TAFTAZANI'S VIEWS ON TAKLIF, GABR AND QADAR: A NOTE OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ISLAMIC THEOLOGICAL DOCTRINES BY

ZAFAR ISHAQ ANSARI

Commentayy of Sa'd al-Din al-Taftazani (d. 794 A.H.) on the THE- Creed of Nagm al-din 'Umar al-Nasafi (d. 537 A.H.) contains hardly anything original. Our author's claim to significance does not rest, at least primarily, on brilliance or profoundness of thought. What is striking about him is his approach to theological problems. This approach is marked with open-mindedness which seems to be rooted in his intellectual integrity. In grappling with theological questions which were quite explosive and had behind them a long tradition of polemical bitterness, Taftazani appears to be relaxed, seems to suffer little from any phobias or obsessions, and refuses to give any but perhaps minimal due to prejudice. As it is well- known, he belonged to the Aš 'ari school. But this association does not seem to weigh much on his mind and he shows hardly any hesitation in abandoning the doctrines of his own school in favour of those of other schools. The approach of Taftazani cannot be explained, however, merely in terms of his personal characteristics as an intellectual or as a person. It is vitally linked with history; i.e. his approach reflects not only his intellectual personality but also a particular phase in the development of Aš'arite doctrines, indeed of Muslim theology as such. His Commentary represents the culmination of a process which had continued since the time of Abu 1-Hasan al-Aš'ari (d. 324 A.H.) down to his own days-the eighth century of higya. This process was one of effecting modifications in the Aš 'arite doctrines so as to blunt the edge of its extremism and bring it closer to the more moderate doctrines of the school initiated by Abu Hanifa (d. I50 A.H.) and developed by Abu Mansur al-Maturidi (d. 333 A.H.), a contemporary of As'ari. By the time of Taftazani very appreciable change had taken place in the doctrines of the Aš'ari school. The Commentayy epitomizes the extent of this change. It shows that by the time of Taftazani 66

(and in him ?), the and Maturidi traditions had fused together, having become almost indistinguishable and having attained a meaningful synthesis. In the opinion of this writer, the observation that has been made above is particularly true with regard to Taftazani's views on taklff, gaby, and qaday.

I

Before assessing the significance of Taftazani's views on taklif, an important point should be noted with respect to the discussion among Muslims on this subject. Despite disagreements and contro- versies, the idea that man is answerable to God and is incumbent with moral responsibility was never brought into question 1. The controversies on the question had arisen as a result of relating the question of man's responsibility to some of the bigger questions: questions about the nature of God. What these people were really discussing was not whether man was incumbent with taklif or not. They were rather discussing the rationale of this taklff, which was related to their views about the rationale of the operations of God. Does God do something merely because He will to do so, or is He subject to considerations of right and wrong, of just and unjust ? If He has imposed some responsibility on man, has He imposed it in consideration of some principle of right and wrong, or without 2 any regard for it ? The early Muslims who had begun to speculate on these questions, (and they had begun to do so at the latest during the second half of the first century of the higya), tried to answer these questions in the light of their understanding of God, particularly in the light of two aspects of His Being: His Omnipotence and His Righteous- ness. Both these notions formed an integral part of the Muslim conception of God since both have been stressed in the Qur'dn. Differences arose largely because of bringing these concepts to bear on the understanding of the nature of the activity of both man and God. This intellectual activity led to the development of what are known as the doctrines of qadar and gaby, and sub-

1. W. Montgomery Watt arrives substantially at the same conclusion. See Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam, (London, 1943), p. 167. 2. It is questions such as these which lay behind the question: can God impose upon man a responsibility beyond his capacity ?