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Analytical Digest Russian No. 201 18 April 2017 russian analytical digest www.css.ethz.ch/en/publications/rad.html www.laender-analysen.de FEDERALISM ■■ANALYSIS Kremlin–Governor Relations in the Run-Up to the 2018 Presidential Elections 2 Carolina De Stefano, Washington, D.C. ■■ANALYSIS The Origin and Development of Federalism in Russia 7 Angela Di Gregorio, Milan ■■ANALYSIS Bureaucratic Strength and Presidential Inattention: Disempowering Territorial Development Instruments in Russia 10 Andrey Starodubtsev, Helsinki ■■MAPS Administrative Subdivisions of the Russian Federation 1999 and 2017 14 Institute for European, Research Centre Center for German Association for Russian, and Eurasian Studies Institute of History for East European Studies Security Studies East European Studies The George Washington University of Zurich University University of Bremen ETH Zurich RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 201, 18 April 2017 2 ANALYSIS Kremlin–Governor Relations in the Run-Up to the 2018 Presidential Elections Carolina De Stefano, Washington, D.C. Abstract The evolution of Kremlin-governor relations is driven by the center’s dilemma of how to exert control over the regions without undermining regional stability. In view of the 2018 presidential elections, the Kremlin solution to this dilemma is not a long-term strategy, but a shortsighted technocratic approach together with a stronger official anti-elite and anti-corruption line. Control v. Competence sentatives3 and the governors lost their automatic mem- Despite the relentless verticalization of powers under- bership in the Federaion Council, the upper chamber of taken in Russia since 2000, the relationship between the Federal Assembly. Instead, the regions had to elect the Kremlin and the governors continues to be more their own representatives from among the members of delicate and less unidirectional than what it may seem. the regional parliaments and, in the process, the senators One of the main reasons is that neither legal reforms lost their judicial immunity, which had been a valuable nor electoral engineering have been able to solve a major benefit for key members of the regional elite. Kremlin dilemma: how to exert direct, pervasive control The Kremlin kept tight political control over the over the governors without undermining the effective process of selecting regional leaders. In 2004, direct local political management needed to guarantee, if not gubernatorial elections were abolished in favor of direct economic development, then at least political stability? presidential appointment. In the context of the country’s economic stagnation The 2011–2012 protest movements, however, made and, more importantly, in the run-up to the 2018 pres- abruptly clear that the increased control over the gov- idential elections, the need to address this dilemma is ernors was not enough to guarantee political order and becoming more urgent. Looking at the series of recent stability in the regions. On the contrary, the choice of governors’ resignations and subsequent replacements, it depriving governors of any source of personal, local seems that the central government’s short-term—and legitimacy potentially threatened Russia’s stability by shortsighted—solution is an increasing technocratic undermining the benefits of institutional centralization. approach combined with a stronger official anti-cor- Dmitri Gorenburg foresaw this risk from the very intro- ruption line targeting not only the governors, but the duction of the presidential appointment in 2004, noting country’s political elite more generally. that “rather than having reliable, competent adminis- trators who implement the central government’s policies No Legal Reforms Are Political Panaceas without much discussion, Moscow is likely to get cau- The evolution of the legally defined powers of Russian tious, semi-competent yes-men who will often be una- governors1 has been a major and undisputable manifes- ble to control events in the regions they are appointed tation of the progressive recentralization and verticaliza- to rule’.4 tion undertaken in Russia since Vladimir Putin became As political stability became an urgent priority, president.2 This process started right after his election in Putin’s third term was inaugurated in 2012 by the rein- 2000. Aiming at regaining control of the regions (which statement of direct gubernatorial elections. The search had enjoyed extensive, but chaotic autonomy during the for stability aside, the direct elections of the governors Yeltsin era), Putin implemented a series of institutional perform another important task in times of trouble: in reforms. Already in 2000, the 89 federal subjects were case of popular discontent, there is someone other than divided into seven districts headed by presidential repre- the central government to blame. Finally, in 2013 an ambiguous, half-way solution was found: the approval of a law—still in force today—that gives the regions a “non-direct elections” option, that is 1 The governors’ formal titles are Head of administration or Pres- ident, depending on the legislation of the republic or region in question. 