ARS AMATORIA" Author(S): ROY K

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EXCESS AND RESTRAINT PROPERTIUS, HORACE, AND OVID'S "ARS AMATORIA" Author(s): ROY K. GIBSON Source: Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies. Supplement, No. 89, EXCESS AND RESTRAINT PROPERTIUS, HORACE, AND OVID'S "ARS AMATORIA" (2007), pp. iii, vii-ix, 1- 7, 9-69, 71-147, 149-161, 163-165, 167-169 Published by: Wiley Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/43767800 Accessed: 05-06-2019 08:32 UTC

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This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms EXCESS AND RESTRAINT PROPERTIUS, HORACE, AND OVID'S ARS AMATORIA

ROY K. GIBSON

INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON

2007

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Acknowledgements ix

Introduction l

Chapter 1. The Middle and the Extremes: Horace, Satires 1 .2, Propertius 2.23, and Ars Amatoria 3.577-610 9

i. Moderation and Excess 10

ii. Horace and the Middle Way 16 iii. Horace, Satires 1.2 and the Sexual 'Middle Way' 19 iv. Satires 1.2 and Propertius 2.23: the Extreme 24

Erotics and Poetics of the immundus soccus

v. Ars Amatoria 3.577-610 and the 'Middle Way' 34

between Horace and Propertius

Chapter 2. Propertian Extremes: from Conservative to Libertine 43 i. Propertius the Libertine: Extremes of Emotion, Extremes of Behaviour 44 ii. Propertius the Conservative? 46 iii. Libertine and Conservative:

the Extremes of Propertius and 'Self-consistency' 49

iv. Propertius and Mark Antony: the Un-self-controlled and the Self-indulgent 53 v. Propertius, Antony, and the Literary Libertine: Archestratus of Gela 63 vi. The Conflicted Lover: Propertius 2.15 and 2.16, and Medea's Dilemma 66

Chapter 3. Ovid's Ars Amatoria and the New Middle Way 71 i. Choose One (of Two) Only: Amores 3.1 72 ii. Ars Amatoria 3.299-306 (1): the New Intermediate and Propertius 77 iii. Ars Amatoria 3.299-306 (2): the de Ojficiis , Decorum, and Poetics 80

iv. Ars Amatoria 3.299-306 (3): the 'Ethical' Intermediate (and Propertius again) 86 v. Simplex munditiisl Pyrrha and the puellae of Ars Amatoria 3 92

vii

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vi. Munditia and mediocritas in the Ars Amatoria 99

vii. Moderation and the Mean in Ars Amatoria 1 and 2 104

viii. The Middle Way of the Ars Amatoria : Ovid, Archestratus of Gela (again), and Didactic Poetry 109

ix. The Middle Way of Ars Amatoria 3: Binary polarities and the lex Iulia de adulteriis 112 4. 'Decorum' in the Ars Amatoria and Remedia Amoris 1 15

i. Decorum and mediocritas 1 16

ii. Decorum in the Ars Amatoria , Love-elegy, and the de Officiis 1 17 iii. The de Officiis and the vulnerability of decorum 122 iv. The Ars Amatoria and the usefulness of decorum 126

v. Decorum in Horace, Epistles 1 and the Ars Amatoria 129 vi. Ethics and aesthetics: Horace's Ars Poetica and the Remedia Amoris 133

vii. Aesthetic and ethical decorum in the Ars Amatoria (and Propertius) 142 Epilogue 149 Bibliography 151

Indexes 163

i . Index of Passages 1 63 ii. Index of Subjects 167 iii. Index of Latin and Greek 169

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This book was completed thanks to a year's sabbatical leave jointly funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council UK, and the University of Manchester. To both I express my gratitude. The final form of the book owes much to two Manchester col- leagues, Andrew Morrison and Alison Sharrock, who read the entire manuscript, offered suggestions and encouragement, and discussed numerous problems with me. Another Manchester colleague, Ruth Morello, added important substance to the argument of Chapter 3. The manuscript was also read by Jim McKeown, who saved me from numerous errors and kindly sent me his (invaluable) forthcoming commentary on Amores 3.1. To all these I offer my thanks. Versions of Chapter 2 were read to audiences in Manchester, London, and Yale; of Chapter 3 to audiences in Columbia, Yale and Bryn Mawr; and of Chapter 4 to an audience in Cambridge. I am grateful to those present on each occasion for stimulating suggestions. For handling production and related matters with efficiency and skill, sincere thanks are owed to Richard Simpson and Mike Edwards at the Institute of Classical Studies in London. Thanks are also owed to the School of Arts, Histories and Cultures in the University of Manchester for financial assistance with reproduction rights for the cover illustration. The person to whom I owe the greatest thanks is Cathy Delaney, my wife. This book is for her. Key parts of it were drafted in a house just above the beach at Ballinesker, Co. Wexford, where we lived for two happy months not long after the birth of our first son. Use has been made of the following translations of Greek texts (and is gratefully acknowledged): S. D. Olson and A. Sens, Archestratus of Gela (OUP 2000), C. Rowe, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (OUP 2002), R. Waterfield, Plutarch, Antony (OUP 1999), and W. Hamilton, Plato, Górgias (Penguin 1971). Translations of other Greek texts are largely adapted or taken from the relevant volume of the Loeb Classical Library. The following Loeb translators are gratefully acknowledged: A. R. Benner (Alciphron), D. E. Gerber (Mimnermus, Phocylides, Solon, Theognis), H. G. Evelyn-White (Hesiod), C. Forster-Smith (Thucydides), J. H. Freese (Aristotle, Rhetoric ), S. Halliwell (Aristotle, Poetics ), A. D. Knox (Cercidas), D. Kovacs (Euripides), A. W. Mair (Callimachus, epigrams), E. C. Marchant (Xenophon), W. R. Patón (Palladas), B. Perrin (Plutarch, Alcibíades ), W. H. Race (Pindar), C. A. Trypanis (Callimachus, Aetia , Iambi), L. Van Hook (Isocrates).

Manchester, June 2006

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Early twentieth-century Anglophone critics found themselves shocked and scandalised by the material and moral excesses of the Ars Amatoria . In his widely read Literary History of Rome, first published in 1909 and reaching a 3rd edition in 1953, J. Wight Duff pro- claimed the poem 'poison', 'pornography', and a 4 uade-mecum in wantonness' whose atmosphere was that of 'a reckless pursuit of the voluptuous in a society amid which the demi-monde reached a pitch of polished luxury unsurpassed in history'.1 The 11th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, published not long after, memorably condemned the immorality of the Ars , and added that it reflected both the degeneracy of its author ('he is as devoid of dignity in his abandonment to pleasure as in the weakness with which he meets calamity') and the excesses of his society ('too idle and luxurious for serious intellectual effort').2 Such judgements also found echoes in later and more scholarly works. S. G. Owen, in his 1924 edition of Tristia 2, notoriously labelled the Ars a 'shameless compendium of profligacy ... a systematic treatise on voluptuous pleasure'. But, so Owen was able to reassure the user of his commentary, society was to blame: 'in th[is] period of luxurious ease ... the gallantries recommended by the poet were familiar facts of everyday occurrence' . 3 In mid-century, L. P. Wilkinson lent aid to a process of rehabilitation in his classic Ovid Recalled . The Ars , it now appeared, was 'not ... a pornographic work', although a reputation for other excesses remained ('the outrageous nequitia , the blasphemy against conventional sanctities').4 In 1973, with Ovid's critical rehabilitation gathering pace, A. S. Hollis singled out the fulminations of Wight Duff and Owen, among others, as responsible not only for the naughty reputation of the Ars (and its consequent absence from school and university syllabuses), but also for the distortion of the understanding of the poem by its readers.5 This was perhaps to underestimate the desire of earlier readers to have their understanding 'distorted', to discover in the Ars the luxury, excess, and immorality promised by critics. A popular translation of the poem published in 1959 and often reprinted, carried the following advertisement on its back cover:6

Ovid's Art of Love has been called, in the words of the ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, 'perhaps the most immoral book ever written by a man of genius'.

1 Wight Duff (1909) 596-97 = (1953) 434-35. The volume was still being reprinted well into the 1960s. 2 Encyclopaedia Britannica , 1 1th edition (Cambridge, 1911), vol. 20, 387-88. - Owen (1924) 6, 38. In her study of 'banned books', Haight (1970) 4 notes that in the US in 1928, The Customs still banned Ars Amatoria , although inexpensive editions were still sold freely within the barrier', and that in 1929 'the Ars Amatoria [was] banned' in San Francisco. (I owe this reference to Genevieve Liveley.) More information can be found in Karolides, Bald, and Sova (1999) 273-74. 4 Wilkinson (1955) 121. 5 Hollis (1973) 84. The Art of Love and Other Love Books of Ovid, The Universal Library: Grosset and Dunlap (New York 1959), with illustrations by F. Castellon (translator not identified).

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Its erotic brilliance appealed to the prevailing taste of the fashionable world of Ovid's day, an era of gross moral laxity, and has continued to fascinate readers for nearly 2000 years.

The same combination of immorality and a lax, fashionable society which so scandalised Owen and Wight Duff, is now used to sell the poem to the educated reading public of the late 1950s. The resort to a quotation from the Encyclopaedia Britannica for an authoritative promise of degeneracy is fascinating. The author of the encyclopaedia's entry on Ovid had first penned those words as long ago as 1911. But well received revisionary accounts had been available for some years, including not only Wilkinson's Ovid Recalled , but also Hermann Fränkel's influential 1945 work, Ovid: a Poet Between Two Worlds , which offered a notably even-handed treatment of the Ars.1 The publisher is also slightly misleading customers in search of proper moral laxity, as the quotation from the Encyclopaedia Britannica article on Ovid reads in full, '[Perhaps the most immoral book ever written by a man of genius,] though not the most demoralising, since it is entirely free from morbid sentiment'. There is eloquent testimony here to a publisher's desire to sell, and customers' desire to read, works of immorality and excess whose classic status put them beyond the reach of 1950s censorship laws. The moral and material excess which critics of the early twentieth century discovered in the Ars - and the reception given to such discoveries by later readers - together created the reputation for the poem noted by Hollis. That reputation lingers on, certainly in the world of the popular translation and on the margins of pornography,8 but also, in somewhat attenuated form, in academic circles. Earlier critics harboured unfounded fears about the 'demoralising' effect of the Ars , but, so it may easily be assumed, could not have been too far wrong about its substance - about its basic tendency towards various kinds of excess (which no longer shock us). This is not a lazy or gratuitous assumption. Ovid's reputation for one kind of excess - an inability to practise stylistic restraint - goes back to his very first readers. 9 The connections between literary style and subject, between style and personal morality, were of course axiomatic for ancient audiences.10 It would not be unnatural to assume a link between Ovid's 'excessive' style and the subject-matter and treatment of the Ars Amatoria in particular. This is not only a work written in the tradition

7 See Frankel (1945) 53-66 for his sympathetic treatment of the Ars , and op. cit. 3-4 for his attempt at rehabilitating Ovid's reputation for sexual licence (3 n. 12 'his indelicacy ... is naively blunt rather than of the tense and sultry sort'). For other examples of attempts to sell the Ars in translation to readers as a titillating read, see Gibson (1996). For the gradual journey of the Ars from instrument of Latin pedagogy in the medieval schoolroom to naughty and even pornographic early-modern and modern text, particularly in translation, see Hexter (forthcoming), Liveley (forthcoming), Sharrock (forthcoming). Cf. Sen. Contr. 2.2.12 adparet summi ingenii uiro non iudicium defuisse ad compescendam licentiam carminum suorum, sed animum , 9.5.17 nescit quod bene cessit relinquere , Quint. Inst. 10.1.88 nimium amator ingenii sui , 10.1.98 si ingenio suo imperare quam indulgere maluisset. For hostile reactions to the excesses of Ovid's style from critics of the early to middle parts of the twentieth century, see Smith (1913) 66, Frankel (1945) 73, Wight Duff (1953) 443, Wilkinson (1955) 73, Mendell (1965) 213, Heinze (1993) 331. (I owe the collection of these references to Joanne MacNamara.) 10 For the former, cf. already Arist. Rhet. 1404M-8; for the latter, cf. the classic expression of Seneca, apud Graecos in prouerbium cessit : talis hominibus fuit oratio qualis uita ( Epist . 1 14.1).

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of Roman love-elegy, a genre known for its tendency to espouse immoderate or extreme positions (as we shall see in Chapter 2 of this study), but also one notoriously responsible for offending the morality and marriage laws of Augustus. Since Ovid's excessive style and manner of treatment are now rightly celebrated,11 and no longer unfavourably compared with the classical 'restraint' and propriety of Horace or Vergil, it seems to make sense to expect and welcome other kinds of Ovidian excess. But it is these sorts of assumptions that apparently have caused many critics either to miss or to underestimate the emphasis of the Ars Amatoria on moderation and restraint. Ovid's version of moderation is often playful and ultimately subversive; but his insistence upon it is clear. To give just one example, the critics of the Ars identified in my opening paragraph consistently place the Ars in the context of a society given over to luxury. Such contextualisations have never been seriously challenged. But the Ars , in particular the book addressed to women (those most prone to the temptations of luxuria ), maintains a fairly consistent emphasis on materialistic restraint. The Ovidian text which espouses a more tolerant attitude towards luxuria is not in fact the Ars , but the earlier Medicamina - although even here Ovid describes rather than prescribes the practice of his pupils.12 Parts of the Ars , of course, are fascinated by the idea of throwing off restrictions, or (more often) read like an exercise in the paradoxical art of controlled excess. But, equally and characteristically, Ovid promotes an unexpected art of self-control, moderation, and the middle way, to be practised by lovers in a wide range of areas and contexts. Included are dress, hairstyle, styles of walking, personal demeanour, eating and drinking, and manner of speaking and writing. A little-remarked instruction issued by Ovid to his readers - 'but, as in many things, lets there be moderation here too' (Ars 3.305 sed sit , ut in multis, modus hie quoque) - is used in Chapter 3 of my study as the key to unlocking this aspect of the Ars. In the same chapter I go on to argue that in the immediate context for this command, where a style of walking intermediate between rusticitas and mollitia is recommended, Ovid makes extensive and significant engagement with his own Am. 3.1. Where the earlier poem, using the ciphers of Elegy and Tragedy, effectively divided the world into a series of polarities in the realms of personal status, morality, and poetics, in the Ars Ovid drives a dazzling middle path between the pairs of alternatives envisaged in the Amores poem. In Am. 3.1 Ovid chose in each case the alternative castigated by the traditional morals of the mos maiorum. But in the Ars he tries the rather different tack, not of opposing, but of suggesting the 'extremism' inherent in traditional conceptions of good moral and poetic choice. On the running together of moral and poetic choices, I add here that a concern with the link between ethics and aesthetics runs through much of the study. The discovery in the Ars of an ethic of the middle way, as I suggested earlier, is 'unexpected' - but not only because of the critical reputation fostered for the poem in the past century. Readers familiar, as Ovid expects us to be, with earlier Roman love-elegy, will know that 'moderation' is no theme or preoccupation of that genre. If anything, one

11 See especially Sharrock (1994) 295 on the Daedalus and Icarus episode in Ars 2, also Tissol (1997) 5-6, Sharrock (2000) 3, 28 with n. 55. 12 Cf. Medic. 17-24 at uestrae matres teñeras peperere puellas: I uultis inaurata corpora ueste tegi, I uultis odoratos positu uariare capillos, I conspicuam gemmis uultis habere manum; I induitis collo lapides Oriente petitos I et quantos onus est aure tulisse duos. I nec tarnen indignum: sit uobis cura placendi, I cum comptos habeant saecula uestra uiros. For the association of cultus and luxuria in the Medicamina , see further Watson (2001) 467-68.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 4 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT expects a commitment from love-elegy to extremism of various kinds. Propertius strikingly rejects moderation as an ideal in a poem (2.15) celebrating a night of love with Cynthia - and in which he later allows a scandalous comparison between himself and Mark Antony. The elegist declares that it would be a serious error to seek for a limit to the madness of love (29-30): errat qui finem uesani quaerit amoris: I uerus amor nullum nouit habere modum. For Propertius there is no modus where 'true love' is concerned. For Ovid, however, 4 modus' is a principle of general application, including to the life of love (Ars 3.305, quoted above). The contrast between Ovid's 'intermediate' stance in the Ars and Propertius' characteristic fondness for extreme positions, oppositional modes, and flagrant inconsistencies I develop in Chapter 2 (and the opening of Chapter 3). I also suggest here a new way of understanding the relationship between Propertius and the iconic libertine Mark Antony. The unexpectedness of the importance of 'moderation' in the Ars Amatoria is deepened further by recognition of the close association in Augustan poetry of this theme with the more clubbable Horace. The literary relationships of the Ars with Lucretius, Vergil, and earlier love-elegy are well documented.13 Rather less widely understood is the importance of Horace to the Ars Amatoria. It is one of the objects of this study, particularly in Chapters 1, 3, and 4, to suggest the depth and intensity of Ovid's engagement with the full range of his Augustan predecessor's poetry. The importance of the mean and the middle way in Epistles 1, for example, is strongly relevant, as it is here that Horace, as we shall in Chapter 4, already inclined to mock the pretensions of Roman love-elegy and its predecessors (e.g. Sat. 1.2, Carm. 1.33), takes care to present his poetry and its concerns as the antithesis of love-elegy. That moderation and the mean between extremes are intensively developed as themes in the Ars Amatoria is to be understood as a pointed rejoinder to Horace. That pointedness consists, among other things, in the fact that Ovid, unlike the more orthodox Horace, proves repeatedly willing to preach restraint and the doctrine of the intermediate in the context not only of 'normal' subjects (such as the consumption of wine or even poetics), but also of highly 'abnormal' ones such as cosmetics or sexual stimulation. As Joshua Scodel has usefully observed, in the course of a study of representations of the mean and the extremes in early modern literature, 'Ovid and his Roman and English imitators applied the Greek ethical notion of pleasurable restraint to extramarital affairs that were intemperate by both conventional Roman and early modern ethical standards, cheekily associating tactical restraint with moderation and the mean'.14 However I begin my study of Ovid and Horace, in Chapter 1, with Sat. 1.2. Here Horace, targeting the themes of earlier love poetry, produces a variation on the doctrine of the mean, and expresses a preference for a woman who is 'intermediate' in sexual,

13 For the Ars and Lucretius and Vergil, see (e.g.) Kenney (1958), Sommari va (1980), Shulman (1980-81), Steudel (1992), Miller (1996-97). Commentaries on the Ars extensively document Ovid's relationship with earlier elegy. 14 Scodel (2002) 263. I have found Scodel' s book on the mean and the extremes in early modern literature very useful for thinking about the same themes in Augustan poetry, and refer to it a number of times in this study. In an earlier article on the 'pleasures of restraint' in Cavalier poetry, Scodel also observes how these early modern poets, in their playful transfer of the ideal of restraint from conjugal relations to tantalized erotic desire, move, in Foucauldian terms, from scientia sexualis to ars erotica (Scodel (1996) 239 with 256 n. 4). The hedonistic application of the mean to ars erotica is likewise important in the Ars Amatoria.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTRODUCTION 5 financial, cosmetic, and poetic senses. However satirical this 'intermediate' is meant to be, Ovid in the Ars Amatoria produces his own version of this 'mean', in such a fashion as to stigmatise the Horace of Sat. 1.2 as an extremist. In so doing he demonstrates the vulnerability of the 'mean' to unscrupulous hijack - a vulnerability in fact evident already in Aristotle's treatment of the doctrine of the intermediate in the Nicomachean Ethics. In Chapter 1, 1 use the Nicomachean Ethics to give depth and detail to the doctrines of the intermediate and the middle way. But the work is invoked (alongside more occasional references to the Poetics and Rhetoric) at a number of points elsewhere in the study. In this way, I hope to establish Aristotle's ethics (and aesthetics) as a fruitful way of thinking about the Ars Amatoria and Roman love-elegy. The argument for Aristotle's usefulness here possesses two strands, neither of which involves acceptance of the idea that Ovid or his fellow elegists had actually read Aristotelian philosophy.15 The first involves the importance of Peripatetic ethics and aesthetics to a poet central to the present study, namely Horace. Where (e.g.) Ovid in the Ars Amatoria manipulates or travesties Horace's quasi-Peripatetic themes or subject-matter, Aristotle provides a useful framing device. The Nicomachean Ethics provide a reference point by which to measure Ovid's perversion of the 'middle way' of Horace (and others). The second strand of the argument is dependent upon the assertion that Aristotelian ethics, ordered and strongly regularised as they may be, are nevertheless closer than most other ancient systems to ethics at the 'pre- philosophical' stage. That is to say, Aristotelian ethics can provide some tantalising glimpses of conventional non-systematic ethics current in many sections, of ancient elite society. Thus, with proper and cautious handling, works such as the Nicomachean Ethics may provide another useful reference point by which to better understand some of the ancient ethical implications of the behaviour and utterances of Ovid and his fellow elegists. In Chapter 2, for example, I use Aristotle as a context within which to discuss the issue of self-consistency (or lack thereof) in Propertius. However, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics is not the only ancient philosophical work to feature in this study. The importance of Cicero's de Ojficiis to the Ars Amatoria is still under-appreciated in Anglophone criticism. Building on the work of Mario Labate,16 I aim to persuade readers of the riches that this ethical text can provide for a reading of the Ars Amatoria. As I argue in Chapter 3, the distinctive concern of the Ars with moderation owes much to the Peripatetic interests and emphases of the de Ojficiis (although Ovid, as might be anticipated, develops these interests in ways hardly envisaged by Cicero). Prominent also in both the Ars and the de Ojficiis is the concept of decorum - the 'appropriate' or 'becoming', to -npe-nov-decorum and 'moderation' are intimately linked in ancient thought. For the 'becoming' - whether in an aesthetic sense (appropriate style) or an ethical one (appropriate behaviour) - is often conceptualised as the middle way between two extremes.17 Using this conceptualisation as my opening, I analyse in Chapter 4 Ovid's engagement with decorum set out as an ethical principle in the first book of the de Ojficiis. I seek to place emphasis on Ovid's departure from the norms of earlier elegy (where ideas of the appropriate and seemly are largely absent), and on the fundamental

15 For Roman knowledge of Aristotle from the time of Cicero on, see Barnes (1997) 1-69 (specifically on the Nicomachean Ethics , op. cit. 57-59), also Fantham (2004) 161-64. 16 Labate (1984). 17 For decorum in the Ars as the subject of important studies by Labate and Myerowitz, see below p. 115.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 6 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT weaknesses, exploited by the poet, inherent in Cicero's systematic application of an originally aesthetic concept to the sphere of proper behaviour. In addition, I attempt to set Ovid's manipulation of the de Officiis , and his exploitation of the ethical and aesthetic aspects of decorum , alongside Horace's engagement with the same text and set of interests in his Epistles and Ars Poetica. Love as a theme and love-elegy as a genre are rather pointedly absent, however, from Epistles 1 and the Ars Poetica , so the development of decorum as a theme in the Ars Amatoria works alongside 'moderation' as a rejoinder to Horace's more orthodox agenda. The first two sections of Chapter 1 provide some basic information on ancient popular and philosophical applications of ideals of moderation and the middle way. Readers already familiar with this material may skip straight to the third section ('Horace, Satires 1.2 and the Sexual 'Middle Way"), where the argument proper begins. The argument of the book, so far as it concerns the relationship of the Ars Amatoria with Horace and Propertius, is complete in some essentials by the end of this chapter. Here I attempt to demonstrate that in elegy 2.23 Propertius uses the 'intermediate' positions of the speaker of Horace Sat. 1.2 to boost his own status as an ethical and poetic 'extremist'; but that in Ars 3.577-610, by contrast, Ovid uses the same Horatian satire to portray himself, with profound irony, as the true moderate. Chapter 1 also sets out the typical methodology of the book, which privileges the close and detailed reading of texts. Chapter 2 and 3 add flesh to the bone of the skeleton argument, expanding on (Ovid's understanding of) Propertian extremism and Horatian moderation, extending the range of texts covered from each of the three authors, and documenting the ever increasing variety, complexity, and sophistication which in particular Ovid brings to his chosen theme of moderation in the Ars. Important here, as also in Chapter 1 for Propertius, are Ovid's revisionist versions of the terms mundus and munditia , closely associated in Horace and elsewhere with the classic 'intermediate' state of mediocritas. The final chapter moves forward not only onto the new, but related subject of decorum , but also onto the final book of Ovid's erotodidactic corpus , the Remedia Amoris. Here Ovid offers a significant de- construction, if not reduction to absurdity, of the principle of 'appropriateness', where Horace is once more Ovid's explicit target. Nevertheless, although the book sustains an argument across its four chapters in this cumulative sense, each of the chapters possesses its own particular focus or argument, and so may be read individually. The reader may notice in this monograph a perhaps immoderate number of references to my own commentary on Ars 3, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4.18 While this is somehow appropriate in a study of O vidian versions of 'moderation', it is also embarrassing for the author of an article on the art of inoffensive self-praise.19 I can offer two attempts at justification. First, references to my Ars 3 commentary, as well as offering to the reader further background or additional data, are often designed to shorten the argument, and so hold out to readers the prospect of leuior poena. Secondly, such references may offer - to those so interested - a way into, or orientation around the commentary, whose size and format may not encourage a reading from cover to cover.20

18 Gibson (2003). 19 Gibson (2003b). 20 Portions of the monograph, especially in Chapters 3 and 4, develop arguments or expand on data found in Gibson (2003), where the latter offers them usually and of necessity in embryonic, abbreviated, or largely uncommented form. Some of the material in Chapter 3 on the cosmetic

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms INTRODUCTION 7

Throughout the study I quote generously from primary texts under discussion. This may appear a tedious practice. But such quotation is part of a deliberate strategy to provide readers with convenient access to the larger contexts within which the validity or usefulness of my readings must be judged.

restraint characteristic of Ars 3 is shared with Gibson (forthcoming), although there the emphasis is rather on Ovid's relationship with both the anti-cosmetic tradition and the lex Iulia de adulteriis.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 1 THE MIDDLE AND THE EXTREMES: HORACE, SATIRES 1.2, PROPERTÏUS 2.23, & ARS AMATORIA 3.577-610

... iJiéaov T€ Kai apicrrov, ÖTrep ècrri r r'ç aperns* Arist. EN 1 106022-23

Moderation seems a trite theme to modern tastes, a subject apt to elicit cliche and dull proverb, strongly suggestive of a lack of personal and political passion or aesthetic inspiration. Scodel has written how a 'politicized aesthetics of sublime excess informs a major strain extending from Romantic to postmodern radical critiques of bourgeois culture'. From William Blake's aphoristic declaration The road of excess leads to the palace of wisdom' to Jean Baudrillard's embrace of the 'seduction' of 'excess', readers are bombarded by exhortations to choose the extreme in art or life (or both) - as an antidote to 'bourgeois' moderation.1 The modern academy has responded to this call with enthusiasm, giving approbation to aesthetic or political 'excess' by lionizing authors and works deemed to be 'trasgressive'. Even a poet such as Seamus Heaney, who does not very obviously transgress 'bourgeois' norms at least in his Irish context, evinces a suspicion of (political) moderation. A poem published in his 1996 collection Spirit Level , entitled 'Weighing In' and apparently written in reference to the early progress of the contemporary Northern Ireland 'peace process', eloquently documents the extreme reluctance and provisional nature of the speaker's acceptance of restraint and (political) balance. The metaphor of a weighbridge balancing two heavy weights dominates the poem. The speaker can only bring himself to acknowledge the 'virtue' of moderation in this peculiar form, by placing emphasis on the immense strain and tension found in the moment of 'balance'. He insists strongly on 'weighing in' on his side of the scales, all the while desiring to overcome long inhibition, have done with restraint, and (perhaps) ultimately outweigh the other 'side'.2 It would be easy to resort to another sort of cliche, and observe that moderation cannot exist without excess, that the pair form a 'mutually constitutive relationship'.3 1 prefer a more direct approach suggested by the Heaney poem, which points the way to the poetic interest of 'moderation'. By this I mean that moderation becomes a theme to arrest the attention when a speaker acknowledges its pull and gravity, but wrestles with the idea of casting it aside, or - as also in the case of Ovid in the present study - offers a radically

1 Scodel (2002) 285-87; cf. op. cit. 194-95, 2 Heaney (1996). For the same poet's praise also of aesthetic excess in his critical writings, see Heaney (1995) 36-37 (cited by Scodel (2002) 350-51 n. 1); but for the contrast between such praise from Heaney and the notably 'unexcessive' aesthetic of the latter' s own poetry, see Corcoran (1998) 214-18. 3 1 take the idea from Eisaman Maus (2001).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 0 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT new understanding. Nevertheless, with perhaps even greater emphasis, I seek to give serious acknowledgement to the vitality and intellectual excitement that earlier literatures invested or discovered in the theme of moderation.4 With this in mind, the present chapter offers sample close readings of texts by Horace, Propertius, and Ovid, and traces their variously intersecting engagements with issues of sexual (and poetic) moderation and extremism. In brief, we see in the third section of this chapter sexual moderation embraced by Horace, in the fourth section the same rejected by Propertius, and in the fifth section sexual moderation again subversively revised by Ovid. The explicit interaction of the latter two poets with the same Horatian text, Sat. 1.2, as we shall see, suggests the extent to which the Horatian middle way, however ironically intended in that poem, was viewed as normative by Roman love elegists. But in the opening two sections of the chapter, I sketch in the background against which the three poets are operating, and attempt to trace some of the main poetic and (popular) philosophical expressions given to moderation and the middle way. It will hardly be possible in the space available to provide even a preliminary overview of all the aspects of 'moderation' in their richness and complexity; hence I must restrict myself to a select few especially relevant to this study.5 Nevertheless the interest and appeal of moderation as a theme for some ancient authors, rather different from its interest to Heaney, will begin to emerge. By this I mean the extreme thematic and contextual flexibility of 'moderation'. I shall also trace the emergence of a tendency, more radical than that evinced by Heaney (and similar in a few respects to postmodern positions), to reject restraint and the virtues of the middle way. i. Moderation and Excess

A start can be made from such common notions as '±érpov ('due measure'), |i6aÓTT|ç ('the mean'), and [ir'Sev ãyav ('nothing in excess'). Each expresses subtly differing aspects of 'moderateness', although common to them all is the idea of quantity. A general recommendation of 'ierpov appears already in the Works and Days , where Hesiod, in the context of loading one's ship for trade, advises his audience to leave the greater part of their substance behind (690); in sum, [lérpa <1>uXdcj(j€cr0ai- Kaipòç 8' em Tracriv

4 Cf. Scodel (2002) 287 on early modern literature. Likewise, in our corresponding aesthetic appreciation of the style of ancient poets writing on these themes, we will do well to remember Paul Veyne's invocation of the modern 'aesthetics of intensity' as part of his efforts to explain 'why ancient poetry bores us'. The verses even of the elegists are 'not intense enough', disappointing 'our secret conviction . . . that intensity in poetry is the gauge of its veracity' and the mark of its 'authent- icity' (Veyne (1988) 180-88). 5 For a complementary brief sketch, see Scodel (2002) 2-3. Some idea of the longevity and range of the idea of moderation can be gathered from North's exhaustive study of sophrosyne (1966); see esp. the following terms via her index: the mean, meden agan , mesotes , and metriotes. cjco<1>po(júvr| is often best translated as 'moderation, self-control', and North's book extensively demonstrates the close connection between this Greek term and ideals of moderation and the mean. However the noun derives its force and meaning from the semantic field of 'soundness' of mind (ctcõç <ļ>prjv). Nevertheless, I include some examples involving CT0)c|>po(jwr| below. I have not seen the study of the same term by Rademaker (2004).

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apiCTToç (694 Observe due measure; the right degree in all things is best').6 Suggestive of the appealing poetic flexibility of 'due measure', the wisdom of observing [lérpov reappears in later authors in a variety of contexts, including restraint in praise and blame of one's fellows, the need for the rich not to be greedy, measuredness in personal judgement, and the advantages of a modest station in life.7 But such great variety of application also gives a first hint of a characteristic that, according to one's point of view, is either a positive or a negative feature. Is 'due measure' pliantly flexible or merely malleable?8 At any rate, the notions of due measure and proportion evidently implied by [lérpov bring it close at points to ideas of piaov and |ieaÓTT1ç - the middle, the mean, the point between two extremes. What |i€Tpov leaves implicit - that 'due measure' is often a middle point or mean between the extremes of excess and deficiency - jiéaov and ļi€cr0TTļ9 make explicit. Again, poets use the idea of the moderate middle in a variety of contexts, including the broadly ethical and the political.9 It is in the political arena above all - the context also for the Heaney poem with which I began - that a second and more obvious hint of malleability in the ideal of 'moderation' is found. Where the intermediate lies will often be entirely dependent on the viewpoint of the speaker. For Thucydides, the government of the Five Thousand in Athens represented a properly 'moderate blend' (8.97.2 |i£Tpia ... ÇiryKpaaiç) of the many and the few.10 To supporters both of democracy and of the Four Hundred, such a government could only appear an extreme. Here the strengths and weaknesses of a mode of thought based ultimately on a notion of quantity - and therefore vulnerable to (unscrupulous) manipulation - are clearly visible. Nevertheless, related to the notion of (ieaÓTr|Ç is that piece of ancient wisdom |ir|86v

6 For Kaipoç - an important concept later in the Ars - as Hesiod's middle road, the opposite of excess, see Wilson (1980) 178-79. 7 Cf., respectively, Theogn. 614 oi ó' àya0ol ttqvtíúv p.£Tpov loaoiv exeiv ('but the noble know how to observe due measure in all things'), Solon 4c.3 è v jieTpioiai TÍ0ea0e [léyav vóov ('moderate your ambition': for the importance of the mean and the middle in the poetry of Solon, see North (1966) 15-16), Pind. Isth. 6.71 'iérpa 'ièv yvu>|ia ôiòkcov, piTpa 8è Kal kot^x^ ('pursuing due measure in judgement and holding fast to it': on the general fondness for themes of human and poetical moderation at the close of Greek epinicia , see Rutherford (1997) 51-53), Eur. Med. 125-27 tcov yàp 'ie Tpitov TTpwTa (lèv dneiv I Touvoļia vim, xpfl^ai re |iaKpw I Xœcrra ßpoToiaiv ('for moderate fortune has a name that is fairest on the tongue, and in practice it is by far the most beneficial thing for mortals'). 8 Cf. Scodel (2002) 2-8 on the 'mean' as a 'fuzzy' concept, and the claims laid on the virtue of the mean by a very wide variety of ideological groups in the religious and political controversies of early modern England. 9 Cf. e.g. Phocylides 12 iroXXà ļieaoiaiv apicrra* picro? OéXoù ev ttóXci eivai ('there are many advantages for those who adopt a middle course; that's the course I want in the city'), Palladas, AP 10.51.5-6. fļ |ieaÓTT|S' yàp ãpiaTov, 6tt€Í Ta pev aKpa iré<¡>vKev I kivôúvouç ¿Tráyeiv, eaxaTa 8' üßpiv ex^i ('for the mean is best, since the height of fortune is apt to bring danger, while the depth of misery exposes to insult'). 10 Cf. the recommendation of a mixed constitution which avoids the excesses of monarchy / aristocracy and democracy at Cic. Resp. 1.38-55, esp. 45 genus rei publicae ... quod est ex his ... moderatum et permixtum.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 2 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT ayav.n This proverb lays particular emphasis on extremes: wisdom lies in avoiding the extreme of excess and so (implicitly) observing moderation, due measure and the mean. The same pattern is often repeated in recommendations of 'moderation' and 'the mean': 'excess' and the 'mean' receive emphasis, but the opposite extreme of 'deficiency' frequently goes unmentioned. Some reasons for this may be discovered in Aristotle (the 'deficient' state hardly exists for some actions or dispositions) and Cicero (excess is frequently more offensive than deficiency).12 Roman ethical discourse was not lacking in corresponding ideas of due measure and the mean. Modus , a highly flexible term, sometimes expresses the idea of (íéTpov,13 while medius is often used to refer to the mean and the ideal of remoteness from extremes.14 Equally familiar to Romans was the proverbial wisdom that one should do 'nothing in excess'.15 In addition, Latin possessed a range of terms associated with modus which expressed various related aspects of the ideal of moderation, e.g. modestus ('restrained, temperate'), modicus ('moderate [in size, force, scale]'), moderatus ('not excessive in size or strength, carefully regulated'), and moderatio ('conduct which avoids extremes, self- control'). I shall have cause to return to some of these Latin terms later. But first the classic philosophical formulation of moderation as an ethical value, namely Aristotle's doctrine of the intermediate, must be introduced.16 His formulation is of course relevant to understanding Horace, who is central to the present study. In the ethical sphere Aristotle's doctrine of the intermediate takes the shape of a series of 'triads' for 'excellences' of character, where each excellence is situated on its own continuum comprising two extremes (excess and deficiency) and an intermediate point.17 Thus the continuum of 'temper' runs from the deficient ('spiritlessness') at one extreme through to excess ('irascibility') at the other; the character excellence of temper, viz.

11 For the original sixth-century context for |ir)Ôèv ctyav, see North (1966) 10-14; for |ir|ôèv àyav in Aristotle, see op. cit. 209. 12 Cf. Arist. EN 1107b4-8 'With regard to pleasures and pains ... the intermediate state is moderation, the excessive state self-indulgence. As for people deficient with regard to pleasures, they hardly occur; which is why people like this, too, have even failed to acquire a name. But let us put them down as 'insensate", Cic. Orat. 73 et s i ... suus cuique modus est, tarnen magis ojfendit nimium quam parum. 13 Cf. e.g. Cic. Orat. 73 (quoted above n. 12), Off. 1.102 qui appetitus longius euagantur ... ii sine dubio finem et modum transeunte Sen. 46 uoluptati, cuius est ... quidam naturalis modus. See OLD s.v. modus 4. The other senses of modus , some of which recur throughout this study, include 'measured amount', 'limit, bound', 'avoidance of extremes', 'measure in music or speech', as well as 'kind, type', 'manner, fashion'. 14 Cf. e.g. Cic. Orat. 98 medius ille ... quem modicum et temperatum uoco , Resp. 1.52 inter infirmitatem unius temeritatemque multorum medium optimates possederunt locum , Pliny Epist. 4.9.9 placuit medium quiddam tenere. See OLD s.v. medius 8. 15 Cf. e.g. Ter. Andr. 61-62 id arbitror I adprime in uita esse utile, ut nequid nimis , Haut. 519, Cic. Fin. 3.73 quaeque sunt uetera praecepta sapientium, qui iubent 'tempori parere ' et ' sequi deum ' et 'se noscere', et 'nihil nimis', haec sine physicis quam uim habeant (et habent maximam ) uidere nemo potest. 16 For a short outline of the doctrine, see North (1966) 199-202. 17 For the same doctrine in the political sphere, see briefly North (1966) 206-07; for the aesthetic sphere, cf. Rhet. 1404b 1-8. More generally, see Urmson (1980) 163-64.

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'mildness', lies at the intermediate point on this continuum. This doctrine of intermediacy did not operate in a vacuum, but rather gave rigour and clarity to a traditional strain in Greek thought. Such notions reviewed above as piTpov ('due measure'), ļieaoTrļ? ('the mean'), and [ir'Sèv äyav ('nothing in excess') in fact provided a body of pre-existing conceptions which might make Aristotle's system seem intuitive in some respects to contemporaries. Crucial to the operation of the system was the potential of the model of triads for various dispositions to facilitate ethical judgement; cf. EN 1 106M8-23:

So for example it is possible on occasion to be affected by fear, boldness, appetite, anger, pity, and pleasure and distress in general both too much and too little, and neither is good; but to be affected when one should, at the things one should, in relation to the people one should, for the reasons one should, and in the way one should, is both intermediate and best, which is what belongs to excellence [[léoov T€ Kal dpiCTTOV, OTTÉp 6CJTI TT'Ç àp6TT1Ç]18

As with more informal notions of 'moderation',19 the idea of quantity again appears to be the key to making an ethical judgement: one can have too much, too little, or (best) a median amount with respect to each disposition. However, Aristotle's most important clarification of his triadic model is made in the passage immediately prior to the one quoted above, where, in the words of Broadie-Rowe (2002) 83 n. 69, he makes clear that 'the ethical intermediate is not arithmetically calculable from pre-established extremes, but is 'relative to us".20 Here it is worth quoting EN 1 106a33-l 106b7 at length:

.. if ten count as many and two as few, six is what people take as intermediate [Ta [iéoa Xapßavoixji], with reference to the object, since it exceeds and is exceeded by the same amount; and this is intermediate [touto 8è [léoov écrri] in terms of arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relative to us [tò 8è upòç r)[iâç] should not be taken in this way; for if 10 minae in weight is a large amount for a particular person to eat, and two a small amount, the trainer will not prescribe 6 minae, because this too is large for the person who will be taking it, or small - small for Milo, large for the person just beginning his training. Similarly with

18 This 'doctrine of intermediacy' is applied in detail to particular continua and their accompanying triads of dispositions later at EN 1 107a28-l 108b 10, e.g. those of fear, physical pleasures and so on. Reference is made at 1 107a32-33 to a 'chart' of these triads of dispositions. No chart survives in any manuscript of the Nicomachean Ethics , but for a modern reconstruction, see Broadie-Rowe (2002) 307. 19 For an attempt to dissociate the Aristotelian 'mean' from the concept of 'moderation', and to connect it instead with behaviour which avoids excess and deficiency appropriately in any given situation, see Urmson (1980) 160-62; cf. Broadie (1991) 98-100. Kraut (1989) 339-41, however, argues that such 'appropriate' behaviour is always in a sense 'moderate' in that lies between the extremes of excess and deficiency in any given situation; cf. Nussbaum (1986) 309. Whatever the truth of the matter, as Scodel (2002) 290 n. 1 1 points out, interpreters of Aristotle have historically associated his mean with moderation, certainly in the early modern period (and no doubt in the ancient world too). See also now, Hursthouse (2006). 20 Cf. Kraut (1989) 328, Nussbaum (1986) 304.

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running and wrestling. It is in this way, then, that every expert tries to avoid excess and deficiency [tt)v inT6pßo'riv |ièv Kai rr'v eXXeu/av], and looks instead for the intermediate [tò 8è [léoov írp-eí], and chooses this; the intermediate, that is, not in the object, but relative to us [[léoov 8è où tò tov i'páy'iaroç àXkà tò TTpòç fiM-âç].

Making the ethical mean 'relative to us' introduces great flexibility also into Aristotle's scheme. For example, 'mildness' - the intermediate between spiritlessness and irascibility - will not be the same in every circumstance (i.e. not calculable from pre-established extremes); but is relative to the particular situation in which humans find themselves. Hence the qualification added by Aristotle in the passage quoted earlier: 'to be affected when one should, at the things one should ...'. But such a flexible doctrine was also liable to objection. The Stoics, for example, argued that elevating moderation to an ethical principle set limits to the pursuit of virtue and allowed some indulgence in vice (Cic. Tusc. 4.34-57). More serious was the apparent misunderstanding that the doctrine of the ethical intermediate could be applied to any action or affection. Cicero, for example, reasons that for a body or soul to be moderately ill, i.e. between the states of serious sickness and minor ailment, is not equivalent to the 'good' state of health. Hence his objection that omne enim malum, etiam mediocre , malum est {Tusc. 3.22). But, so far as Aristotle is concerned, 'not every action admits of an intermediacy, nor does every affection' (EN 1107a8-9 ov irâoa 8' èrnSexeTca 7Tpá£iç ovôè Trau ttcxGoç t fļv (j.6aÓTT1Ta).21 There is no question of there being an intermediate for such things as Cicero's example of illness. Or to take an example given by Aristotle himself and rather apt for the texts studied later in this chapter, there is no intermediate for 'fornication'. One cannot have regard to the intermediate in such an action, attempting to fornicate 'with the woman one should, when one should, and how'. Rather, such a thing is simply 'going astray'.22 Aristotle's reason for this is that some terms - such as 'unjust behaviour' - imply that the affections or actions to which they refer are already extremes. Therefore they cannot have an intermediate.23 But the opportunity for misunderstanding remained, as Cicero's comments in the Tusculan Disputations suggest. As will become clear later, this same opportunity is one creatively exploited by Ovid, in reaction to Horace's own popularised versions of this ethical model. Alongside philosophical misunderstandings and objections to the Peripatetic scheme runs another tradition of rejecting popular ideals of moderation, whether in the political or ethical spheres. Such a tradition, informal as it is, nevertheless creates a fruitful context in

21 On this passage, see Broadie-Rowe (2002) 306. In the following sentence Aristotle hardens his position: acts such as fornication, theft and murder are always wrong. 22 EN 1 107al5-17 (quoted below, p. 41). 23 Cf. EN 1 107a20-25 '... it is like expecting there to be intermediacy and excess and deficiency also in relation to unjust, cowardly and self-indulgent behaviour; for that way there will be intermediate excess and deficiency, excessive excess, and deficient deficiency. But just as in moderation and courage there is no excess and deficiency, because the intermediate is in a way an extreme, so neither can there be intermediacy in those other cases, or excess and deficiency - one goes astray however one does them.'

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which to view the various attitudes of ironic embrace, rejection, and subversion adopted respectively by Horace, Propertius, and Ovid. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, 'moderate' is often used as a term of abuse in politics, but not just in the modern world. Already Thucydides acutely if unsympathetically recognised the currency of such abuse in his classic analysis of the civil strife on Corcyra. In the revolutionary atmosphere of this island, a tendency towards restraint was suspect (3.82.4 tò 8è cr(l>(f>pov tou avavSpou TTpóOTépa)v f| öti ov ČuvriycoviCovTO fļ <1>0óycp tou nepieívai 8i£<ļ>0€ipovTO, 'and the citizens who held moderate views were continually destroyed by both parties, either because they would not make common cause with them, or through mere jealousy that they should survive'). Perhaps the Corcyran 'extremists' are distant relations of the later Stoics, who so disliked the Peripatetic attempt to encourage moderation even in the achievement of virtue. Alternatively, 'moderation' might be rejected on the quite different ground that, while it may be suitable for petty men, it is hardly appropriate to the true elite. So much at least is suggested by the orator Isocrates to Philip (Epist. Phil. 2.4):

To have an insatiate desire for anything else in the world is ignoble - for moderation is generally esteemed [al yàp |i£TpiÓTr|T6ç TTapà rolę ttoXXoÎç £Ü8oKip.oí)ai] - but to set the heart upon a glory that is great and honourable, and never to be satiated with it, befits those men who have far excelled all others. And that is true of you.

Men such as the young Octavian, who pursued power ruthlessly in their youth (before converting to the virtues of moderation and restraint after attaining supreme power), might have found such ideas comforting.24 The Callicles of Plato's Górgias goes one step further than Isocrates. Not only is moderation inappropriate for the suitably qualified man aiming for power, but the pursuit of excess is in fact his moral duty (492b-c):

To those who are either of princely birth to begin with or able by their own qualities to win office or absolute rule or power what could in truth be more disgraceful or injurious than moderation [acac^poauvris'], which involves their voluntary subjection to the conventions and standards and criticism of the majority, when they might enjoy every advantage without interference from anybody? How can they fail to be wretched when they are prevented by your fine righteousness and moderation [rr'ç aci)pocFi>i/r|ç] from favouring their friends at the expense of their enemies, even when they are rulers in their own city? The truth, Socrates, which you profess to be in search of is in fact this; luxury and excess and licence [Tpucķfi Kai OLKoXacjia Kai e'£u0£pia], provided that they can obtain sufficient backing, are virtue and happiness [ape tt| re Kal £Ù8ai|ioi/ia]; all the rest is mere flummery, unnatural conventions of society, worthless cant.

24 For contempt expressed in the early modern period by elite sections of society for 'vulgar' moderation and the mean, and their corresponding embrace of 'noble' extremes, see Scodel (2002) 146, 149-50, 155-96 (esp. op. cit. 168 for the roots of this tendency in Aristotle's own praise of aristocratic magnanimity and heroic excess of virtue).

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The strong man may disregard society's mere conventions, and gratify his desires to the maximum, confident in the knowledge that his 'excess' is virtuous. In context, of course, the argument has no approval from Plato, but, as Dodds points out, is not dissimilar to the practice of various politicians in Thucydides.25 In any case, the complete 'transvaluation of values' recommended by Callicles offers a useful extremity against which to measure the practice of Horace, Ovid, and in particular Propertius, who likewise proclaims his alienation from the values of conventional society Finally a more moderate, and certainly more conventional, rejection of the middle way can be found in a popular ethical narrative. For in the famous Choice of Heracles between Virtue and Vice, there is an explicit denial, as will be seen in more detail in Chapter 3, of the existence or possibility of a middle way. Rather, so the myth is characteristically used to insist, our choices in life are between two mutually exclusive opposites of right and wrong, where there can be no third way. Such hard lessons were full of appeal to Roman political hard-liners and their Renaissance successors such as Machiavelli.26 ii. Horace and the Middle Way

In ancient Greek poetry, then, the theme of moderation and the middle way is a popular one in ethical contexts, flexible to the point of malleability, capable of being adapted to almost any context or point of view. Comparable ideas are given philosophical rigour in Aristotle's similarly flexible scheme, although the latter adds safeguards to prevent unethical manipulation. However, both poetry and philosophy operate in a context where the wisdom or advisability of the middle way may be contested or rejected outright by popular wisdom, politicians and revolutionaries, other philosophical sects, and ethical revisionists. Operating in the same context we find Horace, the Latin poet most closely associated with the propagation of the themes of moderation and the middle way. Shortly I will focus on his handling of a (sexual) version of these themes in a poem from one of his earliest collections. But a preliminary glance at Horace's fondness for the same themes throughout his poetry will not only provide some useful context for the sexual mean of Sat A. 2. Here we shall also see reflected the importance of Aristotle and his doctrine of the intermediate, Horace's awareness of sectarian attempts to contest 'moderation' as an ideal, and the poet's consciousness not just of the flexibility of the same ideal but also its vulnerability to travesty. Horace's poetry is filled with the language of moderation, the mean, and the middle way. Terms such as modus , modestus , modicus , mode rari, me dio cris, and médius abound in a variety of contexts, from the control of anger and sexual desires, through the

25 Dodds (1959) 291. For some possible similarities between this passage and Nietzschean (and later postmodern) stances, see Dodds loc. cit., also Scodel (2002) 46-47, 286. 26 See further pp. 74-76. For the presence of the myth as an archetype in Livy's narrative of the episode of the Caudine forks in book 9, where a repeated failure to grasp that only one of two (and not three) choices must be made leads to disaster for all concerned, see pp. 75-76 (citing Morello (2003)). For the importance of Livy to Machiavelli' s rejection of the via di mezzo , see Whitfield (1971)75.

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moderate consumption of wine, to virtue as an 'intermediate'.27 In many instances the vocabulary is used quite informally. Indeed, as will become evident below, it is not even necessary always to use this vocabulary in order to express ideals of moderation and the mean.28 However, Horace can also use such terms in a doctrinaire fashion, as famously in Carm. 2.10. Although mediocritas does not invariably carry sectarian overtones, this term is normally used in Latin to render the Peripatetic principle of the intermediate (laeao-nr)?). It receives frequent mention, for example, in the philosophical and rhetorical works of Cicero,29 but might also be brought out in front of his peers in the courtroom. The same Cicero who, twenty years later in the Tusculan Disputations would travesty Peripatetic ethics, in the Pro Murena of 63 BCE takes the side of his Aristotelian teachers in an argument against Cato as prosecutor. The latter' s rigid and over-demanding Stoicism would damn Cicero's client, whereas nostri ... illi a Platone et Aristotele, moderati homines et temperati , aiunt ... omnis uirtutes mediocritate quadam esse mode ratas (Mur. 63). The recommendation of equanimity in Carm. 2.10 attracts this same technical term. Equan- imity is the avoidance of the extremes of elation and despair (in the 'extreme' conditions of triumph and disaster); the sustaining of an equally moderate reaction to both hard times and good times. It is an idea professed by most philosophical schools, and a favourite with Horace.30 But the opening lines of the ode are clearly directed at the adherent of a particular school (Carm. 2.10.1-8):

rectius uiues, Licini, neque altum semper urgendo neque, dum procellas cautus horrescis, nimium premendo litus iniquum.

auream quisquis mediocritatem 5 diligit, tutus caret obsoleti sordibus tecti, caret inuidenda sobrius aula.

27 modus : Sat. 1.1.106-07, 1.2.111, 2.3.265-71, Carm. 1.36.11, 3.15.2, also Epist. 1.18.59-60, 2.2.144. modestus : Sat. 1.2.49-53. modicus : Sat. 1.5.2, 2.6.67-70, Carm. 1.18.7, 1.20.1, Epist. 1.5.2. moderari: Epist. 1.2.59. mediocris : Sat. 1.4.130, 139, 1.6.65, 2.4.94, Carm. 2.10.5, Epist. 1.18.99, Ars 370, 372. médius : Sat. 1.2.27-28, 107-08, Epist. 1.18.9, Ars 368. On Horace and moderation (sophrosyne) in general, see North (1966) 263, 293-98. 28 Cf. below p. 121 on the ability of authors to deploy the concept of 'appropriateness' without necessarily using the associated vocabulary (< decet , aptus etc.). 29 Cf. e.g. Brut. 149 cum omnis uirtus sit, ut uestra, Brute, uetus Academia dixit, mediocritas, uterque horum medium quiddam uolebat sequi , Tuse. 3.22 nam Peripatetici, familiares nostri ... mediocritates uel perturbationum uel morborum animi mihi non sane probant, Off. 1.89 mediocritatem illam ... quae est inter nimium et parum, quae placet Peripateticis et recte placet. For the application of the term also in the aesthetic sphere, cf. de Orat. 3.199. 30 For Peripatetic, Epicurean and Stoic profession of the virtue, see Nisbet-Hubbard (1978) 54, and cf. Cic. Off. 1 .90 nam ut aduersas res, sic secundas immoderate ferre leuitatis est, praeclaraque est aequabilitas in omni uita. For Horatian versions, cf. also Carm. 2.3 (aequam memento ), Epist. 1.10.30-32, 1.18.112.

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Rather than concentrating on one extreme of conduct (recklessness), Horace, with two reinforcing pairs of antitheses, mentions both extremes (recklessness and timidity) and their material consequences by way of pointing out the attractions of the middle way. Allusion to the doctrine of a particular school is confirmed and underlined by the use of mediocritas (the unloveliness of the term here redeemed by its combination with aurea). For Horace's addressee excellence, as in Aristotle, lies at an intermediate point between excess and deficiency. In Carm. 2.10 Horace's allusions to Peripatetic doctrine are presumably - in line with his general practice in the Odes of urging elite addressees to do what they are already doing - a complimentary allusion to the philosophical leanings of his addressee.31 But elsewhere Horace or his persona may be found adopting the same ideal for himself, or at least pointedly recommending it to another not otherwise known for his Peripatetic leanings. For in Epist. 1.18.3-9 Horace recommends to Lollius in his relations with the great and the good a middle course between truculence and servility. As in Carm. 2.10, allusion to Peripatetic doctrines is suggested by the care Horace takes to mention both extremes ( asperitas agrestis versus a scurra who personifies servility), even though only one is likely to be relevant to the aristocratic addressee.32 Furthermore Horace highlights the 'mean' point between two extremes as the place where, both in general and in particular, true moral excellence resides (9 uirtus est medium uitiorum et utrimque reductum). The particular character excellence Horace has in mind had in fact been covered by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. Like the latter, Horace can give this intermediate point no name, and so concentrates on the two extremes to be avoided.33 The ideal of the 'mean' is also generally important in the Epistles .34 For example, in Epist. 1.6 extremes of emotion are said to lead to paralysis (12-14), hence it is recommended that even Virtue herself be pursued in moderation: insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniqui , I ultra quam satis est Virtutem si petat ipsam (15-16; cf. 29-31). A notion of quantity ([quod] satis est), as often, marks the intermediate. More importantly Horace clearly shows an awareness of sectarian rejection of the Peripatetic middle way, particularly from the Stoics who fetishized Virtue. Here 'moderation' is no trivial truism or banality, but an ideal that must be defended. The mean between two extremes is developed as a theme also in Horace's rather earlier poetry, although the perhaps more serious philosophical intent of the Epistles is often lacking. In Sat. 2.2, for example, Horace deals with the topic of the simple life, portraying it as the mean between luxury on the one hand and stinginess on the other. He concludes that neither of these undesirable extremes will be followed by the sapiens , and describes the middle course to be pursued between them:

31 For the controversy over whether or not the addressee is L. Terentius Varro Murena, see Nisbet- Hubbard (1978) 151-58 and Lyne (1995) 69 n. 8. 32 Perhaps in order to grab the attention of the addressee, Horace highlights the 'deficient' state of truculence as more offensive (5 uitium prope maius ), even though it is the 'excessive' state which is generally more common and more offensive in any situation; cf. Arist. EN 1 107b4-8 and Cic. Orat. 73 (quoted above p. 12 n. 12). 33 Cf. Arist. £AM126bl 1-20. 34 Cf. e.g. Epist. 1.1.106-08 (with McGann (1969) 37), 1.2.71, 1.10.42-44 (with McGann op. cit. 59-60), 1.18.5, 9, and 2.2.190-204.

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quali igitur uictu sapiens utetur, et horum I utrum imitabitur? hac urget lupus, hac canis, aiunt. I mundus erit qua non offendat sordibus atque I in neutram partem cultus miser (2.2.63-66). The appearance of mundus here is emblematic, for the term is a constant in characterisations of the desirable intermediate between two extremes, and will play an important role in the discussion of Sat. 1 .2 and Propertius 2.23 in the present chapter, and in Chapter 3 for establishing a significant relationship between the Ars Amatoria and Horatian munditiae. The theme of the mean has a role to play, as we shall see again in Chapter 3, also in Sat. 2.3. But, before turning to similar themes in the first book of the Satires , I want to end this short survey of the Horatian middle way by looking briefly at another satire in book 2, which suggests the poet's consciousness of the travesty to which the 'middle way' was open. In Sat. 2.5, Teiresas gives Ulysses advice on the art of inheritance-hunting, and tells the cautionary tale of a captator whose female target ultimately 'eluded' him by the comic means of having her corpse doused with oil (2.5.84-89). This story of a kolax who pressed too hard on the living (nimium institerat uiuenti) leads into advice to avoid this extreme and its opposite: in service to one's target one should neither be deficient (neu desis opera) nor excessive (neu immode ratus abundes). Between these two extremes lies a middle way, now described as one involving caution and care (cautus adito). Earlier we saw some potential weaknesses in the ideals of the middle way and the Aristotelian intermediate, whereby the former's flexibility might become malleability,, while the latter might be construed as applicable to any action or affection. Here we see those weaknesses satirised, as Horace in the guise of Teiresias demonstrates how the middle way is capable of application to amoral or even immoral action, with potentially successful results for the agent. Perhaps this is also Horace's way of commenting indirectly on his own stretched application of the 'middle way' to some rather unlikely areas - such as in Sat. 1.2. At all events, the lesson would not be lost on Ovid.35

iii. Horace, Satires 1.2 and the Sexual ' Middle Way '

The idea of the mean in sexual relationships developed in Sat. 1 .2 possesses arguably the greatest importance among Horace's early poetry for understanding the new middle way of the Ars Amatoria. This satire attracted the interest also of Propertius - and in such a way as to bring out sharply the commitment of the latter to 'excess' and of Ovid to a (perverse) mean in the Ars Amatoria , conceived as lying between the opposed extremes of Propertius and Horace. Given the importance of the satire to the interests and argument of the present chapter, its themes and development need to be investigated in some detail. The first three poems of Horace's first book of satires deal with various extremities in human behaviour: the first with extremities of greed and competitive envy,36 the second

35 For the 'mean' urged on the lover in the Ars , parallel to that by Teiresias on Odysseus as kolax , see Chapter 3. Mario Labate has shown how important the figure of the flatterer (kolax) is to understanding the lover in th z Ars Amatoria ((1984) 174-21 1), and the relevance of the precedent set by Sat. 2.5 for the Ars Amatoria (op. cit. 176 n. 6, 180, 208, 21 1 (with n. 86), 217, 223, 224). Note esp. the expression of the 'mean' at 1.1.106-07 est modus in rebus , sunt certi denique fines, I quo s ultra citraque nequit consistere rectum. On the significance of these three satires in the context of the collection as a whole, see Gowers (2005) 50-5 1 .

