Conditioned Superstition: Desire for Control and Consumer Brand Preferences

ERIC J. HAMERMAN GITA V. JOHAR

There are many opportunities in everyday life to associate consumer products with success or failure. For example, when a basketball fan drinks a particular brand of soda while watching her favorite team win a game, she may perceive that this consumption facilitated the victory. Subsequently, the fan may continue to purchase and consume this same item during future games, in an attempt to help the team. This behavior is known as “conditioned superstition.” Data from five experiments indicate that preference for lucky products (i.e., those associated with positive outcomes) increases with higher levels of desire for control combined with lower levels of perceived ability to control outcomes (e.g., low generalized self-efficacy). People who express a preference for these lucky products form an illusion of control over future outcomes, so that they perceive superstitious behavior to be an effective strategy to achieve the desired result.

everal years ago, one of the authors and his friends same friends attended an important playoff game. After a S acquired season tickets to watch the Dallas Mavericks poorly played first half, the Mavericks again trailed by a (a professional basketball team). During one particular game large margin. At that moment, this formerly loyal Coca- when the Mavericks were losing badly at halftime, a member Cola drinker loudly proclaimed: “It’s time to break out the of the group visited the concession stand to purchase his Dr. Pepper!” usual halftime beverage of Coca-Cola. He returned to his In this article, we focus on the conditioned superstitions seat holding a Dr. Pepper, explaining that the arena was that occur after consumers irrationally associate their pur- temporarily out of his favorite drink. The team subsequently chase or consumption decisions with positive or negative embarked on an unlikely rally in the second half and ended outcomes. Extant research has focused primarily on super- up winning in spectacular fashion. A few months later, the stition related to cultural beliefs. For example, priming lucky (vs. unlucky) numbers increased consumers’ estimates of win- ning a subsequent lottery (Jiang, Cho, and Adaval 2009). Sim- Eric J. Hamerman ([email protected]) is assistant professor of marketing at the A. B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane University, ilarly, Taiwanese consumers were more likely to purchase— New Orleans, LA 70118. Gita V. Johar ([email protected]) is Meyer and expected higher levels of performance from—a red rice Feldberg Professor of Business at the Graduate School of Business, Co- cooker compared to a green one, because they considered lumbia University, New York, NY 10027. Correspondence: Eric J. Hamer- red to be lucky (Block and Kramer 2009). man. The article was based on an essay from the first author’s dissertation These cultural superstitions largely occur with noncon- at the Graduate School of Business, Columbia University. The authors scious priming (Kramer and Block 2008), but we hypoth- thank the other dissertation committee members: Donald Lehmann, Leon- esize that conditioned superstitions may be formed and used ard Lee, Lauren Block, and Tor Wager, and they gratefully acknowledge at a conscious level. We expect superstitions to be success- funding from the Columbia Business School Research Fund and the A. B. Freeman School of Business. The authors acknowledge the helpful input fully conditioned when contingency awareness (e.g., aware- of the editor, associate editor, and reviewers, and appreciate the thoughtful ness of the link between drinking Dr. Pepper and the team comments received from Stijn van Osselaer, Jeffrey Parker, Daniel Mochon, winning; Bandura 1974) is present, and we predict that in- Janet Schwartz, Harish Sujan, and Mita Sujan, as well as participants in dividuals opting for the newly designated lucky products seminars at Columbia University, University of Chicago, University of will acknowledge that their preference reflects a conscious Iowa, and York University. strategy to control future events. Laura Peracchio served as editor and Darren Dahl served as associate If superstition is a conscious strategy to control the envi- editor for this article. ronment, the prevalence of superstitious behavior should be strongly related to perceptions of, and desire for, control. We Electronically published May 1, 2013 hypothesize that individuals who score high (vs. low) on the 428

2013 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc. ● Vol. 40 ● October 2013 All rights reserved. 0093-5301/2013/4003-0003$10.00. DOI: 10.1086/670762 HAMERMAN AND JOHAR 429 desire for control scale (Burger and Cooper 1979) or face a stition is a strategic attempt to influence the environment, valued (vs. unimportant) outcome would be more likely to then superstitious behavior should facilitate an illusion of turn to superstition in order to control their environment. control, such that individuals make more optimistic predic- Conversely, we expect superstitious behavior to be reduced tions about uncertain future outcomes. This is consistent when individuals perceive sufficient internal resources to con- with the findings of Damisch, Stoberock, and Mussweiler trol their environment: if they possess high levels of gener- (2010) that superstition enhances performance expectations. alized self-efficacy (GSE) or if they undergo a self-affirma- Extant literature provides support for the notion that il- tion. Moreover, after engaging in superstitious behavior, we lusion of control is related to optimism about future out- expect people to form an illusion of control over uncertain comes. Factors such as choice, competition, familiarity, and future events (e.g., if I drink Dr. Pepper, my team is more involvement lead people to reclassify games of chance as likely to win) similar to that expressed by Langer (1975). In measures of skills that can be controlled (Langer 1975). other words, choosing a lucky product (i.e., one that is be- Individuals were more optimistic about winning a random lieved to create a favorable outcome) is likely to result in drawing if they chose—rather than were assigned—a lottery individuals predicting more positive future outcomes. The number and preferred a random draw from a deck of cards next section elaborates on our conceptualization. against an uninspiring (vs. intimidating) opponent (Langer 1975). Using a familiar (vs. exotic) deck of cards resulted in increased wagers (Bouts and Avermaet 1992), and TV CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK viewers with higher levels of mental engagement during a Super Bowl broadcast perceived a greater responsibility for The phenomenon of conditioned superstition derives from the outcome (Pronin et al. 2006). operant conditioning, in which the frequency of various be- Illusions of control have also been related to superstition haviors is altered through reinforcement (Skinner 1948). For in the literature. As an individual difference, illusion of example, pigeons demonstrated “superstition” by repeating control is correlated with belief in paranormal superstitions a series of random behaviors that they had associated with (e.g., broken mirrors bring bad luck), because such beliefs the presentation of food (Skinner 1948). The change in provide a sense of “controllability in people who frequently behavior—rather than its functionality—defined the con- exhibit an external locus of control” (Rudski 2004). Super- ditioning process as successful (Skinner 1963). stitious beliefs reflect a desire to control outside circum- The associative learning model explains that any cue that stances (Jahoda 1969), as well as a perceived lack of ability seems to accurately forecast an event can be considered pre- to exert this control; anxious people “share with superstitious dictive (Rescorla and Wagner 1972). This model also applies individuals a perceived inability to control the environment” to human contingency judgment (Shanks et al. 1996), in that (Zebb and Moore 2003). people learn to predict the results of future events based on Because superstitious behavior is expected to create an the presence of features that occur simultaneously. It may seem surprising that cognitive processes in people—such as illusion of control, we examine the prevalence of supersti- logical reasoning—don’t override associative learning when tion as it relates to the desire for, and perception of, control the result seems specious. For example, it should be obvious in the environment. First, we propose that superstitious be- that purchasing Dr. Pepper does not influence the outcome havior is used more often to influence a valued (vs. non- of a basketball game, even if it appears to be correlated with valued) event, because individuals have a high desire to victory. However, individuals often overestimate the influence control this outcome. For example, a basketball fan who of their own actions on future outcomes, even if the two are perceives that drinking Dr. Pepper helps her team may be not logically related (Wegner 2002). more likely to consume this brand while watching the team These spurious associations generally occur when peo- play (vs. during the off-season). Consistent with this idea, ple’s actions are especially salient: they occur prior to the college students utilize lucky charms more often with higher outcome, the result is consistent with their intent, or there stakes (Rudski and Edwards 2007), and athletes engage in is no alternative explanation (Wegner and Wheatley 1999). superstitious rituals for more (vs. less) crucial competitive This is consistent with Bandura’s (1974) finding that learn- events (Schippers and Van Lange 2006). ing through paired associations is most likely to occur when Second, we expect desire for control—as an individual participants consciously recognize that the events are cor- difference—to moderate superstitious behavior (Burger and related. In support of this notion, Allen and Janiszewski Cooper 1979). Those with high (vs. low) desire for control (1989) found that consumers preferred fictitious words that were more likely to knock on wood when describing their were associated with positive feedback on a language task health (Keinan 2002). Therefore, we expect individuals with but only when they reported awareness of this link. high (vs. low) levels of desire for control to be more likely Similarly, we expect conditioning to induce superstitious to attempt to influence their environment by making su- behavior when there is conscious awareness of the link be- perstitious choices. Desirability of control has also been tween the product and outcome. Moreover, when individuals linked with the illusion of control; those with high (vs. low) engage in superstitious behavior—by opting for a lucky (vs. desire for control who are victorious in a coin-toss game unlucky) item—we expect them to acknowledge that their consider themselves more likely to correctly predict future preferences are strategic. If acting on a conditioned super- coin tosses (Burger 1986). 430 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

