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This is to certify that the

thesis entitled

A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF PESSIMISM

presented by

FRANCIS MICHAEL DONAHUE

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A.CRITICAL EVALUASICH OF PESSIHI U

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A.THESIS

Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies of Michige State College of.Agriculture and Applied Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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\a/ i. If) v- as ACICIOITLEDGIERT

The writer is deeply indebted to Professor John Martin

DeHaan, Head of the Department of Philosophy, who gave generously of his time and was a constant source of guidance and inspiration throughout the preparation of this study. His kindness in grant- ing me permission to study the manuscript of his forthcoming Intro- duction to PhilOSOphy,‘A Call to Reflection, has been most helpful.

Grateful acknowledgpent is due to Dr. Lewis Kenneth Zerby,

Assistant Professor of Philosophy for carefully reading the manuscript and offering invaluable counsel and assistance in its organ- ization and revision.

I am also rrateful to Dr. Raymond M. Gonso, Assistant Professor k) of Philosophy for his helpful suggestions for its revision.

Sudh an acknowledgment cannot adequately express my indebtedp ness to them for their unfailing encouragement, critical appraisal an generous aid in this work. COZITEL' A a:

I THE HISTORY OF PESSIMISﬁ l

Pessimism Defined 3 Pessimism in Ancient Religions 8 modern philosophies of Pessimisn 20 II ETHICS Ann PESSIxIsn 37

The Meaning; of Good "8 Useful Good '0 True Good 1.11 Apparent Good 1’2 Life per se as a Value '6 Scholastic View of Life 50 Sd‘xoperﬁiauer's View of Life 50 Suicide 53 LeOpardi's Pessimistic View 58 Consciousness as Value bl Nirvana, the Denial of the Value _ of Consciousness 61+ Voluntarism as Value 65 Value of Pleasure and Pain 69 Material Goods as Value 8 Moral Good as Value 8

II METAPHYSIGAL PESSIMISH 89

The Hindu Outlook 89 The Buddhist Outlook 91 The Hebrew Outlook 95 Christ, the Pessimi st 8 Roman Catholicism and.Pessimism 10h The Calvinistic Outlook 108

IV TEE PROBLEM OF EVIL 113

rEhe Hedonistic Paradox 118 Joseph de Iiaistre's View 120 Kinds of Evil 122 Value of Sickness and Physical Ills 1214»

V COKCEUSION: PESSILIISEJ III THE 3mm}: 131

Argmwnts for Pessimism . 133 rI'he Golden Llean 135

BIBLIOGRAPHY 137 CKAPTER I

THE HISTORY OF PESSIXISL

Diogenes of old went about the streets of Athens, lantern in hand, searching for an honest man, fully convinced in his own mind that he would never find that for which he searched. If philosophi-

cal pessimists had a patron saint, I believe Diogenes would qualify for the honor. Like him, philos0phical pessimists of all ages have gone searching for truth, pleasure, honor, courage, and immortality, fully confident in their own.minds that they would find only suspicion, fear, arrogance, treachery and eventual annihilation. Even the Opti- mist Nietzsche deplored the surplus of defective, sickly, suffering, degraded individuals among men and stated that the successful man is always the exception, the "rare exception."

Turning back the pages of history, pessimists have felt that civilization has but provided a.veneer of artificiality for man's basic and incurable evils, which are the result of his essentially corrupt human nature. Rousseau declared that human evils follow the spread of the arts and sciences and grow in proportion as culture advances; yet he is considered an Optimist. He points to the examples of Egypt, Greece and Rome and to their eventual decline and decomposition as civilization advanced within them. It is his belief that science and art corrupt morals since they had their birth in corruption and seek its perpetuation. .Astronomy, he said, was born in superstition; oratory springs from ambition, hatred, flattery and deceit; geometry from avarice; physics, from vain curi- pessimism perience are moods, on those was Buddhist he and was for ing that culties and is sickness own ed osity. influence the man, to the reasoned, far vanity bear with new. that longer the destruction. he The Philosophical argue of larger and are was looked The in time him his philosophical Eartin vision on reflect is by Before of excess and they it utterly his inclined the innumerable, result personal drawing being into becomes sorrow, experience is a forth Luther, of case scales color our perpetuated.until our striving of eternity. pessimism, a life; of weary up mood, pessimist, upon more to the convincingly, era suffering, feeling with a pessimist the a the think civilization pleasures, of of and the of after calculus a dangerous pains the them men. protagonist course, world pessimistic life If the poorly or like same phantoms. the and and the and Hebrew emotion. is, .A and full he many of eventually man wider judgements finds is disappointment, in and satisfactions of of disappointments founded pleasures must he also of such life Prophet, of course, other breeds struggling prayed spirit world life weariness, But hen do faith; an true upon in so things, it unprofitable. we effort. more is are well and general. around that deeply when on a brings pass and it in such with influenced sad pains, wider the serious possible and aware the a the we joys? is on world and colored them. corruption, poverty Pessimism optimist about Lord pass end both sorrows grounds our and disillusion- that evils The he where Under Thus would to own judgement by old its by the and if confessed diffi- of justify becomes their than is ex- show- he all it life the come not DJ KN

all of one color nor of one kind. There is a need to distinguish

between ontolo3ﬁcal pessimism and continpent pessim1s1, while con-

tin3ent pew1 1a imay oe sue-divided into three tj'pes, namely:

materialistic contin3ent_pessimism, li 1t ea continjent jessimism,

and unlimited contin3 ent pessimism. There is also another type

of pessimism which I shall call psvcholo3ical pessimism, and it

is not to be included, strictly speakin3 , among the philosophical

types. In direct opposition to these types of philOSOphical pessi-

mism there are related types of Optimism and it is with a philosOp her

of ontolO3 ical optimic £1, St. Thomas Aquinas, that we shall deal in

some of our treatment of the subject of life, per se, as a value.

Briefly defining the types of pessimism, we find tliat ont0103ical

pessimism is an outlook which re3ards oein3, per se, as evil. Philo-

SOphers, (such as Buddha, SchOpenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann) con—

sider existence, re 3ardless of con tinL3 ent factors, as necessarily

evil. It would be far better that man should not exist, than to live

in even the best of earthly cond Hi0 us, for the ont0103ical pessimist

claims that the evils in life far exceed the 300d. It is not merely

a contin3ent fact that evil triumphs over 300d, but it is in the very

nature of thin3s that this should necessarily be the case.

Contingent pessimisz, with its three sub-types, holds that being,

per se, does not po sess value, but oecomes ei 1er 300d or bad, depend-

ing upon circumstances; it is contin3ent upon external and personal

actors. It does not look uoon bein3, per se, as evil but being in

a certain state or condition of sufferin3 or evil may be undesirable.

.The first sub-type, materialistic contin3ent pessimism is the philosophy of those who do not belie ve in iziuortality and have no hepe for a rectification or compens a tion in an a: ter—li f" 8. Death to the mater-

as ialistic contin3ent pessi mist is looked upon C. finality and cessation

1. of being. It to observe LIL let the materialist is seldom

concerned with ev1 e. ph ilo scuph i 0° prool em but views it rather as a.practical issue, for a concern with the problem of evil presupposes a belief in a deity, as we shall indie ate later in the chapter on The

roblem of Evil. Lucretius, the Epicurean, is one philosopher who held

this type of pessimism. The second sub—type is that of limited contingent pessimism, which is accepted by -r ‘bose th who while believing in

an immortal existence aft er death, Jvet consider the world with all of its works and pomp as evil, transitory and detrimental to man's eter— nal happiness. There are many ex nples of philosophers who have held to this fonn of pessimism, chief y, Christ, Job, Ecclesiastes, Calvin and Tolstoy and it is typical of monastic institutions w1ich strive to help men and women escape the wickedness of the world, overcome its bla ndisl mients and work out their eternal salvation. The third sub—type is that of unlimited contin3ent pessir1ism, which posits a totally 3loomy outlook of Ce lief in immo rtality but believes that both this world and an after-life are evil; man should therefore seek Kirval One example of this sort of pessimism is contained in the passa3e from Shane spere's

“Hamlet " , which will be dealt with in Chapter II The last type of

C pessimism with which we are concerned s psych0103ical pe u simism which includes scepticism and cynicism, as states of mind, of the man-in-the- street who does not conce rn himself greatly with ‘ the ph ilosophical in- tricacies of the nature of evil, but merely re003nizes ev1l when he finds it and stru“‘les with it or is defeated by it. Giacomo Leopardi U1

exemplifies this type in his talian poetry.

Voltaire, in a psych0103ical pessimistic vein, states the usual outlook of this type of pessimist:

"I am a puny part of the er=at whole. Yes: but all animals condemned :C‘ to live, All sentient thin3s, born by the same stern law, Suffer like me, and like me also die. ....the whole World in every member groans, All born for tornent and for mutual death. I

.‘An f- 1 o'er this ghastly haos you would say The ills of each make up the good of all! What blessedness! And as, with quaki.3 voice, Hortal and pitiful ye cry, 'All's Well,‘ The universe belies you, and your heart Refutes a hundred times your mind's conceit... What is the verdict of the vaster mind? Silence: the book of fate is closed to us. Kan is a stranger to his own research; He knows not whence he comes, nor Whither goes. Tormented atoms in a bed of mud, Devoured by death, a mockin3 of fate; But thinking atoms, whose far-seeing eyes, Guided by thou3hts, have measured the faint stars. Our being mingles with he iifinite; Ourselves we never see, or come to know. This world, this theatre of pride and wrong, Swarms with sick fools who talk of happiness...."

Ue may wonder at the causes of pessimism. hany philosophers,

Schopenhauer among them, have regarded selfishness as basic to a phiIOSOphy of gloom. Schopenhauer holds that selfishness is both normal and universal, but the evil that results from it may be beyond all comprehension. The egoist, he feels, is bent upon his own ends and does not hesitate to strike down all who Oppose him; but cruel spitefulness leads men to do harm to others for the pure joy of seeing

1. Selected works of Voltaire, London, 1911, pp. 3-5. others suffer. Cali3ula wished that the whole world had but a

sin3le neck so that he mi3ht sever it with one blow.

While selfishness may us one of he causes of pessimism,

Professor BeEaan asks if other causes might not be found in some

physical ailment or in one deficiency of the 3lands. He concludes m

after some studv of the point that while some pe essin Hi wt may have

glandular disturbances, it is not the cause of pessimism in all cases

for there have certainly been philosophers who have espoused the

cause of pessimism who have not suffered from any sucn deficiency.

In the manuscript of 1his forthcomin3 tooL, "A Call to Reflection," he writes:

"While it is true that a certain type of depression, called 'Involutional nelancholia,‘ is associated with the decrease in wl ndula ractivity, which normally occurs after middle a3e, the fact is the In 0st of the gree ter Tessiri ts 3ave symptoms of their gloomy stre.in in tieir ee .rly youth, or he d already died long before they could possibly heve been afflicted with 'Involut- ionql melancholia.‘ Inadequate factual knowledge often produces faulty thinkin3. Even if it could be demonstrated thet all vi ctir s of 'myzedema' (caused by a markedly under— active thyroid) were pessimists, you could st ill not conclude that if Bvron was a pessimist he must have lied 'my- :zedema.’ Such thini :in3 ~ mould be a clear—cut example of that type of falls-cy which 103icians call the 'undistriruted middle.'"

Pee sin nism has arisen in different countries and at difi erent

tirnes, thou3h e veys mder similar conditions end we may presume

that it implies the operation of similar causes, general and personal. he find it emer3in3 wherever greet wealth, luxury, "id refinement

alonr side of want, fami1ne,s1c23essand the sava3e mood the t

these arouse in men. It belongs to times when the forces tha work

l DeHeen, John h., "A Call to Reflection", a forthcomin3 Introduction

to Philosophy. for evil overpower the individual will and undertake to commend masses of men. Thus a totalitarian re3ime, bein3 contemptuous

01 1‘ no‘1‘ intolli 1- .. once 01 I. tne ‘, massw' a r 5 and (K I.‘ ess1m1st1c l . -- ‘ . ‘- 01 4 the 1 ao1lity p q . J- hj

of the common man to secure his own 300d, imposes a dictatorial form of 3overnment upon him. The philos0phy of me1's ability to

govern himself 1s an extremely Optimistic one.

1ne phi10s0p1w1;f3loom also sprin3s from the feelin3, Wh ether

in a fee or in many minds, niich slay be described as an attitude either of desit ondency or of despair, or the contempt of life. I

annot conceive of it as a perfectly normal or healthy feelin3.

A.man does not ask, "Is life worth living?" unless he feels that he has reason to doubt that it is. Ordinarily, a man lives his

life, or he may try to live it, worthily, and to fill it with uch [0 worth as he himself possesses. It is the men who despairs of life who feels it to be a burden and QUEStiLnS whether it be worth while to 30 throu311 with it.

Among the types of Hellenic philosol ahy there is one which closely resembles pessimism, thou 3h it was the o,posite of pessimism in many respects. This is Cynicisn, a belief marked not so much by a contempt for life in th abstract as a contempt for men who did not live worthily. It believed that life was good, and that it beca" bad only when its accidents were taken for its essence. ID believed in a law that bound all men to be virtuous; and it deSpised those who claimed to be 300d men, yet did not obey the law. In marv ways it bore a close resemblance to Stoicism, which also seems to have a 01

pessimistic strain. The Cynic, in h1s scorn of those wh made the

accessories into the essence of life, tended to disyense with even

what was 300d in these, and to despise refinement as xvell as the lure

uries in whi h it ima3ined it seem y and prOper to be clothed, in

order the t th e nakedness of the natural man might not be hidc er -.

The protest of the Cynic was a “a inst the conventiona habits, the

veneer of civ1mlizetion, whidh su3 we sted the shameful and stimulated

the sordid they were professedly used to conceal, “y attemptin3 to live

as a oaroarian. Thus the element of pessimism in his thou t was due

to the clearness with which he saw the evil in existing tendencies,

societies, characters and persons. However, so far was he from i“en

ifying the hypocricy which he hated with the whole of being which he

loved, that he conceived of evil as a contradiction of that law of

ri3ht and duty or virtue which was the highest of all la

In the realm of reli3ious thought there have been pessimistic nhilosoohies, principally the Buddhist and the Hiniu, but there are also certain pes Csinistic asxects to the Christian reli ious position.

Not only are there pessimistic strains in the teachings of hrist Him-

s=lf, but in some of the religious interpretations of the Christian

religion there have developed clearly pessim11stic characteristics. We merely mention some of them here, for they will be tre ated in greater

detail in a later pait of this work. Early Oriental and Occidental monasticism was clearly a limited contingent pessimism; Calvinism, while 1.anifestin3 elements of limited contin3ent pessimism also cone

tained e‘tain strains of unlimited con tingent pessimism in that it ’3 0 held some rxen to es eternallv damned and no eifort on tiieir part would

change their fate. A few words about the pessimism of Buddhisn and y the V . Indian religious positions might be useful here since thev form the basis of mucn of the philosophy of Arthur SchOpenhauer. Gotama Buddha,

(MS 3.0.) was one of the principal originators of the Vedic or

Nyaya philosophy. He was deified by his successors who also wrote down his sayings and transmitted them to posterity. There are no extant Writing of Buddha.himself, just as Christ, Confucius, Zoro- aster .nd other religious founders did not write the scriptures which eventually became the guide and touch-stone of their resoective religious followings. According to Buddha” happiness is attained in freedom which can only be acquired throuri knowledge. This freedom consists in a state of total self-negation. Buddha looking out over the world saw only evil and universal misery. He compared the ideal state which man longs for with the very real and ever present lust, covetousness, pride, anger and woe that results from man's selfi-h

raSpin r for satisfaction. Ken's misery, he held, is the result of

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51 1 too great concern with his own needs, or what he considers his m needs. Only through a process of emancipation from this concern for self, a process which would eventually lead to Nirvana or Arhatship, could man be freed of the never—satisfied will that goads him on, never satisfied, never resting. The similarity of this Buddhist concept of the supression of will to the philosophic pessimism of Schop- enhauer, is immediately aowarent. 4.44

In Brahmenic India pessimism is fundamental to the religious concept. All finite existence is burdened with evil. The source of evil is generally given as ignorance in Brahmanic writings and 10

as desire or tr irst for external thing s in Buddhistic writings.

But since e: :istence to the Brahman is evil and inextricably 4L bound up with woe and misery and insatiable desires. and since the Brahman

religion holds to the belief in reincarnation so that a.man can only look forward to a succession of xistences in similar woe and misery, non-being is looked upon as the 2

'J ighest good. This exemplifies

ontological pessimism since to the Brahman being per se is evil, and the highest form of good is not to be.

The Roman poet-philo sOpher Lucretius 98-55 3.0.) is an example of a materialistic contingent pessilnist, for he affirmed

that everything which exi st s in the universe is ultimately of the

same sort as those things which are called material. While he did not deny the existence of the gods, he did hold that they were not concerned with man and his problems. In his poem, "De Rerum

Nature," he sets forth the ethics of Epicurus and the physics of

Democritus as what a soul-searching and disillusioned man needed to be calm in facing life and death. It is a passage from this work of Lucretius that Schopenhauer used as the Shibboleth to end his lectures:

"Qualibus in tenebris vitae quantisque pericles Deg itur hoc aevi quodcumquest'"

Moving on to the Hiddle Ages we find that the asceticism of that time had certain principles and features in common with pessimism. It held the world too unclean to be a fit dwelling place for a.man of God; therefore, a.place to be forsa“en by him who was inter- ested in saving his soul. The existing order of society was conceived

1 "De Rerum Nature". II. 15 sq.. " In whe t d: rlmess of life, in what great perils, do we Spend our years, few as they are!" ll of as evil, and it was thought better that the good man should take himself out of that order than endanger his own soul by remaining within it. On the metaphysical side it was a doctrine of salvation, but on the material and social side it was a doctrine of annihilation,

so far at least,as its attitude signified that the world was so bad

that the pious man could neither desire its continuance, nor do anything

to promote it. It was in this last respect that it agreed with pessimism, for it conceived secular society as so under the power of evil that the happiest thing for it was to pass away and perish.

The asceticism of the Middle.Ages held that the interest derived from a maintenance of our physical life as well as the interest result- ing from the maintenance of the life of the entire community are not ends pursued for themselves, but stages and necessary means toward the attainment of man's true end. But, when these stages and means are accepted as true ends and are pursued as such by the will of the free individual that is ignorant of his ultimate and true end, under sudh misconception of truth, it was held, the pursued ends are to be charact- erized as false, while those who are so foolish as to pursue them are to be considered vain and deluded. If the will of man, the medieval philos0pher argued, having remained ignorant of his true end, pursues the secondary and material ends, he is necessarily deluded, labors in vain, and fails to achieve either peace, happiness or salvation.

SchOpenhauer further enunciates the importance of the will in pessimism for he regards will as that which is the most immediate in consciousness. Commenting upon this, Radoslav Tsanoff explains:

"Will....is prior to the subject-object dualism; and like 12

a magic Spell, it unlocks to us the inmost being of all nature. It germinates in the plant; through it the crystal is formed and the magnetic needle turns to the North; it is manifest in chemical affinities, in repulsion and attraction, decomposition and com- bination, coheasion, gravitation. All these are different only in their phenomenal existence, but in their inner nature are identical. Organic or inorganic, conscious or unconscious, as the case may be, the will ever presses for its fulfilment, meeting impact with resistance, adapting means to ends, responding to stim- ulii, seeking the gratification of instincts, acting on motives, on purpose, loving, hating, hOping, fearing, scorning, envying, enthusing, aspiring. Here is a telee elegy prior to and more ultimate than intelligence."

In any attempt to understand the pessimism of Schopenhauer, it

is important that we understand something of his peculiar psychology, for his writings are his protest gainst the world as he saw it. In evaluating a system we must ever remember its author's personal equat-

ion, take into consideration his character and.his intellectual and ethical qualities. This is especially so in attempting to understand the brilliant, many-sided "high-priest" of pessimism, - Arthur SchOpen— hauer.

From his youth he evidenced a keen interest in philos0phy and especially of the pessimistic thought that was to make him worldr renowned. But there was an objectivity about his thinking and he sought the counsel of those who might possibly be able to lead him in his search for the answer to the riddles that perplexed him. He went to Berlin and became a.pupil of Fichte, the successor of Kant, but soon tired of the "language of unintelligibility" Fichte affected.

In comparing Fichte with Plato and Kant, whom Schopenhauer had studied

1 Tsanoff, Radoslale., The Nature of Evil,_The Hacmillan Co., hew York, 1931, p. 28%. n assiduously, the Berlin professor appeared a mere pedant. ‘ or schelling he had scant praise, calling him a montebanh; while

Hegel's philOSOphy appeared to him to be a "crystalized syllOSism; it is an abracadabra, a puff of bombast, and a wish-wash of phrases,“ and all the verbiage led only to confusion and to impossible contra» dictions. Finding no intellect worthy of his attention in his own

'time he turned back to.Aristotle and Spinoza, to Rabelais and Mont— aigne. It was also about this time that he began to devote more serious study to the ancient Indian schools of thought, the Eimamsa and

Vedanta, Sankhya.and YOga, Nyaya and Vaisesika and those of Buddhism and Jainisn.

Philos0phical pessimism has been described as "the ‘ sense of evil turned into a theory of being and formulated in a law for the regulation and conduct of life." 1 Certainly, it has been found earlier in the Orient than in the western world. In the East, pessimism was given philOSOphical eXpression in Buddhism, not in the pepue lar Buddhistic religion, but in the eclectic Buddhist school of thinke ers. On reading Schopenhauer and then studying the Buddhist and Hindu writings, it becomes immediately apparent that the German philOSOpher was profoundly influenced by them. The following passage, spoken by

Buddha, might have been written by SchOpenhauer, so perfectly does it seem to express his passionate spiri :

"If we live today, it is because we have in some past existence accumulated the merit that calls for reward, or the demerit that cries for punishment. In order to

l Fairbairn, A.M., The Philosophy of the Christian Religion, The hacmillan Co., ﬂew York, 1902, p. 117. escape from being we must escape equally from merit and demerit; but to do this we cannot live among.men, where we must do the things which entitle to penalty or reward. We must retire from the world and culti~ate the suppression of the very desire to live, the surrender

of the capability to act, the quenching of the thirst that by goading us into action, binds by merit or demerit to the wheel of life. Yhen we have ceased to desire, we shall cease to will, cease to act, or to lose merit." I:

To Buddha (and to SchOpenhauer) existence in its very essence

seemed to be sorrow; sorrow for misery that had been in the past, or

was, or would be, endured by all mortal men who groaned and labored

and thirsted after satisfaction. SchOpenhauer was tremendously in-

fluenced by the Kantian philosophy but the basis of much of his pessi-

mism is distinctly oriental. With the Buddhist and the Brahmin, he

shares the belief that in every life there is an indestructible prin-

ciple. He gives the name of Will to the force which Indian philOSOphers

believe is resurrected with man in each of his successive reincarnations.

In noting Schopenhauer's indebtedness to Immanuel Kant, it seems

only fair to clarify his relation to that great philosopher. It is

true that SchOpenhauer gained much inspiration and stimulation from

a study of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," but Kant advanced to

the threshold of a truth he dared not enunciate if he would retain a

logical conformity to his own philosophy, for in his doctrine of the

inscrutibility of the noumenal world, he sets bounds to his own inquiry.

The ultimate metaphysical reality he called Ding_an sich, the thinqhin-

itself, but he had no explanation to offer beyond postulating the theory.

But Schopenhauer was bound by no Kantian periphery of the phenomenal

world, he dared to define the Ding an sich. He defined the incomprehens-

1 Carlson, J.F., The Writings of Buddhism, hurray Co., London, 1908, p. 16. ible as "We H111,“ Kent's thingrin-itself. the ultimate of reality.

