Bachelor Thesis Liberal Arts and Sciences Humanities: European History and Culture

AMENDING HISTORICAL INJUSTICE:

A CASE STUDY WITH A MORAL-PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE OF JUSTICE – THE TRIAL OF

Nora Nijboer ANR: 199780 UNR: u1263880

Supervisor: Prof. dr. A.J.A. Bijsterveld Second reader: Prof. dr. A.L. Smeulers Tilburg University

June 2017

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am using this opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone who supported me in the course of the writing process of my undergraduate thesis. First of all, I would like to thank my thesis supervisor Prof. Dr. Arnoud-Jan Bijsterveld of the Tilburg School of Social and Behavioral Sciences and the Department of Sociology at Tilburg University. Questions and advice regarding my writing were answered with appreciated expertise, while consistently allowing this paper to be my independent work. I would also like to acknowledge Prof. Dr. Alette Smeulers of the Tilburg Law School as the second reader of this thesis, and I am gratefully indebted to her for her valuable comments on this thesis. Second of all, I want thank my fellow students, as I acknowledge Iris, Sammi and Catalina for their efforts in guiding me in the appropriate direction with regard to the legal aspects of the paper. Third of all, besides his immense emotional support, I would like to thank Rouven Schmidt for his help in granting me access to the Niedersächsische Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen and other facilities at the Georg-August University Göttingen, making a great portion of necessary literature readily available during the writing process. And finally, I offer my deepest gratitude to my family: my sisters Sanae and Lina for the necessary distractions and teaching me patience, and my parents Lambert Nijboer and Sumaya Nijboer-Zekari for their endless love and encouragement leading up to this final result.

I ABSTRACT

This paper argues that an examination of the micro-level engagement in transitional justice will result in a more morally effective amendment of historical injustices. With a case study of Albert Speer’s Nuremberg trial, this paper seeks to establish how a more moral-philosophical perspective of justice can be realized. By drawing upon primary sources and the examination of books and articles discussing transitional justice from an interdisciplinary perspective with historical and moral-philosophical features, this paper examines the importance of assessing the perpetrator’s motivations and the victims’ experiences. In line with the research objective, this paper advocates the combination of retributive and restorative tools of transitional justice as outlined in the objectives of the Rome Statute of the ICC.

II TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... I

ABSTRACT ...... II

INTRODUCTION ...... 1 Thesis Objective and Research Question ...... 3

1. EXPLORING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE ...... 5 1.1. ‘Transitional Justice’ ...... 5 1.2. Transitional Justice Tools ...... 6 1.2.1. Truth Commissions ...... 7 1.2.2. Restitution ...... 8 1.2.3. Commemoration ...... 9 1.2.4. Formal Apologies ...... 10 1.2.5. History Education ...... 11 1.2.6. Hybrid courts ...... 11 1.3. The Military Tribunal of Nuremberg ...... 12

2. THE NUREMBERG TRIAL OF ALBERT SPEER ...... 17 2.1. “The Nazi Who Said Sorry” ...... 17 2.1.1. Life Before Nazi Party Membership ...... 18 2.1.2. Architectural Employment in the Nazi Party ...... 19 2.1.3. Minister of Armaments ...... 22 2.2. The Trial of Albert Speer ...... 26 2.3. The Aftermath ...... 30 2.3.1. Imprisonment at Spandau ...... 31 2.3.2. Release ...... 32

3. VICTIMS AND SPEER’S CASE ...... 34 3.1. The Role of Victims in Transitional Justice ...... 35 3.1.1. Which Victims? ...... 36 3.1.2. The Importance of the Victims’ Testimony ...... 37 3.2. Victim Representation ...... 40 3.2.2. Other Jewish representatives ...... 42 3.2.3. Non-Jewish Representatives ...... 45

III 4. CONSEQUENCES FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE TOOLS ...... 47 4.1. Alternative Transitional Justice Tools in Speer’s Case ...... 48 4.1.1. Victim-Centrism at the ICC ...... 48 4.1.2. Speer and the Official Apology ...... 49 4.1.3. Speer’s case and the Truth Commission ...... 51

CONCLUSION ...... 53

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 57 Books and Articles ...... 57 Online Sources ...... 61 Official Legal Documents ...... 62

IV INTRODUCTION

Since its establishment through the entering into force of the Rome Statute in July 2002, the International Criminal Court [ICC] has met with extensive criticism regards to establishing transitional justice and effectiveness (Okafor & Ngwaba, 2015; Evenson, 2015; McCargo, 2015). Even before its coming into being, the Court was characterized by potential overreach, selectivity and statutory limitations (Stahn, 2015). While the ICC is approaching its fifteenth year of existence, the Court is currently involved in ten preliminary examinations and ten situations under investigation (International Criminal Court website), with many Statute members expressing diverting opinions on resources directed towards the Court’s budget (“Annual ICC Assembly”, December 2016). Take for example its annual budget of 700.000 euros for eight situations under investigation (Taylor, 2016), or the recent threat from its largest economy member states which voted for and succeeded in setting the ICC budget for 2017 at 6 million Euros less than Court officials had requested (“Annual ICC Assembly”, December 2016). Besides criticism on the Court’s effectiveness, continuous critique is expressed with regard to the treatment of victims. In the Rome Statute and on its website, the ICC outlines that its provisions ensure that victims are given a voice, while balancing retributive and restorative justice, to enable the Court to bring criminals to justice but also to help the victims themselves obtain justice (ICC website). It is undeniable that progress has been made in victim-sensitivity, however, closer inspection reveals the need for caution. Victim participation in proceedings is tightly regulated: there is no general right to participate during an investigation and even in the application process restrictions exist, which is mainly due to complicated bureaucracy and the absence of legal aid (Singh & Evenson, 2008). In Peter Malcontent’s Facing the Past (2016), David Taylor emphasizes: “…it must also be questioned whether remote representation by a lawyer in The Hague has any value for feelings of justice” (p. 159). Former UN secretary-general (1997-2006) Kofi Annan (2004) in his report on transitional justice stated that too often the emphasis had been on foreign-conceived

1 solutions. In the amendment of historical injustice, he states that the international community had frequently rushed to prescribe a particular formula without first affording victims and national constituencies the opportunity to consider and decide on the proper balance of restorative and retributive justice tools (Annan, 2004, p. 6). He concluded that international justice is laid down from above, with little evidence of meaningful engagement with grassroots communities, beyond paying lip service to their imagined needs. Consequently, Annan (2004) identified the most fruitful transitional justice experiences to be those that owe a large part of their success to the quantity and quality of public and victim consultation carried out (p. 7). Therefore, drawing upon Annan’s report, a more moral-philosophical perception and more careful involvement of the victims (Garkawe, 2006, p. 87) could result in a successful understanding of transitional justice. However, if it had not been for the legacy of the ‘mother of all international criminal tribunals’ (Malcontent, 2016, p. 59) the issues of effectiveness and the position of victims in international criminal law would not be discussed as they are nowadays. Conceivably the first real applications of international transitional justice have been employed in the Nuremberg and Tokyo Military Tribunals after the Second World War. “ and the unprecedented terror the Nazis and the Japanese had unleashed upon their neighbouring countries offered the members of the Allied coalition no other choice than to condemn and punish their behaviour by either executing or trying their most important leaders” (Malcontent, 2016, p. 59). For the first time, the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg enforced that individuals are subjects of international law and can be held criminally responsible for perpetrating war crimes and crimes against humanity (McGonigle Leyh, 2016, p. 115). Although the Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo encountered many limitations, as law was created ex post facto to fit in with the passion and clamour of the time, the can be seen as a prominent and primary example of post-war transitional justice. Like the ICC, the Tribunal of Nuremberg was also criticized for being too bureaucratic for many of the victims and not very effective. A major criticism was that “[t]he major military trials were not through victims’ testimony, but [that] the case was

2 made primarily by reliance on German documentary evidence” (Danieli, 2006). In this manner, essential moral aspects of war crimes, like the motives of the perpetrators and experiences of the victims, were significantly underrepresented. Automatically, then, Military Tribunals of this kind will miss an essential element in amending historical injustice and a successful understanding of transitional justice.

Thesis Objective and Research Question

There are many types of justice. Already in the Ancient Greek world, Aristotle distinguished distributive and compensatory justice as an important dichotomy. More recently, victors’ justice (Minear, 1971), retributive justice, procedural justice, restorative justice, justice for society and justice for the victims (Danieli, 2006, p. 1641) have been noted as distinctive forms of justice. In his Reappraising the Nuremberg Trials: The Role of Victims in International Law (2006), Danieli brings up the fundamental difference between ‘Justice for Society’ versus ‘Justice for Victims’. In sum, justice for society is primarily aimed at social reconstruction and reconciliation through institutions like tribunals; this type of justice can be linked to retributive justice. Justice for victims can be understood as defined in the UN Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power (1985), but can also be seen as justice being done from a non-institutional victim’s perspective (Danieli, 2006, p.1645). In this, justice is established through compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, and commemoration; this type of justice can be linked to restorative justice. This paper will emphasize their distinction and focus on the perception that transitional justice should return to the objectives of the Rome Statute of the ICC. It should incorporate a more moral perception of justice, which includes the perpetrators’ motives and the victims’ experiences. This paper will not research the juridical effectiveness of transitional justice tools, but investigate how a shift towards a more moral- philosophical perspective towards crimes against humanity in juxtaposition with the more juridical perspective is possible. Given the mass and extensiveness of literature and research on the Nuremberg Trials, the choice for a case study fell on the trial of the German architect and Nazi

3 minister Albert Speer, who is widely known as “the Nazi who said sorry” (Davidson, 1996). In the Nuremberg Trials, he got indicted on all four possible counts (participating in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of crime against peace; planning, initiating and waging wars of aggression and other crimes against peace; war crimes; and crimes against humanity) and was sentenced to twenty years of imprisonment. He claimed responsibility through his statement: “it is my unquestionable duty to assume my share of responsibility for the disaster of the German people" (IMT vol. 16, 1947, p. 483). In contrast with other cases in the Nuremberg trials, his case provides both in the official sentencing and personal conviction (through the admittance of his guilt), a way to assess the usage of tools for amending historical injustice. Special attention will be paid to Speer’s motivations, which will add to the philosophical discussion of the effectiveness of his trial. Furthermore, several representatives of the victim groups involved in Albert Speer’s case will be considered in the discussion of the moral-philosophical justification of his Nuremberg trial. Overall, this paper will deepen the subject of historical injustice and demonstrate the relevance of discussing moral effectiveness of tools in transitional justice by studying the case of Albert Speer’s Nuremberg Trial, primarily through the multidisciplinary analysis of (primary) sources and literary review. Given the necessary details and boundaries, the above leads to the following research question:

Taking Albert Speer’s Nuremberg trial as a case study, in terms of amending historical injustice, how can a moral-philosophical perspective of justice be realized?

This paper will result in a discussion of the aforementioned motivations and their influence on international criminal justice generally, and on Albert Speer’s case specifically. Furthermore, in the discussion, some ideas will be developed on the continuation and future of using transitional justice tools, given their extensive criticism. Finally, a conclusion will bring the whole together and provide an answer to the main research question.

4 1. EXPLORING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Throughout this chapter, Peter Malcontent’s (2016) recent publication Facing the Past: Amending Historical Injustices through Instruments of Transitional Justice is used as a guiding work in providing the basic principles and general status quo on transitional justice from legal, historical and moral-philosophical perspectives. His book “is a comprehensive volume offering an integral and encompassing view on how societies at the national and international level try to deal with mass atrocities through instruments of retributive and restorative justice, for anyone attempting to find his or her way in the still expanding world of transitional justice” (Malcontent, 2016, p. v). The definition of historical injustices can be found in Malcontent’s (2016) work as “large-scale injustices of a serious nature”(p. 21). Particularly for the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg it is important to establish a basic understanding of the term “transitional justice”, transitional justice tools and how the Trials relate to international criminal law and transitional justice.

1.1. ‘Transitional Justice’

The concept of ‘transitional justice’ is a fairly new one, and although procedures to deal with past grievances have been around for more than 2000 years (Elster, 2013), only recently they developed to be more generally suited as legitimate tools to repair historical injustices. Reasons for this are spread out over the latter part of the twentieth century and range from a rising international human rights culture (bolstered by the adoption of the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948) to a growing historical claims culture motivated by (formerly) suppressed social and ethnic groups that were finally in the position to draw attention to their suffering. Notably, the current terminology has it limitations. The word ‘transitional’ seems to suggest a period following a phase of injustices that has come to an end, or an enactment of measures at a point of political transition, but the ad hoc tribunal of Yugoslavia, for example, has shown that this procedure may well happen during an instable period of conflict. Besides the arbitrariness of the term with regard to the assumed termination of historical injustices, ‘transitional’

5 also seems to refer to a limited transitional period of time, but the example of Argentina and its dictatorial regime, with gross human rights violations and violent uprisings lasting as a result of the trials of military officials, demonstrates how much time it can take for a transitional period to be considered as having ended. Moreover, the studies published on transitional justice in the last few decades have faced considerable criticism as well. As Fischer (2011) reports: “[g]iven the lack of long- term analysis or systematic empirical research, there is not much knowledge concerning the effects of tribunals and trials on the respective societies” (p. 414). Certain gaps in the research methods of many transitional justice studies can be found in the overpowering focus on the analysis of a case study’s underlying policy-making processes, regimes and the extent of present democratic factors. Too little attention has been paid to studies that examine the nature of micro-level, or bottom-up engagement in transitional justice and that observe, “how these [aforementioned] processes affect people” (Backer, 2009, p.66). This can be explained by the fact that a final and comprehensive assessment can only be determined in the long run, and that transitional justice as a research subject is too young to draw long-term conclusions. In the context of this paper, it will be argued that an examination of the micro-level engagement in transitional justice will result in more a more morally effective amendment of historical injustices.

1.2. Transitional Justice Tools

Setting aside the previous confinements, “scholarly debates and practitioners’ discussions largely build on the assumption that coming to terms with the past through transitional justice is a necessary precondition for establishing sustainable peace between nations and social groups that have been at war with each other” (Fischer, 2016, p. 25). Transitional justice has provided modern-day international criminal justice with many tools to (re-) install retributive and restorative justice. In the academic fields of political science and peace studies, it is a given that a combination of both retributive and restorative justice tools are needed to establish redress. Former member of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and founder of the International Centre for Transitional

6 Justice, Alexander Boraine (2006) in ‘Transitional Justice. A holistic interpretation’ argues for a holistic approach towards transitional justice, in which five key pillars of accountability, truth recovery, reparations, institutional reforms and reconciliation come forward as the most important factors that influence reconciliation positively (p. 411). It includes and transcends both types of justice. On the one hand, retributive justice aims at punishing wrongdoers out of fair-mindedness to those who have been wronged. It tends to be generally backward looking, but particularly forward looking in the objective of sending a future message in which the costs of ethnic hatred and violence outweigh the benefits (Malcontent, 2016, p. 11). On the other hand, restorative justice is directly focused on the victim. By appropriate forms of reparations, it allows individuals and/or communities to empower themselves and retake control of their lives. Some examples of both restorative and retributive justice tools will be discussed below. Interestingly for this paper, the transitional justice tools for both retributive and restorative justice differ insofar that they are debated in terms of their effectiveness in contributing to reconciliation. It can be argued that a more moral perspective on Justice for Victims exists somewhat in the middle of the two. Typical retributive justice tools include: military tribunals, international ad hoc tribunals, hybrid and traditional courts, and the international criminal court (Malcontent, 2016, pp. 59-89). Characteristic restorative justice instruments include: truth and reconciliation commissions, restitution and financial compensation, commemoration, formal apologies, and history education and new historical narratives (Malcontent, 2016, pp. 205-222). In the light of the case study highlighted throughout this paper, the military tribunal as a retributive justice tool obviously deserves the main examination. However, this will be done through the following part (1.3.) on the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg. More remarkably, the restorative and retributive justice tools that were not directly linked with the Nuremberg trials could show for intriguing insights.

