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Le Dossier Du Terrorisme Israélien The LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAÉLIEN Une corruption morale THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE A Moral Corruption MOSHE SHARETT LIVIA ROKACH NOAM CHOMSKY ISRAEL SHAHAK ODED YINON RONALD BLEIER AND ONE OF THE MURDERERS OF COUNT BERNADOTTE [Français & English] GGB REPRINTS 2003 >http://ggb.0catch.com< Première edition / First edition THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE DOSSIER SUR LE TERRORISME ISRAÉLIEN FILE ON ISRAELI TERRORISM Israel must invent dangers, and to do this it must adopt the method of provocation-and-revenge... And above all – let us hope for a new war with the Arab countries, so that we may finally get rid of our troubles and acquire our space. Moshe Dayan, 26 may 1955. (Moshe Sharett's Diary, p. 1021.) CONTENU / CONTENTS Ce dossier est en construction. File under construction A la fin octobre 2003, il comprend: End of October 2003 it includes Au début était le terrorisme, de Ronald Bleier (trad. du suivant) p. 3 In the Begining There Was Terror, by Ronald Bleier, p. 13 Un compte rendu de lecture du livre de Stephen Green (en anglais), p. 24 Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations With A Militant Israel A Review of the above title p. 24 Une stratégie pour Israël dans les années 1980 par Oded Yinon (trad. fr. du suivant), p. 25. The Zionist Plan for the Middle East, by Oded Yinon, (1982) with a preface by Israel Shahak., p. 31 How they Murdered the UN Envoy Count Bernadotte, by one of the killers, p. 44 Israel's sacred terrorism, by Livia Rokach, introdution by Noam Chomsky. (anglais) + an article by Uri Avneri, p. 51 – 2 – LE DOSSIER DU TERRORISME ISRAÉLIEN Au début était le terrorisme Ronald Bleier Une bonne part de l’histoire du terrorisme du Moyen-Orient actuel a été jetée dans le puits de la mémoire d’Orwell, en raison d’une campagne très efficace au cours des 50 dernières années pour supprimer les informations préjudiciables à Israël. Faire sauter un bus, un train, un bateau, un café ou un hôtel, assassiner un diplomate ou un négociateur de paix, tuer des otages, envoyer des colis piégés, massacrer des villageois sans défense, c’est, comme on le sait, du terrorisme. Dans le Moyen-Orient moderne, ça a commencé par les sionistes qui fondèrent l’Etat juif (1). Le péché originel Le péché originel d'Israël est le sionisme, l’idéologie pour laquelle un Etat juif doit remplacer la Palestine précédente. A la racine du problème se trouve l’exclusivisme sioniste par lequel seuls les juifs sont traités comme citoyens de première classe. Pour créer et consolider un Etat juif en 1948, les sionistes ont expulsé 750.000 Palestiniens de chez eux et n’ont jamais permis à eux ni à leurs descendants de revenir. De plus, les forces israéliennes ont détruit plus de 400 villages et perpétré près de trois douzaines de massacres. En 1967, les Israéliens ont forcé 350.000 Palestiniens à fuir la Cisjordanie et Gaza, et 147.000 Syriens à partir des hauteurs du Golan. Depuis 1967, Israël a mis la population entière des territoires sous occupation militaire. Les effets de la dépossession des Palestiniens et d’autres Arabes nous suivent, avec les vies détruites de millions de gens directement touchés, et aussi comme signe de la guerre de l'occident contre la nation arabe entière et les musulmans partout. On peut avancer que le péché originel du sionisme et ses effets sur les peuples du Moyen-Orient ont été au centre de la motivation derrière les événements du 11 septembre, dont la conséquence la plus importante a été la " guerre contre le terrorisme " en cours qui étouffe notre paysage politique. Assassinat d’un négociateur de paix Un des actes les plus notoires du terrorisme israélien a eu lieu en 1948 quand des forces juives, membres de la faction LEHI (aussi connue comme Gang Stern) assassinèrent le comte Suédois Folk Bernadotte, médiateur appointé par l’ONU. Bernadotte fut tué le 17 septembre 1948, un jour après qu’il eut présenté son second plan de médiation qui, entre autres choses, demandait le rapatriement et des dédommagements pour les réfugiés palestiniens. L’assassinat de Bernadotte souligna une des principales différences de politique à l’époque entre les USA et Israël, c'est-à-dire le sort des réfugiés palestiniens. A l’époque, les forces juives/israéliennes avaient déjà forcé plus d’un demi-million de Palestiniens hors de chez eux. Le tollé international qui en suivit attira l’attention sur les effets sur la paix au Moyen-Orient autant que sur les souffrances des réfugiés. De plus, le devenir de centaines de milliers de juifs vivant dans le monde arabe, surtout en Irak, au Maroc, au Yémen et en Egypte, était mis en danger par la politique d’expulsion israélienne. La veille de l’assassinat, le ministre des Affaires Etrangères Moshe Sharett accusa publiquement Bernadotte