According to SchOpenhauer it is neither mind nor matter, and while he does not attempt to explain it, he descrioes its work'ngs and character as unceasingly impelling, driving, grasping. It is the most immediate part of our consciousness and only upon our recogb nition of this Will as the dynamic force of our existence, can we learn in some measure to control our individual destinies.

Schopenhauer explains that Will is not a.moral will but the will-to-live. Our dissatisfaction and frustration results from the perception of the clash of our will-to—live with other things and w th other wills. But the striving and reaching of the Will is doomed to failure of final attainment and herein lies the heart of Schopenhauer's pessimism - for the will is evidenced in man in the form of desire and desire according to Schopenhauer is insatiable, and indestructible. Future generations of human beings, he says, who may differ from us in habits and customs, will yet be impelled onward from conception through the embryotic stages to birth to ad- olescence, maturity, senility and death. The individual man is like a leaf on a tree, which, when autumn comes, deplores the fact that it must fall, envious of the new foilage that will take its place in the spring. Where does this force come from that impells each generation of men, or leaves, or animals onward from birth to death? SchOpenhauer bids us to see that it is the same hidden force that is deathless, the

Will-to—live. It is the one invariable, identical and equal force in

existence. Will is want and desire and consequently is basic to pain, for pain, he states, is nothing more than not-having — from the desire to have. Unsatisfied desire is painful, whether I. it is for objective wealth, health, love, glory or in ortalit;r. Pleasure is the I) J U) 6’) ('1'

Ho desire, out satis r {0 F') [.3 :3 O C O O F ’J 9 ‘9 5 H :1: H

H. ECClOHS a" CD g. E 0 H) more infreouent occurance than dissatisfaction. Pain then, is

the positive aspect of reality vilile pleasure and good are nothin3 more than the momentary absence of pain and evil. Schooenhauer felt that desire last lon3 and its demands are inf Hit while satis-

13 H ct ion of desire is short and scantily measured out:

"It is essentially all the sauna whether 1e pursue or flee, fear injury or seek enjoyment, the care for the constant demands of the will, in whatever form it me v be, continually occupies and sways the consciousness; but without peace no true well-oein3 is possible. The subject of willing is tlrus constantly stretched on the revolvin3 wheel of Ixion, pours water into the sieve of the D .aids, is the everhlon3in3 Tantalus."

According to SchOp enhauer, the Will, which may be described as the pr’n ciple of ausation, is more a motivated than a mechanical .~

force° 7 it is one and universal, lies outside t1me and space, yet is ever 031°Ctlf"lﬂ“ its elf in the things that arise within time and

space. Will, he considered as inseparable from the person, distributed t111ou3hout the whole organism, and actin3 in it and throu3h it;

4L‘ the or3enism is the incorporated vv: will. It is . L' tnere101e A ~ -u because n‘_' 01 J this Will that we live, and willing is livinc. We create life, he held, by willin3 to live.

It is the ultimate reality Will which causes the stones to fall to the earth, the pieces of iron to cling to the magnet or the sun to draw the moisture into the clouds. It is this same Will which attracts or impells the moth to circle the flw .e and causes man to seek food,

l SchOpenhauer,.Arthur, The World as Will and Idea, trans. by Haldane and Kemp, Vol. III, p. 253. 17

to seek to 3overn nations or to

crave tlie affection of others. But the existence wxieh the Will

stru3 g3led to realize ras mise er5; it mes sorrow and would end in death. Schopenhauer conceived of the e1aborate and marni works of creation as bein3 without system of intelli enee or a mechanical order. IIe sr1iC tlat if creation as we know it, life as we possess or under 30 it, were the work of a conscious creator, then he was the greatest of all wron3-doers! He must have been an

ill-advised God, who could make no oetter Sport than to objectify his will into so lean and hun3: r5 a world. Schopelhauer, therefore, denied corseious°~1ess to the creator for he could not conceive of

xistenee that was mis m' as havin been divinely ‘1 O desi3ned, or its desi3ner would have been 3ui ty of an unpardonable crime, far worse than the sum of d1 human evi il, which would but have its or i3 in in

he divine se diam.

It vzas Schopenhe uer's contention that this world is so evil that no world would 1a ve been better; it is some 3 that mi3ht better never have been. What then re s to be done with this un-

ate miscreancy? SchOpenhauer sincerel" believed that he had "iven the answer to the question of the a3es - since the world could not be mended, it on ht to be brou3ht to an end, for the only

to escape from sorrow was by escapin3 from existence. There1ore, in} is works he pre meh a doctrine of resi3nation or abdication of the

had its ori3in in will, by extinction of the will it would be possible to bri1n3 about he extinction of bein3. Peace from

a insatiable drive of the will comes when will is denied and renounced. }. pJ c1- CD honini men, was 1 null masse going alizing and erized and endless dealin3s crisy the Individuals craving selfi Ibid., not free. followers aacniavellian ‘9 He continue shielding U) and of , 1ne V lupus! by wars always that never the after O men with "To ss raintene1ce p. which worlds. world and bein other, the exploitation, the complete! 1d He are by inconsistency 392. this raged and if livin3 will (as, demonstrate of to therefore canecity others. what tires Hor their the so essentially is it tile a exist in of areda who world, pretences ey has Prince have The veneer the does on is which, nations o= man's pride 3‘ave did ‘ ”A only no is the essentially w hi- ner for absurdity been pointinr tory he none greed, reaches a not matter her to pretence of to of of feelin3 of offer ownia and existence, continue therefore, hs.in for of this that sought selfish us Peace men kill of culture thousanc.s the 3 the cor1uption salv how its that this in out any of SchoPenhauer is calling scene specnla more miserable I" they pal his while to of Ho rulers Lid . 3laring.“ to the; and :3 the - Rousseaun ainful and it n

he 01 apply every benefitin3 his of original exist would intelli3ent their of est increases is futility coldly mey manners. felt, themselves th- saec and tho tormented pes others, the y ceeths de3ree the and avenous Dy be consciences seek ‘crrm: misery n misled ridicules; Li1ism he nest ruthless devourin3 unsatisfyin3. killed. system rder consolation :ﬁ state of salv.a;s the with r to nd man in It and ent of Christians the and beast their the is common cover man, man is knowled3e all of is; its aaonized thorough- in endlec in Homo by this thei: the stunid was ea ontnnisn, been possible which a to fellow sell- is their their man, that ration— de3ree hypo- 1 noble condition this charact- men }—J (D 01 ’1 13

In his essay on The ani.. o: 1*istCTCC, S1hO'

corgeres the stru33les of men to the teamin: movements 0: "in—

fusoria" when viewed throu3h a microsco-

f cheese, all of which a33ear to bustle about with

ea3 ern es and pur; se, *ut which to the

and ridiculous. In the microscope of our 0"rn consciousness,

xistence We live seems so lar3e and important 1 out Schenenh.1er

says that an individual existence is but an indivisihle point drann

out and er lar fed by the l nses f Time and Syace.

‘he will in re_ation to a philos enhy of pessimism has three

fundanental ends, (1) the percenal or carnal interest, (2) the

public or social interest, (3) the metaphysical interest in the

soul, and the larger problems of rezlit 3!. These three funda 1ental

erests have as the cause of their existence three primary desires })

of the soul, that is, the desire for l H- e, the desire :or power, and ¥

the desire for knowledge, which are develoged successively one after

the other as man matures. .ne main power and knowledge, 'herefore, a consciousness of the lack of thes

qual’t H’- ie arouses a des1re to acquire them, - the will reaches out

to achieve these thin3s which it conceives as necessary for its satisf-

action. The livin3 man is sustained in life throu321 the power and knowled3e he mossesses. He is conscious that he lives well or badly xrithin a sr.eci fie d period of time; that he possesses a small and not

a great amount of strength; and th 1at sknovledre is quite limited

and his i3norance colossal. As a result of his consciousness of this

1. Schopenhauer, Arthur, Essays, ed. T. Bailey, Saunders, Wiley Book Compe.y, ﬂew Yorx, . l9h2, p. 2%. ‘n lack, there 3roxs \ithin h n the desire to acguire the thinvs he

does not possess, nd t1 eg‘ seem 300d, desirable to him. From a

consciousness of tl1e mi: erablenes and brevity of life there grows

in man the desire to live sell and lens; from a consciousness of

weakness there syrin3s the desire to be able to accomplish all that

he wills; while from a consciousness o f i3norance there comes the

as g isre to learn and know every thi113unlmom1.

By means of the p1ursical world, the \.'il.l, aided by whatever

insi3ht the intellect provides, seeks to satisfy the {esire of a

‘y and lenxtbv lize; by means of the moral world of human society

it seeks to s atisfv the desire for power; while bv near.s o? a search

for the ori3inal source of all thin3s , the Prime Cousa, it seeks to

attain compassion and the absexzce of desire. Hen turns his 3aze to

the stars, reaching out for tile en lik a tin" child, and when he fails

to touch with h1s fin3 ers the infinity beyond, he sulks and grows

despondent and lessim istic.

.A 3lance into history reveals to us others of the more prominent philcsoyhers of pessimism, amon3 them Giacomo LeOpardi, EQu rd von {‘7

Eartmei r. and Tolstoy. A brief mention of pessimistic elements in

the writings of Rousseau will also be made, alon3 with mention of

Voltaire's strains of pes s1rmim1

Jean Jacques Rousseau taujht that reason is not an infallible

guide to truth and more.l conduct but in the really imgortant questions

of life man should depend upon his etiotion and instincts for he held

that the lens of nature are the only infallible guides. He denounced

the "thinking man“ as a depraved animel and extolled the life of the 21

savage. In his campaign to lead maziinn a ‘ "oacl: to nature“ he loomed upon the origin of nrivate property as 1.- the primary source of human |> sufferinp and misery. In explanation of this position he states:

"The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, could think of saying, This is nine, and found peoyle single enough

to believe him, was the real founder of civil society. How many cri in s, wars, murders, miseries, and horrors would not have been s_pared to the human race by one who, plucking up tlie stakes, or filling in the trench, should h3ve called out to his fellows: Beware of listenin ng to this imoo ter; you are undone if you forget that the earth belongs to no one, and that its fruits are for all."

So thoroughly did he feel that western civilization was decadent and that mankind had degenerated into aoys1al stnuidity that he re- marked that if he were to be a Eigritian Chieftain ruling a native tribe of COfIN11 telv uncivilized savages, he sould have the first

Euroyean mi ssi ionary or aLHvoc te of the ideas of occidental civilizar tion O hangedQ upon entering 0 hlS C lands. 2

Living in tlze same era was the inmort: l Voltaire who once wrote to Rousseau that ofter ree ding his work it caused him to feel like walking on all fours, for Roussea u had0 tated thct man closely ajproach- ed the brute. This does not mean that Voltaire was any more Optimistic of man's ability to rise above his brutish nature for he too deSpised the "StUU1lld masses" and felt that they were like dumb oxen fit only for the y he, whip and fodder. Yet, desy it ethis despairing outlook concerning nan, Voltaire spared no com13assion in his efforts to amelior-

l. Rousseau, Oeuvres, Vol. I, p. 551; transl. in Xorley,"Rousseau". 2. Tsanoff, Radoslav, The Nature of Evil, The Macmillan Co., H.Y., / 1931: P- 150- ate the condition of those who suffered oppression, nor did he

T? O'. confine his efforts to ‘ rance alone. his letters, filled with biting barbs of wit and sarcasm, reached into all parts of the world to voice his protest against the cruel treatment of an individual or a minority.

While Voltaire's Candide is an insolent parody on Optimism he does show that the sufferings of men touched him, whether these sufferings were caused by the forces of nature or by man's inhumanity to his fellows. An earthquake at Lisbon stirred him almost as much as though his closest friends had been involved, and one must respect him the more for the passion he shows, for the indisiation with which he rejects the idea that eternal law can ius cents.

But France has never been a stronghold of pessimism and Voltaire's

Candide was regarded as something novel. It is true that Frenchmen are often cynical in their indifference but he always seems to retain his taste for life and but seldom sinks into the depths of despair.

Death is not the timely-topic for morbid discussion in France that it was in Germany. French literature, while lawless and sensational enough in some respects, looked upon life with a smile or a laugh, but seldom with a jeer or a grimace of scorn. Troubadours and trons veres raised their voices in song to their dhatelaine in words of love and occasionally boastfully of their prowess. Rabelais wrote with a laugh that often approached tears but the French generally, had little time for the morbid.

l Saltus, Edgar, The Philosophy of Disenchantment, Brentano 00., 1885, pp. 8-0. n)

K»:

While not ess ntially a.philosopher, though his writings

preach a gospel of negation and pessimism, the Italian Count

Giacomo LeOpardi, (179 1837) is an example of a psychological

pessimist. He lived one of the most distressing xistences among

men of genius. Almost blind, hunchbacked, suffering digestive ills,

asthma” neurasthenia, dropsy, inflammation of the lungs and the humil-

iation of poverty, this stepchild of Fortune wrote some of the most

beautiful of all Italian verse, and the pessimistic creed.he taught

always seems sublime, deepite the depths of gloom to which it descends.

Leopardi anticipated the criticism of posterity which would lay

his pessimism to the account of his infirmity of body. In 1332 he

wrote to a friend protesting against those who would attribute his

pessimism to his poor health:

"Before dying I shall protest against this weak and vulgar notion, and beg my readers, instead of blaming my illnesses to turn to the disposal of my observations and reasonings."

Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that the unhappiness pof his early childhood, the long days spent in veritable seclusion

in his father's library, the lack of parental affection, the ridicule

of the townspeople of Recanati, the town where the Palazzo LeOpardi

had stood for many years, and the hereditary tendency toward rickets

and nervous infirmities that afflicted the Leopardi family - all

contributed to his gloom state of mind and influenced his writings.

_The wonder is that his genius overcame these infirmities and that he

was able to become the foremost writer of Italy during his time and

l Epistolario, Vol. II, p. #79. Cf. Hjalmar Hahl, Les tendances morales dans l'oeuvre de Giacomo LeOpardi, Helsingforé, 1896, p. 1h.

that in the midst of his sufferings and despair he was yet able to write lyrically about love and life. Beneath it all there is the pessimistic strain, of course, but there is a dark beauty about it nonetheless. In one of his works, Zioaldone, .Q Leopardi expresses his pessimism:

“Works of genius have this peculiarity that, even when they represent the nothingness of things, even :hen they clearly demonstrate and make us feel the inevitable unhappiness of life, vhen they express the most terrible moods of despair, yet to a great mind, even though it may be in a state of extreme depression, disillusionment, blankness, ennui, and weariness of life, or in the bitter- est and most paralyzing misfortunes (whether with reference to deep and strong feelings or to anything else), they always serve as a consolation, rekindle enthusiasm; and though they treat of and represent no other subject than death, they restore to such a.mind, at least momentarily, that life which it had lost....And the very knowledge of the irreparable vanity and falseness of everything beautiful and great is in itself a certain beauty and greatness which fills the soul, when this knowledge is found in works of genius. The very contemplation of nothingncss is a hing in these works which seems to enlarge the soul of the reader, to exalt it and satisf‘ it with itself and its own despair." 1

Leopardi turned with disgust from the present in which he found himself and sought refuge in classical antiquity, in the writings of.Homer and the Latin poets. He was terrified to find himself in the midst of nothingness and he despaired at the thought that amid this futility he himself was nothing. Like Rousseau he blames civilization with its veneer of hypocricy and selfishness for the misery of man, - if only man had been permitted to remain in his original state he could have escaped the bitter disillusionment of a fictitious

l Leopardi, Giacomo, Zibaldong, Vol. I, pp. 349 \ ff. edited o with . s Introd— uction and notes and a.Verse-Translation in the metres of the Original, by Geoffrey L. Bickersteth, Cambridge University Press, 1923. modern culture. He saw in the Gospel a pesshnistic other-worldly attitude of Christ Who had said that His kingdom "is not of this world."

In the brightness of the dreams of youth, a young man may look into the future with hope and Optimism, reaching for the pleasures, the glories, the greatness that he can build for himself. But LeOpardi warns him that his dream is but an illusion that will soon pass and in its place there will be the grim reality of the evil and nothingness of life. “Men regard life as Italian husbands do their wives: they must needs believe them faithful, although they know them to be otherwise." 1

LeOpardi does not accept an absolutistic concept of ethics in his Zibaldone for he writes that values are relative and that good is merely a matter of custom and mores. Truth and knowledge he despaired of and called them “unnatural and baneful to man." Even the concept of an infinite God must be dissipated in the cold light of his pessimism, and with it all belief in immortality, for he regards all hOpe of eternal glory a myth men no longer even laugh at.

As a final indictment of the world and existence, this lyrical pessimist makes a statement in the concluding volume of Zibaldone:

"All is evil. That is, all which exists is evil; that all things' exist, is an evil...." 3 There is no infinite, only plodding, evil, evanescent man and the ruthless nature which encompasses him.

l LeOpardi, op. cit., p.351. 2 Tsanoff, Radoslav, The Nature of Evil, p. 235. 3 LeOpardi, op. cit., p. 10“. PO

Despite his perplexity with life and his ready admission that he nor any man may ever comprehend the awful mystery of its futility,

LeOpardi holds onto life and seeks to live it fully, finding in it (O

mystery a challenge to spur men on to achievement - this is the para- | .L b dox of his philosophy, that he believes all effort futile, yet he would not have any man cease asoirin“ if man has within him the evil genius that will not rest, the insatiable will of which SdhOpenhauer writes. Commenting upon this . aspect of Leopardi's pessimism, Francesco J. de Sanctis writes:

"LeOpardi produces the contrary efiect of that which he intends. Hot believing in progress, he makes you desire it; not believing in liberty, he makes you love it. He calls love and glory and virtue illusions, and kindles in your breast an endless desire for them. You cannot leave him without first wishing to pull yourself together and be purified, in order not to have to blush in his presence. He is a sceptic and makes you a believer; and while he sees no possibility of a less dismal future for our native land, he rouses in your breast an ardent love for it and fires your heart for noble deeds. He has so low an estimate of human nature, and his own soul lofty, gentle and pure, honors and ennobles it...."

Like many another philos0pher, LeOpardi turns to contemplation, to intuition and imagination as a haven of rest to which we might return occaionally to find surcease from the unending struggle in a life of evil, to help him attain nobility amidst the ignoble.

In the 5? axy of pessimistic philOSOphers, Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann, like SchOpenhauer, xemplifies ontological pessimism, and his philos0phy might be considered a logical continuation of

Schopenhauer's position. Born in 18H2 in Germany, Hartmann's child-

l Sanctis, Francesco de, Saggi Critici, 30 edition, pp. 297 f. hood, as different from that of Leopardi or Sdhopenhauer, vas a very happy one. In fact, looking into his early and later life, it would be difficult to find any personal frustration or tragedy to which his pesshnistic strain mirnt be attributed. Perhaps it is the result of his sensitive nature and his keen penetration into the problems of existence, rather than any personal suffering, that developed.his pessimism. In fact, it is legendary that the common saying among his friends and aquaintances in Berlin was,

"If you want to see really contented and happy faces, then go to the house of the pessimists, the von Hartmanns."

Von Hartmann's early training was sporadic and unspectacular.

He disliked university regimentation and the type of life of the students but strangely enough did not rebell against the roughness and discipline of army life, for he entered the army and served until an accilent to his knee made it necessary for him to retire once more to private life, at the age of twenty-two. He suffered no serious impairment to his health, however, and there is no evidence that the rheumatism which eventually develOped hindered him in living a full life.

He married the famous Agnes Taubert, herself an ardent pessimist and authoress of the work Der Pessimismus und seine Gegner.

After her death in 1877, Hartmann married again and seems to have been just as fortunate in the choice of his second wife, as he had been of his first. Indeed, since his family life was so happy, one must attribute the following statement on the trials ud tribulations D.) O)

of married life to his keeness of observation:

"Family happiness is even in n ormal circumstances uncertain. Either husband or wife is not of much account, or they are not quite suited to each other, or th e marria3e is c11ildless, o1 el.se yields so rich a crop of cl ildi en that daily care visits the home, or efforts to prevent too many births poison conju3al happiness, or the illnesses of ;a rents or children cast a shadow over the home, or the parents must need bewail the loss of he very children who seem dearest, or else the werry over some blind, dea_-mute, imbecile, epileptic, or otherWise sickly or inv alid c ild emoitters their joy in the others. If the children grovr up, then therschool-.vor1ies over lary or un3ifted children wei 3h over the parents more than over the children, s.d perhaps there is a li3ht-minded, 300d—for-nothin3 among them. Should the hildren all fare well, then suddenly he mother dies, and leaves her husband to worry how with stran3e help he can bring up the children, or else the father himself passes frfm the home circle and leaves the family in sudden need.“

In true Schopenhauerian style, Hartmann follows, in thought, the life struggle of man from the first moment of life to the grim defeat of death and he finds only unadulterated wickedness, misery and evil of every sort. Like Schopenhauer, he finds life's good of brief duration and mixed with evil. He cannot conceive of a pure 300d, for aW1op tin3 some of He 3el's dirlectic, he feels that every 3ood cont: ins within its elf the seed of future evil. Thus a man mi311t enjoy eating or drinking or pleasure of any sensual sort, but his 1 oys 1n experi “c13these goods are shortlived, U for they soon turn into re3ret, shame or diS3ust. Even antic ciiated pleasures rarely meas re up to one' s ex1ectations or if they do, they are of sucl1 slort dur:tion that the loss of them brings with it new desires that cannot be fulfilled or satisfied.

1 Von Hartmann, Eduard, Grundriss der Axiolorie oder Yert v5 gun3plehre, p- 59. ’1' '1‘ ”Hat r- -1, 5n 1 ., mann re lly ace r): -1 plish: 11 vas -~r a. A nyo..~ v . -,v 1u1sation . ‘ . n . 01 5‘ the ‘

Hosovnic s .. stens 11-? o; nonopennauer "‘ ‘1 -1 ‘.,.. 1 and “ he”. 1.. el, and ,_ ‘ 1nsp1reu ‘.1.._,' ,5 ‘, DJ [—4

acneilinr he sou3nt to overcome irrationalism and rationalism my

and idea. 11eUr1conscious, he claimed, 3enerates all values in

a philosophical sy tem w.i 1 avoids what he considered the error

of subjecti e monistic izealism and phenomenalism by means of

the solution he believed he had evolved, - transcendental realism.

In a manner somewhat reminiscent of Plato and Aristotle, thou3h

certainly not a3reein3 with them in the 103ical roral consequences

of the civisio11 nortmcnn rec03n'zes three positions of moral develOp- ment: the realm of Nature, which includes animals and man in his natural state; the realm of1' .orrﬁl y, which includes man in a state of adherence to moral principles or standards of et ics, consciously followed; and lastly, the realm of the super—moral. Each of these

three realms contribute toward the true end of the Universe. tan,

in his natural state, best tends oaard t21e rezlization of his own destiny and the supreme end of the Universe by followin3 his instincts,

rather thou onv conscious dr've, for the Unconscious is the only un— errin3 guide for those who do not possess moral ins i3ht. A more 1 bein3, however, would best promote the true end of the Universe by bein3 moral.