1.2.1. Truth Commissions

Although the first forms of truth commissions can be found in 1974 Uganda, the stronger legacy of these commissions can be found in Latin America, with the commissions of

7 Argentina and Chile as its most prominent examples (Malcontent, 2016, p. 226). They are differently created through differing contexts, having their own particular mandates, compositions and institutional frameworks. Priscilla Hayner (2011) draws them together in her authoritative definition consisting of four characteristics: they are concerned with past events (1), they investigate patterns of violations and crimes (2), they are temporary and are finished with a final report (3), and they come into being with the official support of a state (4). Although truth commissions come with a number of related issues (Can truth commissions offer truth at all? Is it possible to offer nothing but the truth outside of politics? At what price?), what must not be forgotten is that these commissions are a relatively recent phenomenon and need more research into the perceptions by their constituencies. In relation to the victims, truth commissions generally facilitate victims with an opportunity to relate their own accounts, and to recommend reparation measures for them. In line with a more moral-philosophical perspective on Justice for Victims, truth commissions offer an initial suitable replacement of Military Tribunals. However, one integrated feature of truth commissions is the granting of amnesty for specific acts under specific conditions, particularly when the political context does not allow for prosecution. This could stand in the way of successfully bringing forward important victims’ experiences and perpetrators’ motives, and therefore preventing an effective bottom-up perspective in transitional justice.

1.2.2. Restitution

Restitution and financial compensation in transitional justice have continuously been controversial instruments to amend historical injustices, since minority rights seem to challenge the universality of the human rights regime, many victims argue that reparation payments are equal to ‘blood money’, and essential victim groups are left out. Restitution as a transitional justice instrument is the restoration of what has been lost or taken away to the rightful owner. The decline of nationalism in post-war societies of the West, together with the Human Rights revolution of the 1960s, contributed to a social climate in which the alternative narratives of overpowered minorities were no longer dominated by older, nationalist narratives fabricated to support the development of the nation state.

8 “Many collectives started to use their victimhood to strengthen their social and political identity, and demand restitution for past suffering” (Malcontent, 2016, p. 208). In light of the Second World War and the Nuremberg Trials, the West German-Israeli ‘Luxembourg’ Reparations Agreement of 1952 can be seen as an early and important example of financial restitution, but it remains an interstate agreement between the German Federal Republic and Israel. It was only decades later that Jewish groups and individuals began to present further claims for restitution, or compensation to the German state, its institutions, enterprises, or to other states (like Austria and Switzerland) Malcontent, 2016, p. 45). It was also only decades after the Luxembourg agreement that the Nazi persecution of victim groups such as the Roma were identified as racially motivated, so that these groups could obtain financial compensation likewise.

1.2.3. Commemoration

Increasingly, after World War II and its atrocities, memorials, monuments and museums were not established to glorify a state’s past, but to acknowledge a state’s past grievances against its own peoples or against others. In the context of transitional justice, the creation of memorials has become an important instrument of symbolic reparation and democracy building. “The practice makes a visible statement about what (and who) a political order considers worthy of remembrance and is a means of reaching large numbers of people over an extended period of time” (Light & Young, 2015, p. 233). In comparison to the other tools of transitional justice, it can be said that while the institutional instruments of military tribunals and ad hoc trials have a symbolic dimension, in societal terms their impact may be relatively limited. Realistically, not necessarily everyone in society is in the position to reclaim property or has a personal connection to central figures that are placed on trial. Consequently, the effects on the everyday lives of the majority of the population will be limited. Though, as Light & Young (2015) state “monuments and commemorative landscapes have the potential to reach far more people in the course of their daily lives, and to address their wish for justice in a much more immediate and visible way. For most people, commemoration in the public arena is a form of public recognition that is important in coming to terms with past injustices” (p. 250).

9

1.2.4. Formal Apologies

In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly issued a resolution on the ‘Basic Principles and Guidelines to a Remedy and Reparation of Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law’. This states that victims have a right to a remedy, which features the aforementioned compensation but also “Public apology, including acknowledgements of the facts and acceptance of responsibility” (Section IX, Article 20; Article 22e). Although these are frequently referred to as apologies for historical wrongs (Marrus, 2007), apologies are distinguished by categorizing them as either political or historical apologies, and either inter-state or intra-state apologies. Public or official apologies bring a number of issues to the transitional justice table. On the one hand, “individual members of corporate entities [like states, businesses or religious groups] often oppose apologies issued in their name on the grounds that they are not personally guilty of actions by either their actual biological, or corporate, ancestors” (Howard-Hassman, 2016 p. 248). A rather self- evident counterargument to trans-generational denial of responsibility can be found in the fact that, as a member of a corporation, the individual shares the entity’s moral responsibility to amend past grievances that it committed. Even if the actual victims did not survive, their descendants may still suffer from the historical injustices committed against ancestors and still be in need of ‘moral restitution’ (Weyeneth, 2001, p. 31). With reference to the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg, formal apologies can be seen as a tool to restore relations that were intentionally ruptured during warfare, conquest, or other large-scale events. The acknowledgements emerging from World War II can be categorized as intra- and inter-state apologies, but are principally political because they were instigated “for acts that have continuing political relevance” (Howard-Hassman, 2016, p. 249). These apologies also “demonstrated respect for international laws, and the preservation of international order and stability” (Löwenheim, 2009, p. 554). Interestingly for the case study of Albert Speer’s trial, his personal apology can be added as another dimension to the discussion and evaluated in this theoretical framework.

10 1.2.5. History Education

The last transitional justice tool that Malcontent mentions in his Facing the Past (2016) is (history) education. As part of building peace and regionalisation in post-war Europe, a history textbook reform to remove stereotypes and gross inaccuracies was initiated in the 1960s (Georg Eckert Institute, n.d.). Even though this instrument was applied soon after World War II, former director of the History and the Politics of Reconciliation Program at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs Elizabeth Cole claims “education still does not figure prominently on the list of available remedies” (Cole, 2016, p. 285). She argues for considering history education reform as a force of reconciliation (Cole, 2007, p. 115). Other academics who cite education as an essential response to past injustices along with the aforementioned transitional justice instruments, state that “[i]n order to help students face the contemporary world with its legacy of great violence, education must convey the message that history is largely the result of human decisions, that prevention is possible, and that education must have a moral component if it is to make a difference” (Stern Strom, 2017, pp. xx-xxiii). Considering the fact that the return to the grassroots in amending historical justice is advocated throughout this paper, history education does not strictly fall in line with the elements associated with this moral philosophical view on transitional justice, while education is mostly imposed on society from above, with possibly biased criteria and governmental provisions for instance. However, Stern Strom’s aforementioned prescribed moral component can evaluate victims’ experiences and perpetrators motives, and could bring the amendment of historical injustice back to the grassroots nevertheless.

1.2.6. Hybrid courts

Before the transitional justice tool of the international tribunal is discussed in the section below, another manner of addressing past grievances are the recent implementations of mixed tribunal or hybrid courts. The inherent limitations of domestic courts and international criminal proceedings require the ICC to implement legislation allowing “states to carry out their domestic law in accordance with the Rome Statute” (McGonigle

11 Leyh, 2016, p. 131). Hybrid courts allow for the proceedings to take place in the region where the crimes occurred, facilitating the process for prosecutors who are familiar with the local context of the crimes, and the victims who have easier access to evidence bases. Besides an advantageous location, the hybrid court can acquire international funding for the costs of investigation, prosecution, defence and legal aid. Regardless of the numerous benefits to the hybrid court, making it an attractive alternative to exclusive international or domestic prosecutions, “the creation of such courts does not necessarily mean that the criminal process will work effectively, efficiently, without bias and leave a lasting impact upon the community most affected by the crimes covered by the court’s jurisdiction” (McGonigle Leyh, 2016, p. 133). Considering the model of hybrid courts in relation to the IMT at Nuremberg, it remains up for debate whether the mixed tribunal offers (more) Justice for Victims. Since post-war German recognition of the victims and persecution of the perpetrators bear traces of the failed domestic court after World War I, realistically a hybrid court would only prolong the transitional justice process, despite hypothetical easier access to evidence collections for victims and witnesses. The restorative and retributive transitional justice tools mentioned above were never implemented or insufficiently implemented during the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg and were only effectively developed decades after its conclusion. Therefore, during the analysis of Speer’s motives (chapter 2), of the victims’ experiences (chapter 3), and of the consequences for transitional justice tools (chapter 4), these instruments will regularly make their appearance to further the discussion initiated in the afore-mentioned elaborations of each tool. The following section deals with the Nuremberg Trials in the contexts of international law and transitional justice. The details about the historical and international law context of the Tribunal are necessary to set the stage for the case study of Albert Speer’s Nuremberg trial.

1.3. The Military Tribunal of Nuremberg

Many academics have qualified the decisions that resulted from the Military Tribunal of Nuremberg as a landmark which established the divide between classical and

12 contemporary international law. “The United Nations General Assembly first recognized the need for a permanent mechanism to prosecute mass murderers and war criminals in 1948, following the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials after World War II” (Danieli, 2006, p. 1646). The Tribunal influenced the development of international criminal law significantly. The Genocide Convention (1948); the Universal Declaration of Human rights (1948); the Nuremberg Principles (1950); the Geneva Convention on the Laws and Customs of War (1949) and its supplements (1977) all reflect elements that were essential to the Nuremberg trials. In the light of international law in the making, the Trials have also been fundamental for the foundation of what has now become a “permanent feature of modern international justice” (Overy, 2003, p. 2), or the ICC. The Nuremberg trials consisted of the ‘International Military Tribunal’ [IMT] and the ‘Nuremberg Military Tribunals [NMT]’. While the latter encompassed the Doctors’ and Judges’ trial, this paper deals with the former, the trial of the major war criminals. The Tribunal was founded through the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (1945), signed by the Allied powers. According to the Charter, the IMT had to be created “for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.” The IMT was held under supervision of the United States, , the United Kingdom, and the between 20 November 1945 and 1 October 1946, and it endeavoured trying 24 of the most important political and military leaders of (Harris, 2006). Central figures like , and Joseph Goebbels had committed suicide in April and May 1945 instead of accepting the Third Reich’s defeat. Alternatively, their official successors were put on trial as they were deemed representative of important aspects of the dictatorship (Overy, 2003, p. 12). Of the 24 men, 22 were present. While three were acquitted, twelve defendants were sentenced to death by hanging, and seven received prison sentences ranging from ten years to lifelong incarceration. The IMT was tasked to prosecute (the common plan or conspiracy of) “crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity” (IMT Charter, Article 1; Article 6). War crimes can be defined as serious violations of the rules and regulations of warfare. The rules and regulations, which the IMT was based on after World War II (since the Geneva Conventions were only ratified in 1949), encompass the international

13 humanitarian law in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The concepts of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity were retrospectively created by the Allied powers during the Nuremberg trials to prosecute Nazi top-officials, with hardly any historical foundation in international criminal law. Although it certainly was problematic to accuse the Germans of crimes the Allied forces had been guilty of themselves, charging Nazi king-pins with crimes that were not recognized as such at the time they were committed was justified with the argument that “[t]he Nazis committed crimes beyond imagination that needed to be placed in a category distinguishable from conventionally conceived war crimes” (Malcontent, 2016, p. 59). In From Nuremberg to The Hague, Overy argues that, the Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and Tokyo were a legal ‘first’. For the first time, enemy leaders of an acknowledged state were to be “[prosecuted] by the international community for conspiring to perpetrate, or causing to be perpetrated, a whole series of crimes against peace and humanity” (Overy, 2003, p. 2). The IMT’s precedence in relation to other fundamental international criminal law institutions comes down to its reasoning that “[c]rimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international law be enforced” (Heller, 2011, p. 3). This legal ‘first’ prevented the foregoing possibility to pass responsibility along to higher entities like the State. Therefore, immunity in one’s capacity as an officer of the state was no longer a reason for exemption from punishment (IMT vol. 1, 1947, p. 177). American veteran Secretary of War Henry Stimson in his statement argued against summary justice (through immediate execution) and instead in favour of a tribunal that “should reflect Western notions of justice: notification to the accused of the charge, the right to be heard, and to call witnesses in his defence” (Overy, 2003, p. 4) Even towards men like Hitler, it was considered important for the Allied war effort to grant democratic notions of justice. The presence of ex post facto law (after the crime was committed), arbitrariness and victors’ justice (justice was solely applied by the victors’ judges) during the Tribunal caused unfortunate legal drawbacks. However, as an overpowering forte besides these drawbacks, the establishment of the IMT provided the first actual formation of an

14 international institution prosecuting perpetrators of historical injustice. As Malcontent (2016) states in his Facing the Past: “The idea of establishing an international tribunal to prosecute individual perpetrators of historical injustices [like the International Criminal Court] was not new, and proposals had already been made in the 19th century and after the end of WWI” (p. 59). The main motivation behind the deferment of eventually establishing an International Court like the IMT was the existing impunity and fear of breaking down the functioning of the Westphalian system of national sovereign states. The Leipzig trials (1921-1927) after World War I put German soldiers before a national court, and failed to prosecute war crimes effectively due to obvious reasons of bias and shame. However, although national procedures also have numerous strengths (Derby, 2006, p. 279) the initial failure of the Leipzig trials shifted into valuable experience for the Allies to base the organisation of the Nuremberg Trials on. Besides the actual creation of an international tribunal, McGonigle Leyh (2016) claims the Nuremberg Trials were also exceptional in the fact that the proceedings took place close to the site of conflict (p. 117). Although this was certainly not true for the crimes committed by the Nazis across its borders in occupied states, this detail is particularly meaningful for the moral-philosophical perspective on the Trials: with regard to the victims of the conflict, problematically little was done to involve them in the proceedings. In an interview with Danieli (2006) on the role of victims in international law, Frederick Terna, a Holocaust survivor of various concentration camps, stated that “[the victims] were far removed from the action. The Nuremberg trials were seen as necessary. War crimes needed to be defined and punished, but the trials did not have an impact on [the] survivors. There was only a vague understanding about the extent of the destruction of [Jews] throughout Europe” (p. 1643). Similarly, Danieli (2006) also interviewed the recently passed Benjamin B. Ferencz, who was an American war crimes investigator. He was present at the liberation of concentration camps, and served as the chief prosecutor in the trial against Nazi extermination squads. Ferencz claimed: “The Nuremberg trials under the auspices of the allied armies were an entity unto itself. They played no significant role in the lives of the victims. The survivors were not even in the audience, which was mostly German” (p. 1642). Contrary to the actual situation at

15 Nuremberg, the act of public witnessing has many considerable benefits for Justice for Victims specifically and the understanding of the committed historical injustices in general. In relation to the aforementioned transitional justice tools, the IMT should have included tools that integrated victim involvement (through testimonies and representation) and should have focused far less on documentation left behind by the Nazis. This is also true for the case study of Albert Speer’s trial. Although he was among the 24 major war criminals and one of the few perpetrators (Frank, Rosenberg and Ohlendorf) who claimed responsibility for “planning and participating in the vast program of forcible deportation of the citizens of occupied countries” (IMT vol. 2, 1947, p. 486), the emphasis was put on the documentation, not so much on the victims’ testimony (Karstedt, 2010) or on Speer’s motivations. Only in the aftermath of the IMT, the victims and their needs and concerns were gradually addressed. Retributive transitional justice tools could have suggestively ameliorated the slow process of transitional justice and amending the historical injustices. More details about the addressing of the victims’ experiences during and after the Trials will be provided in chapter 3.

