Gangs and Counter-Gangs

Gangs and Counter-gangs MAJOR. FRANK KITSON M.B.E., M.C. WITH A FOREWORD BY GENERAL SIR GEORGE ERSKINE G.C.B., K.B.E., D.S.O. LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR AND COMMANDER IN CHIEF, JERSEY FORMERLY C. IN C, KENYA LONDON BARRIE AND ROCKLIFF © Frank Kitson 1960 First published 1960 by Barrie and Rockliff (Barrie Books Ltd.) 2 Clements' Inn, Strand, ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS London W.C.2 Many people have helped me to produce this book and I should like to Printed and bound in Great Britain by acknowledge the help I have received from them. I cannot mention them Robert Cunningham and Sons Ltd. all by name but I should like to record my gratitude to certain individuals. Alva, Scotland First I must acknowledge the great debt I owe to the officer who was responsible for my going to Kenya in the first place. Had it not been for him I would have missed the two best years of my army service and there would have been no book to write. I only discovered a few months ago that the officer concerned was Major J. Harington, D.s.o., M.B.E. Next I should like to thank Lt.-Colonel R. D. Poole for suggesting that I should write the book and for putting me in touch with a publisher who was prepared to show me how to present my story. My particular thanks are due to the Hon. A. G. Samuel, Mr L. A. Ullstein and the staff of Barrie and Rockliff for their never-failing guidance during the whole time I have been producing the book. The business of handling an amateur author is an art in itself and I fully realize how lucky I was to fall into the hands of such experts. I should also like to thank Lt.-Colonel T. C. Sinclair, O.B.E., M.C. for reading the manuscript and for many helpful suggestions. His help throughout has been invaluable. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Miss D. Poland for checking the proofs. Not only did she carry out this unrewarding task with speed and efficiency but she also helped me by doing a number of other tiresome but necessary jobs in connection with the book. Finally I should like to thank all the Europeans and Africans who worked with me in Kenya for their help and friendship. This book attempts to tell their story and if it brings their struggles to the attention of their countrymen it will achieve its purpose. CONTENTS FOREWORD XI Chapter One A NEW JOB I Two EARLY DAYS 20 Three TROUBLE 34 Four WARUINGI 49 Five BIRTH OF AN IDEA 62 Six THE IDEA GROWS UP 77 Seven OFFICIAL APPROVAL 91 Eight INTERLUDE 105 Nine THE NEW LOOK 114 Ten THE OATH 123 Eleven NAIROBI'S LAST FLING 134 Twelve THE RISE OF WARUINGI 145 Thirteen INTERESTING DIVERSION 157 Fourteen THE FOREST 170 Fifteen SPECIAL FORCES 185 Sixteen OPERATION DANTE 192 Seventeen THE END 199 Eighteen EPILOGUE 208 LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS Frank Kitson frontispiece Mau Mau gang posing for propaganda picture facing page 18 Mau Mau weapons; Denis Kearney 19 The house at Kamiti; View from the house 28 Kiambu police headquarters; Eric Holyoak 29 Bill Henning; Tribal Police 60 Peter Dempster; Kikuyu huts 61 Jacky Miller 68 Building the Kamiti post; The Special Methods Training Centre, Kamiti 69 Walter Gash; The staff at Kamiti 84 Frank Kitson in Narok; The 'evening meal' 85 Preparing the evening meal; Lionesses feeding TOO Pseudo gang resting; Pseudo gang posing for pro paganda picture 101 The ammunition oath; Oathing ceremony 116 George Hales and John Stanfield; Wambogo 117 John and Oleo; Omondi 132 Hooded Men; Frank Kitson 133 Karure market 148 Kikuyu village 149 Don Bush; Pete van Aardt 188 Pseudo gang; Pseudo gang at prayers 189 Eric Holyoak 196 Waruingi Kurier 197 Maps 4-5 and 24-25 Organization charts 12, 80 and 116 In some photographs the faces of Africans have been obliterated. The people so treated were members of the Security Forces, or those who co-operated with them, and this measure has been taken for their protection. For the same reason, the names of the Africans have been changed in the text. FOREWORD Frank Kitson's book will be of special interest to those of us who served in Kenya during the Mau Mau rebellion since few people could be told at the time of the special operations developed by him. But there are many lessons in his story which will be of equal interest to those whose business it is to study or take part in the restoration of law and order. The British Army has been kept busy with that kind of work in recent years. Global war is an international affair and it is in the international field that our statesmen will strive to reach