d’un " parti-pris contre l’Etat d’Israël et pour les Etats arabes ". Stephen Green indique les preuves montrant que le gouvernement israélien lui-même fut directement impliqué dans l’assassinat. La nuit de l’assassinat, les consulats tchècoslovaques de Jérusalem et de Haïfa étaient occupés à préparer les quelque 30 visas pour les membres du groupe Stern " qui avaient été arrêtés pour leur implication dans la préparation ou l’exécution " de l’assassinat. " Entre les 18 et 29 septembre, la plupart sinon tous les 30 quittèrent Israël sur des vols pour Prague." L’" échelle, la précision, et la vitesse de la fuite-évacuation " conduisit le Département d’Etat à " suspecter que le Gang Stern n’était pas seul impliqué ". Les USA se demandèrent si " l’opération avait pu être planifiée de Tchécoslovaquie, et si un escadron spécialement entraîné avait volé de Prague en Israël dans ce but " (2). De plus, l’historien Howard Sachar note que " On pense en général que Yehoshua Cohen, un ami de Ben Gourion, a servi de détonateur " (3). Huit mois plus tard, en mai 1949, les Israéliens ont révélé à l’ONU que la majorité des membres du groupe Stern arrêtés pendant la " purge " avaient été libérés avant quinze jours. Les non-libérés furent gardés jusqu’à une amnistie générale accordée le 14 février 1949 (4). Personne n’a jamais été jugé pour le meurtre. L’assassinat de Bernadotte fit les titres internationaux et pendant quelques temps on fit plus attention à la question des réfugiés palestiniens. Finalement la pression pour les rapatrier ne put jamais être assemblée. On peut dire que du point de vue de la politique d’expulsion israélienne, l’assassinat fut un succès puisqu’aucun – 3 – THE ISRAELI TERRORISM FILE des successeurs de Bernadotte ne fut capable de mettre suffisamment de pression sur les Israéliens pour les amener à des concessions. Si Bernadotte avait survécu, il aurait peut être réussi là où d’autres avaient échoué. Au minimum, son meurtre fut un avertissement pour tous ceux qui auraient été tentés de suivre son modèle d’action. Dynamitage d’un édifice public Un des exemples les plus notoires du terrorisme juif/sioniste dans la période 1945-48 fut le dynamitage de l'hôtel King David le 22 juillet 1946. L'attaque fut le produit d'une atmosphère où les sionistes étaient furieux de voir que l'éclatante victoire des travaillistes britanniques à l'été 45 n'avait conduit à aucune libéralisation de la politique du gouvernement précédent sur l'immigration juive. L'insistance britannique sur le maintien de sa politique restrictive d'immigration produisit l'unification des trois factions des forces combattantes juives dans une résistance unifiée. Les trois forces comprenaient la Haganah de l "Agence juive menée par David Ben Gourion, le LEHI, ou gang Stern mené par Nathan Yellin-Mor, et l'Irgoun dirigé par Menachem Begin, qui dans son livre " La révolte " se vantait d'être le " terroriste numéro 1 ". A la fin d'octobre 1945, ils acceptèrent formellement de coopérer sur " une lutte militaire contre le pouvoir britannique " (5). Leurs actions coordonnées, dont la " nuit des trains ", la " nuit des aéroports ", la " nuit des ponts " et d'autres opérations, furent de tels succès qu'elles causèrent finalement de puissantes représailles britanniques. Immédiatement après la " nuit des ponts " du 17 juin 1947, des traques de terroristes furent menées, des arrestations faites et des juifs furent tués ou blessés lors d'affrontements. Une opération britannique beaucoup plus importante, qui fut connue sous le nom de " Sabbat Noir " commença deux semaines plus tard. Des milliers de juifs furent arrêtés. Les troupes britanniques mirent à sac les bureaux de l'Agence juive à Jérusalem, s'emparèrent de documents importants, arrêtèrent des dirigeants de la direction de l'Agence juive, et conduisirent des fouilles et des arrestations dans de nombreux kibboutz. En résultat direct de l'opération Black Sabbath, le commandement de la Haganah décida le 1er juillet de conduire trois opérations contre les Britanniques. La Palmach (forces d'élite de la Haganah) ferait un raid sur un camp de l'armée britannique pour s'emparer de ses armes. L'Irgoun ferait sauter l'hôtel King David où se situaient les bureaux du gouvernement mandataire et du commandement militaire britannique (la tâche du LEHI, faire sauter l'immeuble proche des David Brothers, ne fut pas réalisée). Un appel de Chaim Weizmann, le président de l'Organisation Sioniste Mondiale, arriva à ce moment là, demandant l'arrêt de la lutte armée contre les Britanniques. En conséquence, le comité politique suprême décida " d'accéder à la demande de Weizmann ". Cependant, Moshe Sneh, chargé de liaison de la Haganah avec l'Irgoun et le LEHI, s'opposa fermement à la demande de Weizmann et n'informa pas Begin de la résolution du comité, lui demandant seulement de reporter l'action (6).
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