Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses
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Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Kenneth Katzman Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs May 28, 2013 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov RL32048 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Summary A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed to a broad range of U.S. interests by Iran, in particular by Iran’s advancing nuclear program. Well before the nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U.S. concerns about Iran, the United States had seen Iran’s support for militant groups in the Middle East, Iraq, and Afghanistan as efforts to undermine U.S. interests and allies. U.S. officials also accuse Iran of actively helping Syria’s leadership try to defeat the armed rebellion there. The Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is peaceful. Three rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in 2012 yielded no breakthroughs but did explore a potential compromise under which Iran might cease enriching uranium to 20% purity (a level not technically far from weapons grade) in exchange for modest sanctions relief. Further high-level talks took place on February 26-27, 2013, and April 5-6, 2013, both in Almaty, Kazakhstan. No breakthroughs were achieved in Almaty. Iran’s Supreme Leader has not taken up U.S. offers to engage in the direct bilateral talks that many experts believe are required to produce a breakthrough. And, there is an emerging consensus that international sanctions—although severely harming Iran’s economy—have not pressured the regime to the point at which it is compelled to compromise. The government of Israel has asserted that it might take unilateral military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities if Iran’s program advances to the point where Iran could produce a nuclear weapon relatively quickly. President Obama Administration says the option of U.S. military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities remains open, but he has asserted that there is still time— although increasingly limited—for diplomacy. He reiterated this position during his March 2013 visit to Israel. Some experts assert that the popularity of Iran’s regime is in decline, in part because of Iran’s growing international isolation and in part because of its repression, although not to the point where the regime’s grip on power is threatened. The domestic opposition remains relatively weak and outwardly inactive. The March 2, 2012, parliamentary elections increased the political dominance of Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i, and the major candidates in the presidential election to be held on June 14, 2013, are Khamene’i loyalists. Two major figures considered a potential threat to the ruling establishment, including President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s close aide and protégé, were barred from running by the ruling clerics. The 112th Congress supported additional economic sanctions against Iran, most recently with enactment of the FY2013 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4310, P.L. 112-239). These laws expand sanctions against companies that conduct energy, industrial, and financial and precious metals transactions with Iran. Additional Iran sanctions bills, such as H.R. 850, are in varying stages of consideration in the 113th Congress. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr. Congressional Research Service Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Contents Political History ............................................................................................................................... 1 Regime Structure, Stability, and Opposition .................................................................................... 2 Unelected or Indirectly-Elected Institutions: The Supreme Leader, Council of Guardians, and Expediency Council ...................................................................................... 2 Council of Guardians and Expediency Council .................................................................. 3 Elected Institutions: The Presidency, the Majles (Parliament), the Assembly of Experts, and Recent Elections ................................................................................................ 7 The Presidency .................................................................................................................... 7 The Majles ........................................................................................................................... 8 The Assembly of Experts .................................................................................................... 8 Recent Elections: Ahmadinejad Rides Conservative Tide in 2005 ..................................... 8 Ahmadinejad Reelection in 2009: Protests and Subsequent Schisms ................................. 9 June 2013 Presidential Election: Likely Candidates and Schisms Playing Out ................ 11 The Opposition ........................................................................................................................ 12 The Green Movement and Its Uprising ............................................................................. 12 Exiled Opposition Groups: Supporters of the Son of the Late Shah of Iran ..................... 13 Exiled Opposition Groups: People’s Mojahedin ............................................................... 13 Ethnic or Religiously Based Armed Groups ..................................................................... 16 Iranian-American Interest Groups ..................................................................................... 17 Other Human Rights Practices ....................................................................................................... 18 Criticism of Iran’s Record in U.N. Bodies .............................................................................. 18 Iran’s Strategic Capabilities and Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs ................................... 21 Conventional Military/Revolutionary Guard/Qods Force ....................................................... 21 Nuclear Program and Related International Diplomacy .......................................................... 24 Assessments of Iran’s Nuclear Program ............................................................................ 24 Early International Diplomatic Efforts to Address Iran’s Nuclear Program ..................... 27 Developments During the Obama Administration ............................................................ 29 Missiles and Chemical/Biological Weapons............................................................................ 34 Chemical and Biological Weapons .................................................................................... 34 Ballistic and Cruise Missiles and Warheads ...................................................................... 35 Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups .......................................................................... 37 Support for International Terrorism ......................................................................................... 37 Foreign Policy: Relations with the Persian Gulf States ........................................................... 39 Yemen ................................................................................................................................ 41 Iranian Policy in Iraq ............................................................................................................... 41 Undermining Israel by Supporting Militant Groups ................................................................ 42 Iran and Hamas.................................................................................................................. 42 Iran and Hezbollah ............................................................................................................ 43 Syria ......................................................................................................................................... 45 The Caucusus and Central Asia ............................................................................................... 46 South and East Asia ................................................................................................................. 46 East Asia ............................................................................................................................ 46 South Asia: Afghanistan .................................................................................................... 47 Pakistan ............................................................................................................................. 48 India ................................................................................................................................... 49 Al Qaeda .................................................................................................................................. 49 Congressional Research Service Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses Latin America .......................................................................................................................... 50 Venezuela and Cuba .........................................................................................................