Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf

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Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf 1616 Rhode Island Avenue NW Working draft, Washington, DC 20036 Please send comments Anthony H. Cordesman and suggested additions Phone: 1.202.775.3270 to Email: [email protected] [email protected] Iran and the Changing Web version: www.csis.org/burke/reports Military Balance in the Gulf Net Assessment Indicators Anthony H. Cordesman With the assistance of Grace Hwang March 26, 2019 Burke Chair Photo: -/ Getty Images In Strategy 1 Table of Contents The document has the following table of contents: Iran and the Changing Military Balance in the Gulf ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………….2 The Changing and Uncertain Role of Key States ………………………………………………………………………………………………………….......5 The Changing Military Aspects of the Balance ……………………………………………………………..…………………………………………….…..7 Probable Patterns of Deterrence, War Fighting, and Escalations ……………………………………………………………………………….……..….….11 Setting the Stage: Clashes, U.S. Commitments, and Comparative Resources………………………………………………………..…………………………..23 Setting the Stage and Defining the Balance …………………………………………………………………………………….…………………..….…….24 The Dynamics of the Growing Crisis in U.S. and Iranian relations ..………………………………………………………………………………………...25 Uncertain Future U.S. Commitments and Current Bases and Forward Deployed Forces .…………………………………………………………………..38 Comparative Military Budgets and Arms Imports …..……………………………………………………………………………...………………………..47 The First Key Shift in the Military Balance: Changes in the Regional Struggle for Strategic Control and Influence ……………..………..…………..…...73 Shifts in the Regional Struggle for Strategic Control and Influence ………………………………………………………………………..………………..74 Iraq is a Pivotal Focus of the U.S. and Iranian Struggle for Influence in the Gulf ……………………………..………………………………..…………..86 Yemen, the Indian Ocean, and the Red Sea ………………………………………………………………………………………….………………..……..98 The Second Key Shift in the Military Balance: The Rising Impact of Iran’s Asymmetric Forces …………………………………..………..………..……..105 The Rising Impact of Iran’s Asymmetric Forces …………………………………………………………………………………..……………………….106 Naval-Missile-Air Forces and Threats to Shipping and the Gulf …………………………….……………………………………………………………..116 The Global Importance of the Flow f Persian-Arab Gulf Petroleum Exports ……………..………………………………………………………………..143 Limits to the Role of Land Forces …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..151 14 Appendix of Charts, Maps, Tables, and Graphics The document has the following charts, maps, and tables: Map of Iraqi Military Bases with U.S. Forces Present as of 1/2020 ..……………….…………………………………………………….…………………………,28 Table of Illustrative U.S. Power Projection Weapons Investments FY2020-FY2021-I ..……………………………………………………….……….………..….41 Table of Illustrative U.S. Power Projection Weapons Investments FY2020-FY2021-II ..……………..……………………………….…………………………….42 Map of IISS Summary Estimate of Location of Major U.S. Deployments in the MENA/Gulf Region-2020 ..………………………….…………………….…….43 Map of Iranian and U.S. Military Bases ..………………………………………………….…………………………………………….………..……………….….44 Table of Iran and the Arab Gulf Balance in 2020 ..…………………………………………………………………………………….…….……………..….……..52 Chart of IISS: Comparative Military and Security Spending in 2020 ………………….……………………………………….……………………..……..………53 Chart of WMEAT: Mean Annual Value of Military Expenditure from 2007-2017 ..………………………….……………………………………….……..….…54 Chart of IISS Comparative Estimates of Military Spending as Percent of GDP, 2020 .…………………..…………………………….……….…….………...…..55 Chart of WMEAT: Mean Annual Value of Military Expenditure as Percent of Mean Annual GDP from 2007-2017 ..…………………….…………….…….…...56 Table of SIPRI: Low Iranian Military Spending Relative to Arab States, 2000-2018 ..………………………………………………….…………………..……….57 Chart of DIA Estimate of Iranian Defense Spending ..………………………………………………………………………….…………..……………..………….58 Table of CRS Gulf Arms Orders and Deliveries: 2008-2015 in millions of current U.S. Dollars ..……………………………………………………….………….59 Chart of CRS: New Conventional Arms Transfer Agreements by Supplier, 2008-2015 ..……………………………………………….………………..…..….…..60 Chart of SIPRI: Comparative Gulf Arms Imports, 2000-2018 ..………………………………………………………………………….…………………..……….62 Chart of WMEAT: Total Value of Annual Arms Imports in 2017 ..……………………………………………………………………….……………….………...63 Chart of WMEAT: Trends in the Total Value of Annual Arms Imports from 2007 - 2017 ..………..………………………………….………………,….…….….64 Chart of WMEAT: Total Value of Annual Arms Imports in 2007-2011 and 2012-2017 ..……………………………….…………….…………………...………..65 Chart of WMEAT: Total Value of Cumulative Arms Transfer Deliveries in 2015-2017 ..……………………………………….…….……………………..…......66 16 Appendix of Charts, Maps, Tables, and Graphics Chart of WMEAT: Total Value of Arms Transfer Deliveries from Russia and China between 2015-2017 ..