16 2. THE NUREMBERG TRIAL OF ALBERT SPEER

The BBC documentary series ‘Reputations’ that made Albert Speer widely known as the “Nazi who said sorry” sheds light on Speer’s life as an architect and a Minister of Armaments during the Third Reich, and the sentiments of his case during the Nuremberg Trials. Besides the great attention in popular World War II literature paid to Nazi top-official Adolf Eichmann in the run-up to his capture and court trial, the Nuremberg case of Albert Speer is considered to be unique due to the fact that he claimed full responsibility for the crimes he was accused of, with a significant effect on the lowering of his sentence. However, arguing against the common perception that was featured in the documentary, for the grievances committed by the government he had served, Speer did not accept moral responsibility as the only defendant. Hans Frank, Alfred Rosenberg and Otto Ohlendorf accepted guilt as well, but were inevitably sentenced to death by hanging.

2.1. “The Nazi Who Said Sorry”

To offer instant clarity on another matter: by no means does this chapter intend to provide the reader with a comprehensive analysis on whether Speer did or did not know about the Holocaust and the genocide of peoples the Nazi regime deemed inferior. This discussion is often brought to the surface when discussing Speer as the “good” Nazi and an extensive amount of literature has been devoted to this subject (Goldhagen, 1971; Schmidt, 1984; Van der Vat, 1997). However, “[i]n the debate on the place of victims in international criminal proceedings, the ‘search for truth’ takes centre stage as an important concern of victims, international criminal tribunals and the wider international community” (Stolk, 2016, p. 973). Therefore, this debate will shortly return in chapter 3, on the victims’ experiences in relation to the Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, among which the trial of Albert Speer. Instead, as expressed in the thesis objective, the focus on the moral perception of justice, which includes the perpetrators’ motives and the victims’ experiences, will prevail. Overall, this chapter will provide Speer’s motives and

17 motivations through three sections: firstly, through the well-known biography of Sereny (1995), who interviewed Speer for her Albert Speer: His Battle with Truth, this chapter will provide a short account of Speer’s life leading up to his Nuremberg trial. Secondly, his trial will be explained in more detail, based on the aforementioned biography and IMT documentation. And finally, looking further into the aftermath of the IMT’s prison sentence, his imprisonment and release from Spandau will be addressed.

2.1.1. Life Before Nazi Party Membership

On June 19, 1946, the IMT prosecutors requested Speer to speak about his life before he was appointed Minister of Armaments. Speer himself did not believe the court was much interested in his youth. This was certainly true for judicial matters. However, it can be unquestionably interesting and fruitful to evaluate a human being’s life in order to recognize some of their developments, motivations, and conflicts (Sereny, 1995, p. 39). In line with this paper’s research objective of attempting a bottom-up perspective on Speer’s case, these “developments, motivations and conflicts” will be of great significance in the following passages. Albert Speer was born on 19 March 1905 in Mannheim. Before his parents’ marriage, his mother was part of the social elite in Mainz, where his parents for the first time. His father became an apprentice to a firm of architects, in the footsteps of his own father, building a comfortable life-style for his wife and children in Mannheim. After the Great War, the family of five moved to a house above the Heidelberg castle (Sereny, 1995, p. 43). In his teenage years, Speer met Margarete Weber, who would later become his wife. His parents, especially his mother, did not approve of a marriage with a girl of lower standing. The secret letters the couple sent each other, while Germany continued to suffer the losses of the war, show that this did not affect the wealthy Speers, nor were the Webers shaken by the instabilities World War I brought to many Germans in the 1920s and 1930s (Sereny, 1995, p. 57). By 1921, Adolf Hitler became the head of the Nazi party. Even though Hitler’s speeches reached wide audiences in Munich and elsewhere, in his letters, Speer appears not to have been involved with the political issues that did not disturb him directly. Admittedly, he resided in a rather comfortable position to be

18 unaffected by the topics of German frustration with economic and social despair expressed in Hitler’s speeches. His father did not allow him to study his beloved mathematics. Instead, he shadowed his grandfather and father’s carriers by becoming an architect. He attended the universities of Munich and Berlin and by 1929 he earned a moderate income as a first assistant at the technical university of Berlin (IMT, 1946, p. 430). The preceding year he got married to Margarete. Although the couple was not rich, they were able to share their small fortune with students close to them and their situation contrasted heavily with the common image of financial insecurity and unemployment. In one of his Spandau prison letters to his daughter Hilde, Speer wrote: “When I encountered National Socialism in 1931 for the first time, the party, probably in order not to discourage new applicants, was fairly reticent with regard to anti-Semitic propaganda, even though it was certainly part of their platform” (Sereny, 1995, p. 79). What was undoubtedly convincing for Speer was Hitler’s speech for students, which Speer’s fellow-students persuaded him to attend. Contrary to his expectations of a raging man in uniform, Hitler spoke of love and the admiration for their country and their work. Speer got the impression Hitler cared, not only about Germany, but also about young people. Subsequently, Hitler’s consciously adapted speech had the desired effect on the young listeners, and Speer joined the party the next day.

2.1.2. Architectural Employment in the Nazi Party

Given the fact that the IMT at Nuremberg claimed offenses against the defendants individually and as members of any of the groups or organisations, Speer came one step closer to committing offenses by joining Hitler’s National-Socialist party. In the IMT’s charter the party was considered “criminal by reason of [its] aims and the means used for the accomplishment thereof and in the connection with the conviction of such” (IMT vol. 1, 1947, p. 28). Particularly the institution of the Nazi party was seen as the central core of the common plan or conspiracy, which is named as count one of the four possible crimes that the IMT aimed at prosecuting.

19 After the Trials and the conclusion of Speer’s sentence, many of the remaining individuals from Hitler’s inner circle spoke of Speer’s disloyalty displayed at the Nuremberg Tribunal and in his writings and interviews since his imprisonment in Spandau (Sereny, 1995, p. 5). This account can be viewed as contradictory to Speer’s faithfulness in the early years of his Nazi party membership. In Speer’s defence at Nuremberg he notes: “[i]n 1933 Hitler noticed me for the first time. It was then I got to know him and from that moment on I was able to practice my profession as an architect with undiluted fervour, for Hitler was fanatically involved in his patronage of architecture and confided immense commissions for me” (Sereny, 1995, p. 104). Speer notably benefited from Hitler’s passion for the arts. In the BBC documentary series ‘Reputations’, biographer Fest remarks, “Speer was a young, jobless architect, and Hitler gave him commissions that no other architect in history had been given” (Davidson, 1996, 6:59). Speer’s admiration for Hitler was unreserved, but this feeling was not unreciprocated by Hitler himself either. In these early years (1931-1933), many people, including Jews, did not take Goebbels and Hitler’s anti-Semitic polemics about the eventual fate of the Jewish communities of Europe seriously yet. Although persecution of the Jews and other groups of people the Nazi party deemed inferior developed gradually (for instance, through the call for a national boycott of Jewish businesses in 1933, the first anti-Semitic of 1935 and the Euthanasia Program aimed at people with mental and/or physical disabilities in 1939), Speer saw opportunities for his career as an independent architect in active involvement with the Nazi party. Sereny notes that, “because the deepening depression caused a cut in university assistants’ salaries, establishing himself professionally became his primary concern” (Sereny, 1995, p. 91). With the help of his father, Speer continued little architectural work in Mannheim. After Karl Hanke, the party district leader of Berlin, noticed his work in July 1932, Speer was commissioned to build the district’s new headquarters. Later, when the Nazis were voted into power in 1933, Goebbels appointed Speer to redecorate the rooms of his new office as Propaganda Minister. But only after Speer designed the décor for the 1 May celebratory rally at Tempelhof Field did Hitler notice Speer’s talents, as he commissioned him to build the

20 new Reich Chancellor’s apartment in Berlin. Hitler increasingly began to view the young architect as “someone whom [he] would be able to entrust [his] building plans to one day, [someone] capable of carrying on after [his] death” (Sereny, 1995, p. 105). Just as the Nazi party moved to the Wilhelmstrasse (the Chancellery) and increasingly gained popularity through effectively dealing with unemployment, housing and the national self-image following the Versailles Treaty, Speer moved to Obersalzberg with his family to be in the vicinity of Hitler. Speer became part of Hitler’s intimate circle and they initially discussed smaller architectural projects, but this swiftly switched to an official appointment for huge architectural creations across the country in 1934. Meanwhile, the Röhm Putsch (Hitler’s assassination of political enemies as a “preventive measure”) and the death of Hitler’s first architect, Professor Troost, allowed Speer’s relation to Hitler to grow stronger and eventually saw him to become the ‘First Architect of the Reich’ (although this title did not exist as an actual political position, but was offered by Hitler). After a couple of mammoth commissions for Hitler, like the Cathedral of Light (1934), the construction of a huge complex for the annual Nuremberg party rally (1935), and the projected renewal of Berlin (1937), “he was made department head in the German Labour Front and the official in charge of capital construction on the staff of the deputy to the Führer, positions which he held until 1941” (IMT vol. 1, 1947, p. 330). During these first big years, Speer rarely saw his family and barely had any rest finishing commissioned projects in record time. Holding the rank of a State Secretary and as the Inspector General for the construction of Berlin in 1937, Speer became entitled to a seat in the Reichstag (Sereny, 1995, p. 144). Gradually, Hitler brought Speer into the sphere of political involvement he abstained from before. Contrary to his former abstention, the colleagues and friends interviewed by Sereny (1995) noted Speer’s rational and organisational qualities, and his tendency towards pragmatism to be particularly fitting for his later governmental positions. By 1938, the gradual anti-Semitic realisation of German society found its chaotic kick-start in the ‘’, or ‘Night of Broken Glass’, which was the Goebbels organized on 9 November. Sereny (1995) observed, “Speer seemed exceptionally unaware of what was going on, perhaps because he was unreceptive to the

21 propaganda (…) he had noticed the more obvious results but did not seek to know the reasons ” (p. 164). Besides, Speer’s constant occupation with Hitler’s megalomaniac architectural projects and particular insensitivity for politics made him reflect on the matter no further. A considerable portion of the post-war outrage directed at Speer stems from the arguable fact that “[f]ew men could have been closer to Hitler than Speer” (Sereny, 1995, p. 168). In his position he could and should have done more to prevent Jewish suffering. In the final speech in Speer’s defence by Flächsner, he stated, “by virtue of his position as an architect, [Speer] exercised purely architectural and artistic functions even in the party setup” (IMT vol. 19, 1946, p. 178), but this did not remain a valid argument in case of his later position as head of the armaments industry.

2.1.3. Minister of Armaments

Following the annexations of Austria (March 1938), Sudetenland (October 1938), and Czech-Slovakia (March 1938), while always repeating a determination for peace towards the Allied forces, the Second World War was initiated by Hitler’s invasion of and the Allied declarations of war on Germany. In his ‘Spandau draft’ (1953) (consisting of the smuggled letters sent to his children from inside the Spandau prison), Speer recalls the political significance of the (Austria’s annexation by Nazi Germany), but in his published book Inside the Third Reich (1969) he distances himself from these events (Sereny, 1995, pp. 189-190). The importance of this distance to political matters can be recovered in Hitler’s General Order No. 1 from January 1940, in which “no member of a government or military agency was to be informed or seek to know more about secret matters than was required for the enactment of his or her duties” (Sereny, 1995, p. 184). A similar reason for Speer’s distance can be found in the two major events of the led by in January 1942 and Heinrich Himmler’s secret Posen Speeches at the Gauleiter (= party leader of a Nazi district) conference in October 1943. At the Wannsee Conference in January 1942, Heydrich’s ‘ to the Jewish Question’ inaugurated the systematic of all Jews. In Berlin, the organisational and bureaucratic details of the final solution filled the Wannsee conference hall, but they failed to reach Speer, as he did not have to be present. Yet,

22 some motives can be drawn from his conflicting position on the solution to the ‘Jewish Question’. Speer relied heavily on the compulsory service of imported slave labourers. Therefore, although the later Armament’s Minister was not directly involved in the decision to start the Endlösing, Speer’s constant emphasis on the necessity of (skilled) labourers for construction and production in letters and minutes exchanged between him and other members of the Nazi leadership (‘Case Files Milch I’, n.d.; ‘Case Files Milch II’, n.d.) demonstrates his interest in this matter and his awareness of financial consequences of the Jewish extermination. This confirms Speer’s unethical, but efficient reasoning. As Speer was confirmed to be present during the Posen speeches this raises the controversial question of his awareness and knowledge of the Holocaust. During this assembly of Reichsleiter and Gauleiter in Posen, Himmler emphasized the policy of extermination of the Jews of Europe, and was ordered by Hitler to “make sure that his supporters were all implicated in the catastrophe he was bringing on Germany” (Sereny, 1995, p. 388), so that no one would dare to break ranks. Although numerous friends and colleagues confirmed Speer’s absence during Himmler’s speech, Himmler’s direct address to Speer proves a controversial feature. Himmler explicitly state that “[i]t is precisely this kind of so-called war production enterprise [the fur and textile production in the , initially guarding thousands of Jews from deportation] which party comrade Speer and I will clean out together over the next weeks” (Smith, 1974). Also, the fact that many of his closer associates who had been present could have told him can be used as an argument against his unawareness of the Holocaust. Once the Wannsee conference had taken place and by the time Speer attended the Reichs- and Gauleiter conference in Posen, Hitler had promoted him from being the Inspector General of the reconstruction of Berlin and the First Architect in many other immense projects, to become the Minister of Armaments. When Speer’s predecessor Fritz Todt had died in a in a plane crash, Speer reluctantly followed Hitler’s command in taking ministerial office and all of Todt’s former posts. With the promise to have his position as an Armaments Minister dissolved once the war had ended, Speer assumed to continue his profession as an architect during peacetime. In the IMT, Speer explains his initial responsibilities as follows: “[N]ot building but the intensification of armaments was

