Policy Paper June 2021 Next Steps in NATO Deterrence and Resilience Steven Keil, Heinrich Brauß, and Elisabeth Braw Washington, DC Ankara Belgrade Berlin Brussels Bucharest Paris Warsaw Policy Paper June 2021 Introduction Steven Keil NATO’s summit this month marks a new phase of the The NATO 2030 effort and strategic concept review alliance’s year-and-a-half long quest on how it will adapt cannot paper over political problems, but they also to the challenges of the next decade and beyond. Secre- must avoid fixating on these. NATO must adapt to tary-General Jens Stoltenberg will unveil his proposals larger strategic shifts and their consequences—namely from the NATO 2030 initiative, which aims to make the rise of China and its implications for U.S. engage- the alliance “even stronger. Strong militarily. Stronger ment in and around Europe. This has consequences politically. And more global.”1 This will be the first for how NATO counters Russia’s threat to European holistic rethink of alliance strategy in over a decade. security, the continued challenge of terrorism, the In principle, the Brussels summit will prove to new challenges posed by emerging technologies and be a pivotal milestone in the NATO’s evolution. But climate change, and strategic stability. As Stoltenberg this is only the beginning of a process that will enable has reiterated, enhancing consultations will be critical NATO to face current and future security challenges. to NATO’s adaptation in the new era. More frequent Summit and post-summit deliberations will confront consultations may result in more public disagree- many of the serious issues of political cohesion expe- ments. But they are critical for allies to create the space rienced over recent years, which ultimately instigated to consider the deficiencies and opportunities of its the NATO 2030 process at the 2019 London leaders approach in a new geopolitical era. meeting. Today, many of these challenges remain. There are The Brussels summit is only the significant differences among allies on issues like threat beginning of a process that will prioritization and the balance between dialogue and enable NATO to face current deterrence vis-à-vis Russia. While defense spending and future security challenges. has improved, adequate burden sharing is still lacking and discussions on how best to incentivize better prac- tices or what those targets may indeed be are politi- In this spirit, the two parts of this paper seek to cally charged. There are also growing concerns about contribute to the discussion on NATO deterrence and the democratic trajectory of certain NATO members. key issues surrounding resilience, offering action- The chief difference in alliance dynamics since the able recommendations for the allies to consider. The start of the NATO 2030 effort is the new U.S. admin- first, authored by Heinrich Brauß, takes a broad look istration, which more naturally gravitates to multilat- at NATO’s deterrence posture and the Enhanced eral approaches and has a long history in engaging and Forward Presence effort. First outlining the strategic supporting Euro-Atlantic institutions. shifts in the geopolitical environment, Brauß then turns to how the alliance can augment and enhance its deterrence efforts from the Baltic to the Black Sea. 1 NATO, Remarks by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg on launching #NATO 2030 – Strengthening the Alliance in an increasingly He lays out ten specific recommendations as NATO competitive world, June 8, 2020 considers how best to adapt its deterrence posture. Steven Keil, Heinrich Brauß, and Elisabeth Braw : Next Steps in NATO Deterrence and Resilience 2 Policy Paper June 2021 The second contribution, authored by Elisabeth Launching the NATO 2030 effort, Stoltenberg Braw, takes a deeper dive on resilience issues and the remarked that “the best way to prevent a conflict, is specific need to examine the nexus of supply chains, to remove any room for doubt, any room for miscal- Euro-Atlantic security, and private-public partnerships. culation about NATO’s readiness, willingness to While supply-chain management is the responsibility of protect all Allies. Defense and Deterrence is central.”2 member states or institutions like the EU, developments He also underscored that resilience is key and “that like the coronavirus pandemic and various cyberat- resilience—be it infrastructure, telecommunica- tacks have revealed the vulnerability of NATO and its tions, 5G or healthcare, access to protective equip- militaries. Braw draws out these challenges and offers ment—all of that matters for the civilian society, suggestions on how to connect national security policy but it actually also matters for NATO as a military and important industries across societies, to including alliance and our military capabilities.”3 The ideas put briefings and potential joint military-industry exercises. forth here offer an important and timely contribu- She argues that NATO can play a vital coordinating role tion to the current strategic dialogue facing NATO, in enhancing gray-zone activities interacting with crit- and the transformation it will undergo following the ical supply chains and the private sector. Brussels summit. 