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 20 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT with sexual extremism, and the third with extremes of human intolerance. This second poem is somewhat rambling, apparently incoherent, and its arguments often hard to take seriously. But one thing does unite the poem: the recurrence of the language and ideas of the extremities, and the moderate mean. As seen above, moderation and the mean are favoured themes in Horace's later poetry, but their frequency in Sat. 1.2 amounts almost to monomania. For these ideas are expressed in constantly fresh form as the speaker moves from the topic of financial extremism to his main subject of various forms of sexual extremism, including adulterous relationships or infatuation with any woman.37 This provides for the reader the best possible illustration of the thematic flexibility of these ideals. But such an immoderate treatment of extremes and the mean also suggests a typical kind of Horatian irony. However, neither the irony nor the ludicrous aspects of the speaker's arguments are the main focus of my interest in the poem. Propertius and Ovid, as is often the way of poets responding to the work of predecessors, simplify,38 even 'under-read' the satire, ignoring its ironies and complexities. Nevertheless, I shall not entirely ignore the distinction between Horace and his over-serious speaker, whose absurdities and extreme viewpoints threaten to undermine the recommendation of the mean. The satire begins with a contrast between an 'over-generous' man and a miser eager to avoid the name of spendthrift (1-6); next - returning to another version of the first extreme - comes a prodigal who freely spends his ancestral wealth to avoid the reputation of being mean-spirited (10). The public response to this figure is characterised by similar extremity: 11 laudaturab his , culpaturab illis. Then appears a fellow who, like the miser, in a bid to escape a reputation for being a wastrel resorts to the opposite extreme and becomes tight-fisted (12-22). The 'message' of this preamble is summarised by the speaker as dum uitant stulti uitia , in contraria currunt (24), i.e. fools rush to extremes.39 (It is not only fools who rush to such ends, but also apparently the narrator, who sees around him a world filled only with extreme cases. In this he resembles, as often in the satire, the disgruntled old men of Roman comedy, and the extremes which he sees bear strong resemblances to the stereotypes of the comic stage.40) There follows an illustration of similar extremism in the areas of dress and personal hygiene (25-28):

37 Dessen (1968) well illustrates the links between the financial extremism of the opening of the satire and the sexual extremism of its latter sections. Cf. also the summary of Gowers (2005) 54, 'it is 'moderate' to enjoy the 'middle' regions of the 'middle' class of women which is 'easily available' - in medio1. 38 One example of such 'simplification' must suffice. Ovid's response to the anti-cosmetic arguments of Prop. 1.2 informs much of the initial instruction in Ars 3, but Ovid treats Propertius' poem as a simple anti-cosmetic tract on the theme of natural beauty, ignoring the later collapse in that elegy of the distinction between the categories of natural and unnatural. For the complexity of Propertius' poem in this regard, see Sharrock (1991) 40 (cited below p. 58); but for Ovid's focus only on the opening lines of the elegy, see Gibson (2003) 23-25. 39 The idea is a common one; cf. Cic. Off. 1.29 (on those who deal only with their own affairs) qui altero genere iniustitiae uacant, in alterum incurrunt. For its post-classical persistence, see Scodel (2002) 33, 47, 50 See Freudenberg (1993) 40-46, 50.

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Maltinus tunicis demissis ambulat, est qui inguen ad obscenum subductis usque facetus. pastillos Rufillus olet, Gargonius hircum. nil medium est.

According to the speaker, there is no happy medium between effeminacy or dandyism on the one hand and rustic virility or neglect on the other. This observation inevitably recalls Cicero's treatment of male dress in Off. 1.130, a passage whose significance, particularly for the Ars Amatoria , will be fully outlined in Chapter 3. Here for the moment we can simply observe how Horace has adapted the passage. Cicero's gentleman must avoid the extremes of a feminine attractiveness and a 'boorish and uncivilized slovenliness' in matters of dress and appearance, and aim for medioc ritas and munditia ; but for Horace his characters epitomise these extremes and there is no 'middle ground'. The same observation (nil medium est) is next applied by Horace to sexual relationships (the main subject of the satire). Some men will only touch matrons, while others wish only for women in a stinking brothel (1.2.28-30). The same pair of extremities is illustrated again in the following lines, where the famous anecdote of Cato' s praise for a young man leaving a brothel is placed next to the exclusively matronal (and adulterous) tastes of Cupiennius (31-36). The extreme of adultery now becomes for the moment the main subject of the satire, and Horace dwells at some length on the ruined pleasures and dangers of adultery (38-46). In the following passage he focuses on thé 'intermediate', and suggests freedwomen as a mean between the extremes of adultery and the dingy brothel. But this compromise is brief (47-49):

tutior at quanto merx est in classe secunda, libertinarum dico, Sallustius in quas non minus insanit quam qui moechatur . . . In the words of Freudenberg, '[Horace's speaker] quickly realises that his handy moral formula - virtue equals the extremes of vice divided by two - will not work in this case' ((1993) 26).41 So the speaker changes tack. Later readers of the poem, of course, might wilfully or mischievously miss this piece of Horadan irony at the expense of the speaker. Nevertheless, the latter takes up the position that freedwomen are no compromise if one is obsessed with them quite as much as adulterers are with their prey. Here we begin to see a new theme emerge, namely that infatuation - with any woman - is another (and as yet separate) example of an extreme. The extremity of Sallust's passions are reflected in his inability to observe a mean between over-generosity and miserliness (as in the opening of the satire). 42 The obsession of Sallust and his like with freedwomen and mime actresses (53-58) then leads into the anticipated general attack on infatuation with any woman.

41 For the absurdities of the speaker here, see further Freudenberg (1993) 24-26, (2001) 15-16; cf. Broadie (1991) 99. 42 Cf. 49-53 at hic si, I qua res, qua ratio suaderet, quaque modeste I munifico esse licet, uellet bonus atque benignus I esse, daret quantum satis esset nec sibi damno I dedecorique foret. Here modeste ('modestly', i.e. observing modus , due measure) and satis ('enough', i.e. neither excessively nor deficiently) underline the mean. Cf. satis underlining the intermediate also at Sat. 2.3.178 and Epist. 1.6.16.

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Obsession leads to loss of name and substance, a thing wrong in any circumstance (61-62), and in such a situation quid inter- I est in matrona, ancilla peccesne togata? (62- 63). That is to say, the adulterer too is obsessed and loses his name and substance. A connection is drawn between the two separate types of extreme which are the subject of the satire, infatuation and adultery, whereby the former is seen to cause the other. In the final passage of the poem Horace returns to the subject of adultery and its dangers (64-134; cf. 37-46). As is argued by P. Michael Brown - whose outline of the satire I find persuasive (and largely follow throughout) - if the passage discussed above (49-63) presents infatuation with any woman as an extreme, then the final section of the poem, in line with the poem's obsession with such themes, implicitly discovers a mean for this extreme.43 This is achieved by recommending 'satisfaction of one's desires on a casual, dispassionate basis' (Brown (1993) 101) - as an alternative to adultery. The two separate themes of the satire are again brought into proximity. As for the opposite extreme on the continuum of infatuation (excessive state) and casual satisfaction (mean), this 'would be complete sexual abstinence, but this solution receives no more mention than does total forgiveness of all faults, the opposite extreme to rigid intolerance, in Satire 3' (Brown loc. cit.). Such a pattern of concentration only on the excessive state and the mean to the exclusion of the 'deficient' state is one implicit, as noted above, within the proverbial wisdom of |ir|8ev ayav and is further illuminated by Aristotle and Cicero.44 In this final section of the satire, Horace begins by emphasising once more the imbal- ance between pain and satisfaction that is the adulterer's lot, particularly by comparison with other types of liaison (64-79). A fully-fledged comparison between the matron and the toga-clad girl (or her like) is now developed (80-126). The theme of sexual extremism returns in new forms, and extensive use is made of the themes of Greek epigram. The speaker insists there is no point focusing keenly on a woman's best physical features (92 'o crus! o bracchia V - a parodie allusion to Philodemus' famous epigram),45 while ignoring all her faults (93). The citation (90-92) of the polarised pair of Lynceus, famous for his eyesight, and Hypsaea (unidentified, but the context indicates one famous for her literal or metaphorical blindness), suggests that such selective eyesight would be rushing to one extreme. One must rather, it is implied, balance a woman's best points against her faults. Further - a fresh example of an extreme - a matrona allows you to see nothing except her face; the rest is covered by a long gown, not to mention other obstacles (94- 99). By contrast, the matron's rival can be seen somewhat more easily in her diaphanous

43 Contrast (e.g.) Fraenkel (1957) 77-78, who asserts that the theme of the [léaov fades from the satire to be replaced by a new focus on adultery. 44 See above p. 12 with n. 12, and note esp. Aristotle's comment there on the extreme rarity of people who are deficient with regard to pleasures. Likewise in Sat . 1.2, the 'deficient' state of complete sexual abstinence receives no emphasis, presumably because it 'hardly occurs' (itself an interesting cultural assumption). 45 Philodem. AP 5.132. For strong advocacy of the general importance of Philodemus to Horace, see now D. Armstrong (2004). For the more tenuous links of Propertius (the subject of the next section of this chapter) to the Philodeman circle, see Cairns (2004). For a possible link between Ovid (the subject of the section after that) and a work of Philodemus other than his epigrams, namely the latter' s On Piety , see Obbink (2004).

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Coan silk (101-03). The reader is hardly discouraged by the argument of Horace's speaker from understanding the body of the 'Coan' woman as (with whatever difficulties) the speaker's mean between the expensively dressed matrona with her pearls and emeralds (80), and the cheapest prostitute 'standing [for sale] in a stinking brothel' (30). Later, while emphasising the greater accessibility of the toga-clad girl and her like, Horace's speaker rejects the sentiment of Callimachus' famous epigram,46 to the effect that love pursues what flees but avoids what lies to hand or is easy to attain (108, quoted below p. 31). The speaker replies with arguments from Epicurean philosophy (109-15), including an argument for the observation of moderation and limits: nonne [sc. quaerere plus prodest] cupidinibus statuai natura modum quem (111). The epitome of this 'limit' set by Nature, as it turns out, is parabilis Venus (119); when one's loins are swollen with lust any male or female slave (117) will do for the satisfaction of desire (an Epicurean sentiment in origin).47 Here Horace approvingly cites a second (lost) epigram of Philodemus,48 where the latter says he does not want either a meretrix who is reluctant or a matrona who is inaccessible (120). His type rather is (121-24):

hanc Philodemus ait sibi quae neque magno stat pretio neque cunctetur cum est iussa uenire. candida rectaque sit, munda hactenus ut neque longa nec magis alba uelit quam dat natura uideri.

Again the reader is not discouraged from seeing here another version of the theme of the mean and the avoidance of extremes.49 This girl represents the mean of the satisfaction of desire on a casual basis, as against the 'excess' of infatuation with any woman (including the matron) - and the unmentioned, but understood, deficient state of sexual abstinence. Thus it is appropriate that in her person she avoids both deficiency and excess, as we saw earlier that the Coan-clad woman might represent the speaker's intermediate between the expensively dressed matrona and the lowest prostitute. This woman is not deficient in her appearance: she does not lack a naturally bright complexion and is erect in her bearing (123). On the other hand, she avoids the 'excessive' state of using artificial aids in the same areas, to make her complexion even brighter or herself seem even taller (123-24). Rather she achieves the mean of being munda in accordance with the dictates of nature. Earlier, I underlined Horace's use of mundus to characterise the mean between the extremes of luxury and stinginess (Sat. 2.2.65). Here, as so often in Latin, the term is applied to the woman whose appearance the male speaker judges as 'intermediate' between an excessively ornamented appearance and a dowdy or rustic one. But since the intermediate

46 AP 12.102.5-6 xoujios* epws* ToióaÔe* Ta |ièv eúyovTa SiioKeiv I olôe, Ta Ó' èv |I6ctctco K€L|ieva TTapTT6T£Tai ('even such is my love: it can pursue what flees from it, but what lies ready it passes by*). Cf. Lucr. 4.1063-67, 1070-72. Brown (1987) 197-99 provides the full Epicurean-Cynic background to the passage. 48 An epigram attributed to Philodemus and answering to Horace's description does exist, and is printed as Sider 38. But it appears to be a forgery, perhaps by Daniel Heinsius; see Sider (1997) 1 99-202 for text, introduction and commentary. 49 Here I supplement Brown (1993) 113, who notes only that the physical attributes of the parabilis Venus echo the themes of beauty (80-82) and absence of disguise (83-105) found earlier.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 24 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT is characteristically dependent on the speaker's viewpoint, the precise sense of mundus or munditiae will substantially alter according as one is an Epicurean (Lucr. 4.1281 (of the ideal woman) munde corpore culto), a lyric poet (Hor. Carm. 1.5.5 (Pyrrha) simplex munditiis ), an austere Christian apologist (Tertull. Cult . Fern. 2.5.1), a legal expert (Ulpian Dig. 34.2.25.10), or, importantly for this study, a playful erotodidactic poet (Ovid Ars 3.133 munditiis capimur ).50 Furthermore, Horace's speaker associates munditia not only with mediocritas , but also, significantly, with 'nature' (124 natura). As a correlative, it will emerge later in the study, excess is routinely twinned with the category of 'artificial'. At any rate such a woman, Horace's speaker avers, is his Ilia and Egeria while making love, and he need not fear any of the traditional interruptions (and subsequent punish- ments) of the adultery mime to destroy his pleasure (125-33). Sex corroded by fear and interrupted by other disturbances is the implied extreme here, while undisturbed sex without fear or interruptions is the 'mean' (and the other scarcely imaginable extreme is no sex at all). This is a triad and a continuum which - no matter how ironically meant - is calling out for subversive re-reading. Propertius and particularly Ovid were ready to oblige. For Horace had given notice of the possible extremes to which a low-minded conception or application of the mean might take a poet. iv. Satires 1.2 & Propertius 2.23: the Extreme Erotics & Poetics of the immundus soccus

Satires 1 was published around 35 BCE and thus precedes the publication of the works of the three surviving elegists by at least half a decade, although Gallus' lost Amores were probably published somewhat earlier than Satires 1. Horace's joking attack in Sat. 1.2 on various forms of extremism, including an assault on Callimachean love (and, as will presently be seen, on Callimachean poetics), was bound to attract the interest of the elegists. For they were wedded in turn, no doubt with equal irony, to an 'ethic' of infatuation. Conspicuously love-elegy lacks Horace's vocabulary of moderation and the middle.51 More typical of elegy is a rejection of philosophy (e.g. Prop. 2.34.25-28), the disregard of limit and moderation and instead a declaration of love-till-death as (e.g.) at 2.15.25-36. Propertius wishes to be bound with a chain to Cynthia, celebrates uesanus amor , declares (in deliberately quasi-philosophical language) that where 'true love' is concerned the search for finis and modus is foolish, and avers it impossible that he could transfer his love to any other woman (rather, he will live and die with Cynthia). This is a complete rejection of the kind of sentiments expressed in Sat. 1.2, and in particular a statement of a preference for the extremity represented by infatuation with a particular woman.52 However the most sustained engagement in elegy with the themes of Sat. 1 .2 is not with infatuation, but rather with Horace's other extreme of adultery. This engagement is to be found in Propertius 2.23, where the elegist also rejects adultery, only to make clear his preference for the opposite extreme as represented by a filthy prostitute - rather than for the mean of the munda [ puella ]. This amounts, I argue, to a programmatic declaration by the elegist of allegiance to extremes. The connections between Sat. 1 .2 and Propertius

50 For further discussion of these passages, see below pp. 93-99. 51 See below pp. 44-45. 52 Cf. also (e.g.) Prop. 2.1.47-58, 65-66.

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2.23 have long been recognised, but the lack of sustained verbal allusion in the latter to the former has led critics to disallow any relationship between the two.53 In one sense it makes no difference to my argument whether Propertius is dealing directly with Horace's satire - and in so doing wilfully ignores Horace's characteristically ironic treatment - or is engaging rather more broadly with the 'anti-adultery' tradition of which Sat. 1.2 partakes. My concern, ultimately, is with the ways in which the 'extremist' ethos of elegy differs from the more conventional 'moderate' and 'middling' sentiments represented by this and other Horatian poems, and later with the distinctive involvement of the Ars Amatoria in this nexus. But it will be no disadvantage to my argument if the discussion below of Propertius 2.23 convinces the reader of a direct engagement between that poem and Sat. 1.2. From the discussion it will become clear that Propertius' extremist rejections of Horatian moderation operate on both the erotic and poetic levels. A key role will be played here by the terms mundus and immundus. According to the argument of Sat. 1.2 adultery is dangerous, infatuated, status- obsessed, deficient in pleasure; the matrona is not more physically attractive than the togata , plus she can hide her defects and is inaccessible. Better to go for a woman who is available, does not cost too much and herself strikes a mean between ugliness and over- ornamentation. Propertius engages with an essentially similar argument in 2.23.1-14:

cui fugienda fuit indocti semita uulgi, ipsa petita lacu nunc mihi dulcis aqua est. ingenuus quisquam alterius dat muñera seruo, ut promissa suae uerba ferat dominae? et quaerit totiens 'quaenam nunc porticus illam 5 integit?' et 'Campo quo mouet ilia pedes?' deinde, ubi pertuleris, quos dicit fama, labores Herculis, ut scribat 'muneris ecquid habes?', cernere uti possis uultum custodis amari, captus et immunda saepe latere casa? 10 quam care semel in toto nox uertitur anno! a pereant, si quos ianua clausa iuuat! contra, reiecto quae libera uadit amictu, custodum et nullo saepta timore, placet.

The elegist begins by expressing a new and surprising taste for water from the lacus, i.e. water from the public reservoir or cistern (1-2). This is a culturally coded reference to prostitutes, who were often referred to as 'public' women and compared to public water sources such as rivers or springs.54 He contrasts the prostitute with women whose slaves must be bribed (3-6), where the women themselves ask for gifts in advance (7-8), while the lover risks capture and imprisonment in a 'filthy hovel' (10), and a night of love

53 See (e.g.) Allen (1962) 124, also Camps (1966)158. 54 For 'public' women, cf. Sen. Epist. 88.37 (the works of Didymus) in his libris ... quaeritur ...an Sappho publica fuerit, Adams (1983) 343-44. For prostitution and public water sources, cf. Philostr. Epist. 19 and 26 (where speakers compare their 'prostitute* lovers to streams and fountains), also the variation on this theme at Ov. Ars 3.89-96 (noting the presence of prostituii at 97).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 26 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT comes round but once a year (11-12). The reference to a custos (9) and the scene from the Adultery mime' in which the lover is forced to hide (10), strongly suggest that the affairs meant here are with a matrona.55 This suggestion, combined with the expressed preference for the prostitute, appears to indicate agreement with the kind of sentiments expressed in Sat. 1.2: why endanger oneself with the matron when the prostitute is freely available? This theme is in fact affirmed in lines 13-14 where, as in Horace, the positive advantages of an absence of fear are emphasised (Sat. 1.2.127-34). But the very next couplet appears to indicate a somewhat strange but little remarked thematic deviation (15- 16, sc. placet ):

cui saepe immundo Sacra conteritur Via socco, nec sinit esse moram, si quis adire uelit.

Propertius expresses a preference for a peculiar kind of prostitute - one with a filthy slipper. The adjective immundus , always rare in Roman love-elegy, is repeated by Propertius as if to emphasise its presence (10 immunda ... casa , 15 immundo ... socco). Elsewhere he uses it but once in the third book (of the sufferings of Antiope), and then three times in the artistically distinct fourth book.56 The positive form of the adjective, mundus , is employed by Propertius only in his fourth book (4.2.38, 4.5.43, 4.8.40). It is thus fair to suspect that the occurrence here of ( im)mundus - for the first time not just in Propertius but in surviving Roman elegy as a whole - may be of some significance.57 In particular, worth pondering is the relationship between this adjective and the positive form applied by Horace in his satire to the 'happy medium' girl (Sat. 1.2.123 munda). But before analysing that relationship, it will be useful - given the importance of this family of terms now and later in this study- to examine mundus , munditia, and immundus in a little more detail. The basic sense of the adjective mundus is purus , KaOapóç, i.e. 'clean',58 and is used in an almost exclusively corporeal sense in the pre-Christian period. In the corporeal sense it* may be used strictly of the absence of dirt, filth, or analogous impurities (less commonly in classical Latin), or employed more loosely to signify lepi- dus , ļautus , elegans , whether in reference to objects or humans, particularly women.59 But the underlying sense of the absence of sordid matter tends to restrict the force of the adjective. It is perhaps often, although not invariably, closer to English 'nice' (in the older sense) than to 'elegant, refined'; hence no doubt the exploitation of the adjective, glimpsed already, to express the 'mean'. The cognate munditia (or mundities) is employed to

55 The basic plot of the adultery mime involved the guilty wife hiding the lover on the unexpected return of her husband; see Reynolds (1946), McKeown (1979) 72-76, Kehoe (1984). 56 The passages (3.15.17, 4.4.78, 4.5.72, 4.7.44) are quoted below n. 67. 57 The evidence is set out below p. 27, with n. 64. The use of mundus and cognates in the Ars is studied below pp. 93-104. 58 See TLL 8.1629.80-1632.72. Helpful short studies of mundus and munditia are provided by Nisbet-Hubbard (1970) 75-76 on Carm. 1.5.5 simplex munditiis , Brown (1987) 375 on Lucr. 4.1281, and Oakley (1998) on Livy 8.15.7 mundiorem ... cultum. 59 Cf. the noun mundus , which is routinely used in prose to refer to instrumentum conspicuum or ornamentům particularly of women, and the phrase mundus muliebris, standard in legal authorities and elsewhere of women's toilet. See TLL 8.1633.79-1634.50.

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signify status mundus , puntasi and can be used like mundus of the absence of dirt and filth, whether in a corporeal or religious sense (the latter mainly a Christian development). Rather more common in the classical period is the employment of the noun in a broader sense, to signify elegantia , nitor , decor. Here munditia is most frequently used in contexts of clothing and general appearance, but may also be employed more abstractly in reference to such - ultimately indefinable - concepts as elegantia uitae and urbanitas. As with mundus , however, the idea of simplicity of ornament often underlies positive use of the noun.61 Finally, immundus normally signifies literally incultus , spurcus , sordidatus , and can be applied to people, animals and things, often conveying a sense of revulsion from tangible squalor.62 The use of the adjective in a transferred quasi-moral sense ( indecorus , turpis) is a development found mostly in Christian and later Latin, but earlier usage is also attested.63 Frequency of attestation of mundus , munditia , and immundus in Catullus, Lucretius, and the Augustan poets also proves interesting. Overall we find the following totals of attestations (in descending order of frequency): Ovid 16, Horace 15, Propertius 9, Vergil 6, Catullus 5, Lucretius 2, and Tibullus 0.64 With this information about range of meaning and frequency of attestation in mind, I return to Propertius' use, for the first time in elegy, of terms from the mundus 'family' in a poem from his second book. This book - perhaps two books in antiquity - is normally dated to the years 28-24 BCE. Ovid had perhaps only just begun the Amores. Tibullus, whose first book is traditionally assumed to have appeared after 27 BCE, does not use any of the terms from the mundus family. For context then we must look to Vergil - who uses immundus alone 3 times in his Georgics - and particularly Horace. The Odes did not appear until 23 BCE, but Satires 1 probably appeared around 35 BCE, and the second book around 30 BCE. In these two books mundus and immundus are found a total of 6 times. But we may point to more than frequency of usage in order to suggest that

60 See TLL 8.1626.23-1627.74. 61 Cf. esp. Nepos Att. 13.5 (of Atticus) elegans non magnificus, splendidus non sumptuosus; omnisque diligentia munditiam, non adfluentiam adfectabat. suppellex modica non multa, ut in neutram partem conspici posset. Note here the implicit connection, once more, between munditia and mediocritas. 62 See TLL 3.500.80-503.25, Brown (1987) 284 on Lucr. 4.1 160. 63 Cf. e.g. Hor. Sat. 1.5.84, Ars 247, Sen. Contr. 1 praef. 8. 64 The adjective mundus is not especially common in these poets as a rule. In addition to one attestation in Lucretius (4.1281, discussed below) and three in Catullus (23.18, 97.3-4, all of arseholes), mundus is found seven'times in Horace (Sat. 1.2.123, 2.7.12, 2.2.65, Carm. 3.29.14, Epist. 1.4.1 1, 1.5.7, 1.20.2) and three times in Propertius' fourth book (above p. 26), but not at all in Vergil or Tibullus and only twice in all of Ovid (Ari 3.479, Fast. 4.108). The noun munditia is even rarer, being found once in Catullus (23.18, of an arsehole again), but not in Lucretius, Vergil, Propertius or Tibullus, and only twice in Horace (Carm. 1.5.5, Epist. 2.1.159) and four times in Ovid (Med. 28, Ars 1.513, 2.677, 3.133). immundus is a little more common. In addition to one occurrence apiece in Lucretius (4.1160, quoted below n. 68) and Catullus (97.3, another arsehole), the adjective is used six times each by Vergil (Georg. 1.81, 1.400, 3.564, Aen. 3.228, 5.333, 12.611), Horace (Sat. 1.5.84, 1.6.124, 2.4.62, Epist. 1.2.26, 2.2.199, Ars 247: not in the Odes), and Propertius (above p. 26). It is also used ten times by Ovid (Am. 1.8.39, 1.12.30, Epist. 1.104, Ars 1.154, 2.486, 2.524, 3.214, 3.756, Rem. 432, Fast. 4.238: not in the Met.), but not at all by Tibullus.

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Propertius is responding principally to Horace. The elegist, as we have seen, applies immundus to a soccus , a type of loose-fitting shoe worn mostly in Rome by women,65 where the primary sense of the adjective must be 'dirty' or 'squalid'. A prostitute with filthy shoes possesses a literal kind of significance: she is a streetwalker, who must pace Rome's alternately dusty and muddy streets looking for custom.66 But an express preference for this quality in a prostitute is so strange as to suggest symbolic significance - and for two reasons. First, as noted above, because immundus usually indicates some degree of distaste on the part of the speaker, as is certainly the case in the four other uses of the adjective by Propertius.67 Secondly, because it is more 'normal' explicitly to desire and prefer munditia in a woman.68 Even where writers express a preference for cheap prostitutes, none, perhaps unsurprisingly, makes squalor one of their requirements. Rather they praise the low fees involved, the carefree atmosphere which prevails (as does Propertius himself), and even the good looks of the girls by comparison with freeborn women.69 In fact - and here is the very nub of our discussion - Horace in the very same context makes quite clear an opposite preference, for a prostitute who symbolises a kind of mean, who is munda hactenus ut ñeque longa I nec magis alba uelit quam dat natura uideri (Sat. 1 .2. 123-24). As I suggested earlier, Horace is alluding in this passage to a lost epigram of Philodemus, where the Greek had presumably praised the girl for her equivalent of munditia.70 Furthermore Lucretius - Epicurean influence on Sat. 1 .2 having already been noted - deploys one of his two examples of ( im)mundus in order to recommend preferences in sexual relationships (4.1280-83):

65 OLD s.v. soccus , defines the item as a low-heeled, loose fitting shoe or slipper worn by Greeks (Cic. de Orat. 3.127); among the Romans usually only by women (Suet. Cal . 52) and comic actors (hence a symbol of Comedy: see below p. 29). 66 Cf. the explanation of the phrase in Enk (1962) 303-04 ad loc., 'Soccus fiebat immundus quia meretrices non lecticis gestabantur, ut matronae, sed pedibus suis ambulabant, cf. luven. 3.247 pinguia crura luto , Sen. de Ira 3.6.4 per frequentia urbis loca properanti in muitos incursitandum est et aliubi labi necesse est, aliubi retineri , aliubi re sper g i.' 67 2.23.10 (quoted above p. 25), 3.15.17 (Dirce's treatment of Antiope) saepe illam immundis passa est habitare tene br is, 4.4.78 (the rustic festival of Parilia) traicit immundos ebria turba pedes , 4.5.72 (an item worn by the lena at her funeral) immundo pallida mitra situ , 4.7.44 (the punishment of a slave) codicis immundi uincula sentit anus. 68 Cf., in addition to the passages cited above p. 24, Plaut. Poen. 191-92 oculos uolo I meos delectare munditiis meretriciis , Cic. Att. 9.10.2 ev tolç èpcoTiKotç alienai immunde , insulse, indecore fit , Lucr. 4.1 160 (the speaker mocks the lover's euphemisms) immunda et foetida ' acosmos ' See also Gibson (2003) 147-48 on Ars loc. cit. 69 For this well established tradition, cf. e.g. Cercidas 5 Powell, Philodem. AP 5.126, Rufin. AP 5.18, and see Hunter (1983) 153-54 on Eubul. frg. 67. 70 It does not appear very probable that Horace's munda translates a form of KÓCT|iia, as the Greek adjective tends to signify 'orderly, well-behaved' when applied to persons (see LSJ s.v. Koaļiios* 2). It is interesting nonetheless that Lucretius in a passage quoted above (n. 68) glosses the lover's euphemism acosmos with immunda. Brown (1987) 284 ad loc. comments that aKoaiios* is not found in this sense, but notes the use of aKoaiiriTos1 in the praise of 'natural beauty' (Philostr. Epist. 22) and in descriptions both of the goddess Philosophy's artificial simplicity (Lucian Pis. 12) and of the plain style (Dion. Hal. Thuc. 23).

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nam facit ipsa suis interdum femina factis morigerisque modis et munde corpore culto, ut facile insuescat secum degere uitam

This woman with her 'obliging ways and nicely groomed body' is placed in implicit counterpoint, albeit not without irony and condescension, to the kind of woman described earlier by Lucretius, whose beauty is false and her lover obsessed and deluded. The munditia of the former represents a kind of mean, whereby her modest grooming avoids the false beauty and cosmetic excesses of her rival (4.1171-91). In direct contrast to Horace - as well as Lucretius and (presumably) Philodemus - Propertius emphasises his taste for a woman with an immundus soccus. Neither Propertius nor Horace will touch the matron. But where the speaker of Sat. 1.2 then refuses to contemplate the opposite extreme of a prostitute in a stinking brothel (30 [puellam] olenti in fornice stantem ), Propertius signals his preference for an equivalent of that extreme. The elegisťs streetwalker shares the squalor of Horace's brothel prostitute, and lacks the essential munditia of his 'mean'. Such preferences are suggestive of the persona which Propertius wishes to project. But there is another, perhaps even greater oddity about Propertius' preference for the immundus soccus. It is standard in elegy for women's bodies and clothing to reflect the poetic preferences of the elegist, as most obviously in Propertius 2.1 and Ovid, Am. 3.1. 71 In particular, women's feet are liable to reflect the poetics of the elegisťs metrical pedes,72 and footwear likewise is not immune to poetical significance. Just as the cothurnus , the thick-soled boot worn by tragic actors, may symbolise the poetics of Tragedy (Am. 3.1.14 Lydius alta pedum uincla cothurnus ), so the soccus as a slipper worn by comic actors may be used to signify the style, diction, and metre of Comedy.73 Furthermore munditia is attested as a stylistic term, albeit as part of a detailed metaphor borrowed from women's toilet.74 mundus and immundus are found in similar senses, although less commonly.75 Like cosmetic munditia , its stylistic counterpart embodies a kind of mean: both avoid excessive ornament and artifice in their respective spheres. If we apply the logic of these metaphors and symbols to the text of Propertius, we find running in parallel with his

71 See Wyke (2002) 115-54. Ovid's Am. 3.1 is discussed extensively below, pp. 79-92, where see the discussion for fuller documentation of some of the issues raised here. 72 Cf. esp. Am. 3.1 .7-8, and see Wyke (2002) 122-25. 73 Cf. e.g. Hor. Epis t. 2.1.174 (sc. aspice Pļautus) quam non astricto percurrat pulp ita socco , Ars 80 (of the iambic metre) hune socci cepere pedem grandesque cothurni , Ov. Rem. 375-76 (quoted below p. 135). 74 This important Ciceronian passage, which reveals the full interpénétration of cosmetics and 'poetics' (and to which I return in Chapter 3), deserves to be quoted in full: nam ut mulieres esse dicuntur nonnullae inornatae quas id ipsum deceat, sic haec subtilis oratio etiam incompta delectat; fit enim quiddam in utroque, quo sit uenustius sed non ut appareat. tum remouebitur omnis insignis ornatus quasi margaritarum, ne calamistri quidem adhibebuntur. fucati uero medicamenta candoris et ruboris omnia repellentur : elegantia modo et munditia remanebit. sermo purus erit et Latinus, dilucide planeque dicetur, quid deceat circumspicietur (Orat. 78-79). 75 The first recorded instance of mundus in a stylistic sense is found in Propertius, but not until 4.5.43; see below pp. 98-99. For immundus in a stylistic sense, see below p. 32.

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desire for an erotic 'extreme' a desire for a corresponding poetic or stylistic extremity. But this style is equated with a lack of munditia - the opposite of the more usual excess of ornament in style. The elegisťs desire must be set within the broader context of allusion to Callimachean poetics which opens the elegy. The confession of the speaker that he who formerly avoided the highway crowded by the ignorant (1 cui fuit indocti fugienda et semita uulgi) now seeks public water sources {petita lacu . . . aqua), is a clear reference to Callimachus AP 12.43.1-4:

¿xOaipto to TToir||ia tò kukXikóv, oûôè KčXeúOq) xaiptü Tl? TToXXoÙÇ ¿06 Kai GÜ06 (1)6 P6L, [IICJĆO Kai TT£pi(ļ>OlTOV 6pGü|I€V0V, OVÓ ' ÓTTÒ Kpf|VTļ9 m vor aiKxalvGo TravTa Ta Siļļioaia. I hate the cyclic poem, nor do I take pleasure in the road which carries many to and fro. I abhor, too, the roaming lover, and I drink not from every well; I loathe all common things.

The epigrammatist's hatred of public roads, public water sources, and poetry popular among the unsophisticated, runs in parallel with his distaste for boys who sleep around. In fact, roads are themselves common figurations of poetry (Aetia fr. 1.25-28), and springs may be both poetic and erotic symbols.76 Propertius hints that he . used to share Callimachus' preferences,77 but now instead he finds water from public sources sweet, i.e. he both prefers common prostitutes (the elegisťs equivalent of beloved boys who sleep around) and poetry that is favoured by unsophisticated readers. This new Propertian poetic sensibility is no doubt meant to be a reflection of the popular subject-matter of 2.23, which draws on the so-called 'Cynic-Stoic diatribe' against adultery, and includes scenes from the common entertainment of the 'adultery mime' (2.23.9-10, 19-20). Some critics have in fact detected correspondingly Mow' vocabulary and syntax in the elegy.78 But it might prove interesting to place Propertius' apparent rejection of Callimachean poetics alongside Sat. 1.2. The elegisťs aesthetic anti- Callimacheanism runs in parallel with Horace's refusal in Sat. 1.2.105-110 of the 'ethics' of Callimachus' lover, who avoids what lies to hand (AP 12.202). But Horace's satire can itself be read, so Kirk Freudenberg has argued, as a disavowal of Callimachean poetics. It

76 Cf. the erotic imagery (on which Callimachus may be drawing) of Theogn. 959-62 e are [lèv avròs 6TTIVOV ÒTTO Kpf|VTiÇ jlcXavÚôpOU, I f)ÔÚ Tl 1J.OI 6ÔÓK61 Kai KdXÒV Tļ|JL€V Ü8ü)p. I VÎ)V 8' fióri T€0óXojTai, ûSœp ô' àva|iíay€Tai Ü8er I aXX^? Sr' Kpf|vr|s- mo|iai Tļ TTOTaļioi) ('As long as I was drinking by myself from the spring's dark water, it seemed sweet and good to me. But now it's become dirty and water is mixed with water. I'll drink from another spring rather than a river'). For springs and poetry, cf. Callim. Ap. 110-12. 77 Callimachus' crowded road is reflected not only in Propertius' indocti ... semita uulgi (1), but, as Warden (1980) 95 suggests, also in the main thoroughfare of the Sacra Via , pounded by the streetwalker looking for custom. 78 See e.g. Enk (1962) 305 on line 19 quaeso , and Camps (1966) 159 on lines 5-6 as contrasted with 8 ('artificially elaborate' versus 'colloquial bluntness'). For the diatribe tradition, see Hunter (1983) 1 53-54 on Eubulus frg. 67; for the adultery mime, see above p. 26 n. 55.

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is this interweaving of the themes of prostitution, adultery and Callimachus in both Propertius and Horace that constitutes the strongest argument for the direct exploitation of Sat. 1.2 in Propertius 2.23. Horace prefaces his engagement with Callimachus by contrasting the well -concealed body of the matrona with the diaphanous Coan garment of the prostitute (Sat. 1.2.101-03):

Cois tibi paene uidere est ut nudam, ne crure malo, ne sit pede turpi; metiri possis oculo latus. It is not just in elegy that bodies and feet have a tendency to signify a poetics. As Freudenberg wittily comments, 'Either Horace is not much of a lover, as he keeps his eyes fixed on the legs and feet of a prostitute who, otherwise, has nothing to hide, or he realises that lines of poetry, unlike a prostitute, have no silken hair, breasts, buttocks, or whatever (or at least none of which I am aware); they have been known, however, to "limp" from time to time, having a bad "leg" or "foot", metaphors for a faulty compositional technique' ((1993) 195). The body of the Coan-clad prostitute, like a poem, may be open to stylistic inspection, but the inspecting lover may have his own poetic prejudices. So much is suggested by the 'translation' of the Callimachean epigram which is inserted into the mouth of lovers of matronae in the lines which follow: ' meus est amor huic similis; nam I transuolat in medio posita etfugientia captať (Sat. 1 .2.107-08). Since de / ex medio is often used in reference to 'everyday' words and themes, the claim of these perverse lovers to bypass in medio posita can also be read as a statement of poetics.79 Again in the words of Freudenberg, 'The lover of lines 105-08, we understand, has poetic pretensions, a disdain for everyday themes and dictions, to match his amorous pursuits' ((1993) 196). Such pretensions are not to the taste of Horace's speaker, as he replies that Nature has established a mean, a modus - both limit and poetical 'metre' - for human desires (1.2.1 1 1). Literary styles, too, may be excessive. The plot thickens as Horace moves on to the kind of woman preferred by Philodemus (1.2.121-24, quoted above p. 23). We have already seen that one of the adjectives used to describe Philodemus' perfect woman - munda - may possess literary connotations. But so also may its companions candida , recta , longa , and even alba, attested elsewhere in reference to simple, spare or smooth compositional styles.80 Philodemus' perfect woman is also the ideal poem, her body reflecting a compositional adherence to the mean and avoidance of stylistic excess. Women - and therefore poems - outside of this mean are for the Galli (120-21 illam ' post paulo'; ' sed pluris '; 'si exierit uir' I Gailis ... Philodemus ait). Here Freudenberg suggests a possible jibe, plausible in this context of sophisticated literary polemic, not only against the priests of Cybele, but also against Rome's most famous Callimachean poet at this date, Cornelius Gallus ((1993) 197).81 The founder of Roman love-elegy, in Horadan terms, is an exponent of Callimachean stylistic excess.

79 See the discussion below pp. 98-99 of Ars 3.479 munda, sed e medio . . . uerba. 80 See Freudenberg (1993) 194 n. 32, 197 with n. 37. For further possible instances of literary polemic in Sat. 1.2, see Freudenberg op. cit. 193-98. 81 Andrew Morrison points out to me that poetry and the priests of Cybele are also placed in opposition at the end of Callimachus' Iamb. 3, in the context of the penniless poet's failure to win a

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Horace and Propertius both reject Callimachean poetics. But where the former makes clear his preference instead for the munditia of the Philodeman poem-woman, the elegist prefers his poem-woman to have an immundus soccus. Or to rephrase this in the illuminating Aristotelian terms discussed at the outset of this chapter, where Horace rejects Callimachean excess in favour of the mean of stylistic munditia , Propertius rejects the same excess in favour of the opposite extreme of stylistic 'immunditiď .82 He repeats his ethical extremism on the plane of poetics. What this ' immunditiď might actually signify we can perhaps guess from the only other attested use of immundus in a stylistic sense, found - as luck would have it - in a contrast between the 'middle style' and its two excesses (precious sentimentality and vulgarity) in Horace's Ars Poetica: tantum de medio sumptis accedit honoris. I s i luis deducti caueant, me iudice, Fauni I ne uelut innati triuiis ac paene forenses I aut nimium teneris iuuenentur uersibus unquam, I aut immunda crepent ignominio saque dicta (243-47).83 Such 'vulgarity' will now become Propertius' favoured style. By subjecting first Horace's ethics, then his poetics to a reductio ad absurdum , the suspicion arises that by immundus soccus Propertius may mean the 'vulgar' subject-matter of Sat. 1.2 and the generally 'low' style of the Satires , now themselves figured as a stylistic 'extreme'. If this suspicion is right, then we might surmise that Propertius has wilfully, and rather wittily, missed the irony of Horace's discussion of whether comoedia - and the Satires - should be regarded as poetry at all (Sat. 1.4.39-65). (What is certain is that Propertius' shift of poetic and stylistic allegiance is temporary, as in 2.24c he pledges himself to Cynthia once more.) But Propertius is not yet finished with Horace. In the final 8 lines of 2.23, the elegist compares the advantages of his 'squalid' prostitute with the typical inconveniences associated with the adultery mime (17-24):

differet haec numquam, nec poscet garrula, quod te astrictus ploret saepe dedisse pater, nec dicet: 'timeo, propera iam surgere, quaeso: infelix, hodie uir mihi rure uenit'. 20 et quas Euphrates et quas mihi misit Orontes me iuuerint: nolim furta pudica tori, libertas quoniam nulli iam restât amanti, nullus liber erit, si quis amare uolet.

The topics shared with Sat. 1.2 are obvious, esp. lines 119-22, 127. Both Propertius and Horace praise a mistress who brooks no delay, is 'reasonably priced', makes no excuses,

young boy: '... it were better for me ... tossing my hair, to honour Cybebe ... But now, fool that I was, I inclined to the Muses' (34-39). 82 The contrast implicit in Horace between Callimachean 'excess' (i.e. excessive rejection of ordinary themes and style), and the mean of munditia appears deliberately paradoxical, as the latter term, with its connotations of discriminating elegance, is not far removed from the Callimachean trademark of X€tttótt|s' See Brink (1971) 290-93 for explication of this difficult passage, which appears to oppose a stylistic mean (243) to its two extremes (246 teneris ... uersibus , 247 immunda ... dicta), whereby the first belongs to the fashionable young forenses (245) and the second to the innati triuiis (245).

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and who occasions no fears about the return of a uir from the country. The presence of the latter topic in the elegist - although a commonplace of the adultery mime (as well as more generally part of the Comic action; cf. the stereotypical durus pater of line 18 of the elegy)84 - affords further evidence of direct allusion by Propertius to the Horatian satire: compare uir ... rure uenit (Prop. 2.23.20), with uir rure recurrat (Hor. Sat. 1.2.127). Despite this similarity, Propertius takes care to signal once more that he identifies more strongly with those whom Horace condemns than with the viewpoint of the Horatian speaker. For in 21-22 the elegist appears to suggest that he shares the characteristic fault of the Horatian 'fool', i.e., the tendency to rush to extremes (Sat. 1.2.24, quoted above p. 20). Like the unbalanced characters of the satire, who declare they never touch matronae (1.2.54 'matronam nullam ego tango ' 57 'nil fue rit mi ... cum uxoribus umquam alienis' ), Propertius too proclaims his avoidance of adultery (22). And, like them, he rushes to the opposite extreme in his avoidance of adultery. The preferred alternative of Horace's fools was characterised by extreme emotional and financial behaviour, and the loss of reputation with mime actresses, prostitutes and ancillae togatae (1.2.53-63). The preferred alternative of Propertius to adultery is now said to be girls sent by the Euphrates and the Orontes (21) - the very lowest kind of prostitute Rome had to offer, at least according to Juvenal (3.60-65): non possum ferre, Quirites, 60 Graecam Urbem. quamuis quota portio faecis Achaei? iam pridem Syrus in Tiberim defluxit Orontes et linguam et mores et cum tibicine chordas obliquas nec non gentilia tympana secum uexit et ad circum iussas prostare puellas. 65

These girls from the Orontes are slave prostitutes of the most unfortunate kind - not free to walk the streets (like the prostitute with the immundus soccus ), but ordered by their pimps ( iussas ) to stand in front of their cubicles (prostare) waiting for customers.85 Propertius, with his taste for such girls, perfectly illustrates the second of Horace's extremities at Sat. 1.2.28-30 sunt qui nolint tetigisse nisi illas I quarum subsuta talos tegat instita ueste: I contra alius nullam nisi olenti in fornice stantem. By avoiding one fault, Propertius quite deliberately rushes into the other; as he makes clear in the following poem, the women he has sought are uiles (2.24a.9 'cheap, low, mean'), not merely reasonably priced (Hor. Sat. 1.2.121-22 quae neque magno I stet predo). In 2.23 Propertius may express a very un-Horatian desire for extremities, but the final couplet of the elegy offers a sentiment with which the speaker of Sat. 1 .2 would be hard pressed to disagree (23-24, quoted above p. 32). Camps (1966) 161 rightly suggests that the significance of this statement is to be understood by allowing the emphasis to fall on amanti: 'the point being that an 'affair' [i.e. with Cynthia] involves amor: sexual

84 For the Comic atmosphere of Sat. 1.2, including the 'adultery mime' scenes, see Freudenberg (1993)40-46. 85 For the chambers in the outer arcade of the Circus perhaps inhabited by prostitutes, see Platner- Ashby (1926) 116. For proseda , prostibulum , and prosto as terms which refer to methods of soliciting associated with the most degraded types of prostitute, see Adams (1983) 329-32.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 34 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT indulgence with women of the street does noť. The speaker of Sat . 1.2 could hardly disagree with this attack on amor and the attendant loss of libertas?6 But Propertius' taste for erotic and poetic extremism, even while appearing to endorse conventional sentiments on the casual use of prostitutes, ought to have forewarned us that the effect of this coolly rational conclusion to the elegy will not last long. In the immediately following poems (2.24a-c) the elegist returns to the distracted state of mind typical of his infatuation with Cynthia, and so effectively exchanges one type of extremity ( immundae puellae) for another (emotional obsession).87 As we shall see in Chapter 2, a fondness for extremities, including sudden and often unexplained swings in attitude and position, is thoroughly characteristic of Propertius' poetry as a whole. However, Propertius does preserve one kind of consistency throughout: Cynthia is never praised as a munda puella. That epithet is reserved for the castanet-playing prostitute Byblis in book 4, poor substitute for Cynthia that she is, who in a rose-strewn context designed to remind the reader of Horace's Pyrrha simplex munditiis , is described as munda sine arte.ss v. Ari Amatoria 3.577-610 and the ' Middle Way' between Horace and Propertius

Propertius engages with Horace's second satire to make clear his own commitment to 'extremities', but in the Ars Amatoria Ovid exploits the same poem rather differently, albeit no less wittily and subversively. Whereas Propertius, apparently accepting Horace's categories, portrays himself as a willing extremist, Ovid questions those same categories by casting himself in the role of moderate and Horace in that of extremist. If for Horace painful obsession is an extreme, and the satisfaction of one's desires on a casual basis the 'mean', for Ovid, by contrast, these are two opposing extremes on his version of the sexual continuum. He accordingly sets himself the task of finding a middle course between frustrated infatuation and casual sex. Here we will find Ovid not only, like Propertius, wilfully ignoring the irony of Sat. 1.2, but also exploiting some characteristic vulnerabilities of the doctrine of the intermediate . In Ars 3.577-610, Ovid instructs his female pupils how to keep the passion of their lovers strong.89 1 quote here the first two-thirds of the passage (577-600):

omnia tradantur (portas reserauimus hosti) et sit in infida proditione fides, quod datur ex facili, longum male nutrit amorem: miscenda est laetis rara repulsa iocis. 580 ante fores iaceat, 'crudelis ianua' dicat

86 On the legal concepts implicit in these lines and the critical reception of this difficult couplet, see Cairns (1999). For contrasting attempts to sort out the contradictions between 2.22a (celebration of the madness of love with a variety of women), 2.23 (disavowal of adultery), and 2.24a-c (infatuation with Cynthia), see (e.g.) Allen (1962) 125-28, who attempts to smooth out the difficulties, and Janan (2001) 203 n. 29, who emphasises the 'illogic'. 88 I follow here Goold's text of 4.8.39-40: crotalistra Byblis I (haec facilis spargi munda sine arte rosa); cf. Hor. Carm. 1.5.1-6 (quoted below p. 94). 89 For some material and arguments here I develop my commentary on the passage (Gibson (2003) 324-34).

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multaque summisse, multa minanter agat. dulcía non ferimus: suco renouemur amaro; saepe périt uentis obruta cumba suis, hoc est, uxores quod non patiatur amari: 585 conueniunt illas, cum uoluere, uiri. adde forem, et duro dicat tibi ianitor ore 'non potes', exclusum te quoque tanget amor, ponite iam gládios hebetes, pugnetur acutis; nec dubito, telis quin petar ipse meis. 590 dum cadit in laqueos, captus quoque nuper, amator solum se thalamos speret habere tuos; postmodo riualem partitaque foedera lecti sentiat: has artes tolle, senescet amor, tum bene fortis equus reserato carcere currit, 595 cum quos praetereat quosque sequatur habet, quamlibet extinctos iniuria suscitât ignes: en ego, confíteor, non nisi laesus amo. causa tamen nimium non sit manifesta doloris, pluraque sollicitus, quam seiet, esse putet. 600

The puellae are to retain their lovers, counter-intuitively, by refusing them entry to the house (579-88), by leading them to suspect the existence of rivals (589-600), and by fomenting fear of a guardian or discovery by a uir (601-10). These are the normal recommended tactics for stoking the passion of waning lovers, at least for the elegiac lena;90 but Ovid's versions of the same tactics are subtly, but significantly, different. Ovid insists throughout Ars 3 on a kind of reciprocity between lovers (e.g. 461-66, 509-16, 525-54), and now rings a change on that theme by framing these traditional mistreatments of men as in fact an opportunity for mutual benefit and co-operation. Ovid's puellae can serve their own interest in keeping lovers' passion strong by serving men's need to avoid both erotic ennui and (well founded) anxiety. In pursuit of this mutually beneficial aim, Ovid is careful to recommend a programme of thoughtful and discriminating torture to his female pupils. The exclusion of the lover must be occasional only (580 rara repulsa ); the lover must be made to entertain niggling suspicions - rather than be sure - that he has a rival (593-94 rivalem ... I sentiat ); attention must be paid to Kotipóç and timing (591 dum ... nuper , 593 postmodo , 595 tum); and the stimulating anxiety inflicted on the male should make use of the power of suggestion rather than actual events (599-600).91

90 Cf. Prop. 4.5.29-30, 37-40, Ov. Am. 1 .8.73-76, 95-99. 91 For the influence of this particular passasge - along with others from the Amores , Mart. 1.57 and Auson. Epig. 38 - on the development of the 'hedonistic mean' in early modern poetry, see Scodel (1996) 239, '[Cavalier poets] wittily identify an erotic mean not with temperance but rather with a mistress's tantalizing coyness or a man's tantalized desire. By means of this subversive application of the mean, love poets transform the ethical regulation of pleasure into a hedonistic technique for the increase of pleasure'. See also Scodel (2002) 263-68.

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In one sense no doubt unforeseen by the Horace of Sat. 1 .2, Ovid and he are in firm agreement. As Scodel observes, 'While in his satire Horace disagrees with poets like Ovid and Martial on whether an easy object is desirable or not, the poets agree in using the mean to celebrate a sensuality shorn of high minded moralising'.92 But Ovid also drives a brilliant middle course between Horace's mean of parabilis Venus (Sat. 1.2.119), and his extreme of outright frustration and torment - the latter a target of Sat. 1 .2 in the guise of affairs with matronae (96-118, 127-34), 93 as well as being typical of elegiac furtiuus amor . It is shown, in a characteristically Ovidian twist, that the lovers of Ars 3.577-610 would soon tire of readily available intercourse (583), and that the interests of neither sex would be served by carrying frustration to extremes (609-10, quoted below p. 37).94 The Ovidian 'mean' avoids both tedium and (undue) torment. Horace's own preferred mean of parabilis Venus appears on Ovid's construction as an extreme to be avoided - if only because it is extremely boring. Lest we miss the implicit engagement with Horace, Ovid refers at Ars 3.584 (saepe perit uentis obruta cumba suis) to the nautical metaphor from Horace's own aurea mediocritas ode ( Carm . 2.10.21-24):95

rebus angustis animosus atque fortis appare; sapienter idem contrahes uento nimium secundo turgida uela.

The 'extreme' of strong following winds needs to be avoided on the sea of love quite as much as on the sea of civic affairs. Using Horace's own imagery, Ovid turns Horace's mean into an excessive wind that will sink the Ovidian lover's ship.96 But this cheeky reference to Horace's Peripatetic ode is only a preliminary to Ovid's main engagement with Sat. 1.2 in the climax to his treatment of the true erotic mean. Here it is recommended that Ovid's pupils stimulate ailing passions by playing out the action of the 'adultery mime' (3.601-10):

incitât et fleti tristis custodia serui et nimium duri cura molesta uiri. quae uenit ex tuto, minus est accepta uoluptas; ut sis liberior Thaide, finge metus.

92 Scodel (1996) 243, who makes this remark in the course of a study of Ben Jonson's Poetaster (1601), a work heavily indebted to classical models. 93 Cf. esp. Hor. Sat. 1.2.96-98 si interdicta petes , uallo circumdata ( nam te I hoc fac it insanum), multae tibi tum officient res, I custodes, lectica, ciniflones, parasitae. The latter idea is a common one; cf. esp. Aristaenetus 2.1 (quoted by Gibson (2003) 325 on Ars 3.580). 95 While the sentiment behind the metaphor occurs regularly (cf. e.g. Ov. Ars 2.437-38 luxuriant animi rebus plerumque secundis, I nec facile est aequa commoda mente pati), its expression in this nautical form is rare; cf., in addition to Hor. and Ov. locc. citt., Sen. Ag. 90-91. For earlier discussion of Hor. Carm. 2.10, see above p. 17. 96 Strong winds recur in another paradigmatic passage in the Ars on avoiding excess, of course in the Daedalus and Icarus episode of Ars 2 (on which see below pp. 85-86). Cf. esp. 2.63 inter utrumque uola ; uentos quoque, nate, timeto.

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cum melius foribus possis, admitte fenestra 605 inque tuo uultu signa timentis habe; callida prosiliat dicatque ancilla 'perimus'; tu iuuenem trepidum quolibet abde loco, admiscenda tarnen Venus est secura timori, ne tanti noctes non putet esse tuas. 610

In effect, Ovid asks his pupils to imitate adultery without actually committing the crime, and to grant lovers the pleasurable fiction of an adulterous affair. This is typically daring of Ovid, but exploitation of Horace Sat. 1.2 gives added piquancy to the passage. As we shall see below, Ovid once again uses Horace's poem to set up his own 'golden mean' and to stigmatise Horace's favoured position as extreme. But first - by way of a slight digression which will nevertheless contribute to our sense of the depth of O viď s engagement with Horace - note the element of fantasy which Ovid introduces. Though his pupils be freer than the famous stage courtesan Thais (that is, freer to take lovers), they should conjure up an atmosphere of terror (604-08) - by pretending to be wives with uiri?1 A similar note of fantasy is found in Sat. 1.2. While tucked under his right side, for Horace a prostitute 'is Ilia and Egeria; I give any name I please to her' (126). The satirist can give her the name of the mother of Romulus or of the prophetic nymph who was wife to Numa; in other words, 'she's as good as the highest-born matron' (Brown (1993) 113). This element of fantasy is found already in the Meliambs of the Cynic Cercidas (3.27-33):

á 8 àyopáç 'A<ļ>po8iTa, Kal TÒ 1J.T1Ô6VÒÇ p.6'r|v ÓTTOLVLKa Xfļ9, OKa XPTIÍTÍ?, où 4>ópoç où Tapaxá* 30 TaÚTav oßoXoü KaTaKXívaç TuvSapéoio ôókéi ya|ißp09 ...

But Venus that paces the market - in repletion of desire demanding no thought or attention:- here is no fear and no care: one obol will win you a mistress, son-in-law fancy yourself to Tyndarus.

Horace probably did not derive the idea directly from Cercidas, rather from the lost epigram of Philodemus to which he refers earlier in his satire (1.2.120-04), although Horace's similarity to Cercidas is perhaps evidence that Philodemus himself drew on the Cynic. At any rate, it is clear that some recommendation to fantasise with prostitutes was present in the 'anti-adultery' tradition: since adultery was dangerous, it was safer - and more pleasurable - to imagine oneself in bed with a high-born woman while actually in

97 The invitation to the counterparts of Thais to imitate wives achieves its own kind of outrageous 'moderation' by effectively blending the two categories - which briefly appear in Sat. 1.2 as opposed extremes - of wife and whore; cf. below pp. 113-14 for a development of this idea in Ars 3 in relation to Am. 3.1. For Thais as a character of the comic stage and her freedom to take lovers, see the discussion of Rem. 383-86, below pp. 135-42.

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the arms of a prostitute. If anything, Horace intensifies Cercidas' element of generalised make-believe (following Philodemus?) by making the fantasy personal to himself (126 do nomen quodlibet illï) rather than recommending it to an addressee. It is this element of make-believe which is exploited by Ovid at Ars 3.601-10. Ovid's fantastical adultery, rather wickedly, is (ultimately) 'no more' than the counterpart Horace provides for himself with 'Ilia' and 'Egeria'.98 No adultery takes place, except in the mind of the lover. The one difference of course is that Horace knows that his experience is a fantasy; Ovid's young men do not. But in neither case is a crime committed: there is (just about) no crimen in Ovid's carmen ." However, one might remember here the two Amores poems - 2.19 and 3.4 - which ultimately lie behind Ars 3.577-61 0,100 and an argument found in the latter about 'real' adultery as taking place in the mind; cf. Am. 3.4.3-6 si qua metu dempto casta est, ea denique casta est ; I quae , quia non liceat, non facit , illa facit. I ut iam seruaris bene corpus , adultera mens est I nec custodiri , ne uelit, ulla potest. If such strict standards were applied to men as well as women, not even Horace himself would escape whipping. Indeed in Sat. 2.7 the Stoic idea that morality is a matter of intention, and illicit desires are as wrong as the deeds to which they might lead, appears in the context of the adultery mime at 72-74 ' non sum moechus ' ais. ñeque ego, hercule, fur, ubi uasa I praetereo sapiens argentea: tolle periculum, I iam uaga prosiliet frenis Natura remotis.m If we now return to a stricter focus on the theme of the 'mean' in Ars 3.601-10 and Sat. 1.2, we will immediately notice that Horace, like Ovid after him, imagines an 'adultery mime' scene of chaos and fear, involving an errant wife, cries of despair from a compliant maid, and a hasty disappearance by the lover (Sat. 1 .2.127-33):

nec uereor ne dum futuo uir rure recurrat, ianua frangatur, latret canis, undique magno pulsa domus strepitu resonet, uepallida lecto desiliat mulier, miseram se conscia clamet, 1 30 cruribus haec metuat, doti deprensa, egomet mi, discinta tunica fugiendum sit, pede nudo, ne nummi pereant.

