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INVERSION OF REVOLUTIONARY IDEALS: A STUDY OF THE TRAGIC ESSENCE OF GEORG BUCHNER'S DANTONS TOD, ERNST TOLLER'S MASSE MENSCH, AND BERTOLT BRECHT'S DIE MAENAHME

DISSERTATION

Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Huimin Chen, B.A., M.A.

*****

The Ohio State University

1995

Dissertation Committee: Approved by

B. Fischer

M . Roche yfyy.m Adviser L . Rugg Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures UMI Number: 9544530

UMI Microform 9544530 Copyright 1995, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.

This microform edition is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, MI 48103 Copyright by Huimin Chen 1995 To My Parents ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I gratefully acknowledge the guidance and critical efforts given to me by Professor Bernd Fischer throughout the process of writing this dissertation.

Many thanks go to the other members of my advisory committee, Professor Mark Roche and Professor Linda

Rugg for their comments and suggestions. I also wish to express my thanks to many of my friends for their prayer and continuing moral support which remained a source of strength for me to finish this project. VITA

May 30, 1957 ...... Born - Guangzhou, China

1 9 8 0 ...... B.A., Guangzhou Institute of Foreign Languages, China

1 985...... M.A. , Guangzhou Institute of Foreign Languages China

1987-Present...... Graduate Associate, Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures The Ohio State University Columbus, Ohio

PUBLICATIONS

Translation from German into Chinese "Die moderne chinesische Volksliteratur" in Journal of Popular Literature: V. 8 (Beijing University Press, 1983), 23-34.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: German TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS...... iii

VITA ...... iv

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER

I. HEGEL'S THEORY OF TRAGEDY 4

II. GEORG BttCHNER'S DANTON'S TOD 42

III. ERNST TOLLER'S MASSE MENSCH 90

IV. BERTOLT BRECHT'S DIE MAJSNAHME 139

CONCLUSION 187

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 204

V INTRODUCTION

The present study deals with the issues of the tragic

in revolutionary drama. This research is motivated by the

conviction that tragedy, because of its philosophical

contextuality, interacts with human life regardless of historical and social changes.1 It is of profound importance to explore the tragic problem of a revolution because, as

Albert Camus points out: "Die heutige Geschichte zwingt uns dazu, die Revolution als eine der wesenhaften Dimensionen des Menschen anzuerkennen. Sie ist unsere geschichtliche

Wirklichkeit."2 This reality is inevitably reflected in literature, especially in the genre of drama.

This project utilizes the Hegelian theory of tragedy to analyze the tragic in three selected dramas. Its purpose is to demonstrate that the dialectical principle of the

Hegelian theory of tragedy indded reveals the tragic essence of the revolutions presented in these dramas. However, this study asserts that, contrary to the Hegelian solution of

1 This view opposes George Steiner's opinion that tragedy is dead because it is no longer possible in modern time. See George Steiner, The Death of Tragedy (New York: Oxford, 1980) .

2 From Albert Camus in L' homme revolte, quoted in Reinhold Grimm and Jost Herman, ed., Deutsche Revolutionsdramen, (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968), 15.

1 2

tragedy, these revolutions do not end in synthesis. I also

intend to show how the revolutionary theories presented in these dramas are actual applications of Hegel's philosophy of history. In that sense, Hegel's philosophy of history is itself prey to the contradiction described in his theory of tragedy.

This project examines Georg Buchner's Dantons Tod,

Ernst Toller's Masse Mensch, and Bertolt Brecht's Die

MaJSnahme. The criterion for selection of these dramas was how the writers dramatize the problems that arise out of the paradoxical nature of a revolution. Reinhold Grimm and Jost

Hermand point out: "Die Gro£e des einzelnen

Revolutionsdramas bemiiSt sich daran, bis zu welchem Grad diese Antinomie erfaJSt und entfaltet wird."3 Dantons Tod,

Masse Mensch, and Die MaEnahme expose the root problem of a revolution by dealing with its dialectical dimensions; hence these dramas can be understood as tragedies in the Hegelian sense, even though their ending contravenes the Hegelian conclusion of tragedy.

In chapter one, I will first give an overview of the

Hegelian theory of tragedy, then summarize the major criticism of his theory and finally offer my own view of this theory. In the following three chapters which deal with the actual dramas, I shall analyze the specific tragic problems innate in the revolutionary movements and show how

3 Ib i d . 3

revolution is problematized by Buchner, Toller, and Brecht.

Brecht's view of revolution may appear different than that of Buchner's and Toller's because of the ostensible gesture of optimism shown in Die MaEnahme. However, as will be demonstrated later, his play actually contains an unintended deconstruction of the abstract model of the Communist revolution. CHAPTER I

HEGEL'S THEORY OF TRAGEDY1

The Hegelian theory of tragedy is a special application of his metaphysical principle, i.e. the identity of opposites, or affirmation through negation.2 The universe as he conceives it is governed by rational laws, and everything in it can be rationalistically explained or justified. These rational laws are grouped according to their values in an ascending scale which ends in the Absolute or Idea. What seems to be discordant in the lower scale may be resolved into a higher harmony. The Absolute or Idea is the ultimate unity in which all opposites, discords and contradictions are dissolved: it is the universal in which all individuals lose their particularities.

Such an ultimate Idea is not abstract, but concrete; the universal is immanent in the individual. This is especially true of art, for art is the Idea manifesting itself in a physical object, "das sinnliche Scheinen der

1 Hegel1s theory of tragedy can be found in various passages scattered throughout his works and his early definition of tragedy differs from his later one. The following is a summary of his second definition of tragedy. A discussion on the difference between the two definitions will follow.

2 Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik II: Werke 6 (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 64ff.

4 5

Idee."3 These two factors, Idea and material object, in

common parlance are called "content" and "form". The Idea as

such'is infinite, free and one; but when it has been issued

in material objects which are finite, determined and plural,

there is a contradiction. In art however, such a

contradiction must be overcome: the two distinct sides of

content and form, of unity and plurality, and of the

infinite and the finite must be bound together to form an

organic whole. In Hegelian language, the thesis and

antithesis are melted together in a higher synthesis.

Synthesis is the identity which reconciles opposites.

Tragedy is a particular instance of art and as such it

follows the general laws of the identity of opposites. In tragedy the opposites constitute the conflict, and identity takes the form of reconciliation. The content of art is the

Idea, which consists of the essential universal and rational

interests of humanity and the spiritual forces which rule the world of human will and action.4 Rather than deal with abstractions, art instead deals with the individual and concrete, material world, and these spiritual forces have to appear in the form of rational human emotions such as family affection, filial piety, parental tenderness, honor, duty,

3 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Ksthetik I: Werke 13 (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 151.

4 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Ksthetik III : Werke 15 (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 521. 6

loyalty, patriotism, and devotion to religion. These are what Hegel generally calls "sittliche Substanz". The

personages in tragedy, according to Hegel, are the

incarnations of these ethical forces. Each of the tragic

characters identifies him or herself with one of these ethical forces and carries it through to the end with an uncompromising self-consistency.5

The ultimate power that animates a tragedy is then the

Idea or, as Hegel sometimes calls it, the Divine Being ("das

Gottliche")6. As the Idea is parcelled out among individual wills and purposes, the identity splits itself into opposites. The spiritual forces are isolated and exclusive, and as a result, they become hostile to one another. For instance, a hero devoted to the service of the state has often to neglect his family duty or a heroine may find it difficult to reconcile love with honor. When two such isolated forces come to face each other and each adheres to its own one-sided, exclusive demand, the result is the tragic conflict. Tragedy arises, then, out of a collision of two incompatible ethical forces. Hegel maintains:

Das urspriinglich Tragische besteht nun darin, daiS innerhalb solcher Kollision beide Seiten des Gegen- satzes fur sich genommen Berechtigung

5 Ibid., 522.

6 Ibid. 7

haben, wahrend sie andererseits dennoch den wahren positiven Gehalt ihres Zwecks und Charakters nur als Negation und Verletzung der anderen, gleichberechtigten Macht durchzubringen imstande sind und deshalb in ihrer Sittlichkeit und durch dieselbe ebensosehr in Schuld geraten.7

Each of the two conflicting ethical forces is

justifiable in itself. Honor is no less good than love, nor

is filial piety less praiseworthy than loyalty to the state.

But as each is one-sided and exclusive, and each negates and denies the equally justifiable claim of the other, they have no place in a universe where harmonious cooperation of various spiritual forces is essential to its very existence.

So they each contain the seed of their own doom. The result is either that they are both destroyed or that they renounce their exclusive one-sided claims. What is generally called a "tragic denouement" takes either one or the other of these forms, a violent catastrophe or a reconciliation. Hegel takes Sophocles' Antigone and Aeschylus' Eumenides as the tragic examples. Whether the conflict results in a catastrophe (Antigone) or in a reconciliation (Eumenides), the moral significance is the same: both the conflicting forces are abrogated and harmony is restored. Hegel states:

Das wahrhaft Substantielle, das zur Wirklichkeit zu gelangen hat, ist aber nicht der Kampf der Be- sonderheiten, wie sehr derselbe auch in Begriffen der weltlichen

7 Ibid., 523. Realitat und des menschlichen Handelns seinen wesentlichen Grund findet, sondern die Versohnung, in welcher sich die bestimmten Zwecke und Individuen ohne Verletzung und Gegensatz einklangsvoll betatigen.8

The Idea, in animating the individual wills and purposes of

the tragic personages, passes out of the repose of its

universality into the sphere of particularity and so causes

an internal conflict; i.e. identity issues in opposites. But

it cannot remain forever in the state of conflict. By

nullifying the one-sided claims of its particular powers, it

avoids the contradiction and resumes its original balance

and repose, i.e. opposites return again to identity.9 That

which is crushed in the tragedy is not the ethical principle

itself, but merely its false and one-sided particularity.

For instance, in the case of Antigone, family duty and state

authority remain just as good as before.

Tragedy, Hegel believes, is not a work of Fate, it is

the manifestation of "Eternal Justice". By "Eternal Justice"

Hegel does not mean the ordinary Divine Judgment in the

sense of a superhuman power which rewards the virtuous and

punishes the wicked. "Eternal Justice" is the reassertion of

universal harmony against individual collisions, or the

sacrifice of the parts for the welfare of the whole.10 It is

8 Ibid.,524.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid. , 526. 9

affirmation through negation. In this sense the good itself may be wrong, when it is one-sided and negates other forces

equally good; wrong itself may also be good, when it is a

necessary means toward a higher end; for instance, a tragic

catastrophe leads to the restoration of harmony.

For Hegel, "Eternal Justice" is the source of tragic pleasure. In this connection Hegel reads a new meaning into the Aristotelian phrase "pity and fear". According to

Aristotle, the representation of pitiable and fearful

incidents achieves catharsis of the incidents. Through pity and fear tragedy effects the proper catharsis of the emotion.11 Hegel understands the Aristotelian pity and fear not as an individual's subjective feelings of attraction and repulsion, which would be too superficial to be of any ultimate value. He transposes this principle of catharsis to his principle of tragedy, that is, reconciliation, whose appropriate display ought to purify the spectators feelings. Eternal Justice forms the basis for the catharsis.

Hegel's definition of tragedy is based soley on the examples of ancient Greek tragedies. He later turns to discuss some differences between ancient and modern tragic works. In ancient tragedy, the Greek heroes are the concrete embodiment of moral forces. Religion, Family, and State are

11 See Aristotle's Poetics Translated by Leon Golden, commentary by O.B. Hardison, Jr. (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1981), 11. 10

to the Greeks the substantial forces, the enduring realities, and the ideals for which they lived. In Greek tragedy one finds fundamental emotions related to Family and

State which are the sources of action and which call forth self-sacrifice. It seldom happens, particularly in Aeschylus and Sophocles, that the purely personal animates the tragic hero. The ends he pursues are of an objective nature. It is for this reason that these characters have universal interest and meaning.

Hegel notes that modern drama introduces us to another world where the principle of subjectivity is the key. In modern drama, the primary concern is the purely individual character, and not the character as the living embodiment of moral forces. Here individual idiosyncrasies become material for the dramatist, and the character's inner psyche is shown through the monologue of one character and commentary of another. Hegel maintains:

Die moderne Tragodie nun nimmt in ihrem eigenen Gebiete das Prinzip der Subjektivitat von Anfang an auf. Sie macht deshalb die subjektive Innerlichkeit des Charakters, der keine bloss indivi- duelle klassische Verlebendigung sittlicher Machte ist, zum eigent- lichen Gegenstande und Inhalt, und lasst in dem gleichartigen Typus die Handlungen ebenso durch den ausseren Zufall der Umstande in Kollision kommen als die ahnliche Zufalligkeit auch iiber den Erfolg entscheidet oder zu entscheiden 11

scheint.12

Hegel discusses three major points concerning modern

tragedy: first, the nature of the various aims of modern tragedy,13 which constitutes the content of the characters;

second, the tragic characters and the collisions to which they are subjected; third, the ending and the tragic reconciliation which differ from that of the ancient tragedy.14

Hegel observes that the aims of modern tragedy demonstrate themselves in a broad variety, since the substantial15 no longer constitutes the interest of individuals in the spheres of religion, family, and state.

Each of these aims has a specific topic, where the true essential can shine through only in a stunted way. In addition, the aims take a completely changed form. For instance, in the religous area, the ethical forces in a person, or as Pathos of human heroes, no longer constitute the drastic content of a modern tragedy; instead, the story of Christ or the saints is presented. In the area of the

12 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Ksthetik III, 555-56.

13 The dramatic examples Hegel uses for his discussion of modern tragedy are the plays of Shakespeare, Goethe, Schiller and others. For Hegel, "modern" begins with the European Enlightenment.

14 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Ksthetik III, 556.

15 This relates to Hegel's concept "Sittliche Substanz" which presents such ethical forces as family affection, honor, duty, and patriotism. 12

state, the focus of the tragedy is on the kingdom, the power of the vasalls, the fight of the dynasties or among the

individuals in the same dynasty, and also the private spheres of the citizens. In the area of the family, it is the same situation. These are the topics the ancient drama never touched upon. Hegel calls the change of the aims in modern tragedy, "das Recht der Subjektivitat".16 The subjective character, in order to reach his goal, would not shrink from the immoral result of his action, although the result is not his personal intention.

According to Hegel, the aims of modern tragedy, in spite of the subjectivity, can be expanded to universality in their content and hence represent in themselves the substantial. Goethe's Faust and Schiller's Die Rauber and

Kabale und Liebe provide examples for him. Hegel summarizes:

Im allgemeinen aber ist es in der modernen Tragodie nicht das Substantielle ihres Zwecks, urn dessent- willen die Individuen handeln und was sich als das Treibende in ihrer Leidenschaft bewahrt, sondern die < Subjektivitat ihres Herzens und Gemiits oder die Besonderheit ihres Charakters dringt auf Befriedigung.17

This statement leads to the second point of Hegel's discussion, the tragic characters and their collision which,

16 Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Ksthetik III, 557.

17 Ibid. , 558. 13

according to Hegel, are of vital importance in modern

tragedy. Hegel points out that whereas the ancient heroes,

embodying certain ethical Pathos. encounter a situation

where they necessarily fall into conflict with another

equally justified ethical force, the modern characters from

the beginning face a wide range of accidental situations and

conditions. The characters have choices to act differently

in these situations, therefore, the conflict essentially

lies in the personal character of the individuals; The conflict occurs not because of the substantial

justification, but because of who the characters are. The

Greek heroes also act according to their individuality, however, this individuality is necessarily an embodiment of ethical Pathos. It is, generally speaking, inconsequential to modern tragedians whether the passion of the character has led to moral or immoral action, whether personal wishes or external considerations are behind the character's action.

Hegel notes in the character portrayals of some modern tragedies the purely abstract and formal personalities, in contrast with the acting individuals whom one meets in the

"real" world. Hegel points specifically to French, Spanish, and Italian characters, who exemplify passions such as love, honor and ambition, but who lack a more full extension of individuality. Hegel cites Shakespeare as a contrary example, where even an abstraction such as Macbeth's 14

ambition does not in the slightest impair "die

weiterreichende Individualitat" .18 Despite the restriction

of the formal Pathos, the character remains an entire man.

Hegel also notices that there is a lack of

determination and union in modern characters. They brood and hesitate in their decision-making, unsure of themselves.

Hegel maintains:

Im modernen Trauerspiel nun kommen dergleichen schwankende Gestalten haufiger besonders in der Weise vor, da!5 sie in sich selber einer gedoppelten Leidenschaft angehoren, welche sie von dem einen EntschluJS, der einen Tat zur anderen heriiberschickt.19

Indeed, one encounters in modern tragedy, wavering purpose, a divided will, the weakness of indecision, the struggles of conscience.

The last point of Hegel's discussion on modern tragedy pertains to the tragic ending. Because the major interest in modern tragedy is focused on the isolated personality and not on ethical vindication or necessity, Hegel contends that no objective reconciliation in this ancient sense is possible. In so far as any kind of reconciliation is achieved in modern tragedy, it is of a different type. Hegel sees it as more abstract and of a colder nature, more like

18 Ibid., 561.

19 Ibid. , 562. 15

that of a criminal court. Wrongs have been committed and punishment follows. The character simply deserves the punishment he receives in the end. This type of denouement often depicts the individual who is crushed by the very

force which he has challenged to carry out his personal whims, e.g., Wallenstein and Gotz.20

For Hegel, the reconciliation in modern tragedy is more subjective. It is a result of the individual's acknowledgement of the justice of his fate:

Bei der Subjektivitat der Charaktere tritt nun hierbei sogleich die Forderung ein,daJ5 sich auch die Individuen in sich selbst mit ihrem indivi- duellen Schicksal versohnt zeigen miissen.21

This can be accomplished in at least two ways: 1) The more religious acceptance when the individual becomes conscious of a higher and more exalted world-order with which his aims have collided; or 2) A kind of spiritual elevation over his own situation and actions, and a steadfastness over his passion and his destiny, which arises out of the infinite essence of his soul.22 This belongs only to the free self-conscious personality. The free soul can

20 Ibid., 565.

21 Ibid. , 565-566 .

22 Ibid. , 566. 16

purge itself from both the evil committed and the fate to

c ome.

The tragic ending is also presented as a result of

unfortunate circumstances and external contingencies, which

could lead to a happy ending. When in this case the external

coincidence agrees with the actual internal nature of the modern character, then one can sense the tragic ending as

reconciliation. Hegel asserts:

Nur in dieser Riicksicht konnen wir uns z.B. in dem Untergange Hamlets und Julias versohnt fiihlen. &u£erlich genommen, er- scheint der Tod Hamlets zufallig durch den Kampf mit Laertes und die Verwechslung der Degen her- beigeleitet. Doch im Hintergrunde von Hamlets Gemiit liegt von Anfang an der Tod. Die Sandbank der End- lichkeit geniigt ihm nicht; bei solcher Trauer und Weichheit, bei diesem Gram, diesem Ekel an alien Zustanden des Lebens fiihlen wir von Hause aus, er sei in dieser greuelhaften Umgebung ein ver- lorener Mann, den der innere tJber- dru£ fast schon verzehrt hat, ehe noch der Tod von auEen an ihn herantritt.23

Hegel made numerous references to modern tragedies to clarify his theoretical position regarding modern art.

Shakespeare's Hamlet, for instance, is one of those examples. In this tragic world an individual's thought becomes its opposite when transformed into action. In this

23 Ibid. , 566-567 . 17

sense it is similar to Oedipus, Hamlet is made to feel as if he were blind and helpless. Yet in Shakespeare no reference to radical fatalism can be made because man is, to a degree, the cause of his own destruction. Hegel also opposes the notion of fate in tragedy, because it indicates a

controlling power of unknown and unpredictable forces and hence weakens the argument that tragedy by itself is a dialectical process of contradictions from conflicting to resolving.

• t *

Hegel's theory of tragedy has drawn various critiques.24 Noticing some of the defects of Hegel's theory of tragedy, A.C. Bradley has proposed a restatement of

Hegel's theory of conflict and reconciliation which serves as the philosophical basis of his book Shakespearean

Tragedy. In his analysis Bradley introduces 1) the notion of waste which includes the notion of suffering neglected by

Hegel, 2) the general term ''division of spirit,1' 3) the idea of fate, which is denied in the Hegelian theory.25 Bradley argues that the ultimate force of tragedy is not only justice but also fate. He discusses first the idea of fate and then the idea of justice and shows that neither of these

24 The discussion on the criticism of Hegel will be confined to those which are relevant to my thesis.

25 A.C. Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy (London: Macmillan, 1985), 28ff, 18

ideas alone is adequate to account for the tragic conflict.

Tragedy, he argues, must possess these two essential

features. On the one hand, it should not leave us depressed and desperate. On the other hand, if it rests exclusively on

justice, the spectacle of suffering and waste could not seem to us so fearful and mysterious as it does. So Bradley comes to a compromise in which the opposites, justice and fate, are identified. He concludes:

Thus we are left at least with an idea showing two sides or aspects which we can neither separate nor reconcile. The whole order against which the individual part shows itself powerless seems to be animated by a passion for perfection: we cannot otherwise explain its behaviour towards evil. Yet it appears to engender this evil within itself, and in its effort to overcome and expell it, it is agonized with pain, and driven to mutilate its own substance and to lose not only evil but priceless good. ... we remain confronted with the inexplicable appearance of a world travailing for perfection, but bringing to birth, together with glorious good, an evil which it is able to overcome only by self-torture and self-waste. And this fact or appearance is Tragedy.26

In the case of reconciliation Bradley intends to strengthen the Hegelian position by remoulding it. He states:

...in the conclusion of not a few

26 Ibid., 28-29. 19

tragedies, pain is mingled not merely with acquiescence, but with something like exultation... This exultation appears to be connected with our sense that the hero has never shown himself so great or noble as in the death which seals his failure. A rush of passionate admission and a glory in the greatness of the soul, mingle with our grief; . . .27

For Bradley it is neither the mere nullification of

conflict, nor the distribution of just reward and

punishment, but the greatness and nobility with which the

hero faces his calamity, that gives the feeling of

reconciliation.

In his book The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and

Schopenhauer Israel Knox points out many weaknesses of

Hegel's theory of tragedy. According to Knox, the doctrine of this theory is permeated with a vicious moralism,28 with a flaming justification of the socio-political and the historico-cultural status quo. Knox asserts that Hegel postulates the equal validity of both claims - that of the

individual and that of the abstract institution - but he

27Bradley, Oxford Lectures on Poetry, (London: Macmillan, 1926), 83-84.

28 Knox borrows the distinction between the terms moral and ethical from DeWitt Parker. Parker clarifies an important issue by saying that "from the ethical view - the good belongs to all free, creative acts that look toward the growth and happiness of individuals... From the moral view - it consists in conformity to law." See Isreal Knox, The Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel, and Schopenhauer (New York: Columbia University Press), 184. 20

postulates them as being in opposition, in irreconcilable conflict. He puts the individual and his ideals against the institution and its laws, and the reconciliation consists in the common destruction of both representitives.29 Knox maintains that in Hegel's theory of tragedy the doom is the doom of the individuals. The majesty and sovereignty of the institution remain sacred and inviolable. The institution is distinct from, and transcendent to, the individual and his heart and conscience.

Knox also notices that there is a lack of the problem of evil in Hegel's theory. Therefore, Hegel transfers the crisis from the hearts and actions of men to the grand ideas and the sactified standards directing the deeds of men, but he does not doubt the inherent logic of the ethical substance, the infallible rightness of ideas, standards and institutions. Knox asserts that Hegel can do nothing else in a world in which "Was ist, das verniinftig ist; was vernunftig ist, das ist."30 It is in this sense that Hegel's negation of the notions of guilt or innocence in tragedy is to be interpreted, that is, "as the rightness and

29What Knox means here is that in Hegel's theory of tragedy, idea, institution, and law are more important than individuals who represent them. The reconciliation of the conflict is the triumph of the institution, which demonstrates itself through the destruction of its representatives.

30Quoted in Knox, 110. 21

rationality of the human sacrifice upon the altar of some

Moloch principle, upon the altar of the Divine Idea."31

In Knox' view, the triumph of tragedy in Hegelian sense

is the triumph of an "idea", an institution; it is not the triumph of the human spirit over the evils in life.

According to Knox, Hegel, in his theory of tragedy, puts his dialectic - the dissolution of contradictions, that is, of thesis and antithesis in the unity of a new synthesis - in the service of the metaphysics of the state. Hegel's concept of necessity in tragedy means, therefore, the inevitable attrition of the characters representing the conflicting or antagonistic values. It is a necessity which accords with reason, which eventuates in the death of men but in the triumph of eternal justice and in the perpetuation of the state, of law, of abstract principles. "It is a necessity predetermined by the dialectic of a formula, and not by the experiential dialectic of real and inexpugnable life, by the fatal nemesis of life itself in consequence of some hybris in character."32

Knox criticizes Hegel of treating the protagonists of ancient tragedy as mere character masks representing ideals.

Knox maintains that tragedy, ancient and modern, should delineate real men and women, and inimitable characters in

31 Ibid., 110-111.

32 Ibid., 113. 22

the warp and woof of life. For Knox, tragedy discovers the

logic of suffering. This suffering, this self-division in

spirit, renders all genuine tragic poetry. In Knox' view,

"because tragedy is the clear rendition of life, and not the

dramatic portrayal of two skeletal 'rights,' we are more

eager, when in its presence, to understand and to allay than to judge and to punish."33

Peter Szondi is another important Hegel critic. In his article "Zu Hegels Bestimmung des Tragischen" Szondi discusses Hegel's two definitions of tragedy, their differences and its implications. According to Szondi,

Hegel's first definition of tragedy is found in "ttber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts." Szondi points out that Hegel's article turns against Kant and

Fichte. It is a dispute of Hegel's newly developed dialectics with the dualistic formalism of philosophy of his time. Hegel criticizes the rigid opposition of law and individuality presented in Kant's Kritik der praktischen

Vernunft and Fichte's Grundlage des Naturrechts. In the contrast to Kant and Fichte, Hegel formulates "die absolute

Idee der Sittlichkeit. " Important in this concept is the idea of identity (of general and particular). However, Hegel emphasizes not only the identity, but also the constant conflict between the forces contained in the identity (this

33 Ibid., 117. 23

is different than Schelling who only accentuates the

identity). According to Hegel, the identity becomes real only through the movement of the conflict. Hegel develops this idea in his definition of tragedy. He states:

Die Tragodie [ist] darin, dafi die sittliche Natur ihre unorganische, damit sie sich nicht mit ihr ver- wickele, als ein Schicksal von sich abtrennt und sich gegeniiber stellt, und, durch die Anerkennung desselben in dem Kampfe, mit dem gottlichen Wesen, als der Einheit von beidem, versohnt ist.34

Szondi points out that for Hegel, the opposition between unorganic law and living individuals, between general and particular is not eliminated, but rather dynamically neutralized within the opposition itself. According to this

Hegelian paradigm, there is a necessary split in the oneness of the sittliche Natur. Hegel calls this process later in Phanomenologie des Geistes Selbstentzweiung or

Opfer. Szondi sees in the principle of "Selbstentzweiung und

Selbstversohnung der sittlichen Natur" Hegel's first application of dialectics to tragedy: "Der Ursprung der

Hegelschen Dialektik ist bezeichnenderweise eine

Ursprungsgeschichte der Dialektik als solcher."35

34 "ttber die wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts, seine Stelle in der praktischen Philosophie, und sein Verhaltnis zu den positiven Rechtswissenschaften". Quoted in Szondi, "Zu Hegels Bestimmung des Tragischen," in Tragik und Tragodie, ed., Volkmar Sander (Darmstadt: Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 420. 24

Szondi also indicates that Hegel starts the dispute with Kant's formalism within the framework of theological

and historical study. Whereas in Kant's formalism there is

no reconciliation between "Menschlichem" and "Gottlichem",

Hegel sees in the figure Jesus an embodiment of the

reconciliation, the dialectical unity of the two forces.36

Szondi maintains that for the young Hegel the tragic process

is "die Dialektik der Sittlichkeit, 'des Bewegers aller menschlichen Dinge', die sich im Schicksal mit sich selber entzweit, in der Liebe aber zu sich zuriickkehrt, . . .1,37

Hegel's second definition of tragedy, which we have quoted earlier in this chapter, was given twenty years later. As Szondi notices, something essential has changed in this definition compared to the first. According to Szondi, the differences between the two definitions consist in the following aspects: 1) In the first definition of tragedy, the tragic is "das Merkmal einer Welt der Sittlichkeit, die sich im Schicksal mit sich selber entzweit und in der Liebe die Versohnung findet",38 in the second definition, the fate

35 Ibid., 422.

36According to the young Hegel, this reconciliation occurs only within Christianity, he excludes Judaism from this framework of tragedy. As we will see, Hegel changed this view in his second definition of tragedy.

37Szondi, "zu Hegel's Bestimmung des Tragischen", 424.

38 Ibid.,427. Here Szondi is talking about Hegel's application of tragedy to Christianity. The love in the New Testament is opposed to the law in the Old Testament. 25

of the tragic hero has changed: his pathos puts him

simultaneously into right and wrong when opposed to another

equally justified value, and he becomes guilty through his

Sittlichkeit. The conflict is between two rights and the

reconciliation takes place in the denial of both one-sided

claims. 2) Essentially, the tragic no longer belongs to the

ideal of the divine. Although the Selbstentzweiung des

Sittlichen is inevitable, it is now determined in its concreteness by circumstances; its content is accidental.39

In other words, the second definition of tragedy is not directly derived from religious and philosophical system, but rather it encompasses the whole variety of tragic possibilities. In the second definition, Judaism is. no longer excluded from the framework of the tragedy as it is in the first definition, but represents one of the conflicting forces. 3) The principle of dialectics is changed from a historical-theological phenomenon (in the spirit of Christianity) and from a scientific postulate (in the first definition of tragedy) to universal law and methodology of knowing (in the second definition of tragedy) .40

39Szondi points out that the element of "Zufall", which comes into Hegel's second definition of tragedy, originates from Hegel's accounts on modern tragedy.

