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Israel and Hamas News in Review – January 2013 – Teacher Resource Guide EIGHT DAYS: Israel and Hamas MINDS‐ON ACTIVITY 1. Imagine you are living in a nation that has been the target of repeated terrorist attacks from a group living in a neighbouring country. These attacks have been coming in the form of suicide bombings and rocket attacks. How do you think your country should respond? What do you think would be a reasonable course of action in this circumstance? 2. Imagine you are living in a country whose trade is constantly restricted by a much more economically powerful and militarily dominant neighbouring nation. As a result, your standard of living is very poor while your neighbour with the strong army enjoys a relatively wealthy lifestyle. How would this make your feel? What might your do to rectify the situation? What would be a reasonable course of action for your nation to take? SETTING THE STAGE a year from Hamas and over half of the nation’s population is within striking range. After an Assassination apparent escalation in Hamas attacks through the In an attack that demonstrated the precision and fall of 2012, the IDF put Operation Pillar of tactical efficiency of the Israel Defense Forces Defense into play. The assassination of Jabari (IDF), Hamas military leader Ahmed Jabari was and the initial bombs were just the tip of the assassinated in a brutal air strike that targeted his iceberg. During the weeklong conflict, the IDF car as it made its way down a street in Gaza. struck over 1 500 sites within Gaza, killing over Israel claimed the attack was justified after 160 Palestinians (103 of whom were civilians Hamas forces spent months firing rockets out of according to the United Nations). And, from the the volatile Gaza Strip toward targets in Israel. outset, Israel threatened a ground invasion of The IDF announced the killing of Jabari via Gaza, calling up 75 000 army reservists to back Twitter just minutes after the assassination and up their threat. then unleashed a series of bombardments on 20 other Hamas strongholds in Gaza. Hamas’ response For its part, Hamas started firing every rocket Israel’s show of force they could muster at their Israeli neighbours What ensued was eight days of tension in the after hostilities began on November 14. Almost Middle East region where such episodes have 1 400 rockets were launched from Gaza with been all too common since the birth of the state close to 60 hitting heavily populated urban areas of Israel in 1948. According to some estimates, including one rocket that struck the suburbs of Israelis are subject to close to 700 rocket attacks Tel Aviv (the first rocket to hit Israel’s capital since the Gulf War of 1991) and another that hit 20 JANUARY 2013 — EIGHT DAYS: ISRAEL AND HAMAS Jerusalem (striking the holy city of Islam and after intense negotiations at Egypt’s intelligence Judaism for the very first time). In all, only six headquarters in Cairo, Clinton and Amr Israeli’s lost their lives in the rocket attacks, announced the end of hostilities and the thanks in large part to the IDF’s Iron Dome – the beginning of a ceasefire. nation’s air defense system that intercepted close to 400 Hamas rockets (though the IDF claims Victory (?) that their interception rate was over 80 per cent). With the ceasefire came posturing on both sides. Israel claimed that their military solution had The diplomats arrive brought Hamas to its knees and created an end With the might of the Israeli army threatening to (however brief) to the escalating rocket attacks. escalate its attack on Gaza, the international Meanwhile Hamas claimed that the international community stepped up its efforts to try to get the attention brought to bear on the crisis showed two sides to agree to a ceasefire. Nations like the that they were a force to be reckoned with in the United States, Canada and Britain defended Middle East. While western countries like Israel’s right to defend itself against rocket Canada and the United States agree with Israel’s attacks from Hamas but encouraged their Israeli depiction of Hamas as a terrorist group, the fact ally to stand down when it came to the threat of that the conflict could attract the Secretary a ground attack. Meanwhile, Hamas found General of the United Nations and the Secretary support with a number of Arab states including of State of the United States lent some credence Iran (the main supplier of arms to Hamas to the claim that Hamas was a powerful militants), Egypt (the nation from which the organization. While both sides claimed victory, arms are smuggled into Gaza via a network of the world held its collective breath as the tunnels on the Gaza-Egyptian border) and tenuous ceasefire held itself together. Turkey. Before the tense eight days had passed, heavyweight