…………………………………….……..……..…….67 Chart of WMEAT: Value of Arms Transfer Deliveries from Russia and China as Percent of Total Value of Arms Transfer Deliveries between 2015-2017 …….68 Chart of Economics. War, and Uncertainty in Global Oil Prices: 1950-2020 …..……………………………………………………….………………………..….69 Chart of Sudden Swings and Radical Differences in National “Oil Wealth” ..……………………………………………………..…….………………….…...…..70 Chart of Initial Impact of Renewal of Sanctions on Iran ..………………………………………………………………………….……………………….….….….71 Chart of Unplanned Petroleum Production Outages ..………………………………………..……………………….……………………………………….…..….72 Map of Broader Gulf Military Theater ..………………………………………………………………………….……………….…………………………….…….78 Map of Iranian Partners, Proxies, and Affiliates ..…………………………………………………………………………………….…………..…………..…..…..79 Map of Iran’s Key Areas of Strategic Influence ..………………………………………………………………………………………..………..……………….….80 Table of Scale of Gulf Region for Military Operations ..………………………………………………………………………………………….……………….….81 Map of A Deeply Divided Arab Gulf Cooperation Council ..………………………………………..………………………………….…………………………….82 Map of Bahrain’s Island Vulnerability Map ..…………………………………………………………………………….………………………………..………….83 Map of Key Naval Operating Areas In and Near the Gulf ..……………………………………………………………………………….………………………….84 Map of The Yemen War in February 2020 ..………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………..……..85 Map of Iraq’s Strategic Position ..………………………………………………………………………….………………………………………………………… 89 Map of Iraq: The Current Struggle for Influence Map ..………………………………………………………………………………….…………………………...90 Map of Iraq’s Continuing Internal Violence ..……………………………………………………………………..………….………………………………..……..91 Map of Iraq’s Vulnerable Energy Facilities ..………………………………………………………………………………….…………..……………………...…..92 Map of The Iranian Supported Popular Mobilization Forces Missile War in Iraq ..……………………………………………………….………………………….96 Map of Yemen and the Gate of Tears ..………………………………………………………………………………….………………………………….………..100 17 Appendix of Charts, Maps, Tables, and Graphics Map of Yemen: Sectarian Divisions ..……………………………………………………………………………………..….…..……….…………………..……..102 Map of Yemen: The Southern Movement ..……………………………………………………………………………………..………….………..……..………..103 Map of Deadliest Conflict Events in Yemen ..……………………………………………………………………………….……..………….…………………….104 Chart of Iran’s Complex Security Structure: 2019 ..…………………………………………………………………………..…………….……………………….107 Chart of DIA Estimate of Iranian Military Command and Control ..………………………………………………………………………………………………..108 Chart of DIA Assessment of Iranian Military Modernization Goals ..…………………………………………………..…………….………………………..…...109 Map of Key Naval Operating Areas in the Arabian Peninsula, Gulf of Oman, Indian Ocean, and Red Sea Areas ..………………………….………..…..…..…..119 Map of Gulf Powers’ Rivalries in the Indian Ocean ..………………………………………………………………………………….……………………..……..120 Chart of Iran and the Arab Gulf Naval Forces in 2020 ..…………………………………………………………..………………….………….…………..……...121 Map of Iranian Naval Commands ..………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………….123 Map of Vulnerability of the Strait of Hormuz ..………………………………………………………………………………..………….…………….……..…….124 Chart of DIA Estimate of Iranian Naval Forces ..…………………………………………………………………………….………….………………….……….125 Map of Iranian Coastal Defense Cruise Missile Ranges ..……………………………………………………………………..……….………………….…..…….135 Map of Iranian Port Visits and Naval Exercises ..………………………………………………………………………………..……….………………………….137 Map of Iranian Attacks in May-September 2019 ..……………………………………………………………………………….………………………………….138 Map of Iranian Tanker Attacks in 2019 ..…………………………………..………………………………………………………….…………………….……….139 Chart of Iranian and Houthi Remotely Controlled Small Craft with Explosive Devices ..……..……………..………………………….…………………..……..140 Map of Peacetime Tanker and Cargo Ship Traffic in the Gulf Region: 6.3.2020 ..…………………………………………………….……………………..……..141 Map of Peacetime Tanker and Cargo Ship Traffic in the Gulf 6.3.2020 ..………………………………………….…………..…….………………………..…....142 Chart of The Strategic Importance of Gulf Exports and the Strait of Hormuz ..………………………………………..…………..….……………………………146 18 The First Key Shift in the Military Balance: Changes in the Regional Struggle for Strategic Control and Influence 73 Shifts in the Regional Struggle for Strategic Control and Influence The maps and data in this in this section focus on the first key shift in the Gulf military balance: Changes in in the regional struggle for strategic control and influence. They illustrate the changing strategic relationships between Iran and the Arab world, Iran’s rising influence outside the Gulf, and the importance of developments in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen – as well as the strategic depth of Saudi Arabia and Iran as
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