Producing Fear in the Enemy's Mind
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Producing Fear in the Enemy’s Mind HOW TO ADAPT COLD WAR DETERRENCE FOR GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION Elisabeth Braw MARCH 2021 AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE Executive Summary eterrence is an instinctive part of shared war or whether one would not have erupted anyway, D existence, whether among individuals, groups, the world emerged from the Cold War without a or nations. It convinces adversaries not to engage direct confrontation between the two blocs. in aggressive acts they may otherwise have viewed Gray-zone aggression directed at liberal democra- as beneficial. Locks, burglar alarms, and signs warn- cies is growing and morphing, which makes it impera- ing of biting dogs, for example, form a basic form tive for these countries to establish effective deterrence. of deterrence, designed to convince prospective As deterrence is primarily about psychology, not the intruders that burglarizing a particular property tools used, liberal democracies can build on the deter- would be unwise. rence strategy developed during the Cold War. During the Cold War, nuclear arsenals’ destructive Because deterrence works only if it is credible, the power made deterrence theory a central component deterrents used should not be primarily of a military of national security strategy. Although it is impossible nature. Instead, effective deterrence must involve all to prove whether this strategy prevented a devastating parts of society. i Producing Fear in the Enemy’s Mind HOW TO ADAPT COLD WAR DETERRENCE FOR GRAY-ZONE AGGRESSION Elisabeth Braw The reason Westminster Abbey has a hawk is not for it to eat pigeons that get into the abbey. The hawk is there to make the pigeons think it will eat them.1 —Westminster Abbey choirboy The person who best described the essence of deter- a function of grand or national strategy. It is a gen- rence did so in one sentence—and he is a fictional char- eral reputation, generated over time by a posture acter. “Deterrence is the art of producing in the mind of (and visible actions) that portrays an image of credi- the enemy the fear to attack,” Dr. Strangelove says in bility and resilience regarding any hostile intent. This Stanley Kubrick’s eponymous 1964 masterpiece.2 The reputation is built by how adversaries interpret that word stems from the Latin verb deterrere, which means posture. It is essential to understand that posture is to discourage from, avert, or frighten away. Deterrence, not the same as reputation. Any actor may choose its in other words, rests on psychology. posture, but cannot choose their reputation; that is This report, adapted from my upcoming book The for other actors to decide based upon their percep- Defender’s Dilemma: Deterring Gray-Zone Aggression, tion and interpretation of that posture.4 discusses existing forms of deterrence and how these could be adapted for gray-zone aggression. Under- General deterrence comprises deterrence by standing the nature of deterrence is vital for liberal denial and punishment, which a country can opt democracies to at least partially curtail this growing to use in different proportions when designing its form of aggression directed against them. deterrence posture. In practice, deterrence by denial consists of resilience and entanglement. It is vital to, in particular, understand the value of resilience, Forms of Deterrence indisputably the less glamorous part of deterrence and one that has long been treated as an after- Dr. Strangelove has considerable nonfictional deter- thought. Despite this neglected position, deterrence rence company. The US Department of Defense by resilience can significantly change the attacker’s describes deterrence as “the prevention of action cost-benefit calculus. by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable In addition to general deterrence—the posture counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action out- with which a country communicates its standing weighs the perceived benefits.”3 The UK Ministry of and national security approach to other countries— Defence’s Development, Concepts and Doctrine Cen- countries maintain tailored deterrence, character- tre (DCDC), in turn, defines general deterrence as ized by DCDC as “the term used to describe specific 1 PRODUCING FEAR IN THE ENEMY’S MIND ELISABETH BRAW deterrence messages and responses for specific audi- makers will hesitate to threaten their use—let alone ences and adversaries.”5 Through targeted deterrence, use them for anything other than extremely serious countries can communicate differently to the respec- incidents—lest the tools lose power. tive recipients. During the Cold War, for example, the DCDC describes extended deterrence as United States used different tailored deterrence for the Soviet Union and Vietcong. The UK government usually taken to mean a more capable actor conduct- displayed one form of targeted deterrence vis-à-vis ing deterrence on the part of a (usually allied) actor