*David R. VILA-VILLLT. Civ
CARIBBEAN STUDIES ASSOCIATION-19th ANNUAL C NFERF4CE (May 94)
Economic Co-operation and Elite Complementarity in the Nest
Indies. Paper by David R. DAVILA•VILLERS, UDLA-Pueula.
Throughout the 70's, Jamaica and Trinidad & Tobago represented around 80% of CARICOM's GDP, according to
Caribbean Development Bank figures, and there WJ:kE a genuj.ne equilibrium of power amongst the four most developed countries. All of them seemed to have learned to comply with multilateral rule, and accordingly Caribbean co-operation prospered inasmuch it prevailed a consensus around the
"development ideology". C11
The dominant political thrust in the Caribbean (J,t• tat'
Manigat called a "m6nage A quatre" involving
Castro (Cuba), Michael Manley (Ja(raica), Forbes Burnham
(Guyana) and Eric Williams (Trinidad and Tobago) in joint communiques and positions in the Non-A1igned Movemen
Conference (Algiers 1973), and the awarding of the Order
Jose Marti to the Guyanese and Jamaican leaders; Wlliams receiving an honorary doctorate from the University of Havana insteadin 1975. .Indeed, Forbes Burnham has been quoted saying that Caribbean integration was "the dream Michael,
Errol and I shared when we were radical undergraduates the heart of imperialist London". i"".1 All four CARICON states (Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad •.f] Tohgo) sJ. multaneously established diplomatic relons *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
1972. C3} It may be asserted, however, that Caribbean
Socialism was far from being dominant or even uniform across
the region.
Jamaica .-
In relation to the Manley's version of socialism, for
instance, Payne and Sutton have concluded:.
Manley never intended to lead Jamaica down this
Esocialistl path, knowing how unrealistic an option it was
in the circumstances in which he had to work, but some of
his language and some of )is policies nevertheless
suggested that this was his goal, thereby bringing upon
his government the wave of opposition one would expect. (4)
Consequently, the authors say:
In the last analysis the [Jamaican3 relationship with Cuba
(which in concrete terms produced only minor technical
assistance) was not worth the opposition it engendered in
the United States. (53
Jamaica was elected chairman of the Group of Seventy-seven at
UNCTAD IV in Nairobi May 1976 (during the years of debate on a New International Economic Order); subsequently, as the leader of the Commonwealth Caribbean, she provided an interesting example of the capacity of small developing states to influence and shape contemporary diplomacy and to *David R. DAVILA—VILLERS*
make significant contributions to the dialogue on change in
the international economic system.
Also during the Manley years, that is between 1972 and 1980,
Jamaica established relations with a large number of
countries around the world, but the "socialist connection"
became evident to the US considering that there were too many
"socialist" countries in Jamaica's list of diplomatic
missions abroad: the People's Republic of China, Cuba, the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Guinea, Iraq, Algeria,
Hungary, the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, Lybia,
Dulgaria, the German Democratic Republic, Mozambique, the
People's Republic of Congo, and the People's Republic of
Yemen. C63 Ey_ all standards this "socialist connection" was
a daring, stance to adopt during the seyenties sup_frpower competitic.a and even more for a small dependent country closely located to the US. And this regardless of whetner
Manlqy was a "sincere" socialist or not.
In the closing days of the Ford Administration, Washington portrayed Manley's Jamaica as a pawn of the Soviet Union and
Cuba, and
Kissinger had become almost manic about getting rid Cif
Manley. f71
An estimated 000 people lost their lives in political violence during the 19E30 elections. After that. the new r.)-(im *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
minister, Edward Seaga, of the conservative Jamaica Labour
Party, was quick to cut off relations with Cuba and reinforce
its relations with the US government instead.