Horace employs these scenes to make the point that fear and danger destroy the pleasure of illicit sex. Earlier in the Amores , Ovid had played a version of Propertius' willing

98 Martial too engages with the fantasy element of this tradition, at 3.33: ingenuam malo , sed si tarnen illa negetur, I libertina mihi próxima condicio est. I extremo est ancilla loco ; sed uincet utramque I si facie, nobis haec erit ingenua. But his argument is less developed than that of Ovid's. 99 For this joke, cf. Ars 1.34 inque meo nullum carmine crimen erit where crimen can fit literally inside the letters of carmine (see Sharrock (1994b) 110-12). Note also Brown (1993) 114, who makes the point that the conclusion of Horace's satire appears to suggest that the speaker has learnt from actual experience - i.e. by committing and being caught in the act of adultery (cf. Hor. Sat. 2.7.46-71). This may add further bite to Ovid's recommendations. Nevertheless, the situation in Ars 3 is reversed in the parallel Ars 2.373-466, where Ovid does not recommend the imitation of adultery, but rather plays with encouraging it. 100 See Gibson (2003) 325 on Ars 3.579ff., 328 on 3.589ff., 33 1 on 3.601ff. "" See further Muecke (1993) 221-22 on Sat. 2.7.72-74, 74.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 1 : THE MIDDLE AND THE EXTREMES 39 extremist to Horace's 'moderate'. For in Am. 3.4, he turned Horace's argument about fear ruining pleasure on its head, and declared that the stimulation of fear actually increased his pleasure (3.4.29-32):102

non proba fit, quam uir seruat, sed adultera cara: ipse timor pretium corpore maius habet, indignere licet, iuuat inconcessa uoluptas: sola placet, 'timeo!' dicere si qua potest.

But at Ars 3.601-10 Ovid, in a manner that is entirely characteristic of the new 'moderate' ethos of the Ars vis à vis the 'extremism' of the Amores , responds to the same Horatian argument with an ironically impressive shrewdness. If, as Horace insists, fear destroys the pleasure of adulterous sex, then, so Ovid counters, robust controls must be placed on the role played by fear. Stimulating as fear may be (604 metus , 606 signa timentis , 608 iuuenem trepidum ), it must strictly be used only to tantalise the lover before intercourse takes place. Under no circumstances must sexual union itself take place in a Horatian atmosphere of panic (609-10). Intercourse without anxiety must be added by the puellae of Ars 3 to fear: a calculated act, like the adding of a new element or ingredient ( admise - enda Venus).103 timor must not be taken to extremes, as the lover will be doing his own calculations (610 tanti ... putet ), and may come to the conclusion that the balance between pleasure and fear has tipped too far in the direction of the latter. The emphasis here on calculation and proportion might bring to mind the hedonistic science of measurement set out in Plato Protag. 356a-57e, where Socrates constructs an argument about quantities of pleasure and pain and correct choice in weighing present and future pleasure and pain.104 However Ovid, like Horace, lacks Socratic high-mindedness - although the reader may feel some compensation is provided by Ovid's characteristic panache. For where Horace took from the ruined pleasure of adultery the conclusion that the lover should make use of parabilis Venus , Ovid is less extreme. Rather than recommending such excessively boring love, Ovid advises that the puellae moderate their own behaviour. In this way Ovid drives another ironically 'reasonable' middle course, this time between the opposed extremities of Sat. 1 .2 (where fear always ruins pleasure) and his own Amores (where fear invariably increases pleasure). It is not only Propertius who is likely to fulfil the role of the opposite extreme to Horace, but also Ovid's own 'younger self'.105

102 For another contribution to this topic, cf. Philodemus AP 5.25, which 'presents a humorous counterexample to the Epicurean view that the sexual pleasures of adultery are more than cancelled out by the thought of punishment' (Sider (1997) 1 16-17 ad loc., who also provides further Epicurean background). 103 For admisceo in this sense, see Gibson (2003) 333-34 ad loc., quoting Cic. de Orat. 2.200. 104 Similarly, of the Aristotetlian mean, it may be remarked with Kraut (1989) 332 'In saying that we should avoid the two extremes, Aristotle does not mean that any point falling between these limits is as good as any other'. Ovid, with his own insistence on exact calibration, would appear to agree. 105 For Ovid's perversion in this passage also of arguments made for the use of prostitutes instead of other citizens' wives, see Gibson (2003) 331-32.

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Ovid drives this course, however, without resorting explicitly to the language of the middle way. Like Horace himself in the second book of his Satires and in the Epistles , he is largely content to leave the readers to work things out for themselves without necessarily using such terms as modus , moderari , and medius to provide emphasis.106 A more direct approach is taken by the epigrammatist Martial, who resorts to 'Peripatetic' language as he specifies the 'intermediate' he desires between a girl who is nimis facilis and one who is nimis difficilis (1.57):

qualem, Flacce, uelim quaeris nolimue puellam? nolo nimis facilem difficilemque nimis. illud quod medium est atque inter utrumque probamus: nec uolo quod cruciat nec uolo quod satiat.

As Alison Sharrock suggests to me, the question put to 4 Flacce ' might represent an address to the Horace of Sat 1.2, who had effectively posed the same dilemma.107 At any rate, Martial's quasi-philosophical illud quod medium est represents what the puellae of Ars 3 typify: they neither torture lovers with unending frustration {quod cruciat ), nor allow them easy satisfactions ( quod satiat). Such 'i€gòtt'ç, as I shall argue in Chapter 3, is not an incidental feature of an isolated passage in the Ars , but in fact characteristic of much of the Ars as a whole, especially the third book. But I want to end the present chapter by exploiting those Peripatetic resources at which Martial's language hints, for thinking about Ars 3.577-610. For here Ovid exploits a 'weakness' of the principle of the intermediate which is evident already in Aristotle's formulations. As Scodel (1996) 241 puts the matter, in the course of a discussion of Ben Jonson's Poetaster.

Both Ovid and Martial parody the Roman tendency to apply the mean mechan- ically as a guideline for every aspect of human behavior. Such uses of the mean attenuated its specifically ethical significance and rendered more plausible its application to an ars erotica - to sexual activity conceived of as a hedonistic practice with its own precise rules and protocols. Aristotle himself authorized the tendency to invoke the mean as a general principle of behavioural decorum when he applied it to the proper conduct of relaxing conversation ( Nicomachean Ethics 4.8).

Furthermore, as I indicated at the outset of this chapter, the doctrine of the mean is at root a proportional concept. Ethical uses may be attributed to it, but ethical content does not necessarily reside within it. In any case, a sense of where the 'mean' lies does depend on the extremities one thinks it proper, or finds convenient, to recognise. A continuum which, for one person, runs from point A (excess) through B (intermediate) to C (deficiency), can always be contracted or expanded at will by another person, so that, for example, the continuum of the latter runs only from A to B via a new point ('X') intermediate between A and B. Of course, when Peripatetics insisted that the intermediate is 'relative to us', they did not mean 'relative to my tastes or point of view', but - a rather more robust basis

106 Cf. e.g. Hor. Sat . 2.2.63-66, 2.3.175-78, Epist. 1.10.42-44, 2.203-04. 107 This suggestion is not incompatible with the existence of an historical Flaccus, whose name occurs often in Martial; for the possible identity of this figure see Howell (1980) 242-43. For other instances of the theme of [1€

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 1 : THE MIDDLE AND THE EXTREMES 4 1 for ethical action - 'relative to us [as human beings / moral agents]'.108 In this way safeguards were added onto the system. Similarly Peripatetics would no doubt point out that the moral standards observable in conventional society were perfectly capable of making the (proper) extremities clear. Note in this connection Aristotle's use of the example of 'fornication' as an action which does not admit an intermediate state, at EN 1 107a8-17:

o i) iräaa 8' èmôéx^Tai TTpaîç oùôè tt&v TTáôoç rr'v [leaÓTrjTcr evia yàp evOvç covoiiacrrai auveiXr||j.ļj.£va 'xerà r rjç (1>auXÓTT1T09, olov èmxaipÉKCtKia àvaiaxwTia <1>6óvoç , Kal èm t ûv TTpaêoov [loix^ta kXottt] avSpoôi/ia* TTavTa yàp TaÛTa Kal Ta Toiairra XéyeTai tû aÙTà cpavXa elvai , àXX' ovx al imepßoXal aÙTÙv où8' al èWeiipeiç. ovk écttlv ouv oùô€ttot€ Trepl airrà KaTopGouv, àXX' àel ajaapTaveiv* oùô' éctti to ev fļ 'ir' ev U6pl Ta ToiaÜTa ev tco f'v Sel Kal ore Kal (hç [loix^veiv, àXX' áTrXójç tò uoi€iv ÓTioOv TouTOjy ápapTáveiv èorív.

Not every action admits of intermediacy, nor does every affection; for in some cases they have been named in such a way that they are combined with badness from the start, as e.g. with malice, shamelessness, grudging ill will, and in the case of actions, fornication, theft, murder; for all these, and others like them, owe their names to the fact that they themselves - not excessive versions of them, or deficient ones - are bad. It is not possible, then, ever to get it right with affections and actions like these, but only to go astray; nor does good practice or the lack of it in relation to such things consist in (e.g.) fornicating with the woman one should, when one should, and how - rather, simply doing any one of these things is going astray.

Aristotle, nevertheless, is forced into limiting the range and power of his concept less with an argument about its central properties of quantity and proportion, more with observations about conventional language usage, about individual terms and their normal interpretation.109 This hardly offers much resistance to the (successful) application of the principle of intermediacy to various areas and subjects beyond the conventionally 'moral'. Of course, the fact that Aristotle's system of triads can operate outside the ethical sphere does not thereby rob the triads of their power as a philosophical tool within that same sphere. What it does do is provide excellent material for satirists, elegists, and others not much interested in elucidating moral concepts in a 'scientific' way. Horace, ironically, pointed the way, not only with his consistently low-minded application of the mean in Sat. 1.2, but also with his cynical advice on the 'intermediate' in legacy-hunting and flattery delivered in the persona of Teiresias (Sat. 2.5, discussed above p. 19). Ovid goes one better in discovering an intermediate for a subject which Aristotle (unwisely) declared had none, namely 'fornication' (poix^la). Within the fantasy context of the adultery mime, Ovid effectively discovers good practice as regards 'fornicating with the woman one should, when one should, and how'. Thus the concept is vulnerable to usurpation, even to reductio ad absurdum , by Ovid with his own sense of the extremities appropriate to the

108 Arist. EN 1 106b5-7, quoted above p. 13-14. 109 See also the remarks of Urmson (1980) 166-69.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 42 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT world of amor. 'Decorum', as we shall see in the final chapter of this study, is likewise a proportional concept with similar 'weakness', and is hijacked by Ovid to similar effect.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 2 PROPERTIAN EXTREMES:

FROM CONSERVATIVE TO LIBERTINE

errat qui finem uesani quaerit amoris: uerus amor nullum nouit habere modum Prop. 2.15.29-30 uos, ubi contempti rupistis frena pudoris, nescitis captae mentis habere modum Prop. 3.19.3-4

In Chapter 1, 1 focused on Horace's second satire, where the speaker applies ideas of the mean and the extremes to the arena of sexual relations, and traced Propertius' rejection of this Horatian 'mean'. In elegy 2.23 the poet makes clear his own taste for erotic (and poetic) 'extremes'. I also argued that, if Propertius accepts Horace's categories of excess and the intermediate in order to portray himself as an 'extremist', Ovid, by contrast, refuses them. In Ars 3.577-610 Ovid wishes to pose as the true moderate and have Horace play the extremist, and steers a subversive middle course between Sat. 1.2 and his own earlier Am. 3.4. The present chapter concentrates on Propertius, and seeks to put flesh on the bone of the erotic 'extremist' who emerges from 2.23. In the opening section, I look at the stratagems by which Propertius, implicitly rejecting the ideals of moderation, fosters love's reputation as an arena for extreme emotions and behaviour. However, this chapter goes on to offer a further argument of its own. The deliberate extremism on offer in Propertius 2.23 forms part of a wider programme featuring, among other conventionally excessive forms of behaviour, the libertine's traditional triad of nox , amor , and uinum. But in apparent conflict with this programme - as I show in the chapter's second section - is a remarkable tendency to espouse apparently traditional moral values. The conflict between these tendencies is not explained, perhaps not even acknowledged, by the speaker in Propertius' poems. Rather the elegist appears internally at odds with himself through swinging between libertine and conservative tendencies, which are so little reconciled as to appear opposed 'extremes' of behaviour. To provide illuminating context for this behaviour I employ, in the third section, the ancient idea of 'self-consistency', found for example in Cicero's de Officiis , but, for my purposes, expressed in its most relevant form in Horace Sat. 2.7. Application of Horace's ironically meant 'unethical' version of this idea to Propertius reveals the elegist' s lack of self-consistency even in his attempts to play the role of libertine. I attempt further to sharpen the sense of inconsistency by introducing, in the final sections of the chapter, the figure of Mark Antony. The triumvir is often thought to be a model for the elegist, but the differences between Propertius and Mark Antony, at least as he appears in Plutarch's Life , are as revealing as the similarities: Antony is portrayed as relatively consistent in his pursuit of vice, while Propertius appears to swing between libertine behaviour and conservative rhetoric. In this way I seek to

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 44 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT deepen and broaden the image of Propertian 'extremism' beyond the self-conscious posturing of 2.23. i. Propertius the Libertine: Extremes of Emotion, Extremes of Behaviour

In the previous chapter I outlined the importance of moderation and the intermediate as themes in the poetry of Horace, and brought together examples of associated terms, e.g. modus , modicus , mediocris , and medius , and less common items such as modestus and moderari. In Propertius, by contrast, there are no examples of the terms modestus , modicus , or mediocris , none of medius in relation to the middle ground or an intermediate, and only two examples of modus in the sense 'due measure' or '[proper] limit' (in one instance denied on principle).1 Instead we find sustained, particularly in book 1, a lexicon of such characteristically unrestrained emotions as madness, insanity and anger: furor , insanus and demens , and ira and cognates appear frequently.2 Even more prominent is the language of crying, grief and lament (appropriately for elegy), including lacrima , fletus and fleo, dolor and doleo , and querela and queror ? There is little talk here of restraint or proper limits. Alongside such terms is found the language of (usually uncontrolled) fear ( timeo , timor , metuo ), of aggressive threats ( minor , minae ), emotional savagery ( saeuus , saeuitia ), and of contempt (fastus ).4 While any use of the language of madness is disturbing (furor , demens , insanus ), occurrences of terms for anger, tears, grief and fear, on the face of it, are less so. But it is in the aggregate, through frequent and repeated usage, that all these terms together create a tone of 'extreme' emotion - extreme at least in an Aristotelian sense (EN 1 106M8-23):5

The elegist's repeated use of the terms reviewed above, including those associated with fear, anger and distress, suggests a degree of emotion which all the major philosophical schools, not just the Peripatetics, would find 'excessive' in various ways. A correlative of this is the absence from the elegist of the language of moderation, which characteristically places emphasis on degree, amount, and proper limit. Not for Propertius is the equanimity, the avoidance of the extremes of elation and despair, which Horace would recommend to

1 2.15.29-20, 3.19.3-4 (quoted together as the epigraph to this chapter). 2 Attestations in book 1 : furor (5), insanus (4), demens (2), and ira and cognates (6). Attestations in book 1: lacrima (10), fleo and fletus (10), dolor and doleo (15), and querela and queror (12). 4 Attestations in book 1: timeo and timor (6), metuo (2), minor and minae (5), saeuus and saeuitia (6), fastus (4). Given that such vocabulary permeates the book, it is perhaps not surprising that references to sickly complexions are prominent: pallor , palleo and pallesco at 1 . 1 .22, 1 .5.21 , 1 .9. 17, 1.13.7, 1.15.39. There is a slight decline in the use of all these terms over the course of books 2 and 3, but their overall prominence is not in doubt. 5 This passage is set in the context of Aristotle's broad ethical scheme above pp. 12-14.

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the addressee of his aurea mediocritas ode ( Carm . 2.10), nor that middle way between desire and fear which opens Epist. 1.6. Horace's address to Tibullus - setting the elegisťs extreme emotions {Carm. 1.33.1 Albi , ne doleas plus nimio ) against a pointedly restrained description of their source (1.33.1-3 memor I immitis Glycerae neu miserabilis I decantes elegos) - might with equal appropriateness have been directed at Propertius himself.6 Extremes of behaviour accompany Propertius' excess of emotion. If the elegist expresses in 2.23 a taste for low prostitutes which is not only extreme (by the standards of Sat. 1.2), but also rather unusual, elsewhere his 'excesses' are rather more conventional. Propertius evinces a taste for the libertine's trademark combination of night-time living, sex, and drink. The triad of nox, amor , and uinum is routinely used to conjure up the gatherings of the dissipated (e.g. Cic. Cael. 67), or retrospectively used by the (now sober) guilty to excuse their misdeeds.7 It also appears regularly in the poetry of Propertius as a badge of honour. He returns to Cynthia late in the night, drunk and under the influence of Amor (1.3.9, 13-14; cf. 2.29.1); the night time brawls of the drunk - including Propertius - are the object of complaint by the door of the elegisťs mistress (1.16.5-6; cf. 3.3.47-48); his parties attract the criticism of more conventional citizens (2.30.13); Cynthia - to the poet's amazement and (eventually) admiration - drinks far into the night (2.33b, esp. 39 largius effuso madeat tibi mensa Falerno ); it is the poet's own ambition to drink until daybreak and his garland withers (2.34, esp. 57-59; cf. 3.5.21-22); and he glories in drunken brawls with his beloved by lamplight (3. 8), 8 and in nights spent drinking and talking 'wantonly', culminating in the 'rites of Venus' (3.10).9 Unlike in Horace, the moderate consumption of drink, along with other forms of moderation and self-restraint, is conspicuous by its absence. Most (conventionally) outrageous of all is the libertine manifesto unveiled after a night of love with Cynthia which threatens to make him immortal (2.15.39-48):

si dabit et multas [sc. noctes], fiam immortalis in illis: nocte una quiuis uel deus esse potest. 40 qualem si cuncti cuperent decurrere uitam et pressi multo membra iacere mero, non ferrum crudele neque esset bellica nauis, nec nostra Actiacum uerteret ossa mare, nec totiens propriis circum oppugnata triumphis 45 lassa foret crinis soluere Roma suos. haec certe merito poterunt laudare minores: laeserunt nullos pocula nostra deos.

6 For the traditional identification of Albius with Tibullus, see Nisbet-Hubbard (1970) 368-70 ad loc. 7 See McKeown (1989) 153 on Ov. Am. 1.6.59-60 nox et Amor uinumque nihil moderabile suadent: I illa pudore uacat, Liber Amorque metu. 1-4 dulcis ad hestemas fuerat mihi rixa lucernas, I uocis et insanae tot maledicta tuae, I cum furibunda mero mensám propellis et in me I proicis insana cymbia plena manu. 9 21 noxque inter pocula currat, 24 et sint nequitiae libera uerba tuae , 29-30 cum fuerit multis exacta trientibus hora, I noctis et instituet sacra ministra Venus.

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Actium, it is said, would never have happened if everyone lived like Propertius: transfigured by sex and lying back 'limbs overpowered with wine'. A parallel is suggested, implicitly but unmistakably, between the lives of amor and uinum lived by Propertius and Antony.10 It is in the context of these lines that the elegist reveals his manifesto for amor which forms the first epigraph to this chapter (2.15.29-30). True love, rather like the elegisťs own way of life, knows no moderation or limit.11 The scope of Propertius* libertinism stretches beyond the pleasures of nox , amor , and uinum with one woman, book 2 reveals a taste for promiscuity which could hardly have been anticipated by readers of the first book. In 2.22a Propertius confesses to Demophoon the abundant allure of female charms on the streets of Rome (1-10), and is in no mood to apologise for it.12 Here love knows no moderation in a rather different way from that envisaged in 2.15, and continues in 2.25.39-48, where Propertius declares how sorely tempting are the vastly different types of puellae who crowd Rome's streets. But it is Propertius' fixation with death that strikes a potentially more shocking note. The obsession of the elegists with death in general is well known, including the fantasy of dying with the beloved or in her arms.13 But Propertius also deals repeatedly with the idea of violent death and murder, bolstering the tone of unconstrained passion. In 2.9 it is alleged that Cynthia cannot do without a man for a single night (19-20), and Propertius challenges the Amores to produce sharper weapons and take his life (39-40); but he will take his rival with him (52). Later, in 2.17, denied a promised night with Cynthia, Propertius wishes to throw himself off a cliff or to take poison (13- 14). 14 In particular, in 2.8, robbed of Cynthia, Propertius determines to die (17-24), taking Cynthia with him (25- 28): sed non effugies : mecum moriaris oportet; I hoc eodem ferro stillet uterque crúor. I quamuis ista mihi mors est inhonesta futura: I mors inhonesta quidem, tu moriere tamen. ii. Propertius the Conservative?

Behaviour more 'extreme' than erotic murder and suicide could hardly be imagined. Yet there is a peculiar quality to Propertius 'excesses'. Unlike the Callicles of Plato's Górgias , introduced in Chapter 1, the elegist nowhere effects a 'transvaluation of values' so that the pursuit of excess is conceived as his moral duty. Nor does he reject conventional ethics

10 For Antony's notorious drinking, cf. e.g. Sen. Epist. 83.25, Pliny Nat. 14.148, Plut. Ant. 9.5. Propertius' assertion asks to be read against the background of the sympotic tradition, which asserted that it was precisely immoderate consumption of wine which led to murderous violence (as in the brawl between Lapiths and Centaurs at the wedding of Pirithous); for this tradition, see below pp. 105-06. 1 1 For virtuously extreme love praised by early modern poets as the the true foundation of marriage - significantly not a theme to which the elegists are drawn - see Scodel (2002) 171-72, 184-85. 12 13-20 quaeris, Demophoon, cur sim tam mollis in omnes? I quod quaeris, 'quare', non habet ullus amor. Il uni cuique dedit uitium natura creato : I mi fortuna aliquid semper amare dédit. II numquam ad formosas, inuide, caecus ero. 13 See Griffin (1985) 142-62, and cf. e.g. Prop. 1.6.25-28, 2.1.47-78, 4.7, 4.1 1; Tib. 1.1.59-70, 1.3, 1.10; Ov. Am. 2.10.29-38 (with the note of McKeown (1998) 215 ad loc.). 14 Cf. also 2.13b.43-58 (Propertius wishes he had died in his cradle), 2.26 (a vision of Cynthia drowning).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 2: PROPERTIAN EXTREMES 47 altogether, and act like a pirate or outlaw, celebrating inhumanitas , immanitas , and auaritia .,5 Rather, and characteristically, Propertius accepts society's negative evaluation of his behaviour, and revels in it. He refers approvingly, playfully, to his - purely sexual - 'naughtiness' or 'roguery' (1.6.25-26 me sine ... I hanc animam extremae reddere nequitiae). But he does not claim such aKoXaaia Kai èXeuGepia ('excess and licence') are virtue and happiness (ape tt| re Kal £Ü8ai|iovia). 16 This is neither full inversion nor outright rejection of society's value system, but happy acceptance of a place as a conventional libertine within it. But we can go further than this in tracing Propertius' (ultimately) conformist tendencies. For it is rarely emphasised that Propertius' acceptance of traditional value schemes is sufficiently complete that he is not only pleased with the role of libertine, but may also play the opposite 'extreme' of conventional moralist.17 Like the ancient uita tradition for poets, which remembers (e.g.) Archilochus as a violent- tempered reprobate and systematically ignores anything in his poetry which contradicts this, it is all too easy even for modern readers to focus on Propertius the libertine and downplay or forget Propertius the moralist.18 Opposed to the elegist's taste for nox , amor , and uinum runs a tendency to voice doubts, qualifications and reservations about a life based on love and wine. In 2.33b, alarmed by the sight of Cynthia drinking into the small hours, Propertius curses the inventor of wine (27-28) and inveighs strongly against the corrupting effects of wine and its destruction of sexual fidelity: uino forma perit, uino corrumpitur aetas, I uino saepe suum nescit amica uirum (33-34). Such moralising sentiments are not out of place in Pliny the Elder, or even in the hostile portraits of Cleopatra to be found elsewhere in Augustan poetry.19 But they are perhaps somewhat unexpected - even if only entertained briefly within the poem - in the mouth of someone who is supposed to identify himself with Antony. Similar outbursts are found elsewhere in Propertius. In 2.25 the elegist, who declares his lasting devotion to Cynthia, issues a warning to those secure in their love to be wary (35-38): at si saecla forent antiquis grata puellis, I essem ego quod nunc tu: tempore uincor ego. I non tarnen ista meos mutabunt saecula mores: I unus quisque sua

15 For what such 'piratical' vocabulary and behaviour might look like, cf. e.g. Hor. Epist. 1.16.61-62 (a prayer) da mihi fallere, da iusto sanctoque uideri, I noctem peccatis etfraudibus obice nubem. 16 Plato Gorg. 492c, quoted above p. 15. nequitia is in fact used elsewhere to criticise the behaviour of the beloved, himself, or others at 1.15.38, 2.5.2, 2.6.30, 2.24a.6, 3.19.10 (as earlier at Gallus frg. 2.1 Courtney). I am conscious of a debt in this paragraph to Veyne (1988) 85-100. 17 For a useful overview of the paradoxes and contradictions inherent in elegy as a whole prior to the Ars , see Labate (1984) 37-43. 18 On this phenomenon in the uita tradition, see briefly Farrell (2002) 27-31, citing on Archilochus Lefkowitz (1981) 25 'only the most destructive aspects of his poetry survive in his biographies; there is no trace of Archilochus who consoles his friend Pericles . . . disdains riches ... or reveres the gods'. 19 Cf. Pliny Nat. 14.142 (on the effects of wine) hinc pallor et genae pendulae ... praemiumque summum ebrietatis libido portentosa et iucundum nefas. For hostile depictions of a drunken Cleopatra by Propertius himself and by Horace, cf. Prop. 3.1 1.56, Hor. Carm. 1.37.12 ebria (with the note of Nisbet-Hubbard (1970) ad loc.), 14 mentemque lymphatam Mareotico. For Cynthia drinking elsewhere, cf. 2.3a. 17, 2.9.21, 2.16.5-6. For Cleopatra in Augustan literature generally, see Wyke (2002) 195-243.

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nouerit ire uia. A complaint about the corruption of the times is usual in the mouths of crusty moralists.20 But here a wish for a return of times well liked by 'girls of long ago' emanates from a man who elsewhere declares that Actium would never have happened had everyone lived the (Antonian) life of amor and uinum. Even when Propertius returns to a more recognisably libertine agenda in 2.32, with an announced commitment to recip- rocal sexual complaisance (39-40), he almost immediately follows this with some rather more ambivalent sentiments. Sarcastic use is made of the language of traditional morals: in Rome, in tanto stuprorum examine (41), the city is more than fortunate si contra mores una puellafacit! (44); Cynthia is only following Lesbia' s example, and if anyone expects Sabine standards in Rome today, he can have only just arrived in the city (47-48); and one is more likely to drain the sea than ensure ut nostrae nolint peccare puellae (51). The strength of the language used here - its intemperance - is thought-provoking. Such conventional moralising perhaps reaches its apogee, however, in 3.13, where Propertius begins with a libertine complaint about how much 'nights of love' are currently costing the customer in Rome (1-2). The 'righteous' indignation of the lover is a frequent phenomenon in love-elegy and elsewhere,21 but few speakers sustain rhetoric of an intensity to equal Propertius. He complains of auaritia , ruina , and luxuria and its products (1, 3, 4-8). But then he widens his complaint to include respectable women (9-14): haec etiam clausas expugnant arma pudicas , I quaeque gerunt fastus, Icarioti, tuos. I matrona incedit census induta nepotum I et spolia opprobrii nostra per ora trahit. I nulla est poscendi , nulla est reuerentia dandi ; I aut si qua est , pretio tollitur ipsa mora. Significantly, Propertius includes himself among those who have to endure the morally distasteful sight of matronae displaying the spoils of dishonour 'before our eyes'. There follows hyperbolic praise of the marital fidelity - absent at Rome - implicit within the Eastern practice of suttee (15-24); the expression of yearning for the simpler, more pious (and cheaper) days of the lovers' Golden Age (25-46); a contrast of the latter with the collapse of religion, and avarice typical of the modern age (47-58); and a final prophecy of Rome's impending destruction at the hands of her own prosperity (59-66). Accom- panying the whole is an unstoppable flood of moralistic sentiment and vocabulary.22 Libertine and conservative sentiments co-exist uneasily in Propertius. However, the inconsistency is not left to readers to discover for themselves, but virtually paraded in front of their eyes. Propertius has a habit of juxtaposing poems whose attitudes and positions are not easily reconciled. One example from book 2 will serve for the moment, although later I shall argue that sudden switches in direction are programmatically encoded in the violent contrast between the tempers and attitudes of the opening pair of poems in book 1 . In 2.6 Propertius not only assumes the role of husband and demands

20 Plaut. Trin. 284-86 (a senex to his son) noui ego hoc saeculum moribus quibus siet: I malus bonum malum esse uolt , ut sit sui similis; I turbarti, miscent mores mali , Truc. 12-13 (speaker of the Prologue) hie habitat mulier, nomen cui est Phronesium; I haec huius saecli mores in se possidet. 21 See e.g. the introduction of McKeown (1989) 281-82 to Ov. Am. 1.10. 22 Cf. esp. pia turba (18), pudor (20), hoc genus infidum nuptarum , hie nulla puella I nec fida Euadne nec pia Penelope (23-24), desertis cessant sacrarla lucis (47), uicta ... pietāte (48), auro pulsa fides, auro uenalia iura, I aurum lex sequitur, mox sine lege pudor (49-50), frangitur ipsa suis Roma superba bonis (60).

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wifely behaviour from Cynthia (e.g. 39-40), but even widens his condemnation of Cynthia to a denunciation of Rome's (respectable) women in general. He comments sarcastically on the foundation of a temple of Pudicitia, and with language that once again borders on the intemperate, denounces the corrupting effect of erotic paintings on 'modest eyes' in chaste homes.23 This condemnation of Cynthia in parallel with the married women of Rome draws its energy from the assimilation of Cynthia and Propertius to wife and husband, and brings the elegist close to the concerns of conventional society. But in 2.7 Propertius makes abundantly clear the strength of his personal opposition to this bedrock institution of conventional society, and to the production of children for his country's army.24 A poem (2.7) in which an anti-conventional and libertine impulse is strongly to the fore follows another (2.6) in which Propertius comes very close to the agenda of the 'normal' married male citizen.25

iii. Libertine and Conservative: the Extremes of Propertius and ' Self-consistency '

Propertius, through his addiction to the libertine's triad of nox , amor , and uinum , associates himself with conventionally 'excessive' behaviour. But the elegist is also likely to condemn the very extremes of behaviour associated with the life of love and wine, such as inebriation, sexual promiscuity, and a taste for the life of luxury. Propertius is not simply (conventionally) immoderate in his desires for a life of love and wine, but 'extreme' in two other senses as well. He swings between behaving like a libertine and talking like a traditional moralist. And in the latter role, Propertius' tone is frequently hysterical and his language immoderate in both in its temper and in the aggregate. Propertius takes even his moralising to extremes. Propertius' behaviour is characterised by a simultaneous rushing to what are effectively opposed extremes. A similar sort of behaviour is repeatedly criticised in Horace's Satires?6 As a tool for analysing the phenomenon in Propertius, however, I wish to invoke the ancient idea of 'self-consistency' ( aequabilitas vel sim.). One influential version of this idea is found in the de Officiis , where Cicero deals with the varieties of character among humans, before drawing the practical consequence that decorum ('appropriate, becoming' behaviour) - a central issue of de Officiis 1 - consists in acting in accordance with one's individual endowments. One must weigh one's own characteristics, regulate them properly, and not experiment with the characteristics of others. A

23 25-30 templa Pudicitiae quid opus statuisse puellis, I si cuiuis nuptae quidlibet esse licet? I quae manus obscenas depinxit prima tabellas I et posuit casta turpia uisa domo, I illa pue Harum ingenuos corruvit ocellos I neauitiaeaue suae noluit esse rudes. 24 Cf. esp. 7-10, 13-14: nam citius paterer caput hoc discedere collo, I quam possem nuptae perdere +more+ faces, I aut ego transirem tua limina clausa maritus, I respiciens udis prodita luminibus. II unde mihi patriis natos praebere triumphis? I nullus de nostro sanguine miles erit. The situation is much the same whether 2.6.41-42 is read as the final couplet of 2.6 or as the opening of 2.7; for arguments in favour of transposition, see Enk (1962) ad loc. 26 Cf. esp. Sat. 1.3.9-12 nil aequale homini fuit illi: saepe uelut qui I c urre bat fug iens hostem, persaepe uelut si I Iunonis sacra ferret; habebat saepe ducentos, I saepe decem sernos , 2.7.6-20 (discussed below), also 1.2.23-30 (discussed above pp. 20-21), 2.2.53-70, 2.3.166-81.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 50 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT stern Ajax should not try to be a complaisant Ulysses (Off. 1.1 13).27 By adducing as further examples men such as Sulla, Crassus, and Lysander (1.109), Cicero does come close to allowing that morally dubious characters have a self-consistency of their own to maintain. Why then should Propertius' flitting between the incompatible roles of moralist and libertine not be a fit subject for study? But Cicero's ban elsewhere on the expression of characteristics that are uitiosa (1.1 10) - such as are arguably displayed by the elegist - renders his account unfruitful for my purposes. For a properly 'amoral' application of the idea of self-consistency we must look to Horace. The issue of self-consistency, and more particularly the problems raised by inconsistent behaviour, evidently appealed to Horace, who makes much of them in his Satires and more especially the Epistles.2* Especially relevant, however, is the speech of the slave Davus at Sat. 2.7.6-20:

pars hominum uitiis gaudet constanter et urget propositum; pars multa natat, modo recta capessens, interdum prauis obnoxia, saepe notatus cum tribus anellis, modo laeua Priscus inani uixit inaequalis, clauum ut mutaret in horas, 10 aedibus ex magnis subito se conderet unde mundior exiret uix libertinus honeste; iam moechus Romae, iam mallet doctus Athenis uiuere, Vertumnis quotquot sunt natus iniquis. scurra Volanerius, postquam illi iusta cheragra 15 contudit artículos, qui pro se tolleret atque mitteret in phimum talos, mercede diurna conductum pauit: quanto constantior isdem in uitiis, tanto leuius miser ac prior ilio qui iam contento, iam laxo fune laborat. 20

In the context of the satire as a whole, Davus is taking advantage of Saturnalian licence to pose some questions to his master Horace on the latter' s alleged inconsistencies of behaviour (such as a desire to be in the country when in the city and uice uersa). However, as Muecke (1993) 213 points out, the speaker fails the test that one who delivers 'philosophical sermons and exposes the faults of others must have aspirations to good living in order for his perspective to be convincing'; Horace himself characterises the speech as putida (21, 'rot'). It is thus with a sense of irony that we are invited to read Davus' pompous contrast between Priscus, who is inconsistent in his behaviour (8-14), and Volanerius who is 'properly' consistent in his vice of gambling (15-18). Priscus, despite his name ('Old Fashioned'), swings between extremes of 'excessive' and 'deficient' behaviour (he either wears three rings or none, either lives in great house or a

27 The larger context for this passage is examined extensively below, pp. 121-22, where see the discussion for relevant bibliography. 28 Cf. e.g. Sat. 1.1.15-22, 83-93, 1.3.1-24, Epist. 1.1.16-19, 82-105, 1.8.12, 1.14.14-19, 1.15.26-46, and see McGann (1969) 12-13, 21-22, 29-30, 72-73.

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hovel), and is either an adulterer at Rome or a man of learning in Athens. By contrast Volanerius found a way of dicing even when he could no longer throw the dice himself. A lexicon of Constancy' highlights the theme here (6 constanter , 10 inaequalis , 14 Vertumnis ... iniquis , 18 constantior ), and a summary is offered at 18-20: The more consistent a man is in one and the same vice, the less unhappy he is and the more he comes out ahead of him who slogs with the rope now taut, now slack' (trans. F. Muecke). My use above of the terms 'excessive' and 'deficient' hints at the susceptibility of Priscus' behaviour to Aristotelian analysis, and in fact a passage from the Nicomachean Ethics may be used to throw some light on Davus' argument (EN 1 146a31-34):

Again, someone who pursued what is pleasant out of persuasion and by decision would seem better than one who did it not through calculation but through lack of self-control [' ir' 8ia 'oyio'ibv âXXà 8i' aKpacriav].

As Muecke (1993) 216 on Sat. 2.7.19-20 comments, in context Aristotle is only raising the view, not endorsing it. Nevertheless, it is fully appropriate that an unapproved idea be put in the mouth of the compromised speaker of Sat. 2.7. But it also helps to illuminate the persona of Propertius, who does not appear to choose 4 what is pleasant out of persuasion and by decision'. Rather, like the Horatian Priscus, he seems subject to wild swings of behaviour, including, rather nicely, an almost exact parallel to Priscus' swing between moechus Romae and doctus Athenis. For, in his first farewell to love, Propertius determines to leave behind his playboy life in Rome and travel to Athens to study, among other things, philosophy (3.21.1-2, 25-30)

magnum iter ad doctas proficisci cogor Athenas 1 ut me longa graui soluat amore uia.

illic uel stadiis animum emendare Piatonis 25 incipiam aut hortis, docte Epicure, tuis; persequar aut studium linguae, Demosthenis arma, librorumque tuos, culte Menandre, sales; aut certe tabulae capient mea lumina pictae, siue ebore exactae, seu magis aere, manus. 30

Propertius' sudden Triscan' swing towards 'learned Athens' is more playful than it might first appear. His approach is rather undiscriminating, while a study of Menander is not necessarily designed to cure a mind of love (cf. Ov. Ars 3.332), and the initial intention to study Plato dwindles, with humorous rapidity, down to looking at tabulae pictae. But Propertius in the context of his collection as a whole - amor makes a comeback in book 4 - is displaying a wild swing between extremes, at least in the decidedly skewed terms of Sat. 2.7. Another passage from Aristotle, this time rather more orthodox, confirms Propertius' status as an 'un-self-controlled' man, and therefore more likely to experience just this sort of swing in behaviour (EN 1 150b29-32):

The self-indulgent type [ó jièv ckoXacrTos'], as has been said, is not the sort to have regrets [où |i6Ta|i£XT|TiKÓç], since he sticks to his decision; the un-self- controlled type, on the other, always has regrets [ó ó' ducpcnT]? iieTaiieXTiriKÒs'

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TTćtę]. Hence it is not as we suggested when we listed the problems: it is the former that is incurable, and the latter that is curable.

In the final poem of book 3 (3.24), as I emphasise below, the elegist does experience regrets, and goes on to claim that he has been cured of his amor and converted to Mens Bona. This suggests that the Propertian persona is, in Aristotelian terms, that of the àKpaTf|Ç man.29 Such a lack of self-control is coherent with the swing in behaviour from libertine at Rome to 'philosopher' in Athens found in 3.21, and, I would argue, with the swings between libertine behaviour and moralising sentiment reviewed earlier. Propertius' Priscan inconstancy can in fact best be seen earlier in book 3, where a central sequence of poems offers a pendulum effect between extremes - not quite the dizzying extremes of moechus Romae and doctus Athenis , but certainly those of libertine and intemperate moraliser. 3.7 offers a sustained moralistic condemnation of auaritia in an elegy for the dead Paetus, who sailed to Egypt in search of profit. If this largely non- erotic elegy brings Propertius close to the sentiments and outlook of the 'normal' citizen, then 3.8, with its celebration of a drunken lamplight brawl with Cynthia, restores him to the uninhibited night-time world of the libertine. But there is no sign of the wine-soaked maledicta of 3.8 in the immediately following reasoned address to Maecenas (3.9), where Propertius discourses at length on the subjects of poetic and civic decorum. In 3.10 Propertius forsakes the exalted company of the princeps ' lieutenant for the rather lowlier company of Cynthia, whose birthday is celebrated with a combination of nox , uinum , and, at the last, amor (sexual union). But in 3.11 Propertius, far from rejoining in or further encouraging such libertine behaviour, mounts an attack on women, including a drunken and libidinous Cleopatra, and goes so far as to praise Augustus for his role in defeating her. But the tables are then turned on Augustus in 3.12, where the elegist, despite having praised foreign conquests in 3.1 1, now condemns auaritia as the motive among Augustus' soldiers for military endeavour abroad. Here Propertius includes praise for a wife who, forcibly separated from a husband on service abroad for Augustus, manages to remain fida and pudica , despite the luxuria of Rome. We are given the spectacle of a poem in which Propertius attacks one aspect of Augustan values (i.e. the valorisation of miltary achievement), not on the basis of the libertine's devotion to a stay-at-home life of extrema nequitia as in 1.6.26, but from the vantage point of traditional morals {auaritia) and one other aspect of Augustan values, namely fidelity and harmony in marriage. This skewed viewpoint is 'corrected' in 3.13 (briefly discussed above), where the elegist eventually returns to more recognisably traditional attitudes, and attacks auaritia and luxuria among all women in society, from high to low. But in 3.14 the libertine impulse is fully restored, as Propertius expresses his admiration for Spartan society - here on the novel ground that this apparently austere civic community allowed free intermingling of the sexes and female nudity. This is not to suggest that the elegist does not sometimes attempt to recuperate or minimise the apparent contradictions which his sudden shifts in position can create. The conventional condemnation of the auaritia of merchants in 3.7 at first reading sits rather oddly with the libertine celebration in 3.8 of an alcoholic brawl with Cynthia. But the final

29 For Aristotelian (kpacria, see Rorty (1980).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 2: PROPERTIAN EXTREMES 53 couplet of 3.7 gives a distinctive twist to the moralising sentiments of the poem. The hexameter states that - like any other archaising moralist - Propertius will never sail the seas for trade (71). But the pentameter lays out an anti-conventional programme for the elegist's unproductively idle life on dry land: ante fores dominae condar oportet iners (72). Thus, in the closing six words of the poem, Propertius 'recuperates' the moralistic sentiments of the poem for the libertine 'cause'. Nevertheless, as my survey of book 3 was designed to suggest, Propertius, in juxtaposed poems, regularly swings between extremes of behaviour that are opposed in a broader sense. But such swings operate not only between juxtaposed poems. To pick out only the most flagrant examples, 3.11, in line with Augustan propaganda, condemns Cleopatra's drunkenness (56), while 3.8 celebrates a brawl with a wine-maddened Cynthia (1-4) as evidence of passionate amor (3.10 similarly involves drinking far into the night). In 3.9 Propertius declines to write epic on subjects which include the defeat and suicide of Antony (55-56), but in 3.11 he is to be found celebrating Augustus' defeat of Cleopatra and her coniunx obscenus (31, or coniugium obscenum : the text is disputed). Finally, the injunction to learn fear from Propertius' example at 3.11.8 tu nunc exemplo disce timere meo , contrasts with the libertine celebrations of the life of love in 3.8 (and 3.10). Such are some of the glaring effects of Propertian inconsistency'. 30 iv. Properius and Mark Antony : the Un-self-controlled and the Self-indulgent

Using the ancient model of 'self-consistency', I have identified in Propertius a new mode of 'extreme' behaviour which goes beyond the self-conscious 'excess' of elegy 2.23. In the terms of Sat. 2.7, he displays an inconstancy which sees the same man attempt to play the roles of moral deviant and moralist- a process which culminates at the end of book 3 in Propertius' decision to abandon the life of love, depart for Athens to study philosophy, and convert to Mens Bona. Whatever the success of this decision - keeping in mind the renewed erotic themes of book 4 - throughout Propertius is consistent in one regard: his avoidance of any suggestion of the mean, the middle, and the moderate. In this sense Propertius at last satisfies one of Aristotle's criteria for excellence, albeit in the aesthetic

30 A tendency to swing between libertine and moralising positions in juxtaposed poems is not confined in Augustan poetry to Propertius. The same tendency can be discovered also in Horace, although it is rare for critics now to perceive this as a problem. It is worth asking why. Briefly, three reasons can be suggested, each of them helpful for understanding Propertian 'inconsistency'. First, the Horace of the Odes plays the role of sensual hedonist at the 'correct' time - at a dinner held at the end of the working day or at a party that takes place in holiday time or atmosphere. Not for him the pleasures of living a life 'limbs overwhelmed with wine'. Secondly Horace, again unlike Propertius, observes some distinction between public and private; he never presents his private carousing as something for public morals or his political masters to be concerned about. Finally, and particularly in the Epistles , Horace creates a kind of narrative about his lack of consistency and thus implicitly recognises it as a problem. I deal with the issue of Propertius' 'failure' to create a similar narrative, below pp. 68-69.

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sphere rather than the moral. For in the Poetics Aristotle requires that on the dramatic stage inconsistent characters be portrayed as 'consistently inconsistent'.31 However, in my attempt to situate Propertius within the nexus of ancient ideas on self- consistency, there is one issue I have so far deliberately refrained from introducing. This is the fact that, despite my arguments for an unresolved clash between the libertine elements and conservative elements of the elegisťs discourse, it can be observed that the former are largely, if not invariably, figured as the concern of the male elegi st (who may freely carouse), while the latter are largely, if not invariably, reserved for the attention of Cynthia and other women (who must display more restraint and be faithful). A graphic illustration of this 'double standard' can be found in the apparent contradiction between the two epigraphs chosen for this chapter. In the poem from which the first epigraph is taken (2.15), Propertius, in the wake of a night of love spent with Cynthia (39), declares a libertine manifesto for world peace of continual inebriation (41-48). It is in this context, as we saw earlier, that the elegist declares (29-30):

errat qui finem uesani quaerit amori s : uerus amor nullum nouit habere modům

True - that is to say wild or frenzied love - knows neither limit nor boundary nor moderation.32 Yet the very same line ending ( habere modum) is used to make an opposite point in 3.19. Here Propertius is faced with the charge of libido ('lust'), and responds with the argument that women are more at its mercy than men. The impassioned frenzy of females knows no bounds (1-4):

obicitur totiens a te mihi nostra libido; crede mihi, uobis imperat ista magis. uos, ubi contempti rupistis frena pudoris, nescitis captae mentis habere modum.

Women cannot impose a limit or check where love is concerned, and they have no respect for pudor. More moralising sentiments follow, including criticism of rabida nequitia (10), and the infamis stupro ...Pelopea domus (20). A manifesto for true amor knowing no

31 For consistency as one of the aims of the dramatic poet's portrayal of character, cf. Poet. 1454a25-27 'Fourth is consistency [tò ò[iaXóv]: even if the subject represented is someone inconsistent [ávcojiaXó?], and such character is presupposed, he should still be consistently inconsistent [ò|iaX(jõç àvój|aaXov].' The example given later is Iphigeneia, who in the Iphigeneia at Aulis is at first outraged that she is to be sacrificed, but later in the play gladly offers herself for Achilles and Greece (1454a31-33). A similar aesthetic issue is taken up in Horace's Ars Poetica ; cf. 119-27, 156-62 (there must be consistency or appropriateness between material and character, and characterisation must be appropriate to the type of person portrayed). The tendency of poets to contradict themselves was, however, a more strictly moral issue for Socrates in the Protagoras (339a-47b). For human inconsistency also as an ethical issue, cf. Arist. EN 1 159b8-10. 32 For this conventional view of love as lacking modus , cf. Verg. Eel. 2.68 quis enim modus adsit amori?, Hor. Sat. 2.3.265-67 (of amor) ' o ere , quae res I nec modum habet ñeque consilium, radone modoque I tractari non uult. ' also Ov. ap. Sen. Contr. 2.2.10 facilius in amore finem impetres quam modum. Note Ovid's probable retort to Prop. 2.15, at Rem. 143-44 qui finem quaeris amoris, I (cedit amor rebus) res age, tutus eris.

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bounds in 2.15 has become in 3.19 ground for criticism of women's unfettered passion. The former elegy declares a manifesto for men (the world would be a better place if their passions were to know no bounds), while the latter offers strictures on women's behaviour (their uncontrolled passions have brought crime and infamy upon the world). Similar inconsistencies have not seriously troubled males down the ages. The reader might feel that we similarly ought not to concern ourselves overmuch with an issue to which Propertius and his readers may have been culturally insensitive, perhaps even blind. But - aside from the observation that the repeated line ending habere modum in 2.15 and 3.19 flaunts the inconsistency before the reader's eyes - I think I can make two further arguments for the continuing usefulness and validity of self-consistency as an approach to Propertius. Here I focus on a pair of issues: the assumed identification of Propertius with Mark Antony, and the strongly opposing views taken by the elegist of his own libertine behaviour in two juxtaposed poems (2.15 and 2.16). The latter poems also directly involve Antony. The case for a parallel between Antony and Propertius is in general convincing. Jasper Griffin, in a now classic article, drew attention to the ways in which the literary persona created by the elegist strikingly recalls the triumvir's career.33 The obvious similarities include the rather similar fondness of Propertius and Mark Antony for the life of nox, amor , and uinum ;34 the parallel between elegy's fixation with death and dying and Plutarch's romanticised report of the final days of Antony and Cleopatra;35 and Cleopatra's Cynthia-like inspiration of murderous and suicidal impulses in Antony (Plut. Ant. 76.3-4; cf. above p. 46). Some broader connections between Antony and love-elegy in elegy in general have also been confirmed by Christopher Pelling's study of Plutarch's Life. He points out, for example, that the charges against Antony, reportedly levelled by contemporaries in connection with Cleopatra (Ant. 58.9-11), are 'reminiscent of Roman elegy ... the domina (11, Kupiav), the seruitium (10), the abandoning of public affairs (11), the gifts, the eager reading of the tablets'.36

33 Griffin (1985) 32-47, an amended version of Griffin (1977): I refer throughout to the 1985 version. The model is endorsed, with some qualifications, by (e.g.) Wyke (2002) 171, 195-96. 34 Cf. Plut. Ant. 9.5 ' ... his general way of life meant that he did not find favour with the upright and moral members of society, as Cicero says. In fact, they intensely disliked him, and were disgusted by his ill-timed bouts of drunkenness, his oppressive extravagance, his cavorting with women, and the way he spent his days asleep or wandering around in a daze with a hangover, and the nights at parties and shows, and amusing himself at the weddings of actors and clowns'. Propertius' drunken behaviour likewise attracts the criticism of the 'upright and moral' in society; cf. 2.30.13 ista senes licet accusent conuiuia duri. 35 See Griffin (1985) 45-46, and compare Prop. 1.17.19-24, 1.19, 2.20.15-18, 2.24.35-38, 2.28.39- 40, 4.7.93-94, with Plut. Ant. 58.8 (Antony's provision for burial beside Cleopatra), Ant. 71.1 (the formation of the 'Society of Partners in Death'), Ant. 76.5 (Antony's reaction to the false report that Cleopatra is dead), Ant. 11 (his death in her arms), Ant. 82.2 (Cleopatra's burial of Antony), Ant. 84.7 (her final plea to Antony over his coffin). 36 Pelling (1988) 261. It does not appear likely that Plutarch knew or was influenced by Roman elegy; rather it is a question of confluence and a shared background in New Comedy; see Pelling op. cit. 35 n. 109.

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But for all the illumination which these parallels lend to elegy, they obscure a key facet of the genre and the poetry of Propertius in particular. Mark Antony is not usually represented, and certainly not by Plutarch, as mouthing moralising and conventional sentiments. The glamorous resonances elsewhere between this famous libertine and the elegist might easily cause us to overlook the significance of this phenomenon. As illustration of the direction I wish my argument to take here, I look at the parallels between the first two poems of Propertius' first book and Plutarch's account of Antony's infatuation with Cleopatra. But first I add some comments on the value of Plutarch's Life of Antony - the text which forms the largest part of the sounding board I attempt to create for Propertius. I am not in the first instance much concerned with the relationship between the historical Antony and the elegist, although historical views of the triumvir are hardly irrelevant to my purpose. Throughout the Life Plutarch, while rarely stooping to outright fabrication, routinely conflates or moves events, supplies 'plausible' details and contexts, imaginatively reconstructs speeches and other features of his narrative, and reshapes sources to make them fit his conception of the triumvir.37 It is precisely this element of 'imaginative reconstruction' which makes the Life so valuable to a study of elegy. Here Plutarch sets himself the task, as he must, of providing a portrait of the libertine par excellence. The Life of Antony provides us with some conception - just as it must have played to ancient audiences' preconceptions - of what a libertine was meant to look like. I thus largely forbear from commenting on the inventions and conflations of Plutarch, in the interests of focusing more closely on the fit or lack of fit between Propertius' self-portrait as libertine and Plutarch's picture of Antony. Mark Antony, like Propertius, is not associated with the routine practice of moderation or self-restraint. In Plutarch's allusion to Plato's famous metaphor of the chariot of the soul ( Phaedr . 254a), Antony throws off all such shackles - along with the admirable Octavia - under the influence of Cleopatra, and exhibits aKoXaaia (36.1-2).38 Cynthia has a similar effect on Propertius in the opening poem of the collection, which extensively displays the language and ideas associated with the furor and perturbatio mentis of amor (cf. Cic. Tusc. 4.75). Love has taught Propertius hatred of 'decent girls' (5 me docuit castas odisse puellas), and to live senselessly (6 nullo uiuere consilio' cf. 2.12.3); his experience of love is that of madness (7 furor , 26 non sani pectoris ), anger (28 ira), and plague (35 malum). Naturally the elegist wishes to be free of this life, but the reader will have to flick forward to the end of book 3 before this claim loses its hollow ring. Curiously, of this madness and instability there is not a trace in the second poem of the first book. Here Propertius presents a sustained argument to Cynthia on the evils of

37 See Pelling (1988) 26-36. 38 euSoixja 8' ri Beivi] CTUļicķopa xpó^ov TTOXÚV, Ò KXeoTráTpa? epcoç, 8okûv KaTewdaÖai Kai KaTaKeKTļXfjcT0ai toîç ßeXTioai Xoyia|j.oís' aìtàis* àvéXajiTrc Kal àveGáppei Zupią -n-Xriaid^oyTos' aÚTOü. Kal ré'oç , akmep c^Tļalv ò 17Xcxtü)v tò 8ix7TTei0èç Kal àKÓXaaTov Tfjç ÚTToCíryiov, àTToXaKTiaaç rà Ka'à Kal awrripia TTávTa ('But the awful calamity which had been dormant for a long time, his love for Cleopatra, which seemed to have been lulled and charmed to sleep by better notions, began to flare up and regain its confidence the nearer he got to Syria. Eventually, in the manner of the disobedient, intemperate member of the mind's chariot team in Plato's book, he kicked out of the way everything admirable, everything that might have saved him ...')

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cosmetics and the trappings of luxuria. This argument draws extensively on the 'anti- cosmetic' tradition,39 and the language used by Propertius reflects the conservative origins of this discourse. Diaphanous garments are criticised (2), 'natural' beauty is praised (5 naturaeque decus ), the effects of art are disparaged (8 nudus Amor formae non amat artificem , 14 nulla ... arte), the beauty of pudicitia alone, amply sufficient for both ancient heroines and modern puellae , is underlined (24 illis ampla satis forma pudicitia , 26 uni si qua placet, culta puella sat est), and contempt expressed for luxury (32 taedia dum miserae sint tibi luxuriae). The purity-hating poet of senseless (Antonian) living has suddenly become the rational advocate of pudicitia and an enemy of luxuria. In fact, in this poem Propertius is taking on the role of a husband instructing his wife in the hairstyles, dress and general appearance appropriate to her. This role had notoriously been played by Ischomachus in Xenophon's Oeconomicus (10.2-9), where he reports a conversation with his wife about the inappropriateness of cosmetics and other forms of female adornment. Like this conservative Greek, Propertius objects to the corrupting artificiality of beauty aids: natural beauty is best, both for wives of old-fashioned aristocrats and for mistresses of libertine poets (although only the latter kind of women drive their men to madness and slavery). As I have sought to show, sudden change or reversals in action, attitude, or emotion, often in juxtaposed poems, are characteristic features of Propertian elegy. For ancient audiences the effect must have been enhanced by the material conditions of reading. For, as one critic has argued, the mechanics of reading the ancient book roll worked to enhance in readers an awareness of sequentiality in poetry books (and to promote exploitation of this awareness by authors in composition).40 The first two poems of the Propertian corpus are doubtless a programmatic introduction to this characteristic of sudden change.41 However, in one sense already raised above, the violent dissociation between the libertine (Antonian) sentiments of 1.1 and the conservative ('Xenophontic') sentiments of 1.2 do not represent a problem, at least for their speaker. For the attitudes of 1 . 1 belong to the male elegist, while the sentiments of 1 .2 are reserved for his female lover - over whose fidelity, indeed, the elegist has fears (as emerges from Propertius' talk of a puella pleasing one man alone at 1.2.23-26). A man may flout society's standards and morality; but his woman is expected to observe versions of the latter remarkably close to (if not quite identical with) their conventional originals. But appeal to the 'double standard' rather too neatly smoothes out the differences between the 'insanity' of 1.1 and the cooler rationality

39 For this tradition, see Gibson (2003) 21-25. 40 See Van Sickle (1980). 41 As Andrew Morrison points out to me, Propertian elegy, characterised by the taking of firm stances and the making of absolute distinctions (where internal consistency is not at a premium), is closer to the ethos of archaic elegy than to the more cerebral and detached productions of Hellenistic epigram. Very little remains of (e.g.) Mimnermus (named at Prop. 1.9.1 1), but the first two fragments in modern editions offer a binary opposition between the joys of youth and the evils of old age. Later, in a fragment the context of which is now completely lost (6), the speaker expresses the not necessarily coherent wish that his 'fated death might come at sixty, unattended by sickness and grevious cares'. It would be interesting to know more about the character of (e.g.) the Nanno in this respect.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 58 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT of 1.2. In particular, these differences remain a problem precisely because of the explanatory power and resonance, both in modern criticism of elegy and no doubt for many ancient readers of the genre, of Mark Antony as model for Propertius. For this model fails to explain the existence of a poem like 1.2. Plutarch's Mark Antony, like Propertius in 1.1, experiences love as the onset of a sudden, nullifying madness. Love's effect on Antony - àvaPaKxeúcraç ('stirred up into a frenzy') - is analogous to the furor felt by the elegist.42 But when Cleopatra arrives in her 'gilded poop' on the river Cydnus in all her finery, Antony's reaction is not at all like that of the elegist in 1.2 {Ant. 26.2):

avTT) 8è KCtT6K£iT0 [lèv úttò ciKiáôi xPwomx(jTip, K€KOCT|ir||j.6vr| ypa^iKtòç ÙXJTT6P 'Apo8iTT|, TralÔÉÇ 8è toîç ypaiKOÎç "Epcoaiv 6LKaa[iévoi Trap' ÉKCXTepOV 6(7T(JÛT£Ç éppiTTl£0V.