^Szondi, "Zu Hegels Bestimmung des Tragischen", 427. 26

Szondi attempted to make use of the Hegelian theory of tragedy in his study of modern drama. His main interest is focused on the dialectical dimension of the dramatic conflict. According to him, the essence of the tragic consists in its dialectical structure, a notion taken from

Hegel. In Szondi's book Versuch iiber das TragLsche, where he intends to ground a crenerellen Becrriff des Tragischen.41 he tries to deal with the question of whether the tragic indeed can be found in modern drama. Walter Benjamin argues in

Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels that it cannot. However,

Szondi points out that even in Benjamin's argument that one should give up the crenerellen Becrriff des Tragischen. there is an implication of the dialectical structure as presupposition of the tragic phenomena.42

While Benjamin gives up the generellen Begriff des

Tragischen and limits tragedy only to its attic form,

Szondi, based on Hegel, insists that the dialectical

41 Peter Szondi, Versuch iiber das Tragische (Frankfurt a/M: Insel Verlag, 1964), 9.

42Questioning Benjamin's thesis that the tragic is possible only in the attic tragedy, Szondi asserts: "Aber die Notwendigkeit der historischen Beschrankung auf die attische Tragodie wird zweifelhaft, da selbst Benjamin, der nicht nur den generellen Begriff des Tragischen aufgibt, sondern auch die gesamte Tragodientheorie des deutschen Idealismus, als irrtiimlich auf die Begriffe Schuld und Siihne begriindet, glaubt verwerfen zu diirfen, in seiner geschichtsphilo- sophischen Deutung auf das Moment des Dialektischen stoiSt, das den gemeinsamen Nenner der verschiedenen idealistischen und nachidealistischen Bestimmungen des Tragischen und darum die mogliche Basis fiir dessen generellen Begriff darstellt." Ibid.,57. 27

structure of sacrifice and freedom, as unsolvable conflict

between two necessities, remains valid in modern drama. His

examples for such drama are Schiller's Demetrius and

Racine's PhSdre.43 To a certain extent, Szondi endorses

Benjamin's analysis that the tragic as essence does not

exist.44 However, he develops a dialectical tragic mode

which manifests his own understanding of the tragic and its

difference from the Hegelian sense of the tragic:

Sondern das Tragische ist ein Modus, eine bestimmte Weise drohender oder vollzogener Vernichtung, und zwar die dialektische. Nur der Untergang ist tragisch, der aus der Einheit der Gegensatze, aus dem Umschlag des Einen in sein Gegenteil, aus der Selbstentzweiung erfolgt. Aber tragisch ist auch nur der Untergang von etwas, das nicht untergehen darf, nach dessen Entfernen die Wunde sich nicht schlie£t. Denn der tragische Widerspruch darf nicht aufgehoben sein in einer iiberge- ordneten - sei's immanenten, sei's transzendenten - Sphare. Ist dies der Fall, so hat die Vernichtung entweder ein Belangloses zum Gegenstand, das als solches sich der Tragik entzieht und der Komik darbietet, oder die Tragik ist bereits iiberwunden im Humor, iiberspielt in der Ironie, iiberhoht im Glauben.45

It is evident in the above statement that the Hegelian synthesis as the solution of a tragic conflict is

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid. , 60f . 28

questioned. What Szondi indicates is an open ending to tragic conflict. Szondi quotes Julius Bahnsen to make his point clear: "Im Tragischen wird die unbedingt versohnungslose Selbstentzweiung des innersten Kernes aller

Wesen offenbar."46 Szondi adopts the Hegelian idea of

"Selbstentzweiung" of a substance as tragic essence.

However, for him, the tragic conflict remains "versoh- nungslos". It is this concept of "versohnungslose

Selbstentzweiung" which concisely describes Szondi's interpretation of the tragic.

The essence of this Szondian tragic mode

("versohnungslose Selbstentzweiung") can be further observed in Theorie des modernen Dramas. In this book, Szondi shifts his focus from the tragic to the relationship of form and content in modern drama. Using the Hegelian idea "Wahrhafte

Kunstwerke sind eben nur solche, deren Inhalt und Form sich als durchaus identisch erweisen"47 as his theoretical basis,

Szondi analyzes the phenomenon of the form - content contradiction in modern drama. He states:

Damit ist jedoch schon die Moglichkeit gesetzt, daJS die inhaltliche Aussage zur formalen in Widerspruch gerat. Bewegt sich

46 Julius Bahnsen, Das Tragische als Weltgesetz und der Humor als asthetische Gestalt des Metaphysischen (Lauenburg: 1877), quoted Ibid., 59.

47Quoted in Peter Szondi, Theorie des modernen Dramas (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1963), 10 29

im Falle der Entsprechung von Form und Inhalt die inhaltliche Thematik gleichsam im Rahmen der formalen Aussage als eine Problematik innerhalb etwas Unproblematischem, so entsteht der Widerspruch, indem die fraglos feststehende Aussage der Form vom Inhalt her in Frage gestellt wird. Diese innere Antinomie ist es aber, die eine Dichtungsform geschichtlich problematisch werden laiSt. . .48

Szondi points out the reason of the form-content tention: the dialogic unity of subject and object in form versus their discord in content. According to Szondi, the characteristics of dramatic form are 1) present, 2) interpersonal, 3) with action. In classic drama, for instance, the key is interpersonal relation reflected in dialogues.49 At the end of the 19th century, the dramatic form of being 1) present, 2) interpersonal, 3) with action, falls into crisis because of the change of the dramatic themes. The three concepts are replaced by three different corresponding opposites: past, innerpersonal, incidence.

Accordingly, dialogue becomes the vessel for monologic reflections.

This phenomenon is particularly typical in social drama

(sozialem Dramas for it has to present a "Handlung, die zwischen der sozialen Thematik und der vorgegebenen

Dramenform als ein Sekundares vermittelt..."50 From the

48 Ibid. , 11.

49 Ibid., 15.

50 Ibid., 63. 30

standpoint of theme as well as from the standpoint of form,

such a plot proves to be problematic because it is no longer

a dramatic one.51 The characters of the social drama

represent thousands of people who live in the same

circumstances. Their situation represents a uniformity

conditioned by economic factors. The fate of the characters

"ist Beispiel, Mittel der Aufzeigung und zeugt so nicht nur von der das Werk iibersteigenden Objektivitat, sondern

zugleich vom dariiber stehenden Subjekt der Aufzeigung: vom dichterischen Ich. "52

In Szondi's view, it is precisely this gap between

form and content of modern drama that generates various new

forms: Subjective-drama, political theater, epic theater, montage, as solutions for the form-content contradiction.

Here, we see the tragic destiny of modern drama: The change of dramatic themes destroys the identical relations between form and content causing contradictions within themselves

(Selbstentzweiung); the numerous attempts of dramatists to resolve the contradiction by creating new forms only leads to new form-content contradiction fversohnunaslos).

51 Ibid. , 64 .

52 Ibid., 63. There is an interesting link between revolutionary drama and social drama. Social drama presents a tragic narrative from the point of view of political or social theories which can become, like the theories in the revolutionary drama, part of the tragic dialectics, and can, therefore, suffer Selbstentzweiung. 31

In his book Die "Tragodie im Sittlichen": Zur

Dramentheorie Hegels, Michael Schulte intends to provide a detailed commentary, a primary interpretation of Hegel's works regarding tragedy and comedy. Schulte discusses

Hegel's theory of tragedy from a socio-historical perspective. He points out that tragedy serves Hegel as a

"Sinnmodell politischen Handelns und Instrument seiner

Analyse".53 According to Schulte, Hegel, in the "Natur- rechtsaufsatz", criticizes the modern natural law,54 which prioritizes the "Sein des Einzelnen." Hegel proposes a theory for the state which mediates the "Einzelne" and the

"Allgemeine," and the social organization and individual existence.55 According to Hegel's theory, the state should

53 The major issue Schulte tries to address is the inner- connection between Hegel's different accounts on tragedy. See Michael Schulte, Die "Tragodie im Sittlichen": Zur Dramentheorie Hegels (Miinchen: Fink Verlag 1992), 12ff. Schulte's book deals with various issues concerning Hegel's drama theory in a highly specific manner. Here I can only concentrate on parts of the issues relevant to my thesis.

54 Hegel argues with the natural law theories of Hobbes and Locke. According to these theories, the state should be derived from the natural, pre-social human condition (without accepting man as a social and rational being), and from his original nature no matter in what society he lives.

55The premise of Hegel's idea of state is: "daiS der Einzelne sein Leben sowohl erhalten als auch aufgeben soil. Denn der soziale Akt schlechthin ist die Aufgabe des individuellen Lebens. Doch damit dies Leben aufgegeben werden kann, muft ihm sein Recht gegeben werden." The contradiction between the self-sustenance and reproduction of individuals (Hegel calls it "unorganische Natur der sittlichen Natur") and the self-sustenance and reproduction of the social organization ("organische Natur des Gemeinwesens") can only be solved when one thinks of a form of organization in which 32

be a "Gemeinwesen", an organic whole, an ethical totality.

The unorganic nature of this absolute morality

(Sittlichkeit) has to mediate to the organic nature.56

Schulte maintains that Hegel derives the possibility of such

mediation from the model of sacrifice and tragedy.

Schulte points out that the Hegelian concept of

sacrifice is the key for his idea of mediating the

"Einzelne" and the " Allgemeine. "57 The action of sacrifice

(i.e. an individual splits the products of his work or of what nature has given to him and sacrifices this part unselfishly and purposelessly) involves sharing (Teilung)

and splitting (Aufspaltung) of man and nature, subject and object. It is a splitting of man himself in a natural and spiritual essence as well. At the same time there is a mediation of two moments in the action of sacrifice: if a person sacrificed everything, he would be unable to individual existence is both sustained and given up. The social model of such an organization is for Hegel a state which in principle has two classes or stands ("'Stand der Freien', dessen Arbeit die Erhaltung des Ganzen unter Gefahr des eigenen Lebens ist, und einen 'Stand der Unfreien', dessen Arbeit der Selbsterhaltung der Individuen dient und der der Gefahr des Todes enthoben ist").

56 This mediation which also refers to the relation of stands (classes) includes the problem of the legitimation of "Herrschaft."

57 For Hegel, "Soziales Handeln im strengen Sinne, also ein Handeln, das die Struktur sozialer Organization fordert, dient nicht der Selbsterhaltung des Einzelnen, es hebt sie auf: Soziales Handeln ist die Bereitschaft des Einzelnen zu sterben, sein Eigentum und sich selbst aufzugeben." Schulte, 37. 33

recognize nature and his physical substrate. If he

sacrificed nothing, there would be no freedom for him from

this substrate. Therefore, "Im Opfer als Teilung ist beides

gesetzt, vermittelt und "versohnt". Denn das Opfer ist immer

nur die Weggabe eines Teils des Eigentums. . .1,58

The highest form of sacrifice for Hegel is

"Selbstopfer",59 a sacrifice of life versus sacrifice of

things described above. According to Schulte, the

"Selbstopfer" is again a key element in Hegel's concept of

"Tragodie im Sittlichen". Hegel calls "Selbstopfer" "Opfer

der Tapferkeit" which means: the morality (or the first

stand that represents the morality60) recognizes the

necessity and the right of its unorganic nature, i.e. the

morality recognizes that it (the morality) is tied to the

self-sustenance of individuals and therefore to mortality,

the natural death. The morality knowingly actualizes this

tie to its "sterblichen Leib" and puts it into the scene of

the "Tragodie im Sittlichen" through sacrificing a part of

its individuals (this can only be the first stand) . Their

death takes place not naturally, but out of freedom. "In

dem das sittliche Individuum einen nicht-natiirlichen Tod

stirbt, so hat es durch diesen doppelsinnigen Tod seine

58 Ibid., 42.

59 Ibid. , 41.

60For the explanation of the Hegelian concept of "Stand" see footnote 55. 34

unorganische Natur und den natiirlichen Tod ' zugleich

anerkannt und zugleich sich davon gereinigt1".61

Schulte summarizes Hegel's definition of "Tragodie im

Sittlichen" as following:

"...die Tragodie im Sittlichen" bestand darin, da£ eine Individualitat die ihr gegenuberstehende negiert, indem sie das fiir die andere Potenz konstitutive Moment, insofern es fiir sie selbst konstitutiv ist - denn es ist nichts Gleichgiiltiges -, an sich selbst negiert. Diese Negation ist ein Moment der Autonomie des Selbstbewufttseins. (Es ist die "organische Natur", die im "Opfer der Tapferkeit" einen Teil ihrer selbst opfert und sich dadurch zum "Indi- viduum der absoluten Sittlichkeit" erhebt.)62

Through the principles of sacrifice and self-sacrifice

(Tragodie im Sittlichen) Hegel resolves the problem of mediating the "Einzelne" and the "Allgemeine" within a state and hence the problem of legitimation of "Herrschaft."

Schulte calls this Hegelian tragedy-structure

61 Ibid., 53. For Hegel, the self-sacrifice of Jesus' is the ultimate example for the "Opfer der Tapferkeit". Christ was a God-man, he was God with human nature. The ultimate form of human nature was his death. In Jesus' death God also was "dead". However, the process does not stop there, God keeps himself in this process. The death is only the death of death. God is resurrected again. Everything is turned into its opposite. The restriction of the natural death with the "Tod des Todes" amounts to the movement of "Tragodie im Sittlichen". Hegel maintains: "...die Sittlichkeit [ist] . . .nichts als die Auffiihrung der Tragodie im Sittlichen, welche das Absolute ewig mit sich selbst spielt, - das es sich ewig in die Objektivitat gebiert, in dieser seiner Gestalt hiermit sich dem Leiden und dem Tode iibergibt und sich aus seiner Asche in die Herrlichkeit erhebt."

62 Ibid. , 69 . 35

"asymmetrisches Tragodienmodell" which is opposed to "das symmetrische" later developed by Hegel in the Asthetik through his interpretation of Antigone (where Hegel proposes the concept of a conflict of two equally justified powers, and the reconciling tragic solution based on the downfall of both powers). According to Schulte, the asymmetry of the tragic structure in "Tragodie im Sittlichen" is elevated in the Asthetik to a higher (symmetric) unity. For Hegel, this unity prepares the way for the transition from tragedy to comedy.63

Schulte points out that Hegel, in his drama theory formulated in the Phanomenologie, attempts to develop "einen gegeniiber der 'Tragodie im Sittlichen' neuen

Begriindungszusammenhang der Legitimation von Herrschaft und des Sittlichen."64 Hegel changed the terms of "sittliche

Totalitat" to "das menschliche Gesetz" (das "Gemeinwesen") which is opposed to "das gottliche Gesetz" (family) and he no longer identifies a stand with the absolute morality. The morality of the "gottlichen Gesetzes" becomes more

63 Ibid., 70.

64Ibid., 18. According to Schulte, there are two backgrounds in Hegel's drama theory in Phanomenologie: 1) Hegel's dispute with forms of ethical argumentation represented e.g. by Kant's Imperativ. Hegel sees the failure of the heroes in tragedy as that of an ethics which is based on a direct fusion from ethical command and ethical practice (law). For Hegel this fusion is necessary because ethical action in itself is contradictory. 2) Hegel's modification of the concept "Sittlichkeit" which he developed in the "Natur- rechtsaufsatz". 36

important.65 Schulte scrutinizes Hegel's concept of "das

gottliche Gesetz" such as family love, family members, brother and sister, family death, and the burial of the

dead, as well as their meaning and implication. Schulte maintains that the concept of death has changed in Hegel's reconstruction of the "Sittlichkeit." Contrary to the

"Naturrechtsaufsatz" Hegel now understands death, including

"den Tod der Tapferkeit" as a pure natural and accidental happening which in itself does not have any meaning of reconciliation. Correspondingly, the dead is only a mere being as a corpse, not a being elevated to "allgemeine

Individualitat" through his death.

According to Schulte, Hegel's reconstruction of the

"Sittlichkeit" is further demonstrated in his interpretation of Antigone: her justification of disobeying the royal edict and burying her brother.66 Schulte points out that this

65 In his reconstruction of the "Sittlichkeit" one can notice that "gerade das entscheidende Moment, das im Naturrechtsaufsatz die 'Tragodie im Sittlichen' ausmachte, die Legitimation der Herrschaft des Standes der Tapferkeit durch den freiwilligen und doppelsinnigen Opfertod des aristokratischen Krieger-Helden und die dadurch vermittelte Representation des Ganzen, in der Ableitung des menschlichen Gesetzes und seiner Stufen nicht vorkommt." Schulte, 101.

66 Schulte maintains: "Fiir den Zusammenhang der Gesetze ergab sich bisher, da£ Hegel zum einen eine fundamentale Gleichartigkeit des menschlichen und gottlichen Gesetzes akzentuiert. Sie beruht darauf, daiS beide natiirlichen Prozessen Raum gewahren und sich zugleich in abgestufter Form negativ gegen ein natiirliches Geschehen verhalten. Zum anderen stellt er dieser Gleichartigkeit auch differente Ziige zur Seite, die darauf ve'rweisen, da£ beide Gesetze nicht nur denselben Geist reprasentieren (oder Reprasentanten des ganzen Geistes), sondern auch 37

interpretation indicates a transition in Hegel's concept of tragedy: from the asymmetric tragic model to the symmetric one. In his discussion of Antigone, Hegel speaks about the equal justification of the "menschlichen" and "gottlichen

Gesetzes." Antigone and Creon both one-sidedly accept one of the two laws, and act one-sidedly. Schulte maintains that for Hegel, the antinomy of two equally justified principles constitutes the essence of tragedy. "Beide Seiten verwirklichen nur das eine der beiden, es herrscht

Einseitigkeit vor, der Sinn der ewigen Gerechtigkeit ist, da£ beide Unrecht haben."67

In his book Schulte worked out a great deal of detailed inner connections within Hegel's theory of drama. He points out, that because tragedy serves Hegel as an instrument of his political and philosophical analysis, the presentation of guilt and fate is less important for Hegel. Schulte's detailed interpretation of Hegel's concepts of "sacrifice"

'entgegengesetzte [...] Weisen der sittlichen Substanz zu existieren' sind." Ibid.,149.

67 Ibid., 182. Schulte indicates that "Seine (Hegel's) These von der Geichberechtigung sittlicher Machte, deren Grund- problem nicht eigentlich das einer 'Antinomie zweier gleich- berechtigter Prinzipien' im Sinne zweier Gesetze ist, sondern mit der Paradoxie zusammenhangt, da£ es gleicher- ma£en sinnlos ist, in einer deontisch schlechthin perfekten und in einer schlechthin nicht-perfekten Welt sittlich zu handeln und einer Veranderung der Wirklichkeit anzustreben, und sich sittliches Handeln so nur auf eine Wirklichkeit beziehen kann, die im Gegensatz gegen das absolute Recht des sittlichen Bewufttseins nicht an sich nichtig, sondern gleichberechtigt ist." 38

and "self-sacrifice" as tragic element helps to understand

the principles of Hegel's first definition of tragedy in a

deeper sense. However, Schulte mainly takes a socio-

historical approach in his discussion of Hegel's works which

does not provide too much insight into Hegel's drama theory

as a literary genre. A surprising fact is that in such a

long book (over four hundred pages) on Hegel's theory of

tragedy and drama there is no single word about Hegel's

accounts on modern tragedy. One wonders how do Hegel's

comments on modern tragedy fit into Schulte's interpretation of Hegel's theory of tragedy as a political instrument.

The present study endorses two fundamental points of the Hegelian theory of tragedy: 1) The ultimate animation of tragedy is the Idea. 2) The essential tragic fact is the dialectic self-division, however, (contrary to Hegel's view) without synthesis. My readings of the three revolutionary plays employ Szondi's interpretation of the tragic:

"versohnungslose Selbstentzweiung." Szondi accentuates the moment of chance (Zufall). This idea actually arises out of

Hegel's encounter with modern tragedy. Behavior is now determined by individual character, which does not necessarily embody a moral "pathos." In the view of this study, the tragic moments of the three plays can be read as self-division of an idea. This self-division also occurs in 39

the tragic characters. Because of the heroes' "tragic flaw," this self-division is necessary.68

The conflict of revolutionary drama is a result of the contradiction of the revolutionary ideas. Within each opposing sides there are again inner-contradictions. The actual tragic lies in the contradiction between the totalized claims of the revolutionary ideas and their particularized results. As we will see in Dantons Tod,

Masse Mensch, and Die MaEnahme, revolution is meant to eliminate an inhuman social system, however, it is, for instance, always inflicted with violence inevitably caused by revolutionary actions. All acting individuals are subjected to the dynamics of this violence. Hence revolution falls into collision with itself. In the above dramas, revolutionary theories are embodied in philosophies of history. Here the self-collisions of revolution can also be read as paradoxes of historical theories.

The revolutionaries (except Danton) in the above plays hold to their belief that the course of history is governed by reason. They believe that their revolutionary action

(based on theoretical reason) can determine history. This idealistic philosophy of history finds its theoretical source in Hegel, and it is retained in Marx' materialist inversion. The intellectuals in Dantons Tod, Masse Mensch,

68 The term "tragic flaw" will be explained in the next chapter in the context of the discussion on the tragic characters. 40

and Die MaBnahme share the conviction of history's reason, necessity and perfectability. It is their conviction, that their particular theory of revolution can apply the laws that govern history, which causes tragic collision. This collision is visualized in the contradiction between the subjective intention of the revolutionaries and the objective result of this intention. The actualization of their ideal to establish a just society once and for all via revolution makes it impossible even for themselves to bear the bloody consequences of the revolution politically, psychologically and emotionally. The hubris of the revolutionary theory and action, put into Hegelian terminology, lies in the attempt to assure the role of the

Weltgeist (spirit of history) itself.

The conflict in these modern revolutionary tragedies occurs in the form of collision within the revolutionary ideas, and it does not end in synthesis or reconciliation as

Hegel projected for tragedies. The two sides of the conflict remain irreconcilable after the tragic collision, because the tragedy in these plays is caused by the self- contradiction within the revolutionary ideal, and within each tragic character.

The following chapters demonstrate that the Hegelian dialectical principle describes the dynamic of tragic conflict. Hegel's insight into modern tragedy and tragic character, to a certain degree, applies to the tragedy in 41

Dantons Tod, Masse Mensch, and Die MalSnahme. Tragedy is

indeed a result of the Selbstentzweiung of a substance. The

reason for the cleavage of the tragic conflict actually can be found in Hegel's explanation of the necessary split in

the oneness of the idea. With that it is possible for the

idea to enter history. Therefore, the Selbstentzweiung is

inevitable. In the view of this study, it is not only

inevitable, but also irreconcilable. CHAPTER II

GEORG BttCHNER1S DANTONS TOD

The Hegelian principle of self-division of a substance

in tragedy uncovers the tragic essence of Buchner's Dantons

Tod. The play depicts a tragedy of French Revolution engendered by the self-splitting nature of the revolutionary ideals. Expressing Buchner's deep frustration of the collapse of the "Gesellschaft fiir Menschenrechte",1 and also as a result of his study of the history of French

Revolution, the drama "emerges as a total disavowal of all possible political solutions to the problems of mankind."2

Buchner sees the root of the revolution's tragic problem in the self-contradicting human ideologies which serve as revolutionary theories. In Dantons Tod, Buchner reveals the

1 Early in 1834, Buchner became personally engaged in revolutionary action in Gie£en. Together with three of his fellow students, August Becker, Gustav Clemm, and Karl Minnigerode, he founded an underground organization, which was named Society for Human Rights. Its primary task was to prepare the Hessian people, mostly peasants and artisans, for a mass uprising against the oppressive regime of Ludwig II. His career as a leader of a revolutionary movement came to a frustrating end. On Buchner's life and political activities, see Hans Mayer, Buchner und seine Zeit (Wiesbaden: Limes, 1946).

2Ronald Hauser, Georg Buchner (New York: Twayne, 1974), 25.

42 43

inevitable failure of the revolution by presenting the

tragic destiny of the revolutionary characters.

Hegel's observation of the principle of tragic self- division has found its expression in the convention of psychological interpretation of tragedy. Robert E. Heilman,

for instance, discusses the tragic dividedness from this particular perspective. According to him, the dividedness

from which tragedy springs lies deep in human nature.3

Heilman maintains that the dividedness of the character results from his shortcoming. The standard term for man's shortcoming, as Heilman points out, is the "tragic flaw."4

He further cites T.E. Hulme that man "encloses within him certain antinomies. ... and it is part of his permanent characteristics that this must always be so."5 These accounts are helpful to illuminate some particular tragic aspects of the characters in Dantons Tod (Hegel also ascribes the character's inner psyche to the content of modern tragedy).

In the view of this study, the tragic self-splitting within a character occurs because of the conflict between the character's ideal and the "flaw" which is the action of

3Robert E. Heilman, Tragedy and Melodrama (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1968), 7. Although Heilman is not a Hegelian critic, he uses the same principle of dividedness to analyze tragic problems.

4 Ibid.

5 Ibid. 44

a force not consistent with the ideal. As Hegel formulates

in his theory of tragedy, the split in the oneness of an

idea is necessary because the idea has to bring itself out

of its abstractness and show itself in the concrete.

Likewise, the character's ideal, which is a part of him

(ideal is a construct of man's thinking), has to be realized

through his concrete action (necessarily with tragic flaw),

therefore, the character has to experience a split of

himself. The present chapter will show how Buchner uniquely presents the self-dividedness of his characters which

reflects their self-divided revolutionary ideals.

The self-dividedness of the character Danton is revealed through the fact that he has experienced a tragic

split of A) his initial idealistic belief in revolution and

in the teleological progression of history on one hand, B) his nihilistic view of human existence on the other hand.

At the very beginning of the drama, Buchner's Danton represents himself already as an individual who is alienated

from his revolutionary ideal. He suffers because of the contradiction between the subjective will-to-freedom and the result of the action actualizing it. As a revolutionary activist, Danton, just like Robespierre, is challenged at the important historical juncture to a decision regarding the future direction of the revolution. While they both 45

confront the same terrible problem imposed by history, their reactions to it differ strongly. Gerhard Knapp maintains:

1st einerseits die Tragik Dantons [...] durch das Auseinanderfallen von Hand- lung und Verantwortlichkeit motiviert, verweist das Scheitern Robespierres iiber jenen hinaus. Auch wenn er [...] von Zweifeln bedrangt wird, vermag er diese in der Folge zu iiberwinden.6

Danton has been greatly instrumental in founding a revolutionary institution - the terror - that exists for the universal human liberation by suppressing the enemies of freedom. He has assumed direct responsibility for the fate of the revolution and taken upon himself absolute power of life and death:

Ich habe im September die junge Brut der Revolution mit den zerstuckten Leibern der Aristo- craten geazt. Meine Stimme hat aus dem Golde der Aristocraten und Reichen dem Volke Waffen geschmiedet. Meine Stimme war der Orkan, welcher die Satelliten des Despotismus unter Wogen von Bajo- netten begrub (111,4).7

6 Gerhard Knapp, Georg Buchner 2nd. ed. (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1984), 70f.

7Georg Buchner, Dantons Tod in Georg Buchner: Samtliche Werke und Briefe Band 1 ed. Werner R. Lehmann (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1971), 54. 46

The fact that he has been instrumental in condemning thousands of human beings to death has sowed seeds of immeasurable guilt in his heart. As a result, he is profoundly alienated from the revolution. In 11,5 Danton suffers a nightmare in which the guilt of "atrocious crimes" he has committed as progenitor of the revolutionary terror haunts his conscience:

Will denn das nie aufhoren? Wird das Licht nie ausgliihen und der Schall nie modern, will's denn nie still und dunkel werden, daft wir uns die garstigen Sunden einander nicht mehr anhoren und ansehen? - September!- (11,5)

The word "September" that terrifies him in this dream refers to the infamous "September Massacres" of 1791, for which Danton is partly responsible. The necessity of the revolutionary action (Notwehr) is articulated by Danton in the word "muft":

Das war Nothwehr, wir muftten. ... es muft ja Aergernift kommen, doch wehe dem, durch welchen Aergernift kommt. Es muft, das war dieft Muft. Wer will der Hand fluchen, auf die der Fluch des Muft gefallen? Wer hat das Muft gesprochen, wer? Was ist das, was in uns hurt, liigt, stiehlt und mordet? (11,5) 47

Wolfgang Wittkowski sees the "Aergernift" as an

inevitable force of the universal law.8 According to him,

the well known sentence from Matthew 18:7 of the New

Testament "Es muft ja Aergernift kommen; aber wehe dem, durch

den es kommt!" indicates the unavoidable dilemma of history.

Caught up in the paradox of the revolutionary terror Danton

suffers from its terrible consequence. The paradox of

revolutionary terror is that it is meant to guarantee the

freedom of mankind, but it simultaneously contravenes the

freedom from which it issues. The revolutionary terror thus

creates a vicious circle of freedom and objective necessity

from which neither Danton nor Robespierre can fully

extricate himself.

As a result, the term freedom does not represent a

positive meaning for Danton any more. Buchner skillfully

shows the divided meaning of freedom through the arrangement

of the scenes, dialogues, story telling and analogy. Liberty

literally means being free from captivity, imprisonment,

slavery, or despotic control.9 To achieve liberty is the

ultimate goal of French Revolution. Paradoxically, in this

drama about the great revolution symbolizing man's will of

freedom, Buchner uses a significant portion to show the

8 Wolfgang Wittkowski, Georg Buchner: Persdnlichkeit, Weltbild, Werk (Heidelberg: Winter Verlag, 1978), 206.

9 See The Concise Oxford Dictionary ed. J.B. Sykes (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 579. 48

Dantonists as prisoners. After 11,7 the activities of the

Dantonists are confined to prison rooms. The captivity of the Dantonists serves as a physical picture of the imprisonment of freedom.

Obviously Danton and Robespierre understand freedom differently. For Danton freedom is to be able to pursue personal happiness characterized by pleasure-seeking. The freedom Robespierre strives for is a spiritual one which expresses itself in virtue. The drama shows that neither of these freedoms can be truly achieved. As soon as the conceptual ideas come to practical realization, they split into their opposites.

Danton's ideal of freedom cannot be actualized without contradicting itself. In the first scene Danton points out to his wife, Julie, how the lady playing cards flirts with other men. However, she cannot have the complete freedom of flirting with them without getting into the imprisonment of lying to her husband: "Sieh die hiibsche Dame, wie artig sie die Karten dreht! ...man sagt sie halte ihrem Manne immer das caaur und andern Leuten das carreau hin. Ihr konntet einen noch in die Luge verliebt machen" (1,1). In her conversation with Danton, Marion, the prostitute, who shares the same view of freedom with Danton: "Meine Natur war einmal so, wer kann da driiber hinaus?" (I, 5), shows him how her action according to her free will (constantly having sexual relationships with other men) kills two other 49

individuals. Her mother grieved to death because of her

immorality; and her lover, a young man, drowned himself

unable to accept her infidelity.

Robespierre's ideal of spiritual freedom cannot be

fulfilled either. In Danton's eye, freedom in Robespierre's

revolution equals a prostitute who, in a sense, is a liar

creating illusions of love: "Die Freiheit und eine Hure sind die kosmopolitischsten Dinge unter der Sonne. Sie wird sich

jezt anstandig im Ehebett des Advokaten von Arras prostituiren. Aber ich denke sie wird die Clytemnaestra gegen ihn spielen, ich lasse ihm keine sechs Monate Frist,

ich ziehe ihn rnit mir" (IV,5). Here we see the self-split of the term: freedom which should deliver people out of the oppression of slavery turns out to be the most dangerous deceiver who would bring imprisonment and death. With the question: "Wie lange sollen die FuiSstapfen der Freiheit

Graber sein?" (111,9) Danton exposes the abuse of the term

"liberty" within Robespierre's political ideology and rhetoric. The association of prostitute with death can again be illustrated in Marion's experience: Her freedom to prostitute herself causes death.

It is the tragic and paradoxical dialectic of freedom and necessity in Danton's own revolutionary will and its concomitant praxis which cause him immense inner turmoil. As a result, Danton withdraws from the revolution. He speaks to his colleagues: "Und wenn es gienge - ich will lieber 50

guillotinirt werden, als guillotiniren lassen. Ich habe es satt, wozu sollen wir Menschen miteinander kampfen?"(II, 1)

The tremendous guilt leads to Danton's deep remorse: "Es ist jezt ein Jahr, da£ ich das Revolutionstribunal schuf. Ich bitte Gott und Menschen dafiir urn Verzeihung. . ." (III, 3).