guyana
In Guyana, the socialist thrust was more pronounced. After
declaring Guyana a Co-operative Socialist Republic in 1970,
the government nationalized a considerable number of
industr ies, the main producing sectors, the import trade, and
significant sections of the distribution, communications and
public transport sectors. By 1976, when the sugar industry
was fully nationalized, the gsivernment victoriously claimed
that it now owned and controlled 80% of the econow , . C81
Guyana's commitment with socialist ideals led her not only to
establish diplomatic relations with a wide range of socialist
countries, as neighbouring Jamaica did (adding Yugoslavia and
Romania to the list), but to assist Cuba in ferrying troops to Angola in 1975. f91 As lefty as it may have been during the seventies, Burnham's leadership was later perceived in the US as the lesser of two evils, the opposition having being far more radical and committed to socialism than his ruling People's National Congress might be. SinCe the early eighties, Guyana accepted the terms of the international financial institutions (the World Bank first, by mid-1982, and later the IMF, in 1980 providing for the reprivatization of the economy, a stronger representation of business in *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
public affairs and the enforcement of stringent austerity
measures. C101
Trinidad and Tobago .-
In Trinidad & Tobago, the 70's brought about not socialism
but the strengthening of Eric Williams' presidential Estwer.
Dr Williams remained there since he won the first elections
ever held, in 1956. After having led Trinidad & Tobago tiD.
independence in 1962, he continued to rule over the country
almost singlehandecily until he died in 1981. Williams, first
a supporter of CARICOM during the Seventies, came to be seen,
later on, as one of the main obstacles to further co-
operation in the region, particularly after 1975. (11I
Barbados .-
Under Errol Barrows' government, Barbados followed a sort
"developmental ism" as its main foreign policy goal, somehow coincided with the other big countries' e2:21s.
Although it is considered' one of the most developed countries of the English speaking Caribbean, Barbados relies heavily on multiple accreditation, within which the dominant links are with the United States and Western Europe. Accordingly, her influence is more felt at a regional level, and particularly in relation to the smaller Caribbean states as we will see, rather than at the extra-regional one. In subsequent elections (i.e. those held in 1976 and 1981) the right wing
Barbados Labour Party (Tom Adams) defeated Barrow, whose *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
political party succeeded, nevertheless, to return to power
in 1907.
Grenada .-
As far as Grenada is concerned, the self proclaimed main
purpose of her socialist revolution was "the struggle against
dependency in its three dimensions: the structural, the
externally directed and the psychological". f121
From 1979 (when Bishop ousted Eric Gairy) to 1983, the
qovernment expanded state ownership over the ecOnomy, but
always emphasized that it wanted a Tix!EL w]ith_
elements of public, cooperative and private ownerhip, and
indeed allowed the private sector to grow. f13)
We can only speculate about whether Bernard Coard, the hard liner who murdered Maurice Bishop, was going to follow a more radical course than Bishop himself or not; because the US invaded Grenada in 1903. In any case we should not be misled by the small size of the coUntries where Caribbean is a occurred or the ideological subtleties which surrounded it.
The important thing to take into account is the perceotion that both internal and external actors did have of the process (For instance, Caribbean socialism as part of a larger movement threatening US control over the region).
Seen in this perspective, the "emulation effect" ("if Grenada can do it, then everyone can") acquired new rel ev iiri:Cr ior *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
US, which came to consider Grenadian socialism, part of a
pre-conceived Communist strategy.
CARICOM AND GRENADA.
As we have seen, CARICOM began as a co-operation system whose
main inspiration was the Commonwealth Caribbean socialism
(Jamaica's Manley and Burnham's Guyana) which managed ti::
attract the sympathy of the more conservative Eric Williams
of Trinidad and Tobago. After this "left wing wave" ebbed at
the end of the seventies. another one of pro-US regimes
emeiged in the islands. The ,.5trong influence of th,.
hebemonic power on this co-operation process has already been
introduced, but the invasion of Grenada shall make it stand
out in clear relief. "Socialist" co-operation in the
Caribbean, as we will see, prompted a very strong US
reac;:ion.
Grenada and the right wing .-
The 1930 victory in Jamaica Of Edward Seaga over Michael
Manley was perhaps the single most important event, but was reinforced in 1981 by the return to power of Tom 1 2idams in
Barbados, the reinstatement of Vere Bird as Prime Miniter in f.:ntigu and John Cotio Lon in St Lucia, and in cd
Eugenia Charles as Prime Minister of Dominica. (14) In an electoral sense, this was a movement from left to right. So, when Maurice Bishopled a successful coup against 17jrnad
Eric ► airy in March 1079, he took by surpris(,:. a *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
Community which was on its way to the right, as can be seen
in the following table.
