Succeeding in Afghanistan By George Grant ii First published in 2010 by The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society 210 Pentonville Road London N1 9JY Tel: 020 7340 4520 www.henryjacksonsociety.org © George Grant & The Henry Jackson Society, 2010 All rights reserved The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and are not necessarily indicative of those of The Henry Jackson Society or its Trustees Designed by Genium Design, www.geniumdesign.com Printed by Intype Libra Limited, www.intypelibra.co.uk About The Henry Jackson Society The Henry Jackson Society: Project for Democratic Geopolitics is a cross- partisan, British think-tank. Our founders and supporters are united by a common interest in fostering a strong British, European and American commitment towards freedom, liberty, constitutional democracy, human rights, governmental and institutional reform and a robust foreign, security and defence policy and transatlantic alliance. The Henry Jackson Society is a registered charity (no. 1113948). For more information about Henry Jackson Society activities, our research programme and public events please see www.henryjacksonsociety.org. About the Author George Grant is the Governance, Strategy & Terrorism Section Director at The Henry Jackson Society. He is the author of a number of briefing papers with relevance in this field, including an analysis of the political, economic and philosophical drivers of radical Islamism in the Muslim World as well as a report on China’s rise in Africa, and what it means for the continent’s democratic and economic prospects. Prior to working at the Henry Jackson Society, George worked for a number of newspapers, including The Sunday Times, The Scotsman and the Daily Mail. He holds Masters Degrees in History (with Honours) from the University of Edinburgh and Investigative Journalism (with Distinction) from City University, London. Succeeding in Afghanistan By George Grant www.henryjacksonsociety.org Succeeding in Afghanistan Foreword by General Jack Keane (retired) The war in Afghanistan embodies the greater struggle presently taking place in the Middle East, Central and Southern Asia and North Africa. In all of these places, Islamist extremists are waging a violent ideological conflict to impose their radical ideology onto Muslim society at large. To succeed, these extremists believe they must drive the West, with its democratic ideas, out of the region. This was the logic that largely drove the strategic decision to attack the United States on 11th September 2001. America’s extraordinary response to these attacks - where US forces, allied to the Northern Alliance, launched an invasion of Afghanistan within just a few weeks of 9/11 - brought about an unexpected and rapid collapse of the Taliban regime. This was followed by al-Qaeda’s fleeing the sanctuary of the Taliban and the protection of the rugged, difficult terrain of Afghanistan. Just as happened in Iraq, where violent extremists attempted to take control of the country following the downfall of Saddam Hussein’s corrupt and brutal regime, so the Taliban are attempting the same in Afghanistan today. We should not be surprised that the Taliban will not go quietly after so many years of uninterrupted strangulation of the Afghan people. Unquestionably, the commitment of the West’s resources - principally those of the United States - to the major war effort in Iraq contributed in some degree to the Taliban’s re-emergence in Afghanistan. We are now into the ninth year of a war which inevitably tests the mettle and resolve of democratic societies to not only understand the nature of the war, but, more importantly, how to measure progress and how to define victory. The centre of gravity for conventional warfare is, of course, the enemy, where land, air and maritime forces oppose a similar capability. As such, defeat of those forces or the seizure of terrain and/or population centres are obvious determinants of success. In irregular warfare - such as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq represent - the centre of gravity is not the enemy, it is in fact the people. In such a conflict, there are no obvious metrics for success which the public can easily recognise, but rather a series of obscure benchmarks such as level of violence, measurements of stability or instability i Foreword and, of course, the harsh reality of the number of casualties. Moreover, adding to the frustration and confusion, at times, is that combat operations against the enemy must be viewed in terms of what their likely impact on the people is to be. Indeed, although the enemy may be known to be in a specific location in a town or village and are vulnerable to an attack, that operation must be measured against the risk of harming or alienating the population. Sometimes, the operation will not be conducted because a supportive population is a higher priority in winning the war than killing or capturing insurgents. This places a premium on understanding the people, establishing relationships that earn trust and taking risks to protect the