Superstitious behavior is not the only method of exerting outcomes (Keinan 2002). For example, individuals are more control over the environment. Those who perceive their in- willing to listen to a psychic for an uncertain (vs. certain) ternal resources as sufficient for controlling the environment card-guessing task (Case et al. 2004), and college students should be unlikely to resort to superstition to do so. There- resort to numerous superstitions—including rubbing the foot fore, we expect the constructs of self-affirmation and self- of a campus statue for good luck—before exams in partic- efficacy to serve as moderators of superstitious behavior. ularly difficult courses (Vyse 1997). Self-affirmation boosts self-regard, increasing the personal resources that allow individuals to deal with the threat posed by uncertainty. For example, when they perceive a lack of EXPERIMENT 1: SUPERSTITIOUS control over their environment, people tend to see patterns CHOICE AND OUTCOME PREDICTION in the environment that don’t actually exist; this is elimi- nated after a self-affirmation (Whitson and Galinsky 2008). The goal of this study is to determine whether individuals In general, the affirmation process increases self-worth, pro- who have previously engaged in superstitious behavior per- tecting individuals from threats to their self-concept (Steele ceive that their actions will increase their likelihood of future 1988). Self-affirmation reduces defensive behavior (Sher- success. In other words, expressing a stronger preference man and Cohen 2002), because reaffirming core values al- for a brand that is associated with a positive outcome is lows individuals to handle threatening information without expected to result in an illusion of control over future tasks. resorting to extreme measures such as cognitive dissonance (Steele and Liu 1983; Steele, Spencer, and Lynch 1993). Method We hypothesize that self-affirmation reduces superstitious behavior because individuals who have their self-concept Procedure. A total of 94 student participants at Colum- bolstered through the affirmation process should be unfazed bia University were compensated $6 to complete a series of by the threat of failure and, therefore, be willing to take on experiments, which took place in the Columbia Business a challenging task without resorting to superstition. School’s behavioral laboratory. Three participants were dis- Similarly, high levels of GSE are expected to decrease missed due to behavioral issues (communicating with each superstitious behavior. GSE is an assessment of one’s own other during the session). An additional six participants were ability to succeed in a variety of situations (Smith 1989). excluded from the analysis after reporting that they were unfamiliar with the Kit Kat chocolate brand, leaving 85 People “fear and avoid” threatening situations until they per- participants. ceive the ability to cope with them; perceptions of self-effi- Participants were informed that their university was in cacy determine how much effort they will expend to combat the finals of the Intercollegiate Quiz Bowl (an ostensibly these threats (Bandura 1977). It follows that high-GSE in- real competition), and that they would receive updates from dividuals should be less superstitious, due to their perceived the match. Participants received a miniature Snickers upon ability to achieve desired outcomes on their own. In contrast, arrival, in order to “accurately simulate” the experience of those with low GSE may engage in superstitious behavior watching the event in person. Updates were provided when- to boost their chances for success. This is consistent with ever teams responded to a question. Points were awarded the finding that paranormal beliefs are less prevalent under for correct answers and deducted for incorrect answers. high (vs. low) GSE (Tobacyk and Shrader 1991). Supersti- Twice during the competition, respondents were in- tious behavior also increases task-specific self-efficacy, as formed that competitors were pausing for a refreshment individuals were more likely to believe they could master break. During both of these breaks, an additional mini- a task after following instructions to “cross your fingers” Snickers bar was distributed to each participant. When the (Damisch et al. 2010). Our conceptual model of conditioned updates began, the home team trailed by a substantial superstition is illustrated in figure 1. amount. Throughout the updates, the home team played ex- Five experiments test these predictions. In each study, tremely well, severely reducing the deficit. Respondents participants undergo conditioning trials that pair a consumer were asked during each refreshment break to evaluate the behavior (use of a product) with an outcome. Experiment team’s performance (using a 7-point scale). When the up- 1 examines whether participants who shift preferences to- dates concluded, the match was still in progress. The home ward the lucky option perceive an illusion of control over team was still trailing, but the score was very close, indi- future events. Experiment 2 distinguishes the illusion of cating that the outcome was uncertain. control related to the act of choosing from the illusion of At this point, half of the participants were informed that control based on using a lucky product. Experiments 3 (de- they could select another chocolate as a token of thanks. sire for control), 4 (self-affirmation), and 5 (generalized self- They expressed their preference for Snickers or Kit Kat on efficacy) examine moderators of superstitious choice. an 8-point bipolar scale and were later presented with the In all five studies, the outcomes are framed as uncertain, brand that they chose. Subsequently, these individuals were so that participants have an incentive to resort to superstition asked to predict (on a 7-point scale) the likelihood of their in the hope of influencing the result in a positive direction. school winning the match. The remaining participants were This is consistent with prior research showing that super- asked to predict the winner of the match before being in- stition is more likely to occur for uncertain (vs. certain) formed that they could choose another chocolate. At the HAMERMAN AND JOHAR 431