23 to be my main task, for the heavy losses of material in the battles in Russia during the winter of 1941-1942 [were] a great blow” (IMT vol. 16, p. 432). Initially, Speer was highly successful in fulfilling his duties as a minister, and dramatically increased German war production. Speer’s early successes and his relation to Hitler caused for many top- ranking officials, like Generals Milch, Schmundt, and Speer’s Ministry secretary Kehrl, to regard him as a possible successor to Hitler (Sereny, 1995, pp. 376-77). In 1942, extracts from the records of the ‘Fuehrer Conferences’ concerning deportation and and Speer and Hitler’s analytical minutes make it clear that Speer was mainly aiming at using forced labour in the production of steel and coal during war effort. However, this included the forced deportation of European peoples to German factories. Speer categorically demanded new manpower from Sauckel (General Plenipotentiary of Labour Deployment), who supplied him with German workers, foreigners from occupied countries, foreigners from annexed states and prisoners of war. Although there was a minimal section of voluntary manpower, most foreign workers were forcibly deported to German factories against their will. Speer pointed out to Hitler that, “apart from the insignificant amount of work, no possibility exists of organizing armament production in the concentration camps because machine tools required are missing, and there are no suitable premises” (‘Case Files Milch II’, n.d., p. 2). Nevertheless, the analysis of the records of meetings of the Central Planning Board and Fuehrer conferences, and other records from Speer’s ministry from 1942 and 1945, show that the SS “picked up between 30 to 40.000 forced labour prisoners per month. Besides forced deportation, considering the fact that prisoners were watched extensively, tribunal analysts concluded that their treatment must have been unbearable. It was even suggested by Speer that some “educational work” should be done on them, and that “they should be put into the factories as convicts” (‘IMT/NMT Staff Evidence Analysis’, n.d., p. 5). In the observance of labour conditions, Speer claims, “[i]n all [his] activities as Armaments Minister, [he] never once visited a labour camp and cannot, therefore, give any information about them” (IMT vol. 16, p. 537). However, as came out later, Speer’s personal responsibility for proper labour conditions should have been triggered upon visiting ‘Dora’ in December 1943, the underground installations for V2 ballistic rockets

24 not far from Buchenwald. The secret project used forcibly imported workers who had to work eighteen hours a day, often without tools and with their bare hands, while they slept in the freezing tunnels underground (Sereny, 1995, p. 404). Although Speer’s visits to Dora and the Mauthausen labour-cum-concentration camp left a lasting impression on him, he could but did not address nor use his power to stop the maltreatment of the slave labourers in Germany. The tribunal’s judgment of Speer in the official documents of the IMT states that “Speer was also directly involved in the utilisation of forced labour, as Chief of the Organisation Todt. The Organisation Todt functioned principally in the occupied areas on such projects as the Atlantic Wall and the construction of military highways” (IMT vol. 1, 1947, p. 332). Later, upon showing evidence of letters and orders by Speer, he admitted that “he relied on compulsory service to keep [the construction and production projects] adequately staffed” (Ibid, p. 332). Adam Tooze’s (2006) The Wages of Destruction: The Making and Breaking of the Nazi Economy describes the German war economy under Speer as an effort to triumph and persist in a war for which they knew they never possessed sufficient resources. After Hitler appointed Speer to the War Production, additionally to the Armaments Ministry, the turning point for the initial successes of the economy came with the Allied attack on the German resource hub of the area in 1943 (Tooze, 2006, pp. 357-58). From that point on, similarly to the circumstances of the war economy the amicable relationship between Speer and Hitler started to shift in a negative spiral. Instead of calling Speer, Hitler phoned Speer’s deputy Saur for the latest production figures, and Speer sent Hitler letters emphasizing a wish to withdraw to purely artistic architectural tasks. This withdrawal was mainly due to competitive tensions in the Ministry with his colleagues Borman and Dorsch during a half-year long illness that affected Speer. By the end of 1944, Speer’s position was not only endangered by others but “there were indications Hitler no longer trusted [him]” (Sereny, 1995, p. 185). Although he continued his efforts to produce arms for the war, Speer knew that the end of the war was approaching. Finally, Hitler’s orders to strip vital industries, such as food production and

25 rail transport, from manpower in an attempt to produce armaments, and to use scarce medical gasses for the war, were ignored by Speer. On 19 March 1945, Speer handed Hitler one of his last memoranda, explaining that the war was lost and “the only important thing now was to preserve Germany’s infrastructure for the sake of the people” (Sereny, 1995, p. 83). Hitler’s response was the ‘’ Decree, or the Nero Decree ordering the destruction of infrastructure and industry in German hands as well as anything else of value for the continuation of war to prevent their use by the Allied forces. Speer deliberately disobeyed this order and later, in the Nuremberg Tribunal as well as in many interviews following suit, claimed that he did so in order to save what could be saved of Germany. In Speer’s final plea, his defence lawyer Flächsner brought forward the point that “Speer informed the Gauleiter and the commanders of various army groups that the war was lost and thus helped prevent, in part at least Hitler’s policy of destruction” (IMT vol. 19, 1947, p. 211). From this point onwards, Speer sabotaged Hitler with many following his lead. The moment Hitler gave these devastating orders, Speer claims to have lost all admiration for Hitler and no longer “reconciled his passionate love for [Germany] with the obedience to a leader who seemed to hate his people” (Sereny, 1995, p. 472). He realized Hitler would never compromise and would take everyone down with him. This resulted in Speer’s dream to assassinate Hitler, as was mentioned in his during the Nuremberg trials. Yet, many critics declare that Speer fabricated this vision in order for him to get a lower sentence. One month later, on 30 April 1945, Hitler committed suicide together with his wife, Goebbels and Goebbels’ family, and his successor Karl Dönitz ordered the German surrender in Reims on 7 May 1945, formally ending World War II in Europe.

2.2. The Trial of Albert Speer

“[W]hile Soviet lawyers, British socialists and Jackson’s team of New Dealer lawyers saw nothing unjust about including industrial magnates at Nuremberg, they were opposed by those who saw business activity as independent of politics and war-making” (Overy, 2003, p. 10). In Philippe Sands’ (2003) From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International

26 Criminal Justice, Richard Overy comments on the ambiguous manner in which the selection of defendants was determined by the Allied forces. Particular Italian and Hungarian key figures were left out for strategic reasons, foreseeing the future collaboration with the Allies. Speer was, as one British official suggested, “essentially an administrator not a war criminal” (Overy, 2003, p. 11). Albert Speer’s trial in the IMT is described over the course of a number of particular volumes of the Nuremberg Trial proceedings published by William S. Hein & Co., Inc. Important to this paper are volume 1, with the introduction of Speer’s case and a brief summary of the main details of his trial; volume 16, covering the cross-examination done by the Nuremberg prosecutors and his defence council on Speer; volume 19, containing details on Speer’s positions from his defence council; and volume 22, on the conclusion of Speer’s trial. During the Nuremberg trials, Sereny (1995) describes Speer as, “contrary to many of the other defendants, who pretended to be bored or asleep, read or fidgeted endlessly with their hands or in their seats, (…) [sitting] very still, listening intently” (p. 5). Henry T. King, Jr., member of the U.S. assistant council for the prosecution at Nuremberg, experienced Speer’s trial first-hand in a similar manner and described Speer as a man living in two worlds: one world where Speer could live blindly and non-politically with ambition and dreams for power, the other where Speer became more in touch with the world around him, including Germany and his family (King, 1997). Although a significant amount of question marks could be placed behind the sincerity of Speer’s sudden shift from emphasizing the former to the latter “world”, this divide between remaining ignorant to the court’s claims about war crimes, crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity found its way back in the heated discussion between Speer, Göring and their respective supporters. Throughout the entirety of the trial, Speer and Göring fought a “bitter leadership battle” (Sereny, 1995, p. 4). Whereas Göring wanted all others to reject the validity of the court, and claimed they could not be tried for obeying their own laws during the Third Reich, Speer asked all to join him in a “recognition of universal law under which they had to accept responsibility for the crimes in the eyes of all the civilized world for which they, and not the German people, should and could be called into account for” (Sereny,

27 1995, p. 4). In his opening statement, Mr Justice Robert Jackson (chief of the American prosecution council) brought attention to the court’s differentiating nature with regard to German civilians and the German accused perpetrators (IMT vol. 2, 1947, pp. 102). During his cross-examination at the IMT, Speer emphasized the matter in a similar manner: “under no circumstances should any international crimes be committed which could be held against the German people after they had lost the war [referring to the bombings they had planned]” (IMT vol. 22, 1947, p. 528). This difference was essential to the image portrayed to the global audience of the Trials. After the Allied forces liberated the concentration camps, initially, the German population was not spared with the benefit of the doubt. Specifically, the encountered misery by the soldiers at Auschwitz, and the indifference of German citizens to the horrors in their midst, facilitated the practice of generalizing all German bystanders with the perpetrators. Besides Speer’s emphasis on the diverging responsibilities of German citizens and German Nazi officials during the war, he attempts to focus on the technicalities of his tasks and Ministry. At first, Speer had responsibility for the Army’s armaments industry only, but in 1943 Dönitz gave him Navy responsibilities and Funk (the Minister of Economy) brought him the production task the Ministry of Economy, and in 1944 Göring added the Air Force production to the whole. When the court questioned him on the joined responsibility for “recruiting foreign workers and prisoners of war, and for taking manpower from concentration camps” (IMT vol. 16, 1947, p. 438), Speer defers his charges towards the Reich Labour Ministry, the Health Office of the Reich Ministry and the German Labour Front. In his defence, Speer evaluated his responsibilities in the area of employing foreign workers in relation to the fact that, upon his appointment as Minister of Armaments and War Production, he indicated that the German worker reserves remained ample and that he was interested in using German female workers. However, this went against most Nazi officials’ principles, and therefore Speer concluded he could not “be held solely responsible for covering the essential needs, that is, for demanding foreign labour” (IMT vol. 16, 1947, p. 456). Another aspect that the court considered decisive for Speer’s sentence is his establishment of blocked industries, which kept many labourers in their homes (IMT vol. 1, 1947, p. 333)

28 On the contrary, Speer claimed no responsibility for the method by which workers were recruited; he simply saw it as none of his concern whether the laws by which these workers were obliged to work for Germany were justified. The outright lies that Speer presented to the court when he was questioned about the working conditions of the inmates from concentration camps; that they “looked well fed” (IMT vol.2, 1947, p. 442), and the camps made a “model impression of cleanliness” (IMT vol. 2, 1947, p. 443), were not addressed in Nuremberg. His defence council, led by Flächsner, benefitted from the incompleteness of the Tribunal’s evidence at hand and the court’s unknowingness of the exact conditions for slave labourers at the concentration camps of Dora and Mauthausen when Speer visited them. The fact that specific statements by Speer were not checked on their accuracy most probably increased his chances in getting a lower sentence. The above brings forward a few of Speer’s underrepresented motivations. For instance, much later in an interview with Gitta Sereny, Speer admitted his “objection to maltreatment [of prisoners] was because it could not increase efficiency; it was not a [personal] moral issue” (Sereny, 1995, p. 590). Neither his defence lawyer Flächsner, nor the court officials questioned Speer for the motivations behind his actions. Although motivations do not necessarily play an important role in reaching justice for society, as the evidence provided through documentation is reasonably sufficient to establish overall justice, they do contribute to a perceived higher Justice for Victims. The victims in Speer’s case included the workers supplied by Sauckel: German workers, foreigners from occupied countries, foreigners from annexed states and prisoners of war. Representation for the overwhelming Jewish victim-majority came from the Jewish lobby, consisting of the New York based Institute of Jewish affairs [IJA]. But, while the IJA strived to bring the “destruction of European Jewry to the attention of those who scrambled (…) to organize an international proceeding” (Marrus, 2006, p. 1652), the efforts remained in the realm of retributive justice, and continued the privileging of documentary evidence over Jewish testimony. Eventually, although indicted under all four Counts (participating in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of crime against peace; crimes against peace;

29 war crimes; and crimes against humanity) the Tribunal found that Speer is “not guilty on Counts One and Two, but is guilty under Counts Three and Four” (IMT vol. 1, 1947, p. 333). This was mainly due to the fact that when Speer attained his position as the Minister of Armaments, the planning and initiation of all the wars of aggression and those in violation of international treaties were already taking place, and Speer’s activities in charge of the German armament production “were in aid of the war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the waging of war” (IMT vol. 22, 1946, p. 577). As his inferior, Sauckel was less fortunate with the court’s sentencing. His defence council, led by Servatius, inferred that both legally and morally Speer bore greater responsibility than Sauckel, who acted on orders from his superior. Given the great scale of Speer’s tasks, and the fact that the forced labour program was only a minor segment, the court decided Sauckel was responsible for this task alone. The claim that Speer was unaware of the Nazi extermination plans imposed on the Jewish communities of Europe and other groups deemed inferior by the Nazis, most likely saved him from death by hanging. On the two counts of indictments, the Tribunal sentenced Speer to twenty years’ imprisonment.

2.3. The Aftermath

Global attitudes towards the Nuremberg Military Tribunal and Albert Speer’s trial have been inconceivably diverse, and even in Germany the reactions were considerably diverging. The impact that the Nuremberg trial had on Germany changed over time (Merritt & Merritt, 1980, p. 101). Christoph Burchard’s (2006) The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany highlights the differences between West and East during the Cold war and the reunified German approaches to Nuremberg. While continued the prosecution of minor Nazi perpetrators, the West condemned the Tribunal for its practice of victor’s justice and the creation of ex post facto law. Germany’s reunification in 1990 marked an increasingly positive outlook on international criminal justice as exemplified at the IMT. Although the attitudes towards the IMT differed across the globe and the German regions, the stance towards Speer’s sentence could be divided the

30 opinionated into two camps. First, there were those with the opinion that Speer was a simple administrator, or even just an architect with dreams that got fulfilled by Nazi commissioners, unaware of the horrors that the Allied forces encountered in the concentration camps. Then, by others, Speer was believed to have had knowledge about the slave labourers in concentration camps, failed to use his position to ameliorate the circumstances, and was thus condemned to a higher sentence (either life imprisonment or death by hanging).

2.3.1. Imprisonment at Spandau

During Speer’s imprisonment at Spandau, the debate surrounding his Nuremberg trial continued until far after his release. Unlike other convicted perpetrators at Nuremberg, like Dönitz, Speer did not protest against his long sentence. Instead, he believed his unfulfilled position to find out about the horrors at the required him to come to terms with the reasons behind his unawareness. In accordance with the Allied Control Commission’s Spandau penitentiary regulations, the inmates were ought to be isolated other than one hour each day, to work in the prison, and to be addressed by number. Speer and the others received spiritual guidance in the form of the Calvinist chaplain Casalis, and supported his isolation with walks around the prison yard and gardening. Eventually, the regulations relaxed over time, and Speer could focus his time in solitary confinement on writing. He secretly wrote letters for his children which contained author’s notes and “reminders to himself for later editing” (Sereny, 1995, p. 45). These letters constituted the foundation of the later published Spandau: The Secret Diaries (1975), while the “Spandau draft”, as it is often referred to in Sereny’s biography, led to the publication of his memoir in Inside the Third Reich (1970). Besides conveying his conditions inside the prison and elaborations on his life before imprisonment to his children, Speer’s letters attempt to deliver a message of distance from anti-Semitism. Yet, much of the language in the books portrays Speer as a “conventionally civilized anti- Semite” (Kitchen, 2015, p. 367) who confessed having had a “slight discomfort all of us sometimes feel when contact of [Jews]” (Speer, 1970, p. 20).

31 On many occasions in his interviews with Sereny, Speer was questioned about leaving out important aspects in relation to Hitler and the war effort of his own memoirs in Inside the Third Reich (1969). For example, when Hitler commissioned him to design a 290-meter dome, Speer’s design contained a perched eagle with a Swastika in its claws – however, Hitler insisted on an alteration with the eagle clasping a globe instead. Sereny questioned Speer about his awareness of Hitler’s search for world domination, and while Speer admitted that he wanted the man whom he depended on to dominate the globe, he did not process this manner of thinking in the Nuremberg trials nor in his own books. This particular criticism of leaving out essential motives is elaborated in Twiss’ (2010) Can a Perpetrator Write a Testimonio? Twiss (2010) assesses Speer’s 600-page memoir describing his role in Hitler’s intimate circle during the Nazi regime, and addresses internal moral elements like ambition, self-deception, origins of guilt, and the acknowledgement of responsibility return in Speer’s testimonio. But while Twiss criticizes Speer’s lack of using language of repentance, he acknowledges Speer’s choice “to accept personal responsibility [to a certain degree]” (Twiss, 2010, p. 38).