She herself reclined beneath a gold-embroidered canopy, adorned like a painting of Aphrodite, flanked by slave boys, each made to resemble Eros as if in a painting, who cooled her with their fans.

The crowd of onlookers is stunned by the sight, and so in the sequel is Antony (Ant. 27-29). Cleopatra is decked out (K€KoaļiTļ|j.6vr|) like Aphrodite in a painting, and her attendants similarly like the Erotes. Painting is an important theme also in Propertius 1 .2. While the coincidence is fortuitous (yet fuelled by the same aesthetic fascinations), it does allow us to reflect on the different characters constructed for Propertius and for Antony. The elegist praises ancient heroines - whom he would like Cynthia to imitate - and their natural sheen for the similarity of the latter to the famous (artificial) sheen of the paintings of Apelles (1.2.21-22). One implication of this paradox is brought out by Sharrock (1991) 40: 'He tells Cynthia not to paint herself, but instead he paints her, for this poem celebrates her beauty, draws a verbal picture of her, 'paints' her'. While Cleopatra stuns Antony with adornments which liken her to a painted Aphrodite, Cynthia is asked to divest herself of her own trappings and finery: she must make do with the elegist's verbally-rich poetical painting of herself. True libertines, it would appear, rejoice in a woman's cosmetic self-display, while Propertius, with his talk of natural and unadorned beauty, effectively reveals himself as an heir of Xenophon's Ischomachus. My interest in Antony and Propertius here is not primarily motivated by a sense of how the argument about similarities between the two is flawed or incomplete. Nevertheless, a good case could be made for the dangers of assimilating the two, starting from Plutarch's key summarizing description of the characters featured in his paired lives of Demetrius and Antony, at Demetr. 1 .7 łporriKoi ttotlkoí aTpaTiomKol (j-eyaXoScopoi TioXvreXelç ußpicrrai ('[both] womanizers, drinkers, fighters, open-handed, extravagant, and arrogant'). Propertius is certainly épcoTiKÓ? and ttotikos- , but himself refuses the arena in which he might be <7TpaTi(joTiKÓç, and few readers would allow him the epithet

42 Plut. Ant. 25.1 [epcaç] TtoXXà tcov čti Kpirrrropivw èv airrco Kai àTpefjLoúvTtov ttclGwv èyfipaç Kal civaßaKX£iKxxs' el ti xP1!^^ r' acairipLov ò'iíúç àvreïxev, iļ^aviae Kai TTpoa8i€cļ>0£ipev. ('Love awoke a number of feelings that had previously been lying quietly buried within him, stirred them up into a frenzy, and obliterated and destroyed the least vestiges of goodness, the final redeeming features that were still holding out in his nature.')

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|i£yaXóôojpo9.43 However, my interest in the link between triumvir and the elegist must remain centred on the issue of self-consistency. Propertius, as I have argued, lives a life of excess, but frequently mouths intemperate moralistic sentiments. By contrast Antony never espouses such sentiments, neither where Cleopatra nor where he himself is concerned. One revealing contrast is to be found in their attitude to wine. Earlier I discussed Propertius' discourse about the injurious effects of wine on the body and on fidelity between lovers (2.33b). Antony, however, is never depicted, even in his more sober periods (Ant. 67, 69-70), as asking Cleopatra to moderate her drinking or parties. Instead together they form the 'Society of Inimitable Livers' (Ant. 28.2); Cleopatra joins in with Antony's drinking (Ant. 29.1); their dinners remain drunken (Ant. 59.4-8); and, at the last, they form the extravagantly hedonistic 'Society of Partners in Death' (Ant. 71.1). Plutarch's conception of the behaviour characteristic of libertines appears not to cohere with the elegist's own self-portrait. Similarly revealing is the contrast between Propertius' (sarcastic) use of the language of traditional moralising in the context of Cynthia's infidelity (2.32, discussed above p. 48), and Antony's behaviour towards his wife Antonia. Plutarch tells us that Antony reacted furiously to suspicions of her infidelity with Dolabella by ejecting his wife from their house (Ant. 9.2-3). The biographer in all probability has invented the larger context in which this action takes place, namely Dolabella's political programme of the cancellation of debts.44 But he does not also invent for Antony a moralistic speech on Antonia' s infidelity and the corruption of women in general. Such an invention - and this is the important point - would have been quite out of character with Plutarch's evident general conception of the triumvir qua libertine. Plutarch may attribute to Antony intermittent attempts to reassert his qualities as a military commander (and so to conform to conventional standards of behaviour in at least one area of his life).45 But on no occasion does the biographer even hint at traditional moralising sentiments espoused by Antony, much less attribute them to him. This raises the question of what we are to make of such language in the mouth of Propertius. Further significant divergences between the libertinisms of Propertius and Antony appear in the elegist's third book. In 3. II,46 Propertius reacts to the surprise of an

43 With the elegist's consistent tightness with money (most conspicuous in 3.13, discussed above), contrast Antony's famed liberality to others with his money (Plut. Ant. 4.6-9): he revels in conspicuous luxury with Cytheris and her like (Ant. 9.7-9), squanders his money on actors, magicians and drunken flatterers (Ant. 21.3; cf. 24), spends with Cleopatra 'incredible, disproport- ionate amounts of money' (Ant. 28.2), and showers on her gifts of amazing - or shocking - generosity (Ant. 36.3-4, 58.9). Aristotle observed that the generous or 'liberal' man is prone 'to go to excess in giving' (EN 1120b4-6); but this 'noble' form of excess is clearly not one to which Propertius is vulnerable. 44 See Pelling (1988) 136-37 ad loc. (Asinius Pollio appears to be the main source used here). 45 Cf. e.g. Plut. Ant. 31.3, and see Pelling (1988) 25. Contrast also Propertius' condemnation of the corruptibility of matronae in 3.13, and Plutarch's Antony, who, distressed as he might be about wifely infidelity, could hardly be imagined making such a speech. More typical of the triumvir, perhaps, are the libertine sentiments found in a private letter to Augustus, quoted at Suet. Aug. 69.2 'an refert, ubi et in qua arrigas ?' 46 Discussed briefly above, p. 52. For other readings of this difficult elegy, see, with references to earlier literature, Mader (1989), Gurval (1995) 189-208, Miller (2004) 147-48.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 60 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT unnamed addressee that his life is under the sway of a woman (1-8), and constructs a catalogue of women famous for their domination of men or other notable achievements (9-28). Of this catalogue the final member is Cleopatra, whose recent designs on Rome and subsequent defeat by Augustus dominate the rest of the poem (29-72). On first reading, Propertius appears to reflect here an 'Augustan' view of the Actian conflict. Antony is mentioned only indirectly (31) and the battle is presented as one between East and West, rather than as a civil war (34-46); Cleopatra's ambitions to rule over Rome itself are emphasised (31-32, 45-46), her sexual and libertine excesses highlighted (30, 39, 56); and the importance to Rome of Caesar Augustus (49-50, 65-66) and the crucial role of Apollo at Actium are underlined (69-70). But, as some critics have argued, we cannot ignore the initial frame to the poem: quid mirare , meam si uersat f emina uitam I et trahit addictum sub sua iura uirum, I criminaque ignaui capitis mihi turpia fingis , I quod nequeam fracto rumpere uincla iugo? (1-4). Reading the elegy anew with these lines in mind, it can be seen, as Griffin (1985) 34 points out, how '... Propertius ... allow[s] the logic of his own poem, if read as a unity, to push him into the role of Antony; for he says "No wonder if I am dominated by a woman - look at Cleopatra'". That Propertius, for all the worthy and patriotic sentiments in the latter part of the poem, is at the poem's end still enslaved to Cynthia, like Antony to Cleopatra, is undeniable.47 But what may be more significant is not the fact of the implicit identification between Antony and Propertius, but rather the quality of it. The elegist ends the poem as an Antony who apparently accepts the Augustan view of the conflict, and spits out venom - unparalleled in the Actian poetry of Horace ( Carm . 1.37) and Vergil ( Aen . 8.685-712) - at the personal excesses of Cleopatra, both sexual (30 fámulos inter femina trita suos , 39 meretrix regina ) and drunken (56 assiduo lingua sepulta mero). Plutarch's Antony, of course, does not mouth Augustan sentiments after his defeat at Actium. More importantly, though the triumvir may sometimes hate or criticise Cleopatra (or follow her with a heavy heart), he never does so on quasi-moralistic grounds.48 Antony feels betrayed by Cleopatra, but he nowhere complains of her sexual or other libertine excesses - unlike Propertius, who mounts moralistic attacks on Cleopatra, and Cynthia, in both areas. Whereas in earlier pairs of poems (e.g. 1.1 and 1.2, 2.6 and 2.7) Propertius swung between the extremes of libertine and moral conservative, perhaps we find here that same swing executed within one poem: the elegist swings from the defiant (quasi-Antonian) bluster of the opening lines,49 to more apparently 'conventional' views of Cleopatra at the poem's close (29-72).

47 Cf. Wyke (2002) 195, 196 'But at the poem's close its narrator still remains in bondage to his elegiac mistress and, therefore, locked into the position not of a resistant Augustus but of a Mark Antony enslaved by the meretrix reginď . Cf. Plut. Ant . 67.1-6, 69.6-7, 73.1-5, 76.3-5, also (Antony chooses Cleopatra with apparent reluctance or a heavy heart) 53.5-12 and 56.1-6. Might Antony's 'refusal' to offer moral criticism of Cleopatra have something to do with the attitude of Plutarch towards a fellow Greek? 49 The opening lines of the elegy recall the charges of enslavement laid against Antony prior to Actium (Plut. Ant. 58.9-1 1); but the elegist' s defiant tone resembles the blustering defence put up by Plutarch's Antony of his relationship with Cleopatra {Ant. 36.6-7), and the mocking, unrepentant spirit of Antony's own private letter to Augustus on the same subject, quoted at Suet. Aug. 69.2 ' quid te mutauit? quod reginam ineo? uxor mea est. nunc coepi an abhinc annos nouem? tu deinde solam Drusillam inis?'

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There are significant divergences also between the 'farewell to love' constructed by the elegist for himself, and that thrust upon the triumvir. In 3.21, in the midst of a series of poems of increasingly conservative, moral and patriotic bent (3.18-24), Propertius, as discussed earlier, announces his intention to travel to Athens to escape unhappy love. At 3.21.33-34 he reflects seu moriar, fato , non turpi fractus amore; I atque e rit illa mihi mortis honesta dies : a clear reference back not only to the mors inhonesta of murder and suicide at 2.8.27-28, but also to the strongly anti-conventional sentiments of 2.26.57-58 (Propertius determines to accompany Cynthia on a sea voyage) quod mihi si ponenda tuo sit corpore uita, I exitus hic nobis non inhonestus erit. In 3.21 Propertius effectively signals that he has abandoned such sentiments, and reasserts traditional values with the strongly Roman 'the day of my death [without turpis amor ] will bring me honour'.50 His return to a concern with public standing is then confirmed in the final poem of book 3, where he turns the language of conventional morals on his past behaviour. He feels pudor (4); declares he has finally achieved what his patrii ... amici could not - the end of the affair (9-12); rejoices in his returned sanity and restored health (17 resipiscimus , 18 uulneraque ad sanum nunc coiere mea , 19 Mens Bona)', and regrets both his five years of servitude to Cynthia and that he was a laughing stock at conuiuia (21-24). Propertius is turning his back on his former existence (at least until book 4). This contrasts suggestively with the fate of Antony in Plutarch's account. Antony bring his life to a conclusion with a Liebestod , although, unlike the impassioned Propertius of 2.1.47-56, he does not console himself with its prospect. Rather, in Plutarch's imaginative reconstruction, Antony places emphasis on his own manliness, courage and position as commander {Ant. 76.6), and, at the very last, on his qualities and achievements as a Roman (Ant. 77.7):51 aÙTÒv 8è ļjLTļ Gprļvetv èm ralç uaTaTaię |i€Taßo'ats' àXXà |iaKapi£eiv Sòv 6TUXÉ KaXcûv, èm(J>avéaTaToç avGpwmov •yevopevo? Kai irXelarov iaxúaaç, Kai vüv oí)K àyevvtòç 'Poop-ato? ùttò 'Pajpaioi; KpaTT106Íç.

[he begged her] not to mourn his final misfortune, but to think of all the good luck he had enjoyed and count him happy; supreme fame and fortune had been his, and a Roman he had now been honourably defeated by a Roman.

Antony achieves a romantic death, but himself frames his life in such a way as to direct attention to the (very real) public achievements contained within it. There is no talk of sanity restored, and no shame and no regrets are expressed for the libertine behaviour which, in the grand manner of Alcibíades and Alexander the Great, ran alongside his life

50 Primarily concerned with the social sphere and the world of Roman public standing, honestus can signify 'respectable' (e.g. Hor. Epist. 2.1.149-50, Ars 213), 'morally worthy of respect' (Cic. Quinci . 49 mors honesta saepe uitam ... turpem exornat ), and, as here, 'bringing honour to the person concerned' (Hor. Epist. 2.2.32 donis ornatur honestis). 51 For this aspect, see further Pelling (1988) 305, 307-08, 318 on, respectively, Plut. Ant. 76.5-11, 77.7, 84.6. Contrast Cleopatra's final speech over Antony's tomb (likewise imaginatively recon- structed), which does not emphasise Antony's qualities, but instead concentrates on their shared sufferings as lovers and on the prospect of being united in death. For the elegiac ethos of her speech, see Pelling op. cit. 316-18 on Plut. Ant. 84.4-7.

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as a military commander. Cleopatra is merely asked 'not to mourn his recent misfortune'. Antony reasserts his allegiance to the constellation of Roman military honour and renown, unlike Propertius, whose mortis honesta dies suggests the rather more constricted (in a different context one would say 'bourgeois') world of propriety. There cannot but be a stark contrast with the elegist, who all but 'repents' of his former way of life. The conservative impulse in the (equestrian, non-elite) elegist has, for now, won the day; in the grandly aristocratic Antony it never had any place.52 In summary Propertius, when viewed from the perspective of one powerful ancient portrait of a famous libertine, is apt to appear strangely conflicted about his own status as a libertine. The elegist offers readers the picture of a man who declares his addiction to nox , amor and uinum , and experiences murderous and suicidal impulses; but who, unlike Antony and Cleopatra, will not allow his lover to beautify herself, may entertain passing doubts about her drinking, is apt to moralise on the suspect character of all women (and not just Cynthia), and, at the last, is himself restored to the sphere of honestum , pudor , and Mens Bona. Or, to rephrase the matter in terms adopted throughout this chapter, Propertius is apt to appear inconsistent in his pursuit of the libertine life by comparison with Antony. The latter does experience intermittent conflict between his libertine lifestyle and his desire to be a great military figure. But, just as often, a libertine lifestyle and military ambitions may complement one another, as Plutarch's account makes clear in a discussion of Antony's popularity with the rank and file of his armies (Ant. 4.4-5). Unlike the elegist, Antony experiences no conflicts or doubts within the libertine sphere of his life. Antony is self-consistent in his pursuit of 'vice' - like the dicing Volanerius of Horace, Sat. 2.7, who is the better man because the more consistent, in the judgement of the (strongly ironised) speaker Davus.53 Similarly Antony also resembles Aristotle's àKÓkaoToç , the self-indulgent man who, even as he dies in the arms of Cleopatra, 'is not the sort to have regrets'. By contrast, Propertius resembles the aKpaTiļs-, who does experience regret - as most obviously in 3.24 (see above) - and who so lacks self- consistency that, already in his first two poems he swings from 'libertine' sentiment to deeply conservative rhetoric.

52 The general 'equestrian' - i.e. non-aristocratic - ethos of Roman love-elegy in this and many other areas would repay serious investigation; cf. below p. 92 n. 84 on elegy's rejection of aristocratic material excess. For the argument that conventional values are inappropriate to the elite, cf. Isoc. Epist. Phil. 2.4, also Plato Gorg. 492b-c (quoted above pp. 15-16). For Antony's appropriation of a Hellenistic kingly ideal of conspicuous consumption versus Augustus' chosen model of 'Italian' austerity and self-control, see Dench (1998) 122-23, 142. 53 Overall, inconsistency does not appear to be an important component in Plutarch's conception of Antony, except in the not insignificant matter of his tastes in rhetorical style: Ant. 2.8 kévoü yaupiaiiaTos1 Kal ^iXoTiiiías* àva)|idXou [leoròv (Tilled with vain prancing and capricious ambition'); cf. Suet. Aug. 86.2 (Augustus on Antony's style) malum et inconstans in eligendo genere dicendi iudicium. Contrast, however, Plutarch's conception of Alcibiades - a figure often thought similar to Antony - where inconstancy appears as an important general feature of his life: 'His character, in later life, displayed many inconsistencies and marked changes [àvoiioiÓTTiTas' Trpòç aírrò Kai jieTaßoXds*], as was natural amid his vast undertakings and various fortunes' (Ale. 2.1).

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It might be argued, albeit with some considerable sense of irony, that Propertius, rather than resembling Antony, may stand closer to Augustus. Contemporary and later commentators found the princeps notably inconsistent and contradictory. Augustus displayed this inconsistency not only over the long course of his life - i.e. in his transformation from excessively cruel Octavian to restrained and clement Augustus - but even for periods of his maturity. Here was a man who liked to pose as the restorer of antique morality, and who, after Propertius had ceased writing love-elegy, would impose on his fellow citizens a draconian adultery law; but whose own adulteries were a matter of public knowledge, not even denied by his closest associates.54 Propertius, with his own sexual and other double standards, at times seems more like the contradictory Augustus than the 'consistent* libertine of Plutarch's Antony. At any rate, Propertius once more emerges as an 'extremist' in a deeper and more fundamental sense than was evident in the elegy analysed in Chapter 1 .

v. Propertius , Antony , and the Literary Libertine: Archestratus of Gela

Plutarch's personal conception of the figure of the libertine may present us with a character who makes no resort to the language and sentiment of traditional moralising. It is worth pointing out, however, that the Antony revealed in his own letters to fellow members of the Roman elite could make use - albeit clearly opportunistic use - of the moral and patriotic code of that elite. Or so his rather heavy-handed letter on the recall of Cicero's enemy Sex. Cloelius would suggest.55 On the other hand, if Cicero is to be believed, Antony in his letters could also appeal to elegantia in the somewhat inappropriate context of civil war revenge.56 The raising of questions of taste in such a murderous context suggests the playboy - one not far removed from Plutarch's Antony. (Cicero was of course an important source for the biographer.) I raise these considerations by way of asking how typical it is, outside Plutarch's pages, for libertines to eschew moralising rhetoric (unlike Propertius). I bring before the reader the now irrevocably lost possibility of probing Antony's own writings for an answer to this question. For it would be interesting to know how and in what terms Antony defended himself in his immoderately-titled de sua Ebrietate ('On One's Drunkenness'). This work appears to have been a short tract issued just before Actium in response to Augustus' continued attacks, in the tradition of Cicero's Philippics , on

54 For these and other inconsistencies displayed by Augustus and noted by ancient sources, see Gibson (forthcoming), where the remarks of Galinsky (1996) 370-75 on Augustus' contradictory character are used to analyse the Ars Amatoria. 55 Cie. Att. 14.13a = Sh-B. 367a, esp. 2 sed mehercule, si humaniter et sapienter et amabiliter in me cogitare uis, facilem profecto te praebebis , 3 honestius enim et libentius deponimus iriimicitias rei publicae nomine susceptas quam contumaciae. On the two other Antonian letters preserved in Cicero {Att. 10.8a, 10.10.2) and those that can be extracted from Cicero's Philippics and elsewhere, see Huzar (1982) 642-45, who also provides a more general survey of all of Antony's written output. 56 Cic. Phil. 13.38 (quoting Antony's letters) ' quam ob rem uos potius animaduertite, utrum sit elegantius et partibus utilius , Třeboni mortem persequi an Caesaris 38 'utrum,' inquit, 'elegantius ' - atqui hoc bello de elegantia quaeritur!

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Antony's reputation for drunkenness, and on his identification in the East with Dionysus, as consort of Cleopatra.57 Pliny the Elder certainly believed that in this tract Antony championed his own excessive drinking habits,58 although Huzar (1982) 657 is surely right to suggest that 'Pliny may well have followed Octavian's propaganda, learning of his defense of moderation as a flaunting of his excess'. If Antony did here assert or defend his moderation, it has certainly left no trace in Plutarch's portrait of his libertine drinking.59 There are however other surviving texts at which we can look for a libertine's self- portrait. The failure of the de sua Ebrietate to survive reflects the normal fate of (alleg- edly) libertine texts written by those without a first-class literary reputation. Compare the fate of perhaps the most famous decadent text of antiquity, the so-called 'sex-manual' of Philaenis, which was completely lost until the publication in 1971 of some tiny (and innocuous) scraps as P. Oxy. 2891. 60 We are fortunate, then, that perhaps one third or more of a text frequently linked with the scandalous Philaenis does survive, namely the Hedupatheia ('Life of Pleasure') of Archestratus (4th BCE).61 A review of the contents of this libertine text will allow us to judge better the particular character of the libertinisms of Propertius and Antony. Since the text is unfamiliar to all but students of minor didactic poetry, I must provide some brief information on context and contents. This will have the added benefit of paving the way for the arguments of the following chapter, in which Archestratus also has a role to play in helping to understand the new middle way of the Ars Amatoria. Extensively quoted in Athenaeus, Archestratus' hexameter work consisted largely of an extended catalogue of foodstuffs, their place of purchase, and appropriate cooking instructions.62 The reputation of Archestratus' poem for encouraging licentious and extravagant behaviour (Athen. 8.335d-e, 10.457c-e) is borne out, at least to some extent,

57 See Scott (1929). 58 Cf. Pliny Nat. 14.148 is enim ... auidissime adprehenderat hanc palmam [for drinking] edito etiam uolumine de sua ebrietate, quo patrocinan sibi ausus adprobauit plane, ut equidem arbitror, quanta mala per temulentiam terrarum orbi intulisset. Cf. also Sen. Epist. 83.25. 59 Cf. e.g. Plut. Ant. 2.4, 9.5, 29.1, 56.6, 59.4-8, 71.1. The attribution of the title de sua Ebrietate to Antony's tract may have been part of Augustus' propaganda war (as the production of the tract may conceivably also have been). For Philaenis, her text, reputation, and parallels with the Ars , see Gibson (2003) 15-17 (with further references). A low literary reputation for Philaenis is suggested by Lucian's criticisms of her neologisms (Pseud. 24). For Antony's poor reputation as a stylist, see the numerous passages cited by Huzar (1982) 654 n. 93, noting especially Plut. Ant. 2.8, Suet. Aug. 86.2 (quoted above n. 53). Cicero's criticisms of Antony's word order (Phil. 3.22) and choice of vocabulary (13.38-39) can be tested against the latter's three extant letters (cited above p. 63 n. 55); see further Calboli (1997) for an assessment of the style of these letters. 61 For the proportion of the whole represented by the surviving 330 verses, see Olson-Sens (2000) xxiv; for the controversy over the poem's title, see op. cit. xxiii-xxiv. For the link with Philaenis, cf. Athen. 8.335d-e, 10.457c-e, Justin, Apol. 2.15.3 (= Olson-Sens test. 4, 5, 9). Archestratus' poem was known to the Romans through an adaptation made by Ennius entitled Heduphagetica : text, translation and commentary at Olson-Sens (2000) 241-5, also Courtney (1993) 22-25. 62 Olson-Sens (2000) xxiv-xxviii. All references to the text are from the edition of Olson-Sens op. cit.

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by the text itself. Archestratus expresses a fundamental preference for an 'elegant meal' (frg. 4.1 aßpoöaiTi), rejects cheap food consistently throughout the work (frg. 9, 11.1, 25.1, 27.3-4, 29.1-2, 53, 60.12-15), and evinces contempt for the herd (frg. 15.2-4, 39.3- 5). Instead there is a strong emphasis on the purchase of expensive foodstuffs (frg. 16.3, 35.3-4).63 The importance of culinary pleasure is also repeatedly stressed by Archestratus (e.g. frg. 5.17-18, 10.7-10, 37.7-9) - an emphasis which no doubt accounts for ancient attempts to associate Archestratus with Epicureanism.64 Most pertinent, from the viewpoint of this study, are Archestratus' open injunctions to live the life of luxury and intemperance. Archestratus advises his readers to pursue culinary pleasure with crime if necessary, even at the risk of their own lives (fr. 22.1-2).65 To those who refuse to eat shark on the ground that it eats humans, he responds that such 'nonsense' is for those who wish to live temperately' (èyKpaTéœç, frg. 24.20 Olson-Sens). Archestratus will not have his readers denying themselves the physical pleasure of eating fish, even if some think of this as libertine behaviour. Similarly, of the lyre fish it is remarked that it 'likes to see people spend money, since it lacks self-control [àKÓXacrro?] ' (frg. 32.7 Olson-Sens). Such self-indulgence and excess, here humorously transferred from consumer to foodstuff, is the opposite of awpoawr| ('moderation, self-control').66 oiKoXacjia is in fact precisely what Archestratus' critics accused him of (Athen. 8.335e); but, like a true libertine, the poet wears it as a badge of pride. Archestratus usefully sharpens our picture of Propertius as libertine. The Greek didactic poet, like Propertius, declares allegiance to values which run contrary to those accepted by conventional society, and proudly claims his alienation (or in Archestratus' case, isolation) from that society. But the surviving fragments of Archestratus' poem confirm what we might already have guessed: 'libertines' do not usually (also) espouse strongly conservative attitudes. Nowhere in the surviving fragments of his poem does Archestratus evince a (contrary) commitment to conservative morals. Unlike Propertius, but rather similar to Plutarch's Antony, Archestratus' position is apparently quite self- consistent.

63 Cf. also frg. 6.1, with Olson-Sens (2000) 38 ad loc. 64 Cf. e.g. Athen. 8.335b, d-6a (Olson-Sens test. 5), Athen. 3.104b, 7.278e-f (Olson-Sens test. 6), Justin Apol. 2.15.3 (Olson-Sens test. 9), also Olson-Sens (2000) xliv-xlv, and 232, 236 (on frg. 60.12-13, 19-21 respectively). 65 Of one delicacy, Archestratus advises that it be eagerly sucked down even at the risk of choking (frg. 23.6-7; cf. frg. 57.6 àXX' čctGié Xdßpws1 'but eat it [hare] greedily'). As Olson-Sens (2000) 103 point, such a humorous recommendation both indicates the desirability of the food and associates the speaker with the negative stereotype of the 'gluttonous òifjo^áyoç' or gourmand. But what the rest of society views with disapprobation, the true libertine, it would appear, readily embraces. Cf. Olson-Sens (2000) li, lii 'One basic point of the ideology of eating implicit in the Hedupatheia is ... that the individuals it addresses should feel no concern for the culinary and social conventions of contemporary society as a whole, but should defy them if they can enioy themselves more thereby.' 66 Olson-Sens (2000) 131 ad loc. usefully quote Arist. EN 1 104a22-24 'the man who enjoys every pleasure and refrains from none is 'intemperate' [àKÓXaaToç]'. For the àKÓXaaToç, see also above pp. 51-52.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 66 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT vi. The Conflicted Lover: Propertius 2.15 and 2.16, and Medea's Dilemma

Earlier (p. 55) I mentioned two arguments for the validity of questioning the 'self- consistency' of Propertius as an approach to understanding the idiosyncratic extremism of the elegist. The first involved an extensive comparison between the apparently inconsistent elegist and Mark Antony, and concluded with a further confirmation of the 'consistency' of the true libertine provided by Archestratus. The second, to which we now come, looks at perhaps the most egregious example in Propertius of a conflict between libertine and moralising tendencies where the double standard for men and women is not involved. Here, rather, the elegist espouses directly conflicting attitudes towards his own behaviour. The elegist' s avoidance of the middle ground as he swings from one extreme viewpoint to its opposite will be illustrated graphically. Once again Mark Antony plays a key role. In 2.15, as already emphasised, Propertius unveils his manifesto for uerus amor. After a night of love spent with Cynthia, he declares that had everyone - including presumably Augustus - lived the Antonian life of wine and love, there would have been no slaughter at Actium.67 With this view of Actium, contrast a passage from 2.16. In context, Propertius has been supplanted as lover by a wealthy praetor just returned from Illyria (1- 2). This provokes from the elegist a quasi-moralistic condemnation of the purchasing of amor with muñera (15-16, 19-22); but contained within it is an unusually explict reference to Augustus, and a wish that he take up residence in the casa Romuli (by moving from his much larger house nearby on the Palatine): atque utinam Romae nemo esset diues , et ipse I straminea posset dux habitare casa! The reference here to Augustus as dux is prelude to a reference to another (rival) dux , whom Propertius mentions in the course of reflecting on the shame and turpitude in which he now finds himself because of love (35-42):

'at pudeat.' certe, pudeat! nisi forte, quod aiunt, 35 turpis amor surdis auribus esse solet. cerne ducem, modo qui fremitu compleuit inani Actia damnatis aequora militibus: hunc infamis amor uersis dare terga carinis iussit et extremo quaerere in orbe fugam. 40 Caesaris haec uirtus et gloria Caesaris haec est: ilia, qua uicit, condidit arma manu.

The elegist gives some recognition to the values of conventional society: he should be ashamed of himself (35 'but I should feel shame'); and he registers his initial agreement (35 'without doubt I should feel shame'). But then he suggests an excuse for his behaviour - love is deaf (to the opinions and values of conventional society). However, this is not a

67 2.15.43-46, quoted above p. 45. Enk (1962) 225 ad loc. notes an interesting parallel with Alciphron 4.7.6, which allows Propertius 'proposal' to be seen not as a libertine's revolution but as (ultimately if inadvertently) the position of a quietist. Alciphron' s courtesan tries to convince a former lover that she is preferable to the philosopher he has apparently forsaken her for: 'No one, when he's with a courtesan [łTaipą ôfiiXûv], dreams of a tyrant's power or raises sedition in the state [Tupavvíôaç òveipoTToXei Kai aTaaiáCei Ta koi vá]; on the contrary, he drains his early- morning beaker and then prolongs his drunken rest until the third or fourth hour'.

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whitewash of his own behaviour, as the elegist retains the adjective turpis to describe his amor (36). The values of 'normal' society have not lost their force entirely. Equally deaf to common moral values - so the logic of the poem suggests - was Antony. Just as Propertius is afflicted by turpis amor , so the triumvir suffered from infamis amor (39), and his deafness drove him to defeat at Actium and a disgraceful retreat and flight to the ends of the earth.68 That is to say, had Antony adhered to conventional values - and rejected shameful love - Actium would never have happened. Contrast with this the explicit argument of the previous poem (2.15.41-44): were everyone to have lived Antony's anti-conventional life of wine and love, Actium would never have happened. That the immediately following poem offers a sudden shift in position should occasion little surprise, so characteristic is it of Propertius. However, Griffin (1985) 34 finds it significant that, at the end of 2.16, the elegist, like Antony , 'is still persevering in his "degrading love", not breaking free'. Any identification here with Antony, in fact, is far from complete. Propertius is conscious that his love is turpis , that conventional society thinks he ought to feel pudor - unlike the Antony of his poem, who is driven to final destruction by 'love deserving of ill repute'.69 But what proves more significant here is not the extent of Propertius' identification with Antony, rather the extent of the conflict between the judgements on Actium found in 2.15 and 2.16. In the first poem, Actium would have been avoided if everyone had followed the example of Antony and lived the life of amor and uinum. In the second it is precisely Antony's addiction to base love which led to Actium (Antony, not Augustus, is figured as the one filling Actia ... aequora with soldiers), and to his defeat there. In one poem amor (along with uinum) is the solution to the problems of Roman society, in the second it is the cause of conflict, defeat, and disgrace. Propertius, in line with the larger dynamic in his poetry of repeated swings between libertine and conservative attitudes, has produced two different judgements on Actium which are in implicit - but strong - conflict with one another. And here the reader cannot impose on this conflict, as if in resolution, the observation that the libertine attitudes of 2.15 act in the interests of Propertius, while the conservative attitudes of 2.16 are directed at denouncing and controlling women's behaviour. In both 2.15 and 2.16 Propertius keeps the focus on the behaviour of the male, celebrating then denouncing his behaviour in turn. As elsewhere in the elegist' s poetry, there are extremes, but no middle ground. I distinguish my approach and conclusion here from two characteristic tendencies in Propertian criticism identified by Kennedy (1993) 34-39. The first is a tendency to iron out contradictions and discrepancies in the elegist by appeal to the 'neutralizing' context

68 This 'account' of the battle in fact reflects 'Augustan' versions of the action at Actium, which emphasised Cleopatra's cowardly flight and Antony's sudden decision to follow her and desert his men; cf. esp. Plut. Ant. 66.5-8. But, for the breakout at Actium as probably a planned manoeuvre, see Pelling (1988) 278-80. The inevitably more complex Antony of Plutarch's Life does reflect on the nature and implications of his love for Cleopatra. He refuses to call her his wife, as 'his rational mind was resisting his love for the Egyptian' {Ant. 31.3); his love is at one point 'lulled and charmed to sleep by better notions' {Ant. 36.1); and eventually he chooses Cleopatra over Octavia with a heavy heart {Ant. 53.5-9, with the note of Pelling (1988) 245-46).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 68 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT of love poetry (such poetry 'cannot represent serious political dissent') or to the restrictions of writing in an ancient genre (all poetic statements, even discordant ones, are to be regarded as merely conventional). The second is a tendency to accept the elegisťs contradictory positions, but to explain away one of these positions as ultimately the less significant whether by reference to the poet's extra-textual biography or by appeal to his career as a poet.70 Under this scheme, Propertius either 'matures' into the Augustan poet of 4.6 and its account of Actium, or pressure is increasingly brought to bear on this essentially anti-Augustan poet until he produces an ostensibly Augustan piece like 4.6. My own position, however, stands closest to that of Paul Allen Miller, who in his analysis of 2.15 and 2.16 urges that critics must 'accept the contradiction itself as the fullest instantiation of the Propertian subject'.71 The wisdom of accepting the contradiction between these two poems in all its fullness is underlined by the observation that Propertius fails to provide any narrative about his sudden reversal in position. He does not confront, comment on, or apparently even acknowledge the conflict.72 This is done despite the existence of a well established model for staging a conflict between opposing impulses. I have in mind here the heroine's dilemma of being pushed in opposite directions by two emotions: one which urges the subject to conform to traditional values and one which urges 'reckless' behaviour.73 A classic example is Apollonius' Medea caught between shame and desire (3.645-55). Apollonius' Medea, of course, is at the centre of her own critical controversies over apparent contradictions. She appears to flout Aristotelian requirements that characters be consistent, being both naïve virgin and potent sorceress, and a woman who charms dragons but is scared of snakes.74 Nevertheless, Medea faces and makes a choice, as may

70 Cf. Miller (2001) 130 n. 21 (= (2004) 258 n. 6) on Stahl (1985). 71 Miller (2001) 131; cf. op. cit. 130-31 (= (2004) 133) the poet, by occupying both sides of the opposition but never being wholly present on either side, inscribes the possibility of a third position that can only be expressed in terms of the simultaneous contradiction and equivalence of both sides. The poet's contradictory self-positionings within this ideological matrix are, therefore, more an indication of the impossibility of a normative Propertian subject within the terms of the late republican and early imperial Symbolic than of the need to assign priority to one of these positions as 'truly Propertian' and denigrate the other as either a mis-reading or a mystification designed to deceive the uninitiated'. See also the readings of Prop. 3.4 and 3.5 in Miller (2004) 149-57. 72 However, as Steve Green points out to me, the Vertumnus of 4.2 is not just an admission of inconsistency within one person (1 quid mirare meas tot in uno corjiore formasi), but a celebration of it, and may be read as symbolic of book 4 and perhaps even as representative of the poet of all four books. Cf. esp. 4.2.21-24 opportuna mea est cunctis natura figures: I in quamcumque uoles uerte, decorus ero . I indue me Cois, fiam non dura puella : I meque uirum sumpta quis neget esse toga? For a reading of Propertius' fourth book in terms of oscillation or a 'poetics of polarity' between erotic and aetiological themes, where this binary thinking is nevertheless challenged and a hybrid discourse is produced, see DeBrohun (2003). For DeBrohun's reading of 4.2, see op. cit. 169-75. 73 Cf. e.g. Eur. Med. 1019-80, A.R. 3.648-64, also Ov. Epist. 19.173-74, Met. 8.463-514, Tarrant (1976) 199-200 on Sen. Ag. 132ff. 74 See Hunter (1993) 12-13, 59-61, also idem (1987). For the Aristotelian requirement of dramatic consistency in characterisation, see above p. 54 n. 31.

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be seen most readily in Ovid's later portrayal of her internal conflict between cupido and mens (partly based on the struggles of Euripides' Phaedra) at Met. 1. 1 8-21 :

si possem, sanior essem. sed trahit inuitam noua uis, aliudque cupido, mens aliud suadet: uideo meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.75

Despite the aesthetically appealing mollitia of restaging a woman's dilemma, Propertius never places himself in Medea's position; even in the farewell poem to Cynthia at the end of book 3, the elegist's mind is portrayed as already made up. The closest Propertius comes to replaying Medea's dilemma is in the juxtaposed pair 2.15 and 2.16, where the elegist is the object in turn of a 'libertine' impulse and a 'conservative' one. But the impulses operate in juxtaposed poems and not within one poem - where Propertius might otherwise have staged the narrative of a conflict between his recognition of the benefits of the life of love and wine, and his recognition of the infamy and disaster wreaked by turpis amor. Such a staging would have required Propertius - like Medea - to make a choice (even against his better judgement). In the Poetics , Aristotle draws a direct link between character and choice: 'Characterisation appears when ... speech or action reveals the nature of a moral choice; and good character when the choice is good'.76 What then are we to say of Propertius, who in 2.15 and 2.16 presents stasis and contradiction rather than a conflict out of which choice might arise? At the very least, Propertius' avoidance of a situation compelling choice suggests that his poetry is wedded to an aesthetic of taking up extreme (and unresolved) positions. The overall artistic effect intended by the elegist may be to engender in the reader an experience of the terms in which love was traditionally condemned (Cicero, Tusc. 4.75-76):

... perturbatio ipsa mentis in amore foeda per se est. nam ut illa praeteream, quae sunt furoris, haec ipsa per sese quam habent leuitatem, quae uidentur esse mediocria! iniuriae, I suspiciones, inimicitiae, indutiae, I bellum , pax rursum: incerta haec si tu postules I ratione certa facere, nihilo plus agas, I quam si des operam ut cum ratione insanias, haec inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis quem non ipsa prauitate deterreat?

The 'inconstancy and fickleness of mind' to which Cicero refers, as his quotation from Terence's Eunuchus in the middle of this extract shows, is that of the lover's tempestuous love-hate affair with his beloved. Propertius, however, takes inconstantia mutabilitasque mentis to a new and altogether more demanding level, where the lover falls not in and out of love, but successively praises and blames his whole way of life.

75 In his Aristotelian essay 'On Moral Virtue', Plutarch cites {Mor. 446a) a Euripidean fragment of comparable sentiment as an example of ctKpacjia (and at 445f. cites Mimnermus frg. 1 as an example of aKoXacFLa). For the argument that Propertius resembles Aristotle's ¿lepante1, see above p. 52. 76 Arist. Poet. 15 ë£ei 8è 1)009 |ièv èàv... TToifj cf>avepòv ó Xòyoç f' fļ Trpa^ię TTpoaípeaív Tiva fļ ti? âv "5, Se èàv xPT1(T'nìv- F°r moral choice in adversity as an index of good character in the Nicomachean Ethics , cf. EN 1 100b30-l 101 al 3.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3 OVID'S ARS AMATORIA AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY

Ars 3.305 sed sit, ut in multis, modus hie quoque Livy 9.3.10 tertium nullum consilium esse Publil. Syr. 6 aut amat aut odit mulier: nihil est tertium

I ended Chapter 2 by arguing that, in a key moment in book 2, Propertius espouses contradictory attitudes to the libertine lifestyle shared by himself and Mark Antony. In 2.15 an 'Antonian' lifestyle is hailed as the solution to Rome's problems, but in 2.16 the same lifestyle is lambasted as the source of infamy and disgrace. This, I suggested, is the closest Propertius - characteristically prone to swinging between the 'extremities' of libertine behaviour and conservative sentiment - comes to playing out the classic dilemma of Medea. This Greek heroine is typically portrayed as feeling herself the prey of the forces of both 'anti-social' desire and more traditional values. But whereas Medea acknowledges her internal conflict and chooses one side over the other, in Propertius the conflict operates in juxtaposed poems and is left without resolution, even without explicit acknowledgement. Not only does Propertius avoid the middle ground, but, at least until the last poem of book 3, he also avoids making a choice between his libertine and conservative tendencies. As is suggested by Paul Allen Miller, the contradiction between 2.15 and 2.16 is perhaps 'the fullest instantiation' of this elegiac poet. In the present chapter I go on to argue that, in the Amores , Ovid by contrast does construct for himself a version of the classic 'Medea' dilemma apparently avoided by Propertius, and makes a decisive choice for the libertine style of life (and poetry). When that choice is presented to the poet in Am. 3.1, there are, obviously yet significantly, only two options from which to choose, namely Elegy and Tragedy (or meretrix and matronā). The contemplation of only two options, I will argue, in fact reflects the broad ethos of elegy, including Propertian elegy, in as much as the genre typically works within a scheme of polarised alternatives. In Ars Amatoria 3, by contrast, Ovid evolves a new scheme of an intermediate and two extremes, which allows him to drive an exciting and paradoxical middle way between the ethical polarities of matron and whore (and their accompanying poetics). Here I intend to build on an argument made in Chapter 1, which suggested that in Ars 3 Ovid espouses a 'middle way' between two extremes - the excitement of adultery and the sexual boredom of easily procurable intercourse (one of which is represented by Am. 3.4). This new and subversive 'intermediate' position I now argue to be generally characteristic of the Ars Amatoria , which enjoins moderation on a range of issues from drinking to dressing. Here the more conventional moderation and mean favoured by Horace continue to be targets for Ovidian subversion, after the model of the mockery of the arguments of Sat. 1.2 in the Ars (discussed at length in Chapter 1). But the material from Propertius considered in Chapter 2 also sharpens perception of this new moderation in various ways. Ovid both avoids the libertine excesses of his

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 72 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT predecessor, and exhibits none of his tendencies towards self-contradiction, by omitting to espouse the moralistic rhetoric characteristic of conservative discourse. In addition another text to which I have alluded in previous chapters - Cicero's de Ojficiis , where moderation is also an important theme - will begin to move into keener focus in anticipation of its key role in the final chapter of this study. It will emerge that Ovid's strongest and most sustained emphasis on moderation, restraint, and the mean is to be found in the third book of the Ars. A focus on these themes in a book addressed to women, I shall suggest at the end of the chapter, possesses poetological, quasi-ethical, and even political significance. i. Choose One (of Two) Only : Amores 3.1

I start with a key expression of Ovid's new 'intermediate' at Ars 3.299-306 and - first and at some length - the all-important scene set for it by the contest between Elegy and Tragedy in Am. 3.1. In Am. 3.1 Ovid is approached by two female figures representing the genres of Tragedy and Elegy (7-14), who make speeches in turn on why their respective poetics should be chosen by the poet (15-30, 35-60). Ovid in conclusion summarises the attractions of each and gives reasons for his choice of Elegy for the time being (61-68). The influence here of Prodicus' myth of the choice of Heracles between Virtue and Vice (Xen. Mem. 2.1.21-34) has been clear to critics for some time.1 The implications of the poet's choice of Elegy over Tragedy - an inversion of Heracles' choice of Arete (Virtue) over Kakia (Vice) - have been well explored, for example, by Maria Wyke, along with the assimilation of the bodies of the two women to the poetic practices of Elegy and the higher genres.2 Ovid's description of Elegy and Tragedy at 3.1.7-14 is important for establishing this assimilation:

uenit odoratos Elegia nexa capillos, et, puto, pes illi longior alter erat, forma decens, uestis tenuissima, uultus amantis, et pedibus uitium causa decoris erat. 1 0 uenit et ingenti uiolenta Tragoedia passu: fronte comae torua, palla iacebat humi; laeua manus sceptrum late regale mouebat, Lydius alta pedum uincla cothurnus erat.

The two women are compared point-for-point as regards their hair (7, 12), feet and gait (8 and 10, 11 and 14), dress (9, 12), and expression (9, 12). All four subjects, as I shall show later, are covered by Ovid in the Ars Amatoria. The first three are also well known symbols for poetics (as, in the case of feet, was made clear in the discussion of Propertius 2.23 in Chapter 1), so that, both here and later in Am. 3.1, the bodies and speech of the

1 See Wyke (2002) 131 with n. 35, also Boyd (1997) 195-200. For the great popularity of the myth in antiquity, see the references collected by Trapp (1990) 143 n. 2. For the relationship of Xenophon's account to Prodicus' 'original', see Sansone (2004). 2 Wyke (2002) 115-54.

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two women give flesh to the differing poetics of elegy and the higher genres.3 If the poetic practices of the two genres are legibly written on the bodies of the two women, Tragedy and Elegy also, as Wyke (2002) 132-33 points out, personify the modestly-dressed matrona (12 palla iacebat humï) and the sexually provocative meretrix (9 uestis tenuissima). The same overtones had been present in Xenophon's contrast between the pure white of Arete's dress and the revealing garment worn by Kakia (Mem. 2.1.22).4 It is important here that Ovid's apparently decisive choice of Elegy over Tragedy is not just an expression of his preferred poetics, but also a choice of the meretrix over the matrona. There is a clear underlining of a preference for the libertine lifestyle. Immed- iately a contrast with Propertius suggests itself. Earlier I argued that Propertius never constructs for himself a choice between his libertine and conservative tendencies, but, at most, experiences the impacts of amor and pudor quite discretely. By contrast, Ovid offers numerous versions of the dilemma of the heroine caught simultaneously between opposing forces or emotions - encapsulated in the Medea of Apollonius who finds herself assailed by both aiôcoç and īļiepos1 (3.652-53). His Ceres is caught between pudor and amor (Am. 3.10.28); Hero between calor and reuerentia (Epist. 19.173-74); and Medea between cupido and mens (Met. 7.18-21). More particularly, Ovid effectively stages his very own version of this conflict in Am. 3.1, where he finds himself faced with the poetic equivalents of passion and shame. Tragedy indeed emphasises pudor (22 praeterito ... pudore ), while Elegy urges the claims of Cupido and Amor (41-44).5 One important model, it is true, for Ovid's eventual choice of Elegy rather than Tragedy is the Judgement of the Goddesses, where Paris prefers the goddess of love to her grander rivals.6 Never- theless, the event of a - morally reprehensible - choice of one option from two in Am. 3.1 also calls to mind Medea, who, likewise in a contest of two, chooses the worse rather than the better. The presence of Medea in the reader's mind is made more substantial if Tragedy's demands on Ovid are associated with his (now lost) tragedy Medea. The 'extremism' of the Amores thus appears qualitatively different from the extremism of Propertius: where Propertius alternates between libertine and conservative, Ovid constructs for himself an explicit choice between the two lifestyles in the mould of Heracles faced by the rival claims of Kakia and Arete. Elsewhere in the Amores , Ovid does appear to shuttle between opposing positions in the Propertian manner. Nevertheless, in broad keeping with Ovid's willingness to confront the Choice of Heracles, these swings in position are often systematised or given a kind of narrative. This feature of the Amores is seen to best effect in a series of diptychs, where the second poem of the pair reverses

3 See Wyke (2002) 115-30. 4 But for some respects in which Ovid makes Tragedy resemble Xenophon's Kakia, see McKeown's introduction to Am. 3.1 (forthcoming), and note on 41 sum leuis. 5 For further conflicts between amor and pudor , see also McKeown (1989) 49 on Am. 1.2.31-32 Mens Bona ducetur manibus post terga retords I et Pudor et castris quicquid Amoris obest. 6 For various mythical prototypes which lie behind the Prodicean Choice of Heracles, including the Judgement of Paris, see Kuntz (1994). For Ovid's assimilation to Paris in Am. 3.1, see McKeown's introduction: Tragedy has some of the attributes and makes some of the promises of Juno and Minerva, while Elegy is close in the same respects to Venus; and both Paris and Ovid choose the latter over the former.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 74 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT the position of the first, as e.g. in 2.19 and 3.4. Ovid first asks that a man guard his puella more carefully, then protests that the same man is guarding her too carefully. There may be no middle ground here between the 'extremes', as in Propertian elegy, but the reversal in position is 'explained' - a species of narrative is created - by the care which Ovid takes in these poems to signpost the playful point-for-point overturning of his previous position.7 Best of all, and close in a number of respects to Am. 3.1, is 3.11 (sometimes printed by editors as the diptych 3.11a and 3.11b), where Ovid first bids farewell to love (1-32), before reversing his position at 3. 1 lb. 1-2 [3.11.33-34] with a typically clear summary of his change of heart: luctantur pectusque leue in contraria tendunt I hac amor ; hac odium ; sed, puto, uincit amor} Nevertheless, for all the differences between the typical practices of the Amores and Propertian elegy, such divergences, at least from the perspective of the Ars Amatoria , appear less significant than a more fundamental similarity between the former pair. For both the Ovid of the Amores and Propertius remain wedded to working with binary polarities. In 2.15 and 2.16 there are two 'extremes' for Propertius to swing between, while in Am. 3.1 only two choices are offered: Elegy (Vice / meretrix) or Tragedy (Virtue/ matrona). A similar binary polarity is an integral part of the context in which the Choice of Heracles most famously occurs, and worth reconstructing in a little detail both to provide context for the opposed alternatives of Am. 3.1 and to prepare for the contrasting new triadic model of the Ars Amatoria. I begin by returning to Hesiod. In the Works and Days the archaic poet, as briefly seen in Chapter 1, can operate with a triadic conception of 'due measure' (neither too much nor too little, but somewhere in between) when it comes to loading ships with merchandise - or even of the right age at which to take a wife.9 But when it comes to outlining for his addressee Perses the options for one's course in life, Hesiod offers only two: the smooth road to 'baseness' or low standing in society (287 tt'v 1JL6V ... K0LKÓTT|T0t); and the long, steep, and rough path to 'excellence' or high standing in society (289 rf'ç 8' àp€Tf'ç). The metaphor of the two roads used to express the choice between different ways of life is common to other cultures, is well attested elsewhere in Greek literature, and was destined to have great influence.10 What is most relevant from the viewpoint of the present study is that only two roads are offered, one right and one wrong. Later generations develop this implication, and use Hesiod as part of an argument to refuse the middle way - as, significantly, in Xenophon's Choice of Heracles. The Heracles myth occurs in the course of an exchange between Socrates and Aristippus,

7 Such 'systématisation' may be seen at work in various ways also in (e.g.) Am. 1.11 and 1.12 (Nape and the tabellae ), and 2.7 and 2.8 (Cypassis). Similarly, for significant differences between Ovidian and Propertian versions of 'Antonian' excess, see Miller (2004) 167-68. 8 Cf. also Am. 2.9, likewise sometimes printed by editors as two separate poems (2.9a and 2.9b). Cf. Op. 694 (quoted above pp. 10-11), and (on marrying) 695-97. 10 For attestations in other cultures and elsewhere in Greek literature, as well as the later influence of the Hesiodic formulation, see West (1978) 229 ad loc; cf. esp. Theogn. 910-14 Kal 8íxa 0u|iòv exw, ł èv TpLÓÔtp 8* 60TT1KCT 8Ú* €Íal TÒ TTpÓaõeV Ò8oí ļJLOl* I <ļ>pOVTl£(jO TOUTCüV TļVTlV LO) TTpoTēpTļv, I Tļ ... I f) ... ('and I am of two minds. I'm standing at the crossroads, with two ways ahead of me, and deliberating which of them to choose, whether . . . or . . .').

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 75 where Socrates poses the question whether it is more pleasant to rule or be ruled (Mem. 2.1.10). Aristippus refuses Socrates* position and declares that he avoids entanglement in any political system, choosing instead a middle course (2.1.1 1 a''' aval tíç ļioi 8ok£i 'iécrc] Toirnov óôóç, 'but there is, as I hold, a middle path') as the one most conducive to eudaimonia. Socrates replies to the effect that such avoidance of the normal obligations and political structures of the life of the citizen is a dangerous sort of life, and returns to a version of his initial binary opposition of 'ruling' versus 'being ruled'. It is in this context that Socrates produces the metaphor of the 'two roads' (quoting the Hesiod passage discussed above, at 2.1.20), and brings his discourse to a climax with a version of the sophist Prodicus' story of Heracles (2.1.21-34). In this myth Heracles is asked to choose between two roads, the first a quick and easy one (via pleasure) and the second a hard and long one (involving effort and toil). No middle way is offered. If Hesiod' s two roads are deployed by Xenophon in an argument which denies the existence of a middle way, then Prodicus' myth of Heracles is used in turn by later generations to the same end. One episode where allusions to the same myth bring out with particular clarity this function of the story is to be found in Livy 9, with its famous tale of the Caudine forks. Here, as Ruth Morello argues, Xenophon (and through him Hesiod) is crucial to Livy's account. The historian's description of the area owes little to the geography of the Caudine site;11 but the presence in the background of the archetype of the choice between two roads is unmistakable, duae ad Luceriam ferebant.uiae ... (9.2.6): the Romans may choose either a road which is safe (but long), or one which is shorter (but dangerous).12 They make the wrong choice - choose the shortcut - and find themselves in trouble at the Caudine forks, where the Samnites control both entrance and exit. A binary polarity is written into the episode now for the Samnites, who consult Herennius Pontius. Pontius offers a choice between letting the trapped Romans go immediately or killing them all (9.3.6-9), explaining that the Samnites must either earn the friendship of the Romans, or strike an annihilating blow. There is, he concludes, no third plan: tertium nullum consilium esse (9.3.10). This conclusion is disputed by the Samnites, who press the advantages of a 'middle way' (9.3.11 cum ... exsequerentur, quid si media uia consilii caperetur ), i.e. letting the Romans go unhurt, but imposing terms on them; however Herennius insists no such intermediate course is possible (9.3.12 'ista quidem sententia' inquit 'ea est , quae neque amicos parat nec inimicos tolliť). Nevertheless, the Samnites eventually follow their preferred middle course - only to regret their moderation when the Romans later repudiate the peace agreement (9.12.1-2). Here the Xenophontic context for the Choice of Heracles is strongly relevant: for the Samnites the real choice, as in the Memorabilia , is between the mutually exclusive alternatives of ruling or being ruled.13 But they (foolishly) choose the equivalent of Aristippus' untenable media uia , and suffer worse things than if they had chosen either of Herennius Pontius' two roads.

11 See Morello (2003) 291-92. 12 For the sustained evocation here of Xenophon' s two roads, see Morello (2003) 302-03. See Morello (2003) 303. Contrast the more 'reasoned' approach adopted in political debate elsewhere, e.g. in the discussion at Cic. Resp. 1.38-55 of the constitution which is a 'well regulated mixture' of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (cf. above p. 1 1 n. 10).

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This short detour to review the emphasis placed by both Xenophon and Livy on there being no middle way has been valuable in two ways. First, it provides a reminder of the existence of a tradition, documented in Chapter 1, which rejected the otherwise popular ideas of the mean and the middle. Secondly, it underlines a feature of Am. 3.1 - already noted - the significance of which might otherwise be missed: the provision of two, and only two, choices. In particular, such a basic continuity between Ovid and his Xenophontic model is all too easy to ignore, so overshadowed is it by Ovid's hilarious reversal of the Heraclean choice of Virtue. But both the elegist and Xenophon remain wedded to a binary polarity. In Am. 3.1 there is no third genre, such as Comedy, to offer a corresponding extreme to Tragedy, and between whom Elegy can offer a middle way.14 On a complementary metaphorical plane, there is in Ovid's poem likewise no third woman between meretrix and matrona , such as the libertina who (briefly) appears as the desirable intermediate between the matrona and the prostitute in the stinking brothel in Horace, Sat. 1.2.28-49. 15 In one obvious sense this is the result of Ovid's adaptation of the myth of Heracles. But, at a deeper level, one attraction of the myth for an elegist must be its fundamental sympathy with the genre's apparent predilection for extremes, stark oppositions, and avoidance of compromise. For elegy - over and above Ovid's and Propertius' repudiation of the middle way by a persistent preference for 'extreme' positions - tends to operate with, and derives much of its vigour from, a series of binary polarities: elegy vs. epic, youth vs. age, male vs. female, love vs. war, amor vs. marriage, and so on.16 For the elegist, as for Socrates or Herennius, there is no media uia. However, in the context of a myth used by other authors to eradicate the idea of a middle way, it is entirely typical of Ovid that he should seek to end the poem with a deeply ironic gesture of compromise. He chooses Elegy on the ground that she will grant uicturum nomen (65), but adds (67-68): 'exiguum uati concede , Tragoedia, tempus: I tu labor aeternus; quod petit ilia , breue est ' After a brief continuation with Elegy, Ovid will soon take up Tragedy. When restated in the layered terms found in Xenophon's account - i.e. after dalliance with Kakia (prostitute), the poet will try Arete (respectable woman) - the playfulness of Ovid's intention to have it both ways becomes clear: it is just such a compromise which Prodicus' myth is designed to contest. To compound the situation, Tragedy (Virtue / matrona) nods her approval of this highly dubious compromise: 69 mota dedit ueniam. But, as the archetype of the Judgement of Paris underlying Am. 3.1 suggests, Elegy (Venus) is the real winner of this contest.17 At any rate, the ostensibly clear explanation given here by Ovid for his decision - and hinted later reversal of it - contrasts with the Propertian mode of largely unexplained swings between libertine and conservative positions.

14 For personifications of Tragedy and Comedy - rather more common in art than in literature - see McKeown's (forthcoming) introduction to Am. 3.1. Ovid appears to have invented a personification of Elegy specially for Am. 3.1 (or, perhaps prior to that, 3.9). 15 See above pp. 21-22. Cf. DeBrohun (2003) 26 on the first three books of Propertius. 17 See McKeown's (forthcoming) introduction to Am. 3. 1 , and note on 15 et prior ... dixit.

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¿i. Ars Amatoria 3.299-306 (1): the New Intermediate and Propertius

Am. 3.1, then, in keeping with the broader ethos of Ovidian and Propertian love-elegy, operates with a series of binary oppositions from which Ovid then makes a single, decisive choice (albeit leaving himself the option of reversing that choice). It will be the main object of the remainder of the present chapter to argue that this implicit, but fundamental, binary model is rejected as a template in the Ars Amatoria. My initial focus will be on the deliberately polarised walking styles, hairstyles, and clothes of Elegy and Tragedy in Am. 3.1, and the 'middle path' offered by Ovid's advice to women on these same subjects in Ars 3. Styles of bearing and gait are a significant and much discussed topic in the ancient world.18 The late-antique translator of the 3rd century BCE Peripatetic treatise Physiog- nomonica (later attributed to Aristotle) includes a section on these subjects, and begins by distinguishing between motus corporis ... naturalis and affectatus (74). 19 Of the latter 'affected' movements he posits three types, each of which reveals something important about the walking subject, e.g. such as a desire to prey on virgins, or (as in the case of a conspicuously masculine walk) the desire of the cinaedus for self-concealment. This is followed by a detailed chapter (echoed in good part in the ps.-Aristotelian exemplar, 813a2-9) on what is revealed by a man's step or stride, along the lines of qui longis passibus incedunt magnanimi sunt et efficaces ; parui autem et restricti passus inefficaces , parci , paruae mentis sunt etc. (75). No interest is here displayed (of course) in construing women's gait, although a Téx^T] can be informally constructed from numerous remarks passed elsewhere by writers on the typical walking styles of (e.g.) the meretrix and the goddess.20 Nevertheless, when Ovid includes instruction on styles of gait among his first subjects in the section devoted to 'personal accomplishments' in Ars 3 (291-380), it can be assumed that a subject of some significance is being introduced (299-306):

est et in incessu pars non contempta decoris; allicit ignotos ille fugatque uiros. 300 haec mouet arte latus tunicisque fluentibus auras accipit, expensos fertque superba pedes; ilia uelut coniunx Vmbri rubicunda mariti ambulat, ingentes uarica fertque gradus, sed sit, ut in multis, modus hie quoque: rusticus alter 305 motus, concesso mollior alter erit.