Knapp describes Danton's situation:

Der Verlust seiner geschicht- lichen Existenz, die in der Identitat von Handlung und ttbersetzung wurzelte, beraubt Danton jeder sinnvollen Entwick- lungsmoglichkeit [. . . ] dieser Sinnverlust lalSt ihn jetzt seiner Schuld an den Septembermorden [...] und des unerfiillten Auftrags der Revolution gewahr werden.10

Danton's interior anguish leads directly to despair. He realizes that revolution is futile, and that the terror must immediately be discontinued. However, this realization does not motivate him to put an end to the terror with any meaningful action, instead, he succumbs to the belief that man is powerless to change the course of history and that suffering represents an ineluctable determination of human existence. He sees the revolutionaries as puppets, controlled by an unknown power:

Puppen sind wir von unbekannten Gewalten am Draht gezogen; nichts, nichts wir selbst! Die Schwerter, mit denen Geister kampfen, man sieht

10 Knapp, 67. 51

nur die Hande nicht, wie im Mahrchen (11,5).

The alienation caused by the tragic disjunction of the revolutionary ideal: "...die Revolution ist wie Saturn, sie

fri£t ihre eignen Kinder" (1,5) results in a split of his belief in teleological progression of history: "Die Welt ist das Chaos. Das Nichts ist der zu gebarende Weltgott" (IV,

5). This is an inversion of Hegel's philosophy of history.

The complete breakdown of his belief in revolution and in historical telos leads Danton to nihilism. He now seeks nothingness which should annihilate his psychic pain caused by his revolutionary past. However, this nothingness again is not possible.

Danton's nihilism reveals itself in his very first words opening the drama. His remark on the card-playing lady in the first scene: "Sieh die hubsche Dame...Ihr konnt einen noch in die Liige verliebt machen" signifies his conviction that men can know nothing and no one. To his wife's question, "Glaubst du an mich?" Danton answers:

Was weiiS ich? wir wissen wenig voneinander. Wir sind Dickhauter, wir strecken die Hande nacheinander aus aber es ist vergebliche Miihe, wir reiben nur das grobe Leder aneinander ab, - wir sind sehr einsam (I, 1).

Even the most intimate relationship, that between man and wife, is but illusion for Danton: 52

Ja, was man so kennen heiJSt. Du hast dunkle Augen und lockiges Haar und einen feinen Teint und sagst inuner zu mir: lieb Georg. Aber er deutet ihr auf Stirn und Augen da da, was liegt hinter dem? Geh, wir haben grobe Sinne. Einander kennen? Wir miiiSten uns die Schadeldecken aufbrechen und die Gedanken einander aus den Hirnfasern zerren (I, 1).

Danton also distances himself from the political

discussion of his friends. Whereas they still insist on

freedom of individual happiness represented in their

conception of the republic, Danton gives up that hope. "What

Herault considers a problem responsive to political

solution, Danton sees in existential proportions."11 He is

tired of their political speculation. He says to Julie: "Ich mu£ fort, sie reiben mich mit ihrer Politik noch auf" (I,

1). Not only do political discussions irritate him, but, as

his "prophecy" indicates, he feels that they lead to

nothing: "Zwischen Thiir und Angel will ich euch prophezeien:

die Statue der Freiheit is noch nicht gegossen, der Ofen

gliiht, wir Alle konnen uns noch die Finger dabey verbrennen"

(1/1 ) •

Alienated from his revolutionary deeds, Danton attempts to wipe out the memory of his revolutionary past by turning to sensual dissipation, an effort which remains futile.

Danton's luxury and depraved life is overshadowed by his

11 Hauser, 32. 53

past, because it is actually made possible through his

revolutionary career. Robespierre points out:

Ihr werdet mich leicht verstehen, wenn ihr an Leute denkt, welche sonst in Dachstuben lebten und jezt in Carossen fahren und mit ehema- ligen Marquisinnen und Baronessen Unzucht treiben. Wir diirfen wohl fragen, ist das Volk geplundert oder sind die Goldhande der Konige gedriickt worden, wenn wir Gesetz- geber des Volks mit alien Lastern und allem Luxus der ehemaligen Hoflinge Parade machen, wenn wir die£e Marquis und Grafen der Revolution reiche Weiber heiraten, iippige Gastmahler geben, spielen, Diener halten und kostbare Kleider tragen sehen? (1,3)

Even in the brothel (I, 5), where Danton desires to

obliterate everything associated with revolution from his mind in.strict privacy, he cannot stay out of the shadow of the "past." Marion insists on telling him the story about her past, which is a potential suggestion that Danton

should, in return, also share his past. At the end of the scene, their privacy is interrupted by Lacroix who informs

Danton about Robespierre's official declaration of the fight against the counterrevolutionaries (the Dantonists). This news again reminds Danton of his revolutionary past.

Realizing the futility of escaping his past through sensual dissipation, Danton resolves to seek nothingness which he believes can be found in death: 54

Man hat mir von einer Krankheit erzahlt, die einem das Gedachtnis verlieren mache. Der Tod soil etwas davon haben. Dann konrnit mir manchmal die Hoffnung, da£ er viel- leicht noch kraftiger wirke und einem Alles verlieren mache. Wenn das ware! [...] Der Ort soil sicher sein, ja fur mein Gedachtnis, aber nicht fur mich; mir gibt das Grab mehr Sicherheit, es schafft mir wenigstens Vergessen. Es totet mein Gedachtnis. Dort aber lebt mein Gedachtnis und totet mich. Ich oder es? Die Antwort ist leicht (11,4).

Danton's longing for death is again expressed already

in the first scene of the drama:

Nein Julie, ich liebe dich wie das Grab.

Nein, hore! Die Leute sagen im Grab sey Ruhe und Grab und Ruhe seyen eins. Wenn das ist, lieg' ich in deinem SchooJS schon unter der Erde. Du siiJSes Grab, deine Lippen sind Todtenglocken, deine Stimme ist mein Grabgelaute, deine Brust mein Grabhiigel und dein Herz mein Sarg (I, 1).

However, this hope in peace which should be made possible through the oblivion of nonbeing found in death is later shattered. After Danton has been imprisoned, where death comes closer to him, he recognizes that "nichts" is an impossible thing. In a conversation with Philippeau, Danton expresses this thought:

PHILIPPEAU. Was willst du denn? DANTON. Ruhe. PHILIPPEAU. Die ist in Gott. DANTON. Im nichts: Versenke dich in was Ruhigeres als das Nichts, 55

und wenn die hochste Ruhe Gott ist, ist nicht das Nichts Gott? Aber ich bin ein Atheist. Der verfluchte Satz: etwas kann nicht zu nichts werden! und ich bin etwas, das ist der Jammer! (111,7)

Danton seeks release from a world full of suffering and wishes for the "tiefe Ruhe" only nothingness can afford. He seeks nothingness because being signifies irremediable anguish. At the same time, he recognizes that the concept of pure nothingness is thinkable only in dialectical relation to being. Therefore, Danton!s despair is also rooted in the recognition that the category of nothingness must relate to being:

Die Schopfung hat sich so breit gemacht, da ist nichts leer. Alles voll Gewimmels. Das Nichts hat sich ermordet, die Schopfung ist seine Wunde, wir sind seine Blutstropfen, die Welt ist das Grab, worin es fault (111,7).

Danton's free praxis, undertaken for the sake of human universal liberation, ends in his belief that the universe is the inescapable grave where nothingness rots. His ruminations in 111,7 reproduce this thought:

Wir sind Alle lebendig begraben und wie Konige in drei- oder vierfachen Sargen beygesezt, unter dem Himmel, in unsern Hausern, in unsern Rocken und Hemden. Wir kratzen fiinfzig Jahre lang am Sargdeckel. Ja wer an Vernichtung glauben konnte! dem ware geholfen. Da ist keine Hoffnung im Tod, er ist nur eine 56

einfachere, das Leben eine ver- wickeltere organisirtere PaulniJS, das ist der ganze Unterschied! (111,7)

Furthermore, Danton despairs because this dialectical

relation of nothingness to being ultimately reveals how an

eternal universe completely devours the nothingness which makes the primordial meaning of being in its infinite

necessity possible.12 "Because the universe is absolutely

infinite - i.e. infinite annihilation of infinite nothing -

Danton infers that personal extinction is an ontological

impossibility."13 Here, Danton's nihilism which should alleviate his psychic pain encounters a split. His suffering and despair become another necessity.

Whereas Danton withdraws from the revolution,

Robespierre identifies his revolutionary will with the necessities and inner dynamics that drive the revolution.

12 Rodney Taylor points out in the above quotation from 111,7 (Die Schopfung has sich so breit gemacht...), that Hegel's speculation on the metaphysical origins of the real world comes to light in Danton's juxtaposition of Sein ("Welt") and Nichts. This juxtaposition generates a dialectical relation - hence totalizing synthesis - similar to that described by Hegel in the Logik ("Das Nichts has sich ermordet [...] die Welt ist das Grab worin es fault"). Danton conceives the totality of the universe in terms of a dialectic of being and nothingness. This is a dialectic culminating in a synthesis that is actual existence: the "grave" of nothingness. Therefore, for him, pure nothingness is unintelligible, since both principles are possible only in dialectical relation to each other. See Rodney Taylor, History and Paradoxes of Metaphysics in "Dantons Tod" (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 116-117.

13 Ibid. ,127-128. 57

This decision certainly results in his own destruction. The

self-dividedness of the character Robespierre is revealed through the split in A) his role as a "messiah", B) his assertion of equality based on virtue.

In the course of his revolutionary experience,

Robespierre developed a theology of freedom which was supposed to be actualized for all time in a society of equality. Up to the end, he believes that humanity, liberty and equality can be realized through revolution. The revolution has to overthrow the old, decadent world based on tyranny and inequality, more specifically, the old powers, political structures, and moral values.

Robespierre believes, for authentic freedom to become the foundation of a new society, it is imperative that humanity undergo not only a radical external change but an internal one as well. He is convinced that in order for the political revolution truly to succeed, a concomitant moral and spiritual revolution would have to take place. For the monumental task of completing the moral and spiritual revolution, Robespierre has to assume the role of a

"messiah".

Robespierre's first appearance (in the street scene) is characterized by his popularity among the people. He is honored by them as a messiah and the "unbribale." A Weib spells out the people's image of Robespierre: "Hort den

Messias, der gesandt ist zu wahlen und zu richten; er wird 58

die Bosen mit der Scharfe des Schwertes schlagen. Seine

Augen sind die Augen der Wahl, seine Hande sind die Hande

des Gerichts!" (1,2) Indeed, Robespierre imitates the

biblical messiah -- Jesus, and acts like a shepherd among

the lost sheep. In the street scene, he comforts the people who are lost in rampage resulted from the frustration with

their material misery: "Kommt mit zu den Jacobinern. Eure

Briider werden euch ihre Arme offnen, ... "(1,2) .

Like Christ who urges people to repent from their sins,

Robespierre is concerned for human moral and spiritual

condition. For both the historical and Buchner's

Robespierre, virtue is the overriding meaning of the revolution, the "soul of the republic [...] the magnanimous devotion that sees all private interests in the general interest."14 In his speech delivered in the Jacobin club

Robespierre appeals to the audience:

...die Kraft der Republik ist die Tugend.... Das Laster das Cainszeichen des Aristocratismus. In einer Republik ist es nicht nur ein moralisches sondern auch ein politisches Verbrechen (1,3).

Robespierre not only verbally advocates virtue, but also attempts to give a living example. Through the conversation between Robespierre and Danton we find out that

14David P. Jordan, The Revolutionary Career of Maximilien Robespierre (New York: The Free Press, 1985), 162. Rodney Taylor points out that Buchner1s Robespierre resembles his historical counterpart. See Rodney Taylor, 152f. 59

Robespierre indeed makes an effort to live morally. Danton

admits: "Du hast kein Geld genommen, du hast keine Schulden

gemacht, du hast bey keinem Weibe geschlafen, du hast immer

einen anstandigen Rock getragen und dich nie betrunken.

Robespierre du bist emporend rechtschaffen" (1,6). However,

by assuming the role of a messiah who brings the good news

of an equal society to mankind, Robespierre confronts a

tragic paradox. As a mortal man, Robespierre cannot possibly

carry out the mission of a messiah because of his physical, mental, moral and spiritual limitation. Acting in the

likeness of the messiah and paradoxically also in the

likeness of a despot, preaching virtue with the means of despotic force, Robespierre achieves the opposite of what he strives for, because pure virtue among men does not exist.

The tragic "flaw", which lies at the root of the self- split of the character, exposes itself in a comparison of

Robespierre with the biblical Jesus. Both of them are called by others, the "messiah", who promises to bring about change in human life. The messages of their missions are conveyed in their public speeches. In one of his sermons on the plain recorded in the book of Luke Jesus said this to the people:

But I say to you who hear: Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you, bless those who curse you, and pray for those who spitefully use you. To him who strikes you on the one cheek, offer the other also. And from him who takes away your cloak, 60

do not withhold your tunic either. Give to everyone who asks of you. And from him who takes away your goods do not ask them back. And just as you want men to do to you, you also do to them likewise.15

Buchner's Robespierre travesties the biblical Jesus. In

the name of the messiah, he also addresses the people who

are thirsty for his words ("Einige Stimmen. Hort den

Aristides, hort den Unbestechlichen! Ein Weib. Hort den

Messiah,..."). Robespierre preaches to the people:

Armes, tugendhaftes Volk! Du thust deine Pflicht, du opferst deine Feinde. Volk du bist gro£. Du offenbarst dich unter Blitz- strahlen und Donnerschlagen. Aber Volk deine Streiche diirfen deinen eignen leib nicht verwunden, du mordest dich selbst in deinem Grimm. Du kannst nur durch deine eigne Kraft fallen. Das wissen deine Feinde. Deine Gesetzgeber wachen, sie werden deine Hande fiihren, ihre Augen sind untriigbar, deine Hande sind unentrinnbar. ...wir werden ein Blutgericht uber unsere Feinde halten (I, 2).

In his message Jesus commands people to be compassionate and loving to one another, including their enemies and through love to reach reconciliation among themselves. Robespierre also appeals to the people for solidarity, which, however, should serve the purpose of fighting against their common enemies. The term enemies in

15 Luke 6:27-31 in Spirit Filled Life Bible (Nashville:Thomas Nelson, 1991), 1521. 61

Robespierre's address is ambiguous. They are not the

people's enemies, but rather Robespierre's political rivals.

The people's real enemies are hunger and poverty which

Robespierre's revolutionary measures fail to extirpate.

Instead of dealing with the root problem of meeting people's

material need, Robespierre diverts their anger caused by the

lack of food to the Dantonists. In this sense Robespierre's

speech is demagogic and sows seeds of hatred.

Another comparison between Christ and Robespierre is made by Camille. In a newspaper article he describes

Robespierre as a hypocrite:

DieiSer Blutmessias Robespierre auf seinem Kalvarienberge zwischen den beyden Schachern Couthon und Collot, auf dem er opfert und nicht geopfert wird. Die Guillotinen- betschwestern stehen wie Maria und Magdalena unten. St. Just liegt ihm wie Johannes am Herzen und macht den Convent mit den apokalyptischen Offenbarungen des Meisters bekannt, er tragt seinen Kopf wie eine Monstranz (1,6).

Camille points out a key difference between Christ and

Robespierre: whereas Christ sacrifices himself for the salvation of all, Robespierre sacrifices his "enemies" for the sake of the revolution. Finally, Robespierre has to accept the title given by Camille:

Ja wohl, Blutmessias, der opfert und nicht geopfert wird. Er hat sie mit seinem Blut erlost und 62

ich erlose sie mit ihrem eignen. Er hat sie silndigen gemacht und ich nehme die Siinde auf mich. Er hatte die Wollust des Schmerzes und ich habe die Quaal des Henkers. Wer hat sich mehr verleugnet, Ich Oder er?- (1,1)

Another parallel between Jesus and Robespierre can be

found in Danton's criticism of Robespierre's revolutionary

measure: "Ihr wollt Brod und sie werfen euch Kopfe hin. Ihr

durstet und sie machen euch das Blut von den Stufen der

Guillotine lecken" (III, 9). The association of bread and wine with body and blood reminds us of what Jesus did at his

last supper. Using the metaphor of his body and blood as bread and wine he told the disciples about the new covenant he brought for the sinners. Celebrating the passover, Jesus

instituted the Lord's supper. He took the bread, gave thanks and broke it, and gave it to the disciples, saying: "Take, eat; this is my body." Then he took the cup, and gave thanks, and gave it to them, saying: "Drink from it all of you. For this is my blood of the new covenant, which is shed

for many for the remission of sins."16 By offering his body and blood as bread and wine (spiritual food), Jesus provides symbols of true freedom. According to the Bible, whoever believes in Christ (eats his body and drinks his blood), will remain in the new covenant, and will be set free from the slavery of sin.

16 Matthew, 26:26-28. 63

Following Christ's example, Robespierre tries to "bear

the sin of many"17 and to assume the full burden of

mankind's present corruption for the sake of its future

salvation. Like Christ, who sacrificed his life for the

sinners, Robespierre sacrifices his conscience for humanity

by executing revolution. However, the excruciating blood­

shed of the revolution can neither create spiritual freedom,

nor eradicate the material poverty of the people, because

human heads cannot serve as bread and human blood not as

wine. As a result, Robespierre suffers a dividedness in his mind. While assuming the role of a messiah, he believes,

contrary to Christ, that no one is able to save the others with his own wounds: "Wahrlich, des Menschensohn wird in uns

Allen gekreuzigt, wir ringen Alle in Gethsemanegarten im

blutigen SchweiJS, aber es erlost keiner den Andern mit

seinen Wunden" (1,6). Robespierre's assumption of the role

"messiah" clearly demonstrates its inversion.

Robespierre's travesty of the messianic role reveals the self-splitting nature of his restrictive moral code which serves him as prerequisite of equality. His idea of

equality is based on the Rousseauean egalitarianism implicit

in the latter's conception of the social contract. Rousseau views the social contract as enabling man to overcome his bondage to the primeval forces of nature. Each individual's

17 Isaiah 53:12. 64

natural "force," which is synonymous to his liberty, is the

chief means for his self-preservation. The problem, then, is

how to unify man's individual power with a communal power

without suppressing his freedom:

to find a form of association which will defend [. . . ] with the whole common force the person [...] of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before.18

The essential purpose of the social contract is that of

establishing a unique "public person" representing the

unitary selfhood, as it were, of a single mind. If one

individual obtains certain privileges at the expense of

others, the unity of this mind evaporates, and man's originally compassionate, virtuous nature is distorted into

a selfish quest for personal dominion and power. This distortion of nature results in a societally and historically conditioned situation in which each individual,

in his natural quest for self-preservation, is at war with everyone else. However, for Rousseau, an individual human being becomes more powerful, more able to subordinate brute nature to the dictates of reason, to the extent that he is

18Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourses tran. D.D.H. Cole (London: Everyman's Library, 1983), 174. 65

unified with other individuals in a community expressing a

single will.

The general will is like a supraindividual mind whose power is generated through a collective surrendering of all

the individual powers composing its unity. In return for the

individual's sacrificing of his own power of freedom for

self-preservation, the state formed by the social contract magnifies his personal power, since he (namely,the

individual) in effect becomes an embodiment of the general will itself: the all-encompassing mind of the state:

These clauses may be reduced to one - the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community; for [...] as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all [. . . ] Moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perpect as it can be.19

Thus, the life of the general will, and the society constituted through it, is nothing other than absolute equality. For Rousseau, justice and freedom are possible only when equality is present in society; and equality can be actualized only through the absolute alienation of each individual's power and liberty, because inidividual liberty taken in itself inevitably engenders conflicts that

19 Ibid., 174. 66

contradict pure, i.e. unlimited, freedom, which Rousseau

views as synonymous to the definition of the state.20

The intention of Buchner's Robespierre is by means of

terror to create the absolute equality and revolutionary

virtue characterizing the society of Rousseau's social

contract. His goal for the terror is that it quickly makes

possible the voluntary Rousseauean self-alienation of all

individuals in revolutionary society, so that a truly free,

socialist state can be born:

Die Waffe der Republik ist der Schrecken, die Kraft der Republik ist die Tugend. Die Tugend, weil ohne sie der Schrecken verderblich, der Schrecken, weil ohne ihn die Tugend ohnmachtig ist. Der Schrecken ist ein Ausflu£ der Tugend, er ist nichts anders als die schnelle, strenge und unbeugsame Gerechtigkeit. Sie sagen der Schrecken sey die Waffe einer despotischen Regierung, die unsrige gliche also dem Despotismus. Freilich, aber so wie das Schwert in den Handen eines Freiheitshelden dem Sabel gleicht, womit der Satellit der Tyrannen bewaffnet ist. Regire der Despot seine thierahnlichen Unter- thanen durch den Schrecken, er hat Recht als Despot, zerschmettert durch den Schrecken die Feinde der Freiheit und ihr habt als Stifter der Republik nicht minder Recht (I, 3).

20 According to Rousseau, the freedom of the individual is equivalent to the freedom embodied in the state: "Each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole." Rousseau, 175. 67

The result of this socialist equality will be the emergence

of a single "human power" (Rousseau) in which unrestricted

human freedom may assert itself against the tyranny of

nature, and mankind's tortured past. This is why, in 1,6,

Robespierre insists against Danton on the necessity of

upholding the terror which he (Robespierre) equates with

virtue.21 The practice of virtue is the undeniable condition

for the possibility of absolute equality, which is

tantamount to the rational development of power and freedom

in the individual: the goal of the social contract. Virtue

is the only method whereby the social contract, hence human

happiness, can be realized. Terror, then, is the sole means

for liberating society for virtue, the free society

envisioned by Rousseau.

According, to Robespierre, without universally accepted moral standards, the republic is in constant danger of

chaotic disintegration. His objection to the gute

Gesellschaft is based on the argument that its wealth comes

from the abuse and exploitation of the people. The

selfishness of pleasure-seeking is synonymous to injustice which must be eradicated in order to avoid the repetition of suffering and enslavement characterizing its entire past history. Robespierre maintains:

21 Rousseau's identification of the state with the individual will and its enhanced power of being and freedom made available by the state is the philosophical reason for Robespierre's equation of virtue with terror. 68

Er will die Rosse der Revolution am Bordel halten machen, wie ein Kutscher seine dressirten Gaule; sie werden Kraft genug haben, ihn zum Revolutionsplatz zu schleifen.

Wir werden das Schiff der Revo­ lution nicht auf den seichten Berechnungen und den Schlammbanken dieJSer Leute stranden lassen, wir mussen die Hand abhauen, die es zu halten wagt und wenn er es mit den Zahnen packte! Weg mit einer Gesellschaft, die der todten Aristo- cratie die Kleider ausgezogen und ihren Aussatz geerbt hat (1,6).

Robespierre argues here for a continuation of the

revolution: from bourgeois revolution to an antibourgeois revolution, since it is now the bourgeoisie that has

inherited the old civilization, it thus has become the enemy of the people and the revolution. Influenced by Rousseau,

Buchner's Robespierre assumes the natural good in the peasants, the masses. For Robespierre, the purpose of the revolution is to restore the original basis of community by reestablishing what he believes is mankind's innate social equality, which is the overriding objective of the social contract. Revolutionary terror is necessary because a just state, one founded on the social contract, is unthinkable as long as warring factions bent on self-aggrandizement exist in the new society.

In Robespierre's view, morality is tantamount to revolution which is a means to achieve the ultimate purpose 69

of history: freedom. Therefore, revolution (morality)

functions for him as an agent of history. In his monologue

after the verbal confrontation with Danton, Robespierre

explains why Danton and the Dantonists must be executed: "Er

muJS weg. Wer in einer Masse, die vorwarts drangt, stehen

bleibt, leistet so gut Widerstand als trat'er ihr entgegen,

er wird zertreten" (1,6). This principle is not only true

for Danton but for Robespierre himself as well. By

hesitating to jnake the decision to purge the Dantonists, he

puts his own life in danger: he would be run over by the massive movement of the revolution. St. Just challenges him: "Willst du noch langer zaudern. Wir werden ohne dich

handeln" (I, 6).

Robespierre's equation of morality with revolution

leads to the vicious cycle of ruthless killing of the old and new aristocracy including innocent people.22 As a

result, virtue produces violence and poverty. Out of the

Rousseauean logic for equality and freedom, Robespierre draws this conclusion: only the poor can be virtuous. It is not a mere coincidence that Robespierre literally juxtaposes the words "poor" and "virtuous" in his address to the people: "armes tugendhaftes Volk!"(1,2) Caught up in the metaphysical shortcomings of Rousseau's imagined natural society, Robespierre's pursuit of the ideal of freedom

22 See Dantons Tod, (I, 6). 70

destroys the concrete individual freedom represented in the

"contract sociale" of a bourgeois republic.

Robespierre's policy of terror, armed with virtue, in a

sense, provides a sort of equality. Ein Anderer points out:

"Das Beil des Gesetzes schwebt iiber alien Hauptern"(II,7).

However, this "equality" again creates inequality. In the

deepest longing for her husband, Lucile cannot grasp why a

human being should be stripped of his basic right to live, a

right which even the most insignificant insect has: "Sterben

- Sterben - Es darf ja Alles leben, Alles, die kleine Miicke da, der Vogel. Warum denn er nicht? Der Strom des Lebens miiJSte stocken, wenn nur der eine Tropfen verschiittet wiirde.

Die.Erde miiiSte eine Wunde bekommen von dem Streich" (IV, 8).

The revolution has experienced its deepest self-splitting: pure reason turns out to be antireason, absolute equality perpetuates absolute destruction.

This inversion of equality again results from a flaw in

Robespierre's demand of morality. In a conversation with

Robespierre, Danton indicates an important truth that no human is morally perfect so that he can judge and condemn others. To Robespierre's question: "Du leugnest die Tugend?"

Danton answers: "Und das Laster. Es giebt nur Epicuraer und zwar grobe und feine, Christus war der feinste; das ist der einzige Unterschied, den ich zwischen den Menschen herausbringen kann. Jeder handelt seiner Natur gemaJS d.h. er thut, was ihm wohl thut." As Taylor points out, Danton 71

vehemently objects to Robespierre's socialist political

aspirations on grounds that mankind is by nature incapable

of realizing this ideal. When Danton asks Robespierre: "Bist

du der Policeysoldat des Himmels?"(1,6) he implies that

justice is realizable only in a transcendental realm, where

God will judge men's hearts.23 Robespierre, in Danton's

view, has overstepped the bounds of human morality by

assuming the status of divinity -- or in Hegelian terms, the

role of the Weltgeist himself. As a result, Robespierre's

highest virtue becomes tyranny. Szondi points out: "...die

Revolution vernichtet selbst den Revolutionar, der zu

verhindern sucht, daJS sie sich in Tyrannei verkehre."24

In fact Robespierre himself suffers from the tragic dividedness of his moral code. He can hardly bear the tremendous guilt caused by the result of his own revolutionary decisions. According to Jordan, the historical

Robespierre was plagued by devastating self-doubts, depression and attacks of nervous anxiety:

There were [. . . ] weeks of silence, mute stretches spent at the Duplay's , perhaps gazing into the pleasant courtyard while exploring his mind, self, and heart. These retreats [...] signaled not only physical and psychic exhaustion, but times of depression, doubt, disgust, manifestations of the felt unattainability of all

23 See Taylor, 155.

24Szondi, Versuch iiber das Tragische, 103. 72

he had dreamed and preached.25

This anxiety is reflected in the dramatic figure

Robespierre. In the depths of his melancholy reveries, he

compares the life of a revolutionary to the powerless

meanderings of a sleepwalker. In 1,6 Robespierre experiences

a persistent thought that tortures his mind: "Wie das immer wieder kommt. Warum kann ich den Gedanken nicht l.os werden?

Er deutet mit blutigem Finger immer da, da hin! Ich mag so viel Lappen darum wickeln als ich will, das Blut schlagt

durch"(I,6). While assuming various phantom-like forms, all of which represent to Robespierre his feeling of boundless

guilt, this thought always recedes into indeterminacy:

Die Nacht schnarcht iiber der Erde und walzt sich im wiisten Traum. Gedanken, Wiinsche, kaum geahnt, wirr und gestaltlos, die scheu sich vor des Tages Licht verkrochen, empfangen jezt Form und Gewand und stehlen sich in das stille Haus des Traums. Sie offnen die Thuren, sie sehen aus den Fenstern, sie werden halbwegs Fleisch [...] Und ist nicht unser Wachen ein hellerer Traum? sind wir nicht Nachtwandler? ist nicht unser Handeln wie das im Traum, nur deutlicher, bestimmter, durchgefuhrter? (1,6)

After he made the decision to purge the Dantonists, in order to save the revolution, Robespierre cries out: "Sie gehen Alle von mir - es ist Alles wiist und leer - ich bin

25 Jordan, 210. 73

allein" (1,6). This is the most authentic testimony for the tragedy of this revolutionary figure who fought for freedom, but ends in the imprisonment of alienation and emptiness. It is also

Ausdruck der Verzweiflung. Ist doch Verzweiflung nicht bloiS ein Wissen urn die Ohnmacht des Tuns, sondern ein Tun voller Sinnlosigkeit, das die Ohnmacht der Einsicht demonstriert. In wiistem Gemetzel wird sich die Selbst- zerstorung vollenden.26

At the root of the dividedness of the characters Danton and Robespierre lies the hubris of carrying out the laws of history single headedly and completing history once and for all by the means of revolution. "Hubris ordinarily implies a self-glorifying aggressiveness, a rash assurance of beating the game, a reckless defiance of limits. The tragic hero is, whether grossly or very subtly, 'the man who would be god.1"27 The game that is to be beaten here, is nothing but history itself. To different degrees this is true for both

Danton and Robespierre. They believed in their unlimited power to change society. The difference now between the two is that Danton, after assuming the monumantal task of

26 Erwin Kobel, Georg Buchner: Das dichterische Werk (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 28.

27Robert B Heilman, The Iceman, the Arsonist, and the Troubled Agent (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), 31. 74

changing history, realized the human incapablity to fulfill

this task. Upon the recognition of the futility of his

revolutionary action, Danton, motivated by his nihilistic

world view, abandons his revolutionary ideal and succumbs to

hedonism. His hubris is a problem of his past, and Buchner's

drama presents Danton as a tragic character who suffers from

the result of his hubris.

Robespierre also experienced a moment of self-doubt.

Like Danton for whom the revolutionaries are nothing but

mere puppets, Robespierre compares them to the sleepwalker.