population. And in doing so our young officers and NCOs are part mayor; negotiator; community consultant; chief engineer for reconstruction; and the leader in charge of protecting the lives of the people. These irregular wars are not only more complicated but require time to forge relationships with the people; time to understand a more decentralised and, at times, invisible enemy; and time to assist in establishing responsive local governance in a secure, stable environment. We have learned, painfully, that security is the necessary precondition for responsive governance and economic development. Our goals in Afghanistan, while often discussed and debated, seem apparent: to establish a secure and stable Afghanistan, capable of governing itself, with the ability to support its people, while ensuring that Afghanistan is not a safe-haven for violent extremists who will prey on the Afghan people, their neighbours or other countries of the international community. Moreover, a secure and stable Afghanistan is in the vital interests of the United States, the United Kingdom and other NATO countries, and it is key to the stability of Central and Southern Asia. This body of work is both unique and invaluable. In one place the reader gains insight into the recent history of Afghanistan; the nature of the current conflict; the nine year war with its accomplishments, challenges and setbacks; and, finally, what is needed to succeed in Afghanistan. General Jack Keane (retired) Former Vice Chief of Staff, US Army ii Succeeding in Afghanistan Acknowledgements I am honoured that General Jack Keane (retired) agreed to provide the Foreword to this report and would like to thank him for doing so. I am also grateful to the many helpful interlocutors with knowledge of the situation in Afghanistan, who have provided invaluable input and feedback as the work for this report progressed, though particular mention should be reserved for my colleagues Dr Alan Mendoza and Davis Lewin at the Henry Jackson Society for their input. Any mistakes contained within this report are however mine alone. iii Contents ConTents Foreword i Acknowledgements iii Acronyms v executiVe SUmmAry 1 inTroduction 5 CHAPTer i – THe CoUrSe oF oPerATionS BeTWeen 2001-2009 8 And WHy THey did noT SUCCeed Afghanistan 2001-2005 8 The British Military Strategy Between 2006-2009 13 CHAPTer ii – THe STrATeGy For SUCCeSS in AFGHAniSTAn 18 The Need for a Counterinsurgency Approach 18 Basic Operational Concepts – Clear, Hold, Build 20 The Problem with Counterinsurgency 24 The Nature of War 26 Building Hampshire in Helmand? 27 Intelligence 28 No Guns Without Money – Eliminating the Taliban’s Finances 31 The Imperative of Good Governance 33 Reconciliation with the Taliban 38 The Need for International Legitimacy 41 CHAPTer iii – TALiBAn diViSionS 43 What Motivates the Insurgency? 43 Strategic and Operational Divisions Within the Insurgency 46 The Role of Pakistan 49 CHAPTer iV – THe rAmiFiCATionS oF FAiLUre 51 The Ramifications for Western National Security 52 The Ramifications for Regional Stability 54 The Ramifications for Development & Human Rights in Afghanistan 56 The Relationship Between Underdevelopment and Support for Terrorism 58 Conclusion 60 Endnotes 63 Bibliography 68 iv Succeeding in Afghanistan List oF mAin ACronymS used in thiS publication Amn Afghan Mission Network AnA Afghan National Army AnP Afghan National Police Coin Counterinsurgency ConoPS Concept of Operations dFid Department for International Development FATA Federally Administered Tribal Areas FCo Foreign & Commonwealth Office FCr Frontier Crimes Regulation GdP Gross National Product HiG Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin ied Improvised Explosive Device iSAF International Security Assistance Force iSi Inter-Services Intelligence nATo North Atlantic Treaty Organisation oeF Operation Enduring Freedom PrT Provincial Reconstruction Team UK United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland Un United Nations US United States of America v Executive Summary executiVe SUmmAry • The conflict in Afghanistan can and must be won. The purpose of this report is to explicate the strategy currently in place; to argue why it is the right one; and to emphasise that success in Afghanistan is not just a humanitarian imperative, but a strategic one also. The worst option that the governments of Coalition forces could therefore take is to pledge an unconditional withdrawal from Afghanistan without understanding that the current strategy is both viable and necessary. • The war in Afghanistan is first and foremost a war for the support of the people. Without that, neither the Afghan government nor the insurgents have any hope of victory. Consequently, the strategy the Afghan government and its Coalition partners must pursue if they are to succeed is one that makes the security of the people, and the improvement of their quality of life, its overriding objective. • operations in Afghanistan have not succeeded to date because, until recently, neither the correct strategy, nor the resources necessary to execute it, were in place.