TABLE 15 Caribbean Elections, December 1979-November 198(_1
Election Date Territory Winning Party ' Head of Government
Dec 5,1979 St Vincent Labor Party Milton Cat: 1/t'3 seats) Kitts-M Peoples'sKenneuy Action Nov. 5/9 seats Apr 27,1900 Antigua Labor party Ve•e Bird 13/17 seats Jul 21,1980 Dominica Dominican Eugenia Charles Freedom party 17/21 seats Oct 30,1980 Jamaica Jamaican Edward Seaga Labor party 51/60 seats
Source: Heine & Manigat. Op (it p 55. (*) "Labor" and conservative are frequently synonymous in the Caribbean. 11/13 means 11 out of 13 seats.
Mniey, in power, weicol6ed 1:1!
revolution, and so did Forbes Burnham from Guyana. Tfinidad
and Tobago preferred to assume a "neutral" position, E,nd
Barbados opposed the new regime. WISA countries not only
,_laJellined the revolution and refused fOCc:HjniT government, but proposed the creation of a police force to stamp out revolutionary insurrection in other islands.
The isolation of Grenada was further aQravated th
People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada accued Burnhafil of complicity in the murder of the Guyanese left wing leader
Walter Rodney, and by Trinidad's refusal ti: have a dialogue with the government of Maurice Bishop.
Finally, the Caribbean Right wingers received a powerful *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
helping hand when Ronald Reagan went on a "working holiday"
to the Commonwealth Caribbean. While in Jamaica, the t.J
presidenL backed thE ,Jeacla government whilst attacking Cuba
by the same token. In Barbados, he invited the leaders of
Antigua, Dominica, St Kitts and.Nevis, and St Vincent,
deliberately excluding Grenada, St Lucia, and Trinidad and
Tobago, which under Georges Chambers (Williams died in 1931)
had tried to re-open channels with Grenada. C15.1
When in October 1933 Bishop's blood was spilt by the group of
Bernard Cc'ard, Grenada's isolation was complete. Even Fidel
Castro issued a strong condemnation of the new regime, and
Manley pledged publicly to seek the expulsion of Coard's
party from the Socialist International. .C16•
of CARICOMf.pcialism does no- ully oi
the crisis of Caribbean co-operation. f n addition to that,
and given the personalistic leadership of the Caribbean
political culture and conduct of foreign affairs, rivalries
:and jealousie amongt their leader ,.3 FA .;-ongly the
organization progress. There were only two summits of -
CARICOM leaders during 1973-75, and none between 1975 and
1982, in strong contrast with the 13 that were held between
19C;2 and 1975.
The succession of Trinidad's Eric Williams, who died on 29
h *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
made possible the re-launching of CARICOM summits. At that
occasion, one of the founders of the movement, Guyana's
Forbes Burnham, had the opportunity to meet the new
generation of leaders of Barbados, Grenada and Jamaica.
A ::uwciit ,4.1 then kr-inounced for 1922.
The summit was held on 15-16 November 1982 in jamaica,
irrounded by quit* different political environment. f.) , 1
Ronald Reagan's visit had preceded the summit, CARTOON
leaders found themselves discussing, as never before, "Free
Elections" and "Human Rights". However, an of
communique on these subjects prepared by Barbados' Tom Adam
and supported by Jamaica's Seaga, and Dominica's Charles, .., withdrawn due to the opposition of Bishop (Grenada), ChamberF:L
(Trinidad), and Bird (Antigua). This pre-empted the split over the invasion of Grenada in 1903, but the summit also showed a strong will to prevent the stagnation of the integration process as a result of these ideological divisions.