Both the 300d and the evil man, accordin3 to Ho Hr monn' s philoso:1hy, promote the end of the Universe, thou3n the morally good man promotes

it more. If the moral man does evil, he retards the true end of he

Universe which will be attained, but not soon as if he would refrain

Iron Fl doing evil. 1

1 “a 1:.) 4- l Rasndall, nast1n3s, ' —. 119 , -neory 1 'A of seedQ - a1aA“ T Erilj . Cnforu .1 Press, lonuon, ‘ 192%, ‘1 pp. 27u—'{o. /' -7 Hartmann explains his whilosOpny of the Unconscious by

"”1e worl H°l€t3 only of a sum 0; activities or W111- acts of the Unconscious, and the e30 c1nsists 01 another sun 0: activities or 1ill-acts of the Unconscious. Only so far as the fervor activities int rse t the latter does *2. ‘ ' 0 he -- th la ter

en or Unconscious is OUVOSBC to

our on.; it 1H01ld be to our advanta3e not to live, it is to the adv vanta3e o: to 1 1e v me nscious that we should do so, and that others should oe crou3ht into exist ence 13211101131. us, Ha tnann held. The

'ncz nsoious, therefore, in the securin3 or adv ncement of its aims,

a1)" has surrounéed m:n vith such il usions as are cagua .1 him into the belief that life is a pleasant and *esirable thin han's instincts are no hing but the forms whidi conceal this un-

J...‘ I 1... ,

reasonin3 desire to live and the unconscious use (.0

1.11888 (.61 Ho CeS to inspire men and mould him to its proz* it. In this Way, Hartr 1nn I‘ l l 1 (1" H. (D | F5 ‘t ...) *‘3 (f t' O :1 I v c (0 (D

r man expends :0‘ H k. O H. U) (D O 0 0 which but 3ivec him the ri3ht to su1fer; from t; cedes the erroneous idea whi 41 is formed of the pa'n and pleasure derivable from life and the fresh hepes that sorin

Steaks 0: one "stupification of the will at the existence of the ‘ A.

1 von Hartne nn, Eduard,F JILOSOPHIE DES UUTEHJSSTEI, transl.by Coupland, Vol. II, p. 2:2.

2. 1.018... g J.D 830 "‘3 3.;

Eertnann felt the world-drama to be one of tragedy. As

men becomes conscious he knows of the rain and the misery that

abounds universe 13. With regard to hni>1ntss, he holds that

there are three fonts of illusions: (l) the illusion the. under

certain circumstances happiness is chl‘cole in 01; present state

on ecrtn- (2) the illusion tht hegpiness can be realized in a futtze

state; (3) the illusion thdt napji iness till be discovered in the

march of progress through the cor.1in3 centuries. Only when eocn of

these three elm “h s1e been dispelled universally, Enrtmann

believed, will the world be ready for its great quietus

In drawing up J the De ilFL sheet 01 liie, Her menn differs

from SchOpenheuer on the question of the purely no“: :tive Chara-cter

of pleasure. That pleasure is at times a neeative condition, as in

the cessation of pain, he willingly admits, but from his Viceroint

it is something else besides. It may be eitiiei positiwe, altnor~~

derived from £1 illusion, es in love; or re: as in art and science.

ﬁevertheless, the r‘ecowinence Oi pain over pleasure seems to be

fir ly estaoli.hed according to Her tn .enn's svstem. and his examin—

ation of this suoject is not without a repellent interest. Like

Sc.ooennuder he feels tlat men's quest for L7 one setisfvinv is a use- 9 x.) 1 - 1 SS and vein SC {3‘ TOP...

We now turn to Russia which in the late 1850's was in e seething

state of turmoil with Opposition brewing to the reactionary reQime of

Eicholes I. Peesznt serfdom no longer seemed to answer one needs 0

tLe geople. vestonol fel1 and witL it passel mucL of the Rursian

1 lsenoff, "‘ Tne 'I nature 1 of Ev1l, pp. gay-gnu. war“ 'TF( " W'L tr 0: U1eatn5ss. Mm “La In cnai1ctexistic r» at n . . 31s21an ‘Q A . :Lsnion, ﬂy- . e.cr;11*.11U -- -‘L a —‘ seems. ‘ ‘1'". ‘ J .‘o‘ ole 1 ens 0 ~ cmszninQ Q “-4-. ' ' '4 tns vr cr1t1c12e1, . . . ‘ Otertn1ow v- ‘ -i v 01 4” sez1oom, '1': ‘ cou1ts, 'r‘ guo11cW ‘1 1 '. eo1cc j ‘ t1on, Cbuborbnlg, ’t‘“ n \“ o ‘r' lCCal r _ . terlnent v ~. . «s ens(‘3‘ ~ EVCIJ . 1--

14? OK“. Of 0011 -" u I‘OJ. ‘ \.-.-..S ~vrx 13119 ‘ OLA—J .‘1 80101 . ~ ‘L'.A u lot). 4“.‘rL 1.1-1111. SEN-slit ‘- U. ﬁ at,1“ Ir) E "1‘“ -1 118ch q" . In“*7 C' 1".- - one ranted to make changes enu improvements - to turn thin s unside down.

Count Leo Tolstoy, who has ho‘n on An ust 23, logo, fir-{'1 wrote oiling these troubled times and as he grew older his rm 1t 1110s exercised a great inflrence not only upon Russian t'wo ht, but u10n the rest of the world. It may not be preper to sjeak of a To stoyan "yhilOSOph.C£' system" but certainly his pessimistic i‘eologies reflect Quite accu r. ately something of the gloom and passivity of the Rus€1an nontLlitv; it m1 it oe szid that 'Iolstowr has verbalizel the pessinistic philOSO*

Tolstoy had every educational advantere Curin; his youth. His mother died ' Zen he was almost two years old, but on the family estate of Yasnaya Polyana, the young Tolstoy received affectionate care from his father, grantmother, aunt aml oth- r members of his ‘ 111‘ oily.

One of his favor te Cnestles as a child was to search for a creen H. b b c'ticl: upon which, it was said, was carved the formula for ncl111e s.

All his lire lon~ Tolstoy searchec ~ for the form ula :or happiness ans a peace and after his death they buried him in the egot he had selected,

- L. tne place where the green stick tas reputedly buried.

hidway in his lifetime, Tolstoy found himself adrizt in a sea of lng-LClolono ~n "a. {.0 ‘r' 11::‘n («‘1.31.--‘VL.~.(:‘CL 'x'rnﬂ 111.:ja'r‘ v :90: —-r«_cr~-- 1651...]. -1.., 10 ..\:o11...- 1‘1rlt‘.‘1'.C-;.; -1, 1.111;;‘r’r- .Lc-.ll__~yI',~~"]~v-

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7vI; 1.92. - q attAanL L '- tut I lik‘i.\d11t h: "‘1 O1 'F‘ 1 L m an autumn '1 ~ 5- O L; _ 8.1.]. Q stenuazus J— V ‘2 Lnu. ‘ -, ct he felt the transiency of all that he possessed. The growing intensita of his spiritual se arch for a religious I 6 ith thzt would solve all his

A nouots ‘ - L v~° “as .ra1L ii! ally ~ oiLhing ~ 11-.~°v - n1n‘- o - abaJ 0"“ 1104 “‘5 v- J'“ the rnateriel conce1.1s o — life. a In narcng . Q loYo, (If f his Wife nauN a written o of her nusoand1 a in o he1 "1 ’11 r *3 F. '73

"Today he ears that he cannot live long in this terrible reli gle in which he has been buried over these last tw years...." But he was repelled by the worldly theologians and by the leer ed of his day.

He turned to the poor, siuole, u11lettered folk, nil rims, monxs, sect- arians and Ieasants for a solution to his problem. He was driven to thou Jhts of suicide, but eventually acce;1ted the beliefs of the humble peOple of Russia who had "iven him an inssi slit into the understanding of the meaninr of life. Like them, he felt that he must li"e "godly", and that he must ren01 Luce all the plea sures of life, humole him sel suffer and be merciful. For a time he cs.refully ooserved the fasts e-nd prescriptions of the Russian Orthodox Chuich but in the end had to con:ess that belief in Orthodoxy was inpossiole for him. He

\.'ondered thy the priests of his own Church considered the beliefs of all other C11istians heretical. he felt that the conflicting inter- oretations of d1e erious chura es, had nullified the teacnings of

Christ Who had ;1 MC wi ed to unite all in one 181th are love and that they had L t succeed.ed in destroying what religion had sought to create.

Tolstoy' solution was to acceft the liter 1 crzin; of non- 1 f- 1 Fron the Sermon on the .C i *‘S H d" C H 1'15 O U) U) C (n H. (—4- }.Jo H, (D (4‘ c O .1: ‘4 H) H 9 U) E“) 0 (D m (I) Mount,,‘ m -OlStuJ A'V eluc1uLted . :r ‘ f -."-" »e coanLnenents 'V‘l’ '-- V‘.“ ‘ that ‘01- he ”' accentedIN N‘ :or n

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core of Christ's teaching, and if n H cc» iced mould link reli ion to man's daily life. He saw clearly all their far-reachirg im- plications. For a "(In tho rczuses to swear an oath cannot take any fart in the offices of civi government or serve in the armv; the complete observance of the commandment "resist not him that

H. s evil" involves ultimately tl.e entire abolition of comgulsory H

Q s1 w tion, law courts, police and prisons, as Well as all forcible {‘1 restraints of man by man; and adherence to "love y ur enemies!"

Would mean the end of all wars. But he in ally realized, as he sait- ‘JJ that man is we: h and in aye ble of a strict obse-rance of such pre- cepts as "do not ’13ry" or "Do not lu st“, and to abstain from anger and lust as much as possible, he admitted, was perhans all that 1 our depraved a11im al natures would allow. He regarded man's selfishness as the root of evil.

What then could be the solution if man lives amidst the

Vic :edness and corruption Tolstoy found on all sides? Has the solution to Withdraw into a hopeless longing for a Rousseauen o ‘3'

state 01 man's ori3inal blessedness? Or silould a defe atist at (+- H 5; {L (D be adOpted, - the world is evil and man can do noth n3 to radicallv

iolstoy felt that the solution must be one, not only for all men to be able to follow, but one which he lzi elf could immediately put into practice. He anticipated something of the Ru mi.n Communist or harxian tWIeor of aoendonin3 the d C 8‘sn onest practice of accepting ,IJ unearned increment, of 32inin3 any lezm fit that is not directly

and couple clv e6111ed by oneself. he ccndenntd the evil in man which caused him to resort to violence, er103 :.nce, lust, exploit— ation of the humble and the poor, and the 3rcs in3 for power.

Juch of his feeling of dee air over civil ization and its

evils is contained in his wo"h Pram“

"Peeple say to me, 'uell, Lyof Hi- olaevitch, as far as preaching 3oes, you p1each; out how about your meetice?' The question is a perfectly natural one; it is alW'"s put to me, and it alwty shuts my mouth. Condezzn 19, if you c.100se.- but condemn 13g, and not the path which I am followin 3....If I know the road home, and if I 30 along it drunk, and staggering from side to side, does that prove that the road is not the right one? Do not yourselves confuse and mislead me, and then rejoice over it and cry, 'Look at him! He says he is 30in13 ho:..e, an” he is floundering in the swamp!' Ky he:1t is bre 'Lin3‘ with despair be- ceuse we have all lost the road; and while I struggle tith all my strength to find it, and keep in it, you nstead of pitying me When I go astrev , cry triumph, antly, 'sees He is in the s.”r-..p with us!" 1

Tolstoy saw clearly the evil in the world, and to him it

seemed more pervasive than any temporary good that mi3ht be found. K: h of his ‘espair over civilization evolved into a thorou3h3oin3 pessimism of a limited contingent type. The world is evil, he felt; Inan he s no alternative but to make the nest of a very b2 d situation and the best way to do this is to follow the Gospel teaching.

Fundamental to each of the foregoing types of pess1mism there has been clearly evident certain value-judgements concernin3 the nature of good and evil. In the attempt to arrive at an under-

l Tolstoy, Psvma, Vol. I, pp. 1M2 ff.; transl. in Hcvelock Ellis, "The New Spiri ," 1890, p. 225, quoted by Tsanoff, hature of L'il, n. 170 standing of pessinicn it is necessary to ahe into consideration the types of ethics which give rise to such a despairing attitude.

It will also prove useful to investigate certain philosOphiccl positions, such as those of St. Thomas Aquinas, Nicolai Hartmann and H. Noldin, S.J. on the value of life per se; the value of consciousness and the importance given to Kirvana and non-being as Opposed to this value; the evaluation of pleasure and of pain; voluntaris: as a vlaue with the renunciation of will as its anti-

hesis; and lastly the value placed upon both material and moral goods as things men seek in their Quest for the satisfying and the lasting in existence. I shall attempt to clarify the meaning of eood an 1 some of its aspects in What follows. (‘11 CEAPTER II

ETHICS AL' PESSIXI&

Frederick Xietzsche, in his work The Genea103y of horals

states that man in the ancient past has called "300d"

things which were useful to him and while eventually he for3ot

the ori3in of the value-theory, there develOped a habit of pra lS in3 certain thin3s as 3ood or evil. Good, ancient man

thou3ht, was associated with good peOple, and q he thought of good people as the intellectually and socially elite. In his comment upon this, Nietzsche writes:

“The real homestead of t11e concept '3ood' is sou3ht 1d located in the wron3 place; the jud3ement “good' did not ori 3inate a110n3 tlm se to whom 3oodness was shown.1£uch rather has it been the 300d themselves, that is, the aristocratic, the powerful, the high- stationed, the hi3h-minded, who have felt that they themselves \:ere 300d, and that their actio1'1s were 300d, that is to say of the first o1der, in contradistinction to all the low, the low—minded, the vul3ar, and the plebian. It wa s out of this pathos of distance th at they first arro3ated the ri3ht to create v dues for their own profit, and to coin the names of such values....The pathos of nobility and distance, as I 1ave said, the chronic and despotic esprit de corps and fundamental instinct of a higher dominant race coming into association with a meaner race, an 'under race', this is the ori3in of the antithesis of 300d and bad."

In the case of the above quotation from Nietzsche, ethics or the a::iolQ ical jud3.ement is determined sociolO3ically, by a consensus of Opinions of the "best" people. There is no absolute

standard of ethics in such a system, instead the ste.ndard shifts

1 Nietzsche, Frederick, The Geneal_3y of Horals Modern Library Edition, hen York, pp. DEM-635. depending upon the formulated Opinions of a group of individuals

who 30 no further than their own actions, setting themselves and

heir activities as the "good."

Nietzsche is a naturalistic perfectionist who bases his eth cs

upon a Darwinian concept of evolution. here natural survival in

the Darwinian sense, however, does not satisfy Eietzsche for he

believes that the true nature of man is manifested in the will-to-

nower. Since the will-tO-power is to be considered good, those

thjn3s which contribute to the will-to—power are to be considered

as good also, while those which frustrate or inhibit it are evil.

But what is "300d"? How are men to know what is 300d and

what is evil? From a merely cursory investi3ation it becomes

apparent that "good" has a number of meanin3s, some of which I

will attempt to discuss. If to the Optimist things 0 seem good

while to the pessimist these same things may seem evil, there must be a wide variation in axiOlO31cal jud3ement. Why does the

"good" of one man become the "evil" of another? Is the difference

intrinsic or extrinsic?

In its widest sense, good is defined by many philOSOphers,

principally by the Scholastics, as that which is apprOpriate to

thin3, and in a more restricted sense as that whicn ‘ is the object 9)

of the striving of a thing. Goodness is subject, therefore, to

many distinctions.

Good is often referred to entitatively. Entitative good or

good in the order of being is every reality that has actuality, esse, or xistence. This is St. Thomas Aquinas' view and it is accepted by the Neo-Scholastics of our own time. Entitative good is also called transcendental good beca‘se it transcends every class of being and is co xtentive with being in itself. It is also described by saying that a thi-g is good by reason of the fact that it exists since existence itself, Aguinas holds, regardless of contingent facts, is better than non~existence. Likewise, the very fact of existence, the Scholastic argues, implies a certain perfection which makes it desirable, at least. to itself. 1 In this sense being and good become interchangeable tends. Often, persons dying of some incurable lisease, the Scholastic would point out, even though death is imminent and the dying persons are racked with pain and can survey an ex'stence that offers a superabundance of suffering and misery, will cling to life no matter how disagreeable it might be, for it is difficult to regard non-being as a good.

On the other hand, there are philOSOphers who, like the Brahman, hold that non-being is the highest good and they hepe only for eventual annihilation and nothingness to be freed from a disagreeable succession of earthly existences. The suicide prefers non-being to his present disagreeable state of being. Suicide as the denial of life per se as a.value will be discussed in another part of this chapter.

'3 Another type of good is that called Natural Good. ‘- This good is defined as the fulness of all that is necessary for the perfection of

l Buddhists, of course, hold that the very fact of existence implies an evil. 2 The Bonum Naturals mentioned by St. Thomas Aquinas l-E, XVIII, l,c.

ho a being's mode of existence. This goodness exists securdum Quid in

a being that lacks some perfection, for then it is only good in so far as the perfections it has are concerned. Commenting upon this type of good, A.C. Ewing writes:

"then I talk of somebodv's good, I may only mean what will satisfy his desires. But I may also mean what is 'really to his good', as when I say that it is not to a man's good to have everything lit he wants, and the tw meanings shade into each other so that it is difficult to tell which is intenled. This is becaus

{3 fied is for one's real good, provided they are not posit- 'vely inmoral desires. To say that something is for a man's good is to say that it will directly or indirectly result in a part of his life being better in some way (not necessarily hedonistically) than would otherwise be the case without a counterbalancing loss somewhere else in his life."

Thus when the pessimist reduces good and evil to pleasure and

ain, or to self-denial and self-assertion, or to primitive and to

c H. vilized conditions of life, value is mistakenly treated as good- in-itself and as residing in specific things or aspects or conditions. If the pessimist adopts the subjectivist viewpoint that moral and aesthetic values represent the subjective feelings and reactions of individual minds and have no status independent of such reactions, it seems inevitable that he should become so ego- centric that he regards himself and his desires as the criteria of good and.evil.

Carrying the analysis of the meaning of good still further, there appears a form of good which we can call the Useful Good or the Good of Utilitv. Ewing calls this Good as a means, and it is

1 Ewing, A.C., The Definition of Good, The liacmillan 00.. 19W, pp. lie-113. 1:1

desired as a means to some end. An instance of such 7 good would be

the desire for food or its us as a means of conserving the strength

of the body. This goodness might also be desired for its own sake,

because it is in conformity with right reason to want it, as for

example, the desire for virtue, and inasmuch as this would be the

means of bringing about the haipiness of the individual this good

can also be construed as bonum utile. By an extension of this prin-

ciple of utility, those things which are inefficient or do not serve

a.means to desirable ends, while they may not be intrinsically evil,

do produce bad effects. Ewing classifies disease and natural catast-

rOphes, hurricanes, floods, droughts, etc. as being bad in this sense,

though certainly they are not evil intrinsically. The pessimist is

inclined to regard these natural calamities as completely evil, with-

out differentiating between intrinsic or extrinsic value.

We mir t go deeper into this investigation of good by clarifying

Subjective Good and Objective Good; True Good and Apparent Good. Brief-

ly, subjective good is that which i1heres in an individual while object-

ive good is that which is the object of his faculties. According to

St. Thomas, the objective good for man is ultimately the Infinite God.

Therefore, God could never be the subjective good of man since the

Infinite cannot inhere in him. hen can only possess God in a finite manne I".

In commenting upon True Good, or as he calls it, Goodein-itself,

Ewing states that for him this means simply "good itself" as distinguisa—

ed from good as a means, and that it is goodness in its primary sense

and not merely because of its utilitv. He does not feel ‘71 Duct r- True Good and Useful Good are exclusive terms for an object can be both

"good-in-itself" and "goodrforbsomething" at the same time. In contradis tincti on to True Good, Apparent Good is that which is in

self evil, but is apprehended under the "“‘eurcnces of good, as theft, revenge, etc..

Evil has just as many variations and types. cwing divides

bi a into ten categories

"'Bad' mav mean (1) unpleasant; (2) contrary to that we desire; (3) inefficient in fulfilling certain pur— poses, whether these are themselves good, bad or indifferent; (:)I productive of something intrinsically evil; (Z ) in ficiently made; (3) intrinsically bed. in Loore' s sense as applied to particulars; 7) ultimx ately bad as applied to particulars; (8) as applied to Qualities, such as to make what has it bad in the sixth or seventh sense; (9) morzfilir bad as applied to actions; (10) morally bad as applied to persons. — vil is synonrxous with b-d except that it is not customarily used unless the degree of badness is very seriowi s, and it could not, I thi1fi: correctly be applied to tvllat is consid ered bad only1 senses 1,2,3, or 5, except as aapiece of slen=' Itn has therefore, unlike 23%, no purely ne tural_ist sense at all." 2

Of especial importance to philosonhers, Ewinw feels, is the .. .. .L - s.) concept of evil as intrinsically bad when applied to particulars, and ultima ely bad as applied to particulars. These two alone cannot be defined, Q that is, be reduced to any terms used in the natur l sciences and are not dependent upon general approval. Such approval would be merely a contingent accident.

Hume in considering the problem of what kinds of thin

1 Ibid., p. 11M. 2 Ibid., p. 117.

boou ‘ anu 1 what Lind. 0 ~ a1e , 1. and ,- ' reduces 1 - 1. ‘..Ll: ' . SLaTCﬂ ‘ 4-, U0 L‘s the v- guest1on: ‘ "4.: .

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”Is there 5n; characteristic connon and p r-

71 {:9 c?- 1..

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c (D "3 toward which all or most men “eel an enotion of approval, beside the fact that they are the objects of this emotion?" In attemptin to solve the problex he holds that this question can be settled only

J-

tion followed by an empirical gen ‘11 ralization.

Those thin s which generally merit the approval of men are diviﬁed into 'wo classes: "Tlose which are i1zn ediately pleasant either to tne1r possessor or to other men; and those vhich are useful, i.e., ultimately and indirectly produ t've of nleasure, either to their nos s_ssor or to other men.“ 1 E: ul- inc feels that everything that 031 b

‘7‘ we lnCllued . . ‘1 .- 1n . eltner . '1 A 01 .5. 4-11 these c1usses 1 r~ a. Llll 0v. call ,. 1orun-C‘ 4-. aQJLOle -a~ “-1 r' in .

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Commenting upon Zumc‘ theory, Borad points out that this (J) sw: cte em of valuation ‘educes the concept of pood and 1 evil to an ldtlvltuul's m7011070010.]. state. unat Lame mi ht hav sair is that the emotion of CIPTOV81 as called forth by things which we

consider good depend upon that i U) hr 1 ieved by the observer to be

'nmediately pleasant or useful. Because unhappiness is dis pleasing to men, most men feel Lisannroval for those things ww1i 41 they believe to be unplee cent or which might contribute to h man misery. But such approval or chi 1uroval does not alter the fact that a thing may be good or e1ril inuep enden tly of m 4'1 s avprovcl or €Lis1v.p1r0"al of it.

The mere fact that thousands or millions of men approve an act, such

l Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, harcourt, Brace and Co., ﬂew York 61d London, 13 O, p. 37. 2 Ibid. p. 89. ~ r r. 4 E; .Q+ 4 1 1 1 ' ‘ ' ..3( .3e ‘7er 3301‘ Lu... -'-.2' q -'

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on be defined by a thinking individual as ends or objects of strivin3. then We think of value we think of satisfaction in tne result of a processor activity; mien we think of end 7e think of the process itself 1 vin3 to its 3oal. It seems that the end gives stimu

.J i"ection to endeavor “hile valire inzicates hat the endeavor nas been satisfactorilv completed. Certainly the bare notion of activity does not connote value but activity is expressed in terms of feeling and the differences of feeling or emotion in response to an external

ﬁmulus are the celuti ~ ions whicn 5 3ive rise to elementary valies.

If we (LCCS t the definition of ethical science as the law of kno led 3e of good throU3h which men is able to so and. att in h papines: :, then it mould seer. that the ri 3:1t res son of ethics is not diff e1 rent from that of logic, "ut the some rid identical right reason should be found in ooth branches of plilosophy.