FIGURE 1

MODEL OF CONDITIONED SUPERSTITION

close of the study, participants were asked—using a 7-point Experimental Design. This between-subjects experi- scale—the extent to which they felt a sense of “affiliation” ment included the dichotomous factors of order (predict with their school. In this case, affiliation acts as a proxy of score before vs. after selecting chocolate) and choice (su- “desire for control.” Those with greater affiliation with their perstitious p Snickers; nonsuperstitious p Kit Kat). Af- school should more strongly desire to control the outcome filiation was a continuous variable, using a 7-point scale. of the match and be more likely to form an illusion of control The DV was the predicted likelihood that the participants’ after selecting the lucky option. university would win the match. 432 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

Results FIGURE 2

EXPERIMENT 1: PARTICIPANTS’ PREDICTION OF Attention Check. Participants rated the team’s perfor- QUIZ BOWL OUTCOME mance during two refreshment breaks. As expected, these ratings were highly correlated (r p .65, p ! .0001). On a 7-point scale—higher score indicating better performance —participants rated the team’s performance as a 6.11, in- dicating that participants generally paid attention during the conditioning trials. Superstitious Choice. Of the 85 participants in the analysis, 34 (40%) selected an extra Snickers bar instead of switching to Kit Kat. (On the 8-point bipolar scale, those who mea- sured 5 or above were given a Snickers bar.) As expected, prevalence of choosing Snickers did not change based on order, that is, whether the predictions of team success were made before or after selecting a chocolate. Snickers was chosen by 16 of 41 (39%) of the respondents prior to pre- dicting the score of the match, while 18 of 44 (41%) chose Snickers after they predicted the score. Affiliation did not affect the likelihood of choosing Snickers. Among those who chose Kit Kat, those with high affil- Likelihood of Predicting Future Success. A regression iation did not differ in their prediction based on order, but analysis with factors of order (prediction first or selection of those with low affiliation were marginally more likely to chocolate first), choice (superstitious p Snickers; nonsuper- predict victory when selecting the chocolate prior to (vs. stitious p Kit Kat), and affiliation (continuous variable) on after) predicting the outcome. Given that low-affiliation par- predicted Quiz Bowl outcome revealed a significant inter- ticipants should not be trying to influence the match—and action between order and choice (b p Ϫ1.93, t p Ϫ2.36, choosing Kit Kat is not expected to create a perception of p ! .03), which was qualified by an interaction between all control—this result may be unrelated to superstition. three factors (b p .35, t p 2.45, p ! .02). A spotlight analysis It is interesting that affiliation did not influence the like- (Aiken and West 1991; Fitzsimons 2008) was conducted at lihood of choosing the lucky option but did influence one standard deviation above and below the mean for affil- whether participants formed an illusion of control after mak- iation. Among those who engaged in superstitious behavior ing their choice. We expected affiliation with the school to —choosing Snickers—participants with high levels of affil- be a proxy for the level of participants’ desire to control iation were more likely to predict that their team would win the outcome. This may be an issue of calibration, as the when they selected their chocolate before (vs. after) making selection of chocolate was categorized as binary (Snickers this prediction (b p 1.67, t p 2.00, p ! .05), while low- or Kit Kat), whereas predicted likelihood of victory was a affiliation participants did not differ in their predictions based continuous measure and therefore more sensitive to the in- on order (b p Ϫ.76, t p Ϫ0.94, NS). Among participants fluence of affiliation. who selected Kit Kat, those with high affiliation did not differ As expected, preference for Snickers (vs. Kit Kat) did not based on order (b p Ϫ.47, t p Ϫ0.75, NS), though low- vary based on order. All participants associated Snickers affiliation participants were marginally more optimistic about with success, so it is unsurprising that both “order” con- the outcome when choosing Kit Kat prior to (vs. after) making ditions preferred Snickers at approximately equal rates. It their predictions (b p 1.05, t p 1.70, p ! .10). Results are should be noted that only about 40% of the respondents presented in figure 2. chose to receive the lucky brand of Snickers (vs. Kit Kat) at the end of the session. This may be due to variety-seeking; a post hoc test found that only 15% of individuals who Discussion imagined receiving three Snickers bars reported they would choose to stay with this brand (vs. Kit Kat) for a fourth Among participants who selected Snickers (the lucky op- selection. Hence, there is evidence that the conditioning was tion), those with high levels of affiliation were more likely successful. to predict the home team to win when they selected their While experiment 1 indicated that the illusion of control chocolate before (vs. after) making their prediction. In other can be formed as a result of superstitious behavior, an al- words, high-affiliation participants—who should seek to in- ternative explanation is that this illusion stems from the act fluence the outcome—formed an illusion of control over the of choosing (Langer 1975) rather than the identity of the match after engaging in superstitious behavior. Those with chosen product. Experiment 2 attempts to establish that su- low affiliation who chose Snickers did not differ in their perstition and choice are two distinct routes to illusions of prediction based on order. control. HAMERMAN AND JOHAR 433