18 See Gleason (1995) 60-64, Corbeill (2002), (2004) 107-39 (with references to earlier literature), also the material cited by Gibson (2003) 218-19 on Ars 3.299ff. (in the argument which follows I try to unpack for the reader some of the significance of the material supplied there more fully than is possible in a commentary). Gait and deportment are a frequent subject in Quint. Inst. 1 1.3 (detailed prescriptions at 125-26): the orator and the lover share the need to win over their audience. For, more generally, a 'physiognomic consciousness' pervading Greco-Roman literature, see Tatum (1996) 136. On the pseudo- Aristotelian work and later physiognomical texts, see Gleason (1995) 29-37. Cf. e.g. Cic. Cael. 49 si ... ita sese gerat non incessu solum sed ornatu ...ut non solum meretrix sed etiam proterua meretrix , Verg. Aen. 1.405 et uera incessu patuit dea.

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The poet begins by emphasising the allure of decor in one's gait (299). Two female walkers are introduced, one whose gait is characterised by ars as she catches the breezes with her flowing tunics and 'haughtily moves her measured feeť (301-02), and another who walks like the wife of an Umbrian, is ruddy (with the open air), and 'straddling, takes huge strides' (303-04). The presence of ars , of course, is normally a mark of approval in the Ars (cf. the 'hymn' to ars at 1.1-12), but it becomes clear in 305-06 that both the artful stride and the waddle represent extremes.21 The former displays excessive 'softness' (i concesso mollior ), while the latter displays rusticitas - so undesirable in the modern, urban context of the Ars (3.127-28). The 'intermediate' gait is allusively described by reference to these two extremes, with Ovid calling for the observation of 'moderation' (305 modus). This essentially 'triadic' scheme, with its two extremes and a mean, makes an especially marked contrast with Am. 3.1, where there are two walking women (3.1.7-12) but no intermediate between them. Furthermore, Ovid signals a correspondence between the Umbrian rustic in Ars 3 and Tragedy in Am. 3.1:22

Am. 3.1.1 1 uenit et ingenti uiolenta Tragoedia passu

Ars 3.304 ingentes uarica fertque gradus

Tragedy walks with a huge, manly stride, which corresponds to the 'extreme' gait of one of the women of Ars 3.23 The correspondence of the other extreme of Am. 3.1 with the artful walker of Ars 3 is not complete: Elegy has, according to the logic of the assimilation of poetics and body in Am. 3.1, the graceful uitium of having one foot shorter than the other. Yet Elegy there is characterised by mollitia and artistry, and so corresponds in a more general way to the artful walker of Ars 3.305-06. Ovid rejects the gaits of both, and seeks moderation and a 'middle way'. It might be proposed that Ovid here rejects love-elegy's characteristic scheme of binary choices and polarities, and seeks to replace it with a triad of 'excessive', 'deficient' and 'intermediate' states. Strong encouragement to accept this proposal is provided by the

21 The criticism here of ars is made comprehensible to the reader by the undesirable presence of superbia (cf. 3.509-10), by the similarity of the artful walk to bodily movements more appropriately made by a dancer on a stage (cf. 3.351-52 artifices lateris, scaenae spectacula, amantur : I tantum mobilitas ilia decoris habet , Am. 2.4.29-30), and by Ovidian insistence elsewhere on the need for concealed art ( Ars 2.313 si latet, ars prodest; cf. Met. 10.252); see further Gibson (2003) 220 on Ars 3.301-02. The combination of desirable qualities such as ars (albeit in excess) and undesirable, such as superbia , strengthens in a general way the correspondence outlined below with Am. 3.1: there Tragedy possesses a similarly paradoxical combination of the qualities of both Arete and Kakia (see above n. 4). 22 The importance of the archetype of the Choice of Heracles is anticipated at Ars 3.23-28, where the personification of Virtus as a woman draws on the figure of Arete, and a contrast is drawn between Virtus-Arete and the woman suitable for Ovid's ars / Ars' see Gibson (2003) 96 on Ars 3.23, McKeown's (forthcoming) introduction to Am. 3.1. 23 For the significant rarity of ingens in the Amores , see McKeown (forthcoming) ad loc. For 'further suspicions of rusticitas in Tragedy's demeanour as opposed to that of Elegy', see McKeown on Am. 3.1.13 laeua manus , late , 36 grauis , 43 rustica.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 79 poet's elevation of the lesson of this passage into a general principle: 'but, as in many things , let there be moderation here too' (305). It is in fact traditional, when applying to a particular situation the ideals of moderation, to emphasise the wider applicability of the same ideals.24 In keeping with such generalising tendencies, Ovid engages here not only with his own earlier Amores , but with a range of other texts including Propertius and (as will be seen presently) Cicero's de Ojficiis . Propertius had himself enunciated a general principle involving modus , already explored at length in Chapter 2: uerus amor nullum nouit habere modum (2.15.30). For Propertius, amor , the central topic of love-elegy, has no knowledge of modus', but for Ovid modus is a principle with application in many areas, including women seeking to attract the opposite sex. Where Propertius espouses a rhetoric of uniqueness and separateness for love, Ovid appears to espouse one of 'contiguity' with other (so far unspecified) areas of life.25 But an even closer engagement with Propertius can be detected in line 302 of the Ars 3 passage. The characterisation there of the 'extreme' of the artful walker ( expensos fertque superba pedes) makes clear reference to Propertius' description of his own walk at 2.4.5-6:

nequiquam perfusa meis unguenta capillis, ibat et expenso planta morata gradu.

The reference is guaranteed by the shared use of expendo , rather rarer in the context of gait than suspendo?6 Propertius' mincing walk, so Ovid's allusion suggests, is more appropriate to a woman, but even then it is excessive in its mollitia.21 I could also speculate - somewhat more playfully - that Propertius is silently written into Ovid's other extremity of the coniunx Vmbri rubicunda mariti (3.303). The specification of the maritus as Umbrian has no motivation in context other than that the region's reputation for agri- cultural prosperity (Catull. 39.11 pinguis Vmbef) make its inhabitants a not inappropriate illustration of waddling rustic gait. Other fertile regions of Italy would have done just as well. Propertius tells the reader that he is from fertile Umbria (1.22.9-10 Vmbria ... I me genuit terris fertilis uberibus ; cf. 4.1.63 tumefacta ... Vmbria ), and, it might be inferred from the claims of Passenus Paulus to be descended from him (Pliny Epist. 6.15.1, 9.22.1 a quo genus ducit ), may even have been a respectably married man (maritus). That Propertius should, in some form, end up on both of Ovid's extremities would nicely mirror his tendency, identified in Chapter 2, to swing between libertine and conservative,

24 Cf. e.g. Hes. Op. 694 (quoted above pp. 10-11), Phocylides 12 ttoXXò [jí croi cti v ctpiora ('there are many advantages for those who adopt a middle course'), Trag. Adesp. 547.6 N. r' 8e iieaoTTis' €v TTãaiv áa^aXearépa ('the mean in all things is sure'), Cic. Off. 1.130 in quo , sicut in plerisque rebus, mediocritas optima est (discussed below), Hor. Sat. 1.1.1 06 modus in rebus. 25 On the rhetoric of 'contiguity' pervasive in the Ars (unlike earlier love-elegy), see Labate (1984) 97 -120. 26 See Gibson (2003) 220 ad loc. (where the MSS alternative of extensos is also discussed). 27 Ovid of course is mischievously ignoring the fact that in context his elegiac predecessor is describing such dandyish behaviour as in the past and without effect on his beloved - although he perhaps has the encouragement of Cynthia to believe that Propertius did not renounce such behaviour; cf. her instruction at 4.8.75 tu ñeque Pompeia spatiabere cultus in umbra.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 80 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT and cohere with Ovid's own tendency to pass playful comment on his predecessor's 'inconsistencies'. But of course such a quasi-biographical reading must not be pushed too readily onto the text. Rather more certain, perhaps, is Ovid's determination to portray himself as a consistent 'moderate' in contrast to Propertius. The latter, as argued in the previous chapter, is often highly conservative in his attitude to female dress and behaviour. But, as well as claim a mincing gait for himself, he can also praise the mollitia of his beloved's bearing: 2.12.23-24. [sc. quis erit qui talia cantei] qui caput et dígitos et lumina nigra puellae I et canat ut soleant molliter ire pedes. Where Propertius is all contradictory attitudes, an unstable compound of the modern and the antique, Ovid, not without some irony, announces himself as the advocate of consistent 'moderation'. iii. Ars Amatoria 3.299-306 (2): the de Officiis, Decorum , and Poetics

Ovid's advice on walking styles contains in nuce several other features of the Ars which are of vital interest to a study of the mean and the middle way in his erotodidactic poetry: an implicit rejection of the binary polarities of Am. 3.1 on the poetical plane (Tragedy vs. Elegy) as well as on the plane of status and morals ( matrona vs. meretrix ), and a clear signalling of the importance of the key concept of decorum. Ovid's deployment of the concept of decorum in Ars 3.299-306 is closely tied to his exploitation of another work to which the same concept is also central, namely Cicero's de Officiis. The influence of Cicero's ethical treatise of 44 B.C on other works of Augustan poetry, particularly Horace Epistles 1, is well known.28 Less thoroughly familiar perhaps, at least in the Anglophone sphere, is the impact of the same Ciceronian work on the Ars Amatoria. The de Officiis possesses numerous didactic features, being addressed to Cicero's son Marcus at a key moment in his young life - although its systematic and practical ethical advice is doubtless intended 'for an entire category of young readers in need of similar advice, as they sought, not merely a career, but a set of guiding principles for life'.29 In keeping with this practical aim the treatise makes extensive use of directive expressions, such as gerundives, found in other treatises of a more formally didactic nature.30 The Ars and the de Officiis are thus in some respects formally similar. Verbal parallels between the two works were first noted by C. Atzert in the preface to his Teubner edition of the latter work, and supplemented by later scholars (albeit not without some scepticism).31 But Mario Labate succeeded in putting the connection between the two works on a sound footing by considering the conceptual similarities between the two works, particularly the shared commitment to successful relationships and the earning of esteem / affection, whether between male members of the Roman elite or between iuuenis and puella.32

28 See below pp. 129-33. 29 Dyck (1996) 10-16 (quotation at 16); cf. Gill (1988) 195-96 on the practical and morally-engaged aspects of the treatise. Kilpatrick (1986) xx-xxi uses the same aspects as part of an argument for the influence of the de Officiis on the practical ethics of Horace, Epistles 1 . 30 See Gibson (1997). 31 Atzert (1949) xxxii-iii, Kenney (1958) 207 n. 2, D'Elia (1961). 32 Labate (1984) 121-74; see further Gibson (2003) 22 n. 57.

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Nevertheless, the highly significant parallel in Ars 3.299-306 between Ovid's advice to women on walking styles and the de Officiis was noticed already by Atzert (1949) xxiii. At the beginning of a long section on various aspects of decorum (1.126-49), Cicero declares 'appropriateness' to be relevant to all areas of life from 'movement and state of the body' to 'deeds' and 'words' (1.126). This is the licence on the basis of which Ovid later elevates decorum to a principle in the Ars (a topic to receive fuller treatment in Chapter 4). In context, Cicero deals first with the avoidance of the immodest and the indecent, and gives advice on the subjects of standing, walking, sitting and reclining (1.128-29):

status incessus sessio accubitio uultus oculi manuum motus teneat illud decorum. quibus in rebus duo maxime sunt fugienda, ne quid effeminatum aut molle et ne quid durum aut rusticum sit.

Like the gait of the puellae, the incessus of the aristocratic male should possess decorum (cf. Ars 3.299 decor), and both must likewise avoid two extremes: the effeminatum aut molle on the one hand, and the durum aut rusticum on the other. These abstractions are humorously actualised by Ovid as two walking women who represent mollitia and rusticitas - clearly after the model of Am. 3.1. D'Elia (1961) 136 noted the further parallel with Off. 1.1 31, 33 where, as in the earlier passage, Cicero sets out two 'extreme' gaits to be avoided, one of which is characterised by mollitia. Immediately prior to this passage, while bringing to a close some words on the application of munditia to the (male) appearance, including clothing, Cicero enunciates a principle of mediocritas explicitly said to be of general application: eadem ratio est habenda uestitus , in quo, sicut in plerisque rebus , mediocritas optima est.34 As I note in my commentary on Ars 3.305 (quoted above p. 77), Ovid offers a virtual paraphrase of these words.35 The architecture too is all but identical in each case, comprising two extremes to be avoided and a (generally valid) intermediate. Furthermore, the presence in Ovid of the concept of decorum alongside that of 'moderation' is hardly coincidental, since 'seemliness' or 'propriety', as I shall demonstrate in the next chapter, is a distinctive mark of the 'mean' between extremes in the de Officiis.36 That Ovid should turn to the de Officiis for a new 'triadic' scheme - or at least should find it there - occasions no surprise. For Panaetius, although a Stoic, was, in the words of Dyck (1996) 250 'sufficiently <(>iXoapiaTOT6'r|s> (fr. 57) to favour moderation in various spheres'. The issue of Panaetius' direct

33 cauendum autem est ne aut tarditatibus utamur ingressu mollioribus, ut pomparum ferculis similes esse uideamur ; aut in festinationibus suscipiamus nimias celeritates. See also Narducci (1989) 173 citing (e.g.) two examples of gaits which err on both sides of the extreme, namely those of Catiline (Sail. Catil. 15.5 citus modo, modo tardus incessus) and Tigellius (Hor. Sat. 1.3.9-11, quoted above p. 49 n. 26). 34 For the close connection between munditia and mediocritas , see above pp. 23-24. 35 Cicero's parallel enunciation of the principle of mediocritas technically comes just before the second section on gait, but the paragraph to which it provides the conclusion itself contains a closely comparable section on uitium in gestu motuque (1.130). 36 For decorum here vis à vis the same found in Am. 3.1.9, 10, 31-32, see below p. 144.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 82 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT knowledge of such Peripatetic school-works as the Nicomachean Ethics is controversial,37 although there can be no doubt that such Peripatetic ideals as moderation, the intermediate, and the avoidance of extremes all make conspicuous appearances in the de Officiis .38 Equally certain, however, is the essentially subversive nature of Ovid's appropriation of Cicero. Quite apart from the eroticisation of Cicero's text, and potential implication that this subject is actually more appropriate to women, the context itself is most un-Ciceronian. For Ovid almost immediately sheds his Ciceronian cloak to become the erotomaniac of Am. 2.4, and confesses (307-10) to a predilection for women who display the upper part of their left arm and shoulder naked (the concept of decorum makes another subversive appearance at 309 hoc uos praecipue , niueae, decet ).39 I now move on to the other features of the new 'middle way' found in nuce at Ars 3.299-306, and return more closely to the engagement of that passage with Am. 3.1 . Given that Ovid sets himself a choice in the Amores poem between Elegy and the higher genres, and, on another level, between meretrix and matrona , my question must be what Ovid's new middle way in Ars 3 signifies on these same planes of poetics and opposed extremities of status (and morals). Taking poetics first, it should be emphasised that the choice faced by Ovid in Am. 3.1 of two - and only two - opposed poetic practices has a long and distinguished history, as may be clearly seen in Callimachus' Aetia prologue (1.25-28):

TTpòs- 8é (J€]Kai tóô' avcaya, Tà 'n' irareovaiv ä|ia£ai Tà <7T€iß£iv, erépc ùv ìxvia MT) Ka0' ó|iá 8i<(>pov e']ąv ļirļS' otļiov ava TrXaTÚv, àXXà kéXéúOouç àTpL-nTo]ys' 6 1 Kai aT€iyoTepr|v èXáaeiç.

This too I bid you: tread a path which carriages do not trample; do not drive your chariot upon the common tracks of others, nor along a wide road, but on unworn paths, though your course be more narrow.

37 Sceptical on this issue is (e.g.) Sandbach (1985) 58-9. Equally controversial is the issue of the relationship between the de Officiis and Panaetius' lost Peri tou kathekontos. In his commentary on the former, Dyck (1996) takes the pragmatic view that most of the material in de Officiis 1-2 is derived in some sense from Panaetius; but for a recent re-assertion of Cicero's freedom in his use of Panaetius, see Lefèvre (2001). 38 In addition to the various instances noted in Off. 1 . 1 28-3 1 , cf. Off. 1.14, 29, 34, 89, 93, 141 and see the notes ad loc. of Dyck (1996) 230, 249-50, 298, 304, 308, 319. For Peripatetic thought in the second book of the de Officiis , esp. 2.54-64, see Dyck op. cit. 357. For the possible influence of Panaetius' 'mean' on Horace, Epistles 1, see McGann (1969) 13-14. 39 Furthermore, immediately prior to the passage on gait, Ovid spends a few lines on the subject of pronunciation, observing the charm to be found in a 'letter deprived of its proper sound' (293 legitima fraudatur littera uoce ), and the stammering of an 'affected tongue' (294 blaesaque fit ... lingua coacta). Particularly striking is his emphasis on the decor to be found in 'pronouncing] certain words badly' (295 in uitio decor est quaedam male reddere uerba ). This is in direct contrast to Cicero's own advice on pronunciation at Off. 1.133, where a mean is recommended between litterae expressae and oppressae ('words neither mouthed nor muffled'). Clearly the ideals of the mean can only be taken so far in the erotic world, where the lover's idea of decorum may differ substantially from Panaetius'.

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Lycian Apollo here makes a distinction between two poetic paths: one common, wide, and frequented by other carriages; and a second which is narrow and frequented less (or not all). Although the context is poetological, there are pointed allusions here, among many others, to the moral oppositions both of Hesiod's smooth road to baseness and rough path to excellence (Op. 287-91); and of the two similar roads associated with Kakia and Arete in Xenophon's Choice of Heracles (Mem. 2.1.23, 29).40 In Am. 3.1, as is noted by Jim McKeown in his introduction,41 Ovid practises a form of double allusion in bypassing the Callimachean archetype for Dichterweihe in favour of the latter' s own Xenophontic and Hesiodic models. The Aetia prologue also makes a more direct contribution to Am. 3.1, in that 'Callimachus seems to have given Ovid a precedent in his contrasting the long and short works of Philetas and Mimnermus in terms of female personifications [frg. 1.9-12]' (McKeown op. cit.). Taken together, this material demonstrates a firmly established tradition of poets faced with, or judged by, poetic choices or standards expressed as binary polarities.42 Against this tradition of bipolar choices now stands the Ars Amatoria , where a new model of one intermediate and two extremes is set up. It has been already pointed out that one of the walkers in Ars 3.299-306 is characterised by her huge stride and by rusticitas , both of which find close parallels in the figure of Tragedy in Am. 3.1. The contrasting walker is characterised by an excess of ars and mollitia as well as by superbia (an attribute which, in Aristotelian terms, is already a kind of excess).43 superbia is a standard characteristic of Elegy's analogue, the elegiac mistress; cf. the variously admiring or hostile descriptions in Propertius of Cynthia as superba , at 2.1.8 and 3.24.2 (the latter a poem in which Cynthia's body coalesces with the elegist's verse), mollitia , of course, is a characteristic both of the elegist's poetry (Prop. 1.7.19, 2.1.2, 3.1.19) and of the gait of the elegiac mistress (Prop. 2.12.24, Ov. Am. 2A23-24).44 It is then humorously appropriate that the walker in Ars 3 who has these same characteristics - since she is herself an extremity - has them to excess; certainly in excess of Elegy herself. For in Am. 3.1 Elegy displays 'the expression of a lover' (9 uultus amantis ) and flirtatious eyes (33 limis surrisit ocellis) - both of which

40 See the bibliographical references cited in McKeown's (forthcoming) introduction to Am. 3.1. 41 See also McKeown's (forthcoming) notes on 3.1.18, and 26 area. 42 Potential alternative 'triadic' models perhaps exist, and one may be dimly discerned in Am. 3.1, namely the Judgement of Paris between the 3 goddesses Juno, Minerva and Venus. But Tragedy collapses within herself the characteristics of both Juno and Minerva, while Elegy is assimilated to Venus alone (see McKeown's (forthcoming) introduction), so that in Ovid's hands the Judgement of Paris effectively becomes a choice between two opposed extremes. An apparent poetic triad, which is perhaps really a binary opposition, may be found also at the end of Callimachus' hymn to Apollo. The matter is controversial (see Morrison (2002) 127-29), but it can be argued that, from the poetological triad of sea, Assyrian river and spring ( Ap . 105-12), the first two can be collapsed together as representative of bad types of poetry, and act in unison as the opposite extreme to the good poetry represented by the spring. 43 Cf. Arist. EN 1 107a20-25 (quoted above p. 14 n. 23). 44 For lovers' frequent preference for the kind of gait apparently described by Ovid as excessively mollis , cf. also Catull. 68.70, and see the material cited by Gibson (2003) 200 on Ars 3.301.

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Ovid later recommends in Ars 3 to his female pupils in direct opposition to superbia.45 As for the excess of ars , this is an extremity uniquely appropriate to the Ars , the third book above all, where Ovid constantly worries away at, and is sometimes ambivalent about, women's use of ars.46 The two women of Ars 3.299-306 embody, perhaps even exceed, the rustic itas of Tragedy and the mollitia of Elegy. Between them there is a woman whose gait avoids such (poetic) excesses. This putative poetical woman is presumably the Ars herself. Her intermediate position repeats on the poetological plane a key position outlined by Ovid earlier in the poem. In the notorious passage which prefaces instruction proper in Ars 3 (101-28), Ovid rejects antique values and praises the modern city of Rome. Here, as I shall argue later in more detail, cultus is figured as an 'intermediate' between modern luxuria and archaic simplicitas or rusticitas. In this same passage on modern Rome - significantly for the poetologically intermediate woman - a complementary argument about styles of poetry can be detected.47 Prior to disowning simplicitas , Ovid avers (107-12):

corpora si ueteres non sic coluere puellae, nec ueteres cultos sic habuere uiros. si fuit Andromache tunicas induta ualentes, quid mirum? duri militis uxor erat. 1 10 scilicet Aiaci coniunx ornata uenires, cui tegumen septem terga fuere boum!

Andromache, and particularly Tecmessa, are perhaps most immediately associated with early Latin drama.48 Clothing, as seen earlier, may be stylistically significant, and here the tunicae ualentes ('coarse tunics') of the antique pair reflect the unsophisticated literary style of the early dramatists.49 An association between clothing and (archaic) dramatic genre, indeed, is perhaps latent in such terms as fabula palliata , fabula praetexta , and fabula togata.50 Running in parallel with the approval given to an 'intermediate' cultus , approval is implicitly given to a style of poetry which occupies a space between the rusticitas of early drama and one which falls prey to stylistic (over-) ornamentation. A

45 3.509-11 nec minus in uultu damnosa superbia uestro : I comibus est oculis alliciendus Amor. I odimus immodico s (experto credite) fas tus. Cf. e.g. Ars 3.164 et melior uero quaeritur arte color (with Gibson (2003) 158-59 on 3.159ff.), 199 sanguine quae uero non rubet, arte rubet (with Gibson op. cit. 176 on 3.199ff., and ad loc.), 210 ars faciem dissimulata iuuat (with Gibson op. cit. 183 ad loc.), 291 quo non ars penetrai? discunt lacrimare decenter (with Gibson op. cit. 214-15 ad loc., also 21 1 on 3.281). Cf. above p. 78 n. 21. 47 Below I develop the arguments made in more compressed form in my notes on Ars 3.101-34, 109- 12, 127-28. 48 See Gibson (2003) 133 on Ars 3.1 1 1-12, and 306 on 3.519. 49 This aspect of stylistic debate receives later confirmation in Ovid's allusion in Ars 3.125-26 to Horace's celebration of the gradual disappearance, under Greek influence, of archaic and rustic features from modern poetic style, at Epist. 2.1.159-60. The allusion is discussed in detail below, pp. 97-99. Cf. also the similarity of Ars 3.101-28 as a whole to the terms in which Quintilian defends the use of ars in rhetoric, at Inst. 9.4.3-6 (ars, cultus , nature, agriculture, clothing, architecture). 50 On these terms, see Brink (1971) 319-20 on Hor. Ars 288.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 85 clear analogue is the walker of Ars 3.299-306, who occupies a related position between Tragedy and the mollitia of Elegy in Am. 3.1. The poetic intermediate is thus framed in two complementary ways. In one sense the positioning of the Ars between Tragedy and Elegy, or between unsophisticated poetry and over-ornamented poetry, need not tell us very much about the generic affiliations of the Ars - unless readers are prepared to take Tragedy as a cipher for the higher genres in general. Tragedy strictly understood, unlike epic, is largely a symbolic, rather than contextually integrated, generic alternative in the Ars. Contrast the context of the third book of the Amores , where Ovid encounters Tragedy in the first poem before leaving Elegy for her at the end of the book. It is for this reason that I suggest Ars 3.299-306 be understood as largely - and powerfully - symbolic in another way. The Callimachean tradition of bipolar poetic choices, based on the earlier Hesiodic- Xenophontic tradition of bipolar moral choices (embraced by Ovid in Am. 3.1), is now rejected. In its stead is set up a new model of two extremities and a mean. The mean or middle position of the Ars as a poem, however, can be pursued in a number of other ways. Like the Georgics in the career of Vergil, the Ars nestles at the midpoint of the poet's progress, between the 'lighter' productions of the Amores and Heroides and the weightier works that are the Metamorphoses and the Fasti (on which he had perhaps already begun work by the time of the publication of the Arc).51 It is also a hybrid production,52 which combines the metre and subject-matter of love-elegy with the characteristic techniques and treatment of the largely hexameter 'genre' of didactic poetry.53 Similarly, if epic is classically durus and love-elegy mollis (Prop. 1.7.19, 2.1.41, 3.1.19-20) - terms which may in fact be mapped onto the two walking women of Ars 3 - then the Ars may be understood as being in some sense intermediate between the two. This middle way between generic 'extremes' can also be seen reflected in the myth of Daedalus and Icarus in Ars 2. Alison Sharrock has argued that, in this myth, Daedalus, as instructor of his son Icarus, is to be understood as a version of Ovid as praeceptor in the Ars Amatoria ; and that both, on one level of the metaphor, teach their pupils the art of poetry or love-elegy. But the unheeding Icarus flies too high, harbouring 'epic' pretensions (since epic commonly represents the heights of poetry). In this context, Daedalus' earlier advice to his son carries poetological significance (2.59-64): 54

51 For Ovid's concern throughout his poetic career with 'generic ascent', see Harrison (2002). Such ascent can be usefully associated with developing notions of a 4 literary career' which progresses through the genres from low to high on the model of Vergil's ascent from pastoral ultimately to epic. For the idea of a literary career, see Farrell (2002), and for Ovid's Vergilian version of his own, see Farrell (2004). 52 For some intermediates as 'hybrids' in the Aristotelian scheme, i.e. composed out of the contraries between which they are intermediate, cf. Met. 1057al8ff. For the extreme rarity of didactic poems in elegiacs, see Obbink (1999) 64, Gibson (2003) 8-9. For the difficulties of conceptualising didactic poetry as a genre, see the differing responses of Volk (2002) 25-68, and Farrell (2003) 384-85, 394-95, 400-01. 54 See Sharrock (1994) 146-68; cf. Gibson (2003) 34. For early modern receptions of the Daedalus and Icarus myth, which likewise emphasise themes of excess and moderation, see Scodel (2002) 148-55.

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nam, siue aetherias uicino sole per auras ibimus, impatiens cera caloris erit; 60 siue humiles propiore freto iactabimus alas, mobilis aequoreis pinna madescet aquis. inter utrumque uola; uentos quoque, nate, timeto, quaque ferent aurae, uela secunda dato.

Icarus, like his father, must avoid the winds (which in other contexts fill the full sails of epic ships of poetry);55 he must drive a middle course between sky and earth, between the heights of epic pretension and the humbler genres. This, of course, is a good summary of the generic position of the Ars itself.56 Equally important, the triadic model - inter utrumque uola - once more makes clear that the generic choice is no longer one from two (as in Am. 3.1). There is now a middle way: the Ars itself. Moreover, the 'middle' style of the Ars Amatoria is appropriate to its content, so much of which emphasises the values of moderation, the mean, and the intermediate. Contrast Horace's Satires where the same values, as seen already in Chapter 1, appear to be equally important, but without any corresponding editorial hint at a match between style and content. For, judged by Horace's own description (Sat. 2.6.17 Musaque pedestri),51 the Satires make a pretence of clinging to a (mismatched) low style. iv. Ars Amatoria 3.299-306 (3): the ' Ethical ' Intermediate (and Propertius again )

As hinted earlier, the significance of Ovid's rejection in Ars 3.299-306 of the binary polarities of Am. 3.1 does not reside wholly on the poetological plane. For in Am. 3.1 Tragedy is assimilated to a matrona , while Elegy is likened to a meretrix ,58 Similarly in Ars 3.299-306 the matronal status of the rustic walker is underlined twice over in an appropriately lumbering periphrasis (303, quoted above p. 77). Her rival, of course, is assimilated to a prostitute, with her 'soft' walk and artful bodily movements akin to those of an erotic stage dancer.59 This moral binary polarity of matron and whore is firmly fixed in ancient thought. The most graphic illustration is perhaps the assimilation of Kakia and Arete to prostitute and decent woman respectively, but many other examples can be

55 See Gibson (2003) 299 on Ars 3.500. 56 The same half-line is attributed to Daedalus in Met. 8.206 inter utrumque uola. For the lower stylistic level, nevertheless, of the elegiac version of the Daedalus story vis à vis its retelling in Met. 8, and for the position of the former midway between love-elegy and (Ovidian) epic, see Sharrock (1994) 173-88. Alison Sharrock also points out to me the parallel packaging of the messages of Ars 2.59-64 and 3.299-306 in terms of 'travel': the two might be summarised together as ' inter utrumque ambulď . 57 See Muecke (1993) 198-99 ad loc. 58 Matron and whore, nevertheless, are also employed as symbolic figures in the context of stylistic debate; cf. McKeown's (forthcoming) introduction to Am. 3.1, where he cites (e.g.) Tac. Dial. 26.1, Dion. Hal. Orat. Vet. Praef. 1. Similarly, insinuations of prostitution underlie criticism of philosophy or oratory's use of multicoloured dresses, e.g. at Quint. Inst. 10. 1 .33, Diog. Laert. 4.52. 59 See above p. 78 n. 21. The allusion to Prop. 2.4.5-6 and its context of sexual prowling at Ars 3.302 (see above p. 79) adds further hints.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 87 found.60 In this context, the apparent suggestion in Ars 3.299-306 of an inter-mediate poses something of a problem. What middle way can there be between matrona and meretrixi Ancient thought knows of no such woman: one function of the polarisation of the categories of matron and whore is to contest the idea that women can be at an intermediate point on this scale, or at least to elide any inconvenient examples of such women.61 Yet I suggest that in this Ars passage we see once more a binary polarity contested by a triadic model - only now the triad involves morals and status and not just poetic practices. In seeking to track down this woman who is intermediate between matrona and meretrix I could follow one interesting, but ultimately false, trail, namely libertinae. Some of Ovid's disclaimers about the appropriate female audience for the Ars suggest, without directly specifying, an audience of freedwomen; while numerous passages of instruction likewise indicate an audience of low-status women.62 But freedwomen do appear quite explicitly as Ovid's audience at Ars 3.61 1-16.63 This is a circumstance of great interest given that, as we saw in Chapter 1, libertinae feature as an 'intermediate' category in the scheme of the speaker of Horace Sat . 1.2. There freedwomen are framed as a 'mean' between the extremes of adultery and the dingy brothel (1.2.47-49). The speaker soon abandons this dubious position, but the thought has been planted. Nevertheless, Ovid, while often to be observed playing with the idea of libertinae in the poem, never makes an explicit connection between his 'intermediate woman' and this inferior . group. That he never does so is consistent with his rejection at Ars 3.577-610 - traced in Chapter 1 - of the thought and categories of Sat. 1.2 as 'extremist'. I suggest instead that throughout Ars 3 Ovid constructs a more general 'intermediate' class of women, who avoid the stereotypical dowdiness of the matron, and the over- ornamentation of the whore.64 We can begin to get a view of this by looking at two of the other cosmetic features of Tragedy and Elegy in Am. 3.1, and contrasting these with the same features of the puellae in Ars 3. But first a change of tack in my approach to these texts must be underlined. So far I have exerted strong critical pressure on Ars 3.299-306 and its relations with Am. 3.1, and expected the former to carry much of the burden of the argument about the construction of a new 'intermediate' in the Ars Amatoria. It is now time to widen the horizons of this study to the rest of Ars 3 and, presently, to all three

60 Cf. e.g. Hor. Sat. 2.7.46, Epist. 1.18.3-4 ut matrona meretrici dispar erit atque I discolor, infido scurrae distabit amicus , Sen. Contr . 2.7.3-4, Clem. Alex. Paed. 3.5.4 où yàp yuvaiKÓç, àXX' ¿Taipas1 to Ò1XÓKOCFU.OV ('love of ornament belongs not to the wife, but to the whore'). 61 Cf. the elite tendency to efface distinctions between the categories of libertina and meretrix , discussed by Veyne (1988) 74-80. 62 See Gibson (2003) 25-28, 35-36, 1 1 1 (on Ars 3.58), 1 17 (on 3.75), 382-3 (on 3.755ff.). qua uafer eludi possit ratione maritus I quaque uigil custos, praeteriturus eram. I nupta uirum timeat, rata sit custodia nuptae : I hoc decet, hoc leges iusque pudorque iubent. I te quoque seruari, modo quam uindicta redemit, I quis ferat? ut fallas, ad mea sacra ueni. On the controversies of this passage, see Gibson (2003) 334-37 ad loc. 64 A useful contrast can be drawn with the figure of Cynthia, who, just as Propertius himself swings between libertine and conservative, is variously (and confusingly) depicted as first matron, then whore (see Miller (2004) 61-63). Where Cynthia is both meretrix and matrona , the puellae of Ars 3 form - largely if not invariably - an 'intermediate' class of women.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 88 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT books of the poem. But Am. 3.1 will still play an initial role in the argument. Here I will not argue for direct allusion between the Ars and the Amores poem, but rather will use the categories of the earlier poem for continuing an investigation of the later poem. I have already used the feet and gait (and to a lesser extent the facial expressions) of Elegy and Tragedy as a tool for thinking about the women of the Ars , but the hairstyles and dress of the pair are no less revealing. I start with the contrast set up in Am. 3.1 between their hairstyles (7, 1 1-12):

uenit odoratos Elegia nexa capillos

uenit et ingenti uiolenta Tragoedia passu: fronte comae torua, palla iacebat humi.

Elegy's hair is elaborately bound up (cf. Mart. 5.30.4 cultis ... elegia comis) and perfumed, so as to suggest both Callimachus' Graces (Aetia frg. 7.1 1-14) and party-going.65 By contrast, Tragedy's locks lie on her 'stern brow', and allusion to Vergil's Polyphemus underlines the suggestion of a disordered appearance.66 Between these two extremes of coiffure lies Ovid's catalogue of hairstyles for women at Ars 3.1 33-1 58.67 There the praeceptor begins his advice by emphasising the need for giving serious attention to the hair: munditiis capimur: non sint sine lege capilli (133). As I suggested in Chapter 1, munditia is the classic mark of an 'intermediate' position. But I will reserve treatment of Ovid's complex use of this term (which here includes an enriching reference to Horace) for later, and note simply that the lack of lex in the hair is elsewhere characteristic of women either uninterested in attracting men or those neglecting their appearance.68 If the puellae of Ars 3 must avoid the kind of untended hairstyle adopted by Tragedy, equally they must avoid the luxurious approach to hair-care evident in Elegy's appearance. The range of hairstyles recommended by Ovid to his pupils - from which they are to choose the most individually becoming examples - extends from more elaborate styles involving curls (3.148) to the simplest of partings in the hair (3.137). But, significantly, Ovid prefaces his catalogue with a ban on the use of expensive earrings (3.129), and in the very first line of the catalogue proper likewise prohibits the wearing of expensive discriminalia (jewel-encrusted forehead plaques).69 This attitude to luxury items in the hair is both consonant with the line taken on the architectural luxuria of Rome in the immediately preceding passage (3.113-28: see above pp. 84-85), and, significantly, differentiates Ovid's puellae from Elegy. The latter wears perfume in her hair, but neither in Ovid's

65 See McKeown (forthcoming) on Am. 3.1.7; cf. Callim. Aetia frg. 7.1 1-14 4 ... but in Paros you stand wearing fineries and shimmering tunics, and ointment always flows from your locks. Come now and wipe your anointed hands upon my elegies, that they may live for many a year'. 66 Verg. Aen. 3.635-36 lumen ... I ingens, quod torua solum sub fronte latebat. McKeown (forthcoming) on Am. loc. cit. further notes that the description of Elegy's gait {Am. 3.1.11) reappears in reference to Polyphemus at Met. 13.776. Tragedy's hair receives mention again at Am. 3.1.32 densum caesarie ... caput , where caesaries suggests a masculine hairstyle (or male lack of interest therein); see McKeown (forthcoming) ad loc. 67 A related argument appears in greater detail in Gibson (forthcoming). 68 Cf. Met. 1.477 (Daphne), [Ov.] Epist. Sapph. 73, TLL 7.1247.76ff. 69 For the reference in 3.137 to these plaques, see Gibson (2003) 151 ad loc.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 89 advice on hairstyles nor anywhere else in Ars 3 is use of this luxury item recommended to the puellae - despite the fact that perfumes and unguents feature among the positive attributes of both men and women in earlier elegy.70 However, I argue for no direct reference here between Ars 3 and Am. 3.1, only for the idea that in the former Ovid effectively strikes a middle path between the two extremes crystallised in the latter: between the stereotypical excess of the hairdo of the meretrix , and the 'deficiency' of the respectable woman's coiffure.71 In this way Ovid also succeeds in differentiating himself once more from Propertius. The latter, though dealing with an apparently non-respectable woman, tries to force on her, as shown in Chapter 2, conservative values where self-adornment is concerned, as paradigmatically at 1.2.1-4:

quid iuuat ornato procedere, uita, capillo et tenues Coa ueste mouere sinus, aut quid Orontea crines perfundere murra, teque peregrinis uendere muneribus?

Propertius objects to Cynthia dressing her hair or drenching it with myrrh.72 From the vantage point of Am. 3.1 it can be seen that Cynthia dresses herself like Elegy; but the elegist, so it appears, would rather have her appear unadorned (ironically, like Tragedy). From the vantage point of Ars 3, by contrast, Cynthia, whether dressed to her own or to Propertius' satisfaction, is in each case likely to appear, along with Elegy, as one of two 'extremes'. For Ovid may silently share Propertius' (miserly?) antipathy to luxury goods - such items are conspicuous by their absence in A rs 3 - but devotes a whole catalogue to the subject of ornatus capillus. The contrasting clothing of Elegy and Tragedy provides a starting point for a similar line of thought (Am. 3.1.9, 12):

forma decens, uestis tenuissima, uultus amantis

fronte comae torua, palla iacebat humi

Elegy wears a diaphanous dress symbolic both of her Callimachean poetics ( tenuissima ) and, according to traditional thinking, of her meretricious morals.73 Tragedy, by contrast,

70 For perfumes and unguents in earlier love poetry, cf., in addition to Catullus 13, Prop. 2.4.5, 2.29.17-18, 3.10.22, Ov. Am. 1.6.38, Medic. 19. On the absence of these items from Ars 3, see Gibson (2003) 172 on Ars 3.193-208. 71 For the two stereotypes, contrast Plaut. Truc. 287-88 with Ter. Phorm. 104-07. 72 For direct criticism in the Fasti of Propertius' opposition here to cultus , see Barchiesi (1991) 2; cf., more generally, op. cit. 1-3 for Ovid's talent for highlighting Propertian inconsistencies and making his predecessor seem somewhat passé. 73 For the allusion to the dress of Callimachus' Graces (frg. 7.11, quoted above n. 65) and a possible reference to Callim. frg. 532 too" ikcXov tò ypáfi|jia tò Kcoïov (a disputed comparison between the poetry of Philetas and the famous fabric of Cos), see McKeown (forthcoming) on Am. 3.1.9. Cameron (1995) 320 denies the latter comparison, but in doing so illuminates the subversive twist given the poetic clothing metaphor by the Roman elegists: '... attractive as it might seem to read silk as a metaphor for refinement in style (= Xeir-rorns') ... silk connotes luxury and (because transparent) immorality, applied to style, effeminacy'. See also below n. 78.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 90 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT wears the full-length palla associated both with respectable women and with tragic actors.74 Once again Elegy and Tragedy occupy opposed extremes. Contrast Ovid's advice on clothing at Ars 3.169-92.75 A representative sample of eleven dyes is listed, from which a choice is to be made on the principle of personal suitability. But Ovid begins his catalogue with a disavowal of luxuria (169-72):

quid de ueste loquar? nec uos, segmenta, requiro nec quae de Tyrio murice, lana, rubes. cum tot prodierint pretio leuiore colores, quis furor est census corpore ferre suos !

Ovid places a ban, for (typically male) reasons of expense, on the use of such costly items as inlaid pieces of fabric (segmenta) and on luxury dyes such as 'Tyrian' purple.76 Furthermore, he deals only with wool (170, 187): no mention is made of the kind of flimsy and notoriously expensive garment worn by Elegy. On the other hand, as declared at the very outset of the Ars Amatoria , he will have nothing to do with such an unrevealing full-length garment, redolent of matronly morals, as the palla: este procul , uittae tenues , insigne pudoris , I quaeque tegis medios instita longa pedes (1.31-32). Using a wide, but inexpensive, range of dyes and wool garments, the puellae of Ars 3 are effectively invited to pursue a middle path between the stereotypes of the revealingly and luxuriously dressed meretrix and the modestly-dressed matrona. In the course of discussing the subject of hairdressing above, a fairly clear contrast could be drawn between Ovid's intermediate' approach in Ars 3, and Propertius' rather more conservative and 'extreme' attitude, particularly as evinced in the programmatic second poem of his first book. With the subject of clothing, to draw the same clear contrast becomes rather harder, principally because of Propertius' conflicting statements on Cynthia's dress. Here a brief, but I trust fruitful, return can be made to the idea of Propertius as a poet of unresolved conflict. On Cynthia's birthday (3.10), he requests that she artfully arrange her hair (contrast 1.2.1), put on a striking dress (contrast 1.2.2), and relax amidst the scent of saffron (contrast 1.2.3): et nítidas presso pollice finge comas: I dein , qua primům oculos cepisti ueste Properti, I indue, nec uacuum flore relinque caput II et crocino nares murreus ungat onyx (3.10.14-16, 22). The request that Cynthia wear the dress with which she 'first captured the eyes of Propertius' is also a striking revision of the first line of the Monobiblos , where Cynthia 'first with her eyes captured' Propertius (1.1.1 Cynthia prima suis miserum me cepit ocellis). Equally arresting is the apparent contradiction of the sentiments of 1.2 in the opening poem of book 2. The disparagement of fine Coan silk at 1.2.2 (quoted earlier) contrasts with the celebration of Cynthia in similar clothing at 2.1.5-6 siue illam Cois fulgentem incedere uidi, I totum de Coa ueste uolumen erit. This contradiction has been little discussed. Critics by and large are happy to identify the statement in 2.1 as a declaration of allegiance to the poetics of Philetas of

74 See McKeown (forthcoming) on Am. 3.1 .12. 7 A parallel argument is made in greater detail in Gibson (forthcoming). 76 For segmenta and 'Tyrian' purple, see Gibson (2003) 164 on Ars 3.169, 170, 171-72.

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Cos (later associated by the Roman elegist with Callimachus).77 But, if 1.2 is also read as a statement of poetics, then, at least according to a strict reading, the reference there to Coan garments must contain an (embarrassing) denial of 'Philetan' poetics.78 Rather than attempting to resolve the contradiction, I want to highlight it, for it coheres with Propertius' wider tendency, identified in Chapter 2, to contradict himself or make unexplained shifts and reversals of position. In particular, as a statement about the equally significant subject of cosmetics, the clothing of Cynthia in luxury silks in 2.1, after the condemnation of the same in 1.2, fits into a wider pattern of an unresolved contradiction between a vigorous condemnation of luxuria and its apparent acceptance elsewhere. 79 Propertius' tendency to condemn luxury items can be traced from 1.2 ('Coan' silk, Syrian perfume), through 1.15 and 2.18b (make-up, jewellery, imported hair-dye), to its culmination in 3.13, where he borrows the language of moralists to condemn luxuria among both the puellae and the matronae of Rome.80 In this last poem he includes amongst the condemned items Indian gold, Red sea pearls, Tyrian purple, and Arabian cinnamon. But, despite such impeccable sentiments (and an effective plea for Italian self- sufficiency),81 elsewhere the elegist evinces a somewhat contradictory taste for luxury items. Note, for example, his confession of attraction to Indian jewels in the hair of the puellae of Rome (2.22a. 10 [ crines ] Indica quos medio uertice gemma tenet), or his vision of Cynthia - without criticism - amidst a scene of luxury items in 2.29, e.g. 15 Sidoniae nocturna ligamina mitrae , 17-18 afflabunt tibi non Arabům de gramine odores , I sed quos ipse suis fecit Amor manibus , 26 ostrina ... in tunica. Furthermore, whether Propertius is implicitly condoning or explicitly condemning luxuria , he displays a notable tendency to linger over the vocabulary of luxury and attendant luxury items.82 This impression

77 See (e.g.) Wyke (2002) 148-50. For Propertius' linking of Philetas and Callimachus, cf. 2.34.31-32, 3.1.1 Callimachi Manes et Coi sacra Philitae , 3.9.43-44, 4.6.3-4 (an association reproduced in homage to Propertius by Ovid at Ars 3.329). 78 For the poetological interpretation of 1.2, see Zetzel (1996) 73-91, and for his attempt to resolve the conflict with the opening of book 2, see op. cit. 89-90 with n. 37, where it is argued that in 1 .2 Propertius is having his poetic cake and eating it by rejecting Philetas while writing within his tradition. For a disputed comparison in Callimachus between the writings of Philetas and the silks of Cos, see above n. 73, adding Cameron (1995) 473-74 on Propertius' alleged misreading of Callimachus' view of Philetas. For, alternatively, scepticism about the poetological significance of 1 .2, see Miller (2004) 66. 79 The elegist's appreciation for luxury garments is evinced also at 2.3.15-16, where, among the reasons listed as contributing to - but not the main cause of - Propertius' love for Cynthia, is found riec si quando Arabo lucei bombyce puella I (non sum de nihilo blandus amator ego). Cf. the analysis of Prop. 3.13, above p. 48. 81 For this highly traditional 'Italian' aspect of Propertian moralising, see La Penna (1979) 181-84. There is another contrast, which I will not develop here, with the Ars Amatoria which celebrates Rome as the reception point of all the world's riches (including women); see further Labate (1984) 51-64, Gibson (2003) 136 on Ars 3.114 et [Roma] domiti magnas possidet orbis opes. Propertius' moralising here places the elegist (uncomfortably) close in some respects to Augustus' self-image as a 'new man' with the values of traditional Italy; for this image and its context, see Dench (1998). 82 Cf. e.g. 1.14.1-6, 11-12, 19-22 (the criticism of Cynthia's use of luxury items in the following poem, 1.15, is perhaps an implicit comment on the use of the vocabulary of luxury here in 1.14), 2.16.43-44 sed quascumque tibi uestes, quoscumque smaragdos, I quosue dedit flauo lumine

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 92 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT receives some confirmation from a study of Greek loan-words in elegy. The most frequent lexical category in all three elegists of Greek loan words is constituted by terms associated with poetry and music; but '[o]nly in Propertius is the traditionally productive category of words connected with the life of luxury equally important' (Maltby (1999) 380).83 The conflict in Propertius between these two tendencies - between a pronounced tendency to condemn luxuria and a more muted, but detectable, tendency to include luxury items in the life of love - is presented to the reader without any obvious resolution.84 By contrast in Ars 3 Ovid pursues a consistent 'middle way'. He effectively rejects both of the 'extremes' to be found in his predecessor, whether that of luxury items (expensive earrings, jewels in the hair, segmenta , costly dyes, diaphanous fabrics), or that of archaic standards of self-adornment (represented in Ars 3 by Andromache and Tecmessa). Instead, explicit and sustained approval is given to the subject of dressed hair and to the use of colourful (but inexpensive) dyes.85 v. Simplex munditiis? Pyrrha and the puellae of Ays Amatoria 386

In the preceding sections I used the multiple binary polarities of Am. 3.1 as a way of thinking about Ars 3, and argued that Ovid strikes a cosmetic and poetological middle path between the stereotypes of Am. 3.1. This argument can be extended by looking at a chrysolithos , 55 Sidona ... uestis, 2. 1 8b.3 1 caeruleo ... fuco , 2.24b. 11-14 pauonis caudae flabella superbae, I ... dura frigus ... pila , I ... talos ... eburnos , I quaeque nitent Sacra uilia dona Via , 2.25.45 sandycis amictu , 2.32.12 aulaeis nobilis Attalicis , 2.33b. 39-40 effuso ... Falerno , I ... aurato ... in calice , 3.2.11-14 Taenariis ... columnis , I ...camera auratas inter eburna trabes , I ... pontaria , ... I ...operosa rigat Marcius antra liquor (cf. 19-22), 3.3.28, 3.4.2, 3.5.3, 6, 3.6.11-14, 3.7.49-50 sed thyio thalamo aut Oricia terebintho I ecfultum pluma uersicolore caput , 3.8.4 cymbia plena , 3.9.9-16, 3.11.45 conopia , 3.18.19-20. Ironically, Propertius' largely unacknowledged taste for luxuria in both material objects and in vocabulary brings him close to the life and literary style of Mark Antony - although the latter, of course, never evinces a contrasting tendency to condemn the same items. For Plutarch's emphasis on Antony's taste for luxury, cf. e.g. Ant. 9.8 (golden goblets and pavilions), 28.11 (antique golden goblets), 54.6 (golden thrones), 58.1 1 (tablets of onyx and crystal). For Antony's over-ornamented literary style, see above n. 53. 83 Cf. Maltby (1999) 382 '... it is Propertius who stands out from Tibullus and Ovid both in his greater frequency of Greek loan-words and in his wider lexical range' (a complete list of Greek loan-words in elegy is provided at op. cit. 391-96). For the contrasting general simplicity of style adopted in Tibullus, see Maltby (2002) 66-68. For Ovid's relative avoidance of Greek loan words and technical vocabulary in Ars 3, see Gibson (2003) 12-13. 84 For illuminating contrast, see Scodel (2002) 165-69 on the Caroline court poet Carew, who not only celebrates erotic extremism and eschews conventional gender norms (like Propertius), but also praises the virtues of aristocratic material excess (without any of the complications of Propertius). For the putative non-aristocratic character of Roman love-elegy, see above p. 62 n. 52. 85 There is a contradiction between the middle way adopted in Ars 3 and the more tolerant attitude to female luxuria found in Ovid's advice to his male pupils at Ars 2.297-302. But, whether or not one believes Ars 3 was composed later and separately from Ars 1 and 2 (see Gibson (2003) 37-38, with nn. 100, 101), the Coan- and Tyrian-clad puellae of Ars 2 are not (yet) Ovid's pupils. For Ovid's revision in Ars 3 of the attitudes of the Medicamina towards luxuria , see below n. 88. 86 In the following section I expand the compressed arguments made, or use the material cited, in my notes on Ars 3.101-40 (= Gibson (2003) 128-55).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 93 key formulation of Ovid's position at the very commencement of instruction proper in Ars 3, where as praeceptor he declares his allegiance to munditia. Horace, the standard-bearer of the middle way in Augustan poetry, returns as Ovid's main target, and is skilfully manoeuvred once more into the position of an extremist. At Ars 3.121-34, Ovid moves from a general celebration of cultus onto the first aspect of this subject:

prisca iuuent alios, ego me nunc denique natum gratulor: haec aetas moribus apta meis. non quia nunc terrae lentum subducitur aurum lectaque diuerso litore concha uenit, nec quia decrescunt effosso mármore montes, 1 25 nec quia caeruleae mole fugantur aquae, sed quia cultus adest, nec nostros mansit in annos rusticitas priscis ilia superstes auis. uos quoque nec caris aures onerate lapillis, quos legit in uiridi decolor Indus aqua, 1 30 nec prodite graues insuto uestibus auro: per quas nos petitis, saepe fugatis, opes, munditiis capimur: non sint sine lege capilli; admotae formam dantque negantque manus.

Ovid, as briefly noted earlier (above p. 84), rejects antiquarian tastes (121 prisca iuuent alios) and celebrates modern Rome. That celebration is significantly qualified in 123-26 by his dismissal of architectural luxuria as the ground for his happiness in modern Rome, and assertion in 127-28 that the true ground is the presence of cultus and absence of rusticitas. Here cultus is effectively framed as a mean between luxuria on one hand, and rusticitas (and its analogue at 113 simplicitas) on the other. The same approach is explicitly marked as fundamental to the poet's instruction on the adornment of the head: uos quoque ... (129). Running in parallel with Ovid's rejection of architectural 'excess' is his recommendation that the puellae give up luxury items (129-32). Rather, in order to attract the opposite sex, the puellae must aim for munditiae (133). munditiae , in the more narrowly cosmetic sphere, is the equivalent of the broader cultus which Ovid finds so attractive in modern Roman society as a whole.87 And just as cultus occupies an intermediate space between two extremes, so munditiae in 133 is a mean between the 'excessive' adornment of 129-32 and the 'deficient' state of neglect of the appearance symbolised by Andromache and Tecmessa (109-12, quoted earlier).88 This intermediate state is then fleshed out in the more detailed advice on the dressing of the hair which follows.

87 For the frequent association of cultus and munditiae , see Oakley (1998) 579 on Livy 8.15.7 mundiorem ... cultum ; cf. Ov. Fast. 4.108 cultus mundaque cura sui (a passage which reprises Ars 3.101-28: see Fantham (1998) 110-11 ad loc.). 88 A significantly different argument is found in the prologue to the Medicamina , throwing the distinct emphasis of the Ars 3 passage into relief. The prologue of the earlier poem in great measure anticipates the arguments of Ars 3.101-34; see Gibson (2003) 128-29 (on 3.101-34), 130 (on 3.101ff.), 132 (on 3.107ff.), 144-45 (on 3.129ff.). But the Medicamina passage operates essentially

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Much of the significance and force of Ovid's argument is summed up in the phrase munditiis capimur (133). In Chapter 1 (pp. 26-34), the tendency of mundus and munditia to be associated with ideas of the 'mean', particularly where issues of self-adornment are concerned, was studied extensively. This association is largely determined by the basic sense in both cases of the absence of sordid matter (i.e. 'clean'), so that both mundus and munditia regularly connote a simplicity of ornament which is often achieved by virtue of not neglecting the appearance. (Excessive ornamentation is thereby also ruled out, albeit implicitly.) Accordingly, mundus and munditia are used by a range of authors to express approval of women whom they judge to achieve a cosmetic mean. A relationship was also traced earlier between Horace and Propertius, centered on use of the terms mundus and immundus , whereby the latter signalled his 'extreme' preference for a lack of munditia in contrast to the variously 'moderate' preferences of Horace (and Lucretius). To this set of relationships I now add the munditiis capimur of Ars 3; but the relationship I seek to establish is not with the munda puella of Horace's second satire, but with a perhaps better known female character from the Odes. munditia , as shown in Chapter 1, is not found among the Augustan poets in Vergil, Propertius or Tibullus, but only in Horace and Ovid's erotodidactic poetry.89 Horace first uses the term in the Pyrrha ode (1.5.1-6):

quis multa gracilis te puer in rosa perfusus liquidis urget odoribus grato, Pyrrha, sub antro? cui flauam religas comam,

simplex munditiis? heu, quotiens fidem 5 mutatosque deos flebit!

Ovid, in a shared context of the dressing of the hair, clearly has this passage in mind at Ars 3.133. But Horace's simplex is absent from the new Ovidian context: a significant omission, as the lyric poet's simplex intensifies the usual tendency of munditia to signify simplicity of ornament.90 However, Ovidian omission becomes rejection when it is remembered that the elegist mocks simplicitas as an archaic left-over only twenty lines previously, at 1 13 simplicitas rudis ante fuit; nunc aurea Roma est. As Ovid launches into instruction proper, a programmatic revision of munditiae is being offered: no woman who

with a binary polarity, contrasting archaic standards of self-adornment (Medic. 11-16) with modern cultus , symbolised by the desire of puellae for gold-inlaid garments, perfume in the hair, and expensive jewellery (Medic. 17-24, quoted above p. 3 n. 12). But in the new 'triadic' system of the Ars , the modern cultus of the Medicamina becomes an extreme, and a new intermediate is found between it and the other extreme of archaic and rural self-adornment. For the apparent dissociation in the Medicamina prologue of munditia and promiscuity, only for this to be later undermined, see Watson (2001) 464, 466, 468-70. For fuller analysis of this and other terms from the mundus family, see above pp. 26-27. 90 Cf. Nisbet-Hubbard (1970) 75 ad loc.; contrast (e.g.) La Penna (1979) 201-02, who suggests an equilibrium between simplex and munditiae. For a pointed allusion to Horace's Pyrrha also in Propertius, see above p. 34.

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reads the Ars will be asked to be simplex in her munditiae.91 Of course Horace's rather moderately adorned Pyrrha appears against a backdrop of material excess, complete with luxury items such as roses and perfumes. But Ovid, once more, expertly traduces a rival and deliberately 'under-reads' the complexities of another's poetic creation. The full significance of this rejection of Horace will only become clear once the extent of Ovid's engagement with various Horatian texts in the immediate context has been explored. But I want first to ask the obvious question why Ovid rejects Horace on this particular point. One answer is supplied by looking, somewhat less obviously, at Tertullian's de Cultu Feminarum (2.5.1-2):

haec utique non ad crudam in totum et ferinam habitudinem insinuandam uobis suggeruntur, nec de bono squaloris et paedoris suademus, sed de modo et cardine et iustitia corporis excolendi, non supergrediendum ultra quam quod simplices et sufficientes munditiae concupiscunt, ultra quam Deo placet, in illum enim delin- quunt quae cutem medicaminibus urgent, genas rubore maculant, oculos fuligine porrigunt.

