lated to education and training.13 According to the publicizing grievances or voicing criticisms. For in- 11 J. and M. Kipp — The grand duke Konstantin Nikolaevich: 14 L. Batekhin — The time for new approaches. Kommunist the making of a tsarist reformer, 1827-53. Jahrbücher für Ge- Vooruzhennykh SU (1986)(21)17-24. schichte Osteuropas 34(1986)3-18. 5 TylISnabzhenie(l986)(\l)n-21. 12 To think and work in new ways. Krasnaya Zvezda (1986)(22 16 A. Sorokin — A human element to the center of party work. march); Stains on the uniform. Pravda (1987)(21 March). Kommunist Vooruzhennykh SU (1986)(22)9-18. 13 M. Popkov — Party democracy and partly discipline. Kom- 17 O. Zinchenko — Criticism and self-criticism. Kommunist munist Voomzhenykh SU (1986)(16)18-26. Vooruzhennykh SU (1986)(18)52-59.

MS 158(1989)(6) 281 stance, a navy captain stationed at the Leningrad Naval base was reprimanded for informing senior The Soviet military press challenges the military authorities that his commander employed stereotyped image of the Soviet soldier enlisted men in his illegally run private souvenir as a Communist Superman workshop on post, as well as in menial jobs in his home.18 Because of this fear of reprisal, the majo- rity of enlisted men and NCOs do not engage in Another aspect of glasnost in the military press has critical discussions. Military writers report that been the new candor in assessing Soviet military during public meetings military men are reluctant performance during World War II. Though crit- to criticize the army's political departments or icism of selected aspects of Soviet operations (e.g. their representatives.19 As general Lushev ad- organization of the logistic and medical services mitted: 'since criticism is not respected in all mili- during the initial period of war) appeared in the tary units, criticism from below is expressed in the military press during the late 1970s to early 1980s, form of timid suggestions, with caution'.20 This recent discussions have scrutinized Soviet military suggests that the Soviet armed forces have a long failures during all phases of the war. For instance, way to go before a degree of openness is attained a Soviet military historical journal has provided an that will translate into personal motivation and ini- in-depth analysis of Soviet failures during offen- tiative in combat. sive operations in 1944. Since the Soviets view military history as a model for refining their operating concepts for future war, their military theory is Glasnost in the military press likely to benefit from this manifestation of glasnost. At the same time, the military press has con- The Soviet military press, which is clearly more tinued to suppress specific information about the open today than it has been since the 1920s (at country's military and technological capabilities, least on some subjects), challenges the stereo- force development, strategies, and operational typed image of the Soviet soldier as a Communist planning for future war. The quality of statistical Superman. It discusses the plethora of social prob- reporting in this area has not improved: the figures lems which the Soviet army shares with many related to the defense budget, allocations for de- other modern militaries: alcoholism and drug fense programs, and arms sales to Third World abuse, nationality conflicts, draft-dodging, vio- countries remain secret. lence between first- and second-year draftees, Compared to the relatively open current dis- AWOLs, corruption among senior officers, and il- cussions of touchy political subjects in the civilian legal arms trading in units stationed in central media, reporting of political issues in the military Asia. press has not changed markedly. The military Some truthful reports about the war in Afghani- press still reports only haphazardly on Gorba- stan and candid discussions by unofficial veterans chev's economie reforms and foreign policy initia- organizations concerning their demands for more tives (though, it must be noted, political reportage benefits and public recognition have found their is not the purpose of the military press). Mikhail way into the military press. The media have ac- Gorbachev's speech before the January 1987 knowledged reluctance among conscripts to risk CPSU Central committee plenum, which called their lives in combat, and disclosed methods used for broad reforms and attacked opposition to his by parents to keep their children from being program, appeared in an abridged, highly sani- drafted.21 Military glasnost has, however, not al- tized version. In the military press, criticism of lowed an open policy debate to develop over the Stalin as a military commander and of his use of costs and benefits of the Soviet invasion. terror against the officer corps has been limited to 18 A deficiency of glasnost. Krasnaya Zvezda (1987)(17 an academie journal for senior officers. The civil- March). ian press, on the other hand, has been carrying 19 Krasnaya Zvezda (198H)(U ten). 20 on an unprecedented de-Stalinization campaign P. Lushev — High responsibility of the cadres. Kommunist Vooruzhennykh SU (1987)(5)17. which blames Stalin's dictatorship for current So- 21 Man's job. Pravda (1987)(18 May). viet economie and political failures. >