Security', whose security ? .-
Some authors have argued that because of their size, Jo-.)d geopolitical local, CARTOON countries have to trust extrniiii power for their iiecurity,
The invitation extended to the US and not to Britain despite the colonial status of several islands) to intervne in *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
Grenada sharply marks a geopolitical reality: the US is, by
far, the dominant actor in the region. Its military
presence in the region is unmatched .by any other Western
country. However, Britain and Canada are admittedly now
playing an important role in the creation of the Regional
Decurity r- c: ,,And the police and coastguardE of the
reclion, respectively. The participation of these two
countries, however minor, significantly contributes to
diversify CARICOM's sources of military assistance. US
military assistance to the Caribbean is shown in the
following table with data for the Fiscal Year 1986, in
thousands of dollars.
TABLE 16
US MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE CARIBBEAN (000 DOLLARS)
COUNTRY FMS MAP IMET IMET students Jamaica 9079 7656 295 59 Guyana - - - - T & T 50 10 Barbados 355 1097 69 15 Grenada 591 • 546 75 10 A & Barbuda 651 1813 45 10 Dominica 548 336 46 10 St Kitts-N 308 408 27 8 Lucia 285 241 40 13 St Vincent 4632 2627 51 12 Dahama .... - 46 29 Belize 524 479 72 23 ------FMS= Foreign Military Sales. MAP=Military Assistance Program. IMET=International Military Education and Training Program.
Source: Braveboy-Wagner cit. with data from US Department of Defense, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance. Facts as of September 30, 1906 (Washington DC.: Data Management Division, Comptroller, DSSA,1986).
Also of .significance are the US •commercial exports under the
11 *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
Arms Exports Act in 1986, especially for Bahamas, 5 083
thousand of US dollars; Jamaica, 206; Trinidad and Tobago,
182, .and Belize, 181.
With regards to the Regional Security System, it has been
funded largely by Barbados from its beginnings on November
10E32. Since then, she has contributed 49 percent of the
funding, whilst the rest is divided equally amongst the other
islands. More recently,, however, it has been observed that
Barbados' participation in the Regional Security System (RSS)
is rather uneven. She particularly began to show a limited
enthusiasm in the RSS as soon as Errol Barrow took office on
4 June. 1936. The System is still financed by the United
States. 0171
Whilst CARICOM as a whole was deeply divided by the Grenada affair, the OECS emerged as a solid bloc within the former, reinforced by its joint position on a very delicate issue, albeit strongly criticized for their subservience to the
United States. Besides co-operating for the Regional
Security System (with US assistance), they are currently moving towards closer political union, indeed endeavouring to create a single state. They already have a common currency, the Eastern Caribbean dollar, and are often represented by joint diplomatic missions (which is an imperative of smallness, as well Four of the seven OECS states, the so- called Windward Islands: Dominica, Grenada, St Lucia and St *David R. DAVILA - VILLERS*
Vincent are currently deciding the terms of their political
union. (18)
After the right wing wave .-
In. line with the other two regions of co-operation in Latin
America so far studied, the Caribbean right wing wave began
to ebb away during the middle of the Eighties.
In 1986 both Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago changed
governments: In the first instance, a less openly pro-US
government was installed; in the second, a rather pro-West government, which was subsequently defeated in 1991. Guyana's
foreign (and domestic) policy after Burnham was still in the process of re-definition in the late 1980s. President
Desmond Hoyte called elections to be held at the end of 1991, which were protracted several times. And in Jamaica, Manley returned to power in 1900, and pursued a more moderate foreign policy than before. He resigned in mid-March 1992, but his party remained in power. *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
EUROPEAN HEGEMONY OR US HEGEMONY
(CARICOM, between Lome and the C. B. I. )
For countries such as Trinidad and Tobago, Jamaica and
Barbados, the US has emerged as the most important single
export market in recent times. For instance, the share of
Jamaica's e:,,pocts going to the UK fell from about :-A"/. in 1'1)60
to 13% in 1904. With respect to imports, the US, with its
diversified production structure, has grown increasingly
important as a source of supply. At one extreme it provides
The Bahamas with over 75% of its import requirements while at
the other extreme only about 20% of Guyana's imports have
been originating in that market in recent years, which
is only slightly less than that of the early 1960s.
A comprehensive review shows that, nowadays, most
Commonwealth Caribbean countries procure over 30% (and a few of them over 45%) of their import requirements from the US market, compared to less than 20%, in most cases, during the early 1960s.
