The São Francisco Interbasin Water Transfer in Brazil: Tribulations of a Megaproject Through Constraints and Controversy
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www.water-alternatives.org Volume 10 | Issue 2 Roman, P. 2017. The São Francisco interbasin water transfer in Brazil: Tribulations of a megaproject through constraints and controversy. Water Alternatives 10(2): 395-419 The São Francisco Interbasin Water Transfer in Brazil: Tribulations of a Megaproject through Constraints and Controversy Philippe Roman IHEAL-CREDA (Institute of Latin American Studies), Paris, France; [email protected] ABSTRACT: This paper describes the complex social, political and economic dynamics that led the Brazilian government to launch one of the biggest hydraulic infrastructure projects in the country’s history: the transposição do São Francisco (transfer of the waters of the São Francisco River), a large-scale diversion scheme to transfer water from the São Francisco River Basin to semiarid areas of the Northeastern Region.1 This massive interbasin water transfer, first idealised in the nineteenth century, was turned into reality under Lula’s presidency, at a time when the Brazilian economy was booming and a left-leaning neo-developmentalist coalition had seized power. Such a controversial project has fuelled criticism from a wide social and political spectrum. Between 2005 and 2007, when the conflict was at its highest, large parts of society mobilised against the project, which makes the transposição one of the most remarkable socioenvironmental conflicts in the history of Brazil. The project was given the green light at a moment when water governance was undergoing a process of institutional reorganisation officially aiming at the implementation of more democratic procedures and of integrated governance principles. So, it can be viewed as an anachronism of the 'hydraulic mission' with its supply-side technocratic engineering solutions. But it can also be considered as a legitimate and necessary piece of water development, in an emerging country with acute regional water imbalances, that is to benefit a historically underprivileged region (the Northeast). Beyond such simplistic views, we will try to disentangle the complex nexus of political and economic interests and of conflicting discourses related to the extremely diverse set of actors that have played a role in the project, and thereby try to understand why, after more than a century of debate, the transposição has finally become a (still heatedly debated) reality. KEYWORDS: Interbasin water transfer, megaproject, socioenvironmental conflict, neodevelopmentalism, São Francisco River, Brazil INTRODUCTION Under the Lula government (PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores – workers’ party), Brazil has chosen to resort to an interbasin transfer from the São Francisco River to provide water to some of the driest regions of its semiarid Northeastern Region.2 While this megaproject3 has been envisaged since the early 19th century, it unleashed a major conflict in the early 2000s that mobilised several States, the Federal Government, civil society, scientists, intellectuals and various actors of the water management 1 The São Francisco River Basin is itself at 57% semiarid (MMA, 2006b). 2 The author wishes to thank the three peer-reviewers for their useful comments and suggestions. Any remaining errors or shortcomings are the author’s responsibility. 3 Flyvbjerg (2014: 6) defines megaprojects as “large-scale, complex ventures that typically cost US$1 billion or more, take many years to develop and build, involve multiple public and private stakeholders, are transformational, and impact millions of people”. Roman: The São Francisco interbasin water transfer in Brazil Page | 395 Water Alternatives - 2017 Volume 10 | Issue 2 sphere. The controversy’s profound imprint on Brazilian society mirrors the great hopes created by what was presented as Northeast’s economic and social 'redemption'. Since the 19th century and the endorsement of the idea by the last Brazilian emperor, Dom Pedro II, the project has been part of the debates on water scarcity and recurrent droughts in the semiarid area of Brazil. It was recurrently modified and debated, though never implemented because of technical hardships (not least the lack of energy to pump water and drive it beyond the hills on the Northern axis). The São Francisco River, usually known as the velho chico ('old chico') or the 'river of national integration' for its role as a route between the Atlantic ocean and the 'interior' (the sertão) and between the Centre and Northeast regions of Brazil, is one of the most important rivers in Brazil: 2800 km long, with an average flow of 2800 m3/s, its basin spans approximately 638,466 km² (7.5% of the national territory) and several states (Bahia, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Goiás and the Federal District). Multiple uses are made of its waters, among which irrigation (77% of total demand) and hydroelectric power (dams in the São Francisco River Basin supply 12% of the national electricity demand). Figure 1. The São Francisco River Basin. Source: MMA (2006b). Roman: The São Francisco interbasin water transfer in Brazil Page | 396 Water Alternatives - 2017 Volume 10 | Issue 2 Works for the so-called transposição,4 the costliest current Brazilian hydraulic infrastructure, started in 2007 as part of an important programme of investment for the acceleration of growth (the PAC – Programa de Aceleração do Crescimento, Programme for the Acceleration of Growth), and they were initially supposed to be completed by 2011. The transposição, composed of approximately 500 km of concrete canals, pipes and aqueducts, is intended to bring freshwater to 12 million people, to benefit 390 municipalities, and to help the Northeastern hydraulic network operate in a more 'synergistic' way (it has thus been renamed an 'integration' rather than 'diversion' project). The project has already faced several delays (as of May 2017, it was not completed yet), substantive cost overruns (from 4.5 to 10+ billion USDR), and some construction firms involved in the transposição are currently under scrutiny by the Federal Court of Accounts for contracting irregularities.5 What is the point in debating an interbasin water transfer as a symptom of a 'come-back' of big infrastructure? Water is always moving through the hydrosocial cycle (Linton and Budds, 2014), so bodies of water are always being 'transferred'. Artificial interbasin water transfers are in no way new. In many countries, interbasin water transfers help provide cities and agriculture with freshwater, and in some of them long-distance, or 'massive' interbasin transfers (MIBWTs, hereafter) have been built (in China, the United States, Canada and Australia for example). According to Gupta and van der Zaag (2008), in the beginning of the 2000s, 14% of withdrawn water was through interbasin transfers (540 billion m3/y) and big transfers will likely represent around 25% of mobilised water in 2025. More than 200 big water transfer infrastructures are in operation or planned. They are by now essentially concentrated in the Americas (in particular Canada, see Lasserre, 2009), but emerging countries like China, India or Brazil are developing such projects at a fast pace and others like South Africa are already well provided with interbasin transfers (Turton et al., 2008; Blanchon, 2009). Long-distance interbasin water transfers are viewed by some as a necessity for the near future (Ayres, 2006; MIT, 2014) and ambitious if not colossal projects have been debated (see, e.g. Badescu et al., 2010). Pros and cons of such big infrastructure have been discussed at some length (Biswas, 1981; Biswas et al., 1983; Vaux and Howitt, 1984; Snaddon et al., 2000; Lasserre, 2005; UN WATER/AFRICA, 2006; WWF, 2007; Ghassemi and White, 2007; Gupta and van der Zaag, 2008; Lasserre, 2009) but there is arguably less academic work on this class of hydraulic infrastructure than on others, especially dams. To the best of our knowledge, there are no internationally agreed standards for assessing interbasin water transfer projects, and no reference document exists like the WCD report for dams (WCD, 2000). There exist pieces of work on the 'performance' of diverse types of infrastructure projects,6 including dams (WCD, 2000; Ansar et al., 2014), but (as far as we know) not on interbasin water transfers. It is still probable that applying the same analysis to MIBWTs would yield similar results. But at the same time, supposedly well-succeeded infrastructure projects in rich countries offer a showcase for MIBWTs in emerging countries.7 It is no surprise that California has been looked at as an example to be followed in the Northeast by Brazilian politicians, engineers and corporate farmers (Broggio and Droulers, 2000).8 4 We will use both the words 'transposição', as it is the way the project is widely known and referred to in Brazil, and PISF, the acronym for the project’s official name (Projeto de Integração do Rio São Francisco com Bacias Hidrográficas do Nordeste Setentrional – Project of Integration of the São Francisco River with River Basins of the northern Nordeste). 5 Several other court cases concern construction companies involved in the transposição. Executives of a consortium of companies involved in the works of the transposição were temporarily jailed in 2015 and the TCU (Tribunal de Contas da União – Federal Court of Accounts) estimated that more than 700 million R$ were irregularly spent between 2005 and 2013. 6 For an assessment of different kinds of infrastructure megaprojects from a managerial standpoint (financial costs and delivering schedule), see