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THE PROBLEM OF Edited by MARILYN McCORD ADAMS and ROBERT MERRIHEW ADAMS

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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data The problem ofevil.-(O),ford readings in ). I. Evil 1. Adams, Marilyn McCord II. Adams, Robert Merrihew II1.84 ISBN 0--19-824867-9 ISBN 0-19-824866-0 (Pbk)

Library ofCongress Cataloging in Publication Data The Problem ofevil/edited by Marilyn McCord Adams and Robert Merrihew Adams. p. cm.-(Oxford readings in philosophy) Includes bibliographical references. I. and evil. 2. . I. Adams, Marilyn McCord. lI. Adams, Robert Merrihew. IlI. Series. BJ/401.P76 1990 2I6-dc20 90-34004 ISBN 0-19-824867-9 ISBN 0-19-824866-0 (Pbk.)

Printed and bound in Great Britain by Bookcraft (Bath) Ltd, Midsomer Norton, Avon I EVIL AND OMNIPOTENCE

J. L. MACKIE

traditional arguments for the existence of have been fairly thC)rouglhlycriticised by . But the theologian can, if he wishes, this criticism. He can admit that no rational proofofGod's existence oo:ssltJle. And he can still retain all that is essential to his position, by that God's existence is known in some other, non-rational way. I however, that a more telling criticism can be made by way of the tra,diti:onal . Here it can be shown, not that religious beliefs rational support, but that they are positively irrational, that the several ofthe essential theological doctrine are inconsistent with one another, the theologian can maintain his position as a whole only by a much extreme rejection of reason than in the former case. He must now be prep31red to believe, not merely what cannot be proved, but what can be dis(Jrcwed from other beliefs that he also holds. problem of evil, in the sense in which I shall be using the-phrase, is a prc)bll~m only for someone who that there is a God who is both OI11nir)otl~nt and wholly good. And it is a logical problem, the problem of clarif:ying and reconciling a number of beliefs: it is not a scientific problem might be solved by further observations, or a practical problem that be solved by a decision or an action. These points are obvious; I mention them only because they are sometimes ignored by theologians, sometimes parry a statement of the problem with such remarks as can you solve the problem yourself?' or 'This is a mystery which may revealed to us later' or 'Evil is something to be faced and overcome, not be merely discussed'. In its simplest form the problem is this: God is omnipotent; God is wholly and yet evil exists. There seems to be some contradiction between three propositions, so that if any two of them were true the third be false. But at the same time all three are essential parts of most the:olc)gical positions: the theologian, it seems, at once must adhere and consistently adhere to all three. (The problem does not arise only for

L. Mackie, 'Evil and Omnipotence', first published in Mind, 64 (1955), pp. 200-12. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. 26 J. L. MACKIE EVIL AND OMNIPOTENCE 27 theists, but I shall discuss it in the form in which it presents itself .ga~;onably be suspected of thinking, in other contexts, that his power is ordinary .) unlimited. Those who say that evil is an illusion may also be thinking, However, the contradiction does not arise immediately; to show it that this illusion is itself an evil. Those who say that 'evil' is need some additional premises, or perhaps some quasi-logical rules con­ privation ofgood may also b.e thi~king, inconsistently, that,privatio.n ~f necting the terms 'good', 'evil', and 'omnipotent'. These additional is an evil. (The fallacy here IS akm to some forms of the naturalIstIc are that good is opposed to evil, in such a way that a good thing alway in , where some think, for example, that 'good' is just what eliminates evil as far as it can, and that there are no limits to what a "Arltributes to evolutionary progress, and that evolutionary progress is omnipotent thing can do. From these it follows that a good omnipoten good.) If Pope meant what he said in the first line of his couplet, that thing eliminates evil completely, and then the propositions that a goo 'di:sorder' is only harmony not understood, the 'partial evil' of the second omnipotent thing exists, and that evil exists, are incompatible. must, for consistency, mean 'that which, taken in isolation, falsely to be evil', but it would more naturally mean 'that which, in is61lati1on, really is evil'. The second line, in fact, hesitates between two A. ADEQUATE SOLUTIONS that 'partial evil' isn't really evil, since only the universal quality is and that 'partial evil' is really an evil, but only a little one. addition, therefore, to adequate solutions, we must recognise un­ Now once the problem is fully stated it is clear that it can be solved, in satisfclct<)ry inconsistent solutions, in which there is only a half-hearted or sense that the problem will not arise if one gives up at least one of tenlPC,raI~Y rejection of one of the propositions which together constitute propositions that constitute it. If you are prepared to say that God is problem. In these, one of the constituent propositio~s is explicitly wholly good; or not quite omnipotent, or that evil does not exist, or tej,ect,ed, but it is covertly re-asserted or assumed elsewhere m the system. good is not opposed to the kind of evil that exists, or that there are limits to what an omnipotent thing can do, then the problem of evil will not arise for you. B. FALLACIOUS SOLUTIONS There are, then, quite a number of adequate solutions of the problem of evil, and some of these have been adopted, or almost adopted, by various thinkers. For example, a few have been prepared to deny God'somnipotence, these half-hearted solutions, which explicitly reject but implicitly and rather more have been prepared to keep the term 'omnipotence' but one of the constituent propositions, there are definitely fallacious severely to restrict its meaning, recording quite a number of things that an sol111ti