282 MS158(1989)(6) The military establishment finds the application of psychological warfare, continues to warn military Gorbachev's glasnost policy in civilian society dis- personnel that the regime's traditional view of the quieting. The military press now regularly takes ci- West's military threat remains valid. vilian journals to task for misconstruing Soviet There is no and will be no panty vith our class enemy asfar as the hu- World War II failures overstating the extent of man factor is concemed. As alvays before, the marxists do not condemn morale and cohesion problems in today's army, war in general. This would amount to (. ..) pacifism. Our support mll and discrediting the military profession and mili- alvays be with those nations who conduct a just struggle for social and tary officers in the eyes of the public. The political national liberation, against imperialist domination and aggression.1'5 leadership, infuriated by the military's incompe- tent handling of the Cessna incident, has set the This statement portrays genuine concern by the tone for critical attacks on the military in the press. Soviet military about the ramifications of Gorba- In June 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev accused his gen- chev's glasnost policy for the fighting spirit of the erals of a lack of professionalism and of having army. compromised Russia's international prestige as a As we can see, the Soviet military has mixed feel- military power.22 At that time, Boris Yeltsin, the ings about perestroika and glasnost. On one hand, former First Secretary of the Moscow party orga- it hopes to benefit from Gorbachev's reforms by nization, scolded the command of the Moscow making the tightly controlled military system more Military district for insubordination to the political responsive to Western technological and doctrinal leadership. Today the military, perhaps even challenges. On the other hand, these new policies more often than the party apparatchiks or the bring into question the legitimacy of the military KGB operatives, draws fire in the civilian media. institution in Soviet society and create tensions be- Naturally, the military establishment, which in the tween civilian and military elites. Glasnost jeopar- past had enjoyed unquestioned prestige in Soviet dizes the vested interests of many senior officers society, views glasnost as a detriment to its public and generales apprehensions about the disruptive image. As a military writer bitterly complained: effects a more open society may have on the ar- 'Criticisms of the army more and more often spill my's morale and political reliability. into the press. Following one after another, these On balance, Western defense planners should be statements become a factor which creates around aware that the ultimate goal of perestroika and the army an unhealthy feeling of animosity'.23 glasnost for the Soviet high command is to create a But the military establishment's attitude is proba- less rigid military system, emphasizing flexible bly ambivalent, since glasnost, as we have seen, training patterns and autonomy, initiative, and im- does contribute to both the long- and short-range provisation for military personnel. In the long enhancement of military effectiveness. term, these changes, if successful, may make the The military recently blamed glasnost for the ar- Soviet soldier a more formidable opponent. Yet, my's continuing discipline problems and for the because centralized control, rigidity, and inertia growth of pacifism among this year's conscripts.24 are entrenched in the Soviet military system and The Soviet military naturally also fears that Gor- military thinking, it will be a long time before re- bachev's glasnost will soften traditionally stringent structuring can really produce substantial change Soviet assumptions about the endemic conflict be- in the Soviet army. In the meantime, while Gorba- tween the socialist and capitalist systems. General chev remains in power, glasnost and perestroika D. Volkogonov, Deputy chief of the Main political will continue to drive wedges between military and administration and a prominent military expert on civilian authorities, and between groups within the 22 Prawto(1987)(26June). military. 23 KrasnayaZvezda(1987)(\2Dec). 25 D. Volkogonov — The human factor. Kommunist Vooru- 24 Sotsialistischeskaya Industriya (1987)(5 Dec). zhennykh SU (1987)(2)14-15.

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