2.3.2. Release

Many of Speer’s old friends and colleagues, together with his family, managed to attempt arranging an early release from Spandau. In early 1952, Annemarie Kempf (Speer’s former secretary and life-long friend) began to lobby people in Bonn and elsewhere towards achieving this early release. Speer was obviously touched, but had no great hopes. However, hopeful tendencies can be found in a letter to Kempf, in which he suggests that Leni Riefenstahl would gladly aid him. In Nazi occupied Germany, Riefenstahl helped- and was helped by Speer in amicable and professional terms. Therefore, as expected, she offered herself as an available witness for Speer in case of a possible early release (Sereny, 1995, p. 136). Unfortunately, their further efforts towards higher institutions had been in vain, and Speer served his full sentence until his release on October 1, 1966. Besides doing her part in helping Speer with his early release, Kempf also provided Sereny with interesting insights about his motivations. In the last months of the war, Kempf argued that “Speer had become aware both of responsibility (…) but on

32 separate levels (…) one that he could quite honourably acknowledge, but then another (…) he suppressed and resisted” (Sereny, 1995, p. 527). This manner of coping with the blame is also reflected in post-war Germany. As Kitchen (2015) states in Speer: Hitler’s Architect, “Speer played a dual role in post-war Germany” (p. 366). On the one hand he was by far among the greatest critics of Hitler’s regime and confessed his own guilt during the trial, whereas on the other hand he was vaguely unaware and unwilling to figure out what happened in the concentration camps while he had the particular power of being in Hitler’s vicinity. In this manner, many Nazis with less power than Speer could claim they were as unaware of the facts as the most influential man beside Hitler. After his release, his first major interview was published in Der Spiegel. Speer emphasized he preferred a return to the world of architecture, but the social outcast image that his past brought along held back partner offers. In that moment he realistically decided to publish books and to be interviewed to provide for his family. Following his release, Speer conducted many interviews and Sereny’s biography is one among the many renowned ones. Besides the interviews she conducted with Speer’s friends, family, colleagues, and those who knew him from Hitler’s inner circle, Sereny is able to provide the reader with many of Speer’s motives and underlying thoughts. In case of Speer’s knowledge of the Holocaust, the questions she pursues lead to one main conclusion: even if Speer was fully aware what was happening to the Jews in Europe, he “would somehow have gone on trying to help that man [Hitler] to win his war” (Sereny, 1995, p. 368). It is in Speer’s loyalty to Hitler, the opportunities for his architectural projects and the insensitivity towards the (Jewish) victims that Speer’s motivations are found for his decisions during his positions as a major architect and Minister of Armaments in Nazi Germany. After many years of interviews and enquiries by historians and media, Albert Speer died from a stroke in London on September 1, 1981 at the age of 76.

33 3. VICTIMS AND SPEER’S CASE

This paper argues that an examination of the micro-level engagement in transitional justice will result in a more morally effective amendment of historical injustices. Therefore, the engagement of the victims and their experiences as embodied by (un-) official victim representatives can unfold a return to the grass roots and a perception of justice from a non-institutional victim’s perspective. The research objective in this paper urges a return to the objectives of the Rome Statute of the ICC. It should incorporate a more moral perception of justice, which includes the perpetrators’ motives and the victims’ experiences. Along these of lines, necessarily, after discussing Albert Speer’s motives in his decision-making as a Minister of Armaments and War Production, the experiences of the victims and the roles they play in transitional justice should be brought forward to fulfil this moral perception. The role of during Speer’s trial was, like most of the other of the Trials at the IMT, extremely minimal. Even though the IMT represented the interests of the four prosecuting powers and the twenty-one representative co-signing governments, as conveyed in Justice Robert Jackson’s opening statement, the Tribunal was created to deliver verdicts principally on the foundations of Nazi documentation rather than eyewitness testimony from the Holocaust victims, so the Tribunal could not be accused of relying on biased evidence. This aspect came as a surprise to many victims, given that “one of the main perceived purposes of the trial was to provide a sense of justice and vindication for the millions of victims of Nazi policies” (Garkawe, 2006, p. 86). Citing his opening statement: “we need not take the word of any witness but the Germans themselves” (IMT vol. 2, 1947, p. 123), he referred to the documentation left behind by the Nazis. Jackson names the responsibility of the Tribunal to be “[the application of] the sanctions of the law to those whose conduct is found criminal by the [outlined] standards” (IMT vol.2, 1947, p. 152). Further elaboration demonstrates that the Tribunal was mainly aimed at dealing with Nazi-top defendants. While the majority of the victims’ experiences were likely linked to lower-ranking perpetrators, the Allied prosecutors presumed the unlikeliness for

34 a witness to be able to provide specific information on- or proof for the high-ranking defendants’ criminal policies. However, Bloxham (2006) rightly points out that “while the subsequent Trials went into much greater detail than the IMT proceedings on specific aspects of Nazi criminality, they were simultaneously much less significant in the process of popular memory-formation in the 1940s and 1950s” (Bloxham, 2006, p. 73). Defending victim-centred criticism, Jackson recognizes on behalf of the IMT, that “with witnesses' testimony, [they could] prolong the recitals of crime for years” (IMT vol.2, 1947, ibid). Therefore, in the dichotomy of efficiency and justice, the Tribunal opted for a predominantly efficient court with just elements, while excluding justice for the victims at large. Paradoxically, the biased evidence that was denied entrance to the Tribunal came in through the single reliance on documentation. As exemplified by the Nuremberg Trials, the focus on the individual perpetrator in international criminal law has been put forward as a hindrance to clarifying the complexities of situations of conflict and the severity of mass crimes (Karstedt, 2010; Stolk, 2015). This chapter will uncover the role of victims in transitional justice with a view into which victims are particularly addressed in the paper, and why victims’ testimony is important. Additionally, the chapter will encourage victim representation through various Jewish and non-Jewish representative survivors and family-members of Holocaust victims.

3.1. The Role of Victims in Transitional Justice

The particular role that victims play in international criminal proceedings is a questioned matter within the current setting of transitional justice and international criminal tribunals. In recent years, while their testimonial role is seen as providing evidence for historical injustice, “they also play an important role as an audience and provide the very raison d’être for international criminal trials” (Stolk, 2015, p. 974). The ICC outlines that its provisions ensure that victims are given a voice, while balancing retributive and restorative justice, to enable the Court to bring criminals to justice but also to help the victims themselves obtain justice (International Criminal Court website). The undeniable progress with regard to victim-sensitivity over the past decades leads to the conclusion

35 that the ICC grants the victims of international crimes rights on an unprecedented level. For instance, besides numerous other needs of victims after mass atrocity, various lobby groups continue to press for measures (Marrus, 2006; Burchard, 2006) that promote inclusion of victims in international criminal proceedings. In order to establish further clarity on the role of victims upon their inclusion in transitional justice in general and the role of victims in Speer’s Nuremberg case trial specifically, a transparent description must be given of which victims are and which victims are not included in the case of this paper.

3.1.1. Which Victims?

In the UN declarations upon which the ICC bases itself, victims are described as “persons who individually or collectively suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss or substantial impairment of their fundamental rights, through acts or omissions that are in violation of criminal laws operative within Member States, including those laws proscribing criminal abuse of power” or “through acts or omissions that constitute gross violations of international human rights law, or serious violations of international humanitarian law” (UN General Assembly, 1985; Ibid, 2005). The state-enforced persecution of victims in Nazi Germany, and those victims in the aftermath of World War II, encompass a wide variety of groups and communities. Since the introduction of the anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws in 1933 until Hitler’s defeat in 1945, the state administered violent measures towards the majority of the victims: the Jewish people of Europe, and later occupied North Africa. Non-Jewish victims were also prosecuted before the first German tanks passed to foreign soil. Political dissidents were sent to concentration- and labour camps and mentally and/or physically disabled people were targeted in the 1939 Euthanasia Program. The Nazi ideological concept of race also targeted Jehovah’s Witnesses, Roma and Sinti, Resistance fighters, Catholic religious leaders, LGBTQ individuals, “Asocials” and Afro-Germans for persecution, imprisonment, annihilation and sterilization. In contrast with the UN Declaration definitions, “victims” also includes those who were in a close relationship with the victims above. The above are all included in the definition of the victims of the Nazis.

36 Burchard’s (2006) aforementioned work of The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany argues that “a distinction should be made between true victims of international crimes and those who wish to revise history by portraying themselves as such” (p. 824) as many West Germans did after World War II. The persistence of various lobby groups for inclusion of victims in international criminal proceedings has double implications. On the one hand, it is justifiable to address the further victimization of the targets of international atrocities by excluding them from trial and failing to mention them in judgments. On the other hand, Burchard (2006) rightly states that “such considerations must not allow others who style themselves as victims to rewrite history” (p. 825). Although Nazi repression of German people was not fully considered in the IMT verdict, the sentiment towards the punishment of Nazi leadership was positive not for the oppression of minorities but because they had failed the majority (Friedrich, 1999, p. 89). Therefore, through (subconscious) self-victimization and critique on the IMT’s legal flaws, the German personal guilt and responsibility diminished and was rejected. The direct victims in Speer’s case consist of the workers supplied by Sauckel (General Plenipotentiary of Labour Deployment). German workers, foreigners from occupied countries and prisoners of war individually or collectively suffered harm, and ex post facto underwent substantial impairment of fundemental universal human rights. The large group of indirect victims due to the prolongation of the Second World War as a result of Speer’s efforts in the Armaments industry will be left outside of consideration. The Tribunal included this aspect in the verdict on the count of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In the following sections, besides the great body of varying groups of victims as a result of the Nazi past injustices and its aftermath in post-war Europe in particular, Speer’s direct victims will have the general focus.

3.1.2. The Importance of the Victims’ Testimony

The importance of victims’ testimony can be found in various areas of the transitional justice process. From the perspective of society, victims’ testimonies add a particularly dramatic aspect to the body of evidence in trials, making them “more personal, interesting and relevant” to society (Garkawe, 2006, p.92). From the legal perspective of

37 the court, victims’ testimonies are “indispensable to the operation and success of war crimes [trials]” (Stepakoff et al., 2014, p. 426). However, this particular perspective has not been perpetually dominant in international criminal law. The Military Tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo demonstrated the prevalence of written documentation over witnesses testifying about mass atrocities. Since the ad hoc tribunals of Yugoslavia and Rwanda victims and witnesses have increasingly been viewed as the lifeblood of war crimes courts (Wald, 2010). Avishai Margalit’s (2004) concept of the moral witness comes close to the moral essence of why it is important for victims to stand witness for the common lot. In his philosophical work The Ethics of Memory, Margalit (2004) explores those agents entrusted with preserving collective memory (p. 147). Fundamental criteria for the moral witness are the experience of suffering inflicted by an unmitigated evil regime, and the involvement of personal risk and a moral purpose in witnessing. Risk is of central importance in the definition of the moral witness, since it distinguishes the utterly sheltered witness from the moral witness. The two types of risk that a moral witness could experience are “the risk of belonging to the category of people toward whom evil deeds are directed, and there is the risk of trying to document and record what happens for future use” (Margalit, 2004, p. 150). The slave labour victims in the case of Speer’s trial suffered atrocities under an evil regime, they were involved with personal risk in their witnessing, and the moral purpose becomes clear from the victims’ attempts to survive. Yet, this moral purpose remained unaccounted for during the IMT, and bears traces of the conspiracy of silence. This central concept in Danieli’s psychoanalytical works (Danieli, 1984; Ibid, 2006) on Holocaust victims encompasses the act of ensuring the survivors’ silence about Holocaust experiences. This conspiracy of silence is a result from “the survivors’ reaction to the societal (including healthcare, legal and other professionals’) indifference, avoidance, repression and denial of the survivors’ trauma experiences” (Danieli, 2006, p. 1636). This silence was confirmed during the Trials, as the Jewish Lobby represented the victims in an institutional manner, privileging the documentary evidence left behind by the Nazis over Jewish voices before the Tribunal. Danieli (2006) states that “(…) by focusing mostly on war crimes, the Trials failed to

38 comprehend the full scope of the Jewish tragedy of the Holocaust” (p. 1641). He cites the conspiracy of silence persisting during the Trials resulted in a missed opportunity of welcoming demoralized survivors to a world with prevailing justice (Danieli, 2006, p. 1641), adding diminutive meaning to the survivors and their re-emerging communities. Thus, the importance of the victims’ involvement during the application of both retributive and restorative transitional justice tools can be found in healing and truth finding opportunities for the victims and society as a whole. The finding of truth is another important factor of the victims’ testimony. Allowing victims to provide testimony makes a one-sided story of perpetrators one with multiple perspectives. Victims’ testimonies do not make the combined evidence necessarily more truthful. When specific aspects of a testimony turn out to be flawed, for instance when a witness mistakenly remembers numbers incoherent with reality, one cannot accept and will discredit the whole account of events (Laub, 1992, p. 59). Nevertheless, different forms of testimony do contribute to a lesser degree of subjectivity in court. Stolk (2015) describes the information that is provided by the victims as twofold: “[O]n the one hand, they present to the court their knowledge about what happened, which can be understood as traditional ‘witness’ accounts. On the other hand, victim accounts go beyond that of a witness, for victims come to the court to tell about their experiences of suffering” (Stolk, 2015, p. 984). These experiences of suffering in the victims’ testimonies, as mentioned by Margalit’s as the characteristics of the moral witness, are deemed indispensable when establishing a ‘full’ truth. Aside from societal significance, legal relevance, and an establishment of a ‘full’ truth, the importance of victims’ testimonies can also be discovered through the motivations behind victims providing testimony. Research by Stepakoff et al. (2014) asked witnesses to describe their reasons for testifying in the Special Court for Sierra Leone and distinguished 18 conceptually distinct motivations. Four key motivations that came forward in conclusion of their empirical study on the testifying witnesses from the hybrid court by the UN and the Sierra Leonean government address comprise: desires for retributive justice, a fulfilment of their moral duty to other victims, establishing the truth, and narrating their stories. (Stepakoff et al., 2014, p. 426). All aspects are in line with

39 what Danieli (2006) calls ‘survivors’ guilt (p. 1640). He claims that “part of the act of public witnessing and giving testimony, and the judgment by the court, give the victims vindication for their survivor’s guilt (…) and by generating records, courts help the victims not only to create a coherent narrative of what they themselves have gone through, and a sense of what might have befallen relatives whose fate they did not know, but also to comprehend the context for their suffering” (Danieli, 2006, p. 1640). The aforementioned witnesses’ motivations can be linked to the role of victims during the IMT’s transitional justice proceedings. Retrospectively, Garkawe (2006) addresses four aspects of the role of victims with regard to the IMT. First, victim involvement would have underlined the Holocaust and the Nazi's crimes against other minorities, which is viewed as the essential feature of World War II and the IMT itself. Secondly, the role of victims during proceedings has the potential of inserting “real life experiences and stories into the proceedings” (Garkawe, 2006, p. 88), making the trial more memorable. Hypothetically, this would enhance the IMT’s legitimacy in the eyes of the generally doubtful German public. Thirdly, the role of the victims testifying at the IMT in particular could have a balancing effect with regard to the Trials’ overwhelming emphasis on the defendants. Giving Nazi perpetrators the opportunity to testify, while having the actual victims of the Nazi crimes left out is an undoubtedly unjust feature of the IMT. Finally, Garkawe (2006) mentions the research surrounding the psychological effects that an active testifying role can have for survivors and their relatives. The great therapeutic value of victims’ testifying for themselves and the common lot is indisputable, especially seen from the victims’ motivation, to fulfil their moral duty towards other victims. From these role aspect of positive psychological effects for survivors and their associates the concept of the representative witness comes forward.