3 Orttung, R. (2001). Putin’s federal reform package: a recipe for 2 For a deeper analysis of the evolution of Russian federalism in unchecked Kremlin power. Demokratizatsiya 9 (3): 341–9, 342. the last two decades, see the contribution of Angela Di Grego- 4 Gorenburg, D. (2004). The View of Russian Electoral Reforms rio in this issue. from Russia’s Ethnic Republics. PONARS Policy Memo 338, 3. RUSSIAN ANALYTICAL DIGEST No. 201, 18 April 2017 3 the possibility for regional parliaments to chose a gov- the city of Moscow Maxim Reshetnikov. The next day ernor from a list of candidates presented by political Buriatia Governor Vjacheslav Nagovitsyn was ousted parties instead of holding direct elections.5 This provi- and replaced by the republic’s deputy minister of trans- sion reflects another source of central government con- port Aleksei Tsydenov. This switch apparently resulted cern: the need to treat regions that vary greatly among from an internal conflict, as well as the high ratings themselves in a different manner. Indeed, this law was of the Communist Party’s regional candidate.7 In the conceived for potentially unstable regions, above all the case of the Perm region and Buriatia, the main reasons North Caucasus, where the presidential appointment for the changes were both the Kremlin’s and popular was still seen as preferable to direct elections, which discontent.8 were deemed too uncertain. The majority of the repub- On the 13th, the 14th and the 15th of February resig- lics, despite central pressure, did not take this legisla- nations were respectively presented by the governor of tion into consideration.6 Of course, even where elections Novgorod oblast Sergey Mitin, by Riazan’s governor are held, the Kremlin still exerts considerable pressure Oleg Kovalev and by the governor of Karelia Aleksandr over who becomes governor by disqualifying undesir- Khudilainen. In the case of Karelia, the resignation was able candidates. widely anticipated and explained by the governor’s low ratings. Khudilainen has been replaced by Artur Parfen- Recent Governors’ Resignations: Is There chikov, who previously pursued a legal career.9 a Logic? At the beginning of April, Udmurtia Governor Alek- In recent months, a relatively large number of gover- sandr Soloviev and Marii El Governor Leonid Markelov nors resigned and were promptly replaced by presiden- were arrested on bribery charges.10 Soloviev was replaced tial appointees. Some hypotheses on the overall logic by the Secretary of Russia’s Civic Chamber Aleksandr behind these decisions can be made, although the rea- Brechalov and the Governor of Marii El by the legal sons that led to these resignations vary from case to case. expert and judge of the Commercial Court Aleksandr They can mainly be grouped into the following: corrup- Evstifeev.11 tion scandals, conflictual relations with the local elite What do all these resignations have in common? and popular discontent. First, the majority of the regions listed above will hold In October 2016, Kaliningrad’s governor Evgeniy gubernatorial elections in October 2017.12 The center’s Zinichev was replaced by the youngest Russian gover- priority is to choose their candidates for the upcoming nor to date Anton Alikhanov, who previously served in elections by appointing them as temporary represent- several national ministries. atives in advance of the voting. Acting in this manner, Sergei Yastrebov, the head of the Yaroslavl Region, the party is bypassed and the future candidate has time had been dismissed on 28 July 2016 and his post was not only to prepare a political campaign—thus proba- given to the former deputy minister of internal affairs, bly assuring his victory 13—but also to calmly establish Dmitry Mironov. the Kremlin’s new political agenda in view of the 2018 On the same day two other resignations took effect: presidential elections.14 Kirov Governor Nikita Belykh and Sebastopol Gover- Second, the resignations did not end the careers of nor Sergei Menyailo. Belykh’s resignation resulted from the politicians involved. Notwithstanding his unpop- a corruption scandal and he was replaced by the head ularity, Karelia’s former governor Khudilainen is, for of the Russian registry Igor Vasilyev. Menyailo, in con- trast, seems to have been forced to resign due to a per- sonal conflict with the previous speaker of the local legis- lative assembly Aleksei Chaly. In Sevastopol, Menyailo’s 7 < http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/
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