Economic Co-Operation and Elite Complementarity in the Nest Indies
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*David R. VILA-VILLLT. Civ CARIBBEAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION-19th ANNUAL C NFERF4CE (May 94) Economic Co-operation and Elite Complementarity in the Nest Indies. Paper by David R. DAVILA•VILLERS, UDLA-Pueula. Throughout the 70's, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago represented around 80% of CARICOM's GDP, according to Caribbean Development Bank figures, and there WJ:kE a genuj.ne equilibrium of power amongst the four most developed countries. All of them seemed to have learned to comply with multilateral rule, and accordingly Caribbean co-operation prospered inasmuch it prevailed a consensus around the "development ideology". C11 The dominant political thrust in the Caribbean (J,t• tat' Manigat called a "m6nage A quatre" involving Castro (Cuba), Michael Manley (Ja(raica), Forbes Burnham (Guyana) and Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago) in joint communiques and positions in the Non-A1igned Movemen Conference (Algiers 1973), and the awarding of the Order Jose Marti to the Guyanese and Jamaican leaders; Wlliams receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of Havana insteadin 1975. .Indeed, Forbes Burnham has been quoted saying that Caribbean integration was "the dream Michael, Errol and I shared when we were radical undergraduates the heart of imperialist London". i"".1 All four CARICON states (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad •.f] Tohgo) sJ. multaneously established diplomatic relons *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS* 1972. C3} It may be asserted, however, that Caribbean Socialism was far from being dominant or even uniform across the region. Jamaica .- In relation to the Manley's version of socialism, for instance, Payne and Sutton have concluded:. Manley never intended to lead Jamaica down this Esocialistl path, knowing how unrealistic an option it was in the circumstances in which he had to work, but some of his language and some of )is policies nevertheless suggested that this was his goal, thereby bringing upon his government the wave of opposition one would expect. (4) Consequently, the authors say: In the last analysis the [Jamaican3 relationship with Cuba (which in concrete terms produced only minor technical assistance) was not worth the opposition it engendered in the United States. (53 Jamaica was elected chairman of the Group of Seventy-seven at UNCTAD IV in Nairobi May 1976 (during the years of debate on a New International Economic Order); subsequently, as the leader of the Commonwealth Caribbean, she provided an interesting example of the capacity of small developing states to influence and shape contemporary diplomacy and to *David R. DAVILA—VILLERS* make significant contributions to the dialogue on change in the international economic system. Also during the Manley years, that is between 1972 and 1980, Jamaica established relations with a large number of countries around the world, but the "socialist connection" became evident to the US considering that there were too many "socialist" countries in Jamaica's list of diplomatic missions abroad: the People's Republic of China, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Guinea, Iraq, Algeria, Hungary, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, Lybia, Dulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Mozambique, the People's Republic of Congo, and the People's Republic of Yemen. C63 Ey_ all standards this "socialist connection" was a daring, stance to adopt during the seyenties sup_frpower competitic.a and even more for a small dependent country closely located to the US. And this regardless of whetner Manlqy was a "sincere" socialist or not. In the closing days of the Ford Administration, Washington portrayed Manley's Jamaica as a pawn of the Soviet Union and Cuba, and Kissinger had become almost manic about getting rid Cif Manley. f71 An estimated 000 people lost their lives in political violence during the 19E30 elections. After that. the new r.)-(im *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS* minister, Edward Seaga, of the conservative Jamaica Labour Party, was quick to cut off relations with Cuba and reinforce its relations with the US government instead. guyana In Guyana, the socialist thrust was more pronounced. After declaring Guyana a Co-operative Socialist Republic in 1970, the government nationalized a considerable number of industr ies, the main producing sectors, the import trade, and significant sections of the distribution, communications and public transport sectors. By 1976, when the sugar industry was fully nationalized, the gsivernment victoriously claimed that it now owned and controlled 80% of the econow , . C81 Guyana's commitment with socialist ideals led her not only to establish diplomatic relations with a wide range of socialist countries, as neighbouring Jamaica did (adding Yugoslavia and Romania to the list), but to assist Cuba in ferrying troops to Angola in 1975. f91 As lefty as it may have been during the seventies, Burnham's leadership was later perceived in the US as the lesser of two evils, the opposition having being far more radical and committed to socialism than his ruling People's National Congress might be. SinCe the early eighties, Guyana accepted the terms of the international financial institutions (the World Bank first, by mid-1982, and later the IMF, in 1980 providing for the reprivatization of the economy, a stronger representation of business in *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS* public affairs and the enforcement of stringent austerity measures. C101 Trinidad and Tobago .