In each science the so"e rig3 M1 reason reflects the different out—

ard color and es3ect of the known object; for 103ic, throu3h ri3ht

4. ~ I! ‘1?) 1 3:.) 4'13“ 0 "Tie I‘i ~1‘1t reason, c03nizes valiuity; mhile ethics U‘n- .LHU - U‘Le QLJ‘-L 0.- reason co 3ni izes Good. logic air. at the ac.uisition of formal vel- U)

stencr, while ethics aims at the use and oen efit to

De uerived -rom what is known. There must be an interrelation between the two, logic an& ethics. In both these scienc*s, ri3ht reason is the one and ide nticol safe low throu:n.v&i q h both the

1 he non—value. wiver fol muddlec 103ic end the thin3s ethics those 10". some is O .nile a QlCLu Elect, does .- well ontimist the ' has One 3encc wins of c‘ C‘ ﬁ must lo3ic which

r l which is U) and often latter the glnlC- 1‘1“: J- cf- to of the 4&1, bitterly ethical 01 between oecome cons_her

most U) There the wa3es anoear confused tﬂljp pessimist elige apnea l-{) .-- commit 'W Cri- oeceuse p : most ...O 7-“ 3') _‘ important m proolems are a the f- to I: .J 5'11 Opposin3 the to is [—0 O L—J. relentless thetner to (D O ..~~ persistent be thinkin3 one :2. ********* ally the as .."-.L‘.ci 3-3 is u :hilOSOpanS valuationsl be confused it H. .L N‘ to v error $3 evil ,1 LII...) question oromotes EC good

proolems O deteinine of it

'w‘13 hypocrisy ‘- *C tne .D 1.- Po O J6 secones ethics but 3% in of while battle CU. ‘/\..

problems O or p. nessinist his .C ar3unent. are

’U c+ . which of e§3arent concepts I illO3ical O of .'.IlO 1' ’D . which ens ethical "3 5... thev y I (f- life apgerent grainst and in c f h; : existence? TW F). L. ".1

0 Ct- ‘- hold facing fLCb or "—hall

OJ p , are iecei in I 1e per oositions .V (II; P .- a of

instead L; ,I“ .As views? r- his theories ccm k... ' life 300d. in sowhistsy O that so, ‘\1- 4 UJ . he we the 80., EJ- - reinforce reclit" uniolo- (‘ '5‘-" \.‘- —.‘,-. as as look different that Is -. pessimist there of d lSeo, are I In 0 C“; ; e.velue the of 1‘ "J Y..’ believe (T: actual <1 iccl cni this into L:« is, H b.3{f value ethically 3nilty

1 and, H

most I is I A

pp. C

the C Celzsion, those

positions. (7 a the bottle U an. or or 3001. wide 7-3. el on other. that

o- y 4 ementrr" (L\ ﬁr-‘ ~4

13-- 4. 4.? '1. . J-i. .- .5‘ v .-. 7 .—’ «.L value . _'0/ L: 9;“. 1 VilLC‘ttf- C‘I o..c, .0133 Milk. 8..-]. SUCHCE‘ of every tr. in3 :11 e, out ell re.etion 1 L ' 4. to ethichl ‘.. ' . . vulue, r. ‘ wit onlJ '1 .- that View thich is mo1e rest icted in that it re3erd° 1118 as the ontolo 3ical Oasis of an individual, znc onsequently of the moral

L‘ - . q ‘ hein3 and carrier of value, Ulle DUI E1011.

used uyon U101”.1Cc.l 00.5

or3enism A:- - as physical "\~ 1 . f carrier.

rfr'lr) .. .. - .L Licolai Hartmann (1 OOL’. ) an ontological Optimist, upon life c.S(- a.velue in the following terms:

1 ife in .5. men, is a

0 R f‘ I O"f tha '— t Side 0:

koted in inture l

“ § I L The footin3 Of lie 11 uu of value; it is 'q tence, without an hold on ex1 \- 1. S °ﬁlIlLullud, IlCc- La in the

ﬂ -, source 1 ron 12111011 all his ”LULCDII umed23 strength is .L o ,W‘I 17 C over against U -QA— alt .e. stand CH death c..es a disvelue. is not only an Lin- T". hilation oi physical life, but with w-(

k.’ it also of the pl H ituel end personal. The unique griev-

ousness of this disvelue becomes. evident frO' the seri uclA. k I.E£$ of murder, the more sin 33; "(Linst life.

every injur" to life and every \hl C' :{43‘ ess of

59.7.16 stemo the elemental anti-value of . ‘ ' J- - V1 vi'l CLO n 1 ‘ 9 deoev, Le'everstion. in EVG-j mental attitu de 'ive or nesS, in -ioz

1.1. 111 viie symptomatic, di

consequent; C

f“). of those who CL 1‘63 81'. 01:1 i C. v e r and 1111

In his tre 91: .2. :ent of life Le.t or ce

. -. 1 LL this value 113.3 been accent e,C_ -1end ior ethical

111' erwlrovel o: evew- thin3t1et l cL "nature‘l" and condu ive a.

A . L'. .9 4. w n

this li one 1054.811213 of tho 5‘ >65 ir :3 servetion of .c‘.

Eertnenn, hicolei, The Llecsnillen Co., lien Yor-:, l‘ pp. 131-132. Work for its pro ection. He goints to the ancient 11- r«'o~exve men

ielt for those thirgs that are natural and to the revulsion from

all that seemed to be a violation of the due order of ne‘ murder would be a disvclue because it unnaturelly violL

fl. "fi‘fl L .-J- —.-<- , J. ". ‘- < . ,‘ . . .9 —~ - ’- Pl' .- 2 -' ‘ '-. u «no-‘-

Ilqixt uO COnbLinl’L. ,0 8-..].S «31108, ulSuCtSE’. "would Sc! lOuaah 1.1.1.”:L1 LLS 11.441,“ ural and undesirable because it tlrcete nLd. to shorten life. In the

vnristienf‘! o etnos - and ‘ 1n 9 tne Q Old uestmxent—- tradition, Q o o er“ act 01 A a

sexual natuz e Ti;ich was done with the deliberate intention of difeat-

. . in; or preventing co nceot ion, onen1sm,l o sonomy,“ ‘ q or any :ozm n CI n

1 ‘ I 3 C+ (*- (1- F1;

contraception 7&8 look ed u: on es unneture 0l in tna H. (k d- *1 {‘53 (D 0

J 4 « ~ 3 « L.~ , ‘- I'. .

accomplished the defeat of procreation. P1 AE‘I ‘.-1~l811 COILte:LL-n) U¢-(«uU "I$—lle

the individual is be ilt u on the health of the emotional life, the

community r:s ts u; on the health of the racial ins

ﬁnch of “he idea of Mood as that which is heelt 11V or conducive

to the well-bein“ of the human body and consequen -y to the rrolonr- ation of life, is to De found in ancient plilOSOrllieS, chiefly among the stoics and Enicuretns and also in some degree in Platonic ethics.

Nor T10u1.d oess1riis ts disevree with this conception, generally speehin -o \J' for pessimists above all other people seem to unctersten tre value of health, life, beauty, goodness, etc., but their desrnir is that these

things, while they are good and desirable, cannot be achievel, or possess so -for lon . They look upon the good and desirable things as chimeras that if they seem to be grasped fade before 7e can know the pleasure we had anticioated from having them. So: e me ' diS¢5ree with me when I say that the pessimist is above all others in his

1 Gen. rﬁxviii, 9. 2 Gen. xviii and x'x. reco;nition of values as good and desirable, but I thi.h that the writings of pessimists :ive more stress to the desir oility of the good things of life than the jourials of tie 0;:tiuists. It is the

oeautv the loss of ife or its shortness, the paucity of moments of aesthetic pleasure and the feeling that there is no stability except in evil that helps produce a pessimist.- Uith #-

he soul of an optinis t the pessimist yearns for beauty and good J 3 3 p. p. .35 H. c+ F4) h

0 r-l 1e yearns he rem lLWC s and overemphasizes m H (D C4 "1 f 0 I H ,_) d (D H) C‘J c C‘- d- cf

m (D r e .- (—4.- he cannot possess them but in 0 (D O O H a Iinite way. He yearns for infinity but his vision sees only finitude.

Closely related to the view that ife |._J p {I} r se is a.value is the belief of sore pliilosophers t1 Lat health becomes the highest good. Hartmann calls this "an unju fia‘ble extension of bio- logical value beyond its limits, a false anal 3y between soul and body, an ethical neturalism." l

The emphasis on the value of life per se, invests the physical part of man with a sacred character which soon takes on a Spiritual importance, so that soon the two, the spiritual and th physical, become identified. Thus, according to the Roman Catholic viewpoint, it becomes mortally sinful for a physician to perform a cre.iotomy even if by so doing he preserves the life of the mother, for the

Roman Church regards the life of the fetus as sacred and inviolable

l Hartmann, Nicolai, 0p. cit., p. 132. 50 from the moment of conception.

U} asing their position upon the philosOphy of St. Thomas

Aquinas, Roman Catholic apolosists hold that fro n1 revela ion is known that temporal life is a time of preparation, during which man merits or fails to merit eternal life. Therefore, according to this view, it is held that every I1an is ooli _;ed to secure for himself those thin; s which are nece sary for the preservation of life and health, and in time of sickness to resort to the use of medicines and the help of physicians to restore health. Those who refuse to t ‘:e the ordir ary means of preserving and perpetuating life are considered guilty of

So pena nier, however, looks upon existence as a ve.nity ard points to the wide aulf between infinite time and space as contrast- 5-) ed with the finite nature of human life. He says that time is merely the infinite condition in which finite man pends his brief span of life and then ceases to exist - alwavs "oecoming vithout

1 "Hon licet occidere infantem in utero matris, etsi nullum aliud suppetat medium servandi matrem, adeo ut operatione omissa mater et infans perituri sint: est enim directa occisio innocentis, C'LUTI more in: antis intendatur tamquam medium ad servan dam matrem... D.atio decisionis haec esse videtur, a) hon potest affirmari per cranio— tomiam e: :erceri actionem, ex qua aeque immediate duplex procedit effectus, alter bOIlus, alter malus; sed ipsa potius est actio, quae directe occidit UrOlL m ad servandam matrem: directa antem occisio innocentis semper es t 11 licita, etsi solum sit acceleratio mortis certo secuturae. 0) Infans non 1wote t considerari ut aggressor obiective iniustus: ipse enim non ponit actionem obiective iniustam ~11 cum utens iure suo atque ex naturali rerum cursu matri sit causa mortis, ideoque potius con .arencds sit homini peste infecto aliosoue inficie nti, guam iniusto a5 ressori. Di énitas enim personee nt-C‘:e, uze finem unicum hecet Deum, impedit...... Ius in vitar.' suam net 10 alteri ita cedere potest, ut unquam directam sui occisionem licite permittere queat." Holdin, E. S.J. De Praeceptis Dei at E0 cclesi iae, Frederick Pustet Co., Ratisbonc, 1926, Quaestio quinta, pp. 329-330. 2 Ibid. p. 311

ever Bein3.“ He points out the fat1ity of life per se, in the be3innin3 of his essay on gge Vanity of 3313;

" A.man finds himself, to his 3reet as We ishLen U, suddenly existin? 3, after thousa116.s and thousands years of non- existence: he lives for a vr:1ile; and Uien, a gain, comes an equally long period when he mu st exist no more. 1he heart rebels a3ainst his, an feels that it cannot be true. The crudest intellect anrot speculate on such a subject without havin3 a presentiment that Time is something Ideal in its nature.... Ofe every event in our life we can say onlJ for one moment tr at it is; for ever alter, that it was. Every evening we are poorer 03 a dag. It might, perhn ps, make us sad to see how rapidly our short span of time ebos aw'v: if it were not that in the furthest depths of our bein3 we are secretly conscious of our share in the e::haustible sprin3 of eternityr so that we can al.ays hepe to find life in it a3ain....Je are like a man runnin3 downhill, v.ho cannot keep on his le3; s unle he runs on, and will inevitabl; fall if he steps; or a3ain lice a pol e balanced on the tip of one's fin3er; or liLe a planet, whi J1 would fall into its sun the moment it ceased to "hfrry forward on its wa'. Unrest is the me.rk of eizis ence.’

There is an undercurrent throu3h the essay on The Vgnity of

Existence and a careful stuﬂy of it shows clearly that Schopenhauer placed hi311 value on the 3oods of lif.e, and upon life itself as a

300d. "hen he w1Wi es that "every evenin3 we are poorer by a day," he very clearly states that we lose something of value, somethin3 that renders us poorer and less fortunate in possessing a good than we were at the be3innin3 of that da". Here he able, he would st0p the course of Time so that life mi3ht be lived endlessly. Certainly, he valies lif e, even thou3h he re3ards it as an ontolO3ical carrier of miser‘ ml evil. Otherwise, why would he regret its speedy un- vinding, Ht fleetin3 pa .ssa3e that "makes us sad to see how rapidly our short span 01 ‘5 time ebbs away?"

1 Schopenhauer,.A., Op. Cit., in the sect ion Studies in.Pess1mism, pp.

181-200

FJ \‘7

Yet, Schopenhauer considers life to be some kind of mistake.

He reminds us tlat men is a complex creature of desires and in-

stincts which are hard to wtisfy and that even satisfactian its 1

brin3s with it no real pleasure - only a state of boredom. Does life per se, have any value for SchOQenhauer? He thinks not, for viewing man‘s disappointments "nd states of boredom he concludes

"This is direct proo: that existence he s no reazl valu in itself; for what is boredom out the feeling f the emptiness of life? If life - the craving for Which is the very essence of our being - were possessed of any positive intrinsic value there would be no such thin3 as boredom at all; mere existence would sati. fy us in itself, and we would want for nothing."

Wlﬂi e SchOpenhauer loo}:s upon life as of value only if it is

a life in which he can find satisfaction, rest, peace and ple.—sure,-

Scholastic philosoPhers look'upon life as 300d because it is a 1218 of Opportunity to merit ete..m l salvation. In this view, pain and disappointment and misery can be turr ed into things of real value for by them man may advance himself spiritually.

SchoPenhaner's emphasis on the hedonistic form as more import~ ant and of greater va l‘ie tlian life per se, implies an argument some- wh t as follows: Nothing is good or bad in itself, not even life.

The only thing that is intrinsically good is happiness, the only thing intrinsically bad unhappiness. All other things and actions are determined in their 3oodness and badness by their instrumental relation to the production of happiness, peace of nir d, security and

satiety. But opposed to this philosOPE v, .hi:h seens to lead so

asilv to conti n ent pe “Si ism, there is the Forzu dist view, of which

the Thonist and nee-sodolastic fosit ’40 ons are good examples. This "l philos0phy holds that at least some things and acts J. are inherentlv right or wrong, good or bad. In this particu ar case, liie itself

”1"- ‘ c. is an absolute good or value. H wiet f 1er it be because God gave life and that gift confers an absolute value, or whether it is, so to sreaL, in the nature of things, "a law of nature“, the good of lire n is intrinsic or absolute. From this follovs the obligation to maintain life at all costs (an obligation which has generally been considered as absolute in medical ethics) and refusal to maintain life is a violation of that obligation.

In contradistinction to the view that life per se is a value, there are those philosophies which wholly or partially reject this view. Schopenhauer, while condoning suicide holds that the ground of all evil and uffering is man's insatiate will-to-live. He does

:3 ot hold that the object of the desire is evil, but that the frust- *5 H. a C‘- on of the desire is. SchOpenhauer does not suggest that mass

ﬁ 5.1. cide is the solution to the problem of evil. He is far too loge ical to su33est anything so fruitless as that. Suicide, far from being a denial of the will-to-live, is an affirmation of it. The suicide does not take his life simply because he does not value life; he ends his life because he wants to live a life of happiness and what he does not want are the misery and trials attendant on his particular existence. Schopenhauer regards suicide not as a crime, but merely as a.mistake, and.no moral guilt attaches to it:

"In my chief work (Die Welt als sine und Vorstellung) I have explained the only valid reason existing against suicide on the score of morality. It is this: that

y suicide thwarts the attainment of the hi3hest moral aim by the fact that, for a real release from this world of ise ry, it substitutes one the is merely apparent. But from a sisters to a ggiLe 's a far cry; and it is as a crL: e that t‘1 :1e clerd: ' of Christ- endom wish us to re 3ard SuiCl‘18.

Schopenhauer himself etplains suicide by sayin3 that "just because the suicide cannot give‘up w1 illi 1mg, he 3ives up li ring. " 2

But suicide deieats its own pu pose for while it abolishes the individual, not abolish the race; the species continues, and pain and will with it. SChOpen1 1auer doe 9S not recommend suicide as the ray to be rid of the pangs and torments of life. Life itself should not be denied but the cr av ines of th will an the will itself which atrives .fter illusory Joys and pleasures should be known for what it is and once perceived it should be annihilated. Man should continue to live, but strive to (1' dell within h1nse ‘\-Iv f the persistent, pounding, drivin3 force of the will. If he succeeds he will find rest, peace and des ireless quiet. But how is this blessed peace and will-lessness to be achieved? Schop enhauer sigge st s art 1 stic contemplation and music, as the twin keys to unlock the joys 0f serenity and peace.

In his m jor work, Schopenhauer hol as g in every life an indestructible principle. 1his belief he shares wita S the

Buddhist, the Brahmin, the ancient Dr“id 1d the early Sc ut1hav1an, historically speakin3, the doctrine is so old that it mi3ht be considered to be wi liout genealoaf. It i closely a lied to the teach— in3 0: metenpsychosis. Schopenhauer 3ives thei u.me of Will to that

l SchOpenhauer, Essays, 0p. cit., p. 29. 2 SchOpenhauer, Shh tliche uerhe, edited by Paul Deussen, Vol. II,, p. M72. J)r." force vision, in Indian .1-.ilo.-:;oﬂ1;r, (0 Ho cens iilered to re esurrect with man across success1ve lives, and with which the horror of ulterior existences rea.mgears. He holds that tile will-to-live advances to consciousness anC eventually reaches the point Where it can decide be MW£8H its continuance or abolition. If, therefore, in the generations to come the appetite ior death has been so hi3h— ly cultivated, and compassion is so generally :rzct ceu 1, that a

Widespread and united pity is felt for all thin3s, then throu h

8 “cc icisu C a state of indiiference a will be produced in which the subject and he Object d sapieir and. the world will be delivered 1 from pain, misery, evil and frustration. And so it is that Schop- enhauer 1e ﬂ els tn.w beJOﬂd SUiCiLB, waicn is not a 311ilosOphic

a palliative, is found in art and disinteres the other, a specific, in asceticism or absolute chastity. Were chastity universn , it would drain the source 01 humanitJ, and

10911:]. '1. 110.11.; vv ~~1‘: leg.'_1\t)€g~r, -.~I~-~- -q o «'9;O- M 1.1. .4. 1.1.1.3.91h 1;, ."‘ J-‘n-ﬁ 911:, 111J42'uv.\. :‘A-‘L 1.1g1nl..:_;guc1blon7‘!“ '_’_‘_\ﬂ 0—4“ Ol p

S F:O uld T‘a SS 8:1!1.0{f. die out , tile K'I‘Bg.:’:er rel Al 8 Ct. 1011

In a recent survey conducted at three members of the Chica3o

Psycli1t ric Institute, intervi,uin3 lOO peoyle who had unsuccess1ully attempted suicide, it was fovnd the 90 were inst itu asylums for the insane and another 26 were found to require pJJc11l ric care.1 The report states hat in an avera"e year, L2,CCO peeple in the United States commit 11iciie while an additional 100,000 make an

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C».. _r'or."n\4 . 0.1. values.

Nicolai Hrrttann asserts thut the aninal nature 1n no is faced. “g; the fact that tiere is within hi1" so*1et2».1n3 superio" UO his aniv l1u He holds that the uncons_ciou$ness of an aninzl is a “Cull, obscure 115 a blinu hepaening," and the ”stove tnis cert Decrsround in man rises the 'light' 0* concsiousness the

eein3, the knoring life '1 Consciousiess, .e h 1C , is on a level vith th, sjiritual nature of man and out of consciousness rises the world of emotions and out of it sprin3s the evaluat-

Ab tcnlercy and attituce oi ’ mind. The peculiar en mi sis belongs in 3to value is ulvon consciousness are without a Lmo. mi erticip- atine in thin3s, man wouli an unth inking, uni eelin3, unemotional unvaluing vein 3; alive, but not knowing of 1is own existence. Xere existence, then, titiout consciousness, would be of little or no value, ac001 ding to Enrtn enn and others nno no u irilcr views.

Con ciousness must not be tel ken to mean 11y knowled3e o the understt Hartmann holds t there are otne forms whicn are more penetrati

"There are 0t-er forns of experience wn1cn reacn scener, to vwich indeed potentially tne whole inn ner worlu o the life of the soul stano.s Open. In..erd bcﬂ1oldin3l of this kind, ouel1tatively differenti ted feeling, however non- logicnl it .J be, is a consciousn. s of egual value eno it is f ull of content, it is a form of comfureliension, al— tnou~n not transmutaole into tLe l e of concepts' 2

l Eartmann, Hicol , op. cit., p. l 2 Ibid. p. 13M. 62

The value of consciousness, Hartmann hol‘s, increases with

the degree of its deve10pment. 3y develo:ment he means the am-

ount of its penetration, insight, perspicacity, not only in a

subjective realm of ideas but also in an objective reflection of

the outer world around us and gives a deeper meaning to the given

or sensa, a meaning which cannot be the product of the real. Con-

sciousness adds a deeper meaning to thin_s perceived than what

might be termed the mere ontological basis of reality.

From this, according to Hartmann, there evolves a new and

higher metaphysical definition of man. He is the one who eval-

uates, nor is this to be misunderstood as meaning a narrow sort

of valuational subjectivism. In his evaluation man does not give

alue to things, but rather they are given to him and through his

consciousness he is aware of them. Consciousness assumes an added

worth when it is reflected that man can no more create conscious-

1888 than he can create human life. Han, however, has the ability

to "enhance its energy and heighten its worth" by education, train-

ing and other types of mental activity which tend to deve10p con»

sciousness - "these are enterprises for consciousness in conscious-

ness itself and they require constructive work by it upon itself." 1

One might reflect that possibly the pessimist, judged by Hart-

mann's theory, either nisdirects his consciousness or fails to de-

velop it prOperly, so that like the ~aye of a searchlight it penet-

rates on y partially into the gloom and does not succeed in dispell-

ing the phantasmagoria, which upon closer and more penetrating obser-

-1 Ibid. pp. 136—137. f-y

vation would no longer appear to be the hob—gobblins imagined. Is

the pessimist plarued with short-sightedness or "short—consciousness?”