EXPERIMENT 2: CHOICE VERSUS the other, for a total of 24 trivia questions. Participants re- ASSIGNMENT ceived performance feedback after each set of six questions —positive feedback after answering questions with one The autonomy to make personal decisions has been shown background color (lucky background color) and negative to increase perceptions of control and well-being. For ex- feedback after answering questions with the other (unlucky ample, nursing home residents with the power to make background color). choices regarding their daily schedules—compared with After completing the four sets of trivia questions, partic- those for whom daily itineraries were set for them—pos- ipants were informed that there was one last set of trivia sessed a heightened sense of control and improved health questions to be answered. Half of the respondents were in- (Langer and Rodin 1977). formed that they would be assigned the computer back- Consistent with the illusion of control (Langer 1975), we ground associated with success (failure), while the other half predict that individuals who actively select a product for a were allowed to choose the background to use while an- future task will predict more positive results than if the item swering these questions. As the dependent variable, partic- was assigned to them. For example, someone who chooses ipants were asked how well (on a 7-point scale) they ex- a blue or orange computer background to answer a set of pected to perform on the last set of six trivia questions. trivia questions should be more confident in the outcome After answering this final set of trivia questions, all partic- compared to when this background is randomly assigned. ipants were asked to report (on a 7-point bipolar scale) the However, we also expect that regardless of whether the back- color with which they performed better on the first four ground has been selected or assigned, individuals will pre- trials. This was used as a measure of contingency awareness. dict a more positive outcome when the background color has been associated with success (vs. failure). Experimental Design. This study used a between-subjects We expect this latter illusion of control to occur more often design, with dichotomous factors of selection method (choice in participants with higher levels of contingency awareness vs. assignment) and selection outcome (lucky vs. unlucky (i.e., an awareness of the association between the computer computer background color). Contingency awareness was a interface and subsequent success or failure). In experiment 1, continuous independent variable. The DV was the predicted participants were asked about the team’s performance during performance on future trivia questions. the conditioning trials, but they did not report whether they associated Snickers with a pattern of improved performance Results compared to a baseline. In experiment 2, contingency aware- ness is measured by checking whether participants were Superstitious Preference. As expected, significantly more aware of a pattern of better performance using one (vs. than half (105/165; 64%) of those who were given the op- another) background. The measurement is taken at the end portunity to choose a computer background for the final of the session, rather than during the conditioning trials, to round of trivia questions selected the one associated with determine whether this awareness was sustained throughout success (Z p 3.50; p ! .001). the decision-making process. We predict that the act of choosing (vs. being assigned) a Illusion of Control. Using predicted future performance computer background will result in more optimistic predic- as the dependent variable, a regression analysis found a tions about future outcomes. Under high—but not low—con- marginal main effect of selection outcome (b p Ϫ.32, t p tingency awareness, using the lucky option should also have Ϫ1.70, p ! .10), which was qualified by an interaction be- a positive effect on these predictions, indicating that the tween contingency awareness and selection outcome (b p selection method (choice vs. assignment) and selection out- .09, t p 2.49, p ! .02). Consistent with the notion of su- come (lucky vs. unlucky background) are distinct illusions perstition forming an illusion of control, a spotlight analysis of control. (Fitzsimons 2008) at one standard deviation above and be- low the mean for contingency awareness revealed that those Method with high contingency awareness who prepared (i.e., chose or were assigned) to use the “lucky” background associated Procedure. Three hundred fifty individuals were re- with success predicted more positive results than those who cruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete an on- planned to use the “unlucky” background associated with line task in exchange for a small monetary payment; they failure (b p .57, t p 3.14, p ! .01). Among participants were instructed to use two separate background screen/font with low contingency awareness, there was no difference in combinations while answering a series of trivia questions the predictions between those who were prepared to use that were presented in multiple-choice format. The two either the lucky or unlucky background colors (b p Ϫ.04, background screen/font combinations consisted of (a) blue t p Ϫ.25, NS). background with red font and (b) orange background with Additionally, the regression analysis revealed an inter- white font; these were counterbalanced to ensure that there action between contingency awareness and selection method was no bias toward a specific color. (b p .08, t p 2.34, p ! .02). A spotlight analysis revealed Each participant answered two sets of six trivia questions that under high contingency awareness, participants who using one background and two sets of six questions using chose their computer background predicted a higher level 434 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH of future success compared to those who were assigned one matches. Unlike in the previous studies, we add a no- (b p .61, t p 3.38, p ! .01). With low contingency aware- conditioning cell to experiment 3 as a baseline. ness, there was no difference in predictions of future success p based on being assigned versus choosing a background (b EXPERIMENT 3: DESIRE FOR CONTROL .04, t p .21, NS). There was no interaction between selection outcome and PREDICTS SUPERSTITIOUS CHOICE p p selection method (b .13, t 0.67, NS), nor was there Rock, Paper, Scissors requires players to make the hand a three-way interaction between these two factors and con- symbol for a rock, a piece of paper, or a pair of scissors. p Ϫ p Ϫ tingency awareness (b .03, t 0.98, NS). Results Depending on which symbol your opponent “throws,” the are displayed in figure 3. The actual number of questions match may result in a win, a loss, or a draw. answered correctly on the last round of trivia questions was higher for those who took the final round of questions using the lucky background screen (M p 1.55) versus the unlucky Method p p ! screen (M 1.31; F(1, 348) 4.34, p .04). Procedure. In exchange for a $0.50 payment, 275 right- handed adults were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and agreed to complete a short online study purporting to Discussion investigate “handedness” in games. After reviewing the rules Preparing to use a computer background associated with of the game, respondents played four series of five Rock, success (vs. failure) led to an illusion of control, such that Paper, Scissors matches against the computer, for a total of participants predicted a higher likelihood of future success. 20 matches. They were instructed to play with their right However, this only occurred under high contingency aware- hand during two of these series and their left hand for the ness, when participants were able to correctly associate their other two. For each match, participants were instructed to performance with one of the computer backgrounds. choose rock, paper, or scissors by selecting from a visual This illusion of control occurred regardless of whether menu of left (or right) hands in the shape of a rock, paper, participants actively chose the background or had it ran- or scissors. domly assigned to them. Because there was no interaction After each choice, participants would be informed between the factors of selection method and selection out- whether they won, lost, or tied the match. For example, after come, we demonstrate that the illusion of control resulting throwing a winning hand, they would be told, “You have from planning to use a lucky item is unique from the illusion chosen to play Rock (Paper/Scissors). The computer has of control that is formed after actively making a choice. chosen Scissors (Rock/Paper). You win this round!” At the While contingency awareness was expected to interact end of each series of five matches, they were given perfor- with selection outcome, it is surprising that there was an mance feedback. interaction between contingency awareness and selection In the conditioning cell—where participants scored better method. It may be that those who were unaware of the with their left (vs. right) hand—feedback after playing left- correct association between the background color and their handed was as follows: “Your overall score in 5 matches trivia performance were uncertain as to which background color to choose, and therefore, they did not perceive an FIGURE 3 illusion of control after making their choice. EXPERIMENT 2: CONDITIONED SUPERSTITION AND Interestingly, the expectation of higher performance was ILLUSION OF CONTROL borne out by the actual number of trivia questions answered correctly. The computer background was counterbalanced, so this result cannot be explained by the actual superiority of one background over the other. Instead, it may be the case that choosing the lucky option created a placebo effect and facilitated performance, which is consistent with Dam- isch et al. (2010). Experiment 1 found that the illusion of control was greatest for those who affiliate strongly with the home team (i.e., have a strong desire for them to win). In experiment 2, affiliation was kept constant, as the trivia scores reflected participants’ individual performances. In experiment 3, par- ticipants again play for themselves, in the game of Rock, Paper, Scissors. Our hypothesis is that those with higher chronic levels of desire for control should be more likely to resort to superstition to influence the results. Moreover, those who act on these superstitions should form an illusion of control, predicting higher levels of success in future HAMERMAN AND JOHAR 435 while playing left-handed: 3 wins, 1 loss, 1 tie. Overall tioning (b p Ϫ1.62, t p Ϫ1.75, p ! .09) was qualified by winning percentage: 60%. In general, this is a very good an interaction between desire for control and conditioning (above-average) result!” After playing right-handed, partic- (b p .02, t p 2.69, p ! .01). A spotlight analysis (Fitz- ipants were informed: “Your overall score in 5 matches simons 2008) at one standard deviation above and below while playing right-handed: 1 win, 3 losses, 1 tie. Overall the mean revealed that at high levels of desire for control, winning percentage: 20%. In general, this is a slightly be- participants who underwent conditioning had a greater pref- low-average result.” Those in the no-conditioning cell re- erence for playing left-handed than those in the no-condi- ceived exactly the same score—winning 40% of the time tioning cell (b p 2.69,tp 5.97, p ! .0001). At low levels in the first round and 60% in the second round—when play- of desire for control, conditioning did not significantly in- ing with their left or right hands. crease preference for the left-handed option over the no- After 20 matches, it was explained, “You will have one conditioning baseline (b p .68, t p 1.53, NS). These results more opportunity to play a series of 5 matches against the are displayed in figure 4. computer.” Participants chose to play using their right or left hands and then expressed this as a preference on an 8- Illusion of Control. With predicted likelihood of future point bipolar scale. Additionally, participants rated their ex- success as the dependent variable, an ANOVA with factors pected future performance using a two-item scale (r p .62, of conditioning and hand choice found a main effect of p p ! .001), which included the questions: “How well do you conditioning (F(1, 269) 12.37, p ! .01), which was qual- expect to perform in your next five matches against the ified by a significant interaction between these two factors p computer?” and “Compared to the average person, how well (F(1, 269) 13.55, p ! .01). Within the conditioning do you think you will do in these matches?” After playing cell—where the left hand was associated with winning— the final five matches, participants completed the 20-item those who chose to play future matches with their left hand p desire for control scale (Burger and Cooper 1979), which predicted that they would perform better (M 4.5) than included such items as “I try to avoid situations where some- did participants who chose to play with their right hand (M p p one else tells me what to do.” Finally, participants reported 3.8; F(1, 269) 12.34, p ! .01). However, those who with which hand they played best during the conditioning did not undergo conditioning—and so received equal feed- trials (1 p right hand, 4 p equal, 7 p left hand). back with both hands—did not differ in terms of their pre- dictions of future success based on choosing the left hand Experimental Design. This was a between-subjects de- (M p 4.4) or right hand (M p 4.7; F(1, 269) p 2.56, NS). sign, with conditioning as a categorical variable (no p same Among participants who chose to play left-handed, there results with each hand; yes p higher winning percentage was no difference in their predictions based on whether or with left hand). The desire for control scale was a continuous not they underwent conditioning (F(1, 269) ! 1). These independent variable. Dependent variables included super- results are illustrated in figure 5. stitious behavior (preference for the lucky option) and il- lusion of control (predicted likelihood of future success). FIGURE 4