Here Tertullian, traducing Horace with virtually the same ease as Ovid, constructs his own Christian 'mean' in the matter of the cultivation of the body. One extreme to be avoided is 'an entirely coarse and brutish appearance', characterised by 'squalor and filth', while the opposite extreme is symbolised by those who apply cosmetics to cheeks, and around the eyes. But between these two extremes there is a middle way characterised by simplices et sufficientes munditiae. The reference to Horace is unmistakable, and may help to suggest why Ovid rejects his fellow Augustan: the intensification of munditiae by Horace's simplex produces a 'moderation' which - with a little supplementation - is capable of appealing to a deeply puritanical Father of the Church . It would be moderately unfair to blame Horace for inspiring Tertullian. In any case, his simplex munditiis is something of an enigma, as might be guessed from the despair felt by successive commentators about capturing the full sense of the phrase.92 But this enigma resides only partly in the poetry of Horace's callida iunctura. Tertullian's appropriation of the phrase bears witness to a phenomenon evident wherever the definition of terms involving taste and refinement is at stake. A satisfactory definition of such terms is (very often) lacking. Note in particular Cicero's revealing response to a question on the meaning of rhetorical urbanitas , at Brut. 171 qui est , inquit, iste tandem urbanitatis color? nescio, inquam; tantum esse quendam esse scio. Urbanity, like good taste everywhere, cannot be defined, only recognised by the cognoscenti. Such terms possess, in the words of William Fitzgerald, the 'power of the indefinable', and may be used, as they are by Catullus, as a weapon of social exclusion.93 Conversely the same

91 Note also that simplex and simplicitas are connected with ideas of 'single' and 'singleness'; see OLD s.v. simplex 1-4, s.v. simplicitas 1-2. This may be significant, for Ovid offers a representative sample of eight hairstyles to his addressees (Ars 3.135-52), not just one style designed to be suitable for allģ Is one promise implicit in the omission of 'simplicity' here fulfilled? 92 See especially Nisbet-Hubbard (1970) 75-76 ad loc.: 'an adequate English translation seems impossible'. w See Fitzgerald (1995) 87-113.

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terms - as already glimpsed in an earlier study of mundus in Lucretius, Horace and Ulpian - may become the subject of radically different interpretations.94 Horace's simplex munditiis provokes two reactions from a pair of quite different authors: one preserves Horace's simplicitas and supplements it with sufficientes [ munditiae ]; while the other removes the same simplicitas , and is content with munditiae alone. Yet, despite having very different standards of personal adornment in mind, both appear confident that theirs is the true essence of munditiae ; that theirs is the middle way between neglect of the person and over-refinement. The ability of the doctrine of the intermediate to mean all things to all people is evident once more. As suggested at the end of Chapter 1, the continuum of any 'excellence' can be contracted or expanded at will so that a variety of positions may be represented as an extreme or an intermediate. Here, so far as Ovid is concerned, Horace's munditiae represent too much of an extreme, and by virtue of the removal of simplicitas the elegist manoeuvres himself into the middle ground between Horace and the opposite extreme of luxuria. The full significance of Horatian munditiae in Ars 3 has not yet been exhausted. For, as well as engaging with Horace's cosmetic use of the term, Ovid in the same context deals also with Horace's other, and poetological, use of the term in the Epistles. In Chapter 1, the poetological aspects of the dialogue between Propertius 2.23 and Horace, Sat. 1.2 were analysed, including the significance of Propertius' implicit refusal of Horace's 'intermediate' munda [puella] in favour of his own woman with an immundus soccus. Horace rejects 'Callimachean' excess in favour of a stylistic mean, while Propertius embraces the opposite extreme of stylistic Hmmunditia' However, it is worth re-emphasising the relative novelty and the particular character of literary debates involving mundus and cognates, munditia is not overly common in a purely stylistic sense, and its first attested use in Cicero betrays a clear sense of its origin in the sphere of female cosmetics.95 The non-metaphorical use of mundus in the same sense is likewise not commonplace.96 Nevertheless, the reader is invited to attribute a poetological meaning to munditiae at Ars 3.133, since the larger context is one of stylistic debate. In the preceding passage Ovid ridicules the clothing of Andromache and Tecmessa in a way that allows the understanding of a simultaneous rejection of unsophisticated poetry. This understanding is confirmed, and complicated, by an allusion in the final couplet of the eulogy of Rome to Horace's Epistles :

sed quia cultus adest nec nostros mansit in annos rusticitas priscis ilia superstes auis. (Ov. Ars 3.127-28)

94 See above pp. 23-24. 95 Cic. Orat. 79, quoted above p. 29 n. 74. TLL 8.1627.62-74 lists only Cic. Orat. 79, Hor. Epist. 2.1.159, Quint. Inst. 8.3.87, Gell. 1.23.1, 9.3.3, 10.3.4, 10.24.2, and Macr. Sat. 1.4.17. 96 TLL 8.1631.61-71 lists Prop. 4.5.43, Ov. Ars 3.479, Gell. 17.2.12, 19.9.10, and Orig. in Matt, serm. 22 p. 38.21.

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Graecia capta ferum uictorem cepit et artes intulit agresti Latió, sic horridus ille defluxit numerus Saturnius et graue uirus munditiae pepulere; sed in longum tamen aeuum manserunt hodieque manent uestigia ruris. 1 60 (Hor. Epist. 2.1.156-60)

The reader of the Ars 3 passage has been prepared for this engagement with Horace by two earlier allusions. The first is contained in the reference to Tecmessa at Ars 3.11 1-12 (quoted earlier) - a character rarely mentioned outside Greek and Roman tragedy, but who makes a prominent appearance in a catalogue of women at Carm. 2.4.5-6.97 The seal of approval placed by Horace on her beauty, however ironically intended, is apparently dismissed as 'rustic' by Ovid. A second Horatian reference occurs at Ars 3.126 (quoted above p. 93), where the alert reader is reminded of the lyric poet's numerous condem- nations of villas and fish farms built out into the sea.98 Both allusions direct readers towards Horace's frequent espousal of traditional or 'archaic' attitudes (although, in the second example, Ovid does not fundamentally disagree with Horace). This is crucial preparation for the exposure of a contradiction in Horace's thinking at Ars 3.127-28." Here Ovid declares that his satisfaction with modern Rome resides in the fact that 4 cultus is here, and rusticitas has not lasted to our days, [though] surviving our grand-sires'. This is a clear reference to Horace's comment on the influence of Greek poetry on Roman artistic standards in the Epistles passage. Greece introduced the arts to 'rustic Latium', the dirty or turbulent stream of Saturnian verse 'flowed away', and munditiae 'got rid of the noisome liquid'; but traces of rusticitas remained 'for many a year' and remain still.100 Horace's narrative of artistic improvement and evolution is somewhat at odds with his more usual narrative of (moral) decline.101 It is precisely this potential dis-harmony in Horace's thinking which Ovid highlights here - mischievously ignoring any Horatian irony - by reminding readers first of Horace's morality and tastes before directing them to the latter's ultra-modern poetics. As Barchiesi (1997) 237 n. 29 comments, 'Ovid forces a wedge ... between Horace the Augustan poet who exalts the return to simple origins and

97 mouit Aiacem Telamone natum I forma captiuae dominum Tecmessae. See McKeown (1998) 161- 62 on Am. 2.8.11-14 for a complementary pointed omission of Tecmessa from an allusion to the surrounding Odes passage. 98 Cf. e.g. Hor. Carm. 2.18.17-22, 3.1.33-34 contracta pisces aequora sentiunt I iactis in altum molibus , 3.24.3-4 caementis licet occupes I Tyrrhenum omne tuis et mare sublicis. 99 For similar exposures of contradictions in Augustan ideology in the same passage, see Gibson (2003) 134-35 on Ars 3.1 13-28. 100 Translations and summaries are consciously dependent on the commentary of Rudd (1989) 101 ad loc. 101 Cf. esp. Carm. 3.6.46-8 aetas parentum peiorauis tulit I nos nequiores, mox daturos I progeniem uitiosiorem (with Nisbet-Rudd (2004) 97-100, 1 12-13).

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Horace the literary critic who advocates modern poetry against reactionary or conservative taste'.102 The gap between the two Horaces is further reinforced by the difference in his attitude to munditiae in the Odes and the Epistles. In the latter, Horace allots to munditiae a metaphorical role in Roman poetry's evolution from rusticity (2.1.157) towards its modern sophisticated state.103 By the terms of his own argument, the action of munditiae has not gone far enough, because traces of the 'country' still remain. In the Odes , however, the noun munditiae is not allowed to stand alone, but has its sense more closely defined (perhaps narrowed) by simplex ; nor is there any room here for the further operation of munditiae , for Pyrrha is perfect as she is. In Horace, modernising poetic munditiae are a straightforward good; but female and cosmetic munditiae require careful phrasing with an emphasis on archaizing simplicity. Ovid is firmly in agreement with Horace's modernizing poetics. Indeed he even revises Horace's pessimistic assessment of lingering rusticity ( Epist . 2.1.160): according to Ovid rusticitas 'survived our grandsires' ( Ars 3.128) - but is seemingly eradicated today ( Ars 3.127). From his cosmetic munditiae , however, the quality of 'simplicity' is pointedly missing. Further complexities are added in Ovid's advice to his female pupils on the style of written speech which they should adopt in letters to lovers (Ars 3.479-82). The passage is strongly marked: elsewhere the puellae may lisp and mispronounce their words (3.293-96), but their writing style must be free of error. Despite the usual connection between munditia and mediocritas, Ovid here plays one off against the other: a striving after munda ... uerba is not to lead his addressees to despise e medio [ uerba ], i.e. a style composed of 'commonplace' vocabulary.104 For Ovid, unlike Horace, it is stylistic rather than cosmetic munditia which is in need of careful policing. Ovid also gives conscious recognition to the connection between bodily and artistic munditia. The cognate mundus is attested in a stylistic sense only once prior to Ars 3.479, in Propertius' fourth book (4.5.43-44). Here, significantly, the lena advises her pupil to not imitate the 'tirades' (probra) of Medea (41-42), but rather the technique of Menander's Thais:

sed potius mundi Thais pretiosa Menandri, cum ferit astutos comica moecha Getas.

The description of the New Comic playwright Menander as mundus coheres with Ovid's own recommendation of munda uerba: both display an elegance in everyday language.105 More importantly, the recommendation of munda uerba to the puellae - deliberately

102 Barchiesi (forthcoming) makes the further suggestion that Ars 3.127-28 (quoted above) is a self- validating statement: Ovid puts an end to rusticitas by inventing it, that is by minting the sorely missed equivalent of agroikia (a Greek term which also bridges material culture and style). 103 Horace's munditiae here are closer to a farmyard scenario (e.g. Cato Agr. 2.4 pratum purgari, uirgas uinciri, spinas runcari ... munditias ['general cleaning'] fieri), than to the context of women's cosmetics found at Cic. Orat. 79. 104 For e (de) medio of a commonplace and perhaps 'intermediate' style, see below p. 108 n. 37. Cf. above pp. 31-32 for the similar terms of a stylistic debate conducted in Hor. Sat . 1 .2. 108, Ars 243. 105 For the connection between comedy and the everyday style, cf. Rem. 375-76 (quoted below p. 135). For Menander's stylistic reputation, cf. Traill (2001) 300 n. 60.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 99 employing an adjective more commonly used of physical cleanness or elegance - must, in the context of Ars 3, underline a connection between style and body. The stylistic munditia of the puellae must match the physical munditiae recommended to them earlier. This recognition granted to the connection between the two contrasts markedly with the practice of Horace. Horace gives his readers no encouragement to draw a connection between the cosmetic munditia of Pyrrha and his other use of the term in a poetological context. If readers were to make the connection for themselves, they might see the inconcinnity between Horace's somewhat 'archaic' views on the former and more thoroughly modernising views on poetics. Where Ovid flaunts the connection, for Horace it is a potential source of embarrassment.106 vi. Munditia and mediocritas in the Ars Amatoria

From Ovidian jousting with Horatian munditiae I move now to a broader look at munditia in the Ars , and subsequently, in both this section and the next, to a more sustained focus on the middle and the mean in the 'male' books of the Ars (which have been rather neglected up till now). In the closing two sections of the chapter I attempt to come to some sort of appreciation of the larger significance of, and impetus behind, the new ethic of moderation and the middle way in the poem as a whole. Here munditia has a preparatory role to play, strongly connected as it is with notions of mediocritas. That connection, as will be seen presently, can take on (pleasingly) unexpected manifestations in Ovid's hands, and Horace emerges yet again as a target for the elegist. As suggested earlier, love-elegy is attracted towards binary polarities, and operates with a number of conventional oppositions, including that of youth versus age. This polarity of (heroic) youth and (hidebound) old men, of course, is not exclusive to elegy, being memorably played out, for example, in the inter-generational conflicts of New Comedy and the revolt of the speaker of Catullus 5 against the rumores[que] senum seueriorum. The elegists continue with this tradition: the senex amator is ridiculed (Tib. 1.2.91-98, Ov. Am. 1.9.3-4), while the proper audience for elegy is defined in the Amores by Ovid, with an eye on Catullus' seueri , as composed of pueri and uirgines .107 Given the characteristic preference of the Ars Amatoria for the 'middle' and the 'mean', it was perhaps inevitable that Ovid should be found throwing his weight behind the lover of mature years, intermediate between elegy's binary opposition of youth and age. At Ars 3.555-76, Ovid indeed scornfully portrays the antics of the youthful hero of love-elegy and his passionate violence against locked doors, and the cheeks, hair and clothes of his beloved. Such things, Ovid concludes contemptuously, decent pueros aetate et amore

106 Interestingly, despite the close proximity in Ars 1 of Ovid's advice on letter- writing (1.455-86) to his advice on male munditia (1.505-24, discussed below pp. 101-04), no connection is drawn there between stylistic and cosmetic 'elegance'. Male bodies are perhaps not so poetologically suggestive as female bodies. 107 Am. 2.1.3-6 hoc quoque iussit Amor; procul hinc, procul este, seueri: I non estis teneris apta theatra modis. I me legat in sponsi facie non frigida uirgo I et rudis ignoto tactus amore puer. For this desired readership for elegy, McKeown (1998) 6-7 ad loc. usefully compares Prop. 1.17.3, 3.3.19-20,3.9.45.

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calentes (3.57 1).108 The praeceptor praises instead the uetus miles (3.565) - a figure who, appropriately enough, finds his closest analogue in the self-portrait provided by Horace in his erotic Odes}09 This lover is patient and mature (566, 572), and offers his love sensim et sapienter (565). In sum, 'this passion is more sure, serious, and more fruitful than the other: with swift hand pluck the fruit which is passing into over-ripeness' (575-76). Such are the attractions of a lover who - like Ovid himself around the time of the publication of the Ars - is neither puer nor sene: t. The novelty of such an argument within Roman love- elegy is perhaps best appreciated by remarking on its similarity to an influential strain in early modern Christian thought, which posited a mean of temperate long lasting (conjugal) love far removed from the extreme of transient lust.110 The refusal of the polarity of youth versus age is not confined in the Ars to the self- interested promotion of the man of middle years. For at Ars 2.663-702, Ovid spends considerable time and effort praising women over 35, and in terms which anticipate the images of fecundity and fruitfulness of the male in Ars 3: utilis, o iuuenes, aut haec aut serior aetas: I iste feret segetes , iste serendus ager (2.667-68), haec bona non primae tribuit natura iuuentae , I quae cito post septem lustra uenire soient. I qui properent, noua musta bibant; mihi fundat auitum I consulibus priscis condita testa merum (2.693-96). It is worth emphasising the novelty also of this encomium of a woman's 'maturity'. Over against the girl of tender years who is the beloved heroine of New Comedy, love-elegy, epigram, and the Greek novel, stands her binary opposite, the repulsive anus.ni An epigrammatist may set himself the task of praising the sexiness of a sixty-year-old woman (as Philodemus does with Charito in AP 5. 13), 112 but Ovid's praises in Ars 2 of those over thirty-five are not similarly paradoxical in tone. This is quite in keeping with the new emphasis of the Ars , here manifested in a eulogy of the sexual attractiveness of women intermediate between the young puella and the anus. In fact, Ovid singles out such women for their munditiae (2.675-78):

adde quod est illis operum prudentia maior, solus et artifices qui facit usus adest. illae munditiis annorum damna rependunt et faciunt cura ne uideantur anus.

Such women naturally have recourse to the classic mark of the intermediate in cosmetic self-adornment. And they use munditiae , appropriately enough, to avoid appearing older than their years, to avoid the 'excess' (in terms of age) characteristic of the anus.m

108 For the contemptuous tone of pueros , see Gibson (2003) 322 ad loc. 109 See Gibson (2003) 320-21 on Ars 3. 565 ff. Cf. Horace's own portrait of himself in the Epistles , in reference to his former lvric persona , as a now retired fighter (1.1 .2-3). 110 For this strain, see Scodel (2002) 145, 150-51, 164. 111 For examples in elegy, cf. Prop. 2.18a.l9-20, 3.24.36, and the lenae of Prop. 4.5 and Ov. Am. 1 .8. On the anus in Roman poetry more generally, see Richlin (1984), (1992) 109-16. 1 12 See Sider (1997) 95-96 on Philodemus AP 5.13 (= Sider 9) for similar epigrams. 1,3 The emphasis of Ars 3 is not entirely consistent with this passage: there all women are urged to practise munditiae , and Ovid, adapting the discourse of the lena, makes several disparaging comments on the effects of age and child-bearing on the female body (59-82, also 785-86).

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This characteristic association between mediocritas and munditia is written more emphatically into Ovid's advice to men - to whom I finally turn my focus - on personal grooming in Ars 1.505-24. This passage is found in a crucial position just after his advice on making first contact in letter and in person (1.455-504), and just before the actual moment when the lovers first meet face to face for an extended length of time at the conuiuium (1.565-602). 114 sed tibi nec ferro placeat torquere capillos, 505 nec tua mordaci pumice crura teras, ista iube faciant, quorum Cybeleia mater concinitur Phrygiis exululata modis. forma uiros neglecta decet; Minoida Theseus abstulit, a nulla tempora comptus acu; 5 1 0 Hippolytum Phaedra, nec erat bene cultus, amauit; cura deae siluis aptus Adonis erat, munditie placeant, fuscentur corpora Campo; sit bene conueniens et sine labe toga. +lingua ne rigeat+, careant rubigine dentes, 5 1 5 nec uagus in laxa pes tibi pelle natet. nec male deformet rígidos tonsura capillos: sit coma, sit trita barba resecta manu, et nihil emineant, et sint sine sordibus ungues, inque caua nullus stet tibi nare pilus. 520 nec male odorati sit tristis anhelitus oris, nec laedat nares uirque paterque gregis. cetera lasciuae faciant, concede, puellae, et si quis male uir quaerit habere uirum.

Ovid begins with the state of 'excess', namely the hair-curling and customary depilation of the effeminate male (505-08); moves next to the intermediate, characterised by forma neglecta (509) and mundities (513);115 before adding a longer section on the 'deficient' state of male grooming, as characterised by the typical traits of the country bumpkin (515-22). 116 The longer treatment accorded the deficient state reflects the nature of the desired intermediate. If excess may be symbolised by the eunuch priests of Cybele, and the proper state by the hunter Hippolytus, there is a danger that the inexperienced addressee will interpret 'neglected appearance' as the equivalent of a scorn for hygiene.117

1 14 For Ovid's espousal of the 'mean' in both these passages, see below pp. 105-08. 115 For Ovid's preference here for the fifth-declension form of the noun ( mundities ), see Hollis (1977) 1 18-19 ad loc. (such forms may possess a 'slightly old fashioned tone'). 116 Labate (1984) 133 n. 135 notes the extensive parallels between 1.515-22 and the agroikia and dyscheria of Theophrast. Charact. 4 and 19. For the broader significance of Ovid's advice here in the context of late republican and early imperial ideas of urbanitas , see Labate op. cit. 132-36 (who rightly points out that Ovid, unlike Catullus, need not resort to polemic where urbanitas is concerned: that battle has been won, and concern now is with the possibility of excess). 117 The danger may be increased if the addressee has read Phaedra's praise of Hippolytus' appearance at Epist. 4.75-78 sint procul a nobis iuuenes ut femina compii! - I fine coli modico

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But Ovid's Neglect' is that appropriate to a man who exercises on the Campus and at other times wears the toga (513-14); hence the lengthy warning against rusticitas. The passage ends with a reaffirmation that the 'excessive' state of self-adornment properly belongs to puellae and cinaedi (523-24). The parallels with the advice on female grooming in Ars 3 are clear: a state of excess (effeminate appearance for men, luxury items for women), a deficient state (variously designated as archaic or rustic), and an intermediate state (characterised by a restraint in the adornment of the self). Naturally the 'mean' differs for both sexes - the intermediate is 'relative to us' as in Aristotle - but both share a fundamental commitment to munditia(- es). Earlier Ovid was seen defining proper munditiae for women by offering a tendentious reading of Horace's Pyrrha as a cosmetic 'extreme'. An equally subversive manoeuvring of Horace into the position of the 'deficient' state can be detected in the present instance. For behind Ovid's picture of the country bumpkin lies a Horatian 'self-portrait' (Sat. 1.3.30-34): rideri possit eo quod 30 rusticius tonso toga defluit et male laxus in pede calceus haeret: at est bonus ...... at ingenium ingens inculto latet hoc sub corpore.

The person in question - presumably Horace - parallels Ovid's rustic in three respects: his hair is badly cut, his toga is ill-fitting, and his footwear is too big.118 The impulse towards reading these lines biographically is strengthened by the recurrence of the motif of a bad haircut and ill-fitting toga in a more clearly autobiographical context in the Epistles - although modern readers will hardly miss the characteristic Horatian irony and distancing of self from these portraits.119 But Ovid, here as elsewhere, blithely takes this Augustan poet at face value: his male addressees must not imitate such a shocking example of rusticity. More fundamentally, there is no place in the Ars for Horace's contrast between outward appearance and inner worth. It is irrelevant that the rustic is really bonus (morally good) or that beneath his 'uncultivated outward appearance' there lurks a 'huge talent':

forma uirilis amat. I te turn iste rigor positique sine arte capilli I et leuis egregio puluis in ore decet. Phaedra's emphasis on 'moderation' (fine ... modico) is congruent with the Ars ; but the identification of that moderation with 'light dust on the face' hardly suits the urban context of the latter. 118 For a succinct statement of the case for taking Sat. 1.3.30-34 as a self-portrait, see Brown (1993) 117 on 1.3.29-34 (noting particularly the later autobiographical statement at 1.3.63-66). The parallels with the Ars are noted by Hollis (1977) 119 on 1.514-18. Note in particular the verbal allusion at Ars 1.516 nec uagus in laxa pes tibi pelle natet to Sat. 1.3.31-32 male laxus I in pede calceus haeret. 1,9 Epist. 1.1.94-97 si curatus inaequali tonsore capillos I occurri, rides; si forte subucula pexae I trita subest tunicae , uel si toga dissidet impar, I rides. For the irony of these portraits, see Freudenberg (1993) 27-33, who persuasively argues that the self-portrait in Sat. 1.3 is part of a strategy of creating the satiric persona of a 'buffoon' and 'social menace'.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 103 outward appearance is all that matters to the praeceptor ,120 Indeed Ovid adds insult to injury by supplementing Horace's self-portrait with details apparently derived from the Theophrastan 'characters' of 'boorishness' and 'squalor'.121 Ovid casts Horace, then, in the 'extremist' role, and so anticipates the same strategies which he will deploy vis à vis Horace in Ars 3. However, the particular appearance of munditia(-es) as the mark of the recommended 'intermediate' state for men of forma neglecta points ultimately in a direction other than Horace, namely towards Cicero's de Officiis. Earlier I analysed Ovid's use in A rs 3 of a pair of passages from the de Officiis where Cicero sets out two complementary versions of extreme styles of gait (1.128-29, 131). For his advice in Ars 1 on male munditia , Ovid draws on a passage from the de Officiis which appears immediately between this pair of passages, at 1.130:

cum autem pulchritudinis duo genera sint, quorum in altero uenustas sit, in altero dignitas, uenustatem muliebrem ducere debemus, dignitatem uirilem. ergo et a forma remoueatur omnis uiro non dignus ornatus, et huic simile uitium in gestu motuque caueatur. nam et palaestrici motus sunt saepe odiosiores et histrionum nonnulli gestus ineptiis non uacant, et in utroque genere quae sunt recta et Simplicia laudantur. formae autem dignitas coloris bonitate tuenda est, color exercitationibus corporis, adhibenda praeterea munditia est non odiosa ñeque exquisita nimis, tantum quae fugiat agrestem et inhumanam neglegentiam. eadem ratio est habenda uestitus, in quo, sicut in plerisque rebus, mediocritas òptima est

Cicero makes clear the connection between munditia and mediocritas which also underlies the instruction of the Ars. A further attraction of this passage for Ovid, no doubt, was the fact that in Sat . 1 .2 Horace had already used its two extremes of male effeminacy and dandyism as part of an argument that, in Rome, nil medium est (28). 122 Unlike Horace, Ovid re-affirms the reality of a middle way for Roman male cultus. He begins, once more the good teacher, by personifying the abstractions of his 'source' text. Cicero's uenustas muliebris becomes - appropriately for a male audience - Ovid's effeminate male, eunuch priests, and puella (505-08, 523-24), while dignitas uirilis takes the form of Hippolytus and Theseus (509-12). 123 The following brief section on movements and gestures is omitted by Ovid, and reappears as a subject in the Ars only in a passing couplet at 3.275-76. But the recommendation on maintaining a manly appearance by 'good colouring' gained through 'bodily exercise' has clearly influenced Ars 1.513 fuscentur corpora Campo. 124 Most significant of all, however, is Ovid's appropriation of Cicero's

120 The obsession with outward appearance becomes especially strong in Ars 3, almost to the exclusion of all else; see Gibson (2003) 114 (on Ars 3.67-68), 131 (on 104), 145 (on 129ff.), 187 (on 219ff.), 198-99 (on 25 Iff.), 264 (on 397), 294 (on 481), 300 (on 501 ff.), 390 (on 771ff.). 121 See above n. 116. 122 See above pp. 20-21. For extensive parallels also between Cicero and the Paideia of Clement of Alexandria, which may suggest the character and content of the Panaetian original (perhaps rather compressed by Cicero here), see Dyck (1996) 305-07 ad loc. 123 Cf. Ovid's personification of Cicero's effeminatum aut molle and durum aut rusticum , above pp. 81-82. 124 The Campus itself has intruded from the recommendation of ludi at Off. 1.104 suppedita[n]t autem et Campus noster ... As D'Elia (1961) 135 observes, Ovid retains Cicero's recommendation

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munditia. Male munditia is elsewhere viewed negatively or with ambivalence by traditional (archaic / rustic) Roman moralists.125 But to bolster his recommendation of it to his male pupils, Ovid can rely on the support of this grand consensus text of the late Republic. In fact he faithfully transcribes - into a somewhat dubious erotic context - the exact quality of Cicero's munditia. For Cicero, male munditia must avoid the two extremes of being either 'disagreeable' or 'over-meticulous' ( non odiosa ñeque exquisita nimis ), although the mean here is rather closer to the first of these extremes, only being such as to 'avoid boorish [agrestem] and uncivilized slovenliness [neglegentiamY . Similarly, Ovid's mean is represented by 'neglected appearance' and the not over-cultivated figures of Theseus and Hippolytus. Useful for understanding the emphasis of both Ovid and Cicero is Aristotle's chapter (EN 1 108b 1 1-1 109al9) on the greater closeness of the intermediate, at times, to one extreme rather than the other, and the greater resemblance sometimes borne by one extreme to the intermediate (as in the case of the continuum of rashness- courage-cowardice, where the first two elements appear closer to one another than the last two). But, as suggested earlier, Ovid heads off any potential misunderstandings - by adding to Cicero a warning against the extreme of rustic neglectfulness. Whatever the undoubted subversive intent of Ovid's appropriation of Cicero, the gulf between the resulting new middling 'ethic' of the Ars and that of earlier elegy can bear some re-emphasis. This ethic has been established already in the case of the women of Ars 3, where Ovid's puellae are invited to trace a middle path between (e.g.) Propertius' alternating taste for Cynthia's luxuria and his demands that she dress more simply, or between the respectable palla of Tragedy and the silks of Elegy. As for male standards of grooming and dress, the elegists have relatively little to say about themselves here, but Propertius, on two memorable occasions (discussed above), gives distinct hints of a 'foppish' taste in clothing and other luxury items.126 By contrast, Ovid demands a more austere 'mean': forma neglecta , mundities, and a clean toga.127

of a tan at the risk of contradiction with his later instruction at 1 .729 palleat omnis amans: hic est color aptus amanti. No doubt the need clearly to signpost this erotic appropriation of Cicero over- rides other artistic concerns. 125 Cf. Gell. 1.5.2 (on the dress of Hortensius: a passage whose wider context is discussed in Gibson (forthcoming)), and see Oakley (1998) 579 on Livy 8.15.7, quoting Livy 28.35.6 (of Scipio) habitusque corporis non cultus munditiis sed uirilis uere ac militar is, Sen. Contr. 1 praef. 8, Sen. Dial. 4.33.3, Nat. 7.31.2, Tac. Ann. 3.30.2, and Suet. Oth. 12.1. 126 Prop. 2.4.5-6, and 4.8.75 (quoted above pp. 79-80). Note also Am. 3.9.66 culte Tibulle , where culte perhaps refers not only to poetic style; cf. the report of the Vita Tibulli (perhaps derived from Suetonius) on the elegist, insignis forma cultuque corporis obseruabilis , also the mundus uictus ('stylish way of life') attributed to the Albius of Hor. Epist. 1 .4. 1 1 . 127 For the generally conservative attitude of Ovid to male cultus in the Ars , see Gibson (2003) 23, 132 (a contrast between Ars 3.107-08 and the more libertine Medic. 23-26), 151 (haircuts), 162 (dress), 275-76 {munditia versus effeminacy), and 277 and 356 (pejorative use of cultus in reference to men).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 105 vii. Moderation and the Mean in Ars Amatoria 1 and 2

The argument of the preceding two sections of this chapter has been taken up with terms from the mundus family, using the latter to bring into closer focus the novel emphasis in the Ars on the mean and the middle way. Attention now moves to some perhaps more familiar or conventional methods used by Ovid to propagate this same emphasis, beginning with the poet's advice at a key moment in Ars 1. Around line 565 the lover finally comes into close contact with his beloved, at a dinner party. Instruction at the symposium, as well as instruction about the symposium, both have long traditions.128 One conventional feature is the warning given by the symposiast to his fellow men about the dangers of an immoderate intake,129 often backed up by a reference to the murderous brawl between Lapiths and Centaurs at the wedding of Pirithous - as paradigmatically at Carm. 1.18.7-9 ac ne quis modici transiliat muñera Liberi , I Centaurea monet cum Lapithis rixa super mero I debellata. Ovid incorporates these features into his own role as praeceptor amoris at Ars 1.589-94:

certa tibi a nobis dabitur mensura bibendi: officium praestent mensque pedesque suum. 590 iurgia praecipue uino stimulata caueto et nimium faciles ad fera bella manus, occidit Eurytion stulte data uina bibendo: aptior est dulci mensa merumque ioco.

Like a good symposiast, Ovid insists on a 'sure rule for drinking' (do not drink so much that you cannot think or stand up), and warns against violence by citing the example of Eurytion, one of the Centaurs killed in the notorious brawl. Ovid's closeness to the sympotic tradition is unsurprising in itself, but quite remarkable in the context of the elegiac tradition of scandalous parties and immoderate consumption of wine. However it is the contrast between Propertius and the new ethic of moderation adopted in Ars 1 which is most striking. As seen in Chapter 2, Propertius celebrates the libertine's triad of nox, amor , and uinum , drinking and often brawling far into the night.130 One could hardly miss the contrast between Ovid and Propertius' manifesto for avoiding violence, by living with 'limbs overwhelmed with wine' (2.15.41-48). For the former prefers the strongly traditional method of avoiding conflict through moderate consumption. Furthermore, whereas Propertius proclaims his own adherence to a life of love and wine, but has severe doubts about Cynthia matching his consumption (2.33b), Ovid is quite consistent in his

128 For the latter in particular, see Gibson (2003) 379-80 on Ars 3.747-68, 384-85 on 3.761 ff. 129 Cf. e.g. Theogn. 467-98, Xen. Symp. 2.24ff., and Hunter (1983) 186 on Eubul. frg. 94 (= 93 K.-A.). 130 See above pp. 45-46. As regards the night-time element of Propertius' triad, there is an interesting contrast, which I cannot develop here, with the world of the Ars Amatoria where so much of the action takes place in the open air and during daylight, while the night is explicitly marked as a zone of danger and deceit (1 .229-52, 3.747-68).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 06 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT moderation, recommending the same limits for drinking to the puellae of Ars 3 as he had to the male addressees of Ars 1 .131 If Ovid avoids the alcoholic excesses (and contradictions) of Propertius, he also eschews the 'deficient' state of abstinence from wine. In earlier elegy, the poets occasionally practise sobriety, whether through the substitution of water for wine in a context of 'adulterous' subterfuge (Tib. 1.6.27-28), or, as in Ovid's own case, through clever avoidance of wine in an attempt to apprehend his unfaithful puella.13 2 Despite the advantages of such sobriety in a similar context of subterfuge in the Ars (of which more presently), it is indicative of Ovid's adherence to the ethic of the 'intermediate' that he should nowhere recommend to his pupils the 'deficient' state of abstinence from alcohol. In the Remedia , by contrast, and in keeping with the more 'extremist' ethic adopted in that work, Ovid recommends either sobriety or total drunkenness (805-10): uina parant animum Veneri , nisi plurima sumas I ut stupeant multo corda sepulta mero. II aut nulla ebrietas, aut tanta sit , ut tibi curas I eripiat : si qua est inter utrumque, nocet. One general implication is clear: extreme measures are appropriate for curing love, but successful love is an arena to which moderation, quite paradoxically, is proper. But, it is inevitable that Ovid's adoption of the principle of 'moderation' and the 'mean' should not be entirely straightforward. As so often in the Ars , restraint is to be practised in contexts or as means towards ends of which conventional morals would hardly approve. The broader context for Ovid's advice on moderate consumption of wine (1.565-602) is that of a dinner party attended by the male lover in pursuit of a puella who is accompanied by her uir (as in the archetype Am. 1.4). The passage is filled with advice on flirting with the puella and lulling her uir into thinking well of the insidious lover - and into the 'excessive' state of drunkenness. Such a scenario can easily be mapped onto the adulterer's assault on an uxor accompanied by her uir. Furthermore, moderation in wine is recommended not only because it decreases the risk of violence, but also because it is beneficial to the strategy of the lover. Real drunkenness, warns Ovid, is harmful, but feigned inebriation (1.597) will grant the lover licence to make some 'excessive' remarks: ut, quicquid facias dicasue proteruius aequo , I credatur nimium causa fuisse merum (1.599-600). Moderation allows the lover to imitate excess convincingly and then take more effective advantage of its benefits. Various other examples could be given of Ovid's recommendation of the 'mean' to his male pupils, including the highly dubious advice that, in caring for an ill puella , the lover should neither imitate the excesses of the 'flatterer', nor prescribe the bitter medicines of the doctor: sit suus in blanda sedulitate modus (2.334). Kcupóç is likewise recommended in first accustoming the puella to one's presence (1.337-56) and then in judging the

131 Cf. Ars 1.590 and 3.763-65 hoc quoque , qua patiens caput est animusque pedesque I constant nec, quae sunt singula, bina uides. I turpe iacens mulier multo madefacta Lyaeo. For the sting in the tail of such parallel treatment, see below p. 113. The same principle of self-restraint is applied to food at 3.757-58 neue domi praesume dapes, sed desine citra I quam capis: es paulo, quam potes esse, minus. 132 Am. 2.5.13-14 ipse miser uidi, cum me dormire putares, I sobrius apposito crimina uestra mero ; contrast 22 compositi iuuenes unus et alter erant.

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correct length of time to stay away (1.357-72). Rather similar is the advice on the correct length of time for which one should play the role of ex clusus amator (2.521-32). More broadly comic is the recommendation of neither excess nor deficiency in the journey towards mutual sexual pleasure: sed ñeque tu dominam uelis maioribus usus I desere, nec cursus anteat illa tuos (2.725-26). It might be possible to detect here a naughty revision of a sentiment in the Epistles , where Horace stakes his midpoint between the extremes of Epicureanism and Cynicism.133 However, the example from Ars 1 on which I wish to focus is Ovid's advice on the necessarily significant topic of speech and writing. From this will emerge, however, a glimpse of the ultimately greater impact of ideas of the mean on Ars 3. The male lover, after establishing contact with his beloved's ancilla (1.350-98), and having been given advice on the proper time to approach the beloved herself (1.399-436), is now said to be ready to communicate by letter. Ovid offers advice both on content (1.437-54) and on proper style (1.459-68):

disce bonas artes, moneo, Romana iuuentus, non tantum trépidos ut tueare reos: 460 quam populus iudexque grauis lectusque senātus, tam dabit eloquio uicta puella manus, sed lateant uires, nec sis in fronte disertus; effugiant uoces uerba molesta tuae. quis nisi mentis inops tenerae declamai amicae? 465 saepe ualens odii littera causa fuit, sit tibi credibilis sermo consuetaque uerba, blanda tarnen, praesens ut uideare loqui.

The passage begins with some flattery of its highly-educated male addressees - assumed to be dazzling the people, the courts of law, and even the Senate with their eloquence - before offering the swiftly deflating advice that puellae will not be similarly enchanted by such rhetorical fireworks. Men must not display their powers ( uires ), must avoid ostentation ( in fronte disertus ), affected vocabulary ( uerba molesta ), and a declamatory (declamai) or vigorous style ( ualens ... littera). Instead they must write convincingly (i credibilis sermo), employ 'usual' vocabulary ( consuetaque uerba), and aim for the immediacy of dialogue (praesens ut uideare loqui). At first sight, this passage presents something of a problem for the supposed ethic of the 'intermediate' in the Ars. Only two styles - the declamatory and the conversational - are mentioned, not three, this pair being used to make clear the difference between declaiming to an audience and conversing with a correspondent in a letter.134 Ovid's model once more is a passage from the de Officiis (1.132):

133 Epist. 1.2.70-71 quod si cessas aut strenuus anteis, I nec tardum opperior nec praecedentibus insto , with Moles (1985) 37. 134 Cf. the older division of style into two categories, the grand and the plain, e.g. at Cic. Brut. 201. The newer division of style into three is first attested in Latin at Herenn. 4.8.1 1, where distinctions are made between the three types of grauis , medio cris, and extenua ta; cf. Cic. de Orat. 3.177, 199, 210-12, Orat. 20-22, 75-99, and see Fantham (2004) 280-82.

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et quoniam magna uis orationis est eaque duplex, altera contentionis, altera sermonis, contentio disceptationibus tribuatur iudiciorum contionum senātus, sermo in circulis, disputationibus, congressionibus familiarium uersetur, sequatur etiam conuiuia.

Immediately after this sentence, Cicero asserts that the subject of conversation, unlike that of rhetoric, inexplicably, has attracted no precepts (until now). Ovid takes up this challenge, but transfers Cicero's instruction to letter-writing - an equally under-theorised subject, by comparison with rhetoric. The correspondences are close: Cicero's distinction between rhetoric ( contentio ) and conversation {sermo) becomes Ovid's distinction between declamation and conversational epistles. The three audiences envisaged for rhetoric in Cicero (law-courts, assemblies of the people, and the Senate) are carefully reproduced at Ars 1.461. 135 Nevertheless, the clear focus of both Ovid and Cicero on only two types of style - each appropriate to a particular setting - would appear to make it difficult to invoke the model of the 'mean'. But a complementary passage on letter writing in Ars 3, briefly mentioned earlier, retrospectively applies precisely this model to the earlier passage (3.479-82):

munda sed e medio consuetaque uerba, puellae, scribite : sermonis publica forma placet, a, quotiens dubius scriptis exarsit amator et nocuit formae barbara lingua bonae.

The puellae should use words which are 'usual' - for 'the normal forms of language' give pleasure. The repetition of consuetaque uerba ( Ars 3.479 = Ars 1.467) makes the implicit point that both men and women should aim for the same familiar and conversational style in their letters. But the points from which each sex must travel in order to arrive at this style are constructed in such a way as to suggest opposed extremities, whose intermediate point lies at 'usual' vocabulary. At Ars 1.459-68 Ovid warns his male pupils against using their rhetorical training when writing to puellae, while in Ars 3 women are warned against ' barbarismus ' (482 barbara lingua ), i.e. incorrect Latin, such as errors in number or gender or mistakes with syllables and letters.136 In this scheme, men are prone to the 'excessive' state (overwrought use of language in a love letter), while women are prone to the 'deficient' state (ungrammatical language). Over against these characteristic faults stands an ideal style which, being the same for both sexes, now emerges as a 'mean'.137 A

135 Cicero's identification of conuiuia as an appropriate arena for conversation anticipates, more generally, one of the subjects next treated by Ovid (Ars 1.525-630). For Ovid's treatment of Cicero's following subject of pronunciation, see above p. 82 n. 39. On the larger context for Cicero's instruction on the art of conversation, see Narducci (1989) 173-83. 136 For barbarismus , see Gibson (2003) 294 ad loc. 137 The primary reference of Ars 3.479 is to the ideal of a 'commonplace' style (see Gibson (2003) 293-94 ad loc. on e medio in this context), but the phrase arguably here also alludes to the mean or intermediate state between the declamatory style of the male and the barbara lingua of the female. I do not attempt to link Ovid's advice with a more general 'mean' of style or theories of the three styles. For evidence, however, of the Aristotelian school identifying excellence of style as a mean -

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3 : OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 1 09 usefully comparable method of treatment is found in a passage from Horace' Satires on excess in opposite directions. In Sat. 2.3 the speaker tells the story of one Servius Oppidius who diagnosed faults of opposed tendencies in his two sons: one was a prodigal, while the other was a hoarder (2.3.166-75). On his death-bed, as he handed his two farms over to them, he begged, quare , per diuos oratus uterque Penatis, I tu caue ne minuas, tu ne maius facias id I quod satis esse putat pater et Natura coercet (2.3.176-78). The implied mean, as Muecke (1993) 150 on 2.3.175 points out, 'is to avoid going wrong "in either direction" (cf. Sat. 2.2.60)' - to remain satisfied with what one has. Ovid uses a similar procedure here of pointing out opposing extremes of behaviour in two groups of individuals by way of recommending the mean to both. But there is, it should be added, one interesting difference between Ovid and Horace. In the former, one extreme, that of barbarismus , has rather more prejudicial implications for its (female) holders and their status than does the opposite extreme of rhetorical Latin for the male addressees of Ars ļ 138 An important hint of the middle way's relative importance across the three books of the Ars is provided by these passages on letter- writing. In Ars 1 Ovid works with the dual model of rhetorical versus conversational speech, where the central issue is one of 'appropriateness' rather than a 'middle' style. But Ovid's return to the same subject in Ars 3 effectively transforms the significance of the earlier passage. The warning against 'bad' Latin in Ars 3 turns the 'rhetorical' Latin of Ars 1 into an opposing extreme, and the 'usual words' of them both into an intermediate. I shall return to develop some issues implicit in this observation in the final section of the chapter. There I attempt to account for the greater development and importance of the theme of the intermediate in Ars 3. 139 viii. The Middle Way of the Ars Amatoria: Ovid, Archestratus of Gela (again), and Didactic Poetry

Having analysed a significant body of material which strongly suggests a paradoxical emphasis in the Ars Amatoria on the ideals of the mean, moderation and the middle way, some key questions remain to be answered. What is the significance of this emphasis? Why are these ideals, largely absent from earlier elegy, so important in a poem which implicitly proclaims itself a successor to that genre? One reason for the importance of ideas of moderation and the intermediate in the Ars lies in Ovid's discovery of an energising new 'source' for elegy in Cicero's de Officiis. Behind this work of course lies Panaetius, elsewhere known to be an admirer of Aristotle. But to point to the de Officiis in this way is really only to reformulate the question, as it must then be asked what attracted Ovid to the de Officiis (and its ethic of moderation and associated ideas). An obvious answer to all these questions - one hinted at throughout my perhaps confused by some later theorists with the 'middle' style - see Hendrickson (1904), also Bonner (1938). 138 See Gibson (2003) 292-93 on Ars 3.479ff., also idem (1998) 303-05. 139 In Ars 3, cf. also Ovid's advice on the proper way for women to smile (3.283-84); on 'moderation' and Kaipóç in handling the emotions of lovers, whereby women should not give in too easily to men or torture them too long (3.471-78, 511, 577-610); and, more generally, on why women must avoid anger (3.237-42, 369-80, 501-08, 683-84).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 10 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT discussion - is to point out the creative attraction for Ovid of an ethic which might allow him to move beyond, and repeatedly poke fun at, the preference for binary polarities and extremes so beloved of canonical elegy. But there are other kinds of answer too. For Ovid's commitment to 'moderation', as argued above, is also a statement of poetics. The female body often reflects the poetic programmes of the elegists, and in Ars 3, similarly, the grooming recommended to the puellae reflects the poetics of erotic-didactic' s 'middle' position between elegy and the higher genres. But didactic poetry is important in another way too, in the generic pressure which it exerts on the content and expression of the Ars. Didactic' s typical goal of the mastery of a T6XVT) or body of knowledge must be thought to encourage an emphasis on control and balance. It would be more than paradoxical to compose a work full of rules and guidance on 'excess' - although, admittedly, some passages in the Ars Amatoria at times look like an attempt to do just this.140 Nevertheless, an 'art' of decadent excess, from the viewpoint of the Ars Amatoria , will appear lacking in aesthetic and artistic challenge. Moderation and appropriate self-control allow the display of technique, self-knowledge, even flair (on the part of both speaker and addressee); while 'excess' may simply demand that one find the nearest boundary or taboo and transgress or flout them.141 So the 'genre' of Hesiod, Lucretius, and Vergil acts to predetermine that Ovid should recommend the réxvr' inherent in the observation of limits. But the generic pressures exerted by didactic on its subject-matter are perhaps best understood not by looking at these texts, but at another text which, admittedly marginal to the canon, nevertheless shares a reputation for scandal with the Ars and yet displays the same commitment to (a version of) moderation. Archestratus' Hedupatheia was introduced in Chapter 2 to bring out the peculiar character of Propertius' libertinism. There the thoroughgoing commitment of this didactic work to culinary luxury, pleasure, and 'intemperance' (e.g. frg. 24.20 Olson-Sens èyKpaTécoç, 32.7 aKÓXaaTOç) was traced. Such a work, like the Ars Amatoria , might seem an unlikely place to discover an ethic of restraint. But Archestratus is not so antinomian as to celebrate or practise excess, luxury and self-indulgence for their own sake. Even the libertine may avoid indulgence where moderation will increase the elegance of the surroundings or the pleasures of consumption. Olson-Sens observe that Archestratus' hedonism is accompanied by 'a superficially contradictory insistence on simplicity as a basic culinary value' ((2000) lii). For example, the poet gives some prominence to a simple staple like barley and barley-cake rather than wheat (frg. 5); he eschews elaborate cooking techniques for fish; frequently uses áTTXcoç ('only, simply') to qualify his instructions (frg. 36.7, 57.4, 58.2); avoids the description of complicated sauces and stuffings;

140 I think (e.g.) of Ovid's implication that not even a thousand lovers would be too many for the female reader of Ars 3 (87-98). 141 A distant reflection of these sentiments is found in the Ars itself at 2. 162, where the rich lover is said to have no need of ars / the Ars: nil opus est illi, qui dabit, arte mea. (Cf. a more barbed version of this at 3.257-58: women with perfect looks have no need of the equivalent.) It is the challenge of situations requiring artistry and technique which interest the praeceptor.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 3: OVID AND THE NEW MIDDLE WAY 1 1 1 and in seasonings confínes himself to a simple range.142 The reason for such simplicity is made especially clear at frg. 37.7-9 (of fish): Tov 8' ayaOov [iclXolkov re ývcrei Kai mova aápica áXai (lóvov '67TT0i"ai Tráaaç Kal éXaico àXeiijjaç' TTļv ap6Tfļy yàp Tfjç répipioç avròç èv auTw But as for that which is good and naturally soft and rich-fleshed, [treat it] by sprinkling it with fine-ground salt only and basting it with olive oil; for it contains the height of pleasure within itself.

Here the essential character of Archestratus' restraint becomes clear: simplicity is to be observed because it increases pleasure - rather than, as in more conventional and Aristotelian thought, because excess is bad in itself.143 There are obvious parallels here with Ovidian 'moderation'. Furthermore, a social aspect to Archestratus' 'simplicity' may be discovered, as with particular clarity in his attack on the novel and elaborate 'vulgarity' of Sicilian and Italiot cooks . The point of this attack, of course, is to distinguish lovers of elegance and taste from those who merely spend lavishly and indiscriminately.144 Ovid's Ars Amatoria lacks Archestratus' preference for luxury items, and there are few signs in the later poet of a desire to be as socially exclusive as the earlier.145 But there is a highly suggestive parallel between the preference expressed in these otherwise libertine texts for appropriate restraint and self-limitation. For Archestratus, lavish expenditure by itself is not the key to a life of pleasure. Rather the gourmand has his own scale and continuum, with an intermediate point and a state of excess. The former is characterised by refinement and simplicity, while the state of 'excess' is represented by indis- criminate spending. The temper of Archestratus' poem thus anticipates that of the Ars Amatoria - and this may be attributed in part to the shared genre of the two poems. The teaching of an art or subject area inevitably involves the recommendation of discrimin- ation, whether in the avoidance of elaborate sauces and the cultivation of simplicity, or, as in the Ars Amatoria , in the avoidance of drunkenness, inflated rhetoric and effeminacy of

142 See Olson-Sens (2000) liv, and cf. e.g. frg. 24.4-5 (olive oil sufficient), 36.4-7 (cooking a fish simply, without cheese), 38.4-8 (roasting tuna only with salt and olive oil), 57.7-9 (seasoning roast hare with salt alone, avoiding elaborate sauces). 143 Cf. similarly frg. 5.17-18 'A white loaf that has come from the oven fully risen, just at the moment it is ready to be eaten, will give pleasure at dinner [aßpai? 0áXXa)v capais1 Tep^ei Trapa ÔaTTvov]'. 144 Frg. 46.10-14 'Let no Syracusan or Italian I come near you as you are making this dish, I for they do not know how to prepare top-quality fish I but utterly ruin them by covering everything they cook with cheese I and sprinkling it with liquid vinegar and silphium-flavoured broth.' For Sicilian cooking as 'notoriously lavish and heavily spiced' , see Olson-Sens (2000) 186 on frg. cit. 10-11. 145 For Archestratus' audience of 'aristocratic epicures', see Olson-Sens (2000) xliii-xlvi, and cf. the complementary restriction of the recommended number of diners (frg. 4., with Olson-Sens (2000) 20 ad loc.). By contrast, the Ars Amatoria is addressed to a much broader group (1.1, 3.57-58); cf. Gibson (2003) 128-29 (on Ars 3.101-34) on Ovid's avoidance of issues of social exclusion.

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appearance (for men), or the avoidance of drinking, expensive fabrics, jewellery, elaborate hairstyles, even over-eating, and the cultivation of munditiae (for women).146 Support from the influence of the didactic genre on this shared ethic of restraint can perhaps be inferred from the so-called polymetrics of Catullus. The first sixty poems of Catullus share obvious parallels with the subject-matter of both Archestratus and the Ars Amatoria , including drinking, dining, luxury items, personal appearance, styles of speaking or writing, and cultus / urbanitas. Catullus of course proclaims his personal poverty, but never espouses a complementary ethic of restraint and simplicity. Rather the dominant ethic of Catullus' polymetric poetry is one of competition with his fellows for social position.147 Personal poverty is used as a weapon in this competition (as in the gentle humiliation of Fabullus in 13), not as the starting point for the expression of a more general desire for moderation and simplicity.

ix. The Middle Way of Ars Amatoria 3

Such then are some of the meanings which may be discovered for the new emphasis put on the middle way in the Ars Amatoria. But, as hinted earlier, the question of the significance of 'moderation' must be rephrased, taking into account a feature quite obvious in the relative distribution of material covered in this chapter - namely the greater importance of the 'intermediate' in Ars 3. Why is the 'middle way' so important in the book addressed to women? One answer to this question might start from the observation that in much of ancient literature women are typically made the object of a discourse of 'excess'. The wholesale condemnation of women as a species for their treachery, rapacity, and greed, is familiar from the outburst of Agamemnon in Hades against Clytemnestra (Horn. Od. 11.432-34) and Semonides frg. 7 onwards. Ars 3 in fact begins with Ovid's attempt to counter the arguments of this broad tradition.148 One strand of this tradition concentrates particularly on women's tendency towards various forms of excess, and finds its way into elegy - as shown in Chapter 2 - in Propertius 3.19. Here the elegist insists that women are driven by 'lust' (libido), and constantly exceed established boundaries for passion: uos, ubi contempti rupistis frena pudoris, I nescitis captae mentis habere modum (3.19.3-4). Publilius Syrus, in a proverb quoted as an epigraph to the present chapter, makes the related assertion that women are characteristically drawn to the extremities of either love or hate, and know 'no third thing'.149 Such sentiments - and in particular much of the argument of Propertius 3.19 - are in fact taken up by Ovid in Ars 1 in an opportunistic attempt to reassure his male addressees that cunetas I posse capi (1.269-70). Assurances of women's excessive libido both preface the praeceptoť s subsequent catalogue of the

146 The 'Archestratean' combination of luxury with ideals of restraint or refinement - as opposed to ostentation and expenditure - was a tradition evidently understood at Rome, for it is parodied by Horace in his quasi-didactic Sat. 2.4; see the introduction of Muecke (1993) 166-68. 147 See Fitzgerald (1995) 87-1 13. 148 See Gibson (2003) 89-90 on 3.7-28, and 91-92 on 3.9-10. For early-modern reception of this popular sentiment, see Scodel (1996) 256 n. 6, (2002) 323 n. 2. For another typical example of this tradition on women's tendency towards excess, cf. the story of the widow of Ephesus as told at Petron. 1 10.6-1 12.

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transgressive heroines of Greek myth (1.281-82 parcior in nobis nec tam furiosa libido ; I legitimum finem fiamma uirilis habet) and bring it to a conclusion (1.341-42 omnia femínea sunt ista libidine mota ; I acrior est nostra plusque furoris habet). In the prologue to Ars 3, Ovid makes equally opportunistic amends with a skillful revision of this argument, suggesting that women's greater susceptibility to passion in fact means that they are more likely to be victims of male deception.150 But the basic assumption of 'excess' remains, which makes it all the more arresting that Ovid should then go on, in the main body of instruction in Ars 3, to develop and apply to women an ethic of restraint and moderation. Recipients of a discourse on moderation are of course implicitly assumed to be in danger of a tendency to excess. But from the exhortations in archaic Greek poetry on ethical, political, and symposiastic moderation onwards, it is largely men who are the addressees of this tradition. By contrast, women are more likely to be simply denounced for failing to respect agreed boundaries. There is then an aspect of novelty to Ovid's application of an essentially masculine discourse to women, although such novelty need not always operate in women's favour. It was seen earlier in the chapter that Ovid recommends moderate consumption of alcohol to men (1.589-94). Essentially the same advice is given to women at Ars 3.761-69, but to rather different effect. For to address men on this topic is to include one's addressees in a grand aristocratic tradition of sympotic restraint; but to ask women to moderate their drinking suggests the antics of the drunken prostitute at the Greek symposium or of her aristocratic counterpart at the Roman conuiuium.151 I finish this chapter with one kind of answer to the question of the significance of moderation in Ars 3 already given in my commentary, where I examined the relationship between the Ars and the lex Iulia de adulteriis coercendis of c. 18 BCE.152 There I noted that one recent reconstruction argued that the law effectively polarised female citizen society into the mutually exclusive categories of meretrix and materfamilias.i53 One possible purpose of this polarisation was to 'restore' a clear boundary between respectable and non-respectable females.154 My earlier argument for the relevance of this reconstruction of the law to understanding the particular emphases of Ars 3 can be given fresh impetus by reflecting on the Amores poem with which the present chapter began. The authors of the Julian law, it might be said, were effectively living in the same moral universe as Am. 3.1. Just as Ovid there faces a choice between the mutually exclusive categories of matron and whore, so the Julian law appears to have offered to women the stark choice of registering as prostitutes or maintaining (or aspiring to) the highly traditional status of materfamilas. In Am. 3.1 Ovid of course chooses the option of whore, but it is undeniable that the categories with which he operates there essentially replicate those favoured by Augustus for re-introducing moral clarity into Roman society.155 But it

150 See Gibson (2003) 99 on 3.29-30, 30. 151 See further Gibson (2003) 384-85 on 3.761 ff. 152 See Gibson (2003) 25-37. 153 McGinn (1998) 147-56, 194-203. 154 McGinn (1998) 209. 155 For Ovid's ultimate acceptance in the Amores of the impossibility of escaping Augustan values and law, see now Miller (2004) 169-83.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 1 4 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT is precisely this value which is rejected in Ars 3. Ovid, paradoxically, might have introduced some 'Augustan' moral clarity by instructing the puellae of Ars 3 to dress themselves and walk in the luxurious and provocative manner of the whorish Elegy of Am. 3.1. At least then his addressees would have been clearly distinguishable by sight from matrons, their respectable binary opposites. Instead, Ovid rises above the opposition of dowdy matron and lurid whore - implicit both in the Julian law and Am. 3.1 - and creates a world characterised, as argued above, by a restrained and moderate cultus. The poet of Ars 3 insists on a 'moderation' which corresponds to neither of the moralists' traditional polarised stereotypes of women visible in the Amores , i.e. the harlot and her gaudy finery as opposed to the matrona and her modest plainness. Where Am. 3.1 - and Augustus - effectively reinforce the old status boundaries of meretrix and matrona , in Ars 3 Ovid prefers a hybrid rather than a polarity. Or, to rephrase the matter in the Aristotelian terms favoured throughout this study, where Augustus prefers the 'extremities' of matron and whore, Ovid inclines towards an intermediate which is compounded out of the two contraries it mediates.156 Whether the result is a genuinely novel ethic of the 'middle way' for women, or largely a politically subversive refusal to accept Augustan moral categories, I leave to the reader to judge.