Would his pessimism disuuuear if he were to have a more highly develOped o i) J O S O 9 U) m L- P U) H. d" '0 0 :3 (D |> '1 9 i4 U) 0 '“1

One answer is given by Julius Bahnsen (lSjOhlSSl) who sees the

world as irremediably involved in evil and he contends that no amount

of "enlightenment“ or conscious knowledre could possibly improve our understanding of conditions. The highest :isdom would only show that

the evils of he world are more serious and far-reaching than we had

formerly imagined. It is a deep penetrating consciousness that reveals

that man's dream of {ell-being is merely an illusion. Bahnsen denies

the possibility of disuroving the reality of unceasing strife, of the

"war of all a:ainst all" and of the utter futility of existence. x-J

The "Philos0pher of the Unconscious", Karl Robert Eduard von

Hartmann, referred to earlier in this work, describes himself as

a eudaemonolOSical pessimist and a teleolo;ical—evolutionistic

Optimist, and while he is clearly to be classified among pessimists, more specifically among ontological pessimists, it would be unfair not to admit that there are traits of Optimism in his work. While he regards the pursuit of happiness as futile and foredoomed, yet

he feels that life ca: 9 attain its goals even though these woa.s are s)

tragic ones. While he agrees with Schopenhauer that the satisfac.ions

to be der'ved from life are very few and of tragically short duration, he does recognize positive satisfactions. As man's intelligence mat-

ures, as his . consciousness . beeches ~~ horev ’- PBLEtlﬁblné, ‘\ IMF 'L . '1' hel, passes'r- r‘ ('3 1“} tnioubh "D ‘ "‘

es of development: the first is t 1e disillusionment of the hope for individual attainment of happiness in this life: the second missionary promot13 evil modern The out leads accordin3 the in in th then educated of stands itself of even conscious cerning trust is stage 1ere Buddhism, man' the the the nothingness of only As To of be non .L but is in in past. vain existence. the is dissipation s science an existence the in the alaays and woe be3innin3 "pr03ress", solution the looked whi the to to Buddhis antithesis a zeal Buddhist, hOpe last pessimism position Hartmann, process saw cis is n To cause is of the disse:.inatin3 appointzient the in him upon the of Sb "illusion" into to 1. but all its of to hOpe philosophy Unconscious, of a hopelessness .L the 0: throu3h rue with of pers to there a reedi the the thin3s later is would civilization, Pied diSillESicflflSflt problem of 3ive the knowled3e the are absolute disdain nal se, absorption Hart:.1a.n is and valuation Piper be develOpment the 1m and pe beginning, common real of in 1m101talit'° the disillusionment. of utilization of accordin3 Nirvana. in of true as whose inuortalit;, freedom ty consists fantastic the the assent of existence, am. su3gested a neither pessimistic of in re3rettable en1i3htenment insatiable is desire ple as becomes ,As the consciousness to from To he it and to man in of s:1nt-voiced Universal plan Hartmonn, vote in modern the is that humanity to the and the the the became consciousness. Ur the the Brahmin, Unconscious, escape pashion, of .derlying perception accident. modern more the tliird s bonda3e future end. activelv and belief iences. - Spirit, better there world would flute especially from witl the and. man while that nor of all and Un- fina But of the Con— is life the

$3 intelli3ence. It is the Buddhist 1 philoso:.hv the metempS"cn 1 continues to take place until eventiellv Nirva 1a is achiever. -nere

es throuri which a soul must pass before it at

Nirvana, or absolute extinction: -irsc,.t‘ J when the soul learns to be

severe with itself but compassio11ate ‘ t ward otherS' 3 second, is the sta3e where j1ud3ehent ceases; in the tEi rd sta3 e va3ue sentiments of satisfaction derived from intellectual perfection is eli.m u1a teda in the fourth and la st state, consciousness of identity is lost. Here

Kirvana be3ins. Four11i3her st% es a1e passed q be fore the soul finally ac1m1 ves the loss of even t11e perception of nothin3. when Death is 0‘

eaL '4‘ ﬁmn"3amemh e of the soul throu3h the cycles of birth and death, has been achieved and the soul attains mohsa or liberation from the effects of karma, then accordin3 to the Buddhist, the universe will evolve into a mt te of unconscious rest. Unconscious- ness, therefore, is the sunnun bonum of the Buddhist philos Ophy and

it entails the denial of the very value many Western philOSOphers con-

‘er the most important, being. Budh‘wi an brou3ht he premise of the

nplete and unequivocal ann‘1ilation of self with 11 i

01 cf Ho 817188? P3. 88 and evils. while Budmllism is an on90103ical pessimism, oeli Win that this life and any exi tence or series of existences after death are alike undesirable and evil, yet, it offers a certain cheer, for

a soul mev CW! eventually win peace through.total annihilation.

The next ""1010: 3ical position to as considered is Voluntarisn and its antithesis, the denial or renunciation of will as value.

In scholastic philosophv by Voluntarism is meant that view which defends d1e vill as havin3 the hi””est position and di3nity in the

men will differs who as proceeded that hierarcny to Q could is

conCernin; ionrl because IntellQCu the since of comprehend it ize ' 0 4. a necessit" the directs the hold will human is

— Eicolai distinct The the elects no not appetite good. a neglect w

‘ from .-. it will object rationalist the cannot such

.. be or will, of to nature. our LOGS

tie

' to Hertnann will man's deterrined every a reneral value universel must There onsc10uSness

:reeuom do and of inte criticue

". not be of Scotus evil, others. to ° holds determined. always other faculties. the

.‘.. by There grasp is lectuel be and rather nroerenu .- pointed a will, only

oi - / unless a. free good

-'.‘ the ,. of number ki;d that abstract, I have

J-” is the

the .H Cnlv rational ireSents one than attention evil ace a in is

mill. 0 of concrete

..,_° ere J good familiar there out, ,. V

Freedln t necessity of to its

the 2 beizg a '1 ecceo J- rain; is ﬁ Wi

voluntarist, (1 philosOphers. must be made actions as knowledge. limits ecotus, infinite ') a

LC were o 1

‘ upon found moves in its it. to individual '4. _ of fail rin

states to

4-, that srme in some huncn object; the

1. certain and objectively at. "4. tie seem ‘ will o: the the of 7‘ universal he Will, of

J.‘

that In Rational Kantianisn ﬁrQnCIScan contend calls T‘ exhaust'veness, .2.--” will good. knowledge,

,. intellect. of is character the mes even abstract

an not God then I and Scholastics, it Aquines,

thlVluual a,

' When Tne that in

.r' g good, forceﬂ knowled;e, the can that is ' monx the in ,. of School- characters in

'1 wholly the it considered rat- Duns u world, -. is things. out or 3 .0-~:‘ an", liteli i .5‘ .1.“ m1“ y

either accept or to reject the good. I: a being is not .I. thQPilnPd, he CODtQHLS, the.u it must b: iree to select food or to og;o;e it,

otherwise value woul'l rest oowcrless in an ideal Le"on d, Titb mo

tou Jiing upon life at any tangible point. T‘ut man nossesses this

soeci:l Porer of nositive iecision. Earthenn holds that even if d .1 b» r4 LD (F F“ *1 MS F Ho P ,3 ,1 ’4’ F: C l’ f. .3 "5 f1, P H C r f—o (f‘ 6 (2‘ O C d' O H) :1 O O H P .4 (' U) (1‘) 9 H O (E S (3 a

there has been so many and va“ieC attemots to give meta: proof to the freedom of the will attests to its value. To renounce

the freedom of the will would be tantamount to renunciation of

Freedom of will, how ver, is not an unallo;ed.value Ior n it carries with it the oossibility of abuse. Ricnes and power can be abusel, and similarilv freed on of choice can lea“ to the sel- ection of evil in place oi good. Hartmann SQ s that freedom of will is a value n15 up to a ce tain point and begond this 1

becomes a disvalue. Just as a person ﬁrst e caraule o; nearing

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Schonenhauer has been creCited tit A. Q.)

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the .cccﬁrzninant or sign of he

ate 01 A consciousness may be a part of any value, but not the value in its entiretv. For hedonis m it oeCOues

P. 5 necessary that both co nce pt ts b consiiered a Ho

y i {:1

F f, 1 ('1‘

('0 r.)

C (B). 01

amental error of vleC-o nis sm seem c?- 0 ie in its failure to distin“uish H U! between the concept of goodness and that object, n£.:c]v pleasure, to thich the concept is supwosed uniguely to apply.3 Certain14,11.e 1-.- must conclude that hedonism is in: up :1 quate, for while feelin3 may be one in- :2.

}_la cation or criterion of the 300d, without reference to that which pro-

‘uces the feelin3 cannot be considered as equal to value. By extract— ing pleasuroole feelin3 from a type of conduct, we cannot set up the feeling as an adequate criterion of the good. Professor Ur man has summed up the critic1sm of the inadequacy of hedonisn in the followin3

H Hartmann, ﬁicolai, 0p. cit., pp. 160—162. 2 Urban, nilour 3., Vulcrnertuls 0: Ethics, Henry Holt Co., IeW'York,

1930, pp. 31-02. Cf. Reshdall, op. cit., pp. BY-El for a.fuller C.is cu ssion of the KN comme nsure bility of values "-.1e P“ 11 ,. 14111698 —' ,. 11-. mic-or”; . is° 1.x, the “lost.. .1. M‘-1.1»: .19. ehplession .s.‘ 3 , oi .7 the .‘. l. teleolc31Cal -1 - ...‘ ,_ Vie.' ° .. o; -1" no.-.

I t 0 ﬂ ’ A " f a v3 var“ r‘"- J _ f. the native iorn in nhich lany re: sonin,3 on h:ans ( and onus v"-1nos '0 j ehpress1on. ‘q“ ‘_ I In all 3iooao111td,7‘ 1t I .-. “1 3 ll C“1.tinue to be the idiom in thich most men 17ill express their cor ception of the 300d. hen will continue to put th pprsuit of happiness anon :3the hum n 113hts Pare: ‘.ts will continue to plan for their aii when they mean their hi3 host Welfare. X's-'hen men thus sneak, shall We sag, 'no, you meen not h13niness self-realization?' That would be peuantic, as it we" d

te F“ f, when men said of the sun that it rises and sets,

re m hould insist in correcti13 the vernacular terms of the results of our more ana.ytical hnowleu3e. " portant thing is to know that the sun does not real X rise and set. Even more important is it to know that man's highest 300d is not heaviness.

It must be admitted tint it is in oss iole to dispense with

the iiea of pleasur and heppines ss as values but it is important

to realiz tliat plea wsur is not the whole of the ideal life, but

only an element or an aspect of (-1- If pleasure becomes a more Ho 0

criterion then we mi3ht as Well urre people to taste the forbidden ho

fruit and ju Md 8 :or themselves, thus 11 Jﬁln u1mor.lity and crin e a

necessary condition of virtue. The ideal or the good life is an ultima.te concein tion which hardly admits of any further clarificat-

ion or de nition; about all1t'e can 6.0 is to ste te that are the

F4) *4.

elements that 3 90 toward its composition. Happines es and pleasure

are assuredly among these elements, "*t it is erroneous to suppose

them to be the whole of it. St. Thomas AQu inas in his Sunma oontra

Ger tile es afiirms that happiness does not cons 1st in booily pleasures,

in Worldly honors, in wealth, power nor even in acts of the moral virtues, but does ultimately consist in contemg 1atin3 God. Commenting upon the errors of a ohilosoo.' of hedonism, he w; ites:

l Urgan, 0p. cit., p. 93. t 1 1as been shorn th at aceordin3 to nature's order pleasure is for tile s€.1:e of Opere tion, end not con- versely. Therefore, if an onera tion be not the ul- "1

timate end, the consequent 31- C ’1 e can n- ither be

t1 e ultimate end, nor accor .57 1* the d‘. ultimate end. Low it is manifest that the Operations which are followed by (carnal) pleasures....are not the last end; for theva re directed to carts in m: n1iiest end_s; eating, for instance, to the preservation 01 the oody, and carnal intercourse to the oogettin3 0: children. 1hereiore, the aforesaid pleasures are not the last end, nor do they accompany the last end. Therefore, happiness does not consist in them....The hi3hest perk fection of man cannot con Hi t in his bein3 united to thin3s 1 wer than hixnself, (ca*nal) pleasures consist in man's beingn *mited throu3h his senses to thin3.s beneanl1111.1, nz1nely certain sensible thin3s. Theref01e we mus t not assign happiness to such nleasure." 1 J.

We recoil instinctively :r hr on pain as a matter of :perl nee.

Generally it is an unattracﬁx'e subject. But accordin3 to the pessimist, pain looms large in life, and is more often found than pleasure, which most ness mi mi sts re3 ard as an illusion. The world, in short, .L symoolizes pain, even from the fire .L0 noennt when man becomes conscious

O H) 5-; :is e: stence. Pessimists have been q die}: to look upon pain as an evil, but there are some 11.1losonnerc who regard it as productive of value, though pain, in itself, may be an indifferent thing. If pain be looked upon from a purely naturalist vieWpoint, as destructive of men's health aid mental neace, by a slowly deteriorating effect upon nerve and brain, it is regarded as a natur .l evil. But the auestion with

.hich we are here concerned is niether or not it has any ethical value.

Let the psycholO3ists define pain and tell us What it is, if t1 ey are able. our concern here will be with its ax10103ical status

Pain as a.value is distinct from pain as a sensation. In the

l Aquinas, St. T p—J Senna Contra Gentiles, in "Easic Writings of 13 HJ {‘J :0 O . St. 1nomas A nines," ianeom house, new York, Vol. II, p. 52, ed. by Anton C. Pegis, lSeL. "1

hands much l was from E.) wri of view istic content ing stands the so theory in pain Soh0penhauer, a so thin3, pain notr to There Looking purely like experiencing of pili of far Nicolai nothing mi3ht ion made and ilosop Schopenhauer, a experienced "However and ual a3oniz nervous very allowing kind misery of except bodily concerned, Consequently, ion shun VJhit that is naturalistic goes upon by lead pleasure, W11 a.ver" from then instinct; Hart of mrobed of the restricted: ancient es the in3 Ess3"s, no pleasure may in pain pain." the varied the to system vhi31 an wet stoos other, pessimist further, individual so pee oy special the take, purpose, .. pain aborigine nain dentist. far as . and but man a as or sinisrn re op. man make Way, short the The pa nothin3 or the as fa also, as leadin3 else cold, it tient [—1- nor ard failing

01 bodily fort‘.s sort is knowled3e allow him a.neans matelial it the is d nothin

of 1 suffering as i.) pain from not is it tl‘.e 'T/ we is the it simply more of more higher comnlete in real O vie man it that [(214 must oain. must easy absence better .5 value his as Tierra a ens to satisfaction D to to {.0 dentist's of physical thzn basis sensitive to an or health, human inquire

be U] an possibilities excrutiatin3 to come conscious be the (T3 vnsation, 1.. Uhe seek understandin: recognition evil. in off This understand found enl. del of remembered sensa physiolO3:ical of back benefit imep suffering these t? than pleasure Fue3o food, cui basis it e piness chair. to He even Christianity ion, of penetration once all without one bone? every the sees thin3s. the pain to protect- to is of how U in accegting of to and is more pain, brute, and be He of witness is sex- modern his this only kind every phenor at value: It such value. under- derived to accord— the is value has to the the a one hedon— it

3ivon -4 kn a ree03nition to the suolimet in3 and liberat'nv efzects of main

in the expiatory sufferin

mann comnentin3 upon this, sz; 83

“L1e ve due of suiierin3 i . '. glance at the corresno ndinr disvclue ray prove ins ive on t wi t e incanacity to suf' the impossi ;rief and n1 isfortuie, coll- ap°e unde1 ” . in3, a sinkin3, the lowering of the h1m an as in3, a brittleness and inner inelasticity. When dire misfortune has passed away, it leaves the man who is incapable of suffering broken, morally warped, CiSfi3ured, weakened; he can no lon3er stand up, he has oeen dene_3ed in his fundamenta worth. For him sx1ferin3 is, in fact, only a disvalu3. On the other hand, one who has a capacity for sufferin3 is stren3thened in it. His pover o: endiraz1ce, his humanity, his moral Bein3, grows under it. His suiferin3 is of value, for his reaction is the reverse of that 01 the fra3ile and despondin3 (zessinistic) nan. nos itive, ssertive reaction 0: the man un1er the bu of 11;verse<‘- Iate, under the eJ-zteznal pO‘UeI‘ a3ains t w“. h's orn actiV1tyca1not preva il.

This is 619811;f an ex oriation of a weakness of one of the pessimistic positions, for Hartmann calls attention to the lack of more. and nhvsical sta1ina on the part of the fra ile and despondin3 man, thich is Chara cter1st1c of many oessinists, especially 01 .0 the materialistic cor t1n3 ent pessimist, who in his disbelief in immortality, looks upon existence in this world as the be3~ innin3' and the end and fines it evil and ful of pain.

In clee r—cut contrast to Hartmann's position that sufierin3 is a value, the aut1'103rap1ioal v.0rk of W. Somerset nun nun, which

something of an 330103ia.3ro vita sua, or an "autobio3r phy of H. U)

Qw- _ _ 9|- . O

l nartnann, n1 colai, op. Cl cf‘ 03 p. 1390 T? a mind," takes a different view 0: suzzer1n3 and its V(11e. In his earlier years, Kau3ham studied at St. Thomas's Hospital in London and spent a year of internship in the anbeth slums, Witnessing every itiné of huzm.n misery and Weakness. He feels himself par rticularlv quali fi 1ed as the result of ﬁ1ese 82‘8“18QCC to make tiiis comment on tlie value of suffering:

" Here I We 3 in contact with what most wanted, li Ie in

the raw...I saw how men died, I saw how t1 e 3! bore p ain. .0 I saw that h0pe looked like, fear and reli 1e .L ; I saw the dark lines that desgaxir drew on a face; I s: w coura 3e and stea .fa tness. I saw faith shine in the eyes of those who trusts ed in what I c uld only think was an illusion and I sax-'1' the 3511221"; 11;: that made a man greet the pro- gnosis of death with an ironic 301 :e because he r? s too proud to let those about him see the terror of his soul. At that time (a time to most eeople of suf1icient ease, when pe ace seemed certain and prosperity secure) ther was a school of W1 iters who enlar3ed upon the moral v:lue of sufferin3. -he" claimed that it was salutary. They claimed that it increased sympathy and enhanced the senr sibilities. 1ney cl ir1ed that it opened to the spirit avenues of beaut;r and enabled it to get into touch he mystical l-in3dom of God. They claimed that it ' me ned the chcmr cter, purified it from its human 3 s mda brought to him she did not avoid but sought i a more perfect happiness. Several books on these lines had a great success and the i rauthors, who lived in com- for table houses, had three meals a dav and were in robust health, gained much re eputation. I set down in my note- books, not once or twice, but in a dozen places, the facts that Ii1ad seen. I knew that suffering did not ennoble; it deg aded. It made men selfish, mean, petty and sus- picious. It absorbed them in small things. It did not *ake them more than men; it made them less than men; and I wrote ferociously that we learn resi3nation not by our on 71 S“*feri1gs, but by the sufferings of others."

The zessinist, of course, see as duly aware or A the fact that if he hopes to make a plausible case for his theories, it must be done objectivelv and not merely upon the 3rounds of his subjective sensations and feelin Conseque ntl;, he atter pts to xvei3h t1e

in, ,1, ' 1c, ‘__ _~ _ “1 .V. M , , .3 3 .3 '1 l avauol‘chm, II. S’DJQI‘SE‘t, Tne S..L.J.ll11_) LP, Pen::u111 500.68, Illa. ’ 1.6”»? YOI‘IZ,

\, r \ x, \ ,_ 1940, pp. 4H-43. under motin3 By for as and which to a pleasuies the g skills are suca tile coaster. tnst encess 6)" IL «(3:13 will b0 - Juile -¢ VV‘ co -. ' ‘ material a.moie a his ~~ " te problem many WSil it similar mes Pa \‘a.~ as We be " 1s r'- Les pleesiie the . I." in 3sood or in o: " satiszaction Lvel. erives now worthwhi eiuca without n7" n pl s ,- raole a I arts of mleusule. classification sustainin3 t:;- 0: is N to l ' oasu R ma gnu good turn of n 5.1 y‘ N‘ :ed sion, existence out r‘ e01 V a ’ ter “' t or , OO¥L amount evil ' its res lS . . material man' erOI. fin s ‘ 1" I one to ial e tezce with I.€Telg’ sciences. -\ mean law, ‘01 ‘7’ oei11 Vii to lly a he in 5 possessions: pa :‘u some out ~ voluatiox‘.al 3ive of re- J1 for a tne a arm‘s“ a3d1nst rt De.)¢.i~ L solemnly from he: Kor the some "v of pessimistic end, later an are MJdb so11in3 F7: more of "a 1th, . lowest, a some "

- bonum aJSCuCG several (a ‘2' is - Katerial ultinz: particular ‘r tne certiinlr o. J. - ‘ 1.1 an& its 1s ' -N.) ultimate part .’ 4‘." it .— F'I tne « powers anu w: pronounces consics J. comglex tne ' nd "tile we - con serv alwevs u t: ruins. tiiose —\ mez oi stages 1‘» may f eventreting .5. sideretion in3enuity connon . o. Ho 300d rs pain, positive _- for ce this tel -‘ "5 m1 person for 300d tio proolem Ullch consiier true

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Parker goes on to state that laws and civil disciplines are needed when man's moral sense breaks down and he acts from motives other than "community love.“ In a vein that would have won the approval of Schopenhauer, Parker castigates the "double standard" or dichotomy of morality in vogue tods‘. In our modern civilization a child is tarsht an absolute ethical system of truthfulness, altru- ism, perfect chastity while he sees a completely different morality practiced by his elders. Friends may be allowed certain liberties and departures from moral codes, while enemies are severely criticized and condemned for even the slightest departure; a young person soon learns that what he is taught is not meant to be practiced totally.

Parker contends that this gives rise to duplicity and hypocricy of preaching one thing and practicing another. He points to the wide divergence between the moral standards of the New Testament regarding divorce and the general modern practice; the ascetic ideal of renunr ciation and.non-resistance as opposed to the “practical” morality of the Western world with its wars and subjection of minority peOples.

He places the blame for much of the vitiating of every rationalistic and utOpian view of human nature and the social order upon the existence of hate among individuals and among nations. For Parker, harmony is considered the supreme value.

While Parker may criticize the modern duplicity in morality, he does not equate his "community love" with Sdhopenhauer's "compassion."

According to Schopenhauer, it is pity which is the base of every action that has a true moral value. He states that the soundest and surest guarantee of morality is a compassionate sympathy that unites us with everything that lives. Who possesses compassion, he contends, will be incapable of causing the slightest harm to any one and will cause him to be magnanimous, forgiving, just and charitable. In brief, compassion is considered by Schopenhauer as the spontaneous product of nature universally known.

The idea. hat pervades the subject of compassion in SchOpenhauer's philosophy is that love is sympathy and all love which is not sympathy is selfishness. This would not necessarily eliminate a.oombination of the two for the selfishness of enjoying the presence of a friend would not xclude a participation in his joys or sorrows. SchOpe hauer reduces every human action to one, or sometimes to two, or at the most three motives: the first is selfishness, which seeks its own welfare; the second is the perversity or viciousness which attacks the welfare of others; and the third is compassion, which seeks their good. The egoist has but one sincere desire, and that is the greatest possible amount of personal well-being. To preserve his existence, to free it from pain and privation, and even to possess every delight that he is capable of imagining, such is his end and aim. Anything that might stand in the way of his achieving these ends is considered as an enemy or as evil. So far as possible, he would like to possess everything, enjoy everything, dominate everything and when he finds this impossible he turns upon the world and denounces it as an evil illusion. The strange part of Schopenhauer's philosophy is that while he embraces so deep a pessimistic view of man and his capabilities, he could yet form- ulate this exalted.philosophy of compassion which seems so optimistic of man's abilities to rise above his own baser nature. How strange that the philos0pher who wrote the following passage could yet propose 85 and believe possible the compassion of another part of his works:

"Let even the youth be instructed betimes that in this masquerade (of life) the apples are of war, the flowers of silk, the fish of pasteboard, and that all things, yes, all things‘- are toys and trifles; and.that of two men whom he may see earnestly engaged in business, one is supplying spurious goods and the other paying for them in false coin. But there are more serious reflections to be made, and worse things to be recorded. Man is at bottom a savage, horrible beast. We know it, E?- only in the business of taming and restraining.him which we call civilization. Hence it is that we are terrified if now and then his nature breaks out. Wherever and When- ever the locks and chains of law and order fall off and give place to anar ‘1, he shows himself for what he is. A.hundred records, old and new, produce the conviction that in his unrelenting cruelt man is in no way inferior to the tiger and the hyaena.”