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid. Steven Keil, Heinrich Brauß, and Elisabeth Braw : Next Steps in NATO Deterrence and Resilience 3 Policy Paper June 2021 Deterrence and Resilience on NATO’s Eastern Flank Heinrich Brauß In his Interim National Security Strategic Guid- last section offers proposals for how to further adapt ance published in March 2021, President Joe Biden NATO to ensure it is able to meet future challenges, states: “Our world is at an inflection point. Global with a particular focus on deterrence in the east. dynamics have shifted. New crises demand our attention.” What he has in mind are “accelerating A Strengthened Deterrence and Defense global challenges—from the pandemic to the Posture climate crisis to nuclear proliferation to the fourth Russia’s policy of persistent confrontation has become industrial revolution.”1 commonplace. Its hybrid warfare strategy, as well NATO, too, is at an inflection point—the second as its growing military potential and exercises on within a few years. In early 2014, Russia’s aggres- NATO’s border, are designed to destabilize allies sion against Ukraine fundamentally altered the from within and intimidate them from without. In security environment in Europe. As a consequence, accordance with its military doctrine and as regu- after some 20 years of focusing on international larly rehearsed in its large ZAPAD exercises, Russia crisis management, NATO reinvigorated deter- prepares for regional wars on its periphery, including rence and defense as its core task. It has since been the possibility of using nuclear weapons as integrated implementing a long-term program to significantly means of operational warfare. All this has made it the strengthen its relevant posture. Today, only seven most serious potential military and geopolitical threat years later, the transatlantic community is confronted to NATO in Europe. with a new strategic challenge on a global scale. Given the extent and geography of Russia’s terri- The rise of China to world-power status profoundly tory and waters, NATO’s adaptation is geared to changes the global balance of power. We are entering enhancing its capability to respond at short notice an era of great-power competition and the alliance to multiple, possibly simultaneous threats of various today faces two systemic rivals. scale—that is, from limited incursions to large-scale This begs the question of how this will impact attacks—and across several at-risk regions. This NATO’s role and posture in Europe. With this in stretches from the High North and Norwegian Sea mind, this chapter first recollects the principles, stra- to the North Atlantic to the Baltic Sea and Black Sea tegic rationale, and key elements of NATO’s efforts to regions, and to the Mediterranean. It spans the land, strengthen its deterrence and defense posture. This air, maritime, cyber, space, and nuclear domains. is followed by a brief analysis of the new strategic Therefore, NATO must retain maximum aware- challenges the transatlantic community faces and ness, flexibility, and agility to ensure it has the right their impact on NATO’s approach to security. The forces in the right place at the right time. Thus, rapid deployment of appropriate forces to where they would be needed rather than permanent forward 1 The White House, Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March positioning of large forces has been the paradigm for 2021, NATO’s conventional posture. Steven Keil, Heinrich Brauß, and Elisabeth Braw : Next Steps in NATO Deterrence and Resilience 4 Policy Paper June 2021 However, with a view to the Baltic region, which • enhancing the NATO Command Structure borders Russia and is most exposed to a potential to reacquire capabilities to command and military threat, there is a critical time-distance gap control the whole range of operations;4 between a possible deployment of superior Russian • enhancing cyber defense; forces and a buildup of substantial NATO forces for • tripling the size of the NATO Response Force reinforcement. Furthermore, Russia’s anti-access/area to 40,000 troops and establishing the Very denial capabilities (A2/AD)2 in Kaliningrad could, in High Readiness Joint Task Force of some a conflict, impede the movement of allied forces into 5,000 troops; and across the region. This could lead Moscow to • launching the NATO Readiness Initiative believe it has the option of launching a rapid regional to generate substantial land, air, and naval land grab, together with cyberattacks, a disinforma- forces at very high readiness; tion campaign, and subversive actions on allied terri- • working with the EU to create the legal, tories. This could be paired with the use of long-range procedural, military, and infrastructural precision strike capabilities to disable NATO defenses conditions to enable speedy movement of in Europe.