The proportion of OEC:S countries' exports going to the UK has also tended to fall, though less sharply than that of the most: developed territories. And that also applies to the relative weight of the UK as their main Source of supply.
Conversely, the US is second only to the UK as a market for
OECS countries, as Britain continues to buy their major *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
agricultural exports under special arrangements.
CARICOM a group of small Englih nation,
the Anglophone dimension will continue to loom large with
countries such as the US, the UK and Canada. But insofar as
Britain's relations with the EC gain increased relc so
will concessionary EC arrangements, especially the Lome
Convention. The US on its side Ilas devised the Caribbean
Basin Initiative as the legal framework tc' administer
assistance to the region. So, it would appear that the
supply of this hegemonic good tc' the Caribbean should depend
more en multilateral rather than on bilateral arrangements.
Caribbean countries have obtained, in the past, 202.4 million
LCU under Lome I (17% of the 2WJ7.2m total, doL.ntn,,
running costs of the Commission delegations in the ACP
countries), and 318.8 million ECU under Lome II (which is
5.2% of the Lome II 5530m ECU total figure). 1-.19• Lome III
provided for a total financial package of 8500 m::11ion ECU
the.EC is a very important provider of the hegemonic
good to the Caribbean).
The •DI 'covolve ,..:: around a programme of tr!ade, economic assistance and to measures intended to help the economic recovery of Caribbean Basin countries. Unlike the Lome
Convention, the CBI is not a negotiated agreement. It is
one-ay conctsni,i'l trade are, whch *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
tax incentives, interntional, financial and military
assistari':e, plus technical assistance and training. Finally,
as it was originally. conceived (an important change in this
respect has been recently announced as we will see), the CBI
encouraged bilateral agreements, which ran against the
integration movement in the Caribbean. In other words, the
Inititive did not remotely match up to the econo probieiiis
faced by either the Commonwealth Caribbean region in
particular. or the Dasin as a whole. .11, the progrmme
seems to have been oriented to "assist" certain Central
American countries.
A major obstacle to the resumption of growth in the so - called
Third World countries is the extern1 (1:,:bt. The structure ot
the external debt of underdeveloped countries has underdone a
remarkable change in recent years. In 1970 official creditors '
held 68% of the 1ong - term debt outstanding as compared to 32%
for private crcLI.i.tors. Dy 1904 •the forfflar's share had dropped
to 42%, while the latter's had increased to 587... (20)
As with the rest of the Third World, the English Speaking
1... Aribbean is indebted. but although quantit,:ittively scw:tiler, the debt has had a greater impact on the Less Developed
, :...cicL:: f Lhe r. gion, whore it haE, grown AL. JA fc, , c p._, than the GDP.
The Debt has had two main effects that are important for our study. On the one hand, it hampers economic recovey and *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
- hu furthor c;:o-operation in the Caribben. On tho otheen it
adds to the dependence of the Caribbean economies on the US
money market on US supply of this hegemonic
The region is almost. completely a US dollar zone. All
CARICOM countries, with the exception of Guyana and Jamaica,
are at present pegged to the US dollar. By pegging to a major
curr -1c.:y, it is worth recalling, a country deprives itself of
control over the effective exchange rates of its own currency
vis-a7vis others. C211 Furthermore, the US Dollar and not a
European currency will be used to settle cross-border
payments when the Caribbean regional stoc4< exchange begins to
work (the agreement was reached in early April 1991 following
a decision taken during the Jamaica Summit: 31 July-2 August
1990), initially. involving Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and
Jamaica, the only CARICOM countries with existing stock
exchanges.
ao., :taking, ir.117.o consideration factors such as trad(2., economic
n t i Sri t r) t 1 :L t ion r inan
flows4._ and emigration I can onli conclude that
CORICOM is nowadays more dtpendent on the US, as a provider
hegymonic goods, than on the pK, i tLe FC Ds. D. v[:).2,
This dependence on the most important Lnglish speaking country in the world does not solve but compli:cates CARICOM's dilemmas. Because whilst it is true that the US (unlike th;::
17 *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
a unitary actor in world politics and is currently
undertaking the creation of a continental free trade area, it
is also true, on the other hand, that the US is aiming
towards a Free Trade Area with Canada and Mexico.