the Warsaw Pact and another against the Irish Repub- who lacks capability or capacity. Extended deter- lican Army. rence is adversary focused, stating a commitment A third expression is immediate deterrence, the to punish the adversary for attacks on the ally. For form perhaps most commonly discussed in the pub- example, NATO’s operations and forward presence lic debate. After the SolarWinds hack against the on its eastern periphery can be viewed as a policy of United States, which came to light in December 2020 extended deterrence against external threats to the and that the US government subsequently labeled national integrity of the Baltic states.8 a Russian intelligence operation, the public debate demanded the United States respond to “deter” the Extended deterrence in the nuclear age has meant attacker, by which the discussants meant “retali- that nearly all European countries’ deterrence pos- ate.”6 Although deterrence takes place before an act tures have at some point featured nuclear weap- of aggression, retaliation can be used to try to deter ons even though most of them possessed none. future attacks. The form of deterrence closest to such West Germany, for example, had significant num- incident response is immediate deterrence, defined bers of Bundeswehr soldiers stationed along the by DCDC as including intra-German border and was backed up by allied troops stationed in West Germany, but its ultimate actions to enhance denial capabilities, as well as mak- deterrent remained the US nuclear umbrella. It was ing them more credible. In this type of deterrence therefore not surprising that, in the late 1970s, West activity, imposition-of-costs is the principal means of German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt strongly advo- influence.Denial-of -benefits may also work, but their cated bringing US nuclear weapons to West Ger- provisions will usually have to be in place already.7 many in response to the Soviet Union stationing SS-20 nuclear missiles in East Germany. Immediate deterrence, therefore, cannot be impro- That makes extended deterrence the nation-state vised in case of an attack and certainly cannot be suc- equivalent of the schoolyard conversation in which cessful without comprehensive general and tailored one child argues with another then resorts to the deterrence already in place. It is also important to argument that “my dad is stronger than yours,” remember that unlike traditional displays of military whereupon the second child counters with the same strength, certain forms of retaliation lose clout as soon argument. Having failed to determine whose dad is as they are used. This is the case with cyber weapons, stronger, the two retreat to their respective corners which begin figuratively rusting with their first use. with neither having the courage to strike the first The originators—thought to be Israel and the United blow lest they find out. By definition, extended deter- States—of Stuxnet, the computer virus that in 2010 rence is more vital to countries benefiting from the destroyed uranium enrichment centrifuges at Natanz extension than to the countries providing it. to stall Iran’s nuclear program, paid such a price. More importantly, the posture must convince Because the attack involved showing the weapon, the adversary, which means both the receiving and Iran got a chance to examine it. The weapon became extending countries’ populations have to support virtually useless. This often fleeting nature of newer the deterrence. Gen. Riho Terras, who was until 2018 tools of retaliation influences deterrence, as decision Estonia’s chief of defense, explained that 2 PRODUCING FEAR IN THE ENEMY’S MIND ELISABETH BRAW a British or German taxi driver, not to mention ordi- Long before the nuclear age, leaders followed nary Americans, need to believe that Estonia is worth Hermocrates’s commonsense insight. No king, gen- defending. That’s very difficult. How can you make eral, or other leader of any age would state that he them believe it’s important? If we don’t have that entered an armed conflict on his own volition even support by the public, it affects deterrence. That’s though doing so was certain to harm his side. Just why Estonia sends soldiers to serve with the French as no burglar would enter a house if he knew a pack in Mali.9 of bulldogs would thwart his work or harm him, no leader would attack a rival group or country if he By providing troops to Mali and Afghanistan and for were certain of defeat. This basic principle is referred other international missions, Estonia demonstrates to in deterrence theory as rational choice theory, it is a valuable ally. That makes it easier for deci- a term borrowed from the rational actor thinking sion makers in the countries extending deterrence in economics. to commit troops and resources to Estonia. If, how- Not all actors, however, pursue what their adver- ever, an adversary assumes the public will disprove saries and perhaps outside observers would consider of major support for an ally during a crisis, extended the rational choice.