However, he soon ascribes this feeling to mere thought, which must be deceitful: "Die Siinde ist im Gedanken. Ob der

Gedanke That wird, ob ihn der Korper nachspielt, das ist der

Zufall"(1,6) . He comes to the decision to carry on the

revolutionary task regardless of its consequences. Whereas

Danton's hubris played a role in his revolutionary career in

the past, Robespierre's hubris determines his present

decisions. Danton completely gives up the belief in the

teleological progression of history, Robespierre insists on this belief. For him revolution and he himself, as the

revolution's executor, are agents of history. Robespierre's political conviction is manifested in the speech of

Robespierre's follower, St.Just:

Der Weltgeist bedient sich in der geistigen Sphare unserer Arme eben so, wie er in der physischen Vulkane oder Wasserfluthen gebraucht. Was 75

liegt daran ob sie an einer Seuche Oder an der Revolution sterben? (II, 7)28

St. Just's Oration reveals an idealistic interpretation of

revolution and history originated in Hegel:

Entscheidend (in the obove speech, H.C.) ist vielmehr die hegelianisch inspirierte Vorstellung von den "welthistorischen Individuen, welche den Beruf hatten, Geschaftsfiihrer des Weltgeistes zu sein", und die nun - in Abweichung von der Hegelschen Matrix - als Legitimationstheorem eingesetzt wird.29

Benno von Wiese points out that

Robespierre ist der Despot mit dem guten Gewissen, von dem Hegel in seiner Philosophie der Geschichte sagt: 'Die Tugend ist hier ein einfaches Prinzip und unterscheidet nur solche, die in der Gesinnung sind und solche, die es nicht sind ... Es herrschen jetzt die Tugend und der Schrecken; denn die subjektive Tugend, die bloiS von der Gesinnung aus regiert, bringt die fiirchterlichste Tyrannei mit sich. Sie iibt ihre Macht ohne gerichtliche Formen, und ihre Strafe ist ebenso nur einfach - der Tod. 130

28A more detailed discussion of St. Just's speech in relation to Robespierre's belief in the Hegelian teleological progression of history will be given in the concluding section of this dissertation.

29Klaus F. Gille, "Buchners Danton als Ideologiekritik und Utopie" in Wage zu Georg Buchner ed. Henri Poschmann (Berlin: Lang, 1992), 103.

30Benno von Wiese, Die deutsche Tragodie von Lessing bis Hebbel (Hamburg: Hoffmann Verlag, 1961), 516. 76

Wiese maintains that such a fanatic (Robespierre) only

knows about his abstract political thought "dessen Wahrheit

mit Blut besiegelt werden muiS."31 Robespierre's hubris, that

is, his denial of conditions and limits of reality and of

himself, motivates him to impose his idea on the

revolutionary practice in defiance of its bloody result. By

doing so he transgresses the good.

Hegel observed that in modern tragedies, the characters

no longer serve as pure living embodiment of the moral

forces like the ancient tragic characters do. Rather, in

their pursuit of their ideals, they at the same time

struggle and suffer for the sake of their own interests.

Hegel described it as the "subjectivity" of modern tragic

characters. According to Hegel, the fate of the characters

of modern tragedy is often the result of their

psychologically motivated choice of action. This is true for

Danton's and Robespierre's tragic development. Unlike the

ancient tragic heroes, who represent one ethical force, and

simply fall into collision with the other ethical force

without pre-knowledge of it, the revolutionaries in Dantons

Tod are aware of the contradiction within the revolutionary

ideal, i.e. the collision between the revolutionary theory

and practice. They have the choice to act upon it.

31 Ibid. 77

Danton, no longer considering himself a hero of the revolution, takes a diversion in his political career.

Entertaining the view of nihilism, he chooses to abandon his revolutionary ideal, indulge in sensual dissipation and pay little attention to the life-threatening danger caused by his choice of action. His friend points out: "Du stiirzest dich durch dein Zogern in's Verderben, du rei£est alle deine

Freunde mit dir" (11,1). Danton's Faulheit is partly the result of his hubris. He believes that because of his

"merit" gained in the past, he would be "untouchable": "Du traumst. Sie hatten nie Muth ohne mich, sie werden keinen gegen mich haben; die Revolution ist noch nicht fertig, sie konnten mich noch notig haben, sie werden mich im Arsenal aufheben" (1,5).

Robespierre, on the other hand, refuses to forsake the revolution, despite the paralyzing sense of sin caused by the responsibility for the blood shed and the temptation to follow Danton in his despairing rejection of the revolution.

He insists to go further in his responsibility and act in the name of history. Because of that Robespierre can see himself as tragic martyr of necessary action, however, with tremendous guilt.

As evident in Buchner's play, both Danton and

Robespierre have personal ambitions for their involvement in the revolution. The different psychological motivations for the their choices of action determine their tragic 78

destiny. For Danton, the revolution serves as the means for a political and social end of improving the conditions of men as they were. Contrary to Robespierre, who strives for a transcendental meaning of revolution, Danton is concerned about the material satisfaction which the revolution should bring about. He is not the kind of man to forget his own interests and his main concern may have been to provide himself and his friends with the means of gratifying their rather expensive taste.32 Danton, originally devoid of any property, gained, through his "revolutionary career," material freedom to enjoy his pleasure-seeking life. A

Burger points out:

ZWEITER BtJRGER. Danton hat schone Kleider, Danton hat ein schones Haus, Danton hat eine schone Frau, er badet sich in Burgunder, i£t das Wildpret von silbernen Tellern und schlaft bey euren Weibern und Tochtern, wenn er betrunken ist. Danton war arm, wie .ihr. Woher hat er das Alles? Der Fremde hat es him gegeben, damit er euch Alle verrathe (111,10).

The Burger1s remark reveals a fact that Danton has used people for his own material interest during the revolution.

In the name of fighting against the aristocracy to create universal equality and freedom, he had won the people's

32 In his book Danton (London: Duckworth, 1978). Norman Hampson describes the personality of the historical Danton and his revolutionary motivation, which are similar to that of Buchner 1s Danton. 79

trust and support and became their bellweather. However, when the revolution has reached the turning point, that it

has to change from a bourgeois revolution into an anti- bourgeois revolution since the bourgeois now represents new aristocracy (which Danton belongs to because of his new

social status), he distances himself from his previous revolutionary supporters (the people) and retreats into the

"high society" with no desire to continue the fight for equality for all. Of course, as mentioned above, Danton1s passive attitude toward the revolution results from his realization of the futility of the revolution. Nevertheless,

Danton's change in his attitude toward revolution and people in a sense does represent a betrayal to the people. One cannot neglect the fact that Danton lives a drastically different life than the people who shared solidarity with him. Without the people's support for his previous revolutionary action, he cannot possibly have his material freedom.

Robespierre's revolutionary ambition, on the -other hand, is driven by his sense of vanity. Pierre Louis

Roederer, Robespierre's revolutionary contemporary, testifies that "injured self-esteem, wounded pride, or a sense of outraged right, was the prime motive force of the men of 1789. Their prime objective was the achievement of equality of rights,"33 According to Roederer, the historical 80

Robespierre had a melancholic, atrabilious and jealous temperament. His choice of action is often motivated by his sense of vanity. For instance, he would have paid someone to offer him gold, so as to be able to say that he had refused it.34 Buchner's Robespierre finds his shadow in the historical figure. Danton points out:

Mit deiner Tugend Robespierre! . . . Ich wiirde mich schamen dreiJSig Jahre lang mit der namlichen Moralphysiognomie zwischen Himmel und Erde herumzulaufen blo£ urn des elenden Vergniigens willen Andre schlechter zu finden, als mich. Ist denn nichts in dir, was dir nicht manchmal ganz leise, heimlich sagte, du liigst, du liigst! (1,6)

Robespierre insists on his cruel revolution inspite of his knowledge that it cannot reach its end. This fact shows that he does act like a hypocrite who lies with his words and deeds. Danton's and Robespierre's personal ambitions for the revolution contradict the revolutionary ideal they claim: freedom and equality for all. In this sense, the conflict in Dantons Tod occurs also because of who the characters are.35

33 Pierre Louis Roederer, The Spirit Of The Revolution Of 1789 tran. and ed. Murray Forsyth (Aldershot, Gower, 1989), 1 .

34 Ibid., 134.

35 See Hegel's discussion on modern tragedy in Vorlesungen iiber die Ksthetik III, 558ff. 81

Despite the differences in Danton's and Robespierre's

choices to act, there is a similarity in the way they act,

that is, insisting on the impossible. Knowing that nihilism

cannot help him out of his suffering: "...da ist nichts

leer. Alles voll Gewimmels...etwas kann nicht zu nichts werden! und ich bin etwas, das ist der Jammer!" (Ill, 7),

Danton does not change his nihilistic attitude toward life.

He keeps the nihilistic view and acts according to it until he is completely destroyed.

Robespierre envisions that, by continuing the revolution, his destiny will be the same as that of

Danton's: "Man hat auch mich schrecken wollen, man gab mir zu verstehen, daiS die Gefahr, indem sie sich Danton nahere, auch bis zu mir dringen konne" (II, 7). Nevertheless, he continues along the dangerous road: "So erklare ich denn, nichts soil mich aufhalten, und sollte auch Dantons Gefahr die meinige werden. Wir Alle haben etwas Muth und etwas

Seelengrofte notig" (II, 7).

By insisting on the impossible, both Danton and

Robespierre reveal a strikingly similar mentality in their psychological make-up, that is, they are both stubborn and cynical toward their mistakes. Therefore, their tragic endings are also caused by their very stubborness and cynicism, which reveal the aspect of their character marked by sarcastic doubts or despises of sincerity of human life. 82

The self-divisions of the characters Danton and

Robespierre reflect the self-splitting of the revolutionary

idea. The belief that mankind can determine its own destiny via revolution encounters the factually uncontrollable dynamics of history. Buchner, a former revolutionary activist, no longer believes that any revolution can

eventually fulfill its initial claim.36 One of the topics of his drama is to reveal the innate contradiction of the revolutionary idea.

As shown above the split of the revolutionary idea results in two political oppositions: the Dantonists versus the Robespierreists. Despite the inner-contradictions of their ideals, the two factions respectively represent certain moments of truth. In this sense, the drama seems to fit into the second Hegelian definition of tragedy, i.e. it presents a conflict between two equally justified forces.37

36 See his letter to his fiancee, GieJSen, nach dem 10. Marz 1834 in Georg Buchner: Samtliche Werke und Briefe Band 2 ed. Werner R Lehmann (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1971), 426.

37 Since my main focus is on Hegel's first definition of tragedy, the principle of self-division (for the distinction between the first and the second Hegelian definitions of tragedy see Szondi's and Schulte's discussions presented in chapter I), I will only briefly mention the application of Hegel's second definition of tragedy to the drama. Dantons Tod is indeed structured in the way that the two oppositions can claim to haven certain moments of truth. Therefore, they are somewhat equally justified. The merits and weaknesses on both sides are more or less analyzed on the previous pages. 83

The two political views, when taken by themselves, are justified. However, when confronted with each other, they come to mutual violation and therefore, carry guilt.

The Dantonists are right that the oppression and terror must stop now:

PHILIPPEAU: ... Wie lange sollen wir noch schmutzig und blutig seyn wie neugeborne Kinder, Sarge zur Wiege haben und mit Kopfen spielen? Wir miissen vorwarts. Der GnadenausschuiS muiS durchgesetzt, die ausgestoJSnen Deputirten miissen wieder aufgenommen werden. HERAULT: Die Revolution ist in das Stadium der Reorganization gelangt. Die Revolution muJS aufhoren und die Republik mute anfangen (I, 1).

Philippeau and Herault raise the cry for freedom - a cry echoed in the hearts of all who know oppression.

According to them, the time has come for the people to receive the reward of their struggle. Herault goes on to spell out those rewards:

In unsern Staatsgrundsatzen muiS das Recht an die Stelle der Pflicht, das Wohlbefinden an die der Tugend und die Notwehr an die der Strafe treten. Jeder muft sich geltend machen und seine Natur durchsetzen konnen. Er mag nun verniinftig oder unverniinftig, gebildet oder ungebildet, gut Oder bose seyn, das geht den Staat nichts an. Wir Alle sind Narren es hat Keiner das Recht einem Andern seine eigen- thiimliche Narrheit aufzudringen. Jeder muiS in seiner Art genieJSen konnen, jedoch so, daiS keiner auf 84

Unkosten eines andern genieJSen oder ihn in seinem eigentumlichen Genu£ storen darf (1,1).

Herault's stress here is put upon individualism and particularly upon the pursuit of happiness. The state is to provide equal protection to all citizens, regardless of the direction of their pursuits, as long as they do not interfere with the rights of others. The theoretical basis of Herault's conception of the republic can be found in the first constitution of the French republic which strives for the guarantee of equal rights. When taken by itself, the theory is justified. In practice, however, the Dantonists have abused the notion of equal chances to purpue one's happiness. Their conception of republic is lacking any consideration for the material needs of the people in their quest for happiness.

Danton's men, moved by the Epicurean ideal of freedom expressed in the first scene, come into direct conflict with

Robespierre's idea of "republicanism"38 whose central concern is the Burger: "In einer Republik sind nur

Republicaner Burger, Royalisten und Fremde sind Feinde" (I,

3) . Buchner purposely shows the striking contrast between the two political views by immediately introducing a street scene after the first one, which casts doubts upon the practicality of the Dantonists' ideals of freedom (discussed

38 The term "republicanism" is used by Hauser, 35. 85

by them in the first scene). In grotesque terms, the tragic

condition of Simon and his wife forced by economic necessity

to sell their daughter to a rich man as a prostitute shows that freedom under the ideal of the "pursuit of pleasure" is heavily dependent upon economic resources. The Dantonists'

freedom of pleasure-seeking represents an injustice, for this freedom is only possible because the others don't have the freedom to seek their "happiness". Therefore,

Robespierre insists on sweeping economic reform by means of revolution, in order to protect equal chance of happiness.

In contrast to Herault1 s demand: "Die Revolution muiS aufhoren und die Republik muiS anfangen" Robespierre declares:

Die sociale Revolution ist noch nicht fertig; wer eine Revolution zur Halfte vollendet, grabt sich selbst sein Grab. Die gute Gesellschaft ist noch nicht todt, die gesunde Volkskraft mu£ sich an die Stelle dieser nach alien Richtungen abgekit- zelten Klasse setzen ...(1,6). ...Die Revolutionsregirung ist der Despotismus der Freiheit gegen die Tyrannei (1,3).

Robespierre is right, because there is a pressing need for moral and economic reform (this is shown in the street scene) . However, the very fact that the continuation of

Robespierre's revolution has killed thousands of lives and individual freedoms is already evident in the "moral 86

reformer's" (Robespierre's) own speech, where he condemns

himself as a tyrant and makes a mockery of the idea of

freedom ("... so wie das Schwert in den Handen eines

Freiheitshelden dem Sabel gleicht, womit der Satellit der

Tyrannen bewaffnet ist" (1,3)). If, on the one hand, moral

restraint is a prerequisite for freedom, and, on the other, the strict enforcement of moral codes mocks the very idea of

freedom, what is freedom but an abstraction with no visible link to real human condition and individual happiness.

Therefore, Robespierre's politics in reality also represents an injustice which should be corrected by the demand: "Die

Revolution muJS aufhoren und die Republik muiS anfangen'

(1 ,1 )•

Because of the unjust elememts represented by both sides, the collision between the Dantonists and the

Robespierreists can also be viewed as a collision between two equally unjustified forces. In his analysis of Hegel's theory of tragedy, Schulte also points out this dialectical aspect of the Hegelian second definition of tragedy.39

Dantons Tod reveals the Hegelian principle of tragedy in the following aspects: 1) The self-dividedness of the revolutionary characters embodies the self-dividedness of their revolutionary ideals, 2) The self-division within the revolutionary theory is a necessary split of the idea in its

39 See Schulte, 70. 87

oneness.40 3 ) The revolutionary ideals of the two oppositions, the Dantonists and the Robespierreists, when taken by themselves, represent two equally justified forces which contradict and violate each other and thus both carry guilt and both encounter destruction.

In Dantons Tod, Biichner presented an extraordinary display of the profound paradoxical nature of the revolution under which he himself had suffered. He saw the necessity for a revolution to change the social and material conditions of the people. In a letter to his family Buchner wrote: "Der Aristocratismus ist die schandlichste Verachtung des heiligen Geistes im Menschen; gegen ihn kehre ich seine eigenen Waffen;1,41 In daily life, Buchner observed the violation of human dignity of the poor by the aristocracy.

In one of his letters Buchner described the misery of the

"Haufen zerlumpter, frierender Kinder, die mit aufgerissenen

Augen und traurigen Gesichtern vor den Herrlichkeiten aus

Wasser und Mehl, Dreck und Goldpapier standen."42 His

40We have seen already in the analysis of the drama, how the revolutionary theory as an ideal claiming its ultimate aim of freedom has led to endless misery of the people and constant killing of the revolutionaries.

41 Buchner, "Brief an die Pamilie. GieJSen, im Pebruar 1834," in Georg Buchner: Samtliche Werke und Briefe, Band 2, ed. Werner R Lehmann (Hamburg: Christian Wegner Verlag, 1971), 423.

42Buchner, "Brief an die Pamilie. Straftburg, den 1. Januar 1836," Ibid., 452. compassion for the poor was further expressed in the letter to his friend August Stober: "Die politischen Verhaltnisse konnen mich rasend machen. Das arme Volk schleppt geduldig den Karren, worauf die Fiirsten und Liberalen ihre

Affenkomodie spielen."43 As a result of his sympathy and his sense of justice, Buchner became involved in political activities in his hometown and conceived a plan for a revolution. He wrote the political pamphlet Hessischer

Landbote declaring war to the aristocracy: "Friede den

Hutten! Krieg den Palasten!"

Buchner's political praxis and his study of the history of the French Revolution disillusioned his revolutionary idea. He writes to his fiancee:

Ich studirte die Geschichte der Revolution. Ich fiihlte mich wie zernichtet unter dem graiSlichen Fatalismus der Geschichte. Ich finde in der Menschennatur eine entsetzliche Gleichheit, in den menschlichen Verhaltnissen eine unabwendbare Gewalt, Allen und Keinem verliehen. Der Einzelne nur Schaum auf der Welle, die Gro£e ein bloJSer Zufall, die Herr- schaft des Genies ein Puppenspiel, ein lacherliches Ringen gegen ein ehernes Gesetz, es zu erkennen das Hochste, es zu beherrschen unmoglich.44

43 Buchner, "Brief an August Stober. Darmstadt: d. 9. Dec. 33." Ibid., 422.

^Buchner, "Brief and die Braut" Gie£en nach dem 10. Marz 1834, 425-426. 89

Buchner's frustration with the revolution is rooted in his insight into the horrible human nature: "Das MuiS ist eins von den Verdammungsworten, womit der Mensch getauft worden. Der Ausspruch: es muJS ja Aergernis kommen, aber wehe dem, durch den es kommt, - ist schauderhaft. Was ist das, was in uns liigt, mordet, stiehlt?"45 This statement echoes

Danton1s confession remembering the Septembermord. It raises the question that if all men are unexceptionally sinful, driven to lie, murder and steal, in other words, if they are in bondage to what they should not do, how can they by their own effort (i.e. via revolution) achieve the goal of the highest virtue: absolute freedom and equality? This profound disappointment culminates in Lucile's cry at the end of the drama, when she becomes insane because of the cruel revolutionary reality: "Es lebe der Konig!"(IV,9), This is an explicit denial of the revolution which indicates that there is no reconciliation or synthesis of the conflicting forces presented in the play.

45 Ibid. CHAPTER III

ERNST TOLLER'S MASSE MENSCH

The dividedness of the revolutionary character and the

revolutionary idea discussed in Buchner's Dantons Tod

further characterizes Toller's Masse Mensch. Reflecting the

German November revolution of 1918, the play presents a

tragedy dealing with the specific conflict between the

ethical and political validities of the revolution. As a

revolutionary activist, Toller suffered from this

contradiction and saw no solution for it. The conflict is

insoluble because 1) the idealistic elements inherent in the revolutionary ideas cause self-splitting within these

ideas, 2) the contradiction between the ethical and political aspects of revolution is derived from the paradoxical essence of modern man: man as an individual versus man as a member of the masses.

The present chapter will show that the tragic structure of the play is an integral part of the anarchist theory of society and the Marxist theory of class struggle. Using the

Hegelian tragic principle of self-division, the chapter will analyze the contradiction within the oppositional revolutionary ideals and indicate the inevitable failure of the revolution supported by the above theories. This chapter

90 91

also intends to reveal the dividedness of the tragic character Sonja Irene who reflects a paradoxical essence of human being.

Masse Mensch was written in October 1919 in the

Niederschonenfeld prison.1 In the forced leisure of imprisonment, Toller had time to reflect at length on his experience of revolution. The play is a product of that reflection, and it deals with the theme of socialism and revolution. In the months following the defeat of the revolution in Bavaria, Toller had been troubled by feelings of guilt and remorse which had almost overwhelmed him. The translation of his experience into drama had been a necessary catharsis. He wrote in retrospect:

"Masse Mensch" war nach Erlebnissen, deren Wucht der Mensch vielleicht nur einmal ertragen kann, ohne zu zerbrechen, Befreiung von seelischer Not, Befreiung, die den Zwiespalt nicht selbsttriigerisch durch irgend eine Formel aus der Welt verbannte, sondern die zum Zwiespalt "ja" und "Schicksal" sagte.2

1 Because of his participation in the November revolution and his role in the Bavarian Soviet Regime (the Raterepublik^. Toller was arrested and sentenced to five years' imprisonment in Bavaria, charged with high treason.

2 Ernst Toller, An Theodor Lessing, Briefe aus dem Gefangnis in Gesammelte Werke:Band 5 (Berlin: Hanser Verlag, 1978), 36. 92

Toller's experience of revolution had confronted him

with the conflict between revolutionary ends and means,

between moral principle and political expediency. He now

began to see this conflict as inevitable and the situation

of the revolutionary as inherently tragic:

Der ethische Mensch: AusschlieJSlich Erf tiller seines inneren Gesetzes. Der politische Mensch: Kampfer fur soziale Formen, die den anderen Voraussetzung zu hoherer Lebenshaltung sein konnen. Kampfer, auch wenn er gegen sein inneres Gesetz verstoJSt. Wird der ethische Mensch politischer Mensch, welcher tragische Weg bleibt ihm erspart?3

Toller completed Masse Mensch in a single creative

burst of three days. The play's protagonist, the Woman

(Sonja Irene L. )4, calls for revolution, but believes it can

be achieved through the non-violent means of the mass

strike. She is opposed by the Nameless One, who declares

that only revolutionary force can free the masses from

oppression. According to Richard Dove, what Toller is presenting is essentially the clash between himself and

3Toller, An Tessa, Ibid., 50.

4Toller's protagonist was inspired by Sarah Sonja Lerch, the Russian-born wife of a Munich university professor, who had joined the anti-war group around Kurt Eisner (1867-1919) (journalist and politician, Bavarian Prime Minister) and played a leading role in the strike committee. Arrested at the same time as other strike leaders, she committed suicide in Stadelheim Prison two months later. See Richard Dove, He was a German: A Biography of Ernst Toller (London: Libris, 1990), 277. 93

Eugen Levine 5 (and therefore also between USPD and KPD) in

the final days of the Bavarian Soviet Republic. Dove maintains that the play, however, "is not a direct

autobiographical account, for Toller has distilled his

experience into a dialectic of opposing philosophies of revolutionary action."6

Stylistically, Masse Mensch is very much an

Expressionist play. It consists of seven scenes, which are divided into "real scenes" and "dream scenes". The action is universalized, the characters (except Sonja) are not recognizable persons but figures representing particular

ideas and attitudes. The symbolism of the dream scenes is complex and sometimes obscure, the language elliptical and emotionally heightened.

The first scene introduces the Woman who has joined the revolutionary movement out of compassion for the suffering of the masses. She is to address them in order to call for a general strike, which she sees as a means, not only of ending the war, but also of precipitating revolution. When her husband, a government official, asks her to abandon her political activities because they will damage his career and

5Eugen Levine (1883-1919) was the Munich KPD leader. Born in Petersburg of German-Jewish parents, he was a cool-headed revolutionary who had taken part in the 1905 uprising in Russia and the German November revolution. See Dove, 69.

6 Ibid., 107. 94

his honour, she refuses, feeling that her involvement is a

moral duty.

The second scene symbolizes the capitalist system, which the revolution must overthrow, in the activities of

the Stock Exchange. Pour bankers are discussing a plan to

stimulate the war effort by setting up a state brothel, disguised as a sanatorium for "Siegeswillenstarkung." The system is not only hypocritical but inhuman, treating men and women as "war material". The scene ends with the music of clinking gold coins, as the bankers dance a foxtrot round the desk of the Exchange.

The third scene presents the first confrontation between the Woman and the Nameless One. It begins with a succession of mass choruses, in which different groups of workers lament their material suffering. The Woman then addresses them, calling for a mass strike to end the war and usher in a new era of freedom and justice. Her call is challenged by the Nameless One, a spokesman of the masses.

His argument is that even if the strike were to bring the war to an end, it would not change the worker's plight. He ridicules her appeal for non-violent action, declaring there is only one way in which the workers can throw off their subjection, i.e violent action. Dismissing the Woman's objection to more killing, the Nameless One insists that class interest must take precedence over moral principles. 95

The Woman finally gives in, consciously subordinating moral

scruple to revolutionary solidarity.

The fourth scene restates these issues at the level of

subconscious apprehension. The scene takes place at night in a high-walled yard, a setting which symbolizes the prison of working-class experience. The Nameless One appears and begins to play the harmonica in an invitation to dance. It proves to be a dance of death as prisoners awaiting execution ask to be allowed to join in. The Woman enters as the sentries bring in a prisoner who has the face of her husband. The Woman intervenes to try to save him, but is rebuffed by the Nameless One. At the end of the scene, the

Woman stands beside her husband, inviting the sentries to shoot her, a gesture which prefigures the Woman's later self-sacrifice.

The fifth scene develops these issues at the level of conscious experience. In the turmoil of defeat, the workers take hostages: the Nameless One's demand that they should be shot poses the moral dilemma of the play in its most acute form. The Woman pleads that the murder of the hostages would be a senseless act of blind rage which would do nothing to eradicate the system they seek to overthrow. The Nameless

One accuses her of treachery. As the scene ends, the building is surrounded by counter-revolutionary forces and the woman is arrested, together with the workers. 96

In the sixth scene, Toller explores the nature of guilt

and responsibility in a series of visual symbols. The Woman,

chained and shut in a cage, is haunted by headless shadows

which accuse her of having murdered them. At first, she

denies her guilt, but she ends by acknowledging it. It is

only now that the Woman understands the true nature of her

own guilt.

The final scene takes place in a prison cell, where the

Woman is visited by the Nameless One. He has come to help

her escape, but she rejects his plan, because it would

entail killing one of the guards. The Woman opposes his

belief in revolutionary expediency with an assertion of the

sanctity of human life. She goes voluntarily to her

execution. The play ends with the Woman's death, which

triggers two prisoners' rediscovery of their conscience while stealing the Woman's belongings.

The Woman's moral principle for the revolution is based on her belief in the value of human life.7 In her view, revolution should renew man's soul. Upon man's renewal, a new, just society should emerge. The image of mankind's rebirth reveals itself in the highly symbolic language on the front page of the play:

7 Sonja's belief reflects Toller's concern for man which is a result of his realization of man's value through his life experience. 97

Weltrevolution. Gebarerin des neuen Schwingens. Gebarerin der neuen Volkerkreise. Rot leuchtet das Jahrhundert Blutige Schuldfanale. Die Erde kreuzigt sich.8

As an enthusiastic advocate of human renewal, the Woman is

convinced that the whole process should begin with

correcting the workers' attitude toward the means of production. Since the industrial revolution, machines and

factories have turned into the masters of humans, devastating their physical and mental health. At a workers' meeting, a group of people cry out:

Maschinen pressen uns wie Vieh im Schlachthaus, Maschinen klemmen uns in Schraub- stock, Maschinen hammern unsre Leiber Tag fur Tag

Nieder die Fabriken, nieder die Maschinen! Vereinzelte Rufe im Saal: Nieder die Fabriken, nieder die Maschinen!9

Accentuating the value of human life and human soul, the Woman points out that one of the goals of the workers' emancipation movement is to reverse the alienated relation

8 Toller, Masse Mensch in Gesammelte Werke: Band 2 (Berlin: Hanser Verlag, 1978), 65.

9 Ibid., 80-81. 98

of machines to man and free the workers from the slavery to

machines:

Fabriken diirfen nicht mehr Herr, Und Menschen Mittel sein. Fabrik sei Diener wiirdigen Lebens! Seele des Menschen bezwinge Fabrik!10

In the Woman's view, the measures to be taken to reach

this goal should not be confined to the negotiation with the

factory owners, rather, a nonviolent strike is in order:

Den Ausweg, Briider, wollt ihr wissen? Ein Ausweg bleibt uns Schwachen, Uns Hassern der Kanonen. Der Streik! kein Handschlag mehr. Streik unsre Tat! Wir Schwachen werden Felsen sein der Starke, Und keine Waffe ist gebaut, die uns besiegen konne. Ruft unsre stummen Bataillone! Ich rufe Streik! Hort ih r : Ich rufe Streik!11

The moral ideal of the Woman, the nonviolent

fulfillment of a revolutionary human and social revival is based on the political reasoning of Kurt Eisner and Gustav

Landauer.12 According to them, the Russian revolution of

10 Ibid. , 81.

11 Ibid. , 83.

12Gustave Landauer (1870-1919) was an anarchist writer and philosopher. As a self-styled anarcho-socialist, his ideas were derived from Proudhon and Kropotkin, his philosophy is essentially a poetic interpretation of the tradition of European anarchism. See Dove, 37. 99

1917, which resulted in horrendous destruction because of

the tremendous violence, should not serve as a model for the

German 1918-19 revolution. They believed "dalS es [...]

gelingen wird, ohne Riickschlag, ohne Hemmung, ohne Gewalt

den Weg zur neuen Freiheit zu finden."13

Landauer believed that the quantity of humanity

exercised during the revolution amounts to that remaining at

the end of that revolution,14 because: "Nur die Gegenwart

ist wirklich, und was die Menschen nicht jetzt tun, nicht

sofort zu tun beginnen, das tun sie in alle Ewigkeit

nicht."15 In his Aufruf zum Sozialismus Landauer proposed

his version of socialism which should bring about social

reform (revolution). He defined socialism as "eine Tendenz

des Menschenwillens ... ein Bestreben, mit Hilfe eines

Ideals eine neue Wirklichkeit zu schaffen."16 Men invoked

this ideal precisely because the modern state, and the

capitalist system on which it rested, failed to provide the basis for a satisfying life. Landauer believed that the

13 Kurt Eisner, Die neue Zeit, 1. Folge Miinchen, 1919, 33. Quoted after Rosemarie Altenhofer, Ernst Tollers Politische Dramatik (Diss. Washington University, 1976), 64.

14Toller’s political thinking, reflected in the figure of Sonja, is influenced by Gustav Landauer, especially his work Aufruf zum Sozialismus. See Toller, Eine Jugend in Deutschland in Gesammelte Werke: Band 4 (Berlin: Hanser Verlag, 1978), 84.

15 Gustav Landauer, Aufruf zum Sozialismus ed. Heinz Joachim Heydorn (Frankfurt: Wien Verlag, 1967), 185.

16 Ibid., 58. 100

social order could only be changed in so far as the existing

relationship between human beings was changed, and they came

together again as "Volk."