The formation of a free trade one between the United States
Canada and Mexico is likely to deprive the West Indies of
foreign direct investments. This could complicate
CARICOM's plans.
Put in succinct terms, CARICOM is progressively becoming part
of the US sphere of hegemony (in spite of the relative
generosity of the Lome agreements). The EC (more than the UK
as such), however, remains a most important provider of
hegemonic goods to the region.
CONCLUSIONS
Co-operation and underdevelopment are not mutuall .y. exclusiye.
Thu_ have always co-existed in the Caribbean. And this is so
the countries are not only relatively symmetrical
(OECS countries are very cohesive), contiguous and inter- dependent, but because they share language, culture and history. And because they seem to have an internal balance of power and their elites have reached consensus anew.
nut in the absence of a "favourable external environment"
(i.e.: a stable provision of hegemonic goods), internal pre- conditions will never be good enough to secure the steady *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
L! k ' Ct I I; .". k..7.kr) 1.: fri .:;:k 1. k ck
Who can provide such hegemonic goods ? In the past, the
MDCs seemed able and willing to provide the rest of the
countries with oil (particularly Trinidad and Tobago, before
Venezuela and Mexico begun to deliver them oil at lower
pricei), markets and probably some finance. Dut this
provision was never sufficient and certainly not constant.
External lupplv of hegemonic goods might well c2f.Dinci from
several sources; two of them, however, are truly relevant.
Those are thq European and the Onit•d .;3ta t....f2s.. The
EC, through the Lomb Convention agreements, is currently
providing markets and finance (not enough, the West Indians
say), and two Commonwealth countries (the UK, together with
‘,/ C 221 (..r3
with finance and markets through the Caribbean Dasin
Initiative, which may be superseded by the Enterprise for the
the EC now devoting most of its .r. Duie‘:, to LoM
completing its internal market and re-integrating Eastern
Europe to the West, and this could be detrimental for the
Caribbean. The same can be said about the projected North
American Free Trade Area with Canada and Mexico. It may be
asserted, however, as experience has shown, that limited
capital inflows and access to markets (short of a complete *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
suspension) can affect the progress of Caribbean co-•
operation, but not its very existence. In other terms, co
• tior)
supe,rpcwers. It is an indigenous effort whose success
depends on an adequate external environment.
eace developirient and scict..()Th: as in the two other Lases I
have studied in this paper, cause the West Indies to co-
reaceand security acquired relevance during mid-
80s when the US chose Grenada to show that it could
effectively destioy co operation endeavours in its own area
I: in
J. deological or i ont at ion) . t231 As far as development is con ,.7err, it cannot be proved beyond reasonable doubt that
CARICOM alone can fully provide for it. Jithout
however, development♦ would certainly be 1. -Ar ItlorQ difficult to attain. -*David P. DAVILA -VILLERS*
T. Payne, Anthony. "Rai ,...7,e and Decadence of Caribbean Regionalization" in Journal of Common Market Studies, Ho '.-.
> Ibidem. p 273. Other Caribbean (union) leaders like Grantley •Adams of Barbados and T A Marryshow c Grenada
fa ,foured a c: c ":::union of former Driti7h colonies. ";Je is no hope for the West Indie they become commonwealth". See Darcy, Tom, Deth Wood and Deb Preusch. The other side of paradise. Foreign control in the Caribbean. New York, Grove Presf....,.. 19S4. p 62.
•3) See Demas, Williams G. "Consolidating our independence the major challenge for the West Inclierz" ip TNAL. of LatiPoamt, Ouenos Aires. Octobf.-.. 0 24. The 77:a hl Grenada and St Lucia established relations with Cuba soon after, following the big four. Guyana had previousiv established relations with the Soyiot Union LL'. PD70, did Jamaica and Trinidad Tobago in 1975.