diplomats like United Nations Did you know? Secretary-General Ban ki-Moon, United States Hamas fired close to 1,400 rockets at Israel Secretary of State Hilary Clinton, and Egyptian during the conflict in November 2012. Of those Foreign Minister Mohamed Kamel Amr brought rockets, about 150 never made it out of Gaza, their influence to the table to try to bring the roughly 400 were intercepted, almost 900 fell combatants together. Outside the negotiating in open areas, and nearly 60 hit urban areas in room, US President Barack Obama and Egyptian Israel. President Muhammad Morsi were believed to Source: The Economist, Gaza abacus have played critical roles in getting Israel and November 19, 2012 Hamas to suspend hostilities. On November 21, Checking Understanding 1. How did the most recent conflict between Israel and Hamas begin? 2. How forceful was Israel’s response to the ongoing threats posed by Hamas? 3. How successful was Hamas’ response to Israel’s attack? 4. What role did international diplomats play in negotiating a ceasefire? 5. Who emerged victorious at the end of the conflict? News in Review ∙ CBC Learning ∙ newsinreview.cbclearning.ca 21 JANUARY 2013 — EIGHT DAYS: ISRAEL AND HAMAS VIDEO REVIEW Pre‐viewing Questions Israel was been at odds with Palestinian militants since its creation in 1948. If you look at a map of Israel you will notice that the Palestinian people are located in a small pocket on the coast called the Gaza Strip and a larger inland area called the West Bank. The land mass separating the two areas is the state of Israel. Keep in mind that Israel is in charge of the entire area. 1. What problems do you think this poses for the Palestinians? Viewing Questions 1. What happened to Ahmed Jabari on November 14, 2012? 2. What role did Twitter play in the announcement of what happened to Jabari? 3. What did Israel do shortly after taking action against Jabari? 4. How did Egypt respond to the attack on Gaza? 5. What message did United Nations Security Council President Hardeep Singh Puri and Canadian Minister of National Defence Peter MacKay echo in the wake of the renewed conflict between Israel and Hamas? News in Review ∙ CBC Learning ∙ newsinreview.cbclearning.ca 22 JANUARY 2013 — EIGHT DAYS: ISRAEL AND HAMAS 6. Why does Peter MacKay think that the Middle East is too volatile a region for the world community to allow things to get out of hand? 7. a) What message did countries like Canada, France, Russia and Britain consistently send to Israel and Hamas over the course of the conflict? b) How did Israel respond to this message? 8. What role did the United State expect Egypt to play when it came to the Hamas-Israel conflict? Does this role match the expectations of people in the Muslim Brotherhood? 9. Describe the plight of the people of Gaza a week after the conflict began. 10. Why did civilian deaths in Gaza spike as the conflict raged on? 11. How has life changed for people living in the Yad Mardechai Kibbutz? 12. What fears do the people living close to the Israel-Gaza border have about living in a conflict ridden Middle East? News in Review ∙ CBC Learning ∙ newsinreview.cbclearning.ca 23 JANUARY 2013 — EIGHT DAYS: ISRAEL AND HAMAS 13. What unintended consequences came out of the ceasefire? Post‐viewing Questions 1. In his interview with Peter Mansbridge, Minister of Defence Peter MacKay maintained that Canada could play a role in peace discussions even though they are clearly on Israel’s side? Do you think this is a realistic position? 2. In the end, Egypt played the role of mediator in the conflict; thus meeting the expectations established by the United States (who promised Egypt millions of dollars in aid money). This surprised some people because new Egyptian President Mohammad Morsi is part of the same Muslim Brotherhood as many members of Hamas. Based on this information, why do you think many international observers are very concerned about Egypt’s commitment to peace between Israel and the Palestinians? News in Review ∙ CBC Learning ∙ newsinreview.cbclearning.ca 24 JANUARY 2013 — EIGHT DAYS: ISRAEL AND HAMAS ACTIVITY: Social Media Minds‐On Activity 1. Do you use social media services like Facebook and Twitter? Describe how you use these social media sites on a typical day. 2. Are there any activities that the social media sites prohibit? For example, what policies do these sites have when it comes to posting violent or provocative images? 3. Do you think that government agencies should be allowed to use social media to promote their work? Should there be limits placed on a government’s use of social media to promote itself? The Tweets of War In her article “The Tweets of War,” Emily Greenhouse describes how the Israel Defense Force (IDF) used social media to provide a narrative of their attack on Hamas.
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