3.2. Victim Representation

The ICC is currently involved with diverging types of representation with regard to victims of gross violations of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law. Legal representation of victims occurs in line with the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Regulations of the Court and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Through Legal

40 representatives, victims may attend and participate in the hearings before the Court, and make opening and closing statements in accordance with the Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Overall, victim representation has come a long way since the Nuremberg trials. Aside from the obvious issues that arise when representatives speak on behalf of whole groups (gender issues, age, etc.), the appointment of representative witnesses has shown to carry significant positive effects on the Justice for Victims and Justice for Society. Under Dr Jacob Robinson, a distinguished international lawyer who continuously formulated Jewish positions on such matters as Nazi war crimes and Nazi reparations (Marrus, 2006, p, 1653), the New York based Institute of Jewish Affairs [IJA] represented the Jewish case in preparation of the prospected Nuremberg trial. Through negotiations with Mr Justice Jackson, representing the American case at the IMT, the testimonies of (Jewish) victims were omitted and extensive cooperative examination of Nazi documentation took place instead. This section focuses on the Jewish lobby’s limitations at the IMT, and argues for the inclusion of other victims’ representatives in the shape of surviving witnesses like Chaim Weizmann, Alfred Weczler, Rudolf Vrba, Jean Michel, and Lily van Angeren-Franz.

3.2.1. The Jewish Lobby at Nuremberg

Although a handful of other Jewish professors of international law and Judaic studies pursued the case for a war crimes trial (Marrus, 2006, p. 1652), the Jewish lobby at Nuremberg consisted predominantly out of representatives from the IJA, the American Institute of Jewish Affairs. The IJA insistently made its case to the American prosecution team, and through Dr Jacob Robinson’s meetings with Mr Justice Jackson the IJA offered amicus curiae documentary assistance, “both for legal and other matters” (Marrus, 2006, p. 1656), in preparation of the American case in Nuremberg. The representation for the overwhelming majority of the victims of Nazi persecution remained in the sphere of documentation and the gathering of written information. Nevertheless, according to the minutes of the meeting of the [WJC] with Jackson, Robinson suggested to have someone represent the Jewish survivors, “as the spokesperson of those who perished as well as of the living” (‘Meeting with R.H. Jackson’, 1945, p. 4), so that

41 the trials would “bring to the fore more clearly the moral implications of punishing the conspirators against an entire people” (Ibid, p.4). However, in the American motivation for the IMT, Jackson insisted that no matter how significant, “no individual crime against a specific group (…) could be allowed to supplant the quasi-universalist focus on prosecuting the waging of aggressive warfare” (Bloxham, 2006, p. 79). Therefore, Jackson discreetly removed the notion of specific Jewish representatives, as he explained that the IMT should embrace the whole Nazi plot against the world, and that it might encourage requests from other minorities for the same attention (Marrus, 2006, p. 1655). In a later report by the WJC in September, 1945, the issues with the appearance of a Jewish witness as the IMT are integrated in an expected “severe cross-examination [by] the defendants themselves and their counsels” and the fact that “concentration on the dead may overshadow the necessity of stressing the consequences of Nazi policies for the survivors” (‘Appearance of a Jewish Witness’, 1945, p. 3). Robinson proposed Chaim Weizmann as a representative figure for the Jewish victims. However, although Weizmann was authoritative on “the total picture of the Holocaust” (Robinson, 1972, p. 7), allowing him to testify would trigger a number of significant controversies. Eventually, Marrus (2006) acknowledges that “[The Jewish lobby] attributed the insufficient attention or focus on Jewish matters in the indictment of the accused to the system of division of labour among the [Allies], resulting in four different styles which are not strongly unified” (p. 1659). In conclusion of the IMT in Nuremberg, Marrus (2006) explains that “Robinson and the IJA came away from Nuremberg gratified by the achievement of what was to them a core objective: formal recognition, by an internationally authorized body, of the modern catastrophe of the Jewish people” (p. 1664).

3.2.2. Other Jewish representatives

Chaim Azriel Weizmann was a Belarusian biochemist, which lobbied for the foundation of a higher learning institute in British Palestine in the early 1900s, and eventually became the fourth (1921-1931) and sixth (1935-1946) president of the World Zionist Organisation [WZO] and the first president of the state of Israel (1949-1952). As the leader of the British Zionists, Weizmann pursued the original Zionist aspiration – as

42 expressed in the Balfour Declaration of 1917 − of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine in reaction to anti-Semitism. Robinson helped Weizmann prepare his testimony for the IMT, but against Weizmann’s appointment as a representative witness were a number of different parties, which eventually prevented his representation to actually take place in Nuremberg. First of all, the British case feared Weizmann’s testimony would increase support for the Jewish homeland in Palestine (Marrus, 2006, p. 1655). As the occupier and intermediary between the Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem, the United Kingdom attempted to prevent an escalation of the situation by preventing Weizmann to gain encouragement through an appearance on the international stage of the IMT. Secondly, Weizmann’s close connections already feared his frail health and old age would deem him incapable of skilfully handling responsibilities of his testimony (Marrus, 2006, p. 1656). Finally, Weizmann himself declined to concur on the basis of Robert Jackson’s conditions for witnesses’ testimony: “Jackson was prepared to admit Chaim Weizmann as an expert witness for the prosecution on the murder of the Jews, but only on the condition of prior presentation of a statement carefully prepared in advance” (Bloxham, 2006, p. 78). In his chapter in the interdisciplinary The Nuremberg Trials: International Criminal Law since 1945 on the role and rights of victims at the IMT, Sam Garkawe (2006) addresses the careful selection that should have been in place when endorsing testimony from certain witnesses as representatives of the victims. One objection by Justice Jackson involved the assumption that it was improbable for a victim to have specific information through experiences that would aid in the prosecution of high-ranking officials. Therefore, Garkawe (2006) argues “that any survivor chosen to provide evidence should have been carefully selected, so that they would have some useful knowledge and information for the IMT” (p. 92). This preclusion of many survivors does leave room for a number of Garkawe’s suggested witnesses to provide testimony at the Nuremberg trials. Alfred Weczler and Rudolf Vrba, two Jewish Slovaks who had escaped from Auschwitz to successfully return to Bratislava, could have delivered relevant and useful testimony to the court, like they did when convincing their Slovakian community members of the horrors at Auschwitz in great detail (Garkawe, 2006, p. 92). According to Garkawe (2006), the Weczler/Vrba Report, written by the Rabbi of their community, contains details that

43 prove their hypothetical testimony would provide evidence as eyewitness accounts of the extermination camps (p. 92). Although their accounts were not necessarily linked directly with the responsibility of any IMT defendant in particular, Garkawe (2006) states “certainly would have added to the proceedings and the prosecution case in respect of the charge of crimes against humanity” (p. 92). In relation to Albert Speer’s case, popular representatives like would not have been effective in the bringing of Justice for Victims. Wiesenthal was an Austrian Jew who survived the Holocaust and turned into a reputable Nazi hunter and writer after the war. Speer’s direct responsibilities as a public figure encompassed the armaments industry and its labour force. Therefore, particular victims inside the industry’s slave labour camps would be able to offer their accounts as evidence for past grievances Speer witnessed himself. With the constitution of an account from multiple perspectives, by including the survivors’ voices in this case, a more effective Justice for Victims could have been reached through tools of transitional justice. A proving example would have been Jean Michel, a French slave labourer at Dora, which Speer visited Dora in 1943 for an inspection of camp’s the labour conditions. In his book Dora, Michel (1981) describes the unbearable circumstances the slave labourers were forced to work in: “the missile slaves (…) toiled eighteen hours a day (…) for many weeks without tools, (…) ammonia dust burnt their lungs (…) [as they] slept in the tunnels in cavities which were hollowed out. The deportees saw daylight only once [and had] no drinkable water” (Michel & Nucéra, 1981, p. 62). Speer did find out that thousands had already died, as he admitted to Sereny that the camp officials were unable to hide a number of corpses, while those who were still alive were like skeletons (Sereny, 1995, p. 405). At the later Mittelbau-Dora war crimes trials in Essen, Speer met Michel when he was called as a witness in late 1968. Just as the Weczler/Vrba Report, Michel’s (1981) account in Dora provides proof for a completely unmentioned and unaccounted side of Speer’s knowledge of the conditions at the labour-cum-concentration camp, which he particularly commissioned for the development of V2 rockets. Therefore, the delivery of Michel’s testimony as representative of slave labourers under Speer could have had a significant effect on the Armaments Minister’s sentence at the IMT. However, given the American

44 obsession with crimes against peace while underestimating the assault on European Jewry (Marrus, 2006, p. 1652), it is not safe to state that the participation of victims in particular Nazi defendant trials would have had the anticipated effect of Justice for Victims.

3.2.3. Non-Jewish Representatives

Conceivably, what will become more relevant for transitional justice as the ICC develops, is whether there is a negative impact at the grassroots communities resulting from officially granting individuals the status of victims, while denying that status to others. It can be argued that Robinson’s efforts before and during the IMT have earnestly resulted in the dominant focus of “securing the recognition for the Jewish people as the victim of the Nazi fury” (‘Report by Dr Jacob Robinson’, 1945, p. 1). Although the British preferred to have non-Jews testify (Bloxham, 2006, p. 78) and the French perspective abstained from distinguishing Jews from non-Jews (Ascensio, 2006, p. 40), literature concerning non-Jewish victim representation at the IMT is fundamentally non-existent. Non-Jewish representation of Holocaust victims is entangled in controversies. For instance, many Jewish activists claim the comparison of Jewish and non-Jewish victims has a ring of anti-Semitism, as hinted at by Elie Wiesel (1979) and his famous statement in his report to President Carter on the President’s commission on the Holocaust: “while not all victims were Jews, all the Jews were victims destined for annihilation solely because they were born Jewish”. Besides the Jewish deaths of around 6 million, another large group of persecuted individuals were non-Jewish Polish and Soviet civilians with roughly 7,5 million deaths. As part of the Allied forces, the Soviet Union represented these individuals through the records that they captured from the Nazis in 1945. From all the marginalised groups who were denied redress, the post-war treatment of Roma and Sinti, − then still called Gypsy − witnesses will be taken as an example. While the Roma and Sinti suffered a significantly smaller number of deaths during the war, the annihilation practices and ideology behind the killings of this particular group were similar to the Jewish communities in Europe. In a discussion regarding the destruction of asocial life Goebbels stated: “the Jews and Gypsies should be exterminated unconditionally” (IMT vol. 3, 1946, p. 496). Still, Romani victims of the

45 Holocaust did not receive the same recognition during the Nuremberg trials and post-war financial compensation (Hancock, 1996). The diverging Jewish and Romani experiences with courts “would impact the groups’ perception of redress and reparation undertaken by the state, and overall satisfaction levels with [its results]” (Wolfe, 2014, p. 131). Following the war, Romani survivors founded the short-lived Committee of German Gypsies in Munich in 1946. The first association of Sinti, the Association and Interests Community of Racially Persecuted German Citizens of Non-Jewish Faith, was founded in 1956 (Margalit & Matras, 2007). The former association demanded the Nuremberg establishment for their authorisation in order to represent the German gypsies, for the recognition of their victimhood, and for financial compensation. Although the Munich Committee was dissolved within the year, and the recognition of Gypsies remained a minor footnote dedicated in the Trials, the Association of German Sinti and the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma continued further representation with a focus on the reparation claims in 1948 (Wolfe, 2014, p. 124). Regrettably, the post-war sentiments in Germany towards Roma and Sinti victims instilled a denial of reparations because the Nazis persecuted them “because of an asocial and criminal record” and not because of racial reasons (Wolfe, 2014, p. 123). In the mobilization for Romani reparation and the acknowledgement of the grounded ethnic component of Roma and Sinti persecutions, possible representative persons that come forward are Elisabeth Guttenberger, and Lily van Angeren-Franz. Aside from their young ages at the time of their deportations to Auschwitz’ Zigeunerlager (= Gypsy camp) in 1943 (they were in their late teens), all were known for their Romani and Sinti testimonies either at the first or the last Auschwitz trials in the early 1960s and 1990s. By means of an example, the importance of Angeren-Franz’ testimony at the Auschwitz trial against the block leader Ernst-August König was proven by the fact that she could identify almost all the SS people who were active in the Gypsy camp by name and function (Opfermann, 2012). If allowed, her contribution to the Nuremberg trials would likely have had the wished effect for the recognition of Gypsy victims during and after the Holocaust. Other transitional justice tools in relation to the treatment of marginalised groups from the Holocaust will be discussed in chapter 4.

46 4. CONSEQUENCES FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE TOOLS

The moral-philosophical notion of justice, which in this paper means taking account of the perpetrator’s motives and the victims’ experiences in their accounts of the events, was brought forward through examples and elaborations in chapters 2 and 3. Albert Speer’s Nuremberg trial introduced the discussion of alternative or additional transitional justice tools in the effort of steering the process towards a grassroots notion of justice. Speer’s trial, like the other trials at Nuremberg by the IMT, focussed primarily on the individual perpetrators, thus creating a hindrance to clarifying the complexities of situations of conflict and the severity of mass crimes (Karstedt, 2010; Stolk, 2015). In contrast, the popular trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem allowed for a different manner of dealing with historical injustice trough court trials: “[b]y placing the Holocaust at the legal fore of the trial, and by satisfying the testimonial need of survivor-witnesses, the offered a far more comprehensive and, from the perspective of the survivors, more satisfying treatment of the traumatic history presented in incomplete fashion at Nuremberg” (Douglas, 2006, p. 100). In the past few decades, significant progress has been made in holding accountable those persons responsible for crimes against humanity and genocide. From “large-scale ad hoc international tribunals located outside of the conflict region” a transfer has been made to “more focused and efficient international or internationalized justice mechanisms” (Askin, 2006, p. 1727). Naturally, in line with the Rome Statute, the ICC now outlines that its provisions ensure that victims are given a voice, while balancing retributive and restorative justice tools, to enable the Court to bring criminals to justice, help the victims themselves obtain justice (International Criminal Court website) and enforce societal rehabilitation. Aside from the current progress of Justice for Victims with regard to these aspects from the perpetrators’, victims’, and societal perspectives, it remains fruitful to discuss transitional justice tools in relation to the Nuremberg trials and Albert Speer’s case as a lesson for the future.