So dringend es ist, daiS wir den Sozialismus, den Kampf fur neue Zustande zwischen den Menschen als geistige Bewegung erfassen, das heilSt, daJS wir verstehen, wie es nur zu neuen Verhaltnissen zwischen den Menschen kommt, wenn die vom Geiste bewegten Menschen sie sich schaf fen, ...17

New social forms would not be created by political

revolution alone, but by a peaceful work of construction, organized from new spirit and for new spirit - and nothing

else. The driving force of social change was therefore

"Geist".

"Geist" is a central concept in Landauer's philosophy, though, as Dove points out, "for all his attempts to define

it, it remains an ambivalent, almost mystical one."18 It was both a force within the individual and a bond between

individuals. It determined the manner of social relations, and the social, economic institutions in which they found expression. It was "Geist" which would inspire people and unite them in pursuit of a common ideal: people united in this way were, in Landauer's terminology, "Volk". Whereas

"Volk" was seen as an organic entity, created by an identity

17 Ibid., 139.

18 Dove, 38. 101

of consciousness and aspiration, the state was viewed as an

artificial structure, resulting from historical chance. If

the unity of people is created by "Geist", the unity of the

state is imposed ultimately by force: in Landauer's system

of thought, "Geist" and "Staat" are roughly antithetical.

According to Landauer, the most obvious sign of the absence of "Geist" in modern society was the plight of the proletariat. Separated from the earth and its products, and

forced by the factory organization of capitalism to produce goods unconnected with their own needs, they became alienated, often succumbing to poverty, sickness and alcoholism. Landauer maintains that the proletariat was not the class chosen by God on the basis of historical inevitability, but rather the section of the population which suffers most. That is, as the class most exploited by capitalism, it represented human suffering at its most acute.

Landauer was a severe critic of Marxism, which he described as the curse of the socialist movement. He rejected, above all, its scientific pretensions. Socialism, he maintained, was not the result of a particular stage of material development, but the product of human will: "...der

Sozialismus ist zu alien Zeiten moglich...er ist moglich, wenn die rechten Menschen da sind, die ihn wollen das heilSt 102

tun, . .."19 Accordingly, Landauer believed that the dominant

historical force was the working of "Geist" in society.

While Landauer acknowledged that the force of "Geist"

had been suppressed by the state and by industrial

capitalism, it had not died out entirely. It had remained

active in individuals of heightened awareness - the poets

and thinkers - and it was their duty to reawaken it in

others, to summon up the new reality through the propaganda

of word and deed: "Unser Geist muiS ziinden, mu£ leuchten, mu£

verlocken und an sich ziehen. Das tut nie die Rede allein;

auch die gewaltigste, die ziirnendste, die sanfteste nicht.

Das tut allein das Beispiel. Das Beispiel der Vorausgehenden

miissen wir geben. Beispiel und Opfermut!"20

Landauer's anarchist philosophy is articulated by

Toller in Masse Mensch. The "Geist" is vital in Toller's

understanding of revolution. For him a revolution that lacks

"Geist" resembles a flame that flares up, only to flicker

out uselessly because it lacks the nourishing force.21 It is

evidently this same "Geist" which forms the very center of

the Expressionist concept of "New Man".

19 Landauer, 146.

20 Ibid., 184.

21 Toller, Quer Durch: Reisebilder und Reden, (Berlin: Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag, 1930), 233. 103

As mentioned before, to bring about "New Man" is the

central point in the Woman's ideal of revolution. In her

view, social change presupposes the change of man' s

thinking. Revolution should eliminate the alienation caused

by the workers' separation from the earth and its products

(the Landauerean concept of alienation). In the play, the

Landarbeiter express their feelings:

VerstoJSen hat man uns von unsrer Mutter Erde, Die reichen Herren kaufen Erde sich wie feile Dirnen, Belustgen sich mit unsrer gnadenreichen Mutter Erde, Stolen unsre rauhen Arme in Riistungsfabriken. Wir aber siechen, von Scholle entwurzelt, Die freudlosen Stadte zerbrechen unsre Kraft. Wir wollen Erde! Allen die Erde!22

For the Woman, the workers' poor living condition

represents a shame, it is a humiliation of human dignity.

She has experienced the humiliation while visiting the

shabby shelter of an injured worker:

Durch die Quartiere ging ich. Von Schindeldachern tropfte grauer Regen, An Stubenwanden schossen Pilze aus der Feuchte. Und eine Kammer traf ich, sa£ darin ein Invalide, Der stotterte: "da drauJSen war es besser fast. . . Hier leben wir im Schweinekober... Und schamhaft Lacheln fiel aus seinen Augen. Und mit ihm schamt ich mich.23

22Toller, Masse Mensch, 82.

23 Ibid., 82. 104

Representing Landauer's view, the Woman sees the workers'

suffering as a result of exploitation which is rooted in the

state and capitalist system: "Der Moloch fri£t das sechste

Jahr die Leiber, i . .1,24 She draws comparison between the two

drastically different worlds of the poor and the wealthy:

Auf StraJSen brechen Schwangere zusammen, Vor Hunger sind sie nicht mehr fahig, Zu tragen Last der Ungebornen. In euren Stuben stiert die Not, Stiert Seuche, Wahnsinn, Hunger, griiner Hunger. Dort aber, schaut nach dort: Die Borsen speien Bacchanalien, Sekt iiberstromt errungene Siege, Wollustig Prickeln tanzt Geschehen Um goldene Altare. Und drauften?25

The Woman exposes the corrupt system her husband

represents:

Dein Staat fiihrt Krieg, Dein Staat verrat das Volk! Dein Staat ausbeutet, driickt, bedriickt, Entrechtet Volk.26

The anarchist attitude toward the capitalist system is

similar to that of the communists. Both the anarchists and

the communists spurn capitalism and seek to overthrow this

system. However, they differ in their views regarding the means to achieve the revolutionary end. The anarchists

24Ibid., 83.

25 Ibid., 83.

26 Ibid., 72. 105

oppose using violence, instead, they propose to change man's

spirit in order to form a just society. Responding to the

workers' slogan: "Nieder die Fabriken, nieder die

Maschinen!" the Woman articulates her anarchist view of

changing reality:

Wir leben zwanzigstes Jahrhundert. Erkenntnis ist: Fabrik ist nicht mehr zu zerstoren. Nehmt Dynamit der ganzen Erde, La£t eine Nacht der Tat Fabriken sprengen, Im'nachsten Friihjahr warn sie auferstanden Und lebten grausamer als je. Fabriken diirfen nicht mehr Herr,

Seele des Menschen bezwinge Fabrik!

Ich rufe Streik!27

According to the Woman's revolutionary ideal, the workers should, upon the recognition of the cause of their suffering, develop a new human consciousness. The Woman's image of "New Man" is epitomized in the Landauerean concepts of "community" and "Volk": "Einst.../ Gesellschaft.../

Werkverbundene freie Menschheit ..."28 The concept "Volk" differs from "Masse". In the play Toller draws a distinction between the two:

DIE FRAU: Masse ist zerstampfter Acker, Masse ist verschiittet Volk.

Masse soil Volk in Liebe sein.

27 Ibid., 81,83.

28 Ibid., 110. 106

Masse soil Gemeinschaft sein. Gemeinschaft ist nicht Rache. Gemeinschaft zerstort das Fundament des Unrechts. Gemeinschaft pflanzt die Walder der Gerech- tigkeit .29

This idea is again influenced by Landauer's distinction

between Nation and Volk. Charles Maurer states:

Geist, according to Landauer, is inherent in the individual... Landauer made a distinc­ tion, however, between individuals having a common historical background, and Geist that comes to be an active force in the everyday life of the individuals within a "national" group. Such a group, which is under the influence of Geist...Landauer called Volk.30

Rejecting the Nameless One's view of mass, the Woman gives her definition of the term:

Masse ist ohnmachtig. Masse ist schwach.

Masse ist nicht heilig. Gewalt schuf Masse. Besitzunrecht schuf Masse. Masse ist Trieb aus Not, Ist glaubige Demut... Ist grausame Rache... Ist blinder Sklave... Ist frommer Wille. . .31

29 Ibid., 107, 95.

30Charles Maurer, Call to Revolution: The Mystical Anarchism of Gustav Landauer (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1971), 83.

31 Masse Mensch, 86, 107. 107

For the Woman, human hope lies in "Gemeinschaft" which

is constituted by "Volk", the opposite concept of mass.

This "Gemeinschaft" projects the image of a group of self-

determined individuals (New Man), because it (the

"Gemeinschaft") combines the two elements man and mass.

Sonja articulates: "Mensch in Masse befrein,/Gemeinschaft in

Masse befreien."32 In the play, the Woman sacrifices herself

for her ideal: "Ich geb/Mich hin .../Mich hin..."33 She believes that the spirit of the revolutionary ideal will

live forever:

Ich lebe ewig. ...Von Kreis zu Kreis, Von Wende zu Wende, Und einst werde ich Reiner, Schuldloser, Menschheit sein.34

The Woman's heoric action at the end of the play again reflects the Landauerean anarchist ideal of changing

society, i.e. through the individuals' self-sacrifice.

Sonja Irene L. 's political opinions on revolution are opposed by the counterarguments of the representative of the masses: the Nameless One. In the play he mainly functions

32 Ibid. , 108.

33 Ibid. , 92.

34 Ibid. , 110. 108

as an opponent of the protagonist (the Woman). Their first

encounter takes place in the third scene. Sonja delivers the

message to the workers at the mass meeting: "Ihr! seid uns

Heifer I/Ihr: seid die Briicke! .'1,35 At the moment when the

masses' revolutionary enthusiasm has reached its climax, the

Nameless One rushes into the meeting hall and disillusions

the Woman's idealistic dream. He continues the Woman's

analogy of the bridge and points out the indispensable

function of the , foundation for a bridge. Convinced of the

necessity of violent revolutionary action, the Nameless One

considers the effort of improving the workers' lives through

a strike as futile:

Wer Briicke bauen will, Mu£ auch fiir Pfosten sorgen. Streik ist heute Briickensteg, dem Pfosten fehlen. Wir brauchen mehr als Streik. . . . !36

According to the Nameless One, strikes and negotiations with the state will only produce a short term peace whereas a revolutionary war can change the workers' fate once and

for a l l :

Was niitzts, wenn ihr den Krieg beendet? Auch Priede, den ihr schafft, LaJSt euer Los unangetastet. Hie Friedensmaske, altes Los! Hie Kampf und neues Los!37

35 Ibid., 83.

36 Ibid. , 84. 109

Unlike the Woman, who attempts to achieve better living

conditions for the workers by changing their internal

attitude toward the means of production, the Nameless One

demands a change in the system and the ownership of the

production means: " Wir bauen wohnlicher System. 1,38 Besides

the reform of the political structure, this new system also

presupposes a radical change in the social order: "Den

Arbeitern die Macht! Alle fiir Alle!"39

The call of the Nameless One, quickly answered by the masses, meets their desire because the Nameless One is

identical to them: "Ich bin Masse!/Masse ist Schicksal. 1,40

Countering the Woman's criticism of masses: "Masse ist ohnmachtig. Masse ist schwach", the Nameless One responds with a positive, optimistic argument: "Masse ist

Fiihrer!/Masse ist Kraft!" "Masse ist heilig."41 He draws attention to the power of the masses: "Die Briickenpfosten eingerammt, Genossen!/Wer in den Weg sich stellt, wird iiberrannt./Masse ist Tat!"42 These words convey the same

37 Ibid. , 84.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid. , 84.

40 Ibid. ,85.

41 Ibid., 85, 107.

42 Ibid., 86. 110

idea delivered in St. Just's speech on the necessity and

unavoidability of the revolution. The will of the masses

amounts to the power of nature which is unchangeable and

irresistible. It is not a coincidence, but a revelation of

the fact that the material need of the masses constitutes

the real force of a revolution.

The second encounter of the Nameless One with the Woman

occurs in the fifth scene. The argument focuses on the

justification of the war43 which results in thousands of

deaths: "Der Platz baumt sich vor Toten."44 In her argument

regarding the war, the Woman's primary concern is man as an

individual: "In...beiden Kriegen...Menschen.../In...beiden

Kriegen. . .Menschen. .. "4S The Nameless One, however,

considers the war a necessary renewal and exhortation of the

social position of the working class which should lead to

freedom: "Im Kriege gestern warn wir Sklaven./...Im Kriege heute sind wir Freie."46 This attitude toward revolution again corresponds to St. Just's image of revolution. For

43Masse Mensch deals with issues of two kinds of wars. One of them is the imperialist First World War which was supposed to expand the power of capitalism and which increased the misery of the proletariat; the other war is the civil war, the revolution, which was to fight against the World War and improve the living condition of the working calss. Here the Woman is arguing about the justification of violence in the revolutionary war.

^Toller, Masse Mensch, 93 .

45 Ibid. , 94 .

46 Ibid. Ill

the Nameless One and St. Just, the revolutionary war is

basically a necessary catastrophe.

The Nameless One's central concern is focused on the

aspect of man as member of masses and the group interest.

His justification for revolutionary violence is grounded on

the Marxist theory of violent revolution. In the Manifest

der kommunistischen Partei, Marx and Engels interpret the history of all hitherto existing society as the history of class struggles: "die Geschichte aller bisherigen

Gesellschaft ist die Geschichte von Klassenkampfen. "47

Fundamentally, Marxist theory explains the reason of

inequality among men from a purely sociol-economic perspective. According to this theory, the primary social activity is production, which always involves relations with other men, both in the work itself and in the distribution of the product. It is upon these relationships that the political and legal superstructure and the ideological superstructure are formed.48 In other words, the economic basis determines the political, legal, and ideological superstructures of a society. Therefore, a change of man's external living conditions should precede the change in man's thinking. This theory sees the root of greed and

47 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifest der Kommunis­ tischen Partei in MEW, Vol.4 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1964), 462.

48 Consult Encyclopedia of Philosophy: Vol. 4, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan Publishing, 1972), 12. 112

exploitation in private ownership. Marx and Engels argued

that modern bourgeois private ownership was, in comparison

to the previous types such as feudal private ownership, the

last and most complete expression of usurpation of products.

The task of communists was to abolish private ownership: "In diesem Sinn konnen die Kommunisten ihre Theorie in dem einen

Ausdruck: Aufhebung des Privateigentums, zusammenfassen.1,49

The goal of the communists is "Bildung des Proletariats zur

Klasse, Sturz der Bourgeoisieherrschaft. Eroberung der politischen Macht durch das Proletariat."50

The Marxist theory can only favor masses and ignores

individual man, because the minimum units of the theory's interest are classes of certain social-economical levels, which include various groups of people. There are different terms to label these various classes according to their economic backgrounds: proletariat, bourgeoisie, capitalist, and imperialist. In the view of Marxist theory, class struggle is the key to the liberation of the exploited and suppressed, and violent revolution is its basic form. For the Marxists, immorality and inequality are engendered by the excessive private material possessions of the few and their desire to increase these possessions. For this reason, the violent seizure of capital by the proletariat is

49 Marx and Hegel, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, 462.

50 Ibid., 474. 113

necessary, since the bourgeoisie would not give up its

possessions willingly. Upon the overthrow of one class by

another, society moves a step forward.

The Marxists believe that the proletariat, because of

the weakness of its economical status and conversely the

strength of its class consciousness, has the strongest

revolutionary motivation. The proletariat is the class with

no means of production and no income-producing property, for

this reason, according to Marxist theory, the proletarians

are the bravest soldiers, and the proletarian revolution, in

comparison to other revolutions, stands out in its determination, thoroughness, and completeness. Therefore this revolution will create a new world once and forever.

The Marxist ideology is reflected in the argument of the

Nameless One. For him, only the interest of the masses counts. Violent action is inevitable for the purpose of changing the masses' living condition:

Der Krieg muiS enden. In alle Ewigkeit! Doch vorher letzten, riicksichtslosen Kampf!

Ich rufe mehr als Streik! Ich rufe: Krieg! Ich rufe: Revolution! Der Feind dort oben hort Auf schone Reden nicht. Macht gegen Macht! Gew a l t ...G ewalt!

Ja, nur Waffen braucht ihr!51

51 Toller, Masse Mensch, 85. 114

The Nameless One points out that the Woman's revolutionary-

ideal would achieve nothing:

Schweigen Sie Genossin! Mit Handedruck, Gebet und briinstgen Bitten Erzeugt man keine Kinder. Schwindsiichtge werden nicht gesund durch Wassersuppen, Zum Baumefalien brauchts die Axt.52

He declares his revolutionary ideal contrary to that of the

W o m a n :

Bedenken Sie: ein einziger blutiger Kampf Und ewig Frieden.

Krieg der Starken gegen Schwache, Krieg der Ausbeutung, Krieg der Gier. Bedenken Sie: aufhort das Elend! Bedenken Sie: Verbrechen werden Marchen, An Morgenhorizonten leuchtet Freiheit aller Volker!53

The closing sentence in the Manifest der kommuni-

stischen Partei: "Proletarier aller Lander, vereinigt euch!" not only finds its echo here (freedom of all people) but also in the speech delivered by the Nameless One to the masses: "Ein Ruf der Massen aller Lander. 1,54 According to

Marxist theory, the proletarian revolution entails solidarity among the working class of all nations, to bring

52 Ibid.

53Ibid. ,86.

54Ib i d . ,84. 115

to birth the socialist society which will, governed by the

proletariat, peacefully develop into a global communist

society. This society, which for Marx represents a perfect

and final social form, is the culmination of human history.

The communist society is the common cause of the

proletariat. In order to reach this goal, each individual

has to sacrifice his own interest: "Der Sache willen./Was

gilt der Einzelne,/Was sein Gefiihl,/Was sein

Gewissen?/.../Krieg ist Notwendigkeit fur uns./.../Urn der

Sache willen. . ,55

In both the Woman's and the Nameless One's arguments

there is self-contradiction which reflects the principle of

self-splitting of the idea along the lines of Hegel's

definition of tragedy. Klaus Bebendorf interprets Masse

Mensch as Ideendrama: "Ein in sieben Bildern gegliedertes

Dramengeschehen, das neben der "realen" Handlung auch

Traumszenen enthalt, skizziert den Dialog der beiden

Ideentrager. "56 The Ideen of the Woman and the Nameless One

by themselves present good common will, i.e., to create

equality among men, to free the oppressed ones from the

exploitation. These Ideen can only remain abstract, when

55 Ibid., 86.

56Klaus Bebendorf, Tollers expresslonistische Revolution, (Frankfurt a/M: Lang Verlag, 1990), 72. 116

they are brought into concrete practice, they necessarily

split.

The anarchist idea encounters its inner-contradiction,

because it proposes an ideal which cannot be realized.

Friedrich Engels defines anarchism as the leap of mankind

from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom.57 The

Woman's demand involves a non-materialistic spiritual process, a quantum leap, quite unlike any sort of socialist

projection involving dictatorship of the proletariat as an

intermediary stage. The state and all that goes with it must be destroyed, and destroyed at once - not simply replaced by a different state. According to Michael Ossar, anarchists in general regard human as

infinitely perfectible and consider that crime, poverty, the soulless mechanization of the production of goods, loneliness, isolation and the other manifest ills of modern society are not necessary features of all conceivable societies, but instead the consequence of the distortions caused by government and the state. It follows that the state should be eliminated and the "government of men" replaced by the "administration of things."58

57Friedrich Engels, "Herrn Eugen Duhrings Umwalzung der Wissenschaft," in MEW, Vol. XX (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1973), 264.

58Michael Ossar, Anarchism in the Dramas of Ernst Toller, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980),22. 117

The problem here is, in addition to being an individual concerned with protecting the integrity of his personality from the incursions of the state and all other institutions, man is a social being that requires not only companionship to fulfill himself emotionally, but also mutual aid to enable him to cope in a material sense with a highly complex w o r l d .

Furthermore, anarchism is dichotomized in its double aspects as both an economic and political ideology. The anarchists banish the state from social and political life in favor of decisions freely made by individuals. In general, one can say that in their sense of powerlessness, of being politically manipulated and disenfranchised, exploited by the wealthy and by a society constructed for the wealthy, in their opposition to private property and private controls of the means of production, "the anarchists were ready to make common cause with the socialists and were, in some cases at least, capable of employing the impressive socialist mechanisms for removing the bourgeoisie from the levers of power."59

However, the new non-coercive society will obviously represent a revolutionary change from the present, and consequently its attainment presents the anarchists with a distinct problem. Either man will have to undergo a

59 Ibid., 23. 118

spiritual revolution prompted by example and persuasion, or

there will have to be a social revolution - more than likely

a bloody one. The anarchists were faced with the dilemma

that they would forever remain ineffectual and certainly

fail to achieve their goals unless they formed strong,

centralized organizations ready to seize control by force,

if need be. But if they did these things, the goals they

achieved would not be theirs. The execution of the anarchist

ideal will result in actions opposing this ideal.

We find this dilemma in the Woman's ideal of

"community" and "Volk". The concept of "Volk", a synonym for

"New Man", can only remain an idea and exists in fantasy,

for in reality it is threatened and exploited by the state.

The nature of the exploitation from the state is characterized in the second scene through the symbol of the stock exchange. Toward the end of this scene, the woman appears in the midst of the bankers, reminding them that they are dealing with human lives: "Meine Herren:/Menschen./

Ich wiederhole:/Menschen!60 The bankers respond by organizing a dance for charity, showing the ability of the system to absorb moral idealism.

In addition, the more seductive and more intractable threat to the concept "Volk" comes from within, namely from the mass who should be components of "Volk". The Woman's

60Toller, Masse Mensch, 79. 119

theory of a radical transformation in human nature -- that

is, to change the workers' attitude toward the means of

production by changing their thought of "Maschinen pressen

uns wie Vieh" to "Fabrik sei Diener wiirdigen Lebens!"61 --

is exposed as idealistic by the demand of the mass: "Den

Arbeitern gehoren die Fabriken/Und nicht dem Monsieur

Kapital."62 The counterconcept against her ideal "Volk" is:

"Die Masse gilt."63 The Woman faces the dilemma: if she

insists on her ideal of "Volk", a concept representing a

collective of free, self-determining individuals, she

abandons the mass, which is the central concern of her revolutionary activity; if she succumbs to the will of the mass she betrays her own ideal. Martin Reso sums up his criticism of the Woman's (Toller's) concept of the "New Man" by linking him to Landauer's anarchism:

So wurde "antizipiert", ein utopi- sches Bild vom "neuen Menschen" gegeben, dabei aber "iibersehen", date dieser geforderte, erhoffte und propagierte Mensch nur ein Produkt der veranderten okonomischen und gesellschaftlichen Verhaltnisse sein kann, date er nur in der prak- tischen gesellschaftlichen Bewahrung zum sozialistischen, d.h. zum wahr- haft neuen Menschen werden kann. Speziell fur Toller zeigte sich wieder der unheilvolle EinfluJS

61 Ibid., 80, 81.

62Ibid. , 84.

63Ibid. , 92. 120

Landauers auf ihn, der ja auch be- zogen auf das Problem, Revolution- Revolutionare, gesagt hatte: "Einer der 'schlimmsten Irrtiimer der Marxisten' sei die Meinung, auf dem Weg iiber Revolutionare konne man zur Revolution kommen, wahrend man umgekehrt nur auf dem Wege der Revolution zu Revolutionaren kommt."64

Masse Mensch shows that the Woman's ideal of "New Man"

represented by the concept "Volk" suffers a self-splitting,

"Volk in Liebe" can only be realized as "verschiittet Volk."

The term "verschiittet Volk" expresses the Woman's deep

disappointment of the masses. Her ideal to enlighten the

masses ends in disillusionment because she realizes that

mass is a product of negative forces: "Gewalt schuf Masse./

Masse ist Trieb aus Not,/. . ./Masse ist verschiittet Volk."65

This view of masses finds its echo by Sonja's husband who

warns her for the masses: "Wer Masse aufwiihlt, wiihlt die

Holle auf."66 As long as the masses remain materially

unsatisfied, they will seek violence to change their fate.

Therefore, they cannot become "Volk in Liebe," but rather

"verschiittet Volk" - a group of hopeless people.

The Marxist ideology represented by the Nameless One is also subjected to its inner-contradiction. For Toller,

Marxism, in terms of its brutal application of violence, is

64Martin Reso, "Die Novemberrevolution und Ernst Toller" in Weimarer Beitrage: III (1959), 405-406.

65 Toller, Masse Mensch, 107.

66 Ibid., 105. 121

as detestable as Capitalism. Both systems are equally

distanced from true socialism, where the freedom of a

peaceful life can be shared by everyone. The Woman in Masse

Mensch articulates:

Du bist nicht Befreiung, Du bist nicht Erlosung. Doch wei£ ich, wer du bist. "Schlagst nieder!" Immer schlagst du nieder! Dein Vater der hieJS: Krieg. Du bist sein Bastard. Du armer neuer Henkermarschall, .Dein einziger Heilweg: "Tod!" und "Rottet aus!" Wirf ab den Mantel hoher Worte, Er wird papierenes Gespinst. Der Namenlose: Die Mordergenerale kampften fiir den Staat! Die Frau: Sie mordeten, doch nicht in Lust. Sie glaubten gleich wie du an ihre Sendung. Der Namenlose: Sie kampften fur den Unterdriicker Staat, Wir kampfen fur die Menschheit. Die Frau: Ihr mordet fiir die Menschheit, Wie sie Verblendete fiir ihren Staat gemordet. Und einige glaubten gar Durch ihren Staat, ihr Vaterland, Die Erde zu erlosen. Ich sehe keine Unterscheidung: Die einen morden fiir ein Land, Die andern fiir die Lander alle. Die einen morden fiir tausend Menschen, Die andern fiir Millionen. Wer fiir den Staat mordet, Nennt Ihr Henker. Wer fiir die Menschheit mordet, Den bekranzt ihr, nennt ihn giitig, Sittlich, edel, groiS. Ja, sprecht von guter, heiliger Gewalt.67

67 Ibid., 108-109. 122

In this dialogue, one perceives that Toller, in certain points, parallels capitalism with Marxism (or in the case of

the Russian Revolution, also Leninism), for instance, their

application of violence, exploitation, and enslavement.

This comparison can again be traced back to the influence of Landauer's Aufruf zum Sozialismus on Toller. Landauer turns against capitalism as a period of "Verfall" in general. In his argument against Marxism, he strongly opposes the thesis that socialism should be generated from the process of further development of capitalism and through the struggle of the producers within capitalism. He even claims that the struggle of the workers in their roles as producers ("Den Arbeitern gehoren die Fabriken!") amounts to nothing but a "Drehen im Kreis des Kapitalismus."

Der Marxismus ist einer der Faktoren und kein unwesentlicher, die den kapitalistischen Zustand erhalten, festigen und in seinen Wirkungen auf den Geist der Volker immer trostloser machen.68

The Marxist theory of achieving equality and human freedom creates enemies according to their economic status.

This theory inevitably contradicts itself. In fact, whoever follows the logic of this theory, will face the result of a vicious cycle: those coming to power through the proletarian

68Landauer, Aufruf zum Sozialismus, 137. 123

revolution will change their thinking and behavior pattern according to their new economic condition (because, as shown before, the Marxists believe that the economic basis of a society determines its ideological superstructure, likewise, a person's economic condition determines his way of thinking). Camouflaged in the name of proletariat, they become the new bourgeoisie, repeating the pattern of exploitation and multiplying their possessions, though because of the absence of private ownership, the exploitation will take place in a new form, i.e., in the form of centralization of authority. The new bourgeoisie should again be, according to Marxist theory, necessarily eliminated. Therefore, this Marxist theory leads to perennial revolution and class struggle.69

The split of the Marxist theory reveals itself in the fact that the result of this theory contradicts its principle. The violent revolutionary action for the purpose of realizing human equality causes bloodshed and kills its own purpose. Furthermore, a proletarian can become a bourgeois with the change of his economic condition, i.e., an executor of the revolution can become the enemy of the revolution and be executed (just as Danton in Robespierre's mind). This split is visualized in the fourth scene of Masse

69 This revolutionary theory was literally practised in the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966-1967)which was called "The Revolution under the dictatorship of proletariat" and incurred unprecedented disaster in Chinese history. 124

Mensch. The Woman tries to save a prinsoner's life (he has the face of her husband) . Her appeal for mercy is rejected by the Nameless One and the sentry. At this moment, the face of the prisoner changes into that of the sentry, suggesting that, in killing the prisoner, he is killing himself, i.e. revolutionary violence only destroys the humanitarian principles the revolution seeks to establish.

The Hegelian principle of self-division is reflected in the tragic character of Sonja Irene L. as well. It is remarkable that Sonja is actually the only character in

Masse Mensch. The rest of the stage figures represent a group of nameless types of people: Arbeiter. Arbeiterinnen.

Der Namenlose, Offizier, Priester, Mann. Bankiers, Der

Beamte. Wachen, Gefangene and Schatten. The play begins with Sonja's involvement in the revolution and ends with her death. The subjectivity of this character constitutes the key content in Masse Mensch.

Sonja was born in a bourgeois family and grew up in privileged circumstances. As the wife of a government official organizing a general strike against the slaughter of war and against an exploitative capitalist system, the

Woman's concern for the revolution, determined by her social background, differs from that of the workers. She acknowledges: 125

Ich weiJS. . .Ihr littet mehr als ich. . . Ich bin in hellen Stuben aufgewachsen, Litt niemals Hunger, Hort nie das Wahnsinnslachen der verfaulenden Tapeten.70

In contrast to the workers who desperately fight for their bare survival, Sonja's revolutionary activity is motivated by her compassion for the masses. Her husband questions her motivation for the revolution: "Not? Hast du ein Recht/Von Not zu sprechen?"71 The question reveals the

idealistic nature of Sonja's revolutionary enthusiasm. When threatened by her husband with divorce, Sonja shows strong emotional attachment to the man:

In grower Not. Du, mein Blut bliiht dir. . . Sieh, ich werde welkes Blatt ohne dich. Du bist der Tau, der mich entfaltet. Du bist der Sturm, deft marzne Kraft Brandfackeln wirft in diirstendes Geader. . . Nachte waren, Rufe schwellender Knaben, Die sich baumen in ihres Blutes Reife... Trag mich fort, in Wiesen, Park, Alleen, Demiitig will ich deine Augen kiissen. . . Ich glaube, ich werde schwach sein Ohne dich. . .grenzenlos. . .72

Nevertheless, Sonja's moral principle compells her to decide to repudiate her own class and to stand on the side

70 Toller, Masse Mensch, 97.

71 Ibid.

72 Ibid. , 72. 126

of the proletariat: "Ich bin nicht nervenkrank,/Bin nicht

sentimental./Weil ichs nicht bin,/gehore ich zu ihnen.73

The abandonment of the bourgeoisie does not grant her

the embrace of the proletariat. The Woman's ideal to achieve

the revolutionary goal via non-violent strike is rejected by

the Nameless One as well. He points out that as a bourgeois

intellectual, the Woman is unable to understand the feelings

of the proletariat.

Schweigen Sie, Genossin. Was wissen Sie? Sie fiihlen unsre Not, ich geb es zu. Doch waren Sie zehn Stunden lang im Bergwerk, In blinden Kammern Kinder Heimatlose, Zehn Stunden Bergwerk, abends jene Kammern, So Tag fiir Tag das Los der Massen? 74

The Nameless one further exposes her weakness: "Ein

jeder tragt die Krankheit seiner Herkunft,/Du die

biirgerlichen Male:/Selbstbetrug und Schwache."75 Indeed,

the Woman cannot totally identify herself with the

proletariat because of the unbreakable tie to her bourgeois

background. When visited by her husband in prison, she says

to her husband: "Ich liebe dich...ich liebe dich aus meinem

Blut." "Komm gib mir deine Hand,/Geliebter meines Blutes."76

73 Ibid. , 71.

74Ibid., 85.