Results EXPERIMENT 3: PREFERENCE FOR PLAYING LEFT-HANDED IN ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS Attention Check. On a 7-point scale (1 p right hand, 4 p same score, 7 p left hand), those in the conditioning (vs. no-conditioning) cell reported that they were more suc- p cessful using their left hand (Mconditioning 6.1, Mno-conditioning p 3.7; F(1, 271) p 253.5, p ! .0001). Two individuals in the conditioning cell mistakenly reported playing substan- tially better with their right hands, and they were dropped from the analysis, leaving a total of 273 participants. Preference for Playing Left-Handed. Of those who had undergone conditioning trials in which they won more matches while playing with their left (vs. right) hands, 102 out of 130 participants (78%) chose to play left-handed for the final 5 matches against the computer, while only 36 out of 143 (25%) chose to do so from the no-conditioning cell. A logistic regression for this choice revealed a significant interaction between conditioning and desire for control (x2(1) p 5.94, p ! .02). Preference for playing left- or right-handed was also mea- sured as a continuous variable (1 p right-handed; 8 p left- handed). In this analysis, a marginal main effect of condi- 436 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

FIGURE 5 Given that those in the conditioning cell also won 60% of their matches playing left-handed, it is unsurprising that EXPERIMENT 3: PREDICTED LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS IN there was no difference between them. FUTURE ROCK, PAPER, SCISSORS MATCHES As a follow-up to experiment 3 (where all participants played Rock, Paper, Scissors), the task itself is manipulated in experiment 4 based on whether it promises self-relevant feedback (i.e., is valued). We expect individuals to go to greater lengths—such as engaging in superstitious behavior —to control the outcome of tasks that are considered to be of high (vs. low) value. In other words, the value of the task is a proxy for desire for control. Additionally, self-affir- mation is included as a factor in experiment 4. Self-affir- mation should bolster internal resources—buffering partic- ipants against the threat of a poor performance—and render them less likely to use superstition as a method of achieving a positive outcome on a valued task.

EXPERIMENT 4: SELF-AFFIRMATION AND OUTCOME VALUE Experiment 4 uses similar experimental stimuli—answer- ing trivia questions with different computer backgrounds—as experiment 2. As was the case in experiment 2, we expect ! NOTE.—The contrast is significant at p .01. that contingency awareness will moderate the results. Ad- ditionally, in order to demonstrate whether preference for the lucky item is a conscious strategy, participants will rate the computer backgrounds on objective attributes. Using the bootstrapping method (Preacher and Hayes 2008) on those participants who had undergone the condi- tioning episode, we found that preference for playing with Method the left (lucky) hand—measured as a continuous variable Procedure. A total of 201 adults were recruited from Am- —served as a partial mediator between desire for control azon Mechanical Turk in exchange for a $0.50 payment. and predicting future success [.0001, .0079]. Following the Participants were given two separate studies: one about per- reporting guidelines for bootstrapping (Zhao, Lynch, and sonality, the other about preference for colors and fonts. For Chen 2010), all three regression paths are significant and in half of the participants, the “personality” study consisted of the same direction, indicating complementary mediation. a self-affirmation manipulation adapted from Reed and As- This analysis is displayed in figure 6. pinwall (1998), while the other half were presented with an unrelated task (labeled “Opinion Survey”) as a no-affir- Discussion mation control. The self-affirmation manipulation—labeled “Personal Attributes Inventory”—consisted of seven ques- Participants who were conditioned to associate playing tions designed to elicit affirmative responses. Respondents left-handed with winning at Rock, Paper, Scissors preferred were asked whether they had ever engaged in various kind to continue playing with their left (nondominant) hands. This and compassionate behaviors (e.g., “Have you ever tried to was most likely to occur when individuals measured high make someone feel good when they were sad?”) and, if so, (vs. low) on desire for control. As in experiments 1 and 2, to write about one instance of such behavior. Kindness is participants who engaged in superstitious behavior (i.e., well established as an important personal value, so an- choosing to play left-handed) formed an illusion of control, swering affirmatively to these questions should induce self- predicting a higher likelihood of success for the final round affirmation (Reed and Aspinwall 1998). of matches. Mediation results confirmed that for those who The no-affirmation participants answered a personal opin- underwent conditioning (i.e., associating success with left- ion survey consisting of seven agree/disagree questions handed play), desire for control led to increased preference (e.g., “The weather in the spring is nicer than the weather for using this hand, which then resulted in an illusion of in the fall”), followed by a brief elaboration. None of these control over the outcome of future matches. questions related to the values of kindness or compassion, Interestingly, among those who chose to play left-handed, so this survey served as a no-affirmation control (Reed and predicted likelihood of success did not differ based on con- Aspinwall 1998). ditioning. In the last two sets of matches that the no-con- After completing this task, participants were presented ditioning participants played before making a selection, they with the following cover story: while research studies are won 60% of the time with both their left and right hands. routinely administered online, “little testing has been done HAMERMAN AND JOHAR 437