47 4.1. Alternative Transitional Justice Tools in Speer’s Case

It was only decades after Speer’s trial that the majority of memorials for the victims and survivors were erected, the financial compensation of robbed property owners took place, and national awareness was raised through educating following generations on the past injustices. The restorative justice tools of commemoration, retribution, and history education were implemented in a far later stadium after the atrocities of World War II compared to retributive justice tools like the IMT. These measures contribute to Justice for Victims in diverging degrees. In the Speer case, a combination of the aforementioned retributive justice tool of the court and transitional justice tools of a truth commission and formal apologies would have aided immensely in providing more justice for the victims. The truth commission and formal apologies have been selected for further elaboration in this discussion, since they both involve the victims’ experiences and perpetrators’ motivations in the case of effective execution. First, a critical examination of victim- centrism will be discussed in relation to the lack of victim involvement at the IMT.

4.1.1. Victim-Centrism at the ICC

The lack of focus on the victims at the IMT, can teach us lessons for the current situation and the future of the ICC. The appropriate mechanisms for protection and support of the victims occur because now “[t]he ICC has a sound theoretical basis, as well as a reservoir of practical experience” and “the Statute of the Court represents a strong merger of the lessons of Nuremberg, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and of the ad hoc tribunals” (Danieli, 2006, p. 1647-49). In Trumbull’s (2007) article on the Victims of Victim Participation in International Criminal Proceedings the effects on participating victims and the trials themselves with regard to active victim involvement are discussed. Certain arguments that do not support victim-centrism have to do with the cast doubt on rehabilitation after participation in the proceedings, the expectation that the ICC is able to provide meaningful reparations to individual claimants, the hindrance victim participation causes to the court’s ability to conduct focused investigation, and the creation of frustration when victims are denied the

48 opportunity to testify as witnesses (Trumbull, 2007, pp. 804-10). In turn, the occurrence of unrecognized victims may lead to a completely different range of costs relating to the Justice for Victims. Mohan’s (2009) article in the International Criminal Law Review follows up on the doubts Trumbull introduced. Through a certain ‘paradox’ of victim-centrism, Mohan (2009) presents the victim participation at the Khmer Rouge tribunal with critique aimed at the informing of witnesses about the range of their possible participation and ignorance regarding an “interdisciplinary victimology that recognises that restorative justice can be meted outside the courtroom” (p. 775). Therefore, in order to determine the optimal level of victim participation a combined supposition deduced from Mohan (2009) and Trumbull’s (2007) conclusions reads that “victim participation is consistent with the rights of the accused and the demands of expediency” (p.801) while taking the cost of participation to the non-participating and future victims into account, and recognising multiple transitional justice tools beyond ‘mere’ international trials in court.

4.1.2. Speer and the Official Apology

“This war has brought an inconceivable catastrophe upon the German people, and indeed started a world catastrophe. Therefore it is my unquestionable duty to assume my share of responsibility for this disaster before the German people” (IMT vol. 16, 1946, p. 483). Speer’s public acknowledgement of his personal responsibility (towards the German people) as a representative figure of Nazi Germany during the Third Reich constituted an unofficial apology for past wrongs. In Malcontent’s (2016) Facing the Past, Howard- Hassman distinguishes between guilt and responsibility. “While guilt or fault is an attribute held by an individual only if he has actually committed a harmful act,” somehow, Speer seemed to understand that “responsibility is another matter” (Howard- Hassman, 2016, p. 248). Understandably, Speer’s defence counsel attempted to have the responsibility limited “to those matters over which he had influence” (Sereny, 1995, p. 581). However, quoting Speer’s most representative statement of his strategy in court and sentiment during imprisonment at Spandau, “[i]f we had won the war, we would have shared in these men’s triumphs, and this is why we must now share in the responsibility for the horrors” (Sereny, 1995, p. ibid). Speer’s understanding behind his informal

49 apology, that “membership in a corporate entity means the individual shares in the entity’s responsibility to ameliorate the consequences of injustices that it perpetrated” (Howard-Hassman, 2016, p. 248), is reflected in the (much) later issued statements of regret by the German government (initially) towards the victims from Israel, the Jewish communities, and previously conquered European countries. These official apologies differ insofar from Speer’s acknowledgement of responsibility in the fact that “the apology must be sincere, and the apologizer must show regret and remorse for harming the recipient” (Howard-Hassman, 2016, p. 252). Generally, Speer has been criticized for the lack of emotions as expressed in court, his memoirs, and interviews. For many critics (Twiss, 2010) the combination of his lack of emotions with his lack of using language of repentance in the court and his written works, contributed to an apology that has little value for the recipient. Although official apologies are a possibly powerful political tool, there is no systematic evidence that they have positive reconciliatory effects (Howard- Hassman, 2016, p. 259). In Speer’s case, it can be argued that his apology appeared to have been offered for self-serving reasons in court, principally towards the German people, rather than as a result of genuine contrition towards the victims. In Kitchen’s (2015) biography Speer: Hitler’s Architect, other self-serving aspects of Speer’s position as a (former) Armaments Minister are discussed. While the IMT condemned Speer for his public responsibilities as the Minister of Armaments and War Production, Kitchen (2015) addresses interesting additional features of Speer’s responsibility with regard to the victims in his private sphere. In the conclusion of his biography, Kitchen (2015) sheds light on the staggering profits which Speer made from the ‘Aryanisation’ of property in Berlin (p. 367). The collecting of artworks from forced art sales by Jewish owners, and the elimination of minorities from Berlin who stood in the way of his reconstruction of the city, are examples that Kitchen (2015) deals with in his examination of Speer. Kitchen (2015) argues Speer to be no different from empathy- lacking individuals like Wernher von Braun, “who was unconcerned about the slave labourers who were exploited to death in underground factories building his beloved rockets” (p. 367). These judgments about Speer can be discussed in the light of the IMT’s

50 focus on the perpetrator, while continuing the post-war sentiments of averting blame to one’s official positions and the omission of their motivations. The official apology may have its backlashes as well. Victims might consider it more appropriate to refuse forgiveness and reconciliation, hoping that the formal institutions of justice will punish the perpetrators. In Margalit’s (2004) Ethics of Memory, his chapter on forgiving and forgetting discusses their particular relation and their link with historical injustice. He claims “[f]orgiveness is a conscious decision to change one’s attitude and to overcome anger and vengefulness, (…) there is an indirect way by which forgiveness as a decision can bring about forgetting and thereby complete the process of forgiveness” (Margalit, 2004, p. 193). In a moral-philosophical interpretation of remorse, one can argue that it is impossible to undo the previous wrongdoings, since the past cannot be changed. Yet, “it is possible to change our interpretation of the past” as it allows the provider of remorse to see past actions in a different manner, while the provider of forgiveness perceives the other differently (not necessarily their actions). Although forgiving and forgetting are not voluntary, as they are an involuntary shift in one’s mental state, Margalit (2004) concludes, “an offender can be forgiven even if the offence cannot be forgotten” (p. 199-203). Therefore, victims of institutions under Speer’s responsibility are not obliged to forgive, even if certain communities (for religious or secular reasons) “believe that there is an obligation to forgive in cases of genuine repentance” (Margalit, 2004, p. 207). Thus, the creation of an official apology may successfully lead to forgiveness by some, but it is not a guarantee for an entire group of victims at which such an apology may be aimed.

4.1.3. Speer’s case and the Truth Commission

In terms of justice for the victims, the application of alternative transitional justice tools in an earlier stage of the post-World War II reparations could have prevented a delay of the processing. The fact that the focus was mainly on the Nazi documentation demonstrated that the ‘human’ element in the prosecution of crimes against humanity was chiefly left out of the question, averting full reparation of past injustices through the IMT. In Speer’s case, and the others in Nuremberg, a possible adaption of the transitional justice tool(s)

51 could have added to the justness of the trial in the eyes of the victims and reduced impunity. For instance, a truth commission, as mentioned before, could have brought together experiences of both victims and perpetrators. Where only the latter were given a chance to speak up and perform as witnesses at the Tribunal, certainly, allowing victims to provide testimony at a Tribunal or truth commission as well would make the one-sided story one with multiple perspectives. Especially since Speer struggled with truth in his account of the slave labour he must have perceived during the Holocaust, a truth commission would have brought forward victims with an opportunity to relate their own accounts, and to recommend reparation measures for them. In Speer’s case, the inaccuracies about the Dora and Mauthausen working conditions could have been clarified if victims would have been able to testify (in the Tribunal or a truth commission). However, as is shown in research and proven in several cases (Felman & Laub, 1992; Young, 1997; Hirsch, 2001), it is not always feasible to let victims to testify securely. For instance, victims’ experiences can be misused when doubt is inflicted on their recollections of the facts by the cross-examination of the defence council. Otherwise, when aspects of a testimony turn out to be flawed, one cannot accept and will discredit the whole account of events (Laub, 1992, p. 59). On the other hand, the absence of victims’ voices during the Trials is linked to the common assumption “that they were psychologically unable to be useful as witnesses due to the terrible experiences they had endured” (Garkawe, 2006, p. 90). Arguably, as an approach to protect them from further harm, victims were left out of the IMT. While the provision of testimony by victims cannot always occur securely, others question the accuracy and trustworthiness of evidence provided by victims due to the obstacles like trauma or the elapsed time (Stolk, 2015, p. 983). Additionally, threats by (supporters of) the defendant victimisation may be cause secondary before, during, or after the trial. However, Danieli (2010) rightly notes that the ICC currently has appropriate protective measures and arrangements for witnesses in the judicial process to prevent being (re)traumatised (p. 1647) or interference during the investigation phase. Therefore, the disadvantages to victims’ testimony at truth commissions should be measured carefully in the consideration of applying various transitional justice tools.

52 CONCLUSION

In the context of this paper, it is argued that an examination of the micro-level engagement in transitional justice will result in a more morally effective amendment of historical injustices. In the last decades, referring to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s statement on the Court’s treatment of victims of historical injustice, the international community frequently made rushed prescriptions without first affording victims the opportunity to decide on the proper balance of restorative and retributive justice tools. In this manner, international criminal justice is laid down from above, and brings forward the suggestion that a more moral-philosophical perception and more careful involvement of the victims could result in a successful understanding of transitional justice. By appropriate forms of reparations, it allows individuals and/or communities to empower themselves and retake control of their lives. The paper mentioned hybrid tribunals, restitution, commemoration, history education, truth commissions and official apologies as tools of transitional justice. In chapter 4, the latter two were discussed in more detail with regard to their potential towards effectively amending historical injustice in the case of Albert Speer. In line with the research objective, this paper advocates a combination of retributive and restorative tools of transitional justice as outlined in the objectives of the Rome Statute of the ICC, and critically supports an increased involvement of victims. In relation to the aforementioned transitional justice tools, the IMT should have included tools that integrated victim involvement (through testimonies and representation) and should have focused far less on documentation left behind by the Nazis. With a case study of Albert Speer’s Nuremberg trial (given the mass and extensiveness of literature and research on the IMT), this paper sought to determine how a more moral-philosophical perspective of justice could be realized. By drawing upon primary sources and the examination of books and articles discussing transitional justice from an interdisciplinary perspective with historical and moral-philosophical features, this paper examined the importance of assessing the perpetrator’s motivations and the victims’ experiences in order to bring about Justice for Victims.

53 If it had not been for the Nuremberg trials, the issues of effectiveness and the position of victims in international criminal law would not be discussed as they are nowadays. Given the IMT’s various limitations, the primary example of post-war transitional justice has been criticised by many for its bureaucratic character and the realisation of Justice for Victims. However, when looking into Speer’s case at the IMT in Nuremberg, certain features contributing to the landmark status that the Trials enjoy must be addressed to counterbalance the justly expressed criticism. The IMT provided the first international validation of the number of six million Jewish deaths. Marrus (2006) adds: “it provided major elements of the history of the Holocaust such as the role of Adolf Hitler and his immediate entourage, especially the SS; the mass shootings of the ; the Wannsee Conference; ghettoization; the death camps of the East; the uprising of the Warsaw Ghetto; the Hungarian Jewish deportations, and so on” (p. 1652). However, Speer’s trial, like the other trials at Nuremberg by the IMT, focussed primarily on the individual perpetrator, creating a hindrance to clarifying the complexities of situations of conflict and the severity of mass crimes. Speer’s case had been considered unique by many, due to his personal claims of responsibility at the Trials. In chapter 2, Speer’s motivations are addressed in the light of important developments in his life. Firstly, Speer and his family resided in a rather comfortable position to be unaffected by the topics of German frustration with economic and social despair expressed in Hitler’s speeches. Initially, this allowed him to be relatively indifferent to politics, until his unemployment and admiration for Hitler in his speech for students saw him to join the Nazi party. Secondly, as part of Hitler’s intimate circle and through the official appointment for huge architectural creations across the country, Speer gradually entered the sphere of politics he abstained from before. Contrary to his former abstention, Speer’s rational and organisational qualities, and his tendency towards pragmatism deemed him to be particularly fitting for his later governmental positions. Therefore, with the promise to have his position as an Armaments Minister dissolved once the war had ended, Speer assumed to continue his profession as an architect during peacetime. Thirdly, as a Minister of Armaments his distance to political matters can be derived from Hitler’s General Order in which “no member of a government or military

54 agency was to be informed or seek to know more about secret matters than was required for the enactment of his or her duties” (Sereny, 1995, p. 184). Most probably, this order (passively) led to his unawareness of the Wannsee Conference and secret Posen Speeches. As a confirmation of Speer’s unethical but efficient reasoning, his conflicting position on the Endlösing of the ‘Jewish Question’ originated from his heavy reliance on imported slave labourers and his awareness of financial consequences of the Jewish extermination. At the IMT, Speer concluded he could not “be held solely responsible for covering the essential needs, that is, for demanding foreign labour” (IMT vol. 16, 1947, p. 456). Finally, through Speer’s knowledge of the approaching end of the war and the loss of admiration for Hitler, he could actively ignore orders from Hitler in the ‘Scorched Earth’ Decree, in order to save what could be saved of Germany. During his trial, Speer was predominantly motivated by the recognition of universal law. Under this law, Speer and his fellow IMT defendants had to accept responsibility for the crimes in the eyes of all the civilized world for which they, and not the German people, should and could be called into account for (Sereny, 1995, p. 4). However, his “objection to maltreatment [of prisoners] was because it could not increase efficiency; it was not a [personal] moral issue” (Sereny, 1995, p. 590). It is in Speer’s loyalty to Hitler, the opportunities for his architectural projects and the insensitivity towards the (Jewish) victims that Speer’s motivations are found for his decisions during his positions as a major architect and Minister of Armaments in Nazi Germany. If true motivations remain obscured, many Nazis with less power than Speer could claim they were as unaware of the facts as the most influential man beside Hitler. Although finding true motivations does not necessarily play an important role in reaching Justice for Society, as the evidence provided through documentation is reasonably sufficient to establish overall justice, they do contribute to a perceived higher Justice for Victims. Given that “one of the main perceived purposes of the trial was to provide a sense of justice and vindication for the millions of victims of Nazi policies” (Garkawe, 2006, p. 86), it came as unexpected to many that the Tribunal delivered verdicts principally on the foundations of Nazi documentation rather than eyewitness testimony from the Holocaust

55 victims. This paper examined the importance (and limitations) of victims’ testimony from the legal and moral perspectives, and the motivations of victims themselves. Through the paper’s endorsement of victims’ testimony, certain Jewish and non-Jewish representative figures came forward in the case of Albert Speer. The Institute of Jewish Affairs, Chaim Weizmann, Alfred Weczler, Rudolf Vrba, Jean Michel, and Lily van Angeren-Franz were all critically assessed as representatives in their potential contribution towards instilling Justice for Victims. In line with the grassroots notion of justice, this paper condemns the IMT’s lack of inclusion of victims’ testimonies. With the ICC approaching its fifteen years of existence, lessons for the approaching years, regarding its treatment of victims of historical injustice, should be noted. The undeniable progress with regard to victim-sensitivity over the past decades leads to the conclusion that the ICC grants the victims of international crimes rights on an unprecedented level. However, in order to determine the optimal level of victim participation it must be consistent with the rights of the accused while taking the cost of participation to the non-participating and future victims into account, and recognising multiple transitional justice tools beyond ‘mere’ international trials in court. Therefore, it becomes necessary to recognize that “change may be needed in the realm of international justice, which involves greater reflection in its design and delivery, combined with more conscious awareness of the fundamentality of meaningful, relevant and manifest engagement at the grassroots” (Taylor, 2016, p. 159). In other words: an examination of the micro-level engagement in transitional justice might result in a more morally effective amendment of historical injustices.