Yet, in the same essay. a few pages earlier he proposes compassion among these "savage, horrible beasts":

"I am inclined to lay down the following rule: When you come into contact with a.man, no matter whom, do not attempt an objective appreciation of him according to his worth and dignity.....but fix your attention only upon his sufferings, his needs, his anxieties, his pains. Then you will always feel your kinship with.him; you will sympathize with him; and instead of hatred or eons tempt you will experience the commiseration that alone is the peace to which the Gospel calls us. The way to keep down hatred and contempt is certainly not to look for a.man's alleged 'dignity', but, on the contrary, to regard him as an object of pity.“ 2

Man should be ready to sacrifice himself at all times for the common good, Schopenhauer held. This involves a transition from virtue to asceticism. When he has achieved this ascetic status, it then no longer suffices for him to love others as himself; there arises within him a.horror of the kernel and essence of the world, which recognizably is full of misery, and of which his own is an

1 SchOpenhauer, op. cit., pp. 14-15, (Essay on Human Nature) 2. Schopenhauer, Ibid., p. 3 expression, and therefore derring the nature that is in him, and

ceasing to will anything, he gives himself up to complete indifferent-

ism to all things. But such indifferentism is clearly incompatible with compassion which must be anything but indifferent.

Thus far we have considered life per se as a value and discussed the views of such philosophers as Nicolai Hartmann, St. Thomas Aguinas,

Schopenhauer, Leopardi and others on this problem and its development into views on suicide and other forms of killing. We have also surveyed the views of Eduard von Hartmann and Julius Bahnsen on consciousness as a value as Opposed to the Buddhist and SchOpenhauerian view of

Nirvana as the summum bonum. Pleasure and pain, the value of the will, material goods and moral values have also been discussed. In most cases, extreme views on each subject have been investigated, while the most acceptable philOSOphy would undoubtedly lie somewhere between the two

:idely divergent views of ontolOSical and contingent Opt'mism and pessimism. An example of one extreme is the discussion of life per se as a value. There are many instances of human life coming into existence in the most deformed conditions, without consciousness, without mobility, without the barest essentials for its own preservation. Many philos0phers will contend that it were better for all concerned that such life should not exist and that it is without value per 59. Some ethical philos0phers would contend that it would not be morally wrong to deliberately end such a life rather than to permit it to be a burden to itself and to others, for the mere fact of life, without the goods that go with it, is not considered by them a.value. Thus human life becomes cheap, as it was in ancient Rome and in modern totalitarian states where a man's life is worth no more than the value of his services to the state. In 87

ancient Rome, the offspring had no assurance that its life would be

protected. The fate of the Child was entirely a andoned to the dis-

cretion of the author of his days. When a child was born, he 7a

laid at the feet of the father. If the latter took him up into his

arms, he was permitted to live; hence the expression: suscioere lib- A

2322.‘ to life up the Children. n o If, on the contrary, the father left

the child lying upon the ground, the helpless child was strangled or

thrown into the public sewers, or exposed in the public squares, and

there left to perish from hunger. Infanticide was universally ad-

mitted and practiced among the pre-Christian nations. Tertullian

must have been absolutely certain of not being contradicted when he

rebuked the p sans of his day for this deed. Quintilian, the Roman

rhetorician (a. A.D. 118'), declares the "to 1:111 a man is often a

crime, but to kill one's own children is often a very fine action."

Euthenasia, which denies life as a.value per se, is receiving pOpular support today from those who accept a "jungle philOSOphy"

of the survival of the fittest, or whose emotions run away with

their right reason and cause them to seek to justify killing the

incurable. Such a.philosophy must be included among the material-

istic systems .

The problem of suffering and the value of sickness and physics

ills will be studied in greater detail in the chapter on the Problem

of Evil. Suffice it to say here that pessimism views many of the

events of life as with a nagnifying glass, which discloses the evils,

while overlooking or minimizing the good. In his ouest for knowledge 4»

the pessimist finds tha he cannot comprehend the infinitude of reality with his finite mind, and like a.petulant child he sulks and grows despondent. 89

CHAPTEB.III

METAPFYSICAL PESSIMISM

Havin“ {3 co onsidered many of the ethical problems.L involvinc :3 a pessimistic philosophy, it ma r be pro_ fits ole to investi3ate the pessimistic aspects in certain of the 3reat reli3ions. In this chapter we will consicier the "FOnindu, Buddhist and Christian philos0phies. Under the survey of Christian philosoihies, it ill be well to view certain pessimistic tr rai Ht in the life of

Christ Himself, in Roman and Greek Catholic monasticism, and finally in the Calvinistic teachin3 s of the rejection of worldliness and predes tine tion.

As a creed, pessiri1sm.found its birthplace on the banks of the Gan3es or fa ar back in the lands of Kepaul. The history of pess1m1sm is, as we have said before, as old as c1v1lized 1:1q

Both as a.mood and as a pl Milo ophy it is more native to the East

han to the West. In the East it has had its completest expression.

The astral religion of the ancient Chaldeans thou3dt of the world as ruled by gods who were actually identified with the planets. They rules the universe almos st mechanically. While their immediate intent- ions were sometimes discernible, their ultimate purposes were inscru- table. For the Chaldeans, religion implied no otherworldly signific- ance; one did not resign himself to calamities in th -is life in order to be justified or saved in the next. The Chaldeans had no interest in a life to come. Submission might bring certain earthly rewards, but in general, as hey conceived it, it was not a means to an end at all.

It was rather the expression of an attitude of despair and gloom, of 9O

humility in the face of mysteries that could not be understood.

Compared with the gods, who dwelt in the stars and 3uided the destinies of the earth, man wa a lowly creature, sunk in iniquity and vileness and hardly even worthy of approaching the gods. The

consciousne U) s of sin already present in the Babylonian and Assyr'an religions now reached a sta3e of almost patholO3ical intensity. In the hymns the sons of men were compared to prisoners, bound hand and foot, lan3uishin3 in darkness. Their misery is increased by the fact their their evil nature has prompted them to sin unwittingly.l Never

.. before had men been re; .arued Fl as so hOpelessly depraved, nor had reli3~ ion been burdened with so gloomy a view of life. Curiously enou3h, the pessimism of the Chaldeans does not seem to have affected their morality very much. So far as the evidence goes, they indulged in no rigors of asceticism. They did not mortify the flesh, nor did they practice self-denial. Apparently they took it for granted that man could not avoid sinning, no matter how hard he tried.

A similar pessimistic view of existence is held by Brahmanic

Q Q India which holds that evil is inherent in ll 7 finite existence and P- miser1 and suffering are looked.upon as an integral part of man's life on earth. The doctrine of reincarnation doons man to a long series of rebirths to repent and atone for sins committed in past existences. If his life in his present existence is morally 300d,

t will have a beneficial result 11 s me future life, but he has no Ho assurance that it will be in the existence immediately following upon his present one. The only way to salvation and peace is to .L

l Jastrow, horris, The Civilization of Babylonia and Assyria, Phila., 1351, p. 217. 91

cease existing‘- hirvana. The philosopher of the Unanishads look .1» upon all finite existence as unreal, as an illusion that deceives man. But man's plight 18 no illusion! He cannot escape the miseries that accompany his journ y throu3h a lon3 series of metemesy hoses. .—

It is individual e- ist ence that is evil“ “1d all 0 dier evils proceed irom this primary one. Clearly this is ontolo3ical pes51zian.

Buddhism is close y allied to Hinduism and Budda himself arose out of the ancient Indian religion. After the time of the early Up- anishads and the be innin3 of B the ethics of the two great religions was, so far as formal pronouncement goes, almost identical, as may be shown by the circumstances that the main sins are arranged in the same cate.~ories and cornprise the same subjects. Thus, the law book of Manu incorporates the Buddhistic 3roup of sins of thou3ht, speech and deed in inverted order. The rule given in the Buddhist

Mahasudassana Sutta is one that wouldb aye appealed equs_ lly to the

Brahman: "Do not kill, do not steal, do not be sensual, do not lie, do not drink int xicants; and eat as you have been accustomed to eat." There is, of course, alin.ys the reli3ious difference between the two bodies, the Brahman believes in the sacredness of tradition, in an immort.l soul yet accordin3: to the Upanishads, Hirva na is 100'1 :ed upon as the sunmum bonum; while the Buddhist iconoclast tramples upon tradition, denies the immortality of the soul or the self, and mocking at the notion of the Brahman's Supreme Spirit, rejects these teachings.

Siddhartha Sahyarmuni Gautama, which translated into English, means: autama.who belon3s to the Sahye.tribe and who reached the

3pal of perfection, was born of a1 ancient Indian prince five 0 nturies

before Christ. His earlv lize ﬂ as a young prince was all too happy

and all too unreal in its splendor. At nineteen he married his

cousin Yasodhara. But the brilliance of his marriage was darker ed

by the shadow of disappointment, for his wife was childless. He

began to brood, and made up his mi uto eranine mo re closely the

sorrows of life. Why, he asked himself, is the 31ft of life even

at its best like a counterieit '5 jewel given to us by a stingy 30d?

Why must even the hap Hie t existence be full of the flaws of un-

failin3 misery and unfulfilled hOpes? Was life worth the living

Amon3 the le3ends told about him is the one of the event .7.1icn 9 Q

apparently decided him in his determination to search for truth.

While drivin3 one day with his servant he met an a3ed man bent and

broken by the wei3 ht of 1.is years. Gautama turned awq v in horror.

But his servant .nispered, "This, my prince is the way of life."

And before he could absorb the Shock of this 1 discovery, -9 the prince

came upon a b M‘ar covered wi th the sores of leprosy. "This, too,

is the may of life." said the servant. Ga utama drove on, ponderin3

deeply on what he had seen. And finally, he came upon a naked corpse,

swollen, discolored and rotting in the sun. "This," said the servant,

"is the end of life.“ Having been brought face to face with the misery O of life, Gautama decided to do sciethin3 about what he had seen. He

Questioned wanl erin3 monks and men of 3reat learning, asking them to

tell him about the indignities and the deception of the world. In his search for truth, he lei°t his pleasures and his palace and set

out to find the answers to the problems that beset him. Gradually, his new philosophy evolved. Gautama tau3ht the joy, not of pessession, but of renunciation.

This doctrine of renunciation lies at the very toot of the secret of life, he believed. Human existence represents the soul's journey from earth to heaven. But this journey, he declared, is a successive m13ration of the soul through many bodies. Only he who has learned to subordinate his little personal self to the lar3er self of humanity is read1 at last to end his veary pilgrima3e from life to life and to enter into the Nirvana of eternal rest and nothin3ness. In pessimistic strain, Gautama looked upon existence and all of reation as evil. Nirvana, according to Buddha's doctrine, is the complete exp tinction of all bodily desire, - the only possible way for man to have surcease from the eternal striving and frustration that is the lot of mortals. It is easy to understand, comparing this doctrine to that of Schopenhauer, how the latter conceived his pessimistic philosophy. Faced with much the same questions that had confronted

Gautama centuries before, SchOpenhauer found a kindred spirit in

Buddha and readily accepted his doctrines. The German philosopher found in Buddhism the religious version of his philos0phy and the doctrine of deliverance from the insatiable driving force within the self thidh formed a major part of Buddhistic -hilosophy was readily accepted by Schopenhauer. He embraced the Buddhist doctrine that the ego is the source of selfishness and only by suppressing. the ego is it possible for man to be freed from the illusions that breed the evil of e3oism.

In one sense Buddha.may be regarded as continuing Brahmanism rather than reacting sharply against it. The Vedanta philOSOphy had already proclaimed a message of deliverance from the illusions of this earthly experience through knonledge. And Buddha's own gospel was a message of deliverance from the illusions and snares

of sense through the enlightenment of which he was the prophet.

But while this is so, Buddha silently yet firmly set aside much

that was important in the then existing Brahmanism. The system of caste he treated as valueless, and the Brahmanical theology

seemed to him futile. The elaborate order of sacrifices he judged

to be unnecessary as well as cruel; and self-torture he considered vain. To Gautame the secret of man's sorrow and suffering, and of nis redemption likewise, lay within himself. The way of wisdom lay in recognizing the fact of suffering, in knowing its origin and extinction, and the path which led to its extinction. Like Schopen- hauer centuries later, Buddha believed that the remedy for a world laboring in pain, lay in the overcoming of man's insatiable desire, the suppression of the will to live, and casting away he chains of

sense.

Though we must admit that there is much that is fine and grac-

ious in Buddhism, it has its defects when judged in comparison with

Christianity, which disqualify it from attaining the universality at which it aims. There is an eudaemonistic element in Buddhism which

expresses itself in the dread of misery and suffering, as if suffering were always an evil to be avoided. The Buddhist practices the virtues of kindness and compassion toward suffering fellow mortals, but he does so in order that he may discipline and perfect himself in the

task of extinguishing d sire, not to ameliorate conditions in the world around him. Consequently, his creed is a creed without hope or inspiration. He will die to every desire for all are alike vain and empty - illusions that deceive a man. Certainly the pessimistic

Spirit deeply colors the Buddhist vision of life.

Schopenhauer's philos0phical system owes its being to external

causes, at least in part, for it was the product of two tendencies,

as specifically German, and the other distinctly Oriental. The

German tendency supplied his thought with its philosophic groundwork,

but the Oriental, though it came from an East that was little under-

stood in Schopenhauer's day, gave the impulse that built into a system

of pessimism the principles he had inherited. Certainly, schopenhauer

was greatly influenced by Immanuel Kant and by Fichte, but the impetus

which determined the cirection he took was given, largely, by Buddha.

But from Buddha Schopenhauer learned the central theme that the will,

which was the essence of the ego, because the symbol of the universal

cause - it was the root alike of individual and universal life; this universal will to live, as everywhere distributed, was a.passion for

being, a struggle to live, a yearning toward realization; but this passion was blind, except as its end was being and the maintenance

of being.

Turning from Buddhistic pessimism we enter upon a study of the

ancient HebreW'philosophies, eSpecially the writings in the Book of

Job and the Book of Ecclesiastes in the Old Testament. While the

Hebrew philos0phers were not brilliant metaphysicians and constructed

no great theories of the universe, they did concern themselves with

most of the problems relating to the life and destiny of man. The

Hebrew philOSOpli, while containing Optimistic portions is yet largely

pessimistic and it is two of the pessimistic writers with which we shall 96 concern ourselves here, with the caution that they are not represent- ative of F brew thought generally.

As philosophers the Hebrews were able to stand with the Chinese,

Hindu and Egyptian thinkers and while they never attained the greatness of the Greek seekers after wisdom, they were more advanced in their philosophy than most other peOples in the pre—Hellenic era.

The Book of Ecclesiastes is supposedly written by King Solomon.

Basically, its philosophy preposes doctrines of determinism, mechanism, scepticism and pessimism. t holds that knowledge of ultimate things is impossible and that there is no evidence of any soul or any life after death. All living things are made of dust and will return to the dust from whence they came, "vanity of vanities, saith the Preach- er, vanity of vanities; all is vanity...I have seen all the works that are done under the sun; and behold, all is vanity and.vexation of spirit." 1 Fame, riches, extravagant pleasures are regarded as snares and delusions in the end. .Although wisdom is better than folly, even it is not a sure key to happiness, for an increase in knowledge brings a keener awareness of suffering. Man and beast alike suffer the same ignominy of death; the rich man who has property and servants to do his will and satisfy his every desire, look? ing at his position can but conclude that "all is vanity under the sun." Finding that all existence is futile what is Ecclesiastes to do? He would enjoy the things of life and since there is the possibility of a judgement after death, he would keep on he safe side and obey the commandments. Tsanoff comments upon this by saying:

l Ecclesiastes, Ch. 1; 2 and 1M. 97

"So the mind that had started a dirge of sceptical-cynical weariness

ends, or is made to end, on a note of cautious piety. It is a politic

conclusion of a calculating philosop.y of life." 1

The Book of Job likewise provides an example of limited contingent

pessimism. The Book is a drama of the tragic struggle between man and

fate. Its central theme is the problem of evil, how it can be that the

righteous suffer while the eyes of the wicked stand out with fatness.

Job, the main character, is a man of unimpeadhable virtue, suddenly

overtaken by a series of disasters - he is deprived of his prOperty,

his children are killed, and.his own body is afflicted with a dread—

ful disease. At first he accepts all this with resignation but as his troubles become more and.more grievous he curses the day of his

birth and pravs for death.

Job enters into a lengthy discussion with his friends over the problem of evil. His friends are inclined to view suffering in the usual Hebraic way‘- as a punishment from God for past sins. But this

does not satisfy Job. Despair weighs heavily upon him and he decides

that God is an all-powerful Spirit of Evil, who destroys without mercy

and without purpose. In his misery he appeals to God to reveal Him-

self and His ways to him. The answer he receives convinces Job of his own insignificance and.of the power and glory of God, but there

is no solution offered for the problem of evil and the Deity makes no effort to refute the pessimism of Job. The same note of weariness

and cosmic disenchantment pervades the Book of Job and Ecclesiastes as well.

1 Tsanoff, Nature of Evil, 1). 36. In a direct continuation, since much of he New Testament

is based upon the Old, is the philosophy of Christ. LeOpardi

continually stressed the pessimistic strain in the philosOphy of Jesus, returning time and time again to the fact that Jesus reCOgnized the natural and miserable proclivity of man toward evil and by calling it "the World" emphasized the wide difference between Spiritual or supernatural virtue and worldly nature: "H, m

{ingdom is not of this world."

Schopenhauer commenting upon what he considered the pessimism in the New Testament says:

'The New Testament must be in some way traceable to an Indian source: its ethical system, its ascetic view of morality, is pessimism, and its Avatar, are all thoroughly Indian....the view taken by Christ- ianity in common with Buddhism (is) the world can no longer be looked at in the light of Jewish Opt- imism, which found 'all things very good': nay, in the Christian schemeg’the devil is named as its Prince or Ruler, 5/6”wa T071 (03744.00 rat/7'00,” (John: 12,33)

To Schopenhauer, Christ is the symbol or personification of the negation of the will to live.

Nietzsche, however, takes an opposite view and lays many of the evils of the world at the feet of Christ, and blames Him for the misery, suffering, incompetence, etc., in the world today:

"This Jesus of H.2areth, the incarnate gospel of love, this 'Redeemer' bringing salvation and victory to the poor, the sick, the sinful - was he not really tempt- ation in its most sinister and irresistible form, tempt- ation to take the tortuous path to those very Jewish values and those very Jewish ideals.“

1. SchOpenhaner, Essays, "The Christian System", 0p. cit.,,PP- 92-93- 2 Nietzsche, Frederick, The Geneaology of Morals, Modern Library, New York, p. 9+5. 99

There have been varied views 0 the aha acter of Christ; the

Roman Catholic view of the helpless Babe of Bethlehem and the Infant

of Prague Who draws all men to Himself by His simplicity, His help-

lessness and His humaneness, yet possessing infinitude, power and

divinity; there is the Protestant concept, relying upon the Medieval

reformers, who have made a reformer of Christ, comparable to John

the Baptist; the philosophers of the scholastic era have stressed

th wetaphysical aspects of His character, while Protestantism has

stressed the moralistic aspects. Protestant ChristolOgists, despite

their evident sincerity, seem inclined to expect Christ to advance

the cause of their party and they are forced to view Jesus in their

own narrow way. Man has made Christ in the image and likeness of man.

Even in the realm of art, there has been a wide variety of im- pressions of Christ, apparently creating a Christ to suit the ideals

of the particular age or philos0phy of the time or place. The ihons

of the Eastern Orthodox Church have a gothic weariness and angularity

about them, giving an almost cadaverous appearance to their images 01

Christ. Michelangelo gives Him a muscular appearance while Raphael makes Him fleshy. .About many of the paintings and works of sculpture

there is an effeminate quality about Christ, a quality of weakness

and supineness; other artists depict Him as a terrible avenger, a mighty and powerful judge; while the Spanish artists give to Him a

Quality of suffering, - to them Christ appears all mangled, bruised,

bleeding and dying.

In the midst of all this confusion concerning the real character

of Christ, vriters such as Leopardi and Schopenhauer point to the 100 pessimism of Christ. They deplore the effort of those who attribute to Christ the Optimistic characteristics of human thinkin3, pointin3 out tlat Optimism is but a poor medicine for the Christ Who was immers— ed in 3rief and fully alive to the contradictions of life. Optimism, they point out, means that one must be so uncritical as to accept life and the universe at the face-value and that Christ refused to take all things for granted. Optimism of this sort would imply a blindness to the existence of the remote and the ideal.

t is easy to point out, from a study of the Gospel narratives, that Christ did not preach a 3ospel of success, as so commonly underb stood in worldly terms. 1 He gave no praise to those who tried to solve the problems of this world by any method of exteriorization. He preached to the poor, the maimed, the blind, and the world-veary to prepare them for eternity, "Ky Kingdom is not of this world!" But miristians have metamorphosized Christianity and its pessimi u of the verity of this world. Occidente;l Christianity is able to accept Christ and His

Gos 381 today only oec.use men have Chang ed it, overlooked its true meaning and minimized its mes sa3e of contempt for the things of earthly e} :istence. How else could Protestant and Catholic accept the Sermon on the Hount with its philos0phy of non-resistance and non-resentment?

1 Bruce Barton in his book, 'Tne hen Hobo“v Knows" ta”es a contrary view, the t Christ was a successful business executive and a shrewd advertising and puolicity mana3er, Whose ability in business and social relations was responsible for the relatively swift spread of Christianity. The book was written, we mi3ht recall, in an era when business and "success“ in financial enterprises almost became a reli3ion with many America us. R .H. Tasney, in his book, ‘Heli 3ion and the Rise of Capitalism, ” (Pen3uin Book 3, Inc. N.Y., 19L?) dis- cusses the influence of Calvinism on western thou3ht and the pos si- bility that Calvinism exercised a lar3e influence on the western striviL3 ior material success, as a sign of predestination ori3inally, and later this attitude became habitual, even after its reli; ious ori3in and motivation was for3otten. 101

How else could modern Christians ignore the counsel to seek no treasure in the finite order, fear not those who kill only the body, fear not to cut Off the hand or pluck out the eye, if they Offend the interior spirit, hate the life of sense and love the life of spirit? 1 Certainly these are evidence of the transvaluation of values effected by the limited contingent pessimism of Christ. In

His pessimism of worldly values, Christ insisted upon the supremacy of the inner soul and denounced the attempts to subju3ate the soul to material ends. He stressed the nothinqness of worldly glory, wealth, power and pleasure, "For what doth it profit a man if he gains the rmole world yet suffers the loss of his immortal soul?"

Weighed in the balance, the world is made to appear of little value when compared with the value of but one soul. Christ decides against the Optimism which places man in the world as a thing among things, and decides for a pessimism which drives the soul be h into itself, for He wa anxious to be loyal to the soul and to eternity and thus

He repudiates the world, rejects it as unworthy of the soul.

Yet, Jesus was not lacking in a sense of metaphysical or moral responsibility when He rejected the material order of things in both nature and humanity. On the contrary, when He was permitted to in- dulge His own interpretation of things and persons, He showed extra- ordinary appreciation of the spectacle which was passing before Him.

1 Dr. Paul HonigSheim of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Michigan State College has pointed out in his lectures that the philOSOphies of the world's great religious leaders are soon changed by their followers when religion becomes bureaucratic and men become unwilling to form their lives according to the purity of the master's teaching. They grow insistent upon minimizing the more severe doctrines, accepting only those that meet with more pOpular approval. It is usually the small sect that insists upOn preserving the purer forms Of the creed, for example, the Mennonites, Quakers, Old Catholics, and certain religious orders in the Roman Church. 102

In His limited contingent pessimism, He found it necessary to proceed f

from the soul, from tile self outm Ltoward the world and the social

state; in doin 1‘ this Christ was ever discontented with the way in 5

"iich the tliings of nature and “ th e subjects of the state had been

orsanized into artific1al svstezs. Elie perception of birds and flowers, of children and 1 simple people pleased Him and won His approval,

l i but He became indi51ant at the nJoocricv,.nd formalism of legalistic / / / groups Within the Jewish religion.