FIGURE 6

EXPERIMENT 3: MEDIATION ANALYSIS

to identify the preferred color/font combinations that are Experimental Design. This was a between-subjects de- most aesthetically pleasing.” Participants were exposed to sign, with two categorical factors: self-affirmation (yes or two combinations of fonts and screen colors: a blue screen no) and outcome value (low p reading; high p trivia ques- with red font and a green screen with gray font. The blue tions). Contingency awareness was a continuous indepen- background was intended to be objectively superior to the dent variable. Dependent variables included superstitious green background in terms of its physical appearance. behavior (preference for the lucky option), as well as illusion Participants were instructed to experience these computer of control (predicted likelihood of future success). backgrounds by answering four sets of trivia questions: two sections for each background. As in experiment 2, partici- pants were given 90 seconds to complete each group of six Results questions. The questions themselves—and wording of the Screen Evaluation. Confirming our expectation, the blue feedback—also were taken from experiment 2. All partic- screen was rated as objectively superior (M p 4.8) to the ipants received positive feedback with the green background green screen (M p 3.4; t(200) p 7.62, p ! .0001). This and negative feedback with the blue background. rating was based on three dimensions—aesthetic appeal, After receiving feedback on their fourth set of trivia ques- ease of reading, and strain on the eyes—that were highly tions, participants were asked to select a color/font com- correlated within each color scheme (a p .900; a p bination. Half of the participants were told that the selected blue green .903). These ratings did not differ across conditions. Hence, background was to be used in answering a fifth set of trivia the lucky green screen reflected an “inferior” choice. questions, and that they would receive additional feedback on their subsequent performance. The remaining participants Preference for Superstitious Option. A regression anal- were asked to read a short passage about online research. ysis with factors of self-affirmation (yes or no), outcome They were informed that “you will have the choice to read value (low p reading; high p trivia questions), and con- this passage using one of these two background color/font tingency awareness (low or high) revealed main effects of combinations. There will not be any questions to answer, outcome value (b p .70, t p 2.16, p ! .04) and contingency so there will not be any type of performance feedback on awareness (b p Ϫ.50, t p Ϫ5.06, p ! .01). An interaction this task.” between self-affirmation and outcome value was also re- After expressing a preference for using either the blue or vealed (b p Ϫ.82, t p Ϫ2.53, p ! .02), as was a marginally green background on their next task (on an 8-point scale: 1 significant interaction between contingency awareness and p blue, 8 p green), participants were asked to rate both outcome value (b p Ϫ.17, t p Ϫ1.80, p ! .10), both of screens on three dimensions: aesthetic appeal, ease of read- which were qualified by a significant interaction between ing, and strain on the eyes. Those in the high-value task all three variables: self-affirmation, outcome value, and con- condition were then asked to predict how well they would tingency awareness (b p .20, t p 2.01, p ! .05). perform on the next set of trivia questions (two items; r p To interpret these results, a spotlight analysis (Fitzsimons .75, p ! .01) before being presented with the questions them- 2008) was conducted at one standard deviation above and selves. Those in the low-value condition were immediately below the mean for contingency awareness. Participants who presented with the reading passage. As in experiment 2, were to answer additional trivia questions indicated a lower contingency awareness was measured by asking participants preference for the lucky green screen after a self-affirmation with which color they performed better on the first four (vs. no-affirmation) when contingency awareness was high trials (using a 7-point scale). (b p Ϫ1.63, t p Ϫ2.12, p ! .04), but this did not occur 438 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH with low contingency awareness (b p Ϫ.34; t p Ϫ.43, FIGURE 7 NS). Participants who planned to read a passage about online research did not differ in their preference for the green screen EXPERIMENT 4: PREFERENCE FOR LUCKY based on self-affirmation, under both low (b p Ϫ.77; t p COMPUTER BACKGROUND Ϫ1.0, NS) and high contingency awareness (b p 1.04, t p 1.40, NS). These results are displayed in figure 7. Illusion of Control. Among those participants who were going to answer trivia questions (a high-value task), the level of preference for the lucky, green screen (on a continuous scale) was significantly related to how likely the participant was to predict a positive outcome (b p .08, t p 2.31, p ! .03). This is consistent with our earlier results. However, self-affirmation did not have a significant direct effect on predicted likelihood of future success (b p Ϫ.01, t p Ϫ0.14, NS).