56 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books and Articles

Ascensio, H. (2006). ‘The French perspective’, in: Raful, L, Regenbogin, H. R. & Safferling, C. J. M. The Nuremberg trials: International Criminal Law since 1945: 60th anniversary international conference (pp. 39 - 44). Berlin: De Gruyter. Askin, K.D. (2006). . Cardozo Law Review. Victims and International Law, 27(4). 1723-1729. Backer, D. (2009). ‘Cross-national comparative analysis’, in: Van der Merwe, H., Baxter, V. & Chapman, A. R. (eds.). Assessing the impact of transitional justice. Challenges for empirical research (pp. 23 - 90). Washington DC: USIP. Bloxham, D. (2006). ‘Genocide on trial: Law and collective memory’, in: Raful, L, Regenbogin, H. R. & Safferling, C. J. M. The Nuremberg trials: International Criminal Law since 1945: 60th anniversary international conference (pp. 73 - 84). Berlin: De Gruyter. Boraine, A. (2006). Transitional justice. A holistic interpretation. Journal of International Affairs, 60(1). 17-27. Burchard, C. (2006). The Nuremberg Trial and its Impact on Germany. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 4(4), 800-829. doi: 10.1093/jicj/mql052 Cole, E. A. (2007). Transitional justice and the reform of history education. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 1, 115-137. Cole, E. A. (2016). ‘Education in the shadow of history. Education, history education, and their place in historical justice’, in: Malcontent, P. Facing the past. Amending historical injustices through instruments of transitional justice (pp. 285 - 302). Cambridge: Intersentia. Danieli, Y. (1984). Psychotherapists’ participation in the conspiracy of silence about the Holocaust. Psychoanalytical Psychology, 1(1), 23-42. Danieli, Y. (2006). Reappraising the Nuremberg trials and their legacy: The role of victims in international law. Cardozo Law Review. Victims and International Law, 27(4). 1633-1649. Derby, D. (2006). ‘Enforcement of Nuremberg norms: the Role for mechanisms other than the ICC’, in: Raful, L, Regenbogin, H. R. & Safferling, C. J. M. The Nuremberg trials: International Criminal Law since 1945: 60th anniversary international conference (pp. 278 – 282). Berlin: De Gruyter.

57 Douglas, L. (2006). ‘History and memory in the courtroom: Reflections on perpetrator trials’, in: Raful, L, Regenbogin, H. R. & Safferling, C. J. M. The Nuremberg trials: International Criminal Law since 1945: 60th anniversary international conference (pp. 95 – 105). Berlin: De Gruyter. Elster, J. (2013). Closing the books: Transitional justice in historical perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fischer, M. (2011). ‘Transitional Justice and Reconciliation: Theory and Practice’, in: Austin, B., Fischer, M. & Giessmann, H. J. (eds.). Advancing Conflict Transformation. The Handbook II (pp. 406 - 430). Opladen/Framington Hills: Barbara Budrich Publishers. Fischer, M. (2016). ‘Dealing with the past from the top down and bottom up – challenges for state and non-state actors’, in: Fischer, M. & Simic, O. Transitional justice and reconciliation. Lessons from the Balkans (pp. 25 - 60). London: Routledge. Fischer, M. & Simic, O. (2016). Transitional justice and reconciliation. Lessons from the Balkans. London: Routledge. Friedrich, J. (1999). ‘Nuremberg and the Germans’, in: Cooper, B. (ed.). War Crimes. The legacy of Nuremberg. (pp. 87- 106). New York: TV Books. Garkawe, S. (2006). ‘The role and rights of victims at the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal’, in: Raful, L, Regenbogin, H. R. & Safferling, C. J. M. The Nuremberg Trials: International Criminal Law since 1945: 60th anniversary international conference (pp. 86-94). Berlin: De Gruyter. Goldhagen, E. (1971). Albert Speer, Himmler, and the Secrecy of the Final Solution. Midstream, 17: 43-50. Hancock, I. (1996). ‘Responses to the Porrajmos; The Romani Holocaust’, in: Rosenbaum, A. (ed.) Is the Holocaust Unique? (pp. 39-64). Boulder: Westview Press. Harris, W. R. (2006). ‘Tyranny on Trial—Trial of Major German War Criminals at Nuremberg, 1945–1946’, in: Raful, L, Regenbogin, H. R. & Safferling, C. J. M. The Nuremberg trials: International Criminal Law since 1945: 60th anniversary international conference (pp. 106–114). Berlin: De Gruyter. Hayner, P. B. (2011). Unspeakable truths. Transitional justice and the challenge of truth commissions. London: Routledge. Heller, K. J. (2011). The Nuremberg Military Tribunals and the origins of international criminal law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hirsh, D. (2001). The trial of Andrei Sawoniuk: Holocaust testimony under cross- Examination. Social & Legal Studies, 10(4), 529-545. Howard-Hassman, R. E. (2016). ‘Official apologies’, in: Malcontent, P. Facing the past. Amending historical injustices through instruments of transitional justice (pp. 247 - 264). Cambridge: Intersentia.

58 Karstedt, S. (2010). From Absence to presence, from silence to voice: Victims in international and transitional justice since the Nuremberg trials. International Review of Victimology, 17(1), 9-30. King, H., Jr. (1997). The Two Worlds of Albert Speer: Reflections of a Nuremberg Prosecutor. Lanham: University Press of America. Kitchen, M. (2015). Speer: Hitler’s architect. New Haven: Yale University Press. Laub, D. (1992). ‘Bearing witness or the vicissitudes of listening’, in: Felman, S. & Laub, D. Testimony: Crises of witnessing in literature. Psychoanalysis and history (pp. 57-79). New York: Routledge. Light, D. & Young, C. (2015). ‘Public memory, commemoration and transitional justice: Reconfiguring the past in public space’, in: Stan, L. & Nedelsky, N. (eds.) Post-communist transitional justice: Lessons from 25 years of experience (pp. 233 - 251). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Löwenheim, N. (2009). A haunted past: Requesting forgiveness for wrongdoing in International Relations. Review of International Studies, 35, 531-555. Malcontent, P. (2016). Facing the past. Amending historical injustices through instruments of transitional justice. Cambridge: Intersentia. Margalit, A. (2004). The ethics of memory. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Margalit, G. & Matras, Y. (2007). ‘Gypsies in Germany – German Gypsies? Identity and politics of Sinti and Roma in Germany’ in: Stauber, R. & Vago, R. The Roma: a Minority in Europe: Historical, political and social perspectives. (pp. 103-116) Budapest: Central European University Press. Marrus, M. (2006). A Jewish lobby at Nuremberg: Jacob Robinson and the institute of Jewish Affairs, 1945-1946. Cardozo Law Review. Victims and International Law, 27(4), 1651-1665 Marrus, M. R. (2007). Official apologies and the quest for historical justice. Journal of Human Rights, 6, 75-105. McCargo, D. (2015). Transitional justice and its discontents. Journal of Democracy, 26 (2), 7-18. McEvoy, K., & McGregor, L. (2008). Transitional justice from below: grassroots activism and the struggle for change. Oxford: Hart Publishing. McGonigle Leyh, B. (2016). ‘National and hybrid tribunals. Benefits and challenges’, in: Malcontent, P. Facing the past. Amending historical injustices through instruments of transitional justice (pp. 115 - 138). Cambridge: Intersentia. Merritt, A.J. & Merritt, R.L. (eds.) (1980). ‘HICOG report no. 57.’ in: Public opinion in semisovereign Germany: the HICOG Surveys, 1949-1955. Chicago: University of Illinois. Michel, J., & Nucéra, L. (1981). Dora. London: Sphere. Minear, R. (1971). Victors’ justice: the Tokyo war crimes trial. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

59 Mohan, M. (2009). The Paradox of Victim-Centrism: Victim Participation at the Khmer Rouge Tribunal. International Criminal Law Review, 9, p. 733. Okafor, O. C. & Ngwaba, U. (2015). The International criminal court as a ‘Transitional Justice’ mechanism in Africa: Some critical reflections. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 9(1), 90-108. doi: 10.1093/ijtj/iju025 Opfermann, U. (2012). ‘Genozid und Justiz. Schlussstrich als “staatspolitische Zielsetzung”’, in: Fings, K., & Opfermann, U. Zigeunerverfolgung im Rheinland und in Westfalen 1933 - 1945: Geschichte, Aufarbeitung und Erinnerung (pp. 315-326). Paderborn: Schöningh. Overy, R. (2003). ‘The Nuremberg trials: international law in the making’, in: Sands, P. From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice (pp. 1 - 30). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sands, P. (2003). From Nuremberg to The Hague: The Future of International Criminal Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Schmidt, M. (1986). Albert Speer: The end of a myth. New York: Collier Books. Sereny, G. (1995). Albert Speer: His battle with truth. London: Picador. Singh, P. & Evenson, E. (2008). ‘VII. The Role of Victims in ICC Proceedings’, in: Singh, P., & Evenson, E. Courting History: The Landmark International Criminal Court’s First Years (pp. 117 - 209). New York: Human Rights Watch. Smith, B. (1974). Heinrich Himmler: Geheimreden, 1933 bis 1945, und andere Ansprachen. Frankfurt/M: Propylaen. Speer, B. K. H. A. (1970). Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Stepakoff, S. (2014). Why testify? Witnesses’ motivations for giving evidence in a war crimes tribunal in Sierra Leone. The International Journal of Transitional Justice, 8, 426-451. Stern Strom, M. (1994). Facing History and Ourselves: Holocaust and Human Behaviour. Resource Book. Massachusetts: Brookline. Stolk, S. (2015). The Victim, the International Criminal Court and the Search for Truth: On the Interdependence and Incompatibility of Truths about Mass Atrocity. Journal of International Criminal Justice, 13(5), 973-994. doi: 10.1093/jicj/mqv067 Taylor, D. (2016). ‘Beyond the courtroom. The objectives and experiences of international justice at the grassroots’, in: Malcontent, P. Facing the past. Amending historical injustices through instruments of transitional justice (pp. 139 - 166). Cambridge: Intersentia. Trumbull, C.P. (2008). The Victims of victim participation in international criminal proceedings. Michigan Journal of International Law, 29(4), 777-826. Tooze, A. (2006). The Wages of Destruction: The Making & Breaking of the Nazi Economy. London: Allen Lane.

60 Van der Vat, D. (1997). The Good Nazi : The life and lies of Albert Speer. Boston: Mariner Books. Wald, P. M. (2010). Dealing with witnesses in war crimes trials: Lessons from the Yugoslav Tribunal. Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal, 5, 217-239. Weyeneth, R.R. (2001). The power of apology and the process of historical reconciliation. The Public Historian, 23, 9-38. Wolfe, S. (2014). ‘The German genocides and subsequent redress and reparation movements’, in: The politics of reparations and apologies. Springer series in transitional justice [volume 7] (pp. 87 - 152). New York, NY: Springer. Young, J. E. (1997). Between history and memory: The uncanny voices of historian and survivor. History & Memory, 9(1), 47-58.

Online Sources

Annan, K. (2004). The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post- conflict societies: Report of the Secretary-General. S/2004/616. United Nations and the Rule of Law. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol =S/2004/616 Annual ICC Assembly: States hold ground on ICC, but serious challenges remain. (2016). Retrieved from http://coalitionfortheicc.org/news/20161205/annual-icc-assembly-states-hold- ^ground-icc-serious-challenges-remain Case Files Milch I. (n.d.). Extract from the testimony of Albert Speer at the International Military Tribunal concerning violations of international law in his ministry. Retrieved from: http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/documents/2980-extract-from-the- testimony?q=nmt+2+deportation+forced+labour#p.1 Case Files Milch II. (n.d.). Extracts on the subject of Deportation and Forced Labour from Speer's Minutes on His Meetings with Hitler. Retrieved from: http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/documents/3007-extracts-from-the- records?q=nmt+2+deportation+forced+labour#p.1 Davidson, M. (1996). Albert Speer: The Nazi Who Said Sorry [Television series episode]. In Reputations (1996-2002). United Kingdom: A&E Television Networks, BBC. Rettrieved from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AtHEuU50S8M Evenson, E. (2015). Human Rights Watch Statement for the General Debate of the International Criminal Court’s Fourteenth Assembly of States Parties. Human Rights Watch. Retrieved from: https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/19/human-rights-watch-statement- general-debate-international-criminal-courts-fourteenth Georg Eckert Institute. (n.d.) Retrieved from: http://www.gei.de/en/theinstitute/history.html

61 IMT/NMT Staff Evidence Analysis. (n.d.). Records of the meetings of the Central Planning Board (CPB) and Fuehrer conferences (FC), and other records from Speer's ministry, 1942- 1945. Retrieved from: http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/documents/3169-] records-of-the-meetings?q=Records+of+the+meetings+of+the+Central+ Planning+Board+%28CPB%29+#p.1 International Criminal Court. (n.d.). Retrieved from https://www.icc-cpi.int/ Jacob Rader Marcus Centre of the American Jewish Archives (1945). Minutes, Meeting of World Jewish Congress with Robert H. Jackson in New York City, June 12, 1945. Records of the World Jewish Congress. Retrieved from: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/docu ments/index.php?documentid=C106-16-5&pagenumber=4 Jacob Rader Marcus Centre of the American Jewish Archives (1945). Report, Some basic ideas with regard to the appearance of a Jewish witness at the International Military Tribunal, September 5, 1945. Records of the World Jewish Congress. Retrieved from: https://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/nuremberg/docu ments/index.php?documentid=C107-8-1&pagenumber=3 Stahn, C. (2015). How fair are criticisms of the ICC? Oxford University Press Blog. Retrieved from: https://blog.oup.com/2015/11/criticisms-international-criminal-court/#

Official Legal Documents

Charter of the International Military Tribunal - Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol. 1. (1945). Retrieved from: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp International Military Trials Nürnberg (1946). Nazi conspiracy and agression. [Vol. 3]. Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office. International Military Tribunal Nuremberg (1947). Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg 14 November 1945 – 1 October 1946. [Vol. 1-22]. New York: William S. Hein & Co., Inc. Retrieved from: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp Scott, J. B. (1915). The Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes. Oxford University Press: New York. UN General Assembly. (1985). A/RES/40/34. Declaration of basic principles of justice for victims of crime and abuse of power. New York: UN General Assembly. UN General Assembly. (1998). Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court [last amended 2010]. New York: UN General Assembly. UN General Assembly. (2005). Basic principles and guidelines to a remedy and reparation of victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of International Humanitarian Law. New York: UN General Assembly.

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