75 Ibid. , 109.

76 Ibid., 105, 106. 127

The Man refuses her embrace, leaving her alone in prison.

This is the tragedy of the Woman: she has devoted herself to the cause of changing the proletariat's fate. However, her bourgeois origin makes it impossible for her to truly understand the proletariat. Deserted both by the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, the Woman experienced unspeakable loneliness. She soliloquizes:

Letzter Weg fiihrt liber Schneefeld. Letzter Weg kennt nicht Begleiter. Letzter Weg ist ohne Mutter. Letzter Weg ist Einsamkeit .77

This monologue about dying reveals a bourgeois intellectual entangled in her humanitarian sympathy with the prole­ tariat, and her political impotence to realize her ideal.

Sonja's dividedness is caused by the tragic flaw: her revolutionary ideal to fight for the masses conflicts with her incapability to understand and identify herself with the masses. This is partly rooted in her class background, partly in her anarchist idealism.

Another aspect of subjectivity of the tragic character is revealed in the complexity of her guilt which arises from her attempt to realize her premature belief in a changed humanity. This belief leads her to succumb to the irresistible impulse of revolution, and to acquiesce to violent action out of a concession to the historical moment.

77 Ibid. , 106. 128

Her reluctant acquiescence to the war allowes the bloodshed

that causes countless deaths of the fighting workers. When

imprisioned, the Woman is charged by the headless shadows

with murder:

Erster Schatten: Kennst mich, Erschossenen? Morderin!

(Von irgendwo grauer Schatten ohne Kopf.) Zweiter Schatten: Auch Morderin An mir. Dritter Schatten: Morderin An mir. Vierter Schatten: Und mir. Funfter Schatten: Und mir. Sechster Schatten: Und mir.

Erster Schatten: Du schwiegst. Zweiter Schatten: Schwiegst beim Sturm Aufs Stadthaus. Dritter Schatten: Schwiegst beim Raub Der Waffen. Vierter Schatten: Schwiegst zum Kampf. Funfter Schatten: Schwiegst beim Holen Der Reserven. Sechster Schatten: Du bist schuldig. Alle Schatten: Du bist schuldig.78

Walter Sokel comments on her guilt:

[...] was sie schuldig werden und die Gewalttaten des Namenlosen billigen lalSt, ist innigst ver- schwistert dem, was sie in die gute Sache hineintrieb: ihr Mitleiden mit der unterdriickten und gequalten Masse. [...] Weil sie gegen den Massenmord des imperialistischen Krieges protestiert und kampft, wird sie schuldig am Massenmord des Biirgerkrieges. In echt tragischer Verkniipfung fiihrt das Gute zum

78 Ibid. , 100. 129

B5sen und Edelmut und GrolSe wer den Schwache und Schuld.79

This guilt is inevitable because it is "inherent in the human condition, and in any attempt to change it..."80 The

Woman cries out: "Masse ist MuiS!"81 It is only now that she realizes the true nature of her own guilt: "0 ungeheuerlich/Gesetz der Schuld,/Darin sich/Mensch und

Mensch/Verstricken muiS."82 The guilty feeling leaves the

Woman no other choice than to accuse God: "Gott ist schuldig."83 This thought again finds its counterpart in anarchism. According to Ossar, the notion of the malevolent

God marks the parallel between the thoughts of Pierre-Joseph

Proudhon and Toller. Proudhon's slogan "God is evil" is well known. He writes:

I affirm that God, if there is God, bears no resemblance to the effigies which philosophers and the priests have made of him; that he neither thinks nor acts according to the law of analysis, foresight and progress, which is the instinctive characteristic of man; that intelligence, liberty, personality are constituted otherwise in God than in us; and that this

79 Walter Sokel, "Ernst Toller" in Zu Ernst Toller: Drama und Egagement, ed. Jost Hermand (Stuttgart: Klett, 1981), 29-30.

80 Dove, 109.

81 Toller, Masse Mensch, 102.

82 Ibid., 103.

83 Ibid., 102. 130

originality of nature...makes of God a being who is essentially antici­ vilized, antiliberal, antihuman.84

The concept of a malevolent God is central to Toller as well. In Masse Mensch the Woman replies on being called a blasphemer:

Schandete ich Gott? Oder schandete Gott den Menschen?

Gott Vor ein Gericht! Ich klage an.85

And later on, she states in a passage that illustrates both Toller's conception of the malevolent God and his anarchistic tendencies:

Wer Menschenblut urn seinetwillen fordert, Ist Moloch: Gott war Moloch. Staat war Moloch. Masse war Moloch.86

Accusing God does not solve the Woman's guilt problem.

She has to face the self-splitting of her ethical ideal: 1)

Her absolute principle of non-violence is unable to stop the on-going violence of the war which creates the workers'

84 Quoted in Ossar, 30

85 Toller, Masse Mensch, 103.

86 Ibid., 110. 131

misery in forms of poverty, sickness and starvation; 2) Her

acquiescence in violent action of revolution motivated by

her will to change the workers' living condition incurs

terrible bloody consequences. The only way left for the

Woman to realize her ideal is to sacrifice herself. By doing

so, she saves her abstract ideal. The action, however, does not change the reality, it remains politically

insignificant.

Masse Mensch also shows Toller's gradual recognition that the fundamental contradiction of man as an individual and a member of mass is insoluble. As an individual, one has free will and the right to realize this will, however, when in the situation of a revolution where the masses are the major forces determining the course of the event, the individual will is confronted with that of the masses.

For Toller, the term "mass" represents various connotations. It is both an ahistorical and a historical concept. First of all, mass is one of two aspects of man in general. Each person is bound to encounter the contradiction between individual and mass due to the fact that men are individual social beings. Toller states:

Is not the struggle between the individual and the mass decided in a man's own mind as well as fought out in the community? As an individual a man will strive for his own ideals, even at the expense 132

of the rest of the world. As a mass-man, social impulses sweep him towards his goal, even though his ideals have been abandoned.87

In the above statement, Toller uses the concept "mass" as an equivalent to the anthropological concept "collective" by refering to "mass" as one of the two contradictory aspects of man. The problem of man versus mass has existed since the beginning of human society. Very often the conflict between individual and mass pertains to the question of violence, a force manifested throughout human history. Toller maintains:

The struggle in 'Masses and Man' between the Woman and the Nameless One refers, ...to a conflict thousands of years old; that is, have we the right to change with violence a situation in which injustice and violence rule, in order to bring in the reign of justice and non-violence?88

The contradiction of mass versus man is also expressed through the opposition of immediate material needs and conceptual ideas of society. Toller writes: "The masses, it seemed, were impelled by hunger and want, rather than by ideals. Would they still be able to conquer, if they renounced force for the sake of an ideal?"89

87 Toller, Man and the Masses: The Problem of Peace, 78.

88 Ibid. , 81.

89 Ibid. 133

Secondly, the concept "mass" reflects a historical

phenomenon engendered in the industrial revolution: the

"industrial mass." Before the industrial revolution people

worked in various ways individually or collectively.90 They

possessed the means of production, and had authority over

their work. The industrialization entails massive production

which confines the workers to assembly lines. As a result,

they lose their control over either the input into or the

outcome (products) of their labor. Cooperating with the

machines, their creativity of production is eliminated and

their function is merely tantamount to the machine parts.

Thus, the phenomenon of "industrial mass" ermerges.

In the play, the concept "mass" has both these meanings: it represents the aspect of man (mass-man) as

opposed to individual (in this context, "mass" is almost

equivalent to collective), and it also embodies a historical phenomenon of the industrial world, a synonym for proletariat as opposed to bourgeois.

The contradiction between the ethical and political validities of the revolution discussed above is derived from that between individual-man and mass-man. They are external

and internal forms of the same conflict. Toller explains:

Alles Geschehen lost sich

90 Collective here refers to a small unit of independent working individuals. 134

auf in auiSeres und inneres Geschehen, die beide gleich wichtig, also bewegende Krafte gleich stark waren. [••'■] Nur wenige erkannten, daiS der Kampf zwischen Individuum und Masse sich nicht nur draujSen abspielt, daJS jeder in seinem innern Indi­ viduum und Masse zugleich ist.91

In Masse Mensch Toller presents a unique tragic

conflict: the external form of the conflict, the ethics and

politics of revolution, is bound to be insoluble because of

an internal conflict -- individual-man and mass-man -- which

is inherent in human existence. Toller writes: "Der einzelne

Mensch kann den Tod wollen. Die Masse muJS das Leben wollen.

Und da wir Menschen und Masse in einem sind, wahlen wir Tod

und Leben."92

The split in man, the above mentioned two dimensions of man, is virtually the split of the idea in the Hegelian sense. Only when the idea enters into the domain of man's activity, man's will is divided into the will of the

individual and that of the mass. This split is, according to

Hegel, necessary and inevitable. The will of an individual and that of the mass are embodied in the Woman's belief in the sanctity of each human life and the Nameless One's emphasis on mass interest. The contradiction between these two aspects also expresses itself through two

91 Toller, Quer durch, 280-282.

92Toller, Briefe aus dem Gefangnis, 36. 135

contradictory views on social reform. The Woman's

conviction that the betterment of the world entails the

change of man's nature is challenged by the questions: how can man's behavior and thinking be changed without changing the society primarily? Secondly, is it morally justified to refrain from violent measures against violence when human lives are in jeopardy? On the other hand, the Nameless One's demand that societal change via violence precedes the change of man's inner being faces the dilemma: how can the unenlightened masses without self-consciousness change the society in a desirable way? How can violence change man's heart? In Masse Mensch, this contradiction remains unsolved.

Toller has pondered the questions of violence in the revolution:

Have we the right to sacrifice the living for the future? Have we the right to believe that the end justifies the means, that the despotic accumulation of deeds of violence is good, if thereby we can attain an end considered good? Or is not the moral command to live without violence an absolute one? May the individual sacrifice only himself, but never another, whatever the aim? When the welfare of the soul, the absoluteness of the moral law, the sanctification of life are at stake, must not then earthly, material aims stand back?93

93 Toller, Man and the Masses: The Problem of Peace in GW: Band 1, 81. 136

Toller eventually sanctioned the use of force in the

Munich Revolution. He explained later the necessity of force

on special occasions:

Vor einem Jahr...weigerte ich mich...Waffen zu tragen. Ich haiSte die Gewalt und hatte mir geschworen, Gewalt eher zu leiden als zu tun. Durfte ich jetzt, da die Revolution angegriffen war, diesen Schwur brechen? Ich mu£te es tun. Die Arbeiter hatten mir Vertrauen geschenkt, hatten mir Fiihrung und Verantwortung ubertragen. Tauschte ich nicht ihr Vertrauen, wenn ich weigerte, sie zu verteidigen, oder gar sie aufrief, der Gewalt zu entsagen? Ich hatte die Moglichkeit blutiger Folgen vorher bedenken miissen und kein Amt annehmen diirfen.94

The collision between the ethical and political aspects

of the revolution again can be interpreted with Hegel's

second definition of tragedy. Both sides have their moments

of truth. However, when opposed to each other, the two

ideals violate one another's principles, therefore, they necessarily fall into guilt. Because of the self-splitting nature inherent in the theories supporting each of the

ideals, the collision does not end in synthesis, although

Toller attempted to provide a solution for the paradoxes of the revolution. That is, the Masse has to become Mensch

first so that a social revolutionary reform bringing about

94 Toller, Eine Jugend in Deutschland,165. 137

general equality could be conducted. This is reflected in

the ideal conceived by the Woman: "Gemeinschaft." The idea

of "Gemeinschaft" is formulated in Toller's political writing as well: "Aus seinem Herzen soil er (der Mensch, the

author) Gemeinschaftsbande spinnen,... Nur aus innerlicher

Mensch-Wandlung kann die Gemeinschaft, die wir erstreben, erwachen. "9S

However, because of man's nature this can only remain a unrealized ideal. Masse Mensch not only expresses the need of mankind's renewal, it also displays Toller's changing

image of "New Man" . A letter to his friend Tessa on 18th of May 1921 sums up more explicitly what can already be sensed in the play: "Ich glaube nicht mehr an Wandlung zu

'neuem' Menschentum. Jede Wandlung ist Faltung Oder

Entfaltung. Tiefer als je spiire ich den Sinn des tragischen und gnadigen Worts: Der Mensch wird, was er ist."96 This insight is visualized at the very end of the play where two female prisoners (possibly revolutionaries as well) try to commit larceny because of their very selfish material needs.

The question repeatedly asked by the prisoners themselves:

"Schwester, warum tun wir das?" indicates the rediscovery of their conscience triggered by Sonja's self-sacrifice, but

95 Toller, Revolution und Raterepublik: Leitsatze fiir einen Kulturpolitischen Bund der Jugend in Deutschland in GW: Band 1, 32.

96Toller, Briefe aus dem Gefangnis, 66. 138

they do not find the answer for the "why". Their question

rather points out the striking human sinfulness articulated by Buchner and his character Danton: "Was ist das, was in

uns hurt, liigt, stiehlt und mordet?" For Buchner and

Toller, this problem remains one of the reasons for the unsolvable conflict of the revolution. CHAPTER IV

BRECHT'S DIE MARNAHME

The unique structure of Die MalSnahme - a tragedy presented as a Lehrstiick - can be well interpreted with the

Hegelian tragic model of self-division. The play atually teaches how to make the revolution successful. However, the subject of the teaching turns out to be a tragic event, which the revolution is supposed to prevent. This very fact reveals the split of the revolutionary ideology. The tragic aspect of Die Mafinahme lies in the unintended deconstruction of the abstract model of the communist revolution and the deconstruction of the genre of Lehrstiick. Similar to Dantons

Tod and Masse Mensch, Die Mafinahme shows a tragic collision within the revolutionary idea which undermines the justification of the revolutionary theory and practice.

Die Maftnahme reflects the worldwide proletarian revolutionary movements which characterize the beginning of this century. For many nations, the Russian October revolution of 1917 was a revolutionary example. It sent for the first time the messages of Marxism and Leninism into

China and reinforced the Chinese proletarian revolution by providing a theoretical basis. Aided by the Soviet Union, the Chinese communists struggled for control of Kuomintang,

139 140

the Chinese national party; but they were defeated by

General Jiang Kai-Shek in 1927. After many long and arduous battles the communists, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, came to power in 1949. Using the Chinese revolution of

1920s as its background, Brecht's play attempts to offer a model of communist revolutions.

Die MaEnahme is perhaps the most controversial of

Brecht's didactic plays. Martin Esslin calls the play

"without doubt one of Brecht's best works."1 Brecht himself considered Die MaEnahme his most significant play.

According to Manfred Wekwerth, when asked to name a play for the theater of the future, Brecht unhesitatingly answered,

"Die MaJSnahme."2 Brecht was referring here to the uniquely concise form of the play. Like the other Brechtian short

Lehrstiicke. the abstract quality of Die MaEnahme is achieved through simplicity, and its rational use of conventions to project an idea with precision and clarity. The play characterizes Brecht's gradual movement towards his epic means to present reality in theater.3 Most striking for the audience is its content. To a certain extent, Die MaiSnahme continues the discussions conducted in Dantons Tod and Masse

1 Martin Esslin, The Man and His Work (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1961), 294.

2 Manfred Wekwerth, Schriften. Arbeit mit Brecht (Berlin: Henschel Verlag, 1973), 78.

3 Die MaEnahme is one of Brecht's early plays which shows the tendency of epic theater. 141

Mensch concerning the relationships between violence and

revolution, freedom and necessity, revolutionary means and

e n d s .

Die MaJSnahme deals with its subject matter in such a radical way that it triggered controversial discussions

immediately after its publication and premiere. Central to the intellectual debates on the play is this particular question: Is Die MaEnahme a tragedy, or a Lehrstiick? The arguments about this question can be best observed in the articles by Reinhold Grimm and Reiner Steinweg published in the book Das Deutsche Drama vom Express ionismus bis zur

Gegenwart.4 Walter Sokel, Gorden Eugene Nelson, as well as

Martin Esslin and Joachim Kaiser agree with Grimm and view the play as a tragedy, though the latter two interpret the play as a tragedy with a more ironic perspective. Steinweg, on the other hand, raises the counter-argument considering the play rather a Lehrstiick. His opinion is shared by Rolf

Tarot, Henning Rischbieter, and William Rey.

4 Reinhold Grimm, "Bertolt Brecht: Die MaJSnahme - Zwischen Tragik und Ideologie," in Das deutsche Drama vom Expressionismus bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Manfred Brauneck (Bamberg: Buchners, 1972), 134-144. Grimm wrote an earlier article expressing the same idea: "Ideologische Tragodie und Tragodie der Ideologie," in Zfdph. 78 (1959) 394-424. Reiner Steinweg, "Brechts sDie MaJSnahme1 - frbungstext, nicht Tragodie," in Das deutsche Drama vom Expressionismus bis zur Gegenwart, ed. Manfred Brauneck (Bamberg: Buchners Verlag, 1972), 145-158. 142

As indicated in the title of his article written in

1959, Grimm understands Die Maiinahme as a tragedy of

ideology. Presenting Brecht as a communist ideologist, Grimm begins:

Der Dichter Brecht wurde rehabi- litiert: das war gerecht und not- wendig. Der Ideologe Brecht jedoch wurde und wird fortwahrend ent- scharft, bagatellisiert, verfalscht. Wenn seine Stucke sich einer solchen Prozedur nicht fiigen wollen, ver- schweigt man sie. Die Polge davon ist, daJS wir auf unseren Biihnen - jedenfalls in der Regel - nur den halben Brecht sehen: den anti-ideo- logisierten, ins Allgemein-Mensch- liche stilisierten. Das muJS jede echte Auseinandersetzung im Keime ersticken. Aber Bertolt Brecht dichtete nun einmal seit 1930 als kommunistischer Ideologe, und nur als solcher kann er wirklich ver- standen und - vielleicht - widerlegt w e r d e n .5

For Grimm Die MaJinahme is obviously a Marxist work which intends to spread communism. He continues:

Mit ihm [dem Stuck, H.C] bekannte sich Brecht zum ersten Male offentlich und uneingeschrankt zur kommunistischen Ideologie; zum ersten und einzigen Male auch unternahm er es mit diesem Stuck, den aktuellen Klassenkampf ohne Beschonigung auf die Biihne zu bringen. Die Ausbreitung des Kommunismus ist das ausschlieJS-

5 Grimm, "Zwischen Tragik und Ideologie," in Das Krgernis Brecht, ed. Willi Jaggi und Hans Oesch (Stuttgart/Basel: Basilius Verlag, 1961), 104. 143

liche Thema der Maftnahme; Lieder und Chore verherrlichen die UdSSR, die Lehren der marxistischen Klas- siker, die Weltrevolution. Die Partei selber erscheint auf der Biihne, und zwar als Kontrollchor, vor dem vier Agitatoren iiber ihre propagandistische Tatigkeit in China Rechenschaft ablegen.6

According to Grimm, Brecht was mainly attracted by the humanity of Marxist teachings. Grimm maintains that the play is a tragic work of its own kind. He believes that

Brecht purposely let the play end in "einem ausweglosen

Zwiespalt" which turns the ideological Lehrstiick into a tragedy of ideology. For Grimm the central conflict in Die

MaEnahme lies between the demand of the communist Party and the demand of Marxist humanism. According to him, the Young

Comrade falls into a conflict of two absolute values.

Doch nichts anderes, als daft ein Mensch durch Charakter- anlage und Zwang der Umstande, mithin durch ein unauflosliches Ineinander von Freiheit und Not- wendigkeit in einen Widerspruch zweier absoluter Werte gerat, der ausweglos ist. Beide Werte treten als unabweisbare ethische Forderungen an ihn heran: nie kann er die eine erfiillen, ohne gegen die andere zu verstoften; er muft daher schuldig werden, wie er sich auch entscheiden mag. So wird der Tod zur einzigen Losung aus dem unheilbaren Zwiespalt.7

6 Ibid., 104,105.

7 Grimm, " Ideologische Tragodie und Tragodie der Ideologie,"- in Zfdph, 402. 144

Henning Rischbieter resists Grimm's view, arguing that the conditions of a tragedy no longer exist for Brecht, because:

... eine Tragodie setzt eine tra- gische Weltsicht voraus: ein Fatum, blindes, verhangtes Schicksal iiber der Welt, unentrinnbare Fugungen. Brecht kann kein Tragiker sein, will es nicht sein, weil er solches Fatum nicht akzeptiert: Die Welt, von der die Menschen abhangen, ist von Men- schen gemacht, also erkennbar als veranderbar. Die Utopie, die Herstel- lung einer menschlichen Welt durch menschliche Taten, ist das Ziel Brechts.8

Rolf Tarot also objects to Grimm's opinion and sees in

Brecht a representative of an "untragischen Dramatik", because his dramatic art is based on, according to Tarot, the unconditional claim of the ideology, i.e. Marxism. Due to the absolute validity of that ideology, there is in this type of drama "kein Wertkonflikt, sondern nur die

Entscheidung zwischen Richtig und Falsch."9 For Tarot, therefore, Die Ma&nahme does not deal with a conflict in the

Schillerian sense (Pflichtenkollision); instead, it deals only with the guilt of the Young Comrade.

8 Henning Rischbieter, Bertolt Brecht: Vol. 1. (Velber bei Hannover: Friedrich Verlag, 1966), 99.

9 Rolf Tarot. "Ideologie und Drama. Zur Typologie der untragischen Dramatik in Deutschland," in Typologia litterarum Festschrift fur Max Wehrli, ed. Stefan Sonderdegger, Alois M Haas and Harald Burger (Zurich: Atlantis Verlag, 1969), 351-366. 145

Reiner Steinweg maintains that the play is not a tragedy, but an "Obungstext". He writes:

Noch immer versucht die burger- liche Kritik, das Stuck fur den Kanon der groJSen Tragodie zu annektieren, indem sie den Text von seinem Zweck und politischen Zusammenhang abhebt und da einen zeitlosen, unaufloslichen Konflikt konstruiert, wo es um die Entwick- lung jener Fahigkeiten geht, die zur ttberwindung der todlichen Wider- spriiche benotigt werd e n .10

According to Steinweg, the play shows the inability of the Young Comrade to think rationally and act dialectically because of the revolutionary goal he ideologizes. Thus the play's message is that the contribution of the individual to the social collective should not result in blind obedience, but in a critical attitude based on disciplinary thinking.11

In Steinweg's view, the play offers didactic examples which allow for criticism of the Young Comrade's mistaken revolutionary consciousness. For Steinweg, the inevitable cause of the Young Comrade's death is not his humanity or spontaneity, but rather his lack of rationality. Steinweg cites Brecht to support his argument: "da£ der junge Genosse gefuhlsmaJSig ein Revolutionar war, aber nicht geniigend

10 Steinweg, "ttbungstext, nicht Tragodie,1' 145.

11 See Reiner Steinweg, Das Lehrstiick. Brechts Theorie einer politisch-asthetischen Erziehung, (Stuttgart: Metzler Verlag, 1972). 146

Disziplin hielt und zu wenig seinen Verstand sprechen

lieft."12 The play, according to Brecht, serves the purpose

"politisches Verhalten zu zeigen und dadurch richtiges

Verhalten zu lehren."13 In Steinweg's view, the central theme of the play is the "Gefahr der Ideologisierung und nicht die Totung eines Genossen als abstraktes ethisches

Problem" 14

The interpretation of Die MaEnahme as a political

Lehrstiick is disputed by other critics. G. E. Nelson, for instance, argues: "The play is a failure as a learning play and a success as a tragedy."15 Along the line of Grimm's interpretation of the play, Nelson challenges Brecht's own rejection of tragedy as an art form in the scientific age and comes to the conclusion that Brecht's theory of tragedy was inadequate, that the tragic effect of Die MaEnahme is inherent in the play' s plot and characters, and that the methods Brecht used to destroy the tragic effect of the play, such as epic elements and estrangement effect, actually increase it.16

12 Bertolt Brecht, Die MaEnahme. Kritische Ausgabe mit einer Spielanleitung, ed. Reiner Steinweg (Franfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1972), 237.

13 Ibid. , 237.

14 Ibid., 479.

15 Gorden Eugene Nelson, "The Birth of Tragedy out of Pedagogy and Brecht's 'Learning Play' 'Die Ma£nahme'," in The German Quarterly 46 (1973): 570.

16 Ibid. 147

To make his argument clear, Nelson elaborates on

Brecht's theory of theater. In Kleines Organon fiir das

Theater, Brecht writes: "Nach wie vor waren namlich die

Theater Vergniigungsstatten einer Klasse, die den wissenschaftlichen Geist auf dem Gebiet der Natur festhielt, nicht wagend, ihm das Gebiet der menschlichen Beziehungen auszuliefern.1117 Therefore, the bourgeosie is not prepared to accept a rational portrayal of the world in its theater.

For this class in decline, the theater is a refuge from the insoluble conflicts of its existence.

Brecht believes that in order to fulfill the desires of its spectators, theater developed non-intellectual techniques to induce feeling. Chief among these is empathy.

Empathy is the method by which the bourgeois actor portrays a character and the process by which the audience shares the feelings of the character. Using the technique of producing the illusion of reality,18 the theater has been able to convince the bourgeoisie and even the few proletarian spectators of the necessity of Oedipus', Othello's, or

Wallenstein's fate. From Brecht's point of view,

Solcherart ist das Theater, das wir fiir unser Unternehmen vorfinden,

17 Bertolt Brecht, Kleines Organon fiir das Theater: Nr 31 in Bertolt Brecht: gesammelte Werke: Band 16 (Frankfur a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967), 676.

18 See Ibid. , 697-698. 148

und es zeigte sich bisher wohl im- stande, unsere hoffnungsvollen Freunde, von uns die Kinder des wissenschaft- lichen Jahrhunderts genannt, in eine eingeschiitterte, glaubige, 'gebannte' Menge zu verwandeln.19

Such theater inhibits the audience from critically regarding the world of the play and, more seriously, the world in which they live.

Brecht thus saw in tragedy a way of looking at the world which has no place in the scientific age. That it exists at all is due only to the methods developed by the bourgeois theater to induce the illusion of necessity. It is the task of the theater of the scientific age to develop new methods which will prevent this illusion from arising. To replace the "Aristotelian" tragedy based on empathy, illusion and dramatic tension, Brecht proposes the non-

Aristotelian drama and the epic theater, in which the epic structure of the plays prevents dramatic tension,

Verfremdung prevents empathy, and illusion is destroyed by sets which never let the audience forget it is in the theater. With these new techniques, Brecht believes, it will even be possible to use the classic tragedies in the theater of the scientific era. By eliminating tension, empathy, and illusion, classic tragedies will lose their tragic effect.

Nelson points out that Die MaBnahme is perhaps the most radical example of anti-illusionistic theater in Brecht's

19 Ibid., 675. 149

works. It was intended to teach the amateur actors and

singers who performed the play and the audience who saw it

the basic tenet of Leninist political morality: "Wir

erklaren, da£ unsere Sittlichkeit vollkommen den Interessen

des proletarischen Klassenkampfes untergeordnet ist. Unsere

Sittlichkeit leiten wir aus den Interessen des

proletarischen Klassenkampfes ab."20 This tenet posed

difficult problems for people who had become communists

because they could no longer tolerate the immorality of bourgeois society. These people, who had rebelled against

the bourgeosie because it lied, stole, and killed, were now

expected to lie, steal, and kill in order to bring about a world in which such crimes would be unnecessary. At the same time, these rebels against bourgeois authority were expected

to subject themselves utterly to the authority of the

communist party, because it alone was in a position to determine the interests of the proletarian class struggle.

As already shown, Brecht accepted the connection between tragedy and necessity for the traditional stage. As

Nelson points out, the only difference between Brecht and the "bourgeois" theorists was Brecht's conviction that necessity no longer had any meaning in the scientific age.

Paradoxically the tragic necessity of Die MaEnahme is a product of Brecht's pedagogical intent: if the participants

20 Quoted in Nelson, 568. 150

and the audience are to learn from the Young Comrade, his difficulties have to be like theirs and have their roots in his moral character; if Lenin's dictum on morality is to be fully understood, it has to be given a rigorous demonstration. Such a demonstration requires an equally rigorous demonstration of the necessity of the Young

Comrade's death. If the dictum is correct, it is correct when it calls for murder; but on the other hand, only the most pressing necessity can justify murder even in Leninist terms. Die Mafinahme is, according to Nelson, a tragedy of

Leninist morality. The tragic effect of the play has its roots in the contradictions inherent in the communist morality. The communist doctrine (in a proletarian revolution the end justifies the means) contradicts the traditional bourgeois ethic as embodied in Kant's categorical imperative. However, it does so for the highest possible moral purpose: the creation of a society in which the moral imperatives of bourgeois society can be realized.

Nelson thus shows the inadequacy of Brecht's theory on tragedy, and points out that if the Young Comrade remains morally pure, the world remains unchanged; if he changes the world, he violates himself.

By the same token, Walter Sokel believes that the play demonstrates "die eigentliche Tragik in Brechts Werk."21

21 Walter Sokel, "Brechts gespaltene Charaktere und ihr Verhaltnis zur Tragik," in Tragik und Tragodie, ed. Volkmar 151

The play's tragedy lies in the fact that the revolutionaries

must suppress and eliminate the good in order to prepare the

realization of the good.22 In this moralistic paradox of

suppression of the good, Sokel sees the tragedy of

communism. He believes that Brecht deals in Die MaJSnahme,

in analogy to Greek tragedy, with the confirmation of

necessity. Turning the teaching of Brecht's Lehrstiick upside

down, Sokel's interpretation of Die MaJSnahme challenges

those critics who consider the actions of the Young Comrade

"unrichtiges Verhalten". According to Sokel, the closing

judgement of the Control Chorus does not represent the

authority of the party, but rather functions as, in Esslin's

words, "die tragisch-ironische Verurteilung des sturen

totalitaren Anspruchs auf das Recht liber Leben und Tod im

Namen eines als unfehlbar dargestellten Dogmas."23 From

this perspective, Die MaJSnahme is an apotheosis of

individual freedom which, though not intended by the author,

reflects the author's striving for freedom.24

In the view of this study, there is an insufficiency in

those interpretations of the MaJSnahme which simply follow

Sander (=Wege der Forschung, CVIII), (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1971), 395.

22Ibid., 394.

23 Martin Esslin, Brecht. Das Paradox des politischen Dichters, (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1962), 318.