Discussion

Participants in experiment 4 altered their preferences in favor of a lucky computer background after they became aware of its association with positive outcomes on a trivia quiz. The quiz was a high-value task that should elicit be- haviors designed to exert control over the outcome. However, this superstitious behavior was eliminated among participants who completed a self-affirmation exercise. Additionally, it did not occur among participants who demonstrated low that their expressed preference for the green screen did not contingency awareness. There was no difference in pref- match their rating of its attributes. erences for the various computer backgrounds among those Consistent with our previous studies, participants who respondents who were preparing to complete a low-value were planning to answer additional trivia questions were reading task, which did not offer performance feedback. likely to predict higher levels of success after expressing To check the valued outcome manipulation, we performed stronger preferences for the lucky green (vs. blue) back- a separate post hoc test. (In order to avoid a cognitive dis- ground screen. However, self-affirmation did not directly sonance effect, we did not ask participants in experiment 4 affect participants’ predictions of future success. While self- to assess the task’s value after they completed it.) In a be- affirmation bolsters internal resources—allowing people to tween-subjects study, 51 adults (via Amazon Mechanical directly confront threatening information and making them Turk) were presented with a description for one of the two less likely to resort to superstition—it did not reflect the tasks from experiment 4: taking a trivia quiz (with perfor- same direct influence on perceptions of control as did the mance feedback) or reading about online research (no feed- desire for control measurement in experiment 3. back). A two-item scale was used to measure value (r p Experiment 5 investigates whether GSE—a measure of .79; p ! .0001): “Compared to an average task that you whether individuals perceive sufficient internal resources to would complete for online research, could the results of this solve problems on their own—affects the likelihood of en- task be personally valuable?” and “In general, do you think gaging in conditioned superstition. Experiment 5 also ad- this task provides something of value to you?” As expected, dresses the question of whether superstitious behavior can answering a set of trivia questions—with performance occur when failure, rather than success, follows the use of feedback—is considered more valuable (M p 5.1) than a brand or object. reading about online research (M p 3.9; F(1, 49) p 7.69, p ! .01). EXPERIMENT 5: GSE AND NEGATIVE Note that, on average, the blue background was consid- SUPERSTITION ered more aesthetically pleasing than the green background based on the dimensions of aesthetic appeal, ease of reading, The goals of this study were (1) to extend the results of and strain on the eyes. Pairing the less pleasing background the previous experiments to a negative (rather than positive) with a positive outcome was done purposefully, in order to association and (2) to demonstrate that conditioned super- avoid a ceiling effect and to demonstrate that superstition stition is more likely to occur among individuals with low could lead to objectively inferior choices. Moreover, because (vs. high) GSE. In this experiment, affiliation (which serves the objective ratings of both screens did not vary across as a proxy for desire for control) was manipulated by conditions, this indicates that participants were cognizant whether or not participants were attending schools that were HAMERMAN AND JOHAR 439 involved in a stock trading competition. This factor is ex- switch to one of three different colors (all of which they rated pected to be moderated by GSE. Low-GSE individuals lower during the color evaluation task). This stress ball pref- should perceive their internal resources as inadequate to erence was measured on an 8-point bipolar scale. Participants control the outcome of the competition. Therefore, when were informed that immediately following their decision, the affiliation is high, they are expected to resort to superstition final scores for the competition would be revealed. in order to exert this control. After the final score was displayed (the home university finished second in the fictitious competition), participants Method completed a 10-item, 4-point scale to measure GSE (Schwar- zer and Jerusalem 1995). This scale included items such as Procedure. Eighty-seven participants at Columbia Uni- “I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try versity were compensated $6 to complete a series of studies hard enough.” at the Columbia Business School’s behavioral laboratory. Three individuals were eliminated from the data analysis Experimental Design. This study used a between-sub- due to their behavior during the sessions. Seven additional jects design, with a categorical factor of affiliation (low p respondents reported the cover story to be “implausible” home university is NOT playing; high p home university and were also dropped from the analysis, leaving a total of is playing). GSE was a measured as a continuous indepen- 77 participants. dent variable. The dependent variable was the willingness At the start of the session, respondents completed a “color of participants to engage in superstitious behavior by ex- evaluation task” that was purportedly separate from the day- changing a stress ball in their favorite color for one in a trading stock experiment, in which they were asked to rank lower-rated color. their preferences among four colors. Subsequently, partic- ipants were asked to begin a different study that featured Results “live” updates from the final round of a five-school day- trading stock competition. As a cover story, participants A regression analysis found a significant main effect for were asked to evaluate this competition for use as a teaching affiliation (b p 4.74, t p 2.60, p ! .02) and a marginally tool. For half of the participants, the fictitious competition significant main effect for GSE (b p Ϫ.11, t p Ϫ1.96, p included their home university. The remainder were in- ! .10), both of which were qualified by an interaction be- formed that the competition that consisted of other schools. tween affiliation and GSE (b p Ϫ.15, t p Ϫ2.55, p ! .02). Respondents were told that a stress ball would be provided To interpret this interaction, a spotlight analysis (Fitzsimons to them while they viewed updates from the competition, 2008) was performed at one standard deviation above and because “researchers have found that keeping their hands below the mean GSE score. As expected, low-GSE partic- busy (such as when squeezing a stress ball) helps keep peo- ipants were more likely to give up their preferred stress ball ple focused whenever they perform strategic evaluations.” color under high (vs. low) affiliation (b p 1.73, t p 2.44, A stress ball—in the color that each individual participant p ! .02). High-GSE participants appeared marginally less indicated was his or her favorite during the color evaluation likely to give up their preferred stress ball under high (vs. task—was given to each participant. low) affiliation (b p Ϫ1.44, t p Ϫ1.88, p ! .10). These Competing schools were said to be reallocating their port- results are illustrated in figure 8. folio every few minutes, and participants were shown four real-time stock portfolio allocations for each school. After Discussion reading through these allocations, participants then viewed ostensibly live reports of how each team’s investments per- The results of experiment 5 extend the findings from the formed, as well as the overall standings of the competition. first four studies to a paradigm of negative superstition, Participants who were told that their university was par- where individuals are willing to give up an unlucky product. ticipating were provided information showing that their team The interaction of affiliation—a proxy for desire for was in first place at the start of this final session. However, control—and GSE predicted the likelihood of superstitious in the four subsequent portfolio reallocations during the on- behavior. Those with low GSE—who are vulnerable to going final round, the team lost money. At the end of the superstition—were more likely to shift preferences away fourth round, when all teams were ready to reallocate their from the current stress ball when their team was playing portfolio one final time, the home team was in third place (high affiliation), compared to when their team was not par- (out of five), but they were still close to the leader. In the ticipating (low affiliation). Those with high GSE—who are condition where the home university was not participating, expected to reduce their superstitious behavior—were mar- the stock portfolios and scores mirrored those of the other ginally less likely to give up their preferred stress ball when cells, but the names of the schools competing in the event affiliation was high (vs. low). These results indicate that consisted of universities in a different part of the United when internal resources are perceived as sufficient for suc- States. cess, superstitious behavior is reduced. This is consistent At this point, participants were informed that they would with experiment 4, which showed that boosting internal re- be allowed to keep a stress ball at the close of the session. sources (through self-affirmation) reduced superstitious be- They had the option to retain their current stress ball, or to havior. 440 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH

FIGURE 8 question: “To the best of your knowledge, why do you think you made the choice to play either left- or right-handed?” EXPERIMENT 5: PREFERENCE FOR SWITCHING Of the 133 participants who were asked to provide a re- TO A NEW STRESS BALL sponse, 107 (80.5%) chose to play left-handed. Moreover, 86 of these 107 participants (80.4%) indicated that they were aware of the feedback from their conditioning trials, and that this was a strong influence on their decision (e.g., “be- cause I’d won more matches playing left-handed”).

GENERAL DISCUSSION In five studies, we find that associating consumer items with success or failure can result in the formation of con- ditioned superstitions. Operationalizing desire for control in multiple ways, we find that the conditioning episodes are most likely to shift consumer preferences for these items when participants have a high desire to control the outcome, yet a low perceived ability to do so. Moreover, preparing to use a lucky item promotes the illusion that consumers can exert control over an uncertain outcome, leading to in- creased prediction of future success. Consistent with our definition of superstition, any con- clusions of causality based on the correlations established in the conditioning trials of these experiments would be spurious. For example, few (if any) people could rationally believe that a spectator’s choice of a chocolate could influ- ence the results of a Quiz Bowl competition occurring hun- dreds of miles away. In our experiments, the stimulus (i.e., chocolate, left or right hand, computer background color, stress ball color) While some participants shifted preferences away from was clearly associated with the outcome in question. Con- the unlucky option, most opted to keep their original stress ditioning can be facilitated when people are aware of the ball. Presumably, this occurred because switching meant relationship between conditioned and unconditioned stimuli taking a stress ball in a color that they deemed inferior at (Sweldens, Van Osselaer, and Janiszewski 2010), and we the start of the session. It seems likely that those who claim that contingency awareness also facilitates the devel- switched made a conscious decision to do so in order to opment of conditioned, idiosyncratic superstitions. help their team. Previous literature claims that superstition is largely non- To further investigate the conscious nature of superstition, conscious, as cognitive load did not influence the effect of a post hoc test was conducted on 264 right-handed individ- a negative superstition (Friday the 13th) upon risk aversion uals, who played Rock, Paper, Scissors in a manner similar (Kramer and Block 2008). In addition to claiming that con- to experiment 3. All participants received more positive tingency awareness is required for conditioned superstitions feedback when playing with their left (vs. right) hands. GSE to form, we find that participants who act on these super- is correlated with motivation, achievement, and persever- stitions do so as a conscious strategy. For example, partic- ance (Pajares 1997), so we expected high (vs. low) GSE ipants in experiments 3, 4, and 5 shifted preferences to a participants to display greater contingency awareness. Con- lucky option despite it being inferior. Superstitious respon- sistent with this expectation, GSE was positively related to dents chose to play a game with their nondominant hand in awareness of performing well with the left (vs. right) hand experiment 3, chose the lucky computer background for their (b p .04, t p 2.45, p ! .02). Replicating experiment 5, trivia matches in experiment 4 despite rating its attributes GSE was negatively related to preference for playing with as objectively inferior, and shifted preferences away from a the left hand (b p Ϫ.06, t p Ϫ2.05, p ! .05). In other stress ball in their favorite color to help the team during words, individuals with high (vs. low) GSE were again less experiment 5. likely to engage in superstitious choice. It is possible that Cumulatively, these results indicate conscious awareness; the heightened awareness resulting from high GSE may be participants did not rationalize their superstitious behavior overshadowed by high-GSE participants’ perceived ability by artificially bolstering the perceived quality of their se- to exert control without a boost from superstitious choice. lection. Open-ended responses from our post hoc test in- To further shed light on whether superstition is a con- dicate that participants were not only aware of the associ- scious strategy to control an outcome, half of the 264 in- ations that they formed during the conditioning trials but dividuals were asked to respond to the following open-ended cognizant of acting on this information. Kramer and Block HAMERMAN AND JOHAR 441