agreement to reduce the likelihood of such a calamity. But keeping control in our Colonies and Protectorates is our own affair. The likelihood of military support to our Colonial administration must be rated high. In Africa alone there are vast areas which under our guidance are moving towards a greater degree of self government. We are deliberately moving the responsibility more and more on to the shoulders of the local inhabitants. This involves risks to law and order which must be accepted if these people are to move from the benevolent autocracy of good Colonial administration to independ ence, with all the dangers, disturbances and upheavals which such a change entails. If this change is to be made smoothly, with firm foundations laid for the future, the timing must be controlled. The Colonial administra tion must not be stampeded into making the change because its adminis tration has become so weak it cannot resist. It would be the worst possible service to the people of Africa to give independence against a background of confusion. If the Army is required to intervene it should try to do so in such a way that it does not prejudice the natural progressive development of the terri tory. No lasting results will be obtained by the unintelligent use of force in all directions. Measures must be designed to support and protect the loyal members of the community and to round up the real trouble-makers who have resorted to force and lawlessness. If this can be done fairly and justly you will get the support of the waverers and the battle is half won. But to do this you must have a very good intelligence service. You must not be surprised to find that it is inadequate and your first task should be to build it up. xii Foreword The need to develop a first-class intelligence system is obvious. In these internal security situations you must develop your intelligence service to meet your needs and you must not be content with a general picture and trends. You must know your enemy's mind, his organization and every detail you can possibly find out about him. Only when you know this will it be possible to deal with the root of the trouble and the leaders. Even when you have the information it is often difficult to make use of it quickly enough through the orthodox security forces. The secret of success of the Special Forces, as developed by Frank Kitson, was that they put themselves in a position to follow up their information Chapter One instantaneously and to do something about it. In operations of this kind it is extremely difficult for the soldier or A NEW JOB policeman not to feel that he is being frustrated by rules and regulations which to him seem to be specially designed to assist the enemy and prevent him getting on with the job. It was only in the prohibited area, i.e. the forest, where the Security Forces could operate in an unrestricted maimer. Elsewhere there were rules, and there had to be, to protect the innocent. In the Reserves, the European Settled Areas and in Nairobi these rules protected the gangs as well as the innocent. In spite of the disadvantages BEING asthmatic I was no use to the Navy so I had to join the Army I insisted we must play the rules and I was most loyally supported by the instead. This caused some stir in the family, but as I was obviously unsuited Security Forces. Unfortunately this did not prevent a number of people to the Church there was no alternative short of breaking a father-to-son who should have known better from lending their support to a smear tradition which has lasted for over two hundred years. In fact there was campaign against the Security Forces. In operations of this kind you can little harm done as my only brother was in the Navy and there is some take it for granted that you will be under constant criticism from certain thing to be said for a family not having all its eggs in one basket. My sections of the Press and public. There is not much you can do about it housemaster at Stowe was actually pleased and said something about a except to stick to the rules and not to lose your temper with your critics. 'narrow escape': he was biased, however, having been a regular soldier I have seen the British Army in war, in success and in adversity. I have himself for twenty years. also seen it undertake the entire administration of large areas of Germany I joined the Rifle Brigade in January 1945 and after eighteen months in —a non-military task but one which was carried out superbly for nearly England went to Germany as a lieutenant.

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