24 Sokel, 395. 152

Brecht's labeling of "Lehrstiick", and thus deny its tragic

essence and its tragic effect. For these critics, Die

MaEnahme is a didactic text that teaches the right behavior

according to Marxist and Leninist revolutionary philosophy,

and, since it deals with the absolute claim of the Marxist

ideology, it cannot be a true tragedy. However, Brecht was not a member of the Communist Party. In a US congressional hearing regarding the communist infiltration of the motion picture industry in 1949, Brecht testified that he had nothing to do with the Communist Party. Although he studied

Marxist and Leninist philosophy, his writing, according to

Brecht, does not serve as propaganda for these theories.25

Furthermore, Marxist critics also deny the existence of a true Marxist position in Die MaEnahme.26

As mentioned earlier, Rischbieter finds it impossible for Brecht to write tragedies, since he accepts neither a tragic world view, nor fate or blind destiny which, in

Rischbieter1s view, are prerequisites for tragedy. However, even Aristotle did not consider a tragic world view a condition of tragedy. According to Aristotle, tragedy is simply a story of human life and its failures. He writes:

25 See Siegfried Mews, Critical Essays on Bertolt Brecht, (Boston: G.K. Hall & Co., 1989), 89, and 93.

26 See Ernst Schumacher, Die dramatischen Versuche Bertolt Brechts 1918-1933, (Berlin: Riitten und Loening Verlag, 1955), 367. And Werner Mittenzwei, Bertolt Brecht: Von der "MaEnahme" zu "Leben des Galilei", (Berlin: Aufbau Verlag, 1962), 64. 153

"Tragedy is, then, an imitation of a noble and complete

action, having the proper magnitute; ... for tragedy is not

an imitation of men, per se, but of human action and life

and happiness and misery."27 For Hegel, tragic conditions are the necessary results of the dialectical movement of

ethical substance in history. Taking those considerations

into account, Rischbieter's interpretation of tragedy is

inadequate.

It is true that Brecht himself rejected tragedy as an art form in the scientific age, because he believed that the basis of tragedy was necessity and that tragic necessity had no place in an age which could change men and the world at will.28 In spite of Brecht's rejection of tragedy, "One of the most striking of the paradoxes that surround Brecht and his work is the fact that while decrying tragedy as an art form unsuited to a scientific age, he wrote some of the most successful modern tragedies."29 Among them are Mutter

Courage und ihre Kinder, Die heilige Johanna der

Schlachthofe, Die MaJSnahme, Der gute Mensch von Sezuan,

Leben des Galilei and Die Tage der Kommune. According to

Nelson, Die MaJSnahme is the first of these plays to be

27 Aristotle's Poetics Trans, by Leon Golden, Commentary by O.B. Hardision, Jr. (Tallahassee:Univ. Presses of Florida, 1981), 11,12.

28 See Brecht, Kleines Organon fiir das Theater, No. 22, XVI, 671.

29Nelson, 566. 154

finished, and it serves as a prototype for the rest of these

tragedies .30

This study agrees with Grimm, Sokel and Nelson that Die

MaJSnahme is a tragedy. I will argue that the play is a

tragedy in the Hegelian sense. It does not deal with the problem of fate, but rather with the tragic result of

dialectical movements of contradictions revealed in the

relation of the communist revolutionary theory to its praxis. The tragic aspect of this play lies in the self- dividedness of the communist revolutionary doctrine and the

inversion of the communist humanity and morality.

Die MaJSnahme uses the form of a parable and lacks a real historical revolutionary context. It has nothing to do with the Chinese revolution in the 1920s and the name of the

Chinese town "Mukden" where the events of the play take place is obviously an invention of the author. Whereas one can still identify some of the historical figures in

Buchner' s and Toller' s plays, Brecht' s MaJSnahme presents mere masks of certain political principles. Brecht's abstract presentation of his subject matter in Die MaJSnahme turns the play into a model of a communist revolution whose theoretical principles contradict themselves and thus fail to lead the revolution to a successful completion.

30For details of how Brecht's own attempt to avoid tragedies actually contribute to them see Nelson's article. 155

In order to analyze the deconstruction of the communist doctrine it is necessary to first look at its goal and demand. The communist model of the revolution is outlined by

its abstract ideal to elevate the political consciousness of the Chinese workers and to reinforce the proletarian revolution in the country. The prerequisite of achieving this goal is obedience to the Party disciplines which requires 1) refusal of concrete material aids (so that the workers may develop an independent ability of demanding materials from the oppressors), 2) control of personal emotions, 3) rational thinking as the basis for every action, 4) elimination of individual identities of the agitators and 5) willingness to give up momentary interests for the sake of long-term interests. Adherence to these prerequisites is to guarantee the victory of the revolution.

However, the play demonstrates, with the example of the

Young Comrade, that the theoretical revolutionary disciplines contradict themselves in praxis.

In a sense the Young Comrade, an enthusiastic revolutionary who volunteers for the revolutionary cause, is the vessel for the tension which provides the tragedy.

His concrete actions contradict the party disciplines. The

Young Comrade's subjective revolutionary will is characterized by 1) enthusiasm for the revolution, 156

2) compassion for the exploited, 3) an incorruptible sense

of justice, 4) integrity as an upright individual, and

5) spontaneity of his revolutionary action. These qualities

are demonstrated in a succession of different episodes.

First, we encounter his enthusiasm for the revolution

in the scene Die Lehren der Klassiker. His confession about

his enthusiasm reveals him as a humanist, eagerly desiring

to bring salvation to the suppressed people:

Mein Herz schlagt fiir die Revo­ lution. Der Anblick des Unrechts trieb mich in die Reihen der Kampfer. Der Mensch mufi dem Menschen helfen. Ich bin fiir die Freiheit. Ich glaube an die Menschheit. Und ich bin fiir die MaJSnahmen der Kommunistischen Partei, welche gegen Ausbeutung und Unkenntnis fiir die klassenlose Gesell- schaft kampft.31

The exhilarating voice from his heart is reminiscent of that of Sonja Irene in Masse Mensch who, out of this very enthusiasm for humanity, repudiates her own class and sacrifices herself for the ideal she holds to. Although the

Young Comrade's class background remains unknown, his motivation is surprisingly similar to that of Sonja. The above confession of his revolutionary zeal reveals the

Young Comrade's loyalty to the communist party generated by the ultimate party ideal: to fight against exploitation,

31 Brecht, Die Mafinahme, in Stiicke fiir das Theater am Schiffhauerdamm (1927-1933) (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), 259. 157

against ignorance for a classless society, and to help the

needy. It is precisely this communist utopia - the classless

society without exploitation - that draws him to the

revolution. Transcending the revolutionary discipline, this

ideal is and remains the primary motivation for his

revolutionary activities.

By this token, the Young Comrade eagerly expresses the

pressing need for revolution in the area where he works as a

revolutionary agitator and requires humanitarian aid from

the Moscow Agitators:

Wir kommen nicht weiter. Es gibt Unordnung und Mangel, wenig Brot und viel Kampf. Viele sind voll Mut, aber wenige konnen lesen. Wenig Maschinen, und niemand versteht sie. Unsere Lokomotiven sind in Bruch gefahren. Habt ihr Lokomotiven mitgebracht?32

His first meeting with the Agitators is characterized by the first disagreement between his revolutionary ideal

and that of the Party. The answer of the Agitators to the

above question promises nothing material. This triggers the

Young Comrade's deep disappointment: "Wir stehen Tag und

Nacht in den Kleidern, gegen den Ansturm des Hungers, des

Verfalls und der Gegenrevolution. Ihr aber bringt uns nichts."33 To clarify the purpose of their revolutionary

32 Ibid., 259.

33 Ibid. ,261. 158

activity, the Agitators explain their task, i.e. to inseminate the minds of the Chinese workers with the teachings of the communist classics and of the propagandists: "das Abe des Kommunismus; den Unwissenden

Belehrung iiber ihre Lage, den Unterdriickten das

KlassenbewuJStsein und den KlassenbewuJSten die Erfahrung der

Revolution.1,34

For the Young Comrade, this purpose should be pursued with real actions. Defending his position, he asks: "So habe ich schlecht gefragt?"35 His question with its emphasis on the material needs and his concern for the immediate relief of the workers' suffering, is not negated by the Agitators. "Nein, auf eine gute Frage folgte eine bessere Antwort."36 The answer indicates a broader, however abstract scope of the problem, i.e. to strive for the liberation of all oppressed. The price of achieving this goal lies in the renouncement of momentary and concrete needs. The Young Comrade's question and the Agitators' answer ("eine gute Frage" and "eine bessere Antwort") indicate a key difference in their approach to the revolutionary task. The conflict between the Young Comrade's concrete real action and the Party's abstract doctrine

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid. 159

reveals itself increasingly as the revolutionary work unfolds. Motivated by his enthusiasm for the revolution, the Young Comrade joins the Agitators: "Ich werde mit euch gehen. Vorwarts marschierend, ausbreitend die Lehre der kommunistischen Klassiker: die Weitrevolution.1,37

The Young Comrade's compassion for the exploited is demonstrated through the first mission assigned to him. The objective of this mission is to incite the coolies, who drag the rice barges up the river from Mukden, to demand shoes with wooden soles. Before he begins his mission, he receives a warning: "Verfalle aber nicht dem Mitleid!"38 The purpose of refraining from sympathy is to let the coolies demand such shoes by themselves. By doing so they will awaken and raise their own political consciousness. However, witnessing the suffering of the coolies who express their pain and hunger by chanting songs as they pull the barges, the Young

Comrade immediately succumbs to compassion.

When a Coolie falls twice, the Young Comrade cannot resist surrendering to pity, and he cries to the Overseer:

"Bist du kein Mensch? Hier nehme ich einen Stein und lege ihn in den Schlamm, . . . 1,39 He helps the coolies get back on their feet and thus avoid the whip of the Overseer. In the

37 Ibid., 262.

38 Ibid., 268.

39Ibid. , 272, 273. 160

Young Comrade's first mission, he experiences the conflict

between his commitment to the abstract Party discipline and

his compassion for the coolies which compels him to take

action to meet their concrete need. His sympathetic action

(laying stones in the mud for the coolies) relieves the

temporary pain of the coolies, however, in the eyes of the

Agitators, such action undermines the ultimate purpose of

his mission; therefore, it is unacceptable. Within their rational scheme, the Young Comrade's action shows a lack of

rationality on two counts. First of all, the size of his action is considerably small in relation to the magnitude of the problem. The Overseer affirms the Young Comrade's

folly: "Was helfen uns Schuhe in Tientsin? Ich will euch

lieber erlauben, da£ euer mitleidiger Kamerad mit einem

Stein nebenherlauft und ihn jedem hinlegt, der ausrutscht.',4° In the second place, his conspicuous action draws attention to his revolutionary behavior so that he and his fellow agitators are pursued and their work is delayed.

On his next mission he is to distribute leaflets to factory workers in order to build solidarity among them so that the ongoing strike might be successful. When a nonstriking worker is arrested for passing the revolutionary leaflets which the Young Comrade himself is distributing, his incorruptible sense of justice does not allow him to

40 Ibid., 273. 161

remain silent. Finding out that the life of the arrested worker might be in danger, the Young Comrade interferes. As a result an innocent man is killed and he, in turn, kills a

Policeman. Consequently, the distribution of the agitative literature is stopped, the police force amplified, and the strike-breaking continues. In the judgement of the Agitators the Young Comrade's attempt to protect the worker's life results in two killings, and thus a larger injustice.

The Young Comrade's third mission is to persuade the

Trader to arm the coolies against the British. Utilizing the conflict ' between the Traders and the British, the

Agitators intend to obtain weapons for the coolies. When passing the letter to the Trader, The Young Comrade is invited for dinner. While waiting for the food, The Trader shares his view of the coolies and his evaluation of human beings in general. He sings "Song von der Ware," a ballad of his own exploitation of the coolies, which ends

Was ist eigentlich ein Mensch? Wei£ ich, was Mensch ist? WeiiS ich, wer das wei£! Ich weiJS nicht, was ein Mensch ist Ich kenne nur seinen Preis.41

This comment on the monetary value of man offends the

Young Comrade whose uprightness and keen emphathetic nature do not allow him to compromise his integrity in social

41 Ibid., 288-289. 162

intercourse with the Trader, a man who is useful to the

Party because he has considered arming the coolies against their common enemy, the British. Above all else the Young

Comrade considers himself an honest man, not solely an agent for the revolution. He refuses to eat with the Trader to conclude the bargaining for weapons. By doing so he also defends the integrity of human beings as individuals who should not be compared with goods.

His manifestation of human integrity again contradicts the purpose of the Party. Here The Control Chorus projects the ethical rationale against which the Young Comrade's behavior seems naive.

Mit wem saJSe der Rechtliche nicht zusammen Dem Recht zu helfen? Welche Medizin schmeckte zu schlecht Dem Sterbenden? Welche Niedrigkeit begingest du nicht, urn Die Niedrigkeit auszutilgen? Konntest du die Welt endlich verandern, wofiir warest du dir zu gut? Wer bist du? Versinke in Schmutz Umarme den Schlachter, aber Andere die Welt: sie braucht es! Lange nicht mehr horen wir euch zu als Urteilende. Schon Als Lernende.42

The value and identity of the individual are questioned by this little episode. The scene itself is introduced with the query, "Was ist eigentlich ein Mensch?" The Trader

42 Ibid. , 289-290. 163

knows the value of a human being only in monetary terms, not in terms of his identity. The "Diskussion" following the scene calls into question the Young Comrade's own sense of identity and integrity, because his emphasis on individual values ruins the plan which aims at values for man as a collective.

In the final episode the conflict between the Young

Comrade's revolutionary will and the Party discipline reaches its zenith. The Young Comrade can no longer maintain the abstract ideal of the Party. He sees the urgency of immediate action for the workers and supports the spontaneous revolutionary action of the unemployed because:

"Die Arbeitslosen konnen nicht mehr warten und ich/Kann auch nicht mehr warten/Es gibt zu viele Elende."43 He continues:

Hier bei uns drinnen, sind sieben, die im Auftrag der Arbeitslosen zu uns gekommen sind, hinter ihnen stehen siebentausend, und sie wissen: das Ungliick wachst nicht wie auf der Brust der Aussatz; die Armut fallt nicht von den Dachern wie der Dach- ziegel; sondern Ungliick und Armut sind Menschenwerk; der Mangel wird fiir sie gekocht, aber ihr Jammern wird verzehrt als Speise.44

43 Ibid. , 293.

44 Ibid. , 293. 164

Even the Agitators, who persuade the Young Comrade to stay with them, seem to realize the truth in relieving the pressing misery of the workers:

Wir konnen irren und du kannst recht haben, also Trenne dich nicht von uns! Daft der kurze Weg besser ist als der lange, das leugnet keiner Aber wenn ihn einer weiJS Und vermag ihn uns nicht zu zeigen, was nutzt uns seine Weisheit? Sei weise bei uns! Trenne dich nicht von uns!45

The conflict between the Young Comrade and the Party destroys his commitment to the work of the Agitators. Only able to act in accordance with his evaluation of morality, the Young Comrade cannot accept 'the greater perception and wisdom' ("der Einzelne hat zwei Augen/ Die Partei hat tausend Augen")46 because they demand human sacrifices. The

Young Comrade gives up the patient faith in slow-moving abstract justice and sees himself as judge and magistrate:

Dann sind die Klassiker Dreck, und ich zerreiiSe sie; denn der Mensch, der Lebendige, briillt, und sein Elend zerrei£t alle Damme der Lehre. Darum mache ich jetzt die Aktion, jetzt und sofort; denn ich briille und ich zerreilSe die Damme der Lehre. ... Hort, was ich sage: mit meinen zwei Augen sehe

45 Ibid., 297.

46 Ibid. , 298 . 165

ich, da£ das Elend nicht warten kann.47

Rejecting communist doctrine, The Young Comrade declares his divorce from the Party considering himself the

focal point of justice:

Alles das gilt nicht mehr; im Anblick des Kampfes verwerfe ich alles, was gestern noch gait, kiindige alles Einverstandnis mit alien, tue das allein Menschliche. Hier ist eine Aktion. Ich stelle mich an ihre Spitze. Mein Herz schlagt fiir die Revolution.48

At the end of his revolutionary activities he returns to the starting point of his humanitarian motivation expressed at the beginning of his commitment to the revolutionary task: "tue das allein Menschliche. ... Mein

Herz schlagt fiir die Revolution." Discarding the anonymity assumed as an agitator, he resumes his own unique identity, and accentuates the importance of each individual, acting in opposition to the logic he had accepted:

Ich sah zuviel Darum trete ich vor sie hin Als der, der ich bin, und sage, was ist.49

Tearing the mask from his face, the Young Comrade reveals his true identity. At that moment, the Young Comrade

47 Ibid. , 295.

48 Ibid., 298.

49 Ibid., 299. 166

appears overwhelmingly human, sincere and innocent. The

Agitators admit: "Und wir sahen hin, und in der

Dammerung/Sahen wir sein nacktes Gesicht/Menschlich, offen und arglos. Er hatte/Die Maske zerrissen."50 The heroic action of the Young Comrade necessitates his own death and he dies willingly for the sake of the revolution:

Im Interesse des Kommunismus Einverstanden mit dem Vormarsch der proletarischen Massen Aller Lander Ja sagend zur Revolutionierung der Welt.51

The above statement may exert an impression that the

Young Comrade tends to agree with the communist doctrine once again. But what he truly agrees with is the concrete ultimate purpose of the revolution: humanity. His choice of death indicates his firm belief in this humanity. The alternative way of retaining his conviction is to die.

According to Hegel, the ethical substance (in our analysis it is the revolutionary theory) can reign as totality only when it remains abstract, in other words, when the different relations and forces inherent in the totality remain unchanged and inactive. However, the nature of the totality demands to move out of its abstract ideality and

50 Ibid., 300.

51 Ibid., 306. 167

transplant itself in the real actuality of the phenomenal world. The actualization of the totality destroys the harmony of different forces, and a collision between them arises. In order to reproduce the harmony in which the ethical substance will reign as totality, the inactive condition must be created again, i.e. one side of the collision has to be removed.52

This process can be observed in the collision within the communist ideology presented in Die MaEnahme. The Party doctrine has to eliminate what is concrete, in order to remain as an abstract ideology which will guarantee harmony within this ideology. But, paradoxically the doctrine has to become concrete in order to be fulfilled. Therefore, it is bound to contradict its own principle. This fact is evident already at the beginning of the work. After the Agitators have refused to support the workers with any concrete material, they express their own material need: "Von euch aber sollen wir ein Automobil und einen Fiihrer anfordern. 1,53

This implies the indispensable material needs of a revolution, and that the conflict is also about the question of who will own the means of production in the revolutionary society.

52See Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Ksthetik III, 523.

53 Brecht, Die MaEnahme, 261. 168

The Party's revolutionary principle of emotional self- control of the Agitators contradicts itself as well, because the compassion of the Young Comrade is, symbolically, the source of the ideal for which the Communist Party strives.

The compassion for the exploited serves as a basic quality for all revolutionaries and is the exact reason that the

Young Comrade is recruited into the team. In spite of the failures on each of his missions, the Party continues to assign him new tasks because of his genuine compassion for the needy. Furthermore, while suppressing the feeling of compassion, the four Agitators themselves suffer the experience of compassion at the specific moment when the

Young Comrade is killed and their demonstration of the event focuses upon that feeling. The revolutionary discipline conflicts with their own compassionate human natures:

"Furchtbar ist es, zu toten." Of course, the Agitators sense that compassion works against their rationale.

The Party's principle of rational thinking as the basis for each action (so that the Party's order can be obeyed) also splits. In the episode Was ist eigentlich ein Mensch?, the Young Comrade is unwilling to compromise his integrity by engaging in social intercourse with the Trader. Perhaps he has sensed the analogy between the Trader's conception of man as commodity, an object to be bought and used, and the revolution's use of him as an instrument in the process of social change. Thus the Young Comrade resists to betray his 169

own integrity and to give up his standard of human value.

This rational thinking results in his disobedience to the

Party order. The key reason for the Young Comrade to insist on his integrity is to protest against the abuse of people as a means for an end. This again reminds us of the Kantian imperative: "Handle so, daJS du die Menschheit, sowohl in deiner Person, als in der Person eines jeden anderen, jederzeit zugleich als Zweck, niemals bloii als Mittel gebrauchst. "54

With that in mind, it is then easy to explain why, in the last episode of the play, the Young Comrade insists on taking action to relieve the individual workers from suffering, regardless of the fact that this action violates the Party discipline. Its motto reads: The proletarians must first liberate all mankind in order to liberate themselves.

The Young Comrade's action switches the priority of this principle. Thus he becomes a hindrance of the revolutionary movement and his demise becomes a necessity.

Die MaJSnahme presents an unique example of tragedy in the Hegelian sense of "Selbstentzweiung." This self­ splitting of the communist revolutionary ideology is visualized in the fact that the Young Comrade, who has

54 Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, in Immanuel Kants Werke, ed. Artur Buchenau and Ernst Cassirer (Berlin: Cassirer Verlag, 1922), 287. 170

become a threat to the revolutionary cause, and therefore

needs to be annihilated by the Agitators, is represented in

turn by these very four Agitators who, at the same time,

together represent the Party. When the Young Comrade, in his

rejection to the abstract Party doctrine, asks: "Wer aber

ist die Partei?/Sitzt sie in einem Haus mit Telefonen?/Sind

ihre Gedanken geheim, ihre Entschlusse unbekannnt?/Wer ist

s i e ? » 5 5 The Agitators reply: "Wir sind sie./Du und ich und

ihr - wir alle./In deinem Anzug steckt sie, Genosse, und

denkt in deinem Kopf/ Wo ich wohne, ist ihr Haus, und wo du

angegriffen wirst, da kampft sie."56 This dramatic gesture

that the killed is represented in turn by the killers

implies that the Party doctrine incurs the inversion of its humanity and morality, by eliminating its own member, the revolution bit by bit kills itself.

The self-splitting of the communist revolutionary

ideology is revealed through the collision between the Young

Comrade's revolutionary ideal and the Party doctrine. The

Young Comrade' s view of the revolution contrasts with that of the party doctrine. The former represents the good

intention and ultimate goal of the communist revolution, whereas the latter has to emphasize the means to achieve the end. Like the Woman in Masse Mensch, the Young Comrade's

55Brecht, Die MaiSnahme, 297.

56 Ibid. 171

central concern for revolution is humanity: "Der Mensch muiS dem Menschen helfen ... Ich glaube an die Menschheit. "57 The reason for the Young Comrade to break with the party doctrine is again humanity: "...denn der Mensch, der lebendigste, briillt, und sein Elend zerreiJSt alle Damme der

Lehre. . . . kiindige alles Einverstandnis mit alien, tue das allein Menschliche.1,58

The Communist Party doctrine, on the other hand, demands the means of dehumanization, in order to reach the goal of humanity. Before going to their missions, the

Agitators must wipe out their faces by doning masks and erase their conscience. Only faceless men become effective tools of the Party, and the erasure of the conscience is supposed to express the moral beauty of the sacrifice they committed. The Agitators are "verdinglicht" like blank sheets of paper:

Dann seid ihr nicht mehr ihr selber, du nicht mehr Karl Schmitt aus Berlin, du nicht mehr Anna Kjersk aus Kasan und du nicht mehr Peter Sawitsch aus Moskau, sondern allesamt ohne Namen und Mutter, leere Blatter, auf welche die Revolution ihre Anweisung schreibt .59

57 Ibid., 259.

58 Ibid. , 295, 298.

59 Ibid., 264. 172

With the assumption of masks, the unique identity of each is voided. They do not even have the negative identity of being no one. Their individuality must become flexible, relative, adjustable according to the will of the party. Thus they actually assume the role of puppets (This reminds us of the analogy of a revolutionary to a puppet in Dantons Tod):

Dann seid ihr von dieser Stunde an nicht mehr Niemand, sondern von dieser Stunde an und wahr- scheinlich bis zu eurem Verschwinden unbekannte Arbeiter, Kampfer, Chinesen, geboren von chinesischen Miittern, gelber Haut, sprechend in Schlaf und Fieber chinesisch.60

The dehumanization finds its most striking expression in the Agitators' comparison of men to animals: "Bei der

Kiirze der Zeit fanden wir keinen Ausweg./Wie das Tier dem

Tier hilft/Wunschten auch wir uns, ihm zu helfen, der/Mit uns gekampft fiir unsere Sache."61 This description of man to animal indicates the Party1s apathy to the workers1 misery.

The Agitators remind the Young Comrade of the Leninist revolutionary theory: "Erinnere dich doch an den Klassischen

Rat des Genossen Lenin, nicht alle Bauern als Klassenfeinde zu betrachten, sondern die Dorfarmut als Mitkampfer zu gewinnen"62 (my emphasis). The principle of this theory is

60Ibid., 263.

61 Ibid., 304.

62 Ibid., 295. 173

to let the misery of the masses increase so that out of despair, the masses will rebel. This situation again bears an analogy to the idea that a cornered animal will counterattack with full strength generated by the instinct of self-protection.

The difference between the Young Comrade and the Party is also portrayed as the antagonism of truth and lie. No longer able to bear the workers' suffering, the Young

Comrade decides to take real action by tearing off the mask and telling the truth: "Wir sind gekommen, euch zu helfen./Wir kommen aus Moskau."63 In the Young Comrade's view, this truth will bring encouragement and hope to the workers in their struggle against the exploiters. The

Party's doctrine of correct action, on the other hand, demands not telling the truth and betraying one's integrity when needed. As Nelson points out, the communists who had rebelled against the bourgeosie because it lied, stole, and killed, were now expected to lie, steal, and kill, in order to stop these very crimes. The Kontrollchor confirms this necessity: "Welche Niedrigkeit begingest du nicht, um/Die

Niedrigkeit auszutilgen?"64 By adhering this principle the communist humanity is inverted into inhumanity. Brecht gives the most striking example of the Selbstentzweiung of the

63 Ibid., 299.

64Ibid., 290. 174

communist morality in his play: homicide of a party member by the other party members.

The tragedy presented in Die Ma&nahme is caused by the flaw within the communist revolutionary theory. It is the hubris of the Communist Party of believing that the party has found the ultimate way of creating mankind's equality, liberty and freedom (This hubris is also found in

Robespierre's and the Nameless One's revolutionary claims).

However, the communists did not succeed in their revolution.

They did not find a solution to the problem of their self- splitting revolutionary ideal. Today's history tells its part of the story. The failure of communism is perhaps rooted in the fact that it had to kill out the communist humanists like the Young Comrade (who is spontaneous, eager to actualize the revolutionary ideal) so that the communist ideology could remain abstract and appear as a totality.

Brecht seemed to be aware of the limitation of the communist revolutionary ideal even at the time when he was writing the play. Therefore, he used the dialectical structure of tragedy to problematize the absolute claim of this ideal. In his notes about dialectics in the theater, Brecht writes:

tfberall, wo es auf das Erkennen der Realitat ankommt, miissen wir lernen, die Dialektik zu handhaben. Es ist nicht wichtig, geistreich zu sein. Es ist nicht einmal wichtig, originell zu sein. Der Verzicht darauf verlangt auf dem Gebiet der Kiinste allerdings einige Kiihnheit. 175

Dazu kommt, da£ nicht nur ein System unlieferbar ist, sondern sogar eine halbwegs imposante Anordnung der Gedanken. Man mu£ aber anfangen, und so miissen wir eben den Interessierten zumuten, sich mit dem ungeordneten Aufwerfen einiger Gedanken und Erfahrungen zu begniigen.65

Brecht not only employed the dialectical principle for the play's structure, but he also used dialectics in the

Young Comrade's thinking, action and decision making, as well as in the judgement of the Control Chorus at the end of each episode. The dialectics in the development of the Young

Comrade's attitude toward the revolutionary task and his decision at the end can be traced back to Brecht's two school operas Der Jasager and Der Neinsager. Written in

1929, Der Jasager is about Verstandnis. More specifically, it deals with the agreement of a boy who goes willingly into death. The raw material of the play was the Japanese play Taniko which was translated by Elisabeth Hauptmann from

English into German. It was not only the epic element in the

Japanese play that attracted Brecht,66 but also the attempt of this play to teach certain moral values.67 Der Jasager begins with the chorus:

65 Brecht, Die Dialektik auf dem Theater in Gesammelte Werke. (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967), 868.

66 See Ernst Schumacher, Die dramatische Versuche Bertolt Brechts 1918-1933, 329.

67 The Japanese as well as the Chinese theater often serve the purpose of pedagogy. The Chinese theater, which greatly influenced Brecht's theory and practice of his epic theater, 176

Wichtig zu lernen ist Einverstandnis. Viele sagen ja, und doch ist da kein Einverstandnis. Viele werden nicht gefragt, und viele Sind einverstanden mit Falschem. Darum: Wichtig zu lernen vor allem ist Einver­ standnis .68

The plot of the play is the following: A Japanese boy insists on going with his teacher over the dangerous mountains to fetch healing medicine for his sick mother. On the top of the mountain, the boy's energy is exhausted. The three students who also come along on the journey try to carry the boy over the dangerous ridge of the mountain, however, the attempt turns out to be impossible. They are forced to leave the boy behind. The teacher prepares, the boy to accept his fate:

DER LEHRER: Hor gut zu! Da du krank bist und nicht weiter kannst, miissen wir dich hier zuriicklassen. Aber es ist richtig, daft man den, welcher krank wurde, befragt, ob man umkehren soil seinetwegen. Und der Brauch schreibt auch vor, daft der, welcher krank wurde, antwortet: Ihr sollt nicht umkehren. DER KNABE: Ich verstehe. DER LEHRER: Verlangst du daft man umkehren soil deinetwegen? DER KNABE: Ihr sollt nicht umkehren! DER LEHRER: Bist du also einverstanden, daft du zuriickgelassen wirst? actually is an institute of education where morals are often presented in a direct form.

68 Brecht, Der Jasager - Der Neinsager, in Stiicke fiir das Theater am Schiffbauerdamm (1927-1933), (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), 219. 177

DER KNABE: Ich will es mir uberlegen. (Pause des Nachdenkens.) Ja, ich bin einverstanden.69

The boy who answers according to the necessity (the custom) asks the rest of the team to throw him into the valley, because he is scared of dying alone. They fulfill his wish.

DER GROSSE CHOR: Dann nahmen die Freunde den Krug Und beklagten die traurigen Wege der Welt Und ihr bitteres Gesetz Und warfen den Knaben hinab. FuJS an Fu£ standen sie zusammengedrangt An dem Rande des Abgrunds Und warfen ihn hinab mit geschlossenen Augen, Keiner schuldiger als sein Nachbar, Und warfen Erdklumpen Und flache Steine Hinterher .70

The play triggered criticism in the public. In order to show his real intention with the play, Brecht created a new version, Der Neinsager. In this version, Brecht changed the purpose of the journey undertaken by the team. Here the reason for the journey is no longer the disease threatening many lives in the town, but research on the disease. The boy's motivation of his journey remains the same, that is, to fetch some medicine for his sick mother. When the moment comes that the boy can no longer continue the journey, the three students remind him of the "big custom" : "die nicht weiter konnen, werden in das Tal hinabgeschleudert."71

69Ibid. , 229-230.