- In Trinidad & Tobago, the 70's brought about not socialism but the strengthening of Eric Williams' presidential Estwer. Dr Williams remained there since he won the first elections ever held, in 1956. After having led Trinidad & Tobago tiD. independence in 1962, he continued to rule over the country almost singlehandecily until he died in 1981. Williams, first a supporter of CARICOM during the Seventies, came to be seen, later on, as one of the main obstacles to further co- operation in the region, particularly after 1975. (11I Barbados .- Under Errol Barrows' government, Barbados followed a sort "developmental ism" as its main foreign policy goal, somehow coincided with the other big countries' e2:21s. Although it is considered' one of the most developed countries of the English speaking Caribbean, Barbados relies heavily on multiple accreditation, within which the dominant links are with the United States and Western Europe. Accordingly, her influence is more felt at a regional level, and particularly in relation to the smaller Caribbean states as we will see, rather than at the extra-regional one. In subsequent elections (i.e. those held in 1976 and 1981) the right wing Barbados Labour Party (Tom Adams) defeated Barrow, whose *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS* political party succeeded, nevertheless, to return to power in 1907. Grenada .- As far as Grenada is concerned, the self proclaimed main purpose of her socialist revolution was "the struggle against dependency in its three dimensions: the structural, the externally directed and the psychological". f121 From 1979 (when Bishop ousted Eric Gairy) to 1983, the qovernment expanded state ownership over the ecOnomy, but always emphasized that it wanted a Tix!EL w]ith_ elements of public, cooperative and private ownerhip, and indeed allowed the private sector to grow. f13) We can only speculate about whether Bernard Coard, the hard liner who murdered Maurice Bishop, was going to follow a more radical course than Bishop himself or not; because the US invaded Grenada in 1903. In any case we should not be misled by the small size of the coUntries where Caribbean is a occurred or the ideological subtleties which surrounded it. The important thing to take into account is the perceotion that both internal and external actors did have of the process (For instance, Caribbean socialism as part of a larger movement threatening US control over the region). Seen in this perspective, the "emulation effect" ("if Grenada can do it, then everyone can") acquired new rel ev iiri:Cr ior *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS* US, which came to consider Grenadian socialism, part of a pre-conceived Communist strategy. CARICOM AND GRENADA. As we have seen, CARICOM began as a co-operation system whose main inspiration was the Commonwealth Caribbean socialism (Jamaica's Manley and Burnham's Guyana) which managed ti:: attract the sympathy of the more conservative Eric Williams of Trinidad and Tobago. After this "left wing wave" ebbed at the end of the seventies. another one of pro-US regimes emeiged in the islands. The ,.5trong influence of th,. hebemonic power on this co-operation process has already been introduced, but the invasion of Grenada shall make it stand out in clear relief. "Socialist" co-operation in the Caribbean, as we will see, prompted a very strong US reac;:ion. Grenada and the right wing .- The 1930 victory in Jamaica Of Edward Seaga over Michael Manley was perhaps the single most important event, but was reinforced in 1981 by the return to power of Tom 1 2idams in Barbados, the reinstatement of Vere Bird as Prime Miniter in f.:ntigu and John Cotio Lon in St Lucia, and in cd Eugenia Charles as Prime Minister of Dominica. (14) In an electoral sense, this was a movement from left to right. So, when Maurice Bishopled a successful coup against 17jrnad Eric ► airy in March 1079, he took by surpris(,:. a *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS* Community which was on its way to the right, as can be seen in the following table. TABLE 15 Caribbean Elections, December 1979-November 198(_1 Election Date Territory Winning Party ' Head of Government Dec 5,1979 St Vincent Labor Party Milton Cat: 1/t'3 seats) Kitts-M Peoples'sKenneuy Action Nov. 5/9 seats Apr 27,1900 Antigua Labor party Ve•e Bird 13/17 seats Jul 21,1980 Dominica Dominican Eugenia Charles Freedom party 17/21 seats Oct 30,1980 Jamaica Jamaican Edward Seaga Labor party 51/60 seats Source: Heine & Manigat. Op (it p 55. (*) "Labor" and conservative are frequently synonymous in the Caribbean.