6. CONCLUSION "Human thought and action have their springs not in spatial vacuum, But in some geographical milieu which defines in various degree - The character and orbit of human effort" W. G. East: Geography Behind History There is no doubt about the fact that Shivaji, in his effort to create a political niche for himself, struck a fine balance between the unique geographical situations of the Deccan country on the one hand, and the aspirations of the Maratha people on the other. His creatiyity and genius is well attested by his political and military exploits which have earned him a special place in the history of warfare in India. An analysis of the military activities of Shivaji reveals the working of the mastermind seeking balance between military force and stratagem, direct fighting and indirect methods of warfare. This is precisely the reason why many scholars emphasise that the place of Shivaji in Indian military traditions should be determined by the extent of his contributions to the art of warfare. Geographically speaking, the stretch of territory - Shivaji began with as an independent entity was too hilly and narrow. Given the resources at his disposal, initially, if it was difficult to expand eastward because of the presence of the mighty Mughals, in the west, the Arabian Sea hindered any logical expansion of the Maratha territorial base. Credit must be given to the genius of Shivaji in recognizing the value of a navy for a country (the Maratha Swarajya) with an extensive coastline (as a result of his brilliant military successes). It was the foresightedness of this great leader, therefore, that the foundations of Maratha Navy were laid during his regime. So that the Maratha navy could achieve its declared objectives and, at the same time, function profitably, a national (military) strategy encompassing the geographical realities of the Swarajya (both land and sea) was implemented by Shivaji. 316 In terms of terrestrial location, the Maratha Swarajya could be categorised as 'Maritime location', i.e., a territory having access to sea and also connected with land. Shivaji, therefore, deployed naval forces not merely for defensive purposes, but also for maritime commerce so that the cost of defense, to some extent, could be successfully met. Though the contemporary literature/documents (which were compiled for specific purposes, and were essentially non-military and non warfare-oriented in nature) may not directly help in making-out the real intent of the thought-process of genius of Shivaji, we can, at least have some practical deductions and reconstruct his appreciation of the situation of that time. For example, as noted in Chapter II, the objectives of the Maratha navy during the reign of Shivaji could be studied under three different headings, viz., (a) Military Objectives - To destroy enemy and its war machine through navy: for example the long drawn struggle (or war of attrition) with the Siddi of Janjira; (b) Political Objectives - To enforce political or associated demands on the adversary: with respect to the Europeans as only they could have significantly contributed towards the improvement of the Maratha navy; and (c) Geographical Objectives - To overthrow the enemy from strategically important areas: could be understood in the light of the fight for Janjira and the occupation of Kamsa and Khanderi-Underi. Shivaji was also aware of the fact that the hold on the sea would have helped to keep open an alternative line of communication/conveyance for him in case his main base was (political capital/stronghold on land) was cut across by any of the enemies. Hence, as on land, a chain of marine fortresses, both - on the coast and on the off-shore islands, were constructed. During the time of naval fights, the marine forts acted as the most immediate source of supply of war materials and also the place of safe refuge for the fleet in case of adversity. Such places, if properly fortified, and with ample store of water, ammunition and ganison, could very well serve the function of naval bases, and would successfiiUy stand against the attack of any enemy. At the same time, the artillery and guns of the naval forts (on the coast) would keep the creek or bay safe for navigation. They would thus, discourage the enemy ships from entering the sea/channel or the river lane on which they stood. 317 Boat-building activities were also taken at hand. At a brisk pace, vessels of different specifications and sizes were produced at different dockyards such as Kalyan- Bhiwandi, Jaitapur etc. In a short span of time, the number of vessels under the Maratha naval establishment exceeded more than a couple of hundreds. The logic behind the production of vessels in large numbers could be imderstood in terms of the overall strategy and tactical considerations, the Marathas followed during their naval wars. As per a pre-conceived strategy to overcome the limitation in terms of fire power, the principle of concentration of force (vessels') in naval warfare was applied (quite opposite to what the Marathas practiced during a war on land). At the point of contact, the enemy vessels (irrespective of their size or fire-power, though usually big) were so overwhelmed by sheer number (of vessels as well as crew/fighters), that it was difficult for the enemy to concentrate and target on the Marathas. The Maratha fighters would then board the enemy vessels and induce physical duel with the enemy crew on board. The Marathas would ultimately emerge winners mainly because of their overwhelming numbers. This was the most daring method, aimed to install fear in the hearts of the enemies so that they should give in to the demands of the Marathas. Another method applied by the Marathas in their naval engagements was the principle of surprise in which geographical (hydrographical) features would also constitute a part of the tactics. The Marathas vessels - having full knowledge of the submerged rocks, sand bars and tidal or wind patterns, would lure the European ships to the vicinity of the coast where water would be on the shallower side. Once the trick worked, with the use of specially built vessels (Ghurabs - towed speedily towards the enemy ship by rowing boats or Galvats), the Marathas would de-capacitate the enemy vessels would have become sluggish by that time for want of wind for the sail. Every thing would be done so swiftly that it would leave little scope for the bigger enemy-ships for maneuvering. If, by any chance, the enemy ship still stood a chance to making even with the attacking vessels, the Marathas (mostly with flat bottomed vessels) would make good their escape to the numerous creeks and coves with shallow water. In such a situation, any chase by the enemy would have been rendered dangerously futile. In other words, the Marathas derived the advantage of choosing the spot for naval engagements as well as disengagements. It should be remembered here. 318 that the art of disengagement was equally significant as the art of engagement as the Maratha suffered severe constraints in terms of resources. True, the resources of the Marathas, particularly in the early years of the Swarajya, were too scarce to have allowed them to go for a full-fledged naval establishment, but the foresightedness of the great visionary Shivaji saw the humble beginning and corroborating success of the Maratha Navy. And, with a proper system of naval administration (navy being an independent limb of the state as per Sabhasad Bakhar) in place, Shivaji tried to overcome the resource crunch too. Apart from resource crunch, the limitations faced by Shivaji were too many to have allowed the Maratha navy to grow and flourish in a proper manner. The first and foremost of the limitations was the unavailabilitv of time with him (to be devoted for nurturing the navy in its infancy). He faced the 'time constraint' largely on account of his bigger political compulsions. Most of the time he was hard pressed from the eastern side by the Mughals or the Bijapuris or even some recalcitrant elements. The recurrence of the likes of 'Shaista Khans', 'Afzal Khans', 'Jai Singhs', and 'Khem Sawants' etc., on the political spectrum of Deccan kept him pre-occupied throughout his political career. The end result was that the naval planning and actions depended on the urgency /outcome of these events. That Shivaji had a keen desire to personally supervise the naval establishment of the Swarajya and take it to newer horizons, has been demonstrated quite early in his political career. The laying of the foundation stone of his naval headquarters at Sindhudurg in 1664, and his participation (in person) in the Basrur Naval Expedition of 1665, speaks more than volumes about the real intents of this military visionary. Another noticeable limitation Shivaji faced was in terms of technological backwardness. Though this is a strictly comparative terminology, and depends upon a number of factors. But, keeping in mind the facts: (a) that he had raised a naval establishment from scratch; and (b) the complex nature of challenges from the rivals, he was facing (viz. the European companies, backed by a full-fledged naval establishments back home or even the Siddi of Janjira who were always aided by the Europeans and financed by the Mughals); his naval establishment appeared to be too primitive for any of his rivals. He lacked the technology to construct sea-worthy ships which could frequent 319 the vast expanses of the sea and also put up an effective resistance to the enemy challenges. At best, what Shivaji could manage was a coastal navy or what can be described as the rudiments of a 'Brown Water Navy'.