70 Ibid., 232.

71 Ibid., 242. 178

Whereas the students decide to kill the boy, the teacher again asks the boy's opinion about the decision made according to the old custom. The boy responds to the teacher: "Nein, ich bin nicht einverstanden."72 To the students' question why he does not give an answer according to the old custom (who says A, must also say B) the boy replies:

DER KNABE: Die Antwort, die ich gegeben habe, war falsch, aber eure Frage war falscher. Wer A sagt, muJS nicht . B sagen. Er kann auch erkennen, daiS A falsch war. Ich wollte meiner Mutter Medizin holen, aber jetzt bin ich selber krank geworden, es ist also nicht mehr moglich. Und ich will sofort umkehren, der neuen Lage entsprechend. Auch euch bitte ich umzukehren und mich heimzubringen. Euer Lernen kann durchaus warten. Wenn es driiben etwas zu lernen gibt, was ich hoffe, so konnte es nur das sein, daJS man in unserer Lage umkehren muJ5. Und was den alten gro£en Brauch betrifft, so sehe ich keine Vernunft an ihm. Ich brauche vielmehr einen neuen, groiSen Brauch, den wir sofort ausfiihren mvissen, namlich den Brauch, in jeder Lage neu nachzudenken.73

The three students agree that what the boy says is

"verniinftig, wenn auch nicht heldenhaft" .74 They decide to return home.

72 Ibid., 244.

73Ibid. , 245.

74 Ibid. 179

DIE DREI STUDENTEN: Dann wollen wir umkehren, und kein Gelachter und keine Schmahung sollen uns abhalten, das Verniinftige zu tun, und kein alter Brauch uns hindern, einen richtigen Gedanken anzunehmen. Lehne deinen Kopf an unsern Arm. Strenge dich nicht an. Wir tragen dich vorsichtig. DER GROSSE CHOR: So nahmen die Freunde den Freund Und begriindeten einen neuen Brauch Und ein neues Gesetz Und brachten den Knaben zuriick. Seit an Seit gingen sie zusammengedrangt Entgegen der Schmahung, Entgegen dem Gelachter, mit geschlossenen Augen, Keiner feiger als sein Nachbar.75

The two plays, according to Brecht, should always be performed together at the same time, so that the opposite possibilities of reactions to the same situation can be clearly revealed. Of course the purposes of the two journeys in these plays are slightly different. In Der

Jasager, it is the general health of the town people, threatened by the disease, which brings the team on the journey. In other words, the boy answers "yes" to the old custom agreeing with his own death for the sake of the lives of the town people, including that of his mother. In Der

Neinsager, however, the boy refuses to agree with the old custom and requests to return home, because the purpose of that journey is research on the disease, which can be postponed.

75 Ibid. , 246-247. 180

The dialectics represented in these two short plays

(positive or negative responses in the same situation according to different purposes) can be observed in the

Young Comrade's attitude towards his task as well. The Young

Comrade is concerned with the current suffering of the

Chinese workers. He says "yes" and agrees with the Party's effort to ease the misery. And he says "no" to the Party's abstract revolutionary ideal when it contradicts his own revolutionary ideal. The Young Comrade's death at the end of the play demonstrates a dialectical principle as well. It again indicates "yes" to the concrete revolutionary action alleviating the pain of the oppressed, and "no" to the abstract Party doctrine.

The dialectical principle is reflected in the special function of the Control Chorus in the play as well. Having agreed each time with the conclusions and decisions of the

Agitators, it has to give credit to the Young Comrade in its judgements on the events at the end of each scene. The confirmation of the Young Comrade's actions can be found also in the questions raised by the Chorus. At the end of the first episode Der Stein, for instance, The Control

Chorus asks:

Aber ist es nicht richtig, zu unterstiitzen den Schwachen Wo immer er vorkommt, ihm zu helfen Dem Ausgebeuteten, in seiner taglichen Miihsal 181

Und der Unterdriickung?76

Defending the Young Comrade, the Control Chorus asks again at the end of the second episode: "Was hatte der junge

Genosse tun konnen?"77 The abstract answer to this question given by the Agitators does not provide a solution to the problem:

Er hatte den Arbeitern sagen konnen, daft sie sich gegen die Polizei nur verteidigen konnten, wenn sie erreichten, daft die anderen Arbeiter in dem Betrieb sich mit ihnen gegen die Polizei solidarisch erklarten. Denn der Polizist hatte eine Ungerechtig- keit begangen.78

This answer only tells what to do, but does not indicate how, nor does it take the potential failure of this method into consideration.

The most interesting statement of the Control Chorus at the very end of the play presents its dialectical view of all the events. After its agreement with the deeds of the

Agitators ("Und eure Arbeit war gliicklich" which again is abstract without showing how it was successful) The Control

Chorus changes the tone of its voice:

Aber auch euer Bericht zeigt uns, wieviel

76Brecht, Die MaJSnahme, 275.

77 Ibid., 283.

78 Ibid. 182

Notig ist, die Welt zu verandern: Zorn und Zahigkeit. Wissen und Emporung Schnelles Eingreifen, tiefes Bedenken kaltes Dulden, endloses Beharren Begreifen des Einzelnen und Begreifen des Ganzen: Nur belehrt von der Wirklichkeit, konnen wir Die Wirklichkeit andern.79

In this evaluation, the Control Chorus justifies The

Young Comrade's deeds, that is, in order to change reality one has to do something concrete so that one can be taught by experience and be better equipped for the next step.

Die MaJSnahme not only demonstrates an unintended deconstruction of Communist ideology but also of the genre of Lehrstuck. The teaching of the play virtually indicates

(against the author's will) that the political strategies of the intellectuals fail due to the concrete contradictions within their abstract revolutionary model. This contradiction is revealed through the concrete misery of real people. In this sense the play questions the justification of the revolutionary theory and exposes it as ideology, although this is not the initial intent of the author. Marxist critics noticed this "problem" in the play.

They perceive the void of a true Marxist position in Die

Mafinahme. Criticizing the lack of a positive revolutionary effect of the play, Ernst Schumacher formulates:

79 Ibid. , 307. 183

Mit dieser Abwandlung ["seines hochst personlichen Themas des Einverstandnisses"] bot er nur der reaktionaren bUrgerlichen Presse die Moglichkeit, von einem "bolschewistischen Fememordstiick" zu geifern und die Tatigkeit der Kommunistischen Partei zu verleumden. Die Demonstration der extremsten Situation des illegalen Kampfes war wenig dazu angetan, das Ver- standnis fiir die auf die nationale und soziale Befreiung gerichteten Ziele der Kommunistischen Partei Deutschlands zu erleichtern und das Einverstandnis mit ihrer Praxis bei der nichtkommunistischen Arbeiter- schaft und den ubrigen Bevolkerungs- schichten zu fordern.80

Schumacher's criticism is continued by Werner

Mittenzwei:

Die Frage, die man stellen mu£, geht dahin: hatten die politischen Lehren in der Form, wie Brecht sie vermittelte, zu der Zeit, als das Stuck entstand, einen positiven politischen Lehrwert? Die Antwort mu£ davon ausgehen, ob zu jener Zeit, 1930, eine revolutionare Situation in Deutschland bestand. Falls ja, so konnte das Stuck eine Wirkung auslosen, die der Absicht des Ver- fassers entgegengesetzt war. In einer revolutionaren Situation mu£ten die Argumente der drei Agitatoren beschwichtigend wirken, den revolu­ tionaren Drang der Massen fesseln und eine Shnlichkeit mit den Worten der rechten Abweichler in der KPD bekommen.81

80Schumacher, Die dramatischen Versuche Bertolt Brechts 1918-1933, 367.

81 Wittenzwei, Bertolt Brecht: Von der "MaJSnahme" zu "Leben des Galilei", 64. 184

Apparently Marxist critics have sensed the abstract nature

of the play and Brecht's ignorance of the party's practice.

Georg Lukacs writes:

Da aber diese Inhalte bei ihnen trotz einer anerkennenswerten Konkretisierung noch immer abstrakt bleiben, namlich unmittelbare Ober- flachenerscheinung und nicht die objektiven treibenden Krafte der Revolution, bleibt auch ihre revolu- tionare Gesinnung abstrakt: Predigt, "Tendenz". (Man denke an Brechts "MaiSnahme", wo die strategisch- taktischen Probleme der Partei in "ethische Probleme" verengt werden.) Von diesem weltanschaulichen Ausgangs- punkt ist eine Gestaltung der - unerkannten - treibenden Krafte nicht moglich.82

The Marxist critics agree with Grimm's interpretation of the play that the main theme of Die MaRnahme deals with an ethical problem. However, they refuse to see it as valuable and positive because, in their view, the ethical problem always leads to a metaphysical abstraction deviating from the communist purpose of agitating the proletariat. For instance, the killing of the Young Comrade would arouse the audience's empathy and thus weaken the revolutionary courage.

82 Georg Lukacs, "Aus der Not eine Tugend," in Die Linkskurve, Nov./Dez. (1932), 21. Quoted after: Qayum Qureshi, Pessimismus und Fortschrittsglaube bei Bert Brecht, (Koln: Bohlau, 1971), 92. 185

Whereas we can observe in Dantons Tod and Masse Mensch

the tragic conflict between two equally justified (or

equally unjustified) forces which can be interpreted with

Hegel's symmetric tragic model, there is no such tragic

structure in Die MaEnahme. In the conflict presented in this

play, only one side is guilty, i.e. the Party. Tarot's

opinion that the play deals with the Young Comrade' s guilt

cannot be supported. The Young Comrade adheres to his

humanist revolutionary ideal to the very end without showing

any feeling of guilt (whereas in Dantons Tod and Masse

Mensch, Danton, Robespierre as well as Sonja suffer from

their own guilt). In his confrontation with the Party

doctrine at the end of the play he repeatedly argues: "Weil

ich recht habe, kann ich nicht nachgeben. ... Ich kann nicht

schweigen, weil ich recht habe."83 He is willing to die not

because he realizes his guilt, but rather because he is bent

on keeping his revolutionary ideal. The Agitators, on the

other hand, have experienced torturous guilt by killing the

Young Comrade: "Also beschlossen wir: jetzt/Abzuschneiden

den eigenen FuiS vom Korper./Furchtbar ist es, zu toten."84

Virtually, this guilt is the very reason for the staging of

the play (within a play) . They have to justify the killing

83Brecht, Die MaEnahme, 298, 299.

84Ibid., 304. 186

of the Young Comrade in the party court so that the

acquittal can be granted.

The Young Comrade's heroic death reminds us of

Bradley's remark on modern tragedy. He discusses the effect which a tragic hero exerts on the audience, i.e. the exultation. This exultation is connected with the greatness and nobility of the hero's soul revealed at the moment of his death. We experience the Young Comrade's greatness and nobility with which he faces his calamity. The greatness and nobility of the character contrast the injustice the Party has done. They do not give the feeling of reconciliation, as

Bradley perceives it in the Shakespearean tragedies.85 The deconstruction of the model of the communist revolution and the genre of Lehrstuck demonstrated in Die Mafnahme leaves no room for a synthesis of the tragic conflict. The success of the revolution claimed by the Agitators remains abstract and void.

85 See previous discussion on Bradley's interpretation of Hegel's theory of tragedy and see Bradley's Oxford Lectures on Poetry, 83ff. CONCLUSION

The tragedy of revolutionary ideas, to a certain

extent, reflects structures of the idealistic philosophy of history.1 The analysis of Dantons Tod, Masse Mensch and Die

Mafnahme shows that the revolutionary theories employ structures of Hegel's interpretations of history, i.e. teleology and dialectics. The absolute dogma of the revolutionaries strives for changing history once and for all by realizing total equality, absolute freedom and a class-free society, which, the revolutionaries believe, are the essence of the telos of history. With their abstract ideas, the heroes attempt to construct the highly complex reality within only one single framework of dialectical contradiction, which, in the view of the heroes, prescribes the course of history. The plays, as well as the historical reality, however, demonstrate that their ideals are

1 In his book Aesthetic Theories of Kant, Hegel and Schopenhauer Knox mentions the link between Hegel's theory of tragedy and his theory of history. Knox maintains, Hegel expresses the same idea (for tragedy) that individuals submit to the sovereignty of the institution in his Philosophie der Geschichte. Knox quotes: "The particular is for the most part of too trifling value as compared with the general: individuals are sacrificed and abandoned. The Idea pays the penalty of determinate existence and of corruptibility, not from itself, but from the passions of individuals." Knox, 111.

187 188

innately vacuous. By pursuing the illusive ideals via violent revolution, the revolutionaries become culpable tragic characters.

Hegel's interpretation of history is based on the thought that "the 'Idea,' the logical power of the divine, enters and guides, through mortal men, the scene of historical , struggle, . . . "2 For Hegel, the Idea develops both in space and in time. The Idea developing in space is nature, the Idea developing in time is spirit. The development of the Idea in time (or the development of spirit) is history. History thus becomes one of the great movements of the Idea.

According to Hegel, the Idea is not static but dynamic; it gives rise, by its inner dynamic, to all that exists.

All existence is the manifestation of the Idea. Only by being actualized does the Idea receive its full reality, and only by containing the Idea does the existing obtain its full existence. Since the Idea progresses according to its own laws, which are the laws of the world (reason), all that is must be, and all is as it ought to be.3 But what is real

2 Hegel, Reason In History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History Translated, with an introduction, by Robert S. Hartman (New York: Macmillan, 1953), ix.

3 Knox again points out that Hegel's negation of the notion of guilt or innocence in tragedy is to be interpreted in the sense that "Was ist, das verniinftig ist; was verniinftig ist, das ist", that is, it is right and rational to sacrifice human life upon the altar of some Moloch principle or of the Divine Idea. Knox, 110-111. 189

in existence is only that which is divine in it. Only this

is what develops. Everything else is contingent and must

perish.4

In Hegel's view, the interrelationship between the real

and the merely existent, the necessary and the contingent,

proceeds dialectically: thesis and antithesis contradict

each other, and the synthesis preserves and continues what

is worthwhile and necessary in both. The dialectic process

is thus at the same time logical, ontological, and

teleological. Man's spirit, the synthesis of the divine Idea

and nature, makes the indeterminate reality of the Idea

determinate in existence. History, thus, is the progressing

self-development of spirit. Since spirit by its inner nature

is free, history is the progress of freedom.

The Hegelian view of history is represented by

Buchner's Robespierre and St. Just. They have applied the

form of Hegel's dialectical logic and the idea of the progress of freedom to their revolutionary theory and praxis. In II, 7 of Dantons Tod, St. Just delivers an oration defending Robespierre's resolution to continue the terror on grounds that the revolution is a historical event possessing an all-important metaphysical significance:

... da£ wir nicht grausamer sind als die Natur und die Zeit. Die Natur folgt ruhig und unwiderstehlich ihren

4Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Geschichte: Werke 12 (Frankfurt a/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970), 20f. 190

Gesetzen, der Mensch wird vernichtet, wo er mit ihnen in Conflict kommt. Eine Veranderung in den Bestandteilen der Luft, ein Auflodern des tellurischen Feuers, ein Schwanken in dem Gleich- wicht einer Wassermasse und eine Seuche, ein Vulkanischer Ausbruch, eine Ueber- schwemmung begraben Tausende. Was ist das Resultat? Eine unbemerkbare Ver­ anderung der physischen Natur, die fast spurlos voriibergegangen sein wurde, wenn nicht Leichen am Wege lagen (II, 7).

The above speech echoes Hegel who states that the

spirit encompases the circle of the world, which itself comprehends physical and spiritual nature: "Welt. begreift die physische und psychische Natur in sich; die physische

Natur greift gleichfalls in die Weltgeschichte ein [...]

Aber der Geist und der Verlauf seiner Entwicklung ist das

Substantielle."5 In his speech, St. Just seeks to explicate the identity of nature and spirit which represents the ultimate metaphysical meaning of revolution and history. He continues:

Ich frage nun: Soil die moralische Natur in ihren Revolutionen mehr Riicksicht nehmen, als die physische? Soil eine Idee nicht eben so gut wie ein Gesetz der Physik vernichten diirfen, was sich ihr widersetzt? Soil uberhaupt ein EreigniJS, was die ganze Gestaltung der moralischen Natur d.h. der Menschheit umandert, nicht durch Blut gehen diirfen? Der Weltgeist bedient sich in der geistigen Sphare unserer Arme eben so, wie er in der physischen Vulkane oder Wasser- fluthen gebraucht [...]. Moses fiihrte

5 Ibid., 29. 191

sein Volk durch das rothe Meer und in die Wiiste bis die alte verdorbne Generation sich aufgerieben hatte, eh'er den neuen Staat griindete. [...] Die Revolution ist wie die Tochter des Pelias; sie zerstiickt die Menschheit um sie zu verjiingen. Die Menschheit wird aus dem Blutkessel wie die Erde aus den Wellen der Sundfluth mit urkraftigen Gliedern sich erheben, als ware sie zum Erstenmale geschaffen (II, 7; my emphasis).

St. Just's oration reveals the Hegelian basis of

Robespierre1s idea of revolution and history. The

"Weltgeist" is the power controlling the movement of nature

and history. In Hegel's view, the movement of history as a whole represents mankind's progressive realization of

universal freedom. He maintains:

Mit dem, was Ich [. . . ] iiber den Unterschied des Wissens von der Freiheit gesagt habe, und zwar zunachst in der Form, dalS die Orientalen nur gewu£t haben, da£ Einer frei ist, die griechische und romische Welt aber, daJS einige frei sind, daft wir aber wissen, alle Menschen an sich, da£ hei£t der Mensch als Mensch sei frei, ist auch zugleich die Einteilung der Weltgeschichte.6

It is clear in the above passage, that for Hegel, history is the movement whereby man comes into full possession of his intrinsic spiritual nature, i.e., freedom.

In St. Just's speech as well as in Robespierre's speech

6 Ibid., 32. 192

earlier in the play (1,3), they both understand themselves

as representatives of mankind's collective struggle to

achieve mastery over history. "Robespierre und St. Just

erkennen in den objektiven Gesetzen [...] einer entfremdeten

Geschichte in einer nichtauthentischen Welt eine

Zielrichtung auf die Freiheit, d.h. auf die Identitat hin."7

Gerhard Jancke's perception is corroborated by St.Just's

conclusion to his oration in II, 7: "Die Menschheit wird

[...] sich erheben, als ware sie zum ersten Male

geschaffen."

For St. Just as for Robespierre, the revolution is the

realization of man's authentic nature, i.e. freedom. St.

Just's’ speech advocating man's spiritual freedom has its

source in Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes. Hegel writes:

Diese letzte Gestalt des Geistes, der Geist, der seinem vollstandigen und wahren Inhalte zugleich die Form des Selbsts gibt, und dadurch seinen Begriff ebenso realisiert, als er in dieser Realisierung in seinem Begriffe bleibt, ist das absolute Wissen; es ist der sich in Geists- gestalt wissende Geist [...]. Die Wahrheit ist nicht nur an sich vollkommen der GewilSheit gleich, sondern hat auch die Gestalt der GewiiSheit seiner selbst oder sie ist in ihrem Dasein, d.h. fur den wissenden Geist in der Form des Wissens seiner selbst.8

7 Gerhard Jancke, Georg Biichner: Genese und Aktualitat seines Werkes (Kronberg: Scriptor Verlag, 1975), 180f. 193

Like Robespierre, St. Just views the revolution

primarily as a spiritual event. This refers to Hegel's

concept of "absolutes Wissen." The revolution will culminate

in man's absolute (self-) knowledge. For Hegel, the absolute

knowledge of absolute spirit is synonymous to the self-

knowledge of man's universal, historical mind (Geist), which

is identical to its formal, or purely self intellecting

essence ("Die Wahrheit ist [. . . ] an sich vollkommen der

GewiJSheit gleich"). In Hegel's view, historical man attains

absolute freedom in absolute knowledge:

...Der Geist ist das Bei-sich-selbst- Sein. Dies ist eben die Freiheit, denn wenn ich abh&ngig bin, so be- ziehe ich mich auf ein andres, das ich nicht bin; ich kann nicht sein ohne ein fiuiSeres; frei bin ich wenn ich bei mir selbst bin. Dieses Bei- sich-selbstsein des Geistes ist Selbst- bewufttsein .9

The dialectical development proceeding from

Robespierre's conception of man as divine being10 to St.

8Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes Ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1952), 556.

9Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 30.

10According to Taylor, Robespierre compares the collective anguish of mankind with the suffering of Christ: "Wahrlich des Menschensohn wird in uns Allen gekreuzigt, wir ringen Alle im Gethsemanegarten im blutigen SchweiJS" (I, 6). Taylor maintains that Robespierre identifies humanity as Christ. Mankind in general is the divine being who has suffered endless torments throughout the long-enduring night of revolutionary history. Taylor, 187. 194

Just's "Weltgeist" reflects the Hegelian idea that the

historical Christ represents mankind's awakening to its

"divine" nature and possibilities.11 Hegel writes: "Die

Natur Gottes, reiner Geist zu sein, wird dem Menschen in der

christlichen Religion offenbar. Was ist aber der Geist? Er

ist das Eine, sich selbst gleiche Unendliche, die reine

Identitat. . . "12

Robespierre and St. Just thus share Hegel's belief that

freedom entails (self-) identity. Self-identity, in turn,

involves absolute knowledge. This is why St. Just identifies mankind's attainment of self-consciousness, i.e. authentic

freedom, with the revolutionary "Weltgeist," which signifies the historical apotheosis of mortal man. St. Just's

"Weltgeist"-metaphysics amount to a Hegelian theodicy of

freedom which, in turn, involves a tacit justification for the blood that must be shed in order to realize this

freedom.

The Hegelian idea of absolute human freedom maintained by Robespierre and St. Just undergoes self-splitting.

Absolute freedom entails its own destruction: "Die

Revolution (through which absolute freedom is to be obtained) ist wie die Tochter des Pelias; sie zerstvickt die

Menschheit um sie zu verjiingen" (II, 7). The tragic

11 Ibid.

12Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 391. 195

collision of reason, which St. Just perceives as omnipotent,

with an irrational and brutally objective necessity is made

evident through the fact that the ideal of humanity embodied

in the person of Robespierre and in the philosphical vision

of St. Just is distorted into the reality of blood-letting.

As Hartman points out, the secret of Hegel's influence

is his dynamic method, i.e. the dialectic logic.13 The power

of the method lies in its inner dynamic and universal

applicability. In Marxism, Hegel's method lives on. Marx

adopted the form of Hegel's philosophy and excluded its

idealistic content. For Hegel, the driving power of history

is the dynamic of the spirit; for Marx, it is the dynamic of

economic development, dialectically giving rise to a series

of classes which struggle for possession of the state. Thus

Marx took from Hegel the idea of process, the idea of

progress, the dialectic method, the supra-personal power of

history, the primacy of the collective over the

individual.14

Marx's idea of changing the world is derived from

Hegel's philosophy of history. According to Hegel, the

13Robert S. Hartman, "Introduction11 to Hegel's Reason in History, xi. Hartman maintains that Hegel did not invent his method. Its roots go back to the very sources of Greek philosophy, in Heraclitus; and a thread can be traced, and has been traced by Hegel, throughout the history of philosophy. But Hegel elaborated and applied it to the totality of the world and its equipment.

14Ibid., xx. 196

necessity of historical progress toward a better and perfect

destiny is determined by man's ability to change the world:

Nur in den Veranderungen, die auf dem geistigen Boden vorgehen, kommt Neues hervor. Diese Erscheinung am Geistigen lieJS in dem Menschen eine andere Bestimmung iiberhaupt sehen. . . namlich eine wirkliche Veranderungs- fahigkeit, und zwar zum Besseren - ein Trieb der Perfektibilitat.15

In his philosophical thinking Marx changed the concept of Veranderuna from being merely theoretical to actual practical. He writes: "Die Philosophien haben die Welt nur verschieden interpretiert, es kommt drauf an, sie zu

verandern."16 Thus philosophy has changed its basic

function, namely from descriptive to prescriptive. In the

Marxist view of history, material revolution is the key to change the world, revolution is a basic form of class struggle which serves as a lever of social history.

As the Hegelian philosophy of history is purely idealistic, the Marxist one is utterly utopian. Maximilien

Rubel points out: "Marx did not abolish Utopia. On the contrary, he rejuvenated it and enlarged its scope."17 The

15Hegel, Vorlesungen iiber die Philosophie der Geschichte, 74.

16See MEW, Vol 3, (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1958), 7.

17Maximilien Rubel, "Reflection on Utopia and Revolution" in Socialist Humanism, ed. Erich Fromm (New York: Doubleday, 1965), 194. 197

Marxist idea of violent class struggle is represented by the

Nameless One in Masses Mensch and by the Party in Die

MaJSnahme. Bending his mind on destroying the existing order,

the Nameless One elevates the revolution to the level of an

absolute requirement:

Ihr Toren, brecht die Fundamente, Brecht Fundamente! rufe ich. Dann mag die Sintflut Das verweste Haus, durch goldne Ketten Vor Verfall bewahrt, fortschwemmen.

Ja, nur Waffen braucht ihr! Drum holt sie euch, ersturmt das Stadthaus!18

The Nameless One's idea of Revolution-Creation

(destroy the old world and build the new one) reflects a

Marxist utopia. "It is the mechanics of this imaginary and

imaginative Revolution that partake of Utopia: it supposes men thoroughly conscious of their . . . miseries, men capable

of thinking the entire gamut of social and socialist

reality."19 Virtually, the masses are unconscious of their

social status. As it is shown in Masse Mensch, they only

know how to destroy the existing system, but care little

about the new world to be built. It is the bourgeois

intellectual, the Woman, who projects an ideal for the

future, i.e. a community in the form of Gemeinschaft.

However, this ideal reflects another aspect of the Marxist

18 Toller, Masse Mensch, 84,85.

19 Rubel, 195. 198

utopia articulated by the Nameless One: "Bedenken Sie:

aufhort das Elend!/Bedenken Sie: Verbrechen werden

Marchen,/An Morgenhorizonten leuchtet Freiheit aller

Volker!"20 Ironically, this dream is itself a fairy tale. In order to realize the dream: "Verbrechen werden Marchen," the

Nameless One has to initiate revolution which commits a horrible crime: killing many people.

According to Marx, "communist consciousness" is supposed to "emanate" from the dispossessed masses, not at all from an intellectual elite. As a class prepared for organized struggle, the workers must not commit their initiative to the hands of a corporate elite that claims to prescribe and guide their social and political action.21 No doubt, bourgeois intellectuals do play a role in the workers' movement; however, they cannot become communists prior to reaching the level of revolutionary consciousness which is that of the enslaved workers.

The Woman in Masse Mensch cannot be accepted by the masses due to her lack of political consciousness and understanding of the workers. Therein lies the paradox of the worker's movement. The masses need to be enlightened by

20Toller, Masses Mensch, 86.

21 Marx and Engels emphasize in the Manifest der kommunistischen Partei that the proletariat should take over the political power from their oppressors by themselves. See Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, 474. 199

the bourgeois intellectuals who, however, cannot identify themselves with the masses and therefore have to be rejected by them. Here, the contradiction between the two goods, the

ideal of the compassionate intellectual and the demand of the revolutionary masses, does not end in equal annihilation

(of the irrational) and preservation (of the rational). The

intellectual' s ideal has to yield to the demand of the m a s s e s .

In his theory of revolution, Marx grafts the utopia onto the actual daily struggle and formulates a dialectical clue to the proletarian revolution: "let the workers will and make their revolution, and they shall get socialism in the bargain."22 In other words, the workers have to become conscious of their alienation (a Hegelian term) in order to become capable both of destroying capitalism and building the utopia - a classless and stateless society. This utopian society is the goal which the Party in Die MaXnahme strives f o r .

In this play, Brecht applies the Marxist dialectics 23 to construct a model of world proletarian revolution. The workers' sufferings and their demands for better living and working conditions are the thesis. This generates the contradiction - antithesis - which is represetented by the

22 Rubel, 195.

23Marx formulates his materialism as a "scientific" system because of the dialectics borrowed from Hegel. 200

relationships between the workers and the their oppressors.

The old relationships must be overcome (movement of contradiction) and replaced by new ones (synthesis). By presenting the exact Marxist formula mentioned above, i.e.

let the workers make their own revolution (the contradiction develops by itself), Brecht intends to show how the revolutionary movement develops in the way of the dialectical triads.

According to Marx, the workers, in appointing their own political spokesmen, voice their will to upset the existing order from within-or depending on circumstances-from outside the established institutions. The proletariat constitutes itself into a class and, consequently, into a political party,24 showing thereby that instead of joining political parties outside their own ranks the workers awake spontaneously and creatively to the consciousness of their selfhood. This is the exact task of the agitators in Die

MaJSnahme to help the workers to reach the consciousness of their selfhood so that they can arise as a whole class to fight for their own fate.

The play shows, however, that this Marxist concept again contains a paradox: it is at the culminating point of their destitution that the workers are presumed to become conscious of the dire necessity of advancing toward a social

24Marx and Engels, Manifest der kommunistischen Partei, 479. 201

rebirth through a total revolution. "A strange 'materialism'

indeed, which envisages such a metamorphosis of the slave

who has been turned into a mere cog of a profit-making

industrial machine."25 The workers' destitution is the

central motivation of the revolutionary act, as well as the

creative force of the new social order. However, the workers must remain destitute in order to be revolutionary. They

start as the initiators of the revolutionary transformation.

But, as they become income-producing wage earners, they turn

out to be objects of the revolution.

Serving as the theoretical basis of the revolutions,

Hegel's philosophy of history (and its descendant - the

Marxist interpretations of history) becomes a victim of his own theory of tragedy in the discussed dramas of revolution.

The revolutionary theories of engineering history assume the role of the Weltgeist itself. The realization of the

Weltgeist entails anti-humanist actions. The revolutionary humanists have to sacrifice human lives as concrete and brutal means for the sake of a merely theoretical end. St.

Just's claims: "Soil eine Idee nicht eben so gut wie ein

Gesetz der Physik vernichten diirfen, was sich ihr widersetzt?" (11,7) In this sense -- in the hubris of the equation of revolutionary theory and Weltgeist -- the

Hegelian philosophy of history unveils its own tragic

25 Rubel, 196. 202

structure which, in turn, can be desribed by Hegel's theory

of tragedy.

Interpreted as a prescription for revolutionary

dialectics (as it is by the heros in the three revolutionary dramas), Hegel's theory of history can be deconstructed by both of his definitions of tragedy. First, it is self-

splitting. This theory can only be a whole as long as it remains abstract. When it is brought into actualization (as the revolutionaries attempt to apply it to their revolutions), the theory splits. The theory's avowed goals contradict the means by which these goals are accomplished.

That is, in the three dramas, the dialectical contradiction of thesis (theory) and antithesis (means) does not bring forth a synthesis of historical telos (end). Rather, in the three plays, the humanist impulse of the revolution falls victim to the practical means of the revolution.

Furthermore, the contradiction between thesis and antithesis as represented in the Hegelian tragic model of collision between two equally justified forces cannot be resolved in synthesis either. In Dantons Tod, the two contradicting sides turn out to be two equally unjustified forces, and in Masse Mensch, the bourgeois intellectual, the

Woman, is onesidedly rejected by the proletarian masses.

Finally, the concrete humanism of the Young Comrade falls victim to the totality of the Leninist theory of world- revolution. 203

The masterplan of historical progress, as it is

executed in different revolutions presented by Buchner,

Toller, and Brecht, indeed fulfills itself in the structure

of tragedy as it is described by Hegel. Thus, Hegel's

philosophy of history encounters its literary

Selbstentzweiung.26

26The Szondian notion of "versohnungslose Selbstentzweiung" not only applies to the analysis of the dramas, it also describes the tragic fate of Hegel1s philosophy of history in the eyes of the three dramatists. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

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