In His pessimism, Christ upheld tile noole di wslty to the world. It was the idea of he north of the soul which.served Jesus

in brin5in5 aoout the emancipation of the human self from the thin5s

of the world. The soul has an intrinsic value which 5ives it di5ni v; from this position of di5nity, the soul cannot be displaced by any hing

in the outside world. In the morale of Christ, one must hate the

things of the world. True, Hi sGospel rm s a Gospel of Love, but love of neighbor is even cleansed of its humai aspect of love and lust for He expanded them into ideals of non-resistance and non-resentment,ahd the highest type of love was that based upon a sense of duty, not merely upon emotion. To Jesus these ideals seemed obvious but to

the modern "Christian" non-resistance and non-resentment are either

ignored, watere d— down or casuistically rele5- ated to the works to be done by saints or the chosen few.

Christ was anxious to put an end to the bandyin5 about of the

terms good and band. In order to make Himi elf unders tood.he showed

His disoaorov l of the couuonly a.ccepted values. He had no desire

to place the seal of His approval upon those Who v.'ere in the position 103

of earthly greatness. Thus, He dismissed Caesar with a witticism

concerning the Caesarian image on the coin, called Herod a fox,

and treated Pontius Pilate with silence. Parties came in for

similar condemnation. Pharisaism was suomitted a . to the most strident

form of crit'cism by Him Who showed His scorn by avoiding Scribes

and Pharisees and consorting with Publicans and sinners. Christ

condemned the social order so dear to the hearts of the Pharisees

and He accused them of making the outside of the cup Cleo while

the interior was filled with rottenness and corruption. There is

no thought of the meliorism peculiar to "social Christianity" -

no ideal of "civic ri5hteousness;“ there is nothing but pessimistic

condemnation of the morality of mediocrity. Christ's limited con-

tingent pessimism is strong and virile in the face of wars and

death and sickness and corruption, - "let not your hearts be troub— led," - "Blessed are they who suffer persecution," - "Come to he

all ye who labor and are heavily burdened and I will 5ive you rest,"

but His peace is not the sort of peace the world might give.

It was this pessimistic view of the world that led early mystics

to leave the worldly pursuits of other men and seek refuge in deserts

or caves, where 'n the practice of austerities, they could bring under

subjection the driving will to live and the desire for material things.

Christian ascetics have regarded the world as evil; as filled with temp—

tations that can bring destruction to the soul, and they avoided all worldly contacts, insofar as this was possible. They strove to be {£3

the world, but not 9: it." Indicative of this pessimistic outlook is

the beast of St. Aloysius Gonzaga that he had never looked into the

eyes of his mother for fear that he mi5ht be led to entertain impure 1014 thoughts. then Christian motherhood is regarded as evil, pessimism of a deep dye is certainly evident.

In most Christian monastic communities, members are forbidden to own any prOperty, even the clothing on their backs, in order to avoid worldly contacts as much as possible. To subdue the flesh, they are urged to practice penance and plvsical discipline. All great religions have praised asceticism, and in consequence it we not difficult for Schopenhauer to cite, in support of his theory that chastity is the best alternative to suicide, a number of texts from the 5nostics, the early fathers of the church, the mystics and the Quietists, together with pertinent extracts from the Bible and the sacred books of the Orient. Beyond suicide, Which is not a philosophic solution, there are but two remedies for the misery of life,

SchOpenhauer felt. One of these remedies, a palliative, is found in art and disinterested contemplation; the other, i asceticism or absolute chastity. He felt that if chastity were universal, it would drain the source of humanity anC pain would disappear, for if man is the highest manifestation of Will, if he were to die out, the weaker reflections would pass away. But while chastity for the ascetic is a.means to the exaltation of personal purity and the renunciation of worldly pleasures, to SchOpenhauer, the value of asceticism consists in the fact that it could lead to deliverance; it can prepare the world for the annihilation of pain and misery. SchOpenhauer did not indicate how all men are to be p rS'aded to embrace a life of celibacy, nor how all women are to be convinced that their greatest service to mazkind would be to refuse to bear children. However, it is not the province of philosophy to prOpose how this should be done. 105

medieval asceticism as practiced in monasteries and convents had certain features in common with pessimism. It thought, as did

the early coenobites and hermits, that the world was wrong, too unclean to be a fit home for a holy person; therefore, a.place to

be forsaken if a man would save his own soul. The existina order of Q

society was conce '4- ved as evil, and it was thought better that the good man should take himself out of that order than endanger his

soul by remaining within it. "Flee from the wiCkedness of the world!"- became the hue and cry of the medieval ascetic. On its personal side,

this was a doctrine of salvation, and is limited contingent pessimism,

t on its social side it was a doctrine of annihilation, so far at least as its attitude signified that the world was so bad that the pious could neither desire its continuance, nor do anything to promote it. It was in this latter aspect that it agreed with pessimism, for it conceived secula society as so under the power of evil that

the happiest thing for it was to pass away and perish.

This tendency is typical of tie lessimistic mood that is never very remote from any of us. The first impulse of a man who is ang_y 2 m d U) 93 ch Ho E" it the emptiness and unrealities of human life, is t O (D 9.) "5 all vanity and vexation of spirit. And in the burst of first fervor

in his n w—found Spiritual belief, man is inclined to forsake a world

ésidi is absorbed in the enjoyment of temporal things and to retire to a solitude where he may cultivate his fears and where, from a safe distance, he may watch the march to destruction of those who are too blind to see. Or he may consider it his destiny to devote his life

to prayer for those who are so engrossed in material things. This type of contingent pessimism looks upon the world as filled with evil, 106

but longs for immortality where there will be a rectification or

compensation for the miseries endured in this life. t clearly takes

its cue from Christ Who urged His disciples to leave father and mother

and wife and.all things, to follow Him. The idea of an evil world

brought about by man's wilful selfishness, and.the consequent advocacy

of the rejection of worldliness and the denial of self as essentials

of godliness, Characterize the medieval conception of life. One exp

ample of such disdain of the world and human life is the work of Pope

Innocent III, in which he quotes Ecclesiastes and Job in his attempt

to show the utter'vanity of existence and the worthlessness and futil-

ity of man's life on earth. One passage will illustrate the possi- mism of the work:

"Han is made of dust, of mud, of ashes; verse yet, of the foulest seed; conceived in the itch of the flesh, in the heat of passion, in the stench of lust; and worse, in the depths of sin; born to labor, to dolor, to horror; more miserable still, to death. He acts wickedly, offending God, offending his neighbor, offending himself; he acts infamously, polluting; fame, polluting conscience, polluting character; he acts vainly, neglecting the useful, neglecting the necessa . He is food for fire ever blasing and burning unguenched; food for worms, ever gnawing and eating without end; a mass of putrescence, ever noisome and horribly foul."

It belongs to the medieval mind to substitute physical contin-

ence for chastity, and to believe that the former is a practical

aim and a.virtue, whereas it is often a disease. Catholic educators

often leave youth in false conscience, suffering them to regard as unchaste and sinful things that are perfectly inevitable and quite

normal. The very conception of "angelic purity" (a much used phrase

in pious books) is misleading. ,Angels were (speaking the language of

l Innocent III, Pope, De Contemptu Mundi, sive De hiseria Conditionis Humanae, highs, "Patrologia.Latina,"7Vol. CCXVII, Paris, 1889, pp. 107

concepts) sexless, passionless, and an ideal put before humans as

attainable which does not make allowance for human passion and the

physiology of sex is, to say the least, unsound. Catholic phiIOSOphy

of sex, based as it is upon medieval anatomical studies, does not take

into account the part which the secretions of the sex glands play in

the organism as a whole. Nor does it adapt itself to the findings of

science to the effect that without sexelife full emotional, mental,

and physical maturity is impossible. Such an ethical system gives to youth the vision of sex as a kind of devil within his loins, bent upon his destruction, implacably hostile to his welfare. He comes to

regard himself as conceived in evil and born in iniquity. fter a life of weary struggle he discovers that in itself, sex is no more demoniacal than digestion or reSpiration; or he becomes despondeut and pessimistic at his repeated failures to live the "angelic life“

enjoined upon monastics.

One of the contributing factors in the devclOpment of a.philo—

sophy such as that of POpe Innocent III mentioned above, is the teach-

ing of the Roman Church that marital intercourse, no matter how holily performed is still looked upon with suspicion as potentially unbecoming, and displeasing to God, for pious couples are warned to abstain before

receiving Communion. Greek Catholic priests, who are duly married according to the Eastern rite and discipline, are supposed to "abstain" for three days before they celebrate mass. After childbirth, a Catholic woman must be "churched", that is, ritually purified, as though she were in some way spiritually contaminated by the experience she had undergone in giving birth to her child. In fact, in the mind of the

(mindwgf the Church, sex whether lawfully indulged in or not, whether involuntarily (and 1 therefore sinlessly) experienced, as in sleep, or voluntarily and sinfully experienced, always contaminates more or less. Only little children who know no sex are perfectly pure and acceptable and.holy in the eyes of the Church. 1 What are pen- itents to conclude from such advice but that sex-phobia is a virtue, and asexuality an ideal? Certainly these attitudes lead to a pessimistic outlook on life, magnifying into enormous evil, perfectly natural acts whicn . i are ethically moral and good.

Catholicism, however, is not alone in inculcating a pessimistic attitude of contempt for the world and despair of man's ability to refrain from evil. Calvinism, with its doctrine of predestination has done much to cause men to look gloomily at life here and hereafter, and question its worth by calling into doubt cosmic justice. The

Spiritual revolution thus engendered took as its Shibboleth the phrase, "contemptus muhdi amor Christi.’l

According to St. Augustine of Hi npo, the will of man is ever A perverse and prone to evil, helpless except for God's grace. Calvin accepted and stressed this Augustinian concept and rejected all forms of sacramentalism, holding that no matter what a man does or may not do he is unable to merit his salvation. man is helpless in working out his own salvation and even for the elect, there would be no salvation but for God's grace, gratuitously given. Calvinistic absolute predestinarianism held the man's fall from original grace was a con- seQuence of God's decree of reprobation. It affirmed that God does not

1 Freud would criticize this view that it is possible for even small children to be asexual, for he contends that sex plays a very important part even in the develOpment of infants. 109 nave a true vill to save all mankind but merely the elect and that salvation or damnation depends on the will of God alone, irreSpective of the action of the free will of the saved or the damned, or of their forseen merits or demerits.

Though Calvin stressed the necessity to continue working and conforming to the will of God by living a moral life, even though no man could know for certain whether he was destined for heaven or hell, this doctrine certainly leads men to doubt the beneficence of God and makes them pessimistic of their own abilities to contribute toward their eternal salvation. It leaves the dilemma of undeserved suffering unanswered. We will deal with this problem in the next Chapter on the

Problem of Evil. Are natural catastrOphes, floods, hurricanes, epidemics and all the ills to which mankind is heir the consequence of

Adam's sin? If so, does an Eternally Beneficent God lovingly elect some undeserving mortals to happiness and damn others, both in this life and in eternity to atone for the inherited consequences of.Adam's fall in which they had no part?

Calvin preached a doctrine of renunciation of the world and all citizens of Geneva were compelled to tame an oath of confession to the Protestant faith. Showy dress was forbidden and overseers went from house to house to report on the morals of the peeple and to convince themselves that the laws were being carried out. Three men were imprisoned for laughing during one of Calvin's sermons. Dancing was banned as evil. Taverns were closed and in the approved "refreshment houses" the customer was obliged to say grace before and after meals.

Because of his extreme pessimism concerning man's ability to avoid evil,

alvin had established a police system to enforce morality. 110

Arnold J. Toynbee sums up the pessimism of the Calvinistic

philOSOphy as follows:

"The disillusioned.predestinarian who has been taught by harsh experience that his God is not, after all, on his side is condemned to arrive at the devastating conclusion that he and his fellowhhomunculi are 'But helpless pieces in the game He plays Upon this dheQuer—board of nights and days, Hither and thither moves and hacks and slays, And one by one back in the closet lays.'“ l

Calvinism is a.philos0phy of determinism. Opposed to it is

the doctrine held by the Scholastics and others of free will as

the capability of self-determination. We know the fact of free

will by direct consciousness, just as we know our own identity.

We believe that we can freely guide our own thoughts, selecting,

if we choose, the least attractive. We believe that when two

alternative courses of action lie before us, we can freely del-

iberate upon their respective merits, reflecting, inquiring, and

examining the reasons for each side.

Spinoza, however, holds to a philos0phy of determinism in

contradiction to this Scholastic position. In his hpistles he

says that if a stone which has been projected through the air had consciousness, it would believe that it was moving of its

own free will. But Spinoza denied that either the stone or a philos0pher possess free will for he places freedom not in "free

decision but in free necessity." He holds that every "individual

thing is necessarily determined by some external cause to exist

and Operate in a fixed and determinate manner." 2

1 Toynbee, Arnold J., A.Study of History, Oxford University Press, New York, 191:7, p. 1450 with the quotation from the Rubaiyat. . 2 Spinoza, Baruch, The Philoscphy of Spinoza. Letter LXII. trans. QY Pal-1.1:. Elwes, Tudor Publishing Co., N.Y., pp. 395—398. 111

The moral consciousness of mankind, in Opposition to the

Calvinistic teachings, points to the freedom of man. The sense of moral obligation is written in every man's heart; it is as certain as the uniformity of nature. Man believes that he is absolutely free to avoid evil and to choose good. But the deteIh minist will tell us that these beliefs are mere illusions.

The evil that perplexes the pessimist, is not merely physical evil, however, but moral evil as well. Crime, vice, sin, the lusts that in their search for pleasure make pain, the passions, and the brutalities that make men desolate, are the evils that create despair, for they do not inflict mere physical suffering, but devestate man's soul. There is small consolation in the belief that God.has no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but wills that all men should be saved, for the Question arises, - Why then is His will so impotent?

Our perplexity is further increased when we ponder the fact that

Theism creates the so-called problem of evil. If men did not believe in. a good God, or if they had not the disposition that this belief has created in humanity, they would not feel this Question of evil to be so insoluble a mystery. .A man who believes in mechanical necessity, or a fixed fate, will accept every fact of life, including its evil, but then his conscience will not be burdened, nor will he be perplexed, as if he believes in a free and good God. For where there is no choice there can be no morality, and where there is no morality there can be no responsibility nor condemnation. But if a man believes that there is a powerful and righteous God, the Creator and Ruler of the universe, he is, in the very degree that he is thoughtful, certain to be perplexed by the problem 112 that will rise time and time again, "‘.‘.'hy has He permitted evil to ad st?" It is with this Problem of Evil that we shall be concerned in the following dapter. 113

CHAPTER Iv

THE PROB i OF EVIL

hilos0phy has no more difficult or obstinate question for the consideration of its votaries than that connected with the origin and the existence of evil. It takes no keen intellect or perspic— acious spirit to discern the presence of evil, and both Optimist and pessimist have sought a solution to the problem. If man believes that there is an omnipotent and just Deity; in the course of his contemplation on the events of life, he will be confronted by the question of how this God could allow evil to exist. And as man dwells on this paradox, he reasons somewhat as follows: 'God, being all-powerful, either could.have prevented evil from existing in the world, and would not prevent it; or He desired to prevent it, but did not possess the power to do so. If I embrace the first alternative I must conclude that while He is omnipotent, He is not perfectly Good; and if I embrace the second alternative, I must con— clude that while He may be a God of perfect Goodness, He is a being of imperfect power. But either conclusion leaves me with a proposition which denies the perfection of God, for I must conclude that a perfectly good being would not have permitted so much evil in a world

He created.‘

Symbolically, the problem may be expressed in the following reductio ad aosurdum a, type of argument:

Let G 'God 0 =omnipotence J =justice E -evi1 111;

Then G -—)o and J o as

J —-——>E' o and J ———)E and E‘

G *-‘,'O and J G‘-—-)E and E'

The presence of evil thus forms one of the most serious problems confronting a man who would believe in a personal God. Opti- mism, conceives existence as good in - .ite of the evil found in it, uh wh‘le pessimism as a philos0phy gives expression to the belief that life is undesirable, hateful, or purposeless because of its evils.

Thus both pessimist and optimist concern themselves with the problem of evil: the Pess'mist seeks to learn the answer to the Quest-

ion of the ultimate nature of evil and how best to escape it, - while

the optimist ponders the paradox of why a fundamen ally good and perf-

ect world should include evil and how best to adjust to it and mini- mize it.

As has been said before, the problem of evil arises only in a theistic philosOphy. In atheistic philosophy, there is no "problem" of evil, for the philos0pher who rejects the belief in the existence of a God is not concerned with moral purpose or final causes in a cosmic

sense, but merely with the fact of the existence of evil; he does not give 0 praise u or N olame Ior n things o as qme finds o 1 them 9‘ to any v4 transcendent a 3| beiiv His concern with evil is an empirical one, for he believes to. 115

hat when evil is found, it reS“ ts from an arre Sement inimical to human values, or a maladjustment to purely material thin.s.

Since Immanuel Kent's CritiQue of Pure Reason, philos0phers have almost been compelled, if they would rise above the narrowh ness of dolmatism, to orush aside purely me 5rd ysical speculations a1d concern themselves with analytical, linzuistic, lo pical and empirical inves i-ations, leavinr pure speculation to speculative U scientists, and it is in accord nee with this attitude of Kent tlm

I shall attempt to concern myself primarily with 51h at is known, leeyb in; he theolOgians to s: Mecul ate about the problem of evil and its possible solution. I do not deny that metaphysics is a legitimate field of philosophical endeavor. I simply state that the problem of evil is a transcendental one and philOSOphy should not attempt to prOpose a dojnatic solution to .L theC Hue tion of its me ure.

It is understandable to see how Giacomo LeOpardi turned to grim des air of the goods of life by the time he had reached nineteen years of age for he felt thatl 11s happiness he d been wrecked by ill health which deprived him of one of his greatest joys, that of engag -ing in study; almost blind, hemmed in on almost every side by restrictions and parental objections to his hopes and dreams, he regs rded himse elf as merely bidding his time until he would 11nd release in deatl. Any adeguate study of his pessimism must take into account his own unhappy life, for certainly the jud e 1ent he passes on life was not an impersonal one, but a result of 11is own tra3ic experience.

Philo of Ale:r.ndria an ontolo;ical pessimist, writing in a mystic-reli3ious tradition, is clearly pessimistic in his attitude

toward existence for he felt that evil He 5 inextr icably bound up with every man‘s life. Lhe soul, tied down to the body with all of its propensities toward evil, is never free. He felt that life, which is the ont0103ical ‘as1s for an individual's existence, is also the medium of evil. It is only by asceticism and a denial of worldliness, that man can rise above the evils of the world.

Clearly, many pn110s0p11ers ‘\ 0 in studying life and its varied moral problems will agree with p ssimists in their acco" ts or descriptions of the evils that exist. Even the most pronounced

Optimist would not deny the existence of the lon 3 lists of physical and moral evils of which Schopenhauer writes. F w men ccn live in the world and not be deeply touched by its sufferings, by man's selfishness toward man, by the seeming injustice of morally evil men gain- in; wealth and honor and r1any other me aterial goods while men of good moral character often suffer a plenitude of ills and material evils.

In our own time it was an occasion of perplexity to many that a totalitarian nation, e.g. Nazi Germany, often appeared to thrive on injustice a.d evil while nations 1.hich professed Christian and democratic principles were often beset with evils that threatened their very existence. For a time England seemed to be going down in defeat while Germa.ny rode mater over one EurOpea n country after another. Deepotism, which according to many value judgements is an evil, apparently increases, t.'hile democracy (which of course can be variously defined and has been apgalied to (we crioe ever;: extreme form 117 of government from the most dictatorial to the most d mocratic) must struggle to preserve itself against the onslaughts of elements seek-

Fl- n: “x its destruction.

own, ror dictatorial governments are extremely pessimistic of the {‘3 O H. H H.

C+ f the people of a nation to govern themselves. They annot 0 k: regard the ponulace as intelligezt J. enough to choose the good, nor possessed of sufficient character to resis the enticements of demap gosy; while the pepulace, deSpairing of their own ability to preserve peace 0 find security, look with Optimism to the dictator for leader- H

snip. Th problem 01 h the ‘ violat'o a . ignts of men to govern t5 r. H '1 0 H) (P (D themselves is clearly a moral proolem. So is the question of discrim- ination against minority rroups, the question of war, the question of a) state seizure of property of individuals, and the 1 whole gamut of sini- lar problems which are raised in discussing the relative value of one form of government over another.

There is little or no problem of evil for man in the lower levels of culture. The presence of evil in his environment is accepted without asking whether such a condition could have been avoided. The nai and pressing concern is to overcome or evade the evils which threaten him in his struggle for existence, but for the existence of evil in general, or for trying to understand its causes or its relation to mankind in general, he has no great concern. The growth of reflection, the formation of the idea of a worldpsystem and a social order, provoked a study into the origin and meaning of evil within this order.

In primitive cultures material evils are exclusively dealt with, 118 and the religion which is thought to deliver from these 1s conceived in a.naterial fashion. q . There I 15 o no areas L difficulty for the savage _) to eXplain dle reason for the e::istence of the evils that beset him.

He simply reasons that the goods and evils of life have their corresp- onding sources in the pir it world; and if there are beneficient spirits who are able and willing to help man, there are also evil spirits to those J hostile actionn rbe traced the evils that ems suffers. In man's early develOpment there is little difficulty with the problem of evil, for man spealcs of evils rather than of evil and.he has little difficulty unders tandinr it. he simply imputes evil to evil gods.

But with a monotheistic religion, and the idea of a personal and ozini- potent Deity who is considered to possess the attributes of perfection, the proolem of evil comes into existence.

Even the materialist is faced with t’n e hedonistic paradox. If he embraces a hedonistic philosophy, holding that the only good is pleasure and one ought always to seek it, he is confronted with ne‘I fact that wlienever pleasure itself is the object sought it cannot be found. Human nature is such that pleasure normally arises as an accomp minent of satisfaction of desire for an end ex :cept when that end is pleasure itself. Paradoxically, the way to attain pleasure is not to seek for it, but for something else which when found will have yielded pleas‘re through the finding. And similarly, one should m. iot seek to av moidn p-in, but only actions which produce pain. inere is a psycholo; ice.l reason for this. leasure normally follows upon the sat 'i: 3fc;ction of desires. But the pursuit or A pleasure, for its own sake, means the deliberate stimulation 01 .0 the instir ctive and sensuous tendencies that underlie these desires, and such deliberate 119

stimulation results inevitc oly in satiety and the dm lling of our

sens1tivit uy

H Fl) 0 stimuli. 1here is a great WlSdOH in rec03nizing,

as did Epicurus, he truth that what we call happiness is a by-

product of a ri ah and fully lived e: :istence, and to tuin from

life itself to its by-products brings with it dtime tely disillus-

ionment and pes w1.ism.

If we define a paradox as an Opinion or an event that appears

self—contran He tory, 1e undeserved su11er1n s of the innocent is pared xical. "hen we view the relation of Yahveh to His peeple,

the problem of evil becomes especially perplexing in later Hebrew

thought. What explanation can be given for th apparently undeser- veE sufferine of riﬁiteous men? This is the central problem in th ‘LA

Book of Job as Tsanoff indicates:

"If, with Job's three friends, we judge the t affliction is always puni hment for sin, we reason a3 ainst plain and ab- undrm at experience in men' s lives. If, with Satan, we spec~ ulate that God brin n3s calamity to men in order to test their rirhteousness, we mev be mel1~n1ng God, Whose omnipotence would scarcely seem to rec lire, or His perfect goodness to permit, any uch experiments at good men's expense. But Satan's ques tion me; yet be the decisive one:'Doth Job fear God for nought?‘ Though the tragedy of Job remains in his anguished search for a theodicy, for a view of God‘s treat— ment of him that would not reflect on God's unwavering justice, yet Job's own un shaken moral resolution reveals that he does not serve God for nou~et. Unable to grasp a new view of God nor yet to fbandon th‘ e old one, he holds fast to his rig hteousness."