(2011) explain that the level of consciousness in supersti- than positive) association, while identifying GSE as a mod- tious behavior varies based on whether a stimulus in the erator for superstition. When desire for control was high environment prompts an individual to access a superstitious —such as when a stress ball was associated with poor per- belief, and whether this individual accepts the belief as rel- formance by the participants’ university in a stock trading evant to the decision. Conditioned superstitions—based on competition—low-GSE (vs. high-GSE) respondents were personal experiences—should be easily accessible, and it more likely to prefer replacing this stress ball with one of may be the case that the illusion of control that they facilitate another color. should prompt individuals to perceive these superstitious The cumulative results suggest that individuals are willing beliefs as worthy of consideration. to respond to the formation of a new superstition by altering In each study, conditioned superstitions were formed and their purchase behavior as a strategy to control their envi- acted upon in the same experimental session. Future research ronment. This is likely to occur less often when individuals may determine if superstitions are more likely to be applied have a lower desire for control, or when they possess sufficient unconsciously when they are temporally removed from the internal resources (after undergoing a self-affirmation, or with learning episodes (i.e., more difficult to access). Addition- high GSE). Engaging in superstitious behavior creates a sub- ally, future research may examine the role of social desir- sequent illusion of control over future outcomes. ability in superstition. A recent Bud Light commercial shows Future experiments may further investigate this relation- the odd ways in which NFL fans root for their teams, with ship between illusion of control and superstitious behavior. the tag line: “It’s only weird if it doesn’t work.” However, Superstition has been termed a secondary method of exerting in domains where superstitious behavior is less acceptable, illusory control over chance outcomes, rather than a primary it may take on a more nonconscious role. form of controlling skill-based outcomes (Rothbaum, Weisz, In all five experiments, superstitions were created through and Snyder 1982). This is consistent with Wegner and conditioning trials. In experiment 1, respondents who acted Wheatley (1999), who suggested that people are less likely on the association between Snickers chocolate and their uni- to perceive illusory control over a situation when alternative versity’s Quiz Bowl performance were more likely to form explanations are available. By making salient a skill-based an illusion of control, predicting a higher likelihood of their method of control—such as studying being a prerequisite team winning. This only occurred when high-affiliation for answering trivia questions—it may be the case that the participants—who should have had a stronger desire to con- illusion of control resulting from superstitious behavior trol the match—made their prediction after (vs. before) would be reduced. choosing the lucky option. Other factors that could affect the prevalence of super- Experiment 2 explained that this “illusion of control” can stitious behaviors may include individual differences that occur after a series of conditioning episodes, regardless of share the same larger construct as self-efficacy, such as self- whether the item paired with success was actively chosen or assigned randomly. Consistent with Langer (1975), ac- esteem, locus of control, and neuroticism (Judge et al. 2002). tively choosing the background screen on which to answer Belief in good luck (Darke and Freedman 1997), as an in- trivia questions led to a heightened sense of control, but so dividual difference related to the stability (vs. randomness) did using a randomly assigned background that has previ- of luck, may also affect the likelihood of engaging in con- ously been associated with positive feedback. When con- ditioned superstition, as well as the perception that super- tingency awareness was present, the act of choosing and stition can influence future outcomes. preparing to use the superstitious option led to distinct il- It remains to be seen whether superstitions can be created lusions of control. in the absence of conditioning, such as by advertising a Experiment 3 replicated experiments 1 and 2, as playing product as lucky. For example, stores that sell winning lot- Rock, Paper, Scissors with the left (nondominant) hand— tery tickets often publicize this fact and experience subse- after previously achieving success with this hand—led to quent sales increases (Guryan and Kearney 2008). Future an illusion of control over future matches. Moreover, actual research may relate these findings to the idea of contagion, choice of (and preference for) the left hand was related to such as if a retail store was enhanced when it stocked jerseys high levels of desire for control. Preference for the super- of winning (vs. losing) teams. This is consistent with prod- stitious option mediated the relationship between desire for ucts becoming more appealing after being worn or handled control and predicting future success. by attractive (vs. unattractive) individuals (Argo, Dahl, and Experiment 4 demonstrated that self-affirmation reduced Morales 2006, 2008). superstitious behavior. After associating a green computer Finally, it is an open question as to whether superstitious background with positive feedback on a trivia quiz, those behavior is healthy. Taylor and Brown (1988) argue that with high contingency awareness were less likely to prefer positive self-evaluations, exaggerated perceptions of control, this background for answering additional trivia quizzes if and unrealistic optimism promote mental health. Those who they received a self-affirmation (vs. no-affirmation). This report low GSE or high levels of desire for control—can- difference did not occur when preparing to read a passage didates for superstitious behavior—would seem to be in about online research, which was a less-valued task. need of a boost of optimism. Between its mental health Experiment 5 extended these results to a negative (rather benefits and the possible increase in actual performance due 442 JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH to the placebo effect, superstitious behavior may in fact be Consumer Behavior,” Journal of Consumer Psychology,19 an adaptive process. (2), 171Ð84. Given how easily superstitions are formed and how Judge, Timothy A., Amir Erez, Carl Thoresen, and Joyce E. Bono strongly they can increase perceived likelihood of a positive (2002), “Are Measures of Self-Esteem, Neuroticism, Locus outcome, future research may investigate the positive and of Control, and Generalized Self-Efficacy Indicators of a Common Core Construct?” Journal of Personality and Social negative trade-offs of using superstition. 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