Anthony and Paul Sutt::., n. Dependency Updv...c Challenge. UK, Manchester University p
Braveboy -Wagner, Jacqueline A. Op cit. p I(:)6 -107. Al ,.ao illustrative of Manley's diplomacy was the fact that PinocH:..t
C7.1. Larry Dirn of the Council of Hemiisphoric in "Jamaica," MacNeil/Lehrer Report, July 11, 1980; quoted To,o, Doh O•od and Deb Pr ouch. Dp p L . himHLif 1.:hat local con ,i,:c., rvEttiv ,7.7., focc... to 1::hp government and deny him reelection.
Payne, Anthony and Paul Sutton. Op cit p 89 -10.
Draveboy-UnT ...,i...... ,1 .- , Jacqueline A. Op c:t. p
F'f
Trinidad Tobago had been contributing a generow.:., criRTcnm over optil Dr Yllliams got convinced that other memhor ...:..'..;- policies di.icriminated exportE. Ho frustration and declined to corimA.l.
21 KDavid P. DAVILA -VILLERS',,
. a;:ending a Heads of Government Co1' iferen ,...2, with the, result that none took place between 1975 and 1902. Cfr. Sue Rocvn-jones. CARICOM- The Caribbean !...ndon, Foreign and Commonwealth 6/91 1 . 1-1.Ay p
Payne, Anthony And Paul Sutton. Op cit p 122.
Durin 1902 :he private sector enjoyed A 10 "/. growth, higher than the public sector and ::AAbstantially higher than the private sectors in other Caribbean nations. Barry, Tom, Beth Wood and Deb Preusch. 'Op cit. p 309.
j rdy. "f717ernal influences and Stability in the Caribbean" in Bryan, Anthony T, J Edward Greene and Timothy N Shaw. Peace,ea, Development e pmnt and Security in the Caribbean. UK, Macmillan. 1990: p 216. bominica's Patrick John, a supporter of the Grenadian revo fell in June 1979. Conversely, St Lucia's Coffpton ;:lefeal.:ec! in July of the Fame year, the leadership falling in the hands of the Grenada- supportive St Lucia Labour Party. Cfr Payne, Anthony, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike. Grenada, revolution and invaTion. Croom Helm. 1904. p 90 and subs.
Cl53 Payne, Anthony, Paul Sutton and Tony Thorndike. Op Lit, p 96.
<16) Pastor Robert. "The invasion of Grenada: a pre- and pot-mortem" in MacDonald, Scott B, Harald M Sandstrom D (").)., • jr. rh,.! RevolutiOn, and democracy. Praeger. 1980. p 9J.
.n YZ1f7,5 the U9 conducted joint military oxfs:Icie with CAF(CON ;L ,:Am.)tric,.ti7,. James F Mitchell of St Vincent and ::o -Mare PiA .rrow's onj.nion on 1 .);:i2 RSS. Comercio Exterior. Review of the ba(ico Nacion•l de Comercio Exterior (Mexico). April 1986. Cfr Braveboy-Wagner, Jacquel ine. Op cit, I7 56. Errol Barrow di ,.*d on June 1907, his colleague Er ,7kine ".3andifor off± the following day. See Comercio Exterior. Op cit. July 1987.
.r183. Latin American Regional Reports- Caribbean. London, 75 july p 5.
C19) The fact that the figure for Lome I includes the running the Commission delegJAtion in i:1 -10 (::I CP countriu:ii F:tccount c. for Lhe apparent decline of EC fundind to the Caribbean; thi has terao,:;.. The memborh:,p of Lome also increased from 46 states (Lome I), to 57 (Lome II) and 0...cd:(7! III). RA r (•p cit. *David R. DAVILA-VILLERS*
p and footnote number C..
.C203. I CI E? in . j.. 1S5.
of ,Jail: aica uses an auction system that is clasified by the IMF as independently floating. Ramsaran, Ramesh. Op cit. F: 227-220.
The UK and Canada combine 32% of the voting power in the Caribbean Development Bank, against 20.6% for the US and only 13.4% for CARICOM countries (Data of 1982).
Tik hegmonic iole inide the U .7.2. ,phere influence. Thin eventuality would imply that the LC Lhould have a common foreign policy which not the ca.z.:.e, anyway.