We should face the fact, I believe, based upon empirical obser» vation, that prosperity is not always the lot of the wicked, and misery always the portion of the good, as some pessimists so falselv generalize.

Ilany :;ood.pe0ple enjoy hee.lth, wealth, social and political preeminence,

l Tsanoff, horel Ideals of Our Civilization, E.P. Dutton Co., 19MB, P 120

while nary wicked people suffer sickness, poverty, diS5race, imprison- ment aid painful death. Happiness is not always to be measured by mere externals. Poverty does not always mean suffering, nor does wealth always insure happiness. It would be interesting to know the ratio of suicides among the wealthy as compared wi h that among the middle-income and lower-income groups. It would not be surprisina to learn that the number of suicides among the wealthv was as larse or even larger preportionately, than the n‘nber of uicidal deaths among the lower income groups.

One of the answers to the problem of why a just God.permits innocent men and women to suffer ruin and every sort of evil, and why wicked men often seem to prosper, has been given by Joseph de

Maistre (lYBM-lSZl) a.French philosopher of the romanticist school.

He reasoned that God had established certain necessary relations between the natural and the moral order. This life is a tine of trial, during which a man must prove himself worthy of the eternal happiness that God metes out to those who serve Hit. The sufferings of the good, therefore, are to be regarded as punishment for sin.

De Maistre held that this punishment was meant for mankind, not specifically for any individual. Just as soldiers may not all die in battle but all are yet there to die, so all men are subject to certain ailments which may not afflict every man. Should man expect a.miracle in return for his goodness of life, demanding that the just man drink poison with no ill effects, or the wicked man, because he is wicked, should be struck dead by the remedy that should normally heal his body? God does reward and punish, with perfect justice, de haistre contended, but not in such haste as to disrupt the natural order which He has established. Not all prosperity is divine blessing,

nor all suffering a punishment for sin. This answer I cannot accept

as satisfactory, however, for as long as one innocent pprson, out of

all the worldls millions, bears injustice, misery and other evils,

the problem still remains unanswered.

Catholicism, which de Maistre sought to revive in eirhteenth

century France” does not pretend to give an adequate solution to the problem of evil. Her philosophers and theologians consider it a mystery not to be understood in man's earthly existence. But Catholi-

cism condemns, in no uncertain J. terms, what she considers false solut-

ions to the problem of evil; the dualism of ancient Zoroastrianism, which taught the existence of two equal principles, a good and a bad,

combating continually against each other; the fundamental pessimism

of schopenhauer and.Von Hartmann, which declared the world too evil

to be the product of a good God; the metaphysical Optimism of a Leib— niz, which held that this evil-stained universe was the best of all absolutely possible worlds; the will-to-power Optimism of Kietzsche

which denounced Christianity as a slave moralitv. TheolOgians contend

that God certainly does not intend physical evils for their own sake, for an Infinitely Intelligent God cannot mistakenly apprehend evil as good, and an Infinitely Good God cannot take pleasure in the misery and

SILL .9 ferings of His creatures.

Gandhi, the Hindu mystic, commenting upon the problem of suffering

stated that it is the mark f the human tribe, an eternal law. The mother suffers so that her child may live. Life comes out of death;

the condition of wheat growing is that the seed grain should perish. 122

No country has ever risen without being purified through the fire of suffering; progress is to be measured by the amount of suffering undergone, the purer the suffering, the greater is the progress.

But Gandhi makes God the author of evil;

" I cannot account for the existence of evil by any rational method. To want to do so is to be co-equal with God. I am therefore, humble enough to rec03nize evil as such, and I call God long-suffering and pat- ient precisely because He permits evil in the world. I know that He has no evil in Himself, and yet if

there is evil He is the author of it and dvet untouched by it."

Let us consider evil as of two kinds: evil that may be suffered and evil that may be done. The evil that mav be suffered we will call physical evil; that whi h may be done, moral evil. Actually, it may be impossible to disjoin the two, but for our present discussion we will consider them separately, for they belonr to distinct categories, ‘3 physical evil may be cons1dered incidental, occasional or relative and we might term it negative or privative. Moral evil, on the other hand, is positive and is actual rather than relative. Taken in a large sense of embracing the historv of a peeple or the collective fortunes of a race, physical evil may be endured or suffered either by the innocent or by the guilty, and its being and function may be, in both cases, equally natural and necessary.

Physical evil 2 may be divided into three classes: First, those shidh arise from man's relation to nature and nature's to man: Second, those which are native to his own being: Third, ‘ 0 those inflicted upon him

by inflicted upon him by his fellow man, whether ancestors or contemp- oraries.

1 Quoted in John Gunther's book, Inside Asia, Harper &2Bros., 1939, p.367.

2 For much of data I am indebted to Professor DeHaan for ermission to follow the material in his forthcoming boox,.A Call to eflection. 123

To the first class belong those evils whidh result from the dest-

ructive forces of nature; storm, hurricane, earthquake etc.. The

terrible disasters caused by Japanese earthquakes or a South Pacific

tidal—wave raise m- v doubts as to the wisdom or goodness of God and are more damaging than the scepticism of the eighteenth century philo-

sophers. When nature fails to respond to the work of man, famines result. Droughts, insect invasion, and soil-erosion may destroy man's efforts to provide himself with food. then man neglects nature, and refuses to obey her laws, pestilence and epidemics of disease follow with death in a.hundred forms of slow or swift certainty.

It is important that in considering natural or physical evils we hesitate before deciding that nature acts alone. We should consider just how far nature is reSponsible and how far man may be held to blame in the evils that develop. The number of evils caused by man's own ignorance or deliberate violation of natural laws constitutes an ends less series. Soil-erosion often results from man's greed or his laziness; pestilences are usually man's fault; accidents are usually ere plicable in terms of man's own failure to exercise caution.

Even the natural forces which often work to man's disaster, can be turned into his most beneficent aids if he will but study and master them, and the more man studies the secrets of nature the greater the mastery he attains. We cannot but marvel wzen we reflect how man has

arnessed the forces of nature and set limits upon its destructive pow— er. But before he an control these forces, he must learn obedience to natural laws. Much of civilization is the result of this educative process, man learning to obey the laws of nature and then in turn com- manding nature by obeying her own laws. By imitating the methods of nature and by calculating her forces, man has learned how to navigate upon the seas of earth; to fly the sky-lanes; to sow and reap the harvest. The awful power of a bolt of lightening and the surge of mighty rivers have been harnessed and turned to man's use, to light his cities and to provide heat and p wer to add to his comfort and to lessen his1 labors.

It cannot be denied, however, that nature can also inflict suffering on ma.. But these sufferings have also helped to educate him so that he has become more humane. He has learned that he must help his fellow men who suffer at nature's hands. When pestilence comes, or when shipwreck or disaster strikes, man is able to brave nature's wrath because, knowing her amful power and the fear that she can strike into the hearts of those she smites, man can brave danger in pity for those who are threatened. Famine has taught man to share his goods with those less fortunate and it is only the most perverted and self- iSh who will refuse aid to those who bear nature's wrath. In medieval times pestilence was dreadful, for it aroused, by the fear of contagr ion and the horror of death, the fiercest passions that can burn in man's breast, but the more men have penetrated into nature's secrets, the more they have learned their community of interests and that u.at affects their neighbor can easily affect them for no man can isolate himself entirely from the society in which he moves. No man is ever completely isolated but is always a group member, and as such he is affected by the group and in turn originates action to them. Nature has indeed been here a great educator in human pity and helpfulness; the very suffering he has inflicted has disciplined man and turned him to compassiOn. The people who enslaved the negro learned through 125

the penal conseﬂuences tiat followed to thems lves from their own

act the humanity of the men they had enslaveL. ﬁe slowly discover

that the secrets of nature are not the property 0 F!) he men who dis-

covered tlem, but of the whole race. I must cunit, however, that

this poses but a feeble answer to the problem.

In the second class, the evils that are native to man‘s own

being, we can include thirst, desire, hunger, birth pangs and death

struggle and through all of man's earthly existence the insatiab e H yearning for happiness and peace. One of the greatest frustrations man experiences is the result of his knowledge the his life is so ('1‘

brief, - many of the lower animals live longer on earth than he does,

and such inanimate objects as stones 2 d trees and brooks endure long-

er on the face of the earth than his short span. Death seems man's greatest ignominy, - to know that one day the body which houses our

inner being must be placed beneath the earth and become the food of worms, a thing to rot and decay until nothing but a handful of dust

that can be scattered by a (gust of breeze remains, - this is the most

painful sting 1‘ of mortality. Death strikes not only the individual

who e life is ended, but it toudhes with its pall of gloom and lonli- U) ness innocent and helpless lives that would otherwise probably be

appy. Is not death the greatest irony of mortal existence? What man, whether he looks to an eternity or whether he regards death as the

complete and absolute end of his being, can await with calmness and equanimity the certain approach of the hour of his own demise? But

is death an evil?

To those philosophers who do not regard life per se as a.value, death cannot be a disvalue, for if they refuse to recognise life as a good, then death, which ‘ is the natural ending of that life, cannot be re3arded as evil. Schopenhauer regards existence as an evil, yet he bemoans tile fact that "every evening we are poorer by a day." Should he not have said that we are "ridher" as each day passes, for with the passing of each day man approaches the end of life, which to the pee si— mist is so unpleasant and undesirable, bringing man closer to SchOpen- hauers hope and dream, Nirvana.

But let us consider, empirically, if death has brought any values with it; I will not even attempt to prove thatd ath is not an evil - let tliose who look ulon it as good defend their own proposition. While deaths per se is evil, if we accept life per se as good, for it is the privation of existence or at least of the ontological base or carrier of other goods, it must be admit ted that it has acCentm ted certain v Jues that man mirit otherwise i3nore Death gives a new meaning to life; time takes on a new value; affection, because of its brevity takes on a nobler aspect; and the simplest things of life stand out in oold relie e1 as bein3 good. A man who expects that the nex t m's sunrise will be his last, but who suddenly receives a reprieve at the last moment, can treasure such simple things as the morning dew on the grass, or the smell of newamown he‘, or the glory of an autumn sunset, whereas, all his life long he may have looked upon these thin3s as commonplace or without value. The pe miaist finds life boring and dull, either because of neurotic or other physiological conditions, or because he anticipates economic hardships bece .use of over—population, mechani- aation, or rampant utilitarianism; or he may hold a despairing attitude because of lack of religious faith which usually turns a.man's attention from his present woes to a.hone for future amelioration. L 127

Death can breathe into life a sgirit out or which all tra 3ic

and heroic thin3s can come, and it can add a glory and grandeur to life

that will give it new meaniz 3. Even the thoug 1t of the loss that

death brings to those who must remain behind, touches with tenderness

all the relations of life, for before loss can be felt, possession

must first have been felt. Hi3§1t it not be true that those who love

the livin3 feel life to De the more va uaole oecaus e it is so trans-

itory? Death does no injustice to the individual because no man is

exempt from it.

We turn our consideration to the third class of evils, those

men s"ffers from his fellowhm an. Serious reflection will serve to

convince the ooserver that these are indeed infinitely va1ster, darker

and more terrible the- the s*tu ferin3 s man suffers from the hand of

nature. Greed, vanity, lust, ambition and ne3lect are just as devast-

at1n3 a e ature' s evils. When the atom bomb blasted the life

I"1 :3 H) O 1 P1

out of hiroshima in an 11stant of hell and pain, it was man's inhuman-

ity to man, not any act of nature, that brought thiseyil into existence.

And no amount of rationali ation or casuistry can ever justify the

sla 3hter of innocent beings in time of war, for war is never just, unless it is permis aole to do positive evil that a problematic and highly controversial "good" may result. has any direct act of nature,

in her most deva statin3 fury equaled the evil that man's own greed for

territory,\ trealth, po 7er and political and economic dominance has forced upon mankind! While these th n3< s may be physical in form, they are

ethical in their si3n11ficance and in their conseQuences.

”9 mi_ht enumerate other evils of a 1331021 Htur that J. are 128 ihilicted on men.by man; evils that result from the relations of the sexes; evils that Sprin3 from the social constitution an) civil relations of man as he is organized into communities, states and nations; evils that develOp out of man's need to work that he might live, and the economic and industrial complications that result from this need.

Chile it must be admitted that mankind has not yet learned the ways to live at peace and in concord with his fellowhman, it must be admitted that the 3rowth in civilization may be measured by the limit- ations tEat lave been progressively laid upon his power to harm others.

The sense of the harm man could do to man has possessed the individual conscience with fear, and has armed the social conscience with all its sanCtions and almost all its terrors. But while evil and pain do exist, they do have a purpose.

It is this problem that has occupied the attention of Moritz

Schlick who proposes that he calls "the lav of contrast." .As he has formulated it, this porposition states that "neverhending c‘tates of pleasure could not be felt as such (thus really would not be such) unless they were interrupted by pain: as, for example, the Pytha3oreaus supposed that we did not hear the music of the spheres, solely because they sounded a continuous monotone." 1 He continues to develop this

Ho dea as follows:

"...... even thou3h here we cannot offer a proof, it still seems to be a fact of experience (I am of course not altogether sure of it) that the most profound joys of life are actually not possible unless, previously, 3rave feelings of pain have been experienced. It seems

l Schlich, 3., Problems of Ethics. Prentice-Hall. H'Y" 19 129

that the soul reguires then in order to become receptive of the sublinest pleasures....A life

such as the modest poet ﬁbrike placed "Iﬁnr for:

Wollest nit Freuden Und sollest mit Leiden Mich nicht ﬁbers hﬂtten! - dooh in der Mitten Liegt Holdes Bescheiden....

could not be truly great, not because it lacked the deepest suffering, but because of the absence of the greatest joys, the path to which seems indeed to lead only through pain."

Contending that the value of suffering was unknown to the ancients, Eicolai Hartmann states that when judged from the point of view of the hedonist, suffering and pain must be considered

t03ether as evil, and that Christianity is largely responsible for the view of suffering as producing an elevating and liberat-

ing effect. Hartmann writes that suffering leaves the man in-

capable of suffering “broken, warped morally, disfigured and weakened" and that for him suffering is a disvlaue. But for the man who has a capacity to suffer, his power of endurance, his

"humanity" and his morality grow under it:

"Suffering is the energy-test of a moral being, the load—test of his elasticity. hot only is there no prostration, but suffering also leads to no more resistance, or endurance or moral elf-assertion; there is much rather an actual liberation, an awakening of a deeper moral power - a might of a.hi3her order, as compared with that of activity. For exactly when all activity is destroyed, then sgrength sets in, the positive ability to suffer."

In facing the problem of evil and attempting to give an

1 Ibid., pp. l35§136 2 Hartz'.1ann, Nicolai, op. cit., pp. 139-1140. answer to the Question, "How an it be possible that a good and

onnipotent Deity allows evil to exist in the worlC.?", St. Tho.t1as Acui—

nas holds that q evil has no direct cause, but only an accidental

cause; that evil "which consists in the lefecu 4. of action is always

caused by the defect of the agent." 1 But, Aquinas argues, since God

is perfect, He cannot be the cause of evil. He contends that God did

not intend physical evils for their own sake, for an Infinitely Intell-

i pent God neces 11y loves His own goodness. han's service is a free

service; he is not a mere automaton or slave. The freedom of the will

that man possesses necessarily involves the possibility of evil. Creat- ures by their very existence involve evil, as shadows are involved

by the existence of objects that intercept the light of the sun. There-

fore, even an Omnipotent God could not exclude evil from creation,

though He is not its direct c uuse. While these contentions tend to

1i; Hte the burden of divine responsibility for moral evil, it does

not completely solve the mystery of its presence in the world. The problem of evil still remains unsolved by the Scholastic writers. arena v

COHCLUSICH: P3333 II SI.I I THE BALANCE

It is common enough to characterize pessimism as an

error and therefore as a philosophy to be assiduously avoi Me ,

as though it were a thing of evil. If we are objective in our

evaluation of pessimism as a philosoghy, we must admit that it

certainly has elements of worth. It takes a serious view of the

vils of life, and that is a.matter on which too serious a.view

is hardlv possible. There is something admirable in nor al in nation againSt sufferin3 and ev vil and in the protest against many

of the admittedly ineQuitable events of life Then too, we should

rec03nize thct a pessimist like SchOpenhauer has not simply inC Mu

ing his own cynical mood, nor merely initatin3 the ideologies of the Orient, but representing a deep underlying philos0phy of his

time. Our idea of the necessity of things, our belief in physical law 31d order, and the 1nexorable connection between cause and effect, has seriously affected our view of life and of evil.

It would be an error to ignore the fact that there is little

q ,.

{3‘ anpiness for a lar e part of the world's inhabitants toCov. Few peOple have the keenness of ins1i3ht or he moral sensitivity to realize

that evils abound. ,A shallow and superficial optimism in national and

international conditions toC ay may be the worst possible philosOphy for a people who hope to live in freedom, eq:ality and justice

As Professor DeHaan has observed,1 there are other things to

1 In the chapter on The Problem of Evil, in his forthcoming book. be said for the pessimistic philosophy: frus retiozl is usrally

more keenly felt than satisfaction; there are more numerous desires

tbs saticfa ctiozms man has the tendency to idealize things, rather

than facing reality, and this often results in Lisillusionment; m3

often reaps the rewards of his labors when it is too late for him

to enjoy them suf‘1icient y. Admitted; , these facts are often to

be found in even the most pleasant life, ye et evil usually merges

into good, - pe miiiszi often turns to Optimism. Somerset haugham has ooserved t1 lat it is a mistake to characteriz men as being of

one nature or temperament, and it would be wrong to imagine that

a pessimist is never Optimistic, or an Optimist ever pessimistic:

"”he normal is w113t you find but rarely. The normal is an ideal. It is a picture that one fabricates of the avera e c.m -‘acteristics of men, and to find them all in a single man is hardly to be expected....this (is) a false pi ture...sclfi3s1ness and kindlines s, id.ealism and. sensuality, vanity, slmrness, disinterest- edness, courage, laziness, nervousness, oos tina , and diffidence, they can all exist in a single person and form a.plausible harmony....I suppose it is a natural prepossession of mankind to take peOple as though they were homogeneous. It is evidently less trouble to make up one‘s mind about a man one way or the other and dis- miss suspense with the phrase, hgfs one of the best or he's a dirty do.. It is disconcerting to find that the saviour of his country may be stingy or that the poet who has Opened new horizons to our consciousness may be a snob."

Certainly, the se 11s is true of pes simists, unless they are pathological; it is uncommon to find philosophers who will accept

the extremest type of pessimism, and even the philosophical Optimist, may in some aspects tend toward pessimism. While Christianity has a dism 1 view of the phenomenal world because of ori 3inzl sin, it also ultimately emerges as optimistic. As Tsanoff comments on the

. all 1 La gham, op. Clto. PP- ho_49 pessimism of SchOpenhauer, “it is a mystery of good, and "‘1 its O

solution demands a thoroughgoing revision of his metaphysics and cosmology. Deeper and more ultimate than Schopenhauer‘s pessimism is his doctrine of salvation." 1,As has been stated previously, under the influence of sorrow, suffering, and disappointment, the optimist becomes for the time being a.pessimist, and finds life unprofitable.

The endeavor to justify pessimism by drawing up a calculus of pleasures and pains, and by showing that on the balance the pains are far in excess of the pleasures, is not successf‘ . The difficult— ies in the way of formulating such a calculus are impossible to surmount. Nor will it help matters to venture on the generalization that pain is the positive element, and that pleasure merely denotes the absence of pain. Psychologically, this theory is false. Many pleasures are certainly positive. In this respect, Schopenhauer errs, for every human being has experience of weariness and suffering; but there are few who cannot set over against this times of great hag;iness, hours of satisfaction with tasks being completed. Heed does not necessarily mean misery; and there ma* be a pleasure in satisfying wants although the satisfaction is not final and complete. Usually, it is not desire that makes men unhappy, but desire for the wrong things and people do not become pessimistic because they have hoped and striven, but because they have done so in vain. Schopenhauer attempts to justify his pessimism by pointing to the Spectre of endless desire. But

We have only to ask ourselves whether human beings would enjoy a.hi§her d gree of well-being were there nothing left to desire, to see the error. A human life devoid of striving and aspiration would not be

l Tsanoff, The Nature of Evil, pp. 301 -302.

great or good, - it would be mean and brutisn. Q

l) i) 1

-3

r] U) (3 d P. d. H i- P H. 0‘) Ho L5 0 O U) 0 w to this last view and takes a "grad- O atioaal view of evil" and holds that there is no coming to terms with it. But he finds that pessimism may have an Opposite effect than that anticipated:

"The only view of the world that might justify pessimistic despair would be a view that perceived no evil in it, nothing perverse, nothing lower to surmount or overcome, and therefore nothing higher to challenge our endeavor: no problem, no task, no hazard of defeat or frustration: dull, placid monotony! There is a reported saying of Machiavelli: 'The worst misfortune in life is not sickness, nor poverty, nor grief; but tediousness.' Pessimistic philosophy... may have the reverse effect of that intended by the pessimist: it may be a goad to the sluggish. Evil and the perception of it are conditions for’heroic recognition and pursuit of Value, be it truth, beauty, goodness; for 'powers subjected to no strain...atrophy and eventually disappear.‘ In this sense evil is always only relative to good; but paradoxically, if we refuse to perceive and resist it as evil, then it becomes evil absolute and utterly damns the very man who makes his peace with it."

The pure Optimist steadily regards the other side of the picture and minimizes the evils of life. That there are evils he cannot deny, but suffering he thinks, is easily outweighed in the scale of happiness. There are several considerations, however, which the Optimist overlooks. For one thing it is not by any means clear, that the era perienced feeling of happiness increases sdth civilization. To us the life of the savage seems short and brutish, but the savage himself does not feel it to be so, and he is probably as happy in his own way as the civilized man in his wax. heither would willingly change places with the other. We must also remember that while advancing civilization enables man to satisfy we.ts which, at an

l Tsanorf, h The N ‘dature of Evil, pp. LOO-401 ‘ ‘

135 earlier and ruder sta3e, he could not do, it does not follow that this means a net increase in huian happiness. rO3ress in civilization creates new desires calling for satisfaction, and modern man is made m1s able and frustrated by the absence of some luxury or comfort which his ancestors were perfectly content to do vithout.

With all the at tempts at meliorism, the sufferin3s caused by Op1ression, so familiar in the ancient and medieval world, have not been banished from modern society - they have merely taken on new forms. When riot and anarchy break loose in a civilized community today, we catch a glimpse of the primitive passions that slumber not far beneath the

"prOper" appearing surface of society. Consciousness of these things should m&”e us wary of exuberant Optimism.

What then is the solution to the problems posed by the pessimist, if solution there be? C,.n I hOpe to give an anSt er to the riddle of the ages when such great minds as the Hebrew prOphets, Christian apolo- gists, medieval Scholastics, Schopenhauer, Taubert, von Hartmann, Leo- pardi and hosts Of others have failed to provide a sati “I H ctory sol ution?

To attempt to do so would indeed be intri b1ing , but to presu axe to clai any original and satisfactory solution would be presumptious and fool- hardy. I can but point to a philosopher who seems (to me at lea st) to come closest to providing a solution, - Aristotle. While there is no evidence that Aristotle himself would.apply his "Golden Mean“ to the conflict bet veen Pessimism and Optimism, I would like to propose that it betsed to avoid the extremes of thought, which like extremes in virtue or vice, lead to an unbalanced and unhappy life. The extremes of pessimism and of Opti..ism oot11 seem inadeQuate and fail to view 1136

existence in all of its varied aspects. Truth seems to stand somewhere between these two extremes, and an application of Aristotle's

"Golden Mean" appears most satisfactory.

********#* BIBLIOGRAPHY 137

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