156 See Gibson (forthcoming), where I outline in more detail a contrast between the 'extremism' of the princeps and the moderation of the poet of Ars 3. For the 'extremism' of the former, cf. also Dench (1998) 145-46 on the unresolved clash between austerity and flamboyance in Augustus' self- image.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms CHAPTER 4. 'DECORUM' IN THE ARS AMATORIA AND REMEDIA AMORIS

In the previous chapter I traced Ovid's development of an ethic of moderation and the mean in the Ars Amatoria. Such a development, I argued, was novel in the context of Roman love-elegy, and possessed poetological, 'ethical', and ultimately political significance. The present chapter deals with a related concept whose emergence in the Ars Amatoria is equally novel for elegy, and which proves to be similarly open to successful Ovidian manipulation. I refer here to ideas of the 'appropriate', 'proper', 'seemly', and 'becoming'. Ovid's engagement with such ideas in the Ars Amatoria , alongside his appropriation of 'moderation', represents another attempt to absorb into elegy some of the discourses associated with more conventional ethics (and poetics). decorum in the Ars has already been the subject of important chapters in Labate (1984) and Myerowitz (1985). The latter emphasises the element of artistry implicit in the application to the self of an essentially aesthetic principle of decorum , while the former emphasises the importance for the Ars of an apparently parallel 'ethical' seemliness in Cicero's de Officiis.1 My own treatment takes both these chapters as read, but is perhaps closer in its interests to Mario Labate' s work. The excellent coverage granted by Myerowitz and Labate to decorum in the Ars accounts for the particular character of the present chapter, which may appear more episodic than the preceding chapters. I attempt to develop a series of points and connections left undeveloped by these two critics. The chapter has two (unequal) parts, whereby I deal first with primarily ethical exploitations of decorum as a principle of personal behaviour, then, at somewhat lesser length, with primarily aesthetic exploitations of decorum as a principle of artistic practice. The distinction here between ethical and aesthetic is artificial (if critically convenient), and in practice I frequently move backwards and forwards between the ethical and aesthetic manifestations of decorum ? In the first five sections of the chapter, I briefly

1 Labate (1984) 121-74, esp. 148-69, Myerowitz (1985) 129-49. In the course of this chapter I use 'aesthetic' in reference to two different, but related, applications of the concept of decorum. The first application involves the extension of 'behavioural' decorum to cover subjects outside the strictly ethical (where notions of largely physical or charismatic attractiveness might come into play). The second involves the use of decorum in the realm of literary aesthetics, particularly stylistics and poetics. The two areas are cognate, in as much as both operate largely without reference to strongly ethical ideals. Whether or not a particular shade of clothing is becoming to a particular facial complexion is not primarily an ethical question. Similarly, whether a particular speech is appropriate to a playwright's Clytamnestra is not, strictly speaking, an ethical question, inasmuch as morally dubious sentiments might appropriately be attributed to such a character. As will become clear later in the chapter, a further link between the two areas is provided by the authoritative account of decorum in the first book of the de Officiis , where Cicero has frequent recourse to similes of poet and actor for his notion of 'appropriateness' across a wide range of behaviour. Note, however, the scepticism of Brink (1971) 80 about the connection between the

115

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trace the connection between decorum and the 'middle way' of Chapter 3, note Ovid's marked use of the language of decorum in the Ars , review the ground for Cicero's de Officiis as the key point of reference for understanding 'ethical' decorum in the Ars , and try to identify the (unexpected) attractions of such a nexus of ideas for Ovid and the reasons for the openness of this aspect of decorum to fruitful travesty. Finally, in this first part of the chapter, I set his exploitation of Ciceronian decorum in the Ars against Horace's deployment of the same ethical principle in Epistles 1, and ask whether the Ars is to be understood in part as a response to Horace's agenda in that book. In the second part of the chapter, in section six, I move discussion on to the Remedia Amoris. At the heart of this final book in Ovid's eroto-didactic series lies a defence of the Ars and a lengthy engagement with Horatian formulations of decorum as a principle of poetic practice. Here Ovid's main target is the Horace of the Ars Poetica rather than Epistles 1, where Ovid attempts to reduce Horace's arguments on poetic decorum to absurdity. In particular, Ovid defends the 'immoral' content of the Ars Amatoria on the ground of aesthetic appropriateness. In doing so, Ovid opportunistically runs together ethical and aesthetic aspects of decorum. The chapter ends with a return to the Ars Amatoria , where, in the light of the double exploitation of ethical and aesthetic decorum in the Remedia , I attempt to identify poetological aspects to Ovid's use of decorum as an 'ethical' principle.

i. Decorum and mediocri tas

Ideas of the appropriate and the seemly are typically expressed in Latin by a range of terms including decet , decern, decor , decorum , accommodatus , apt us, congruens, and conueniens (and in Greek by, for example, Trpémo, TrpéTTOv, apļioTTco, oIkéioç). As a rough guide, aptus , conueniens , congruens and accommodatus express the idea of appropriateness in a more neutral fashion, placing emphasis on aspects such as close fit or harmony; while decet , decens , decor , and decorum place greater emphasis on the aesthetic aspect of pleasing appearance.3 The two sets of terms are often intermingled, on the apparent assumption that what is appropriate or proper will also - perhaps 'therefore' - be seemly or becoming, and are found alike in contexts of ethical and aesthetic discussion in the 1st century BCE. The study of decorum in the Ars represents a critically valid and useful progression from the study of Ovid's new intermediate or 'middle way'. For 'appropriateness' and the nexus of ideas represented by moderation, the mean, and the middle way are often closely connected in ancient thought. Such a connection is found already in Aristotle's Rhetoric .4

aesthetically appropriate in Aristotle's Poetics and Horace's Ars Poetica on the one hand, and the ethically appropriate in Cicero's Orator. For an 'aestheticization' of erstwhile ethical questions in Ars 3, see Gibson (forthcoming). 3 Owing to the prominence in the discussion below of decet and cognates, I occasionally refer, for the sake of convenience only, to the broad group of terms listed above as the language of ' decorum '. 4 At (e.g.) RhetAAOAbl-S, Aristotle insists that style (XéÇiç) must be perspicuous and appropriate to its subject. Such 'appropriateness' consists in avoiding stylistic deficiency and excess: Kai 'n're TaTTCivfjv [rí)T€ írrrèp to à^íco[ia, àXXà TTpeTToixjav ('and neither must [style] be low, nor above the dignity of the subject, but appropriate to it'). For this appropriate mean of style, and its relation to Aristotle's doctrine of the ethical mean, see Hendrickson (1904) 129-36.

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But the two texts I wish to concentrate on, as so often in this study, are the de Officiis and the hexameter poetry of Horace. At the very outset of his treatment of 'seemliness', Cicero establishes a link between the mean and decorum (his preferred term for translating upéirov) in the ethical sphere. For Cicero defines decorum as a virtue in which modestia ... et rerum modus cernitur (1.93). An intimate link is thus set up between 'due measure in all things' and tò npéirov-decorum , and is sustained in the chapters which follow.5 Similar connections, albeit more oblique, can be found in Horace's Epistles and Ars Poetica. For example in Epist. 1.6, nil admirari is envisaged as a 'middle way' between desire and fear. Joined to this theme is a conspicuous appeal to the principle of ethically 'appropriate' behaviour. If dining well is living well, then, Horace urges ironically, we should pursue it to excess. Lack of moderation in the pursuit of pleasure, significantly, is linked with a forgetting of what is or is not ethically 'appropriate'.6 At Ars 104-13, Horace discusses the correct relationship between diction and emotion: a style appropriate to the emotions expressed will lead to the proper effect on an audience.7 An implicit connection is made between 'appropriate' style and the mean or avoidance of extremes. Words that are 'ineptly assigned' will lead to one of two emotional extremes, the sleep of boredom or derisive laughter; but 'appropriate' speech will lead to a sympathetic audience - i.e. one which is neither bored nor derisive, but properly engaged.8 In these various ways, Cicero and Horace suggest a connection in ancient thought between appropriateness and an avoidance of extremes. ii. Decorum in the Ars Amatoria, Love-elegy , and the de Officiis

Given this link between the mean and ethical or aesthetic 'appropriateness', it is almost no surprise that the Ars Amatoria is likewise full of the language and ideas of tò Trpéuov- decorum. In fact many of the passages analysed in Chapter 3 feature the language of decorum prominently. For example, in the passage in Ars 1 on standards of appearance for men, where Ovid frames forma neglecta and mundities as a mean between effeminacy and rusticitas , we find this mean described as appropriate or becoming to men (1.509 forma

5 Cf. e.g. Off. 1.128-29 (decorum in standing and walking and the avoidance of extremes), 1.130 (i decorum , munditia and mediocritas in styles of dress), 1.131 (a middle way between extremes of spirit characterised by decor), and 1.141 ( decus as the key to moderating all that affects one's outward appearance). For a quasi-Peripatetic emphasis on moderation and the mean in the de Officiis , see above p. 82 n. 38. 6 1.6.61-64 crudi tumidique laue mur, I quid deceat, quid non, obliti , Caerite cera I digni, remigium uitiosum Ithacensis U lixe i ^ I cui potior patria fuit interdicta uoluptas. On the link here with the emphases of the de Officiis , see McGann (1969) 11. Cf. also the connection between appropriateness and the mean at Epist. 1.10.42-44; for Panaetian influence here, as well as a 'Panaetian' middle way between extremes in Epist. 1.1 and 1.2, see Moles (1985) 36-9, 40-1. 7 104-6 mala si mandata loqueris, I aut dormitabo aut ridebo. tristia maestum I uultum uerba decent, iratum plena minarum. For the Aristotelian background (Rhet. 1408al6-25), see further Brink (1971) 182 ad loc. 8 Cf. Ars 112-13 (i absona dicta produce one of these two extremes in its audience); also 24-31 (on the appropriate amount of variety for the achievement of artistic unity and avoidance of the two extremes of prolixity and uniformity; see also Brink (1971) 1 15-16 ad loc. for the Aristotelian mean in Ars 31).

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 1 8 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT uiros neglecta decet ; cf. 512 aptus ), alongside a recommendation that one's toga be 'well- fitting' (1.514 sit bene conueniens ... toga), i.e. appropriate to personal size and shape. The language of 'appropriateness' likewise makes an appearance in Ovid's recommendations of moderate wine drinking, both to men (1.594 aptior est dulci mensa merumque ioco) and to women (3.761 aptius est deceatque magis potare puellas). Even the most trivial of subjects are not beneath Ovid's notice, as in the case of the connection made between 'seemliness' or charm in laughing and smiling (3.282 decor) and the recommendation of a moderate opening of the mouth (3.283 sint modici rictus). In the key passage in Ars 3 on moderate and extreme styles of walking, Ovid introduces the subject with yet more emphasis on decorum : 'even in the gait there are certain points of decor not to disregarded' (3.299). There is an allusion here of course to Cicero's treatment of the same subject, but since Ars 3 is an erotic poem and women's bodies are its theme, Cicero's stately 'seemliness' (1.128 decorum ; cf. 1.131 decoris) has been transformed by Ovid into the sexier 'gracefulness'. The language of decorum , whether or not explicitly associated with the 'mean', is in fact generally important in the Ars Amatoria - and it is to this more general level that I now move the discussion. The range of Ovid's subjects which reflect the influence of ' decorum ' appears almost comically wide. Ovid discusses becoming behaviour in variously novel areas ranging from appropriate complexion, graceful weeping, and becoming sexual positions to the giving of suitable gifts (see below pp. 127-29). The principle can be found in operation even when the lexicon of 'appropriateness' is absent.9 A study, nevertheless, of the clustering of actual instances of the language of decorum in the Ars , reveals that the majority of examples are to be found in the book addressed to women (just as the ethic of moderation and the mean was found to be more prominent in Ars 3 than its two predecessors). For example, of the 35 occurrences of decet and cognates in the Ars,10 some 12 are to be found in Ars 1 and 2, but almost twice as many (23) in Ars 3 (and a number of examples of this vocabulary in Ars 1 and 2 are in fact used in the context of women).11 The popularity of the language and ideas of the appropriate and the becoming in the Ars Amatoria appears a new development in the context of Roman love-elegy as a whole. Here statistics for usage in Roman love-elegy of (e.g.) decet and a range of cognates give a few pointers - if necessarily at a very broad level only. Such language is found 12 times in Propertius (of which exactly half occur in book 4), 7 times in Tibullus, and 21 times in Ovid's Amores}2 Clearly Ovid was fond of the language of decorum already in the

9 Cf. Ovid's pronunciation on the proper relationship between style and subject or addressee (e.g. 1.465 quis nisi mentis inops tenerae declamai amicae?), without recourse to such items as aptus or decet . 10 Occurrences: decenter (1), decet and decens (25), decor (7), dedecet (1), and dedecus (1). Members of this family found elsewhere in Ovid's poetry, but not in the Ars , include decorus and dedecus. 11 For the greater prominence of decorum in Ars 3, see also Myerowitz (1985) 134-35. 12 Propertius: decet and decens (5), decor (2), decorus (1), decus (1), dedecoro (1); Tibullus: decet (5), decoro (1), decus (1); and Ovid's Amores: decenter (1), decet and decens (14), decor (1), decoro (1), dedecet (2), dedecus (2). conuenio , aptus, and cognates are rather harder to quantify, as

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Amores , but Tibullus and Propertius (particularly in his first three books) somewhat less so. But the 35 instances of the same language in the Ars Amatoria , plus the further 5 to be found in the companion Remedia Amoris , produce a total equal to that found in the whole of 'canonical' elegy. Ars 3 alone contains more examples than either the three books of the Amores together, or the six modern books of Propertius and Tibullus together. The relative infrequency of decet and cognates in earlier elegy raises the question why Ovid becomes markedly fond of these terms in the Ars Amatoria and Remedia Amoris . An answer to this question can begin to be found by focusing on the manner of the usage of this language in the Ars. As may be guessed even from the preliminary review above of the contexts in which the concepts of Appropriate' and 'becoming' behaviour appear, decet , decor , aptus and so on are used in the Ars as part of a coherent programme whose aim is to persuade addressees to dress and behave in a manner that is fitting and becoming to them as lovers in a well developed range of areas. Contrast the Amores , where (e.g.) decet and cognates appear with some consistency in the context of 'becoming' appearance for women, but in a manner that appears unsystematic (in part because of generalising or more narrowly repetitive application). This contrast between the Ars and Amores , of course, is to some extent generic in character, and represents the difference between a didactic poem which seeks to inculcate a Texw[ according to a programme, and the typically somewhat looser design and focus of earlier love-elegy. But such range of coverage and systématisation in the Ars also point once more in the direction of Cicero's de Officiis. For his width of application Ovid possessed a license unwittingly written by Cicero himself, who in the de Officiis had declared that 'this decorum may be seen in every deed, every word, and indeed in the movement and state of the body' (1.126). Indeed Cicero himself deliberately covers areas which had previously received no praecepta , such as the art of conversation (as noted above p. 108), for which he offers the justification that in omnibus igitur his elaborandum est , si in omni re quid deceat exquirimus (1.133). The systematic aspects of Ovid's treatment of decorum also owe something to the first book of the de Officiis. For here Cicero effectively outlines a programme of comportment for the elite male based on the ideas of the appropriate and the seemly (1.93-151). Under the rubric of decorum Cicero treats everything from appropriateness in the matter of play and jest to moral choice in accordance with one's individual endowments. Furthermore decorum - and I emphasise this point - unlike its counterpart urbanitas , was apparently capable both of definition and of being taught.

only some instances are relevant; conuenio may signify 'meet [a person]', and aptus simply 'in good order'. But, rather roughly, by counting examples of conuenio and aptus which appear relevant to the present writer, and adding them to the statistics for decet and cognates, a pattern not dissimilar to the one for decet and cognates alone may be found: Propertius 27 (of which 10 are to be found in book 4), Tibullus 11, and Ovid's Amores 36. Usage of the same range of terms in Ovid's erotodidactic cycle is equal to that of the entirety of earlier elegy - if the 12 examples to be found in the Remedia Amoris are added to the total for the Ars of around 62 instances (66 according to the different counting scheme of Myerowitz (1985) 216 n. 5).

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Hence it possessed obvious attractions both for Cicero the nouus homo and for Ovid as author of a didactic poem addressed to all.13 Another obvious attraction for Ovid is decorum' s potential for successful eroticisation. The unmistakeable association of this concept with pleasing appearance receives particular emphasis in the de Officiis , where, as North (1966) 221 remarks, tò TrpéTTov- decorum becomes 'the external manifestation of what is morally good'.14 This is particularly clear from the comparison made between physical beauty and decorum at 1.98. 15 Just as the 'appropriate disposition of the limbs' of a beautiful body will please the eye of a beholder, so decorum , as it shines out in every aspect of our life, will win the approbation of those around us. Such an emphasis on external aspect and winning the eye or approval of others suggests a concept with strong erotic potential. But the attraction of decorum can perhaps best be understood by looking at a passage in which Ovid draws directly on the de Officiis. I choose here a passage in which the language of decorum makes no explicit appearance - although associated ideas are prominent - so as to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the concept of the appropriate and the becoming. In Ars 2 Apollo makes an unexpected epiphany, and commands Ovid to deliver the following programme of instruction to his male pupils (2.497-508):

is mihi 'lasciui' dixit 'praeceptor Amoris, due, age, discípulos ad mea templa tuos, est ubi diuersum fama celebrata per orbem littera, cognosci quae sibi quemque iubet. 500 qui sibi notus erit, solus sapienter amabit atque opus ad uires exiget omne suas, cui faciem natura dedit, spectetur ab illa; cui color est, umero saepe patente cubet; qui sermone placet, taciturna silentia uitet; 505 qui canit arte, canat; qui bibit arte, bibat. sed ñeque declament medio sermone diserti nec sua non sanus scripta poeta legat!'

13 Narducci (1989) 187 rightly emphasises this facet of decorum as attractive to Cicero. For Ovid's general avoidance in the Ars of issues of social exclusion, see above pp. 92, 111 n. 145. 14 A connection between morality and aesthetics is not confined to the de Officiis , but may be found implicit in the larger context of Roman political and social competition. In a study of the close attention paid by politicians and others to the bearing and stride of an individual, Corbeill (2002) 183 (= (2004) 109) suggests that Tn republican Rome, the reading of morality becomes an aesthetic practice, and one that can be learned'. 15 ut enim pulchritudo corporis apta compositione membrorum mouet oculos et delectat hoc ipso, quod inter se omnes partes cum quodam lepore consentiunt, sic hoc decorum quod elucet in uita mouet approbationem eorum, quibuscum uiuitur, ordine et constantia et moderatione dictorum omnium atque factorum.

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Apollo requests that the attention of these pupils be directed to the legend carved on his temple at Delphi, yvoj0i oeavrôv (2.500). 16 Armed with self-knowledge, a man will love wisely and 'organise his conduct according to his strengths' (2.501-02)17 - which, despite the paradox of wise loving, in practice means displaying those individual assets, whether natural or acquired, which are particularly becoming to one (2.503-06). Following this short review of individual strengths, some examples are then given of particular weaknesses to be avoided, such as the eloquent man turning a conversation into a display of rhetoric or (wittily) a poet reading his own verses (2.507-08). This intervention of Apollo to offer advice has an extremely complex literary background, which, however, need not concern us for the moment.18 I note here only, along with previous critics, that the effectiveness of the god's intervention is somewhat undermined by the fact that his advice repeats and perhaps simplifies that given earlier by Ovid,19 and in any case might have been more 'appropriately' offered in the opening stages of an affair rather than in the advanced stages under instruction late in Ars 2. Nevertheless, the effective function of the passage as a summary of the content and emphases of earlier stages of the Ars makes its allusions to principles of conduct enunciated in the de Officiis all the more interesting. Cicero's reflections on the relationship between decorum and one's character or talents - as they arise from an immediately preceding contrast between the diverse temperaments and appropriately different actions of Ulysses and Ajax - are worth quoting in full (1.1 13-1 4):20

quae contemplantes expendere oportebit quid quisque habeat sui eaque moderari, nec uelle experiri quam se aliena deceant; id enim maxime quemque decet quod est cuiusque maxime suum. suum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et bonorum et uitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quam nos uideantur habere prudentiae. illi enim non óptimas sed sibi accommodatissimas fabulas eligunt; qui uoce freti sunt, Epigonos Medumque, qui gestu Melanippam, Clytaemestram, semper Rupilius, quem ego memini, Antiopam, non saepe Aesopus Aiacem. ergo histrio hoc uidebit in scaena, non uidebit sapiens uir in uita? ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus.

Here 'becoming' behaviour is said to reside in the knowledge and practice of those characteristics which are peculiarly one's own (i.e. it would not become Ajax to act like Ulysses). For illustration Cicero turns to the example of actors who choose not the best plays or roles but those most suited to their talents, before returning to his main theme with an insistence that we too will operate to greatest effect with those things to which we are best suited. One can see in Cicero's submerged allusion to the Delphic motto ('let each

16 Significantly, this motto is often twinned with the warning of ļiTļSev äyav against excess; see Janka (1997) 372 ad loc., citing (e.g.) Plato Prot. 343a-b, Pliny Nat . 7.1 19. 17 For this interpretation of 2.502, see Janka (1997) 373 ad loc. 18 See esp. Sharrock (1994) 197-256, Casali (1997), and R. Armstrong (2004). 19 Compare (e.g.) 2.504 with 1.513, 2.505-06 with 2.123-24 (and 1.565-66), and 2.507-08 with 1.459-68. 20 The correspondence between the de Officiis and the Ars here was first noted by D'Elia (1961) 132.

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therefore know his own talent') the genesis of Ovid's own idea of a fully-fledged Apolline epiphany.21 Furthermore, just as for Cicero knowledge of one's 'talent' leads to the 'practical wisdom' appropriate to a 'wise man', so for Ovid's Apollo self-knowledge leads to wisdom (2.501 'he who shall be known to himself will alone love with wisdom'); here Cicero's 'what is most especially his own' corresponds to the Ovidian 'his strengths' (Ars 2.502). Cicero also matches 'becoming' action to individual talent by resort to a simile-catalogue of famous stage roles (Epigoni, Clytaemnestra, Ajax) and actors' varying talents; but Ovid's Apollo takes the more concrete route of matching becoming actions to various 'erotic' assets or talents. However, the talents of the Ciceronian actors in 'voice' and 'gesture' broadly correspond to Apollo's categories of conversation and physical display of bodily assets. More importantly, in each case the end aimed at is the same: the winning of the approval of those around us. The gaining of such approval is implicit in Cicero's choice of analogy with actors, who enjoy the adulation of their audience by playing the role best suited to them, and more obviously explicit in the Ars , where the point of playing to one's erotic strengths is to win over the opposite sex.22 Despite the deliberate bathos of the advice attributed to Apollo, this summary passage of advice given earlier in the Ars does serve to suggest how decorum - though not prominent in earlier elegy - might successfully be transferred as a principle of behaviour to the erotic arena. The emphasis in Cicero on pleasing performance and on preferences or talents allows decorum to be transferred easily to areas of which the former might never have dreamed, much less approved. Certainly Cicero is not likely to have considered artful singing and drinking becoming to anyone.23 In this sense the fate of decorum is closely akin to that of 'moderation' and the 'middle way', which are repeatedly manipulated by Ovid to his own erotic ends.

iii. The de Officiis and the vulnerability of decorum

The deeper reasons for the openness of decorum to successful misapplication are worth pondering, particularly as this aspect of Ovid's exploitation of the concept has received insufficient emphasis in previous studies. The issue is at first perplexing, because the overall impression of decorum gained from the de Officiis is that of a strongly moralistic principle. This impression is confirmed by a glance at book 1 as a whole, which is mainly concerned with the four parts of honestum-rò Kakóv or four cardinal virtues: wisdom ( cognitio ), social virtue ( iustitia , and beneficentia et liberalitas ), greatness of spirit (magnitudo animi), and finally to ttpćtto v-decorum (1.18-151). The last of these virtues is framed as a relation of suitability or proportion between persona and ethical action (1.93-151). Here, 'appropriate' actions for a moral agent are determined by the four constituent personae of the individual agent: the rational persona imposed by Nature on

21 For the Apolline reference, see Labate (1984) 149 n. 58, noted independently by Dyck (1996) 283 ad loc. Cf. also Off. 1.110. 22 For the emphasis on gaining approval, see further Dyck (1996) 283-84. 23 Furthermore, the Apolline injunction to self-knowledge has effectively been reduced to knowledge of one's body; as Janka (1997) 369 ad loc. points out, Ovid repeats the travesty of the motto criticised by Cicero as naïve at Tusc. 1.52. For a similar travesty in Ars 3, see below p. 129 n. 38.

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all humans, one's own character (as in 1.113-14 quoted above), the persona imposed by circumstance, and the profession of one's choosing (1.105-25). As for the actions which are to be matched to one's total persona , it emerges in the course of Cicero's treatment in the following chapters that some actions are appropriate or the reverse per se (1 .126-5 1).24 decorum here emerges as a flexible and wide-ranging, but nevertheless deeply serious, principle for moral action. Given the moral framework within which decorum is set in the de Officiis , there might seem no more possibility of Ovid hijacking it than any of the other cardinal virtues, such as justice or greatness of spirit. However, Cicero's actual handling of decorum reveals a number of unresolved conflicts or weaknesses, such as the inclusion of morally dubious characters to illustrate his second persona , or a potentially damaging concentration on the second and fourth personae. Behind these local weaknesses lies perhaps a more fundamental problem: unlike other originally social or aesthetic terms which had eventually evolved into ethical concepts, tò npenov -decorum had not undergone a process of evolution to quite the same extent. The first weakness in Cicero's handling of decorum I have already had cause briefly to mention in dealing with the issue of 'self-consistency' in Propertius (above pp. 49-50). decorum in theory consists of acting in accordance with the four personae , with the proviso that one's own natura (second persona) must not conflict with uniuersa natura (first persona ); but, in practice, Cicero includes figures who act in accordance with morally dubious personal naturae?5 These include not only Ulysses (1.113), but also Sulla, Crassus, and Lysander - each of whom was prepared to use any means necessary to secure victory, in contrast to other military figures, 'straightforward and open', who would not stoop to 'treachery' and 'deceit' (1.109). Cicero betrays no consciousness of the conflict with his ban on the expression of 'vicious' characteristics (1.1 10).26 If Sulla, a crafty general in the field - and, one might add, a libertine at home - can observe decorum by acting in accordance with his individual nature, might not then lovers observe the same in their own arena by acting in accordance with their own erotic nature and talents? A second feature of Cicero's handling which must have increased the attraction of decorum for Ovid emerges from Christopher Gill's comparison of this section of the de Officiis with a discourse of Epictetus (1.2).27 This discourse, like the de Officiis , develops a theory of TTpooLùTia-personae. But where Cicero devotes most of his time and energy to the second and fourth personae (one's individual nature and the persona associated with choice of profession respectively), for Epictetus the main upoaomov to be taken seriously, and to which the others in effect are subordinated, is the equivalent of Cicero's first persona , i.e. that associated with humans as moral beings and users of reason. Furthermore, even when Cicero and Epictetus (elsewhere) appear to offer similar advice,

24 For this scheme, see Dyck (1996) 238-41 on Off. 1.93-151. 25 See Gill (1988) 182, who also registers (n. 58) the parallel with Ovid's Apolline advice to lovers at Ars 2.501-10. See further Gill op. cit. 182-87 on the likelihood of a reflection in Cicero of the emphasis of Panaetius (in whose original Ulysses was perhaps prominent). 26 On this point see further Gill (1988) 182. Ovid's apparent exploitation in the Ars of this and other . weaknesses in Cicero's discussion of decorum is analysed below, pp. 126-29. 27 See Gill (1988) 187-93.

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 24 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT important differences are evident. Both emphasise the importance of taking into account one's nature when choosing a profession. But, while Epictetus focuses above all on the philosopher and on moral commitment as part of one's prerequisite 'nature' for this role, Cicero considers a much wider range of occupations and by 'nature' clearly means personal talent and inclinations. This lack of moral stringency in Cicero's approach makes decorum fruitful for playful Ovidian manipulation. An emphasis on what is appropriate to one's individual nature and on personal inclinations is well suited to a poem whose addressees seek to spend their lives attracting or pursuing the opposite sex. A stricter emphasis on acting (above all) in a manner that is appropriate to one's primary role as a rational and moral being would perhaps have rendered the de Ojficiis unuseable for Ovid's purposes. However, and more fundamentally, there is the obvious difficulty that both ttpcttco and decorum normally either refer to a pleasing external appearance, or establish a relation of proportion or suitability between two entities, where the aesthetic qualities of this relation are to the fore ('conspicuously fitting', 'becoming'). Indeed, despite the impressive moral edifice constructed in the de Ojficiis , to irpé-nov had arguably not evolved an ethical sense as strong or as well developed as some other terms - such as m Xóç or àyaGóç - whose original zone of application was either aesthetic or social. Theoretical reflection on to TTpéTTov had in fact long been current in the aesthetic world.28 Peripatetic theory assigned it some importance, whereby tò irpéuov, following Theophrastus' systématisation of Aristotle's Rhetoric , took its place among the four cardinal qualities of style, alongside correct use of Greek, clarity, and distinction. This formulation was influential in various ways, and is directly borrowed by Cicero in the third book of his de Oratore (55 BCE),29 where 'appropriateness' appears as the final quality of style (3.37-38), and is treated in some detail (3.210-12). But Panaetius appears to have been the first philosopher to award tò TTpéuov a similar systematic role in the ethical sphere. Here the philosopher was not operating in a vacuum, as there is every to reason suppose that there were already widely shared assumptions about 'appropriate' styles of life and speech (in both ethical and aesthetic spheres).30 But just as Aristotle was the first to give rigour and clarity to the idea of the 'mean', so Panaetius formalized and articulated already common ideas on appropriateness. But the novelty of his achievement should not be underestimated.31 decorum as a moral term, then, retained the clear imprint of its aesthetic origins.32 The introduction of the concept into a systematic account of virtue clearly demanded some

28 See Pohlenz (1965) 100-04 on the fifth and early fourth century evidence. 29 For a conveniently brief overview of these matters, and for the order of treatment in the third book of the de Oratore , see May-Wisse (2001) 35-37, 47-48, also Fantham (2004) 242-45. 30 Cf. Gill (1988) 195. 31 Cf. Dyck (1996) 238 'tò -rrpeTTov as one of the four cardinal virtues is found in the ethical system of no other philosophical school and is not found in the Stoa prior to Panaetius it has been regarded as one of Panaetius' chief innovations in ethics'; also op. cit. 95 on Off. 1.14. The prior influence of Panaetius on Cicero can apparently be seen in the Orator of 46 BCE, where, explicitly using decorum as an equivalent of the Greek TTpeTTov, Cicero assumes the systematic applicability of this concept to uita and oratio ; cf. Orat. 70, 72, 74. 32 Indeed, one could advance the stronger view that the moral 'content' of decorum is ultimately provided by context and one or both of the entities placed in a relation of suitability by (e.g.) irpétrei

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limitation of the freedoms which it enjoyed in the aesthetic sphere. There a full range of deeds and words, from ethically good to evil, might legitimately and without qualification be described as 'appropriate' or 'becoming' to (e.g.) a character on the dramatic stage. But actors on the stage of life can hardly be allowed the chance of uttering dubious sentiments on the ground of personal Appropriateness'. One safeguard offered by Cicero-Panaetius can be found early in the account of the 'becoming', where the content of the much older virtue acocķpoaljvr) {modestia, rerum modus) is thrust on decorum (1.93).33 However, the determination in the de Officiis to associate decorum with moderation and temperance is potentially at odds with Cicero's very recourse to the aesthetic world of poet and actor for the provision of illumination and even a substantial amount of content for the concept. At the outset of his treatment, he attempts to clarify his definition of decorum by drawing a comparison between the aesthetic decorum observed by playwrights in the presentation of their characters and that observed by ourselves as moral agents (1.97-98). The details of this passage I shall return to in a moment. But note first that much of the following treatment proper of decorum (1.105-25), owing to its foundation in the theory of the persona (TTpócrcoTTOv), sustains the analogy between dramatic actors and ethical agents. Furthermore, the next part of Cicero's treatment (1.126-49) is concerned with a match between that persona and one's words, deeds, and bodily movements. The items announced for treatment here - facta , dicta, corporis motus et status (1.126, quoted below p. 129) - are common alike to stage actors and moral agents in everyday life. In retrospect it thus becomes clear that 'the simile of the playwright really controls the whole presentation of decorum* This simile is an attractive and memorable feature of Cicero's discussion, but brings with it problems. These problems are clear already at 1.97-98. Here, as suggested earlier, Cicero draws a comparison between poets - who would never violate decorum by putting an evil sentiment into the mouth of a good character - and moral agents, who, by implication, likewise should judge what is 'becoming' in accordance with our own characters. As part of this argument it is stated that the attribution of morally dubious sentiments (e.g. ' oderint dum metuanť) to just men such as Aeacus or Minos would be unseemly ( indecorum ), but quite appropriate in the case of Atreus ( est enim digna persona oratio). The vulnerability of Cicero's argument to manipulation becomes evident. If ethically dubious sentiments are appropriate on the dramatic stage, then might not dubious actions - by an obvious if irresponsible logic - be appropriate to certain characters on the stage of life? It is for this reason Cicero soon adds: poetae in magna uarietate personarum etiam uitiosis quid conueniat et quid deceat uidebunt, nobis autem cum a natura

or decet - and not by the latter terms per se. See Dyck (1996) 240-41, also 242 (where the root meanings of ttpcttov and decorum are usefully discussed, along with the problems of using the latter as a translation of the former). 33 See North (1966) 221-23, Dyck (1966) 241 . 14 Dyck (1996) 300. For related aesthetic similes in the chapters on decorum , cf. 1.129, 147. The poet-actor analogy is also bolstered by a series of passing references to related areas and topics, e.g. 1.110 inuita Minerua , 1.130 (the affected manners of some actors), 1.137 (an allusion to the miles gloriosus ), 1.145-46 (an analogy provided by musical performers), 1.144 (a story involving Sophocles), 1.150 (quotation from Terence).

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constantiae, moderationis, temperantiae, uerecundiae partes datae sint ... (1.98). That is to say, as regards our choice of life-roles appropriate to our individual characters, Nature has already placed a limit, so that we can only choose roles characterised by such highly conventional values as constancy, moderation, and restraint.35 But such 'natural' limitations are not inherent to the simile which Cicero uses to control his entire presentation of decorum , and must be introduced from outside it. At any rate, whatever success Cicero has in shoring up his ethical position here, the openness of his system to travesty is clear. Some possible forms of travesty, however, might be more successful or appealing than others. The emperor Caligula, who was fond of quoting let them hate so long as they fear' (Suet. Calig. 30.1), might be imagined arguing that this sentiment was appropriate to his character, temperament, and role in life. But such an argument would not be attractive. A potentially more successful travesty can be discovered in Alexander the Great's attribution of decorum to his own person in the context of his desire to bestow a city on a reluctant friend (Sen. Ben. 2.16.1):

cum ille, cui donabatur, se ipse mensus tanti muneris inuidiam refugisset dicens non conuenire fortunae suae, 'non quaero' inquit 'quid te accipere deceat, sed quid me dare'.

This 'gift' of a city can in fact be placed on a continuum of tyrannical behaviour alongside Caligula's favourite sentiment. However, Alexander's claim that such an act is 'becoming' to him appears more attractive than Caligula's putative claim. Part of the reason for this is that 'Alexander' and 'the gift of a city' are placed in relation. No explicit claim for the justice or otherwise of this relation is made. A claim is made for a relation of proportion or suitability between the two, and (crucially) for the grace which the act adds to Alexander. For a more obviously moral claim to be made, some term other than decet would have to be used. Cicero's argument about the restrictions placed on our actions by Nature - only actions characterised by restraint and moderation can be considered 'becoming' - cannot defuse the aesthetic appeal of Alexander's claim. If Alexander might successfully appropriate notions of 'becoming' behaviour, then why not others, such as the gilded lovers of Ovid's Ars Amatoria ?

iv. The Ars Amatoria and the usefulness of decorum

A concept which possesses a potential for successful extension or travesty and which, in its most systematic account in Latin, is handled with a notable lack of stringency, is one ripe for exploitation. The Ars Amatoria in fact provides fertile ground for the persona- theory of the de Officiis , particularly after the downplaying in the earlier work of the rational and moral persona. For, as generations of readers have sensed, the choosing and playing out of personally appropriate or quasi-professional roles (that of the elegiac lover)

35 See further Dyck (1996) 255-57 ad loc. See also Dyck (1996) 283 on the (weakly) implicit correspondence between the limitations put on the actor (by the existing number of plays in the repertory) and those put on the moral agent (by the roles that are regarded as conventional by society).

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- the equivalents of Cicero's second and fourth personae - lie at the very heart of Ovid's eroto-didactic poem. But another promising weakness of application in the de Officiis remains to be highlighted. For when Cicero gives practical advice about what is appropriate in the area of (e.g.) bodily movements, that advice is conspicuously based on (mere) convention. Decorum , as formulated by Cicero, turns out to be equivalent to what is 'appropriate' for the Roman elite. In the analysis of Gill (1988) 193, 'the decorum theory as a whole ... presupposes a particular social structure, in which specific social roles are correlated with distinct styles of living; and it is by reference to these social norms and conventions that Cicero offers specific advice about what is and is not decorum '. Indeed he even assumes, without argument, that these social norms are unassailable by radical 'rational' criticism ( Off. 1.128, 148). In keeping with this, it is hard to draw a line between ethics and tips on elite social craft in Cicero's advice on (e.g.) appropriate styles of conversation.36 Under these circumstances decorum can - perhaps even with a somewhat reduced sense of travesty - be transposed to another 'social structure', where specific roles are likewise linked with 'distinct styles of living'. As hinted earlier, the range of subject-matter to which Cicero applies his principle of decorum is wide - and not exclusively ethical - including appropriateness in the matter of ludus and iocus , moral choice in accordance with one's individual endowments, the legitimate variety of personal temperament, choice of appropriate profession, proper activities for young and old, appropriate standards of dress and bearing or of conversation and pronunciation, the avoidance of anger, and even quite unmistakably parochial subjects such as choice of appropriate house - alongside such more serious subjects as proportionate effort in the undertaking of action, unseasonable actions, apt correction of personal faults, and appropriate behaviour towards various social groups ( Off. 1.93-151). Ovid did not fail to learn from Cicero here, applying the language of decorum , for men, to such non-ethical or parochial subjects as appropriate complexion, adoption of variously appropriate methods for catching prey both young and old, a willingness to act in a way that is becoming to a lover, proper gift-giving, knowing when a gentleman is de trop , and appropriate love-making talk.37 But it is in the book addressed to women that Ovid applies Cicero's example most effectively. Here he provides an extensive series of tips on the social craft appropriate to the 'distinct style of living' or to the roles {personae ) adopted by the lovers of the Ars Amatoria. Coverage of appropriate or becoming behaviour is provided in the areas of choice of hairstyle (3.135-36 quod quamque decebit, I eligat, 145 huic decet inflates laxe iacuisse capillos , 153 neglecta decet multas coma), choice of fitting colour of clothing (3.188-91, quoted below p. 145), apt concealment of the cosmetic process (3.226 aptius a summa conspiciere manu ; cf. 229 multa uiros nescire decet , 248 dedecus ), choice of appropriate underwear (3.273 conueniunt tenues scapulis analemptrides altis ), graceful crying (3.291 discunt lacrimare decenter ), attractive speech

36 See Gill (1988) 194; cf. op. cit. 197 on Off. 1.146. See above p. 40 for a parallel tendency in Aristotle, cited by Scodel (1996), to apply the 'mean' as a principle of behaviour outside the strictly ethical sphere, e.g. to the proper conduct of a relaxing conversation (EN 1 127b33-l 128b9). 37 Cf. 1.729 hic est color aptus amanti ; I hoc decet 1.765 nec tibi conueniet cunctos modus unus ad annos , 2.241 quod Phoebum decuit, quem non decet? exue fastus, 2.262 e paruis callidus apta [muñera] dato , 2.530 dedecet ingenuos taedia ferre sui , 2.724 dulces gemitus aptaque uerba ioco.

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(3.295 in uitio decor est quaedam male reddere uerba ), appropriate choice of 'off-the- shouldeť wear (3.309 hoc uos praecipue, niueae, decet ), erotic dancing (3.352 tantum mobilitas ilia decoris habet), generally 'becoming' appearance (3.424 curam tota mente decoris agat ), appropriately erotic behaviour at a funeral (3.431-32 ire solutis I crinibus et fletus non tenuisse decet), judgement of fitting uses of lovers (3.529-30 de nobis quem quisque erit aptus ad usum, I inspicite), a becoming entrance to a dinner-party (3.751 positaque decens incede lucerna ), and the appropriate concealment of intimate bodily blemishes (3.808 aptius in uestro corpore multa latent). The range of subject-matter covered in the Ars is entirely in keeping with the flexibility of the concept of the appropriate and the becoming, while the application of the concept exploits the aesthetic aspects of decorum to the full. However, the height of Ovidian inventiveness is to be discovered in the advice on sexual positions in Ars 3. Here the Ciceronian moral scaffolding is removed, and the extent of the vulnerability of decorum to sustained travesty is revealed. For Ovid humorously, but with perfect plausibility within the Social structure' of the poem, insists that in choosing a becoming sexual position his pupils must have regard to their individual characters (3.771-86):

nota sibi sit quaeque; modos a corpore certos sumite: non omnes una figura decet. quae facie praesignis erit, resupina iaceto; spectentur tergo, quis sua terga placent. Milanion umeris Atalantes crura ferebat: 775 si bona sunt, hoc sunt aspicienda modo, parua uehatur equo: quod erat longissima, numquam Thebais Hectoreo nupta resedit equo, strata premat genibus paulum ceruice reflexa femina per longum conspicienda latus. 780 cui femur est iuuenale, carent quoque pectora menda, stet uir, in obliquo fusa sit ipsa toro, nec tibi turpe puta crinem, ut Phylleia mater, soluere, et effusis colla reflecte comis. tu quoque, cui rugis uterum Lucina notauit, 785 ut celer auersis utere Parthus equis.

Ovid demonstrates a clear grasp of Ciceronian decorum - its emphasis on gaining approval and its flexibility - and in so doing exposes its origins as an aesthetic term. His pupils must choose the sexual position that is becoming to them as individuals, according as a position highlights a good physical feature or conceals a bad one. Thus a woman whose buttocks are attractive should be seen from behind (774), while a tall woman should never 'ride horse', as this position only serves to emphasise height (777-78). Here, as in the Apolline epiphany passages in Ars 2, Ovid develops the implications of Off. 1.113-14 (quoted above p. 121). Delphic self-knowledge is set at a premium (Ars 3.771

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'let each be known to herself; cf. Off. 1.114 'let each therefore know his own talent');38 women must act as judges of their good and bad points (Ars 3.771-88 passim ; cf. Off. 1.114 'each should show himself a keen judge of his own good qualities and defects'); and they should not experiment with things that are not becoming to them (Ars 3.772, 777-78; cf. Off. 1.113 'everyone should weigh what is most especially his own, and regulate these things, and not wish to try how someone else's might become him'). Ovid's licence to apply decorum to such an apparently unlikely subject, as hinted earlier, had in fact been written by Cicero himself, with his insistence that decorum illud in omnibus factis dictis, in corporis denique motu et statu cernitur, idque positum est in tribus rebus, formositate, ordine, ornatu ad actionem apto (1.126). The emphasis here on the visible aspects of decorum is then added immediately to the idea of gaining approval: in his autem tribus continetur cura etiam illa, ut probemur iis quibuscum apud quosque uiuamus (1.126). It is this insistence on gaining the approbatio of others which ensures that 'trivial' topics are made subject to decorum , as these may profoundly affect others' opinion of us.39 Particularly arresting from an Ovidian point of view is the fact that decorum can be found even in formositas - an external (and potentially rather feminine) beauty of appearance - and that the latter can be used to gain the approval of those who surround us. Beauty of appearance is what the puellae seek, and the approval of lovers is their aim. It is tempting to talk of 'parody' and the reduction of Cicero's decorum to absurdity. But, despite the deeply-set humour of Ovid's advice on becoming sexual positions, I would prefer to talk here of Ovid's exploitation of the particular weaknesses of Cicero's handling of decorum. These weaknesses, as I suggested above, include Cicero's willingness to think about decorum of dubious characters; a preoccupation with individual natures at the expense of our shared nature as moral beings; an (ultimately arbitrary) identification of decorum with the interests of the Roman elite; and, perhaps above all, frequent reference to the essentially aesthetic world of poet and actor. Taking his cue from the virtually unlimited application of decorum in the aesthetic world, Ovid develops his own decorum to regulate and add grace to actors on the erotic stage of Roman love-elegy. Such characters, like Alexander the Great, may plausibly speak of the actions that are peculiarly appropriate to their personae.

v. Decorum in Horace, Epistles 1 and the Ars Amatoria

Ovid is not the only Augustan poet to engage with the de Officiis : Horace's engagement with the same treatise in Epistles 1 is by now well recognised. The divergent treatments by the two poets of Ciceronian decorum can be usefully laid alongside one another, particularly as Epistles 1 may be understood, in part, as a response to earlier Roman love- elegy. As I shall go on to suggest, Ovid's subsequent deployment of decorum in the Ars Amatoria should itself be read as part of a new dialogue between Ovid, Horace, and Propertius and Tibullus.

38 Cf. the explicit reference to the Delphic oracle 18 lines later, at Ars 3.789-90. As at Ars 2.497-508, Ovid 'naively' applies ywoGi oeavròv to physical self-knowledge; see above n. 23. 39 A point emphasised by Narducci (1989) 142.

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McGann makes a largely convincing case for the influence of Cicero-Panaetius on Epistles l.40 Particularly interesting is Horace's announcement of a new agenda for his poetry in the first poem of the collection: quid uerum atque decens curo et rogo et omnis in hoc sum (1.1.1 1). A philosophical desire to reflect on what is 'right' (uerum) may cause little surprise, but the juxtaposition with decens ('appropriate') - rather than (e.g.) 'wise', 'just' or 'virtuous' - is arresting. The reference here to the distinctive concerns of Cicero and his source Panaetius appears unmistakable, for, as suggested earlier, it was Panaetius' innovation to assign tò TTpéìTov a place as one of the four cardinal virtues.41 As for the use Horace makes of the principle of the 'appropriate' in the body of the collection, attention has been drawn already to one instance in which Horace connects quid deceat (1.6.62) with a characteristically moderate lifestyle. Similar and related language reappears elsewhere in a variety of contexts.42 The use made of decens , as in the Ciceronian exemplar, appears flexible, at times somewhat parochial, but ultimately serious in an ethical sense.43 The importance of ethical decorum in Horace's collection and its virtual absence from the poetry of Propertius and Tibullus - whose elegiac productions, along with the first poems of the Amores , in some ways dominate the decade before the publication of Epistles 1 - become a matter of critical interest if we accept McGann 's further suggestion that Epistles 1, in some part, both reacts against and imitates this influential genre ((1969)

40 Some elements of the case are more convincing than others, but among the evidence cited by McGann (1969) 10-15 are the allusion at Epist. 1.7.98 to Off. 1.1 10; the importance of the principle of self-consistency both in Cicero ( Off. 1.111) and in the Epistles both explicitly (see above p. 50 n. 28) and implicitly (1.7, 1.12 and 1.20); the parallels between Cicero's emphasis on choice of recipients of gifts at Off. 1.45, and Horace's various statements on gifts and gratitude in Epist. 1.7; and the strong approval of the 'mean* in the de Officiis (see above) and Epistles 1 (see above pp. 18-19). For further support for McGann' s broad position, see Moles (1985), also Kilpatrick (1986) xx-xxiii; contrast Mayer (1994) 39-45. The Odes indicate some prior knowledge of the de Officiis ; see Dyck (1996) 40, 642-43, also Nisbet-Hubbard (1970) 342. 41 On the specific issue of the security of the reference in decens to Panaetian decorum , see McGann (1969) 10 contra Mayer (1994) 90 on Epist. 1.1.11; cf. Moles (1985) 37-38, (2002) 142, 150. D. Armstrong (2004) 269 rightly notes that 'it does not make one a follower of Panaetius to have a place for decens in one's language'. This chapter works with the assumption, not that Horace was a follower of Panaetius, but that the former had read - and was interested in - the issues raised by the de Officiis (an assumption not incompatible with Armstrong's insistence on the broadly Epicurean character of Epistles 1). Nevertheless, the direct reference at Epist. 1.1.11 to the Panaetian elevation of decorum to a cardinal virtue seems certain. 42 E.g. behaviour appropriate to one's age (1.7.28 decorum ), knowing one's proper place in society (1.7.41-44 aptus ... apta ... decent ; cf. 1.18.30 decet ), aiming at a mean in life which is fitting to one (1.10.42 conueniet ), and proper behaviour in the company of the great (1.17.2 deceat , 23 decuit, 26 dece bit). 43 D. Armstrong (2004) 294-95 n. 8 criticises the tendency to see in every occurrence of decens and cognates a reference to Panaetianism, such as the use of decuere at Epist. 1.14.32 (quoted below) to suggest that expensive togas and perfumed hair 'became' Horace. But such usage conforms to the specifically Ciceronian tendency to deploy decorum in non-ethical, parochial, or even dubious contexts (albeit with superadded Horatian irony). In any case, the emphasis at 1.14.32 falls on the fact that such luxury items do not now become Horace as a mature human being; see further below.

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97). Again, some of McGann' s arguments are more convincing than others, although I find the cumulative case convincing. McGann, for example, compares the style of treatment in the Epistles with that of Propertius: just as the elegist treats various facets of love without introducing a strong narrative line, so Horace sets forth various aspects of his main theme - ethics - in a fashion which invites synchronic rather than diachronic reading. Also comparable are the number and length of poems which make up Propertius' books 1 and 3 and the Epistles , the unity provided by the virtual dominance of a single theme (love, ethics), and the partial autobiographical impressions provided by each work, whereby Propertius appears almost exclusively as a lover and Horace as a student of ethics. But these similarities arguably serve to reinforce Horace's rejection of the themes of love-elegy. Love is virtually absent as an issue from Epistles 1 - perhaps surprisingly in a series of ethical poems addressed to young men (i.e. those assumed to be most at risk where amor is concerned).44 This omission seems particularly pointed in the light of an apparently hostile allusion to Propertius in Epist. 1.6.61-66, by way of an approving reference to Homer and a disapproving reference to Mimnermus (reversing Prop. 1.9.11 plus in amore ualet Mimnermi uersus Homero).45 Horace does mention an affair with one Cinara in 1.14, although that affair was in the youthful past (32 quern tenues decuere togae nitidique capillï), but which it would now be shameful for him to continue (36 nec lusisse pudet, sed non incidere ludum). As McGann (1969) 98 comments, '[Horace] has a reached a stage which for the elegists lies in the future', and illuminatingly compares Tibullus 1.1.71-74:

iam subrepet iners aetas, nec amare decebit, dicere nec cano blanditias capite, nunc leuis est tractanda Venus, dum frangere postes non pudet et rixas inseruisse iuuat.

Both Horace and Tibullus appeal to ideas of decorum and pudor. But whereas Tibullus supposes he is not (yet) of an age where love is unbecoming or a sense of shame forbids the violent actions of the locked out lover, Horace declares that he is precisely at an age where considerations of appropriate or shameful behaviour have caused him to eschew similarly flashy or drunken actions.46

44 McGann (1969) 98; cf. Mayer (1994) 45. As Andrew Morrison reminds me, the refusal to return to the ludus at the outset of the collection (1.1.3) is partly a refusal to write lyric (including love lyric) again; cf. the consignment of love (and love lyric) to the past at 1 .7.27-28. 45 See Mayer (1994) 155 on Epist. 1.6.65-66. This hostile reference forms part of a now intricate web of literary relations. In Chapter 1 it was suggested that Prop. 2.23b be read as a reaction against Horace's Sat. 1.2; in the Epistles is now seen Horace's own response to love-elegy - a response further consolidated in the Ars Poetica (see below). Note also the famous contest between the lyric poet and the elegist (often identified with Propertius) in Hor. Epist. 2.2.91-105; on which see Rudd (1989) 15 contra the more thoroughly sceptical Brink (1982) 315-16. For a classic statement of Horace's antipathy towards elegy, see Otis (1945); further bibliography cited at Edward (1983) 1 n.2. 46 As for Propertius' old age, the elegist plans then to study natural philosophy (3.5.23-26). Cf. the parallel with the similar interests attributed by Horace to the discontented Iccius at Epist. 1.12.14- 19, where Horace pointedly implies that the study instead of ethics might be of more use to the

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The noteworthy lack of prominence given to love in the Epistles and the early emphasis put on the concept of decorum together may be understood as partially a snub to love-elegy. There love predominates and decorum is scarcely prominent as a principle of behaviour (or, as in Tibullus' first poem, is either held off to a future date or shifted on to others such as Messalla).47 The Ars Amatoria then creates 'dialogue' by injecting one of the distinctive themes of Epistles 1 into love-elegy. In particular, Ovid takes care to signal his use of the same sources for decorum which Horace had used, namely the de Officiis. 48 But, of course, the use which Ovid makes of decorum is markedly different from that made by Horace in Epistles lē The latter, as noted above, largely follows Cicero's commitment to ethical seriousness - or at least may be represented as doing so (from an Ovidian perspective). Epistles 1, furthermore, taken as a whole, somewhat narrows the application of Cicero's flexible and wide-ranging decorum to a run of subjects less immediately prone to the accusation of moral arbitrariness. The collection, in keeping with its opening disavowal of verse and other trifles (1.1.10 uersus et cetera ludiera pono), also downplays the aesthetic potential of decorum (so evident in Cicero). The danger of appearing to offer merely tips on elite social craft remains, particularly in Epist. 1.17, but is less pronounced than in Cicero, and is in any case 'corrected' by Horace in 1.18, which ends with a recommendation of the Epicurean secret life. Ovid, naturally, takes an opposite course, and greatly expands the range of decorum beyond the strictly ethical, intensifies the parochial tendencies observable already in Cicero's treatment, and exploits the aesthetic potential of the concept. Horace appears not to have been unaware of the problems of decorum as an ethical principle. After all, asking quid uerum atque decens is rather different from asking simply quid ... decens. For what is true (absolutely) will not necessarily be the same as what is appropriate, which must change with circumstances, addressees etc. Arguably, ripples from the uneasy coexistence between uerum and decens can be felt throughout the collection.49 decens (1.1.11) is given philosophical flesh in the figure of Aristippus (1.1.18) - a character already seen in Chapter 3 to be associated with the 'middle way' - who appears as a way of marking Horace's own inconsistency, and later in the collection as a model for adaptability, above all at Epist. 1.17.13-32. Here his ability to live with reges is praised, and he becomes the personification of decorum (23-24 omnis Aristippum decuit color et status et res , I temptantem maiora, fere praesentibus aequum).50 This

addressee (Mayer (1994) 198). Horace, by contrast with Propertius, makes poetry out of ethics, and well before his old age. 47 Cf. Tib. 1.1.53 te bellare decet terra, Messalla, marique. 48 Furthermore, specific allusions to the decorum of Epistles 1 are not lacking in the Ars Amatoria ; see e.g. Gibson (2003) 314 on the allusion to Epist. 1.10.12 at Ars 3.545. The allusion is bolstered in context by further allusions at Ars 3.541-42 to Hor. Epist. 2.1.119-20, and at Ars 3.541 amor ... habendi to Hor. Epist. 1.7.85; see Gibson (2003) 41-42, 313. I borrow here the arguments of Morrison (forthcoming). 50 For Xenophon's Aristippus, see above pp. 74-75. Morrison (forthcoming) argues that Aristippus' 'middle way' of an independent life between Socrates' polarised alternatives of 'ruling' vs. 'being ruled' in the Memorabilia , reappears in Epist. 1.17 and 18 as one of two Horatian choices: between the life of consorting with the great (being ruled) and the secret Epicurean life of withdrawal (the independent life); see also Moles (2002) 148-49. An Aristippus - whether the same or his grandson

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lesson of adaptability is of obvious relevance to the parts of Epistles 1 which advise addressees on how to get on in Roman society - chiefly 1.17 and 18 (which several critics take as central to the collection as a whole). However, there is arguably a tension between Horace's advice to adapt oneself and his initial stress on the need for philosophical self- examination (1.1.11 quid uerum ... curo et rogo). This stress on self-examination and on withdrawal, prominent even in 1.17 and 18 (e.g. 1.17.6-12, 18.101-03), seems ultimately incompatible with the advice on adaptability and behaviour appropriate to each situation. But while Horace is prepared to suggest a potential contradiction between uerum and decens , he explores it in a rather oblique way, by juxtaposition of contrasting lifestyles rather than by confrontation. Ovid, however, demonstrates his understanding of the problems and vulnerabilities of decorum in a rather more straightforward way, by transferring the concept successfully to a non-ethical context. Here, in a sustained travesty, decorum guides lovers as they seek to act in a manner that is appropriate both to themselves and to the variety of situations in which they find themselves.

vi. Ethics and aesthetics : Horace's Ars Poetica and the Remedia Amoris

From the application of an originally aesthetic term to the ethical sphere, I move to the application of decorum within its 'proper' sphere of literary aesthetics (where, however, the ethical manifestations of the term will soon return). The most explicit treatment of aesthetic decorum in Ovid's eroto-didactic corpus is to be found in a text which until now has received very little mention. I refer here to the fourth and last book of the cycle, the Remedia Amoris , which engages extensively with the themes and ideas of the Ars Amatoria , including decorum. At the centre of the Remedia (361-96), Ovid argues in defence of the Ars Amatoria and its sexually explicit content that each poetic genre possesses its own 4 decorum '. This argument has a very particular target in Horace's Ars Poetica , where Horace provides a list of genres and appropriate subject- matters, in service of the argument that poets must learn their trade and observe the different types and styles of poetic works as laid down (Ars 73-92). That Ovid should target the aesthetic decorum of the Ars Poetica in his Remedia Amoris - after dealing in the Ars Amatoria in the first instance with the 'ethical' aspect of decorum - is a circumstance of some interest. For Horace himself makes a journey in the final books of his hexameter poetry from the ethical decorum of Epistles 1 - examined briefly above - to the aesthetic decorum which dominates much of his Ars Poetica. An awareness of the parallel journeys made by the two poets from an engagement with the de Officiis to more purely poetic concerns will allow a keener appreciation of the force of Ovid's assault on the Ars Poetica in his Remedia Amoris. Before tracing Horace's journey from ethical to aesthetic decorum in his Epistles , the scene must first be set for Ovid's engagement with aesthetic decorum in the Remedia Amoris. Later I shall comment on Ovid's close engagement with Horace, before reflecting

(the two are often confused) - appears on the internal evidence of de Officiis to have attracted the interest and perhaps the sympathy of Panaetius; see Dyck (1996) 330 on Off. 1 .148. For Panaetius in Epist. 1.17, see Moles (1985) 43-47, more generally Mayer (1994) 44. For the 'Choice of Heracles' underlying the reference to Aristippus at Epist. 1.1.16-19, see Moles (2002) 143, also 150-51.

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on the larger significance for the Ars Amatoria of Ovid's use of decorum in the Remedia. For in the Remedia Ovid seeks to validate the literary decorum of the Ars , but in a context which invites us to deconstruct the correlative decorum observed by the addressees of the Ars. In the long central section of the Remedia Ovid gives advice on how to break one's attachment to a lover (151-608), concentrating particularly on the destruction of illusions and the curbing of feelings (291-608). At 357-60 he announces his determination to give advice on shattering illusions even in the bedroom. Of course, the praeceptor admits to a sense of pudor , but asks his reader to compensate for this by reading between the lines. It is on this highly enigmatic note that the subject suddenly turns to poetry. Ovid changes roles from praeceptor amoris to poet qua poet,51 and announces that his poetry has recently been the object of moral criticism (361-62 nuper enim nostros quidam carpsere libellos, I quorum censura Musa proterua mea est). It is clear that the reference here is above all to the Ars Amatoria , and in particular to the sexually explicit advice given in the finales of books two and three. In the Remedia Ovid is about to advise his pupils on appropriate 'therapeutic' action during intercourse, and the sense of pudor confessed in 359 replicates the prefaces to the passages of sexual advice at the ends of Ars 2 and 3.52 Furthermore, when Ovid finally returns from the defence of poetry to his main text at 399, extensive reference is made to the sexually explicit passage at the end of Ars 3. 53 Ovid makes the following reply to this attack on the Ars Amatoria and its sexually explicit content {Rem. 363-96):54

dummodo sic placeam, dum toto canter in orbe, qui uolet impugnent unus et alter opus, ingenium magni liuor detractat Homeri; 365 quisquís es, ex ilio, Zoile, nomen habes. et tua sacrilegae laniarunt carmina linguae, pertulit hue uictos quo duce Troia déos, summa petit liuor; perflant altissima uenti, summa petunt dextra fulmina missa louis. 370 at tu, quicumque es, quem nostra licentia laedit, si sapis, ad numéros exige quidque suos. fortia Maeonio gaudent pede bella referri: deliciis illic quis locus esse potest? grande sonant tragici: trágicos decet ira cothurnos; 375

51 On the many roles played by Ovid here, see Jones (1997) 23. 52 Cf. Ars 3.769-70 ulteriora pudet docuisse , sed alma Dione I 'praecipue nostrum est , quod pudeť, inquit ' opus also 2.703-04 conscius, ecce , duos accepit lectus amantes: I ad thalami clausas, Musa , resiste fores. 53 Rem. 407-18; cf. Ars 3.771-88, esp. 771-72, also 807-08. The reference once more to pudor (Rem. 407 et pudet, et dicam ) again directs the reader back to Ars 3.769-70. 54 This passage has perhaps attracted more critical attention than any other in the Remedia ; see most recently Hinds (2000) 223-26, Woytek (2000), Barchiesi (2001) 96-100, and the papers of Casali, Holzberg, and Rosati in Gibson, Green, and Sharrock (forthcoming), all with references to earlier literature.

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usibus e mediis soccus habendus erit. liber in aduersos hostes stringatur iambus, seu celer, extremum seu trahat ille pedem, blanda pharetratos Elegia cantet Amores, et leuis arbitrio ludat amica suo. 380 Callimachi numeris non est dicendus Achilles, Cydippe non est oris, Homere, tui. quis feret Andromaches peragentem Thaida partes? peccet, in Andromache Thaida quisquis agat. Thais in arte mea est; lasciuia libera nostra est; 385 nil mihi cum uitta; Thais in arte mea est. si mea materiae respondet Musa iocosae, uicimus, et falsi criminis acta rea est. rumpere, Liuor edax: magnum iam nomen habemus; maius erit, tantum, quo pede coepit, eat. 390 sed nimium properas: uiuam modo, plura dolebis, et capiunt animi carmina multa mei. nam iuuat et studium famae mihi creuit honore; principio cliui noster anhelat equus. tantum se nobis elegi debere fatentur, 395 quantum Vergilio nobile debet epos.

Ovid's self-defence is developed in three stages. First, at 363-70 he observes that great literary success always attracts jealous criticism: witness the critics of Homer and Vergil. Next, at 371-88 Ovid argues in detail that each poetic genre - epic, tragedy, comedy, iambic verse, elegy - has its own decorum in terms of subject-matter, treatment and metre. If Ovid's Muse measures up to his materia , that is to say if the elegiac Ars Amatoria treats appropriate subject-matter, then the poet has no case to answer. Finally, at 389-96 Ovid announces his defiance of Envy. His name will get bigger, his appetite for fame is increasing, the chariot of his poetry is only at the bottom of its incline, and elegy confesses it owes as much to him as epic does to Vergil. Before focusing on the argument from decorum , two preliminary issues must be dealt with: the question of the actual existence of the anonymous critics of the Ars ,55 and the larger literary context for the assault made on Ovid by Envy. Ovid refers to his opponents as 'certain persons' (361) and 'whoever you are' (371), in an explicit strategy of denying his critics a name. Vergil's critics in 367-68 likewise go unnamed. The scourge of Homer, Zoilus56 - also 'whoever you are' (366) - is said to have a name only because of the

55 For a rather different answer from that suggested below, see Casali in Gibson, Green, and Sharrock (forthcoming), who argues that the unnamed critic must be understood as Augustus; cf. Woytek (2000). 56 The testimonia and wretched fragments of Zoilus the ' Oļrnpop.aaTi£ are collected at FGrH 71 Jacoby. Those who report his views attribute to him the typical language of the Homeric scholiasts, e.g. où môavóv, citottov. Given Ovid's subsequent defence of the Ars on the ground of literary appropriateness, it would be interesting to know whether Zoilus also used the scholiasts' cm-peTTe? in

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stature of the poet he criticised. When added to the injunction that readers should 'imagine more by your wit ( ingenio ) than my words say' (360), 57 this withholding of names gives an undeniable air of mystery to the passage. Nevertheless, certain features of the passage are comprehensible once it has been set within the context of the ancient protocols attached to self-praise. The praise of the self was a rather touchy subject in the ancient world, but explicit discussions in Greek and Roman rhetorical handbooks are united in agreement that self-defence is by far the best, because the most legitimate, context for self-praise.58 Here the de Corona of Demosthenes is repeatedly held up for the reader's admiration. Those who wish to praise themselves, yet are unfortunate enough to lack critics, may have to invent, as Isocrates does in his Antidosis , an imaginary scenario of facing a capital charge. Ovidian self-praise, of course, is a conspicuous feature of the Remedia passage, as the implicit comparisons with Homer and Vergil in 365-70 turn into an explicit claim of poetic parity with the latter in 395-96.59 Many critics have found these claims overblown, but the context of self-defence must be presumed to lend them both motivation and some cultural legitimacy. Indeed there is little to stop us supposing that Ovid, like Isocrates, has invented these attacks, in order to allow himself to reflect on an extensive and varied elegiac career which had seen him produce a second edition of three books of Amores , as well as the Heroides , the Medicamina , Ars 1-3 and the Remedia. What better time to look back over one's achievements and praise them than in the process of bringing down the curtain on the genre of Roman love-elegy? The unnamed critics and the thrust of their attack are, I suggest, whatever frisson the publication of the Ars actually caused, largely the opportunistic creation of the poet. 60 As for the literary context for the assault made on the poet, Ovid, appropriately for his high valuation of self in this passage, awards himself literature's most prestigious 'critic' of all, Liuor (<3>0óvoç). Envy - here malicious feelings about another's success (where the success is not unmerited) - appears as a motivation for criticism in 365 and 369, and is eventually personified in 389. This character's Greek counterpart had famously approached Apollo at the end of Callimachus' second Hymn , where his criticisms of the length of the poet's productions were met with a kick from the god.61 In Ovid's case Envy is in fact a repeat offender, as this character, in the same guise of Livor edax , had attacked

his criticisms of Homer. For the scholiasts' use of this language, see, briefly, Pohlenz (1965) 112-16, Dyck (1996) 254-55. 57 There is surely a typical Ovidian joke in 360: readers are asked to apply their ingenium to the Ars. 58 For the supporting evidence for the following argument, see Gibson (2003b). 59 Perhaps more than parity is being claimed. Morgan (2000) 1 12 with n. 58 notes that, despite the apparent symmetry between the pair, Ovid is awarded the hexameter and Vergil the pentameter (just as at 381-82 Callimachus occupies the hexameter and Homer the pentameter). At Am. 3.15.7-8, Vergil must share the hexameter with Catullus, while Ovid has the full pentameter to himself. For the Telchines, 'ignorant and enemies of the Muses', as likewise largely a convenient creation by Callimachus for the polemical purposes of the Aetia prologue, see Schmitz (1999). 61 0óvos- vel sim. in Callimachus: Ap. 105-13, also Aetia prol. 1.17-18 (note Ovid's references to the Aetia at Rem. 381-82, 389), AP 7.525.4. Latin versions of Envy: Hor. Carm. 2.20.4, 4.3.16, Prop. 3.1.21, Ov. Am. 1.15.1, Tr. 4.10.123, Pont. 4.16.47-48. For the larger cultural context for envy in the 'emotional economy' of the Roman elite, see Kaster (2003).

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the poet in Am. 1.15.62 There Liuof s objections to Ovid's indolence had been countered with the argument that the poet was in strenuous search of immortal fame (which poetry alone can supply). In the Remedia , however, we find neither an assault on length, nor a generalised attack on the activity of writing poetry. Rather critical focus is turned on the new subject of the poet's Musa proterua - that is to say, on his (licentious) subject-matter. The poet's defence of his poetry is correspondingly novel within the context of this traditional scene. This defence is first announced at 372: each thing must be judged according to its 'proper number' or, in the case of poetry, 'metre' (ad numéros exige quidque suos).63 Thus war belongs to Homeric verse, which has no place for deliciae (373-74); anger becomes tragedy (375 decet ), while comedy ought not to be divorced from common experience or parlance (376); iambic poetry - whether pure or 'choliambic' - is to be used for attacks on enemies (377-78); and elegy is the proper arena for amores / Amores and the mistress (379-80). Achilles would be out of place in the elegiac verse of Callimachus, while the Cydippe of Aetia 3 would be inappropriate subject-matter for the epic verse of Homer (381-82). Having now established that certain subjects are appropriate to particular metres and associated genres, Ovid reaches the crucial point of his argument in 383-88, which involves Thais, heroine of new comic drama, and Andromache, heroine of epic and tragedy.64 It would be intolerable, a blunder, for a promiscuous Thais to play the part of the dignified - but rather gloomy and unerotic - Andromache of Homer, Euripides and Ennius. Thais is the essence of Ovid's ars / Ars , and unhindered sexual freedom (385 lasciuia libera) is appropriate to his elegiac poetry - which, however, has no place for the uitta of the matron (386). In sum, if he chooses to write elegy, nobody can blame his Muse for being shameless: his poetry observes to ttpéttov in its match between genre and subject-matter (387 mea materiae respondei Musa iocosae). Why, to defend the thoroughly naughty Ars Amatoria , did Ovid reach for this unlikely or even risky argument based on 4 decorum' ? One explanation is quite obvious. A complementary principle of 'ethical' decorum is a key theme of the Ars - and some particular instances of this principle are echoed in the Remedia in the passages surrounding the defence of the Ars on the grounds of literary decorum . For example, Rem. 331-40 advises the lover to engineer the exposure of the talent or feature the puella specifically lacks. This advice reverses both Ars 2.491-510 (above pp. 120-22), where

62 For verbal links between the Remedia passage and Am. 1.15, see Henderson (1979) 88 on Rem. 363-99. The present Remedia passage may also be viewed in part as a reversal of the themes of Am. 1.1, where Ovid had declared his Musa and the materia of love-elegy to be ill-matched. In turn Tristia 2 reverses the themes of the same Remedia passage, where it is argued that sexual content is endemic in all literature. 63 Note the parallel with the advice on 'ethical' decorum offered by Apollo, at Ars 2.502 (of the lover) atque opus ad uires exiget omne suas (discussed above pp. 1 20-21 ). 64 For the literary and moral symbolism of Andromache in the Ars , see Gibson (2003) 132-33 on 3.109-10, 306 on 3.519, and 393 on 3.777-78. The Thais mentioned twice by Propertius is not the historical person of that name, but is explicitly Menander's heroine (2.6.3-4, 4.5.43); cf. the context of the 'adultery' mime in which Ovid refers to a Thais at Ars 3.604 ut sis liberior Thaide, fìnge metus (see above pp. 36-39). (The passages cited also suggest Thais' reputation for sexual license.) For Ovidian references to 'Thais' as generalised references to a stage meretrix , and for Propertian references to Menander's 'Thais' as having little to do with the play of that name, see Traill (2001).

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lovers are advised to put on display the talent which particularly becomes them; and Ars 3.261-80, where women are advised to hide their most unbecoming physical feature. Similarly the general advice at Rem. 425-28 that different stratagems will produce a therapeutic erotic disgust in different lovers, is a version of the repeated insistence in the Ars on the need to take account of what is individually appropriate or becoming to the lover.65 The Ars , which emphasises the principle of lovers acting in accordance with the becoming or the appropriate, invites (by a typically Ovidian logic) the defence that the poem itself is acting appropriately to its genre. There is, if nothing else, an attractive symmetry to this argument about the parallel principles observed by text and addressee. I traced earlier Ovid's travesty of decorum as a principle of behaviour, applying it in non- ethical or dubious areas of which respectable society could never have approved. There is likewise an element of successful travesty in Ovid's treatment of literary decorum in the Remedia , where he uses tò ttpéttov to defend a type of poetry which conventional morals would find indefensible, and, in the sequel, adds fuel to the fire by penning possibly the most obscene lines of his entire official corpus {Rem. 399-440). For, having established the principle that 'unhindered sexual freedom' is appropriate to elegy, Ovid goes on to offer some outrageous therapeutic advice, such as having sex with any girl one can find immediately before making love to one's domina (401-04), or gazing at the latter' s 'obscene parts' (429) and the soiling of a bed by 'disgusting marks' (432). It is then particularly pleasing that, to defend this seemingly indefensible position, Ovid should adapt an argument from Horace's Ars Poetica. The importance of literary decorum as a theme in the Ars Poetica can hardly be missed.66 Horace, for example, insists on speech that is appropriate to the emotion displayed by a character (105-08);67 on a proper match between tone and subject-matter (89-92, quoted below);68 on appropriateness and consistency in characterisation (119-27); on appropriate characterisation of the four 'ages of man' (156-62); and on appropriate styles of speaking, including 'vulgar' speech (225-33). As part of this argument, Horace deals with poetic genres (as defined by metre) and their appropriate subject-matter ( Ars 73-92):

res gestae regumque ducumque et tristia bella quo scribi possent numero, monstrauit Homerus. uersibus impariter iunctis querimonia primům, 75 post etiam inclusa est uoti sententia compos; quis tarnen exiguos elegos emiserit auctor, grammatici certant et adhuc sub iudice lis est. Archilochum proprio rabies armauit iambo; hunc socci cepere pedem grandesque cothurni 80 alternis aptum sermonibus et popularis uincentem strepitus et natum rebus agendis.

65 Cf. Ars 1.755-68, 2.501-02, 3.135-36, 3.187-88, 3.771-72. 66 See Rudd (1989) 35-36 contra Brink (1963) 136. 67 On this passage, quoted above, see p. 1 17 n. 7. See Brink (1971) 174 ad loc. for the importance here of tò irpéirov and the parallels with Aristotle's Rhetoric.

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Musa dedit fidibus diuos puerosque deorum et pugilem uictorem et equum certamine primum et iuuenum curas et libera uina referre. 85 descriptas seruare uices operumque colores cur ego si nequeo ignoroque poeta salutor? cur nescire pudens praue quam discere malo? uersibus exponi tragicis res comica non uult; indignatur item priuatis ac prope socco 90 dignis carminibus narrari cena Thyestae. singula quaeque locum teneant sortita decentem.

Horace lists, in order, the following authors or genres: Homer; elegy in the guise of lament and votive epigram; iambic poetry, first in the guise of the iambic poetry proper and then of the dialogue verse of comedy and tragedy; and finally lyric verse of four different types, three of which are strongly represented in Horace's own lyric verse, including erotic lyric. Each (or most) of these genres is given its own appropriate subject- matter, e.g. kings and battles for Homer, and rage for the iambic verse of Archilochus. The point of this list of genres and subjects is finally made explicit in 86-88: poets must learn their trade and work within the boundaries here laid down. The parallel between Horace and the Remedia passage under discussion has long been recognised, but recent commentators on the passage, while noting that the passage is filled with Horatian language in general, make nothing of the specific link, or declare the shared theme to be too general to allow direct reference between Ovid and Horace.69 However, as I have tried to suggest at various points in the present chapter and the preceding, Horace's Epistles seem to have been on Ovid's mind when he wrote Ars 3 and the Remedia™ Furthermore, the parallels between the Remedia passage and the Ars Poetica are closer than the commentators are prepared to allow. Each poet provides a list of authors designed to make the point that particular metres go with particular subjects. There is also substantial overlap between the genres which feature in each list, although the order of appearance is different and Ovid ends his list with a couplet contrasting Callimachus and Homer.71 Furthermore, a closer look at the pair reveals a literary dialogue rather on the model of Ovid's cheeky references to Epistles 2 in Ars Amatoria 3. Brink (1971) 167 suggests that the description of elegy in Ars 11 ( exiguos elegos) is 'probably loaded', being deliberately contemptuous of Callimachean craftsmanship. But more arresting, from the viewpoint of the present study, is the complete omission from Horace's list of any mention of love-elegy. A failure to include love-elegy as a poetic genre would be quite consistent with the absence from Epistles 1 of the kind of love affairs so prominent in the

69 See Henderson (1979) 90-91 passim , Pinotti (1988) 198-99 on Rem. 371-72, 373-74, Lazzarini (1986) 150 on Rem. 371-88. More positive is Woytek (2000) 187-88 n. 31, but the latter privileges an alleged relationship between the Remedia passage and the opening of Georg ics 3. 70 E.g., for the reference at Ars 3.127-28 to Epist. 2.1, see above pp. 96-98; for the various references at Ars 3.541-45 to Epist. 1.7, 1.10, and 2.1, see above p. 132 n. 48; for a reference at Ars 3.407-08 to Ars 400-01, see Gibson (2003) 267 ad loc. 71 Horace: Homer, elegy, iambic, comedy, tragedy, lyric; Ovid: Homer, tragedy, comedy, iambic, elegy.

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works of Propertius and Tibullus. Brink suggests why the omission might be pointed: 4 A contemporary note is, I believe, implied in H.'s concentration on lament and votive epigram, to the exclusion, here as well as at 402, of narrative and amatory elegy. Considering the attention paid to love lyric a few verses below (85), and the popularity of love-elegy at the time, the omission can be scarcely accidental.'72 If Ovid's list of genres in the Remedia is contrasted, it will be seen that love-elegy and Callimachus are given prominence, while lyric poetry is now absent. It takes little time to come to the conclusion that Ovid has pointedly removed lyric from the list - a genre necessarily associated in contemporary minds with Horace - and restored one of lyric's alleged subjects (love) to its 'proper genre', of course love-elegy.73 Such a removal takes place alongside the use, nevertheless, of Horace's own argument from poetic decorum. Ovid punishes Horace for his omission of love-elegy by demonstrating how useful his arguments from poetic decorum are for defending the very naughty Ars Amatoria. That Ovid is scoring a point off Horace appears confirmed by the lines in the Ars Poetica which immediately follows the list of metres and appropriate subjects (89-92, quoted above). Here Horace deals with styles of diction as exemplified by drama, and argues that a comedy should not be told in tragic style, or the feast of Thyestes be narrated with informal diction; but that each thing should keep its appropriate place (92 locum ... decentem ).74 This is arguably the passage which motivates Ovid's decision to make a case for the decorum of elegy, not with a contrast between Elegy and Tragedy (despite Elegy's immediately prior appearance in Rem. 379), 75 but by using two figures associated in the first instance with tragedy and comedy. In the Remedia , Thais, new symbol of elegy but also associated with new comedy, corresponds to Horace's res comica ; while Andromache appropriately replaces Thyestes. Ovid is subjecting Horace's arguments on poetic decorum in the Ars Poetica to a typically amusing reductio ad absurdum , and he invites us to watch as the great Augustan's decorum is used to defend the indefensible. Ovid's travesty of Horace's arguments derives its vigour from the elegist's determination, once again, to run together what Horace had largely kept apart in Epistles 1 and Ars Poetica , namely the aesthetic and

72 Brink (1971) 165-66; cf. Rudd (1989) 33, also Edward (1983). 73 The piquancy of this omission of (Horatian) love lyric is increased by a comparison with passages in Ars 3 and Quintilian. At Ars 3.329-48 Ovid provides (for puellae to recite to lovers) a list of poets which corresponds closely to the catalogue of authors excluded by Quintilian (Inst. 1.8.5-12) from the grammar and rhetoric stages of education (with the honourable exception of Vergil's Aeneid , allowed by both Ovid and Quintilian); see Hemelrijk (1999) 50-51, Gibson (2003) 230 on Ars 3.329-48. There is one further significant divergence between the lists of the two authors. Quintilian advises careful selection from the 'licentious' lyric poets (Inst. 1 .8.6), while Ovid recommends them prominently (Ars 3.329, 330); but whereas Quintilian includes Horace in this banned class of lyric poets (1.8.6 et Horatium nolim in quibusdam interpretan ), Ovid omits him completely, despite the obvious potential for licentiousness spotted by Quintilian. 74 Rudd (1989) 165 ad loc. notes the parallel with Hor. Sat. 1.9.51-52 (of Maecenas' circle) est locus uni I cuique suus. The organising power of the concept of the appropriate in both aesthetic and 'ethical' spheres is apparent once more. 75 Woytek (2000) 186 notes the parallel between the Elegy of Rem. 379-80 and her counterpart in Am. 3.1.

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ethical aspects of decorum?6 Just as in the Ars Amatoria it is possible to detect an aesthetic position behind Ovid's recommendations of a style of behaviour based on appropriate action,77 so here in the Remedia there is an ethical aspect to Ovid's argument on poetical appropriateness. Ovid defends the Ars Amatoria with a version of the argument that each genre has its appropriate subject-matter; but whereas the equivalent argument in Horace takes place entirely in the aesthetic sphere (poets must match genre and materia ), in the Remedia Ovid is also making a moral point. For his argument on tò TTpéîTov is designed to meet the objections of unnamed critics, 'in whose opinion my Muse is wanton' (362).78 Both censura and Musa proterua , of course, suggest accusations of immoral content, but in his defence Ovid deploys Horatian arguments on purely aesthetic decorum. The extent of Ovid's opportunism is greatly magnified if we reflect how little Ovid practises in his poetry elsewhere the (Horatian) theory which he preaches here of an appropriate relationship between genre and a very narrowly defined subject-matter.79 Perhaps Ovid's travesty of Horace may even be construed as an oblique comment on the Ars Poetica itself, which hardly puts into practice the generic doctrine it so prominently recommends.80 Further comic riches lie in store if attention is turned away from Horace and towards the larger Ovidian context. First, although the defence of the Ars intersects with the content of that poem and reflects its emphasis, it is made in the Remedia in the larger context of the systematic overturning of decorum. Throughout the Remedia Ovid reverses much of his advice from the Ars , in such a way as to reveal the 'constructed' nature of the

76 See, however, Oliensis (1998) 199-206, who provides a reading of the Ars Poetica as a 'Horatian de Officiis in aesthetic dress'. The comparison is aided not only by the prominence of decorum in each text, but also by the presence of the dramatic stage as a subject of instruction in the former and sustained simile in the latter. 77 See esp. the final section of the present chapter. 78 On the intersection of literary criticism and morality in this passage, see also Barchiesi (1997) 40- 41 ; cf. Woytek (2000) 188. Cf. Hinds (2000) 223-26, 233 on the gulf between the 'doctrinaire credo of generic purity' of the Remedia and Ovid's status as 'poster boy of Augustan generic hybridization', the latter being encapsulated in Heroides 3, where Achilles appears in the metre of Callimachus contra Rem. 381 Callimachi numeris non est dicendus Achilles. In context Ovid may allude to this discrepancy by choosing as a symbol of Elegy a character elsewhere associated with new comedy. (Even in her Menandrian incarnation she is a genre-crossing figure; cf. the para-Homeric opening of the play, frg. 163K-A èlio! [lèv ovv deiôe Toiai/nļv, 0eá, I 0paaaav, capaíav 8è Kal m0avf)v āļia, 'sing to me goddess of such a woman: bold, in the prime of life, and winning withal'.) The issue is stated with more force by Farrell (2003) 400, who suggests that 'in Ovid's hands elegy becomes a genre of such totalising ambition that it is impossible to distinguish it with confidence from almost any other literary kind'. ( See the very useful discussion by Farrell (2003) of the gulf in ancient literature between the routine practice of generic hybridism or indeterminacy, and widespread theories of generic purity or essentialism; cf. esp. op. cit. 203 '... the principles advocated by the Ars poetica as an essay in literary theory are largely at odds with the principles it exemplifies as a poem; and this is especially true with respect to genre'. On the 'inconsistencies' of theirs Poetica , see also Sharrock (2000) 17-18.

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beauty, talents, and decorum of the lovers of the Ars (especially its women).81 Note in particular Ovid's advice, immediately following the defence of the Ars , on forcing the pue lia to choose the sexual position physically least flattering to her (Rem. 407- 10).82 This of course reverses Ars 3.771-88, where women are advised to choose becoming sexual positions. Ovid in effect seeks to defend the Ars Amatoria on the ground of (literary) decorum , in a context where that poem's emphasis on a directly related theme is ruthlessly reversed. The Remedia passage seeks to validate and preserve the literary decorum of the text of the Ars Amatoria , in a larger context which invites readers to disregard and confound the correlative decorum of the addressees of the Ars. Ovid may be underlining this contradiction when he argues, at Rem. 383-86 (quoted earlier), that Andromache has no part in elegy, a genre which belongs to Thais. It is an obvious problem for his argument that the former is conspicuously present throughout Ovid's Ars , while the seductive Thais appears only once.83 On most occasions the archaic heroine is the object of ridicule, but in the sexually explicit passages at the end of the second and third books of the Ars - the very passages of the Ars put on trial in the Remedia - it is Andromache who serves as a positive sexual exemplum (2.707-10, 3.777- 78).84 Ovid may protest in the Remedia that it would be inappropriate for Thais to play the role of Andromache, but in the Ars the latter effectively does play the role of the former. Ovid's defence of the Ars on the ground of generic decorum thus calls to mind a passage in that poem which flouts the principle just established in the Remedia. By his own criteria, Ovid is in error.85 But perhaps it is becoming that in the Remedia , of all places, Ovid constructs an argument about 'appropriateness' which is problematised by context and sabotaged by content. What could be more 'inappropriate' to elegy, less decorous, than an elegiac poem which tells readers how to eliminate elegiac amori The Remedia of all poems fails to match subject-matter to metre.86

vii. Aesthetic and Ethical decorum in the Ars Amatoria (and Propertius)

It would hardly be appropriate to end this study with the Remedia. I now return, by way of coda, to the text which has been the main object of critical attention, the Ars Amatoria , and seek to apply to it some of the discoveries made in the course of discussing the

81 Cf. esp., in addition to the examples cited above, Rem. 311-22 and Ars 2.295-314, 641-56, 3.261-80; Rem. 323-30 and Ars 2.657-62; and Rem. 431-56 and Ars 3.209-34, 251-60. 82 Rem. 407-10 includes two prominent instances of decorum : Venerem quoque iunge figura , I qua minime iungi quamque decere putas. Il et nihil est , quod se dedecuisse putent. The larger context for decorum in the Remedia is discussed by Brunelle (2002) 57-58, who points out that Ovid both over- turns the decorum of the Ars (as here), and establishes a new version 'appropriate' to the Remedia , as exemplified in the medical metaphor of Rem. 1 32 et data non apto tempore uina nocent. 83 See above n. 64. For the point made here, cf. also Barchiesi (2001 ) 96-97 with 181 n. 41 . 84 For the figure of Andromache in the Ars , see Barchiesi (forthcoming). See further Jones (1997) 49. 86 I perhaps overstate the case here. The Remedia is designed to cure elegiac love which has gone tragically wrong, rather than to cure elegiac love - with its usual mixture of elation and despair - as such. But for other views on this complex issue, see (e.g.) Conte (1989) 449, Brunelle (2000-01), Fulkerson (2004).

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Remedia. In the opening sections of the present chapter I concentrated on Ovid's travesty of the 'ethical' decorum of Cicero's de Officiis and compared it with the similarly sourced decorum of Horace Epistles 1. In the section immediately preceding the present I moved onto Ovid's travesty in the Remedia of Horatian aesethetic decorum in the Ars Poetica , but emphasised how Ovid seeks to run together what Horace keeps apart. For in the Remedia Ovid uses an argument from aesthetic Appropriateness' as a way of defending the morality of the content of the Ars Amatoria. With this double potential of decorum in mind, I ask whether the 'ethical' decorum of the Ars Amatoria contains a parallel aesthetic significance. In his epiphany in Ars 2 Apollo, as outlined earlier, offers advice on how the lover is to behave based on Ciceronian decorum. The offering of such advice is unexpected, not only because it is somewhat belated, but also because Apollo more normally appears to a poet to issue instructions on poetics. Indeed, as Sharrock (1994) 206-36 argues, Ovid introduces the god in a fashion that suggests the poetological Apollo of Callimachus' Aetia prologue (and of Verg. Eel. 6.3-5 and Prop. 3.3. 1-1 6), 87 only for the god to present himself as the prophetic divinity of the Delphic oracle. However Apollo does belatedly offer advice on poetry (Ars 2.508 nec sua non sanus scripta poeta legat), which retrospectively suggests a poetological dimension to his advice.88 The god's instruction to the effect that the lover will 'organise his conduct according to his strengths' (2.502 uires ) is similar in form to Horace's advice in the Ars Poetica that poets should aim for a match between their material and their poetic strengths (38-39 sumite materiam uestris, qui scribitis , aequam I uiribus). More obvious, however, is the parallel with the advice offered by Apollo himself to Propertius - in a poem to which (as already suggested) Ovid alludes during his introduction of Apollo - on achieving a match between materia and ingenium (3.3.21-24).89 Just as Apollo here advises that Propertius match his poetic production to his talent for elegy (and not epic), so, in the Ars , an Apollo introduced as the god of poetry instructs lovers to match their actions to their erotic assets and talents. Each must make the most of their appropriate good points. The hint, that Apollo's advice on self-knowledge and lovers acting appropriately is equally applicable to the self-knowledge of love elegists writing appropriately, is delicately made. But it is given added resonance by Ovid's adaptation there of a passage in the de Officiis where Cicero refers explicitly to analogous aesthetic choices made by actors (and elsewhere to the same choices made by poets).90 In fact, where advice on 'ethical' to irpéirov-decorum is given in the Ars , within the total context of systematic reference to the aesthetically inflected content of the de Officiis , there must be the suspicion that advice is being offered by Ovid also on the aesthetic (poetological) plane. That suspicion is particularly strong when tò irpéirov-decorum is applied to female bodies. As I hinted briefly in Chapter 3 (p. 99 n. 106), male bodies in elegy are not so poetologically

87 Ars 2.493-96 haec ego cum canerem, subito manifestus Apollo I mouit inauratae pollice fila lyrae. I in manibus laurus, sacris induta capillis I laurus erat (uates ille uidendus adit). 88 For this and a number of the arguments below I draw on Sharrock (1994) 237-39, 244, 253-56. 89 ' cur tua praescriptos euecta est pagina gyros? I non est ingenii cumba grauanda tui. I alter remus aquas alter tibi radat harenas, I tutus eris: medio maxima turba mari est. ' 90 See above pp. 121-22.

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suggestive as female bodies, and in Ars 1 Ovid does not draw the connection, later made in Ars 3 for women, between the munditia of the male appearance and an analogous writing style. However, female bodies are well established in the elegiac tradition as bearers of poetological meaning, and, perhaps not coincidentally, the language of decorum is used most frequently and prominently in the book of the Ars addressed to women. The insistence that the puellae of Ars 3 choose hairstyles and clothing or styles of walking 'appropriate' and 'becoming' to them, for example, is a version not only of Ciceronian behavioural decorum , but is potentially also a poetological claim. Here a return can be made to a text and a subject studied intensively in Chapter 3, namely Am. 3.1 and the body of Elegy (3.1.7-14, quoted above p. 72). Elegy, with her elaborately bound hair, gait, and clothing has a forma decens : both a 'becoming figure' and an 'appropriate style'.91 Unlike Tragedy and her ponderous use of the elegiac metre (later criticised by Elegy at 35-42), Elegy possesses a style that is appropriate to her appearance in this elegiac poem. The issue of literary decorum is a not an unimportant one in the Amores , as Ovid had flagged it as a concern already in the second line of the collection proper (Am. 1.1.2 materia conueniente modis ; cf. 19). Furthermore, as McKeown observes of Am. 3.1.10, 'Elegy's lameness [pedibus uitium causa decoris erat ] contributes to the decorum of her appearance in the elegiac metre, whereas Tragedy's ingentes passus are inappropriate'. Tragedy compounds her fault later in the poem when she threateningly shakes her head (31-32), in contravention of theatrical custom on decorous behaviour.92 The observance of decorum in the same areas is of course a major theme of Ars 3. Ovid pronounces on the attractiveness of a becoming walk at 3.299-306 (quoted above p. 77), where decor (3.299), as suggested at the beginning of the present chapter, signifies in the first instance 'charm' or 'gracefulness'. But the noun may also be used to emphasise appropriateness or seemliness in behaviour, just as in Cicero's recommendation that the elite male avoid the opposite extremes of over-excitement and dispiritedness, at Off. 1.131 attentos ánimos ad decoris conseruationem tenebimus. In both cases decor is associated with the middle way. But walking is a poetologically loaded subject, and in Ars 3 this loading allows the inference that the gait of the puellae is stylistically appropriate to the poem in which they appear - itself an 'intermediate' between, or hybrid of, elegy and didactic. Nevertheless, what differentiates the decorous gait of the puellae of Ars 3 from Elegy's in Am. 3.1 is that whereas the the earlier text operates almost entirely on the poetological level, the later text, through its unmistakable reference to the de Officiis , adds the new idea of appropriate behaviour in public. 'Ethical' and aesthetic decorum are now united.93

91 For forma in this latter sense of 'style'. McKeown (forthcoming) ad loc. cites Cic. Orat. 31, Veil. 2.26.3. The observations below on Am. 3.1 are a summarv of those made bv McKeown ad loc. 92 See McKeown (forthcoming) ad loc., citing Quint. Inst. 1 1.3.68ff., esp. 71. For another potentially indecorous gesture attributed to Tragedy, see McKeown on 13 laeua manus. 93 Gill (1988) 194-95 reports the argument of Pohlenz (1934) that Cicero's chapters on appropriate speech ( Off. 1.132-37) point to the unification of aesthetic and ethical theory as part of Panaetius' original project. Inevitably this (suggested) unification looks rather different from that attempted by Ovid.

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A similar process can be detected in the advice on dressing hair ( Ars 3.135-68) and appropriate shade of clothing {Ars 3.169-92). In Ovid's scheme, choice of hairstyle and clothing must be made in accordance with one's individual characteristics (135-40, 187-92):

nec genus ornatus unum est: quod quamque decebit, 1 35 eligat et speculum consulat ante suum. longa probat facies capitis discrimina puri: sic erat ornatis Laodamia comis. exiguum summa nodum sibi fronte relinqui, ut pateant aures, ora rotunda uolunt. 1 40

lana tot aut plures sucos bibit: elige certos, nam non conueniens omnibus omnis erit. pulla decent niueas: Briseida pulla decebant; cum rapta est, pulla tum quoque ueste fuit. 1 90 alba decent fuscas: albis, Cephei, placebas; sie tibi uestitae pressa Seriphos erat.

Ovid emphasises the importance of 'self-knowledge' and appropriate choice or avoidance of particulars on the basis of that knowledge, as in the account of decorum in the de Officiis (e.g. 1.114, quoted above p. 121). In this context self-knowledge, once again equated with physical self-awareness, takes the peculiarly 'feminine' form of gazing in a mirror (136).94 It is on the basis of this physical self-recognition that women can then choose the style of hair that is most appropriate to the shape of their face and features, or the shade of clothing most appropriate to the colour of their complexions. But, of course, in elegy hair and clothing are subjects also freighted with poetological significance. In Am. 3.1 whorish Elegy's elaborately bound hair and diaphanous clothing form part of her forma decens - part of the 'style' which is appropriate to elegy (in contrast to the neglected hair and unrevealing palla of the matronly Tragedy).95 Potentially, the bodies of the puellae of Ars 3 may represent the genre in which they appear, quite as much as the body of Elegy represents her genre. In what sense, then, might the women of Ars 3 be dressed and tressed in a style appropriate to an eroto-didactic poem? One kind of answer can be found in the material reviewed in Chapter 3, where we saw that Ovid's advice on clothing and hairstyles eschews extravagance, expense, and luxury. Whatever 'style' the puellae choose from among the many listed by Ovid, each will reflect the avoidance of (stylistic) excess which is fundamental to the Ars.96 But there is another kind of answer which focuses on the very diversity of choice which Ovid allows and encourages {Ars 3.135, 149-52, 185-88). A large, potentially infinite, range of hairstyles and colour are appropriate and becoming to the bodies of the puellae as a group. Perhaps we see here an

94 See Sharrock (1994) 249-50, Gibson (2003) 302-03 on Ars 3.507-08. 95 Appropriate style and appropriate clothing are placed in close relation already at Rhet. 1405a, where Aristotle draws a link between propriety in the use of metaphor and epithets on the one hand, and the issue of whether a brightly coloured garment is equally suitable for young and old men on the other. 96 For Ovid's avoidance (e.g.) of the vocabulary of luxury, see above p. 92 n. 83.

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implicit claim here for the wide range of subjects and styles appropriate to a work written in a tradition and genre which, ever since Hesiod's Works and Days , had welcomed texts of a thoroughly heterogeneous nature (like the Ars itself). Whatever the subject-matter included by Ovid in his text, it will be appropriate and becoming to his theme.97 However what is most important here, I suggest, is not so much the exact poetological significance of Ovid's application of decorum , but rather the fact that here in the Ars Ama- toria , for the first time in Roman love-elegy, stylistic decorum is joined to notions of decorum as it affects an individual's behaviour. This is important because earlier elegy, more sparing in its use of the language of decorum in any case, either keeps the two areas quite separate or concentrates on one (often the aesthetic) at the expense of the other. A case in point here is Propertius. The language of decorum is neither common nor important in his first book.98 However, the first poem of book 2 prominently introduces the idea of aesthetic 'appropriateness': elegy is a genre which is proper to Propertius. The elegist's earlier defence of his generic practice in 1.7 had made no use of this concept. Propertius there asserts that seeking for something to use against a dura domina (6) forces him to serve his feelings more than his talent (7-8 nec tantum ingenio quantum seruire dolori I cogor et aetatis tempora dura queri). This introduces the notion that the true bent of Propertius' ingenium might be in some other direction, but his life forces him to ignore this bent - thus breaking the axiomatic connection between materia and ingenium ." In 2.1, however, a rather more positive explanation for Propertius' choice of genre is unveiled (2.1.39-48):

sed ñeque Phlegraeos louis Enceladique tumultus intonet angusto pectore Callimachus, 40 nec mea conueniunt duro praecordia uersu Caesaris in Phrygios condere nomen auos. nauita de uentis, de tauris narrat arator, enumerat miles uulnera, pastor ouis; nos contra angusto uersamus proelia lecto: 45 qua pote quisque, in ea conterat arte diem, laus in amore mori: laus altera si datur uno posse frui: fruar o solus amore meo!

The elegist now makes the argument that elegy is appropriate to the emotions and ethos of his life, as well as to his talent (note the contrast with 1.7), and clinches it with a version in line 46 of a common proverb: quam quisque norit artem, in hac se exerceat (Cic. Tusc.

97 Cf. the claims made by Vertumnus at Prop. 4.2.21-22 (quoted above p. 68 n. 72); for the god as a symbol of a 'changeful yet unified Propertian book' where artistic decorum is retained whatever the (diverse) subject-matter, see Wyke (2002) 84, 179-80. On the stylistic issues implicit in the Ars passage on hairstyles, see also Sharrock (2000) 23-24, 25. 98 1.4.13 (of Cynthia) ingenuus color et multis decus artibus' some editors print apta at 1.8.36 (in reference to Elis). For a reading of changing notions of decorum across all four books of the Propertian corpus, see DeBrohun (2003) 165-84, 190-92, 99 The irony of Propertius' statement is revealed immediately: hie mihi conteritur uitae modus, haec mea fama est, I hinc cupio nomen carminis ire mei (9-10). Nevertheless, for the breach here of personal decorum in Ciceronian terms, cf. Off. 1.1 14.

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1.41). 100 From the viewpoint of a study of decorum in the Ars Amatoria , what is significant here is that the argument deals in the first instance (and primarily) with the aesthetic sphere. The elegist anticipates Horace's advice in the Ars Poetica that poets should aim for a match between their material and their poetic strengths. Although Propertius goes on to insinuate that his material also reflects his lifestyle (45, 47-48), he makes no claim, nevertheless, that such behaviour is appropriate or becoming to him. Both uersu (41) and arte (46) emphasise personal stylistic propriety. The potential for an explicit dissociation between aesthetic appropriateness (observed by all poets) and conventional ethical propriety in one's life (eschewed by the elegist) is not exploited by Propertius until book 3. In his 'dialogue' with Maecenas in 3.9, 101 Propertius deploys a rhetoric of civic or personal decorum to justify his own aesthetic decorum. Maecenas knows his station in society and is determined to stay there (2 intra fortunám qui cupis esse tuam). To phrase the matter in the terms favoured in the de Officiis , Maecenas is content with the role that is personally appropriate to him. However, according to the elegist, Maecenas fails to apply a correlative consideration to Propertius and the aesthetic role that is proper to him: quid me scribendi tam uastum mittis in aequor? I non sunt apta meae grandia uela rati (3-4). To underline the point, Propertius asserts a principle which is equally applicable to both poetry and civic life, omnia non pariter rerum sunt omnibus apta (7); cf. 20 naturae sequitur semina quisque suae. The sentiment is conventional,102 and broadly similar to Cicero's insistence on doing those things to which we are best suited, at Off. 1.1 14 ad quas igitur res aptissimi erimus, in iis potissimum elaborabimus. But note the dissociation of ethics and stylistics: the elegist, while prepared to talk of his own poetic decorum , implies that civic decorum is for Maecenas. Indeed, rather cheekily, he is willing to take the lead from Maecenas' sense of civic appropriateness for his own poetics. Maecenas furls the full canvas of his sails (29- 30); Propertius likewise will not venture on to the sea of epic (35-36), but will write Callimachean poetry for pueri and puellae (43-46). Aesthetic and personal decorum may run in parallel, but the latter is proper to Propertius, and the former to Maecenas. By contrast, in the Ars Amatoria Ovid, with typical ingenuity and on his own terms, manages to unite personal decorum and aesthetic decorum. His addressees must, like Maecenas, practise those things to which they are best suited. The correlatively 'becoming' (and poetologically freighted) bodies of his addressees also reflect the match in the Ars between subject-matter and appropriate style - like the analogous aesthetic match in Propertius between ingenium and materia. The pupils of the Ars are equally well suited to playing the roles of either Maecenas or Propertius.

100 The proverb is attested already at Arist. Vesp. 1431; see further Enk (1962) ad loc. Also relevant are notions of self-knowledge, whether 'Delphic' (yvc50i aeairróv) or Callimachean ( Aetia frg. 1.20 ßpovTdv oùk è' ióv, àXkà Àio?, 'it is not mine to thunder; that belongs to Zeus'). 101 3.9 as a whole may be usefully read within Farrell's model of the 'literary career' of poets as antithethical to the political careers of the patron class; see Farrell (2002). 102 Cf. e.g. Lucil. 218 M., Sail. lug. 64.2, Ov. Ars 3.188, 771, Quint. Inst. 1 1.3.177, Otto (1890) s.v. decet 2 and omnis 1 .

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The bulk of this study, Chapters 1-3, has focused on the various manifestations of ideas of the moderate and the middle found in the Ars Amatoria (and on the larger context provided for them by Propertius and Horace). In Chapter 4, I turned to the idea of decorum , pointing out the close connection between ideas of the 'becoming' or 'appropriate' and the mean or the intermediate. For what is 'appropriate' in any given situation is often conceptualised as the avoidance of excess and deficiency in that situation. In retrospect, and despite the ordering of the work in this fashion, Chapters 1-3 in fact represent an attempt to work back and out from the findings of Mario Labate (and Molly Myerowitz) - to seek a larger context for the decorum which they have done so much to establish as a key theme in the Ars. That larger context is a distinctive and novel emphasis in the Ars on the mean and the middle way. It is customary to end a book by glancing forwards as well as backwards, perhaps providing some hint of the afterlife of the themes or ideas which have been the object of critical focus. But here the forward glance discovers a vista which initially appears largely a blank. For - unless I am mistaken - no vigorous or sustained afterlife for Ovid's erotic mean or decorum can be discovered in the poetry of pagan antiquity. This is partly because, of course, Roman love-elegy ceased to flourish as a genre after Ovid. But more importantly, perhaps, because Ovid's exile to Romania in the first decade of the Christian era stamped the poem with the mark of adultery and sexual and political scandal. In a work with such a reputation, few would expect to find Ovid recommending that the lover hold to the middle course and practise restraint and moderation. To discover a vigorous afterlife for the erotic middle way, we must turn our gaze away from Latin poetry, and towards the literature of the early modern period. The same texts so often cited throughout this work - Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Cicero's de Officii s, the poetry of Horace - formed a common basis for elite education and culture from the Elizabethan period to the Restoration.1 The same tangle of texts and ideas which inspired Ovid to discover an erotic novel middle way, likewise flourishes in the sixteenth and seventeeth centuries. The result was a profusion of engagements with the mean and the extremes - including moderation and excess in love. In the summary of Scodel (2002) 1 :

Donne . . . transforms the classical mean to promote individual freedom, while the aggressively modern Francis Bacon holds extremism necessary for human empowerment. Erotic literature pits extreme passion against temperate conjugal love; symposiastic or drinking-party poetry extols polemically defined norms of sociable moderation or of intoxicating excess. Imagining a modern rival to ancient Rome, georgic poets laud the nation as the embodiment of the golden mean, warn against national excesses, or urge extreme ways of increasing the nation's power

1 See Scodel (2002) 2-3.

149

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and wealth. Challenging his predecessors' and contemporaries' erotic, symposiastic, and georgic writings, John Milton deploys the mean to celebrate ideals of pleasurable restraint and self-respect that his countrymen have ignored to their peril. Such literary adaptations and transformations of an ancient opposition figure centrally in the emergence of a deeply divided, ambivalent, yet self- consciously modern English culture.

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1. INDEXES OF PASSAGES

Alciphron 1.133: 119 4.7.6: 66 n. 67 Orat. [Anon.] 70-74: 124 n. 31 Physiogn. 74-75: 77 73: 12 n. 12 Archestratus 79: 29 n. 74 Hedupatheia : 64-66, 110-11 de Orat. Aristotle 3.210-12: 124 Nicomachean Ethics : 5 Tuse. 1106a33-1106b7: 13-14 4.75-6: 69-70 1 106b 18-23: 13,44 Epictetus 1107a8-9: 14 Diss. 1.2: 123-24 1107a8-17: 41 Hesiod 1 107b4-8: 12 n. 12 Op. 1 108bl 1-1 109al9: 104 287-89: 74-75, 83 1 146a31-34: 51 690-4: 10-11 1150b29-32: 51-52 Horace Poet. Ars Poetica 1454al7-19: 69 73-92: 138-41 1454a25-27: 53-54, 54 n.31 89-92: 140 Rhet. 1405a: 145 n. 95 104-13: 117 Callimachus 243-47: 32 Aetia frg. 1.25-28: 82-83 Carm. AP 12.43: 30 1.5.1-6: 94-96 Cercidas 1.33:4, 45 Meliambs 3.27-33: 37 2.10: 17-18 Cicero 2.10.21-24: 36 Brut. 171:96 Epist. Murena 63: 17 1.1.10: 132 de Officiis: 5-6, 80-81 1.1.11: 130, 132, 133 1.93-151: 119-20, 122-23, 127 1.1.18: 132 1.93: 117, 125 1.6.12-16: 18 1.97-98: 125-26 1.6.60-2: 1 17 n. 6 1.98: 120 1.6.61-66: 131 1.109-10: 50, 123 1.8.3-9: 18 1.113-14: 121-22, 128-29 1.12.14-19: 131 n. 46 1.113:49-50, 123 1.14.32: 130 n. 43, 131 1.114: 146 n. 99, 147 1.17-1.18: 132, 133 1.126: 119, 125, 129 1.17.13-32: 132-33 1.128-29:81 2.1.156-60: 97-98 1.130: 103-04 Satires 1.131:81 1.2: 4-5, 19-24 1.132b: 107-08 1.2.25-28: 29-30,103

163

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Horace, Satires (continued) 497-508: 120-22, 143 1.2.28-30: 29,33 521-32: 106 1.2.47-49: 21,87 663-702: 100 1.2.80-126: 22-24 675-78: 100 1.2.101-11:30-31 707-10: 142 1.2.121-24: 23-24, 28,31 725-26: 106-107 1.2.125-26: 37-38 Ars 3 1.2.127-33:38-39 107-12: 84-85 1.3.30-34: 102-03 111-12: 97 1.9.51-52: 140 n. 74 113:95 2.2.63-66: 18-19 114:91 n. 81 2.3.166-78: 109 121-34: 93-99 2.5.84-8: 19 126: 97 2.7.6-20: 50-51 127-28: 97-98 Isocrates 133-58: 88-89 Epist. Phil. 2.4: 15 133: 94-99 Juvenal 135-40: 145 3.60-5: 33 169-92: 90 Livy 187-92: 145 9.2-12: 75 282-83: 118 Lucretius 299-306: 77-92, 118, 143 4.1280-83: 28-29 302-3: 79 Martial 304: 78 1.57: 40 305: 3, 78-79 3.33: 38 n. 98 479-82: 98-99, 108-109 Ovid 555-76: 99-100 Amores 577-610: 34-41,87 3.1: 3,12-92, 113-14, 144, 145 577-600: 34-36 3.1.7: 88 601-10: 36-40 3.1.7-14: 72-73, 144 611-16: 87 3.1.9: 89-90 761-69: 113, 118 3.1.11:78 771-86: 128-29, 142 3.1.12: 88, 89-90 777-78: 142 3.1.67-69: 76 Medic. 3.4.3-6: 38 11-24: 94 n. 88 3.4.29-32: 38-39 17-24: 3 n. 12 3.11:74 Met. Ars 1 7.18-21:69 281-82: 112 8.206: 86 n. 56 337-56: 106 Rem. 341-42: 112 143-44: 54 n. 32 357-72: 106 331-40: 137-38 459-68: 107-09 361-62: 134 505-24: 101-04, 117-18 363-96: 134-42 565-602: 106 383-88: 137, 140, 142 589-94: 105-06, 118 399-440: 138 Ars 2 407-10: 142 63-64: 36 n. 96, 86 805-10: 106 334: 106

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Philaenis, P. 2.29:91-92 Oxy. 2891: 64 Plato 2.32: 48, 59 Górgias 492b-c: 15-16, 46-47 2.33b.27-34: 47, 105 Protag . 356a-57e: 39 3.3.21-24: 143 Plutarch 3.5.23-26: 131 n. 46 Ant. 3.7-3.14: 52-53 9.2-3: 59 3.9: 147 25.1:58, 58 n. 42 3.10: 90-91 26.2: 58 3.11:60-61 36.1-2: 56 3.13:48,91 77.7: 61-62 3.19: 112 Demetr. 1.7: 58-59 3.19.1-4: 54-55 Propertius 3.21:61 1.1:56, 57-58 3.21.1-2:51-52 1.2: 20 n. 38, 56-58, 90-91 3.21.25-30:51-52 1.2.1-4: 89 3.24: 61 1.2.21-22: 58 4.2: 68 n. 72 1.6.25-6: 47 4.5.43-44: 98 1.7: 146 4.8.39-40: 34 1.9.11: 131 Seneca 2.1:91 Ben. 2.16.1: 126 2.1.39-48: 146-47 Tertullian 2.4.5-6: 79 de Cultu Feminarum 2.6: 48-49 2.5.1-2: 95-96 2.7: 49 Thucydides 2.12.23-24: 80 3.82.8: 15 2.15:66-70 3.82.4: 15 2.15.29-30: 4, 54-55,79 8.97.2: 1 1 2.15.39-48: 45-46, 105 Tibullus 2.16: 66-70 1.1.53: 132 n. 47 2.16.35-42: 66-67 1.1.71-74: 131 2.23: 24-34 Xenophon 2.23.1-14: 25-26 Mem. 2.23.15-16: 26-32 2.1.10-11:74-75 2.23.17-24: 32-34 2.1.21-34: 72-73,83 2.25.35-51:47-48 Oecon. 10.2-9: 57

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adultery: 21, 22, 24-34, 37-38, 41, 51, 113, de Officiis and: 1 19-22, 122-26, 126- 140, 149 29 adultery mime: 26, 32-33, 36-39 elegistsand: 118-19, 130-32, 146-47 Andromache: 84-85, 92, 137 n. 64, 142 ethical and aesthetic aspects of: 115- Antony: see s.v. Mark Antony 16, 1 15 n.2, 124-25, 129, 132, 133- Archestratus of Gela, Hedupatheia of 42, 143-47 Ars Amatoria and: 110-11 Horace and: 117, 130-33, 138-41 excess and libertinism of: 64-65 language of: 116, 118-19 Propertius and: 65-66 Remedia and: 137-38, 140-42 Aristippus: 74-75, 132-33, 132 n. 50 vulnerability to travesty of: 41, 122- Aristotle: 5, 12-14, 18, 40-41, 44, 51, 51-52, 26, 126-29, 133, 140-41 53-54, 62-63, 59 n. 43, 69, 77, 82, 104, deficiency, extreme of unmentioned: 12, 12 114, 145 n. 95, 149 n. 12, 22, 22 n. 44, 23 Ars Amatoria de Officiis of Cicero and the Augustan poets: Amores and: 38-39, 72-88, 88-90, 113- 5-6, 21, 49-50, 80-82, 103-4, 107-8, 14, 144, 145 109, 119-22, 126-29, 129-30, 132, contiguity in, rhetoric of: 79 143, 144, 145, 147 de Officiis and: see s.v. de Officiis of due measure: see s.v. moderation Cicero and the Augustan poets excess: passim generic affiliation of: 85-86, 110, 141 elegy and: 3-4, 24, 34, 53, 76, 109 Horace and: 4-5, 36-39, 93-99, 100, Mark Antony and: 56 102-3, 106-7, 108-9, 132, 139, 139 modern academy and: 9-10 n. 70, 140 n. 73, 143 women and: 1 12-13 immoral and pornographic reputation feet / footwear (as symbol): see s.v. shoes of: 1-3, 149 freedwomen: 21, 87 lex Iulia de adulteriis and: 1 13-14 gait (as symbol): 77-81, 144 Medicamina and: 3, 94 n. 88 hairstyles as symbol: 88-89, 145-46 moderation and the mean in: see s.v. Heaney, Seamus: 9-10 moderation and the mean Heracles, Prodicus' myth of Choice of: 74- non-exclusive nature of: 1 1 1 , 1 19-20 76, 78 n. 22, 132 n. 50 popular translations of: 1 -3 luxury (luxuria): 1, 3, 23, 48, 52, 57-59, 65- reciprocity in: 35 66, 84-85, 88-92, 93-96, 104, 110- Remedia and: 133-42 12, 145 styles (recommended) of speech in: Mark Antony (and Cleopatra): 4, 43-44, 46, 98-99, 107-9 47-48, 55-63, 63-64, 66-67, 92 n. 82 Tertullian and: 95-96 matrona : see s.v. meretrix Callimachean poetics: 30-32, 82-83, 85, 90, Medea: Ovid and: 7 1 , 73 96, 136-37, 139 Propertius and: 68-69 Cicero: see s.v. de Officiis mean, the: see s.v. moderation Cleopatra: see s.v. Mark Antony Medicamina , excess and luxuria in: clothing (as symbol): 20-21, 22-23, 3, 94 n. 88 29, 31, 72-73, 84-85, 89-91, 101-4, meretrix and matrona , binary polarity of: 145 73-74, 76, 82, 86-90, 113-14 decorum : see also Index of Latin and Greek misreading poetic predecessors, deliberate Ars Amatoria and: 117-22, 126-29, practice of: 20, 20 n. 38, 21, 32, 79 133, 137-38, 141-42, 143-47 n. 27 95, 102

167

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 1 68 EXCESS AND RESTRAINT moderation and the mean: double passim standards in: 54-55, 57-58, Archestratus and: 110-11 67-68, 105 Ars Amatoria and: 36-41, 71-114 extremism and libertinism of: 24-34, decorum and: 5-6, 1 16-17, 144, 149 43, 44-46, 52, 56, 66, 79, 91-92 didactic poetry and: 110-11 Horace and: 24-34, 50-51, 53 n. 30, 62, due measure and: 10-14 131, 131 n. 45, 139-40 flexibility of: 10, 11, 13-14, 19, 22-23, inconsistency (extreme) of: 48-49, 49- 95-96, 102, 149-50 66, 66-70, 79-80, 90-92 Horace and: 16-19, 19-24, 94-95, Mark Antony, Cleopatra and: see s.v. 108-09 Mark Antony philosophical rejection of: 14-16, Mimnermus and: 57 n. 41, 131 74-75 non-aristocratic ethos of: 62, 62 n. 52, political rejection of: 15, 16, 18, 75-76 92 n. 84 triteness of theme of: 9 Umbrian origins of (pilloried): 79-80 vulnerability to travesty of: 40-41, prostitutes: see also s.v. meretrix and 95-96, 1 1 1 matrona : 25-34, 37-38, 1 13 narrative self-explanation in poetry Scodel, Joshua: 4, 4 n. 14, 36, 40, 92 n.84, Propertius and, lack of in: 68, 69, 76, 100 n. 110, 149-50 91,92 self-consistency: 49-66 Horace and: 53 n. 30 shoes (as symbol): 28, 29, 72-73, 101-2 Ovid and: 73-74, 76 style (literary) and body: 29-32, 72-73, Ovid 77-80, 83-85, 88-91, 96, 98-99, 104 n. conservative attitude to male cultus of: 26, 110, 143-46, 147 104, 104 n. 27 Remedia critics (unnamed) of: 135-36 extremist ethic of: 106 joke (typical) of: 136 n. 57 Horace and: 133, 138-41 obsession with physical appearance: Tecmessa: 84-85, 92, 97 102-103 Thais: 37, 37 n. 97, 98-99, 137 n. 64, 140, stylistic excess of: 2-3, 92, 92 n. 83, 141 n. 79, 142 145 walking (styles of): see s.v. gait (symbolic) Philaenis: 64 wine and drunkenness: 45-46, 47-48, 52, 53, Plutarch: see s.v. Mark Antony 55,58-59,64, 67, 105-106 Prodicus: see s.v. Heracles Xenophon Propertius Amores 3.1 and Heracles in: 72-76 Augustus and: 63, 91 n. 81 Callimachus and: 82-83 conservatism and moralising of: 46-49, Hesiod and: 74-75 52, 57-58, 59-63,66-67,91 Livy and: 75 Propertius, and Ischomachus in: 57

This content downloaded from 88.111.227.165 on Wed, 05 Jun 2019 08:32:18 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms 3. INDEX OF LATIN AND GREEK TERMS aptus : 116, 118 n. 12, 147 ars: 78, 78 n. 21, 84 deceits: 1 16, 130, 130 n. 41, 132-33, 144-45 decer. 1 16-19, 124 n. 32, 126, 130 n. 43 decor: 116, 118, 144 decorum: 5, 49-50, 81, 115 n. 2, 116-22, 123-33, 137-38, 140-42, 147 honestus: 61-62, 61 n. 50 immundus: 26, 27, 27-29, 32 mediocritas: 17-18, 1 7 n. 29, 8 1 , 1 03 medius: 12, 12 n. 14, 17 n. 27, 21, 31, 40, 44, 75, 98 mollitia: 83-84 munditia: 23-24, 26-27, 27 n. 64, 29-30, 93-99, 100, 101-104 mundus: 19, 23-24, 26, 27-29, 27 n. 64, 34, 94-99 modus: 4, 12, 12 n. 13, 17 n. 27, 21 n. 42, 31, 44, 54-55, 54 n. 32, 78-79, 1 17 rusticitas: 98 n. 102 simplex / simplicitas: 94-96, 95 n. 91 urbanitas: 96, 1 19-20

(koXacric^ áKÓXacFToç : 15, 47, 51-52, 56, 63, 65, 65 n. 66 ckpaaía / (kpanfe : 5 1 -52, 63, 69 n. 75

Kaipóç : 1 1 n. 6, 106, 109 n. 39 kócj|iioç : 28 n. 70

|jL€crov / |ieaÓTT1ç : 11, 11 n. 9, 13-14, 17, 41 liÉTpov : 10-11, 1 1 n. 7 'irfiev àyav : 11-12, 121

TTp€TT0) / Tipénov : 116-17, 124, 124 n. 32 aaxļ)